Midterm Examination Answers for Criminal Law 1

Prof. Adrian Aumentado

Gutierrez | Jomilla | Romero | Valdez | Villaseca

I
“Cambria woke up to see Coheed on top of her, still clothed, and pressing a chemical-soaked cloth to her face. She woke up just in time push him
off her. On trial, Judge House convicted Coheed of attempted rape. Was the judge correct?”

GUTIERREZ: “NO, there was no attempted rape.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony may be committed either by means of “dolo” (with deliberate intent) or “culpa” (negligence).
For there to be an attempted rape, it must be established that first, there is an intent to have carnal knowledge and second, that there are overt acts executed
that will effectuate such intent.

In this case, the act of Coheed in pinning Cambria down and covering her mouth with a wet cloth does not constitute attempted rape because there
were no overt acts to penetrate the vagina of the victim.

Given the circumstances, the situation is an example of an indeterminate offense since there is doubt as to what the offender had intended to do.
Coheed, however, may be liable for grave coercion but nonetheless, he cannot be liable for attempted rape.”

JOMILLA: “NO, Judge House was not correct.

The Supreme Court has ruled that where the perpetrator’s intent to have forceful sexual intercourse is not clearly established, there can be no
conviction for rape. In a case where the woman also woke up with the man on top of her, and pressing a chemical-soaked cloth on her face, the Supreme
Court ruled that the conviction must be for acts of lasciviousness, and not rape.

In this case, the facts are parallel to established jurisprudence. Specific intent to have sexual intercourse cannot be clearly established because the
woman, at the time she woke up, caught the man still fully clothed.

Therefore, the conviction for attempted rape was not correct.”

1
ROMERO: “NO, the judge gave an erroneous decision by convicting the accused of attempted rape.

In the commission of the felony of rape, the accused must possess the intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim which should be manifested
by an overt act showing intent to commit such felony which is lacking.

In the case at bar, the offender, pressing a piece of clothing on her face while holding her down is not consistent with the objective of having carnal
knowledge with the victim, the nature of the act is ambiguous with the objective of rape.

Relying on the given facts of the case, the judge erred in convicting the accused of attempted rape as the offense he committed is ambiguous with
the objective to have carnal knowledge.”

VALDEZ: “NO, Judge House is not correct.

According to Article 6, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does not produce
all the acts of execution which shall produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In this case, the intent of the offender to commit rape is not clear. The intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim is not yet established. Mere
laying on top of the victim, fully clothed, is not an overt act to commit rape. The crime committed is unjust vexation.

Therefore, Coheed cannot be convicted of attempted rape and Judge House was incorrect.”

II
“Angus and Tria are married. Angus went to Japan, met Yui, and got married to her. They returned to the Philippines. Can Angus be convicted of
bigamy in the Philippines?”

GUTIERREZ: “NO, Angus cannot be convicted of bigamy in the Philippines.

According to the Revised Penal Code, the criminal laws of the country can only apply if they are committed within the territorial limits of the country,
subject to the exceptions provided by Article 2 of the said code.

In this case, since the crime of bigamy does not fall under the enumeration of when the Philippines may exercise its extraterritorial application of
laws among its citizens, Angus may not be held liable for bigamy even if he has already returned to the Philippines since the said act was done in Japan and
not the Philippines. Therefore, the act being done outside the territory of the Philippines, Angus cannot be held liable for bigamy.

2
JOMILLA: “NO, Angus CANNOT be convicted of bigamy in the Philippines.

The bigamous marriage was celebrated/consummated abroad. As a general rule, the penal laws of the Philippines do not apply to acts done outside
the Philippines, and the extraterritoriality principle of Article 2 does not apply.

In the case, the marriage may be void, but they cannot be convicted of bigamy, since it was consummated abroad.”

VALDEZ: “NO, Angus cannot be convicted of bigamy.

According to the territorial characteristic of Criminal Law, only crimes committed within the territory of the Philippines are punishable.

Angus committed the crime of bigamy in Japan which is outside the territory of the Philippines.

Therefore, Angus cannot be convicted of bigamy.

VILLASECA: “NO, Angus cannot be convicted of bigamy in the Philippines

Pursuant to the territoriality principle, Philippine laws shall only be enforced within the Philippine territory, except as provided in the treaties and
laws of preferential application and those principle of extraterritoriality mentioned in Article 2 of the RPC.

In this case, since Angus committed bigamy in Japan, our courts cannot assume jurisdiction because of the territoriality principle, furthermore this
case is not enumerated in Article 2 of the RPC.

Hence, Angus cannot be convicted in the Philippines.”

III
Hayaw Maya returned home to find Zaki raping his 20-year-old daughter, Gibli. Upon seeing Hayaw, Zaki ran. Hayaw chased Zaki, and shot &
killed him using a shotgun. Should Hayaw be held criminally liable?”

GUTIERREZ: “YES, Hayaw is criminally liable.

3
 Article 11 paragraph (2) pertains to the defense of relatives. There must be unlawful aggression on the part of the offender who is attacking the
relative, the means used by the person defending must be reasonable in order to prevent or repel the attack, and there must be a lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party, but even if there is, that the person defending had no part therein.

In this case, however, unlawful aggression ceased to exist the moment the rapist has retreated from the area. Hence, the act of Hayaw in chasing
the rapist and killing him does not justify his actions since the element of unlawful aggression is not present.

Hayaw is criminally liable for the death of the rapist.”

JOMILLA: “YES, Hayaw should be held criminally liable.

Art. 247, in case of a daughter, only applies where a man catches his spouse with a paramour, or his daughter, who is a minor, with a seducer. It
does not apply where a man catches his adult daughter being raped. Article 11(2) on the other hand applies only when the unlawful aggression was
continuing at the time of the employment of the means to prevent or repel the aggression.

In this case, Art. 247 does not apply because Gibli (the daughter) is an adult, and Article 11(2) likewise does not apply because any unlawful
aggression from Zaki (the rapist) already ceased when he was shot by Hayaw.

Therefore, Hayaw is criminally liable for killing Zaki.”

ROMERO: “YES, he is criminally liable, as he had not acted in defense of a relative, a descendant to be exact.

Article II par 2 provides that a person is justified if he acted in defense of a relative provided that there is an unlawful aggression, there was a
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel it and that if provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making defense had
no part therein.

In the case at bar, the unlawful aggression ceased when Zaki ran away upon seeing Hayaw, hence the aggression ceased. The act of Hayaw chasing
Zaki constituted a retaliation.

Hayaw is criminally liable for the death of Zaki.”

VALDEZ: “YES, Hayaw is criminally liable.

Article 11(2) states that anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or his relative by affinity of the same degree or those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree provided that the first and second
4
requisite prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked,
that the one making defense has no part therein.

Also, according to the Supreme Court, unlawful aggression ceases when the aggressor leaves the scene.

In this case, Zaki, upon seeing Hayaw, immediately ran and left the scene. Therefore, unlawful aggression on the part of Zaki also ceased. Hayaw
giving chase and killing Zaki with his shotgun cannot be justified under Article 11 par 2.

Hence, Hayaw is criminally liable because there is no defense of relative.”

VILLASECA: “YES, Hayaw is criminally liable.

Pursuant to Article 11(1) of the RPC, in order to be justified, three requisites must concur:
1) Unlawful Aggression;
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3) That the one making defense had no part therein.

In this case, the unlawful aggression already ceased when Zaki ran away; what is being justified in Article 2(2) is an act of self-defense and not
retaliation, unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite to be justified from his criminal act.

Hence, Hayaw is criminally liable.

IV
“Ten Filipinos went to Indonesia. 8 of them conspired to commit sedition. Are they criminally liable under Philippine law?”

GUTIERREZ: “No, they may not be held criminally liable for conspiring to commit sedition.

According to the Revised Penal Code, the criminal laws of the country can apply only if they are committed within the territorial limits, subject to
the exceptions of Article 2 of the said code. Further explained, the Philippines, under paragraph (5) of Article 2 of the RPC states that the Philippines can
exercise its extraterritorial jurisdiction if the crime committed is a violation of national security and the law of nations.

The following are examples of such:

(1) treason,
(2) conspiracy to commit treason,
5
 (3) espionage,
(4) flight to enemy country,
(5) violation of neutrality, and
(6) piracy.
Since the conspiracy to commit sedition is not among those punished under the said enumeration, the Philippines does not acquire jurisdiction
over the conspirators since it took place in a different country, outside of the Philippines’ territorial limits.

Therefore, the Filipinos conspiring to commit sedition in Bali, Indonesia cannot be punished under Philippine law.”

ROMERO: “NO, the eight Filipinos who conspired to commit sedition may not be held criminally liable under Philippine Law.

While Article 2 of the RPC provides for an Extraterritorial application of its provisions, paragraph 5 covers only those which are crimes against national
security such as treason, conspiracy, and proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason and espionage. It also covers crimes against the laws of nations
such as Piracy (as defined by RPC) and genocide, there is no mention of sedition. Although conspiracy to commit sedition punishable by Art 8, it does not
provide extraterritorial application.

In the case at bar, eight Filipinos conspired to commit sedition in Indonesia, a crime against public order for which the RPC may not be applied when
committed abroad.

The eight Filipinos who conspired to commit sedition, a crime against public order, in Indonesia may not be held liable under Philippine Law.”

V
“Jay challenged Daisy to a fight because of a prank she did to him two days earlier.
Jay shot Daisy but couldn’t hit her.
Daisy, however, was able to pick up a knife, and she threw it at Jay, injuring him in the leg. Afterwards, she brought him to the hospital and
decided to shoulder the expenses for treatment. Jay, in his agitated state, removed his bandages, aggravating his wounds. He died after a few
days. Is Daisy liable for Jay’s death?”

GUTIERREZ: “NO, Daisy cannot be held liable for the death of Jay.

Daisy was performing a lawful act since she was acting in self-defense. There was unlawful aggression on the part of Jay when he shot Daisy’s leg.
Daisy employed reasonable means to repel the attack by throwing the knife at Jay’s leg, and that Daisy did not do anything that would sufficiently provoke
Jay from attacking her.
6
 Hence, the situation falls under Article 11, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, pertaining to Justifying Circumstances, persons acting in self-
defense. Daisy was justified in repelling the attack from Jay, therefore, she cannot be held liable for Jay’s death.”

JOMILLA: “NO, Daisy is not liable for Jay’s death.”

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. In this provision, such person is also liable for the direct and natural consequences of the felonious act.

In this case, Daisy does not incur any criminal liability because she was not committing any felony. She was acting in self-defense, and the three
requisites of self-defense have been validly met. There was unlawful aggression on the part of Jay when he shot Daisy, chased her, and shot her again. Such
unlawful aggression was existing at the time Daisy threw a knife at his leg, which was a reasonable means to repel the aggression. There is likewise a lack
of sufficient provocation since the fact of such provocation is merely based on a belief, and even assuming it to be true, a prank does not constitute sufficient
provocation to be shot with a gun.

Therefore, since Daisy was in the act of self-defense, she was not committing a felony, and is not criminally liable under Art. 4.”

ROMERO: “NO, Daisy is not liable for Jay’s death.

Daisy caused the mortal injuries in defense of her person, she may invoke a justifying circumstance under Article II, par 1 of the RPC which states
that criminal liability will not be incurred by anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

In the case at bar, Daisy acted in the defense of her person from the unlawful aggression that is the gunshot which caused an actual, real, and
imminent threat on her life and limb perpetrated by Jay. Her use of a knife to defend herself may have seemed to be the reasonable and only possible way
she thought would prevent the aggression. She could not have been expected to reflect on the means she would use to prevent or stop the aggression. There
was also a lack of sufficient provocation on her part. If Jay started the fight because of the prank he thinks Daisy pulled in him two weeks ago, though that
act may or may not have constituted unlawful aggression as it had ceased two weeks ago. It is action against Daisy may be viewed as retaliation, an act
which is not justified.

The fact that Jay was brought to the hospital although Daisy assisted him and intended to shoulder all the costs is immaterial as the act of Daisy
killing Jay was justified as it was in the defense of her person.

Invoking self-defense as provided by Art II, the killing of Jay by Daisy is justified, she incurs no criminal liability.
7
VALDEZ: “NO, Daisy is not liable for Jay’s death.

According to Article 11 (1), anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights provided that the following circumstances occur: First, unlawful
aggression; Second, reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel it; Third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.

What happened at the hospital was immaterial. The fact that the unlawful aggression on the part of Jay was present when he inflicted injuries on
Daisy using a gun is sufficient. The means employed on Daisy’s part is also reasonable and the provocation given by Daisy who pulled a prank on Jay two
days ago cannot be a reason for incomplete self-defense. When Jay fired his gun, there is no provocation on the part of Daisy, therefore, Daisy is already
justified in wounding Jay.

Therefore, Daisy cannot be held liable for Jay’s death because there is complete self-defense.”

VILLASECA: “NO, Daisy is not liable for Jay's death.

Pursuant to Article 11 of the RPC, the following do not incur any criminal liability:
1) Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights provided that the following circumstances concur:
i. Unlawful Aggression;
ii. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
iii. That the one making defense had no part therein.

In this case, it is clearly shown that Jay Gatsby wanted to retaliate, hence his act constituted unlawful aggression, and Daisy had every right to
prevent or repel the aggression of Jay Gatsby ,and Daisy had no other means of preventing it, except for throwing the knife, and in order for a provocation
to be sufficient, it must immediately precede the aggression.

Hence, Daisy's act is justified under Article 2(1) of the RPC.”

8
 VI
A. “What is mens rea?”
JOMILLA: “Mens rea is the mental element of the crime, the other being actus reus, the physical element. Mens rea in criminal law generally means criminal
intent.

ROMERO: “Mens Rea is an element of incurring criminal liability, it roughly translates as ‘guilty mind.’ It is provided that a person who commits a felony
without mens rea does not incur criminal liability. This is embodied in the Latin maxim, “Actus non facit reum,nisi mens sit rea” or an act cannot be criminal
unless the mind be criminal.”

B. “What is an ex-post facto law?”

[ALL/non-verbatim]: “An ex-post facto law is a law which:
i. Makes criminal or punishes an act done before the enactment of such law
ii. Aggravates a crime, which was committed before the enactment of such law
iii. Increases the punishment for a crime committed before the enactment of such law
iv. Alters the rules of evidence, and lowers the quantum of evidence needed to convict a person of a crime allegedly committed before the
enactment of such law.
v. Purports to regulate civil rights and obligations, but in effect imposes a penalty/punishment for their exercise
vi. Deprives an accused of a right to which he is lawfully entitled, such as amnesty.

C. “What are the requisites of the doctrine of necessity, or for using paragraph 4 of Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code as a defense?”
JOMILLA:
i. That there is actual evil or injury caused to another
ii. That the injury feared is greater than the one done to prevent it
iii. That there be no other practical means to prevent such feared injury.

ROMERO:
i. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists.
ii. The injury caused be greater than that done to prevent it.
iii. There be no other practical or less harmful means to avoid it.

9
 VII
Hayaw Maya returned home to find his 17-year-old daughter Gibli (who was still living with him), having sexual intercourse with Zaki, her
seducer. Upon seeing Hayaw, Zaki ran. Hayaw chased Zaki, and shot & killed him using a shotgun. Should Hayaw be held criminally liable?”

GUTIERREZ: “NO, Hayaw cannot be held criminally liable.

Article 247 of the RPC provides the killing of a person under exceptional circumstances. When a father catches his daughter, which should be under
(18) years of age and still living with him, having sexual intercourse with another person, he is justified in the event that he kills the other person and is
exempted if he inflicts only physical injuries to the person.

In this case, Hayaw is justified since the elements under Article 247 were all present.

Therefore, Hayaw shall not be held criminally liable for the death of Zaki, but he shall suffer the penalty of destierro.”

JOMILLA: “NO, Hayaw should not be held criminally liable.

Art. 247 of the Revised Penal Code states that a man killing the seducer of his minor daughter does not incur criminal liability, but merely suffers
destierro. The same Article likewise does not require that the killing be done immediately after catching the seducer, for as long as the killing was done out
of passion/obfuscation.

In this case, Gibli was a minor still living with her father. She was being seduced and the seducer was caught in flagrante delicto by Hayaw Maya.
Article 247 applies.

Therefore, Hayaw cannot be held criminally liable.”

VIII
“A found that there were squatters in his property. He used a bulldozer to demolish the squatters’ houses. In doing so, one of the squatters died.
Can A invoke Art. 11(1) of the RPC as a justifying circumstance?”
ROMERO: “NO, he may not invoke Art 11 par 1 of the RPC.

10
 Art II, par. 1 provides three requisites, unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and the lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself,

In the case at bar, A may not invoke the justifying circumstance as the construction of shanties did not constitute unlawful aggression as there was
no imminent threat to his life and limb. The means he employed is unreasonable as it had been held that the defense of a property is not greater than life.
Furthermore, for it to constitute a valid defense of property, it must be coupled with intimidation or force, the attack on the property he is defending.

For the reasons mentioned above, A may not invoke Art II, par 1 of the RPC.”

VILLASECA: “NO, A may not invoke paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the RPC.

In order to invoke the right to property in Article 2 Paragraph 1. It is necessary for the one invoking to also receive and attack against his person,
because the right to life is always greater than the right to property.

In this case, the act of A cannot be justified because there was no unlawful aggression and because he didn’t employ the necessary means to
prevent or repel what he believed an attack upon his home or property.

Hence, A cannot justify his act or mitigate liability because unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite.”

IX
“Pulag punched Batulao which caused Batulao to fall down. Upon seeing Batulao in that state, Pulag remembered everything bad that Batulao
did to him, and at that moment, he decided to kill Batulao. Before he was able to do so, Fuji hugged Pulag which caused Pulag to desist. What
crime did Pulag commit?”

JOMILLA: “Pulag committed the crime of CONSUMMATED physical injuries.

According to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is consummated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution.

In this case, Pulag has already inflicted injury on Batulao. Specific intent to kill cannot be deduced from his overt acts, because the thought occurred
to him only after inflicting physical injuries, and because of Fuji’s hug, he was not able to commence killing Batulao.

Therefore, Pulag committed the crime of consummated slight physical injuries, but is not liable for the MERE THOUGHT of killing Batulao.”

11
ROMERO: “Physical injuries, consummated at that point.

Although Pulag desisted from killing Batulao, he already inflicted physical injuries on the latter. The desistance mentioned in the Art 6 of the RPC
refers to acts which are yet to be committed and is inapplicable to those already done.

He may not be held liable from attempted homicide as he desisted before he commenced the commission of the crime.”

VALDEZ: “Pulag committed the crime of consummated physical injuries.

Legal desistance is that which was committed after the attempted stage.

In this case, Pulag desisted while on the act of killing Batulao however, injuries were already sustained by Batulao.

Therefore, Pulag committed physical injuries. There can be no attempted or frustrated physical injuries because the essential requisite of physical
injury is the commission of the injury itself.”

VILLASECA: “The crime Pulag committed was physical injury.

Article 6 of the RPC provides that: Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted are punishable.

In this case when Pulag punched Batulao he had no intent to kill, therefore, it can only be physical injury. In the second attempt, when Pulag desisted
from pushing through with his plan, it can only be attempted homicide, because he still has control over his actions, this it cannot be frustrated because he
has not yet performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and it cannot be consummated because the felony was not accomplished.

Since he desisted from pushing through with his plan, the crime can only be physical injury.”

X
A. “What are the requisites of an impossible crime?”
ROMERO:
i. The act would constitute an offense which is against persons or property.
ii. There is inherent impossibility of the accomplishment of the act or
12
 iii. Offender used inadequate and ineffectual means.
iv. The act is not punishable under any provision of the RPC.

VALDEZ:
i. The act must be against persons or property
ii. There should be evil intent
iii. There must be an inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or employment of inadequate or ineffectual means
iv. The act should not constitute another violation in the RPC

B. “A committed ill-treatment towards B, but B sustained no injuries. Can there be a case for impossible crime against A?”
VALDEZ: “No. There was already a crime committed which is maltreatment.”

13