People vs Lyndon Flores 252 SCRA 31

Facts:

That on or about the 20th day of June 1993, at around 12:00 o'clock noon, in barangay
Malusak, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, the accused Lyndon
Flores , assault, attack, maim and violently kick the vital parts of the body of one Manuel Lazarte
y Malvar alias Ato While he was lying dead-drunk and unconscious on the pavement. Thereafter,
Ato Lazarte was brought to the hospital where he died two days after the incident. That noon
Ato's mother Emperatriz Lazarte had an altercation with the accused due to a cassette belonging
to the former. Emperatriz imputed to accused-appellant the loss of her cassette recorder which
she eventually found in a pawnshop from where she redeemed it.

Issue:

Whether or not for lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong shall be appreciated in
favor of accused-appellant for he had no intent to kill when he attacked the victim.

Held:

Under Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. Thus, anyone who inflicts injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable for all
the consequences of his criminal act, such as death that supervenes as a consequence of the
injuries. Here, accused-appellant is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused by
the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim's body. Thus, since the assault
was qualified by treachery the crime committed is murder and not homicide.

SALVADOR YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

674 SCRA 420

Facts:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, the above-named accused, a public officers, being then policemen, responding to
information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery
and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to
take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at
the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot
wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the
direct and immediate death of the latter.

Issue:

Whether or not mistake of fact may be justified the killing.

Held:

The invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of
criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have
justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable
mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The
inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or
state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the
mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA v. PEOPLE 480 scra 436

Facts:

On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint against Eusebio Mejarito in the then
Court of First Instance of Carigara, Leyte, for quieting of title. The suit involved a 40,500-
square-meter parcel of coconut land located in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as
Cadastral Lot 1301. The trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint and declared Eusebio
the lawful owner of the property.

In the meantime, Eusebio died intestate and was survived by his son, Cleto. Elias Gaviola
also died intestate and was survived by his son, Alfonso.

At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a
barangay councilman, saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing
the coconut trees in Lot 1301. Under the supervision of the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola,
they gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the coconut trees.

Information was filed with the RTC of Naval, Biliran, against the spouses Alfonso and
Leticia Gaviola for qualified theft
Issue:

Whether or not there is no intent to gain when the coconuts taken from the trees from
which they were inherited from his father.

Held:

For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi)
personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of
personal property which intent is apart from, but concurrent with the general criminal intent
which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolos malus). The animo being a state of the
mind may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and conduct of
the accused before, during and after the taking of the personal property. General criminal intent
is presumed or inferred from the very fact that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed to
have willed the natural consequences of his own acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed
from the taking of personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor
thereof. The same may be rebutted by the accused by evidence that he took the personal property
under a bona fide belief that he owns the property.

GEMMA T. JACINTO v. PEOPLE 592 SCRA 426

Facts:

In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a postdated
checked worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc.
The said check was deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena
Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, who was looking for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been
dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced.
However, Baby said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as
replacement for the dishonored check.

Dyhengco filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked
out an entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested.

Issue:

Whether or not impossible crime is committed?

Held:
 Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

Sulpicio Intod vs Ca 215 SCRA 52

Facts:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house
of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a
land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day. Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house

At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's

bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out;
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-
law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by
the gun fire. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.

Issue:

Whether or not Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
Held:

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an
impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime.

THE UNITED STATES vs. PHILIP K. SWEET 1 Phil 18

Facts:

The appellant Philip K. Sweet was at the time of its alleged commission an employee of the
United States military authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person
upon whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such
authorities.

Issue:

Whether or not the offense committed by an employee of the United States military
authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Held:

We have been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local
legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States military
establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No.
136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not aware of the
existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the application of the general
principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of
England and America and which must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence
unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep.,
710.) The appellant's claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by him
in the execution of the orders of his military superiors may, if true, be available by way of
defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but cannot under this principle affect the
right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.

Raquiza vs Bradford 75 Phil 50

Facts:

March 13, 1945, Lily Raquiza was arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps
Detachment of the U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385
wherein she was charged Espionage activity for Japanese.
Issue:
Whether or not the United States Armed Forces authorized to detain and take custody of
the petitioner.

Held:
In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has the Commonwealth
Government asked, and the United States Government agreed, that it come and be stationed in
the Philippines, but it is here for the very realization of the overruling and vehement desire and
dream of the Filipino people to be freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and to see this
war brought to a victorious end. If a foreign army permitted to be stationed in a friendly country,
"by permission of its government or sovereign," is exempt from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the place, with much more reason should the Army of the United States which is
not only permitted by the Commonwealth Government to be stationed here but has come to the
islands and stayed in them for the express purpose of liberating them, and further prosecuting the
war to a successful conclusion, be exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of this place, at
least for the time covered by said agreement of the two Governments. By analogy, an attempt of
our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period expires,
would be considered as a violation of this country's faith, which this Court should not be the last
to keep and uphold. By exercising it, paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose for
which the stationing of the army in the islands was requested or agreed upon may be hampered
or prejudiced, and a portion of said military force would be withdrawn from the control of the
sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy, the agreement for the stationing of the
United States Army or a part of its forces in the Philippines implies a waiver of all jurisdiction
over their troops during the time covered by such agreement, and permits the allied general or
commander in chief to retain that exclusive control and discipline which the government of his
army may require.

Schnneckenburger v Moran 63 Phil 249

Facts:

The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine
Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila
with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court
on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled,
he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance
of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction to try the case
filed against the petitioner.

Held:

This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is
not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the
laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34
Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of
the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's
International Law [2d ed.], 423.)

Liang vs People 323 SCRA 692

Facts:
 Petitoner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometine
in 1994, for alleging defamatory words against ADB fellow worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the
MeTC released him to the custody of the security officer of the ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an office protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the Said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the RTC of pasig City which set aside the MeTC ruling and orderd the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it ealier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is immune from suit.

Held:

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel,
the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.