G.R. No.

127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,

AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin
taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on
third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate
which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he
was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted
when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco
objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.  Rep. Arroyo appealed the
1

ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of
the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in
the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as
published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference
committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

 MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session
hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published
version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in
the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other
versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line
17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published
version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the
question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss
this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they
admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents.
Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the
transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the
rules of the House,   the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not
2

call for the years or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner
Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112,   the Chair
3

deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep.
Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97,  the Chair refused to recognize
4

Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the
report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII,
§109,   the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is
5

alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have
been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from
formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House
that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to
pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and
they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,   which affirmed the
6

conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De
Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of
separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification
for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI,
§16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules
cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements
such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules
of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee
reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No.
7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives,
covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there
being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No.
7198."   This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
7

Lagman.  8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment
of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there
was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House,
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings"   and that for this reason they are judicially
9

enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases,   the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings"
10

was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun,   it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
11

that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,   the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution
12

empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

In Crawford v. Gilchrist,   it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
13

proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the
proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the
exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty
conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,   the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The
14

provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control
of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is
not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many
states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules."

In State v. Savings Bank,   the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows:
15

"The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and
shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may
be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside
such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own
rules of procedure."

In McDonald v. State,   the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so
16

passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied
strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever
declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself ,
or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are
any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory   is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma
17

provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds
vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a
law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed
by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by
the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any
particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the
legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be
reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is
shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules
of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50
N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641;
Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He
wrote:
 Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.  18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have
no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to
look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere
comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion
[by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond
judicial review."   Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
19

acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement
of Art. VIII. §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can
adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For
while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national security,   it has not altogether done away
20

with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already
held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence
of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. §1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion
approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being
none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its
banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the
individual votes of the members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case
is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some
legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such
as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out,
the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no
means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee
report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee
report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr.
Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects,
then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his
attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or
constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the
Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the
vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we
assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance
here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair
can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.  22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just.   The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method
23

do not present any matter for judicial consideration.   In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
24

Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding
the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference
and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be
allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."  25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of

the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon
the last and third readings of a bill,   at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,   and in
26 27
repassing a bill over the veto of the President.   Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of
28

the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have
been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.   It would appear, however, that
29

the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at
3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could
at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not.
The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned
until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except
Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of
Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not,
in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.  And even if
30

Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would
have put an end to any further consideration of the question.  31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to
the courts by Art. VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction."  32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established
the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when
the quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.   Rep.33

Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.  34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep.
Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry
Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.   Rep. Lagman and
35

Rep. Zamora objected to the report   but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if
36

voting had been conducted. Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference committee
report. 37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing
this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one
case   we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
38

provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has
refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to
the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verify and is binding on the courts."   This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the
39

following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost
the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that
they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they
should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual
errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the
work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.  40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.  41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in
violation of Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall
be allowed."  42

In other cases,   this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified
43

by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad.   The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
44
 . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution. 
45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases
and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say
that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to
have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima,
Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership
of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of
the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No.
7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is
required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein.   With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
46

Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,   this Court
47

spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most
permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be
law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case   may instead appropriately be made
48

here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.  49

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 105364*            June 28, 2001

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V.

FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LIQUIDATOR OF THE
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents

KAPUNAN, J.:

May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB)
when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary
Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch
39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans
Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez,
filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP-32311. 1

After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made. However,
due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid. 2

On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the
above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners. 3

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the
rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank.4

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.5

Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen.6

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued
with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set
to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while
petitioners’ claims have been frozen to their prejudice.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio,
and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.

On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed a
Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch 39 of
the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to pay their backwages and
salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No. NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and
Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in an Order dated June 5, 1992,
approved therein movants’ case and directed the bank liquidator or PVB itself to pay the backwages
and differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order. Said intervenors
likewise manifested that there was an error in the computation of the monetary benefits due them.

On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992, filed
their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from the
operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest in the subject matter
of the pending action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the proceedings; and that
the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis and would render moot the
relief sought in the petition.

On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the issuance by
respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.

We find for the petitioners. (ACCORDING TO SC)

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created
Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes",
which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which
was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening
of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3)
years from the date of the reopening of the head office.7 The law likewise provides for the
creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the
provisions of the same.8

Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation
Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate
Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the respondent judge praying
that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169.
On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which
approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.

Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.

On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings of
the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.

As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order
in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB.

On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular
banking operations.

Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has
rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of
the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. 9 It is the
winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the
process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization.
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. 10

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of
rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation
proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No.
7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al.
that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary
Board, among others, the Court is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the
clause "unless otherwise provided." (PRINCIPLE)

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its
approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C.
Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No.
7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was
published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by
respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and
GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further proceeding with
Civil Case No. SP- 32311.

SO ORDERED.