Arroyo v.

De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255 | 1998-06-26

Subject: Separation of Powers, Power of Judicial Review, Yeas and Nays, Enrolled Bill Doctrine,
Legislative Journals

Facts:
Members of the House of Representatives filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging
the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amended the provisions of the tax code on sin taxes
imposed on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. They alleged that the law was passed in
violation of the House rules, which are mandated by the Constitution, and thus, violation thereof is a
violation of the Constitution itself.

The law originated from the House, and approved on third reading. It was transmitted to the Senate, and
again approved on third reading, but with amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed
to reconcile conflicting provisions in both versions passed by the two houses. The report of the
committee was then submitted to the house. When a representative was delivering his privilege speech,
the presence of a quorum was questioned, and Rep. Arroyo’s motion to adjourn for lack of quorum was
not granted. The conference committee report, however, was approved by the house, despite the
objections posed by Rep. Arroyo regarding the lack of quorum. Thus, he posits that the law was passed
in violation of the House Rules of Procedure.

Held:

Separation of Powers

1. Each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not
invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests.
2. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance
on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House.
3. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for the Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules
of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.
4. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty
of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so.

Power of Judicial Review

5. No rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.
6. The Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over its shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
7. The jurisdiction of the Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 of the
Constitution and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
8. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done
away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
9. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.

Yeas and Nays

10. The Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House
has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
11. Considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and
nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

12. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
13. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption.

Legislative Journals

14. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein.
15. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect.
16. The bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly
proven.