THE LOWER WOOD RIVER LEVEE RISK INFORMED FORMULATION CASE

HISTORY

Chris J. Redell, PE 1

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers use the risk framework to provide an analytical way
for gathering, recording, and evaluating information that leads to recommendations for
decisions or actions related to levee systems. Risk assessments explicitly and implicitly
recognize all the contributing elements of the risk, to include hazard, performance, and
consequences. Risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication are essential
components of the risk framework that work in conjunction in order to yield more
effective decisions about infrastructure investments. All three pieces were implemented
within the Lower Wood River Levee Design Deficiency project in order to better
understand and take action to manage the risk that exists. Through a systematic evidence
based approach, the nature, likelihood, and magnitude of risk was determined with due
regards for uncertainty. Based on these findings, decisions were made to select,
implement, and monitor a risk informed solution based on quantifiable results that will
reduce the risk to tolerable levels. This framework not only allowed for a more cost
effective solution but also allowed for decision making with an outcome based approach
as opposed to an action based approach. This case history will present how a risk
informed approach was successfully implemented for the Lower Wood River Levee
Remediation Project. It will cover how risk informed decision making was applied to a
project intended to reduce the flood risk associated with the levee driven by seepage and
internal erosion to a tolerable level. This paper will discuss the history and background of
the project, present the potential failure modes which required remedial action, and the
solution that was designed based on quantifiable results informed by risk to meet the
intended level of risk reduction. The findings will ultimately show how the application of
this risk framework within an engineering and decision making context demonstrates
improved effectiveness with regards to life safety and investment decisions.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

The Wood River Flood Protection Project as shown in Figure 1, constructed in the
1950’s, consists of three hydraulically independent systems: Upper, Lower, and the
combined East and West Forks. The project includes approximately 21 miles of levee,
with 170 relief wells, 26 closure structures, 41 gravity drains, 8 pump stations, and 2 low
water dams.

The project lies in the Mississippi River flood plain of Madison County, Illinois, just
upstream of the city of East St. Louis. There are approximately 12,700 acres of

1
Chris J. Redell, Geotechnical Engineer, St. Louis District, USACE, 1222 Spruce Street, St. Louis, MO.,
chris.j.redell@usace.army.mil.

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bottomland within the levee district and 4,700 acres of hill land tributary to the levee
units.

The project is intended to reduce the risk of flooding from an event up to a 54 foot
Mississippi River stage on the St. Louis Gage, which has an annual chance exceedance
frequency of about 0.04%. The leveed area extends from the city of Alton, Illinois at the
northwest end to the Cahokia Creek Diversion Channel at the southeast, protecting the
industrial and urban areas of East Alton, Hartford, Roxana and Wood River.
Additionally, the Wood River levee System provides upstream protection to the adjoining
East St. Louis Levee System that extends from the Cahokia Diversion Canal to Dupo. In
addition to reducing flood risks to the leveed area, the levee structure is a part of the
containment features for the Melvin Price Locks and Dam Project.

Figure 1 Lower Wood River

The Great Flood of 1993 loaded these levee systems with a flood event reaching 49.5 ft at
the St Louis gage. Extensive flood fighting efforts were required to maintain levee
integrity when uncontrolled underseepage was observed during heightened monitoring.
Underseepage is when river water that seeps under a levee from the riverside to the
landside during a flood. Levees can fail due to underseepage if significant uncontrolled
flow carries foundation soil particles with it, creating a void under the levee. The levee
could collapse into the void, allowing the flood to overtop the levee and wash it away.
Underseepage flows can generally be managed by measures including (but not limited to)
relief wells, seepage berms, or cutoff walls. A detailed review of the original design of

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the project in the 2006 timeframe revealed that in many instances, the need for
underseepage control was underestimated.

A General Reevaluation Report (GRR) was completed in 2006 which recommended

additional underseepage control measures, and a Limited Reevaluation Report (LRR) was
completed in 2011 which modified the 2006 recommendation.

An evaluation of the Lower Wood River levee system was conducted in 2011 to identify
remediation measures to address risk associated with underseepage failure modes. The
2011 evaluation (USACE, 2011) used traditional design criteria and standards outlined in
USACE EM 1110-2-1913. The 2011 evaluation recommended a plan that includes
includes 94 new relief wells; filling 83 existing wood stave relief wells with grout; two
25-cubic feet per second (cfs) pump stations and one 20-cfs pump station; ditching to
deliver well flows to pump stations; 815 linear feet of seepage berm; 1,010 linear feet of
landside clay fill; 2,910 linear feet of slurry trench cutoff wall at the riverside levee toe
and to bedrock (140 ft deep); 1,060 linear feet of slurry trench cutoff wall (100 ft deep) at
the riverside levee toe; 2,875 linear feet of slurry trench cutoff wall (25 ft deep) at the
riverside levee toe; environmental and archeological mitigation work; utility relocations;
9.88 acres flowage easement area; and wetland and bottomland hardwood mitigation
areas. All of these features were located in the Upper and Lower Wood River levee
systems. No features were recommended for the East/West Wood River levees. The
project was justified economically and for safety reasons. The estimated fully funded cost
for the recommend plan was $46,500,000 ($53.6M at FY17 price levels).

Design and construction of the features recommended in the 2011 LRR have been
ongoing by both the local sponsor and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). All
features in the Upper Wood River levee system have been completed. During design of
the Lower Wood River underseepage remediation features, additional data was obtained
(updated permeability from 2016 pump tests, updated LiDAR), actual construction costs
were available for the shallow and deep cutoff walls that have already been completed in
the area, and the sponsor had already constructed some features of the 2011 plan. All of
this information was used to adjust the remaining features, utilizing the same design
criteria used in the 2011 LRR. The result was a large estimated cost increase and the
need for a study to determine the path forward.

These findings inherently doubled the original cost estimate. The St. Louis District
evaluated this new information and determined that a risk informed process should be
used in order to reformulate the original tentatively selected plan (TSP). Thus, a
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of the levee system was conducted starting in the
summer of 2017 to evaluate the incremental risks and provide a basis for better decision
making regarding underseepage remediation considering the Levee Safety Program
framework for the Lower Wood River levee system.

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 LOWER WOOD RIVER REACH EVALUATION

In performing a risk assessment, it is often necessary to divide a levee system into distinct
zones or reaches due to differences in loading (slope of the river), characteristics of the
levee embankment and foundation, past performance and/or consequences. Figure 2
outlines the seven analyzed reaches throughout the Lower Wood River levee system.
Seepage analyses performed in 2016 demonstrated that three reaches met USACE
traditional deterministic criteria for factors of safety against uplift as discussed in EM
1110-2-1913 “Design and Construction of Levees.” Four reaches did not meet the
required factor of safety of 1.6 against uplift.

Not meeting this traditional deterministic criteria does not guarantee the likelihood of
breach of the levee. In order to more accurately evaluate the likelihood of breach for
each levee reach, an array of cross sections were developed and analyzed based on the
geological and geotechnical characteristics such as permeability, blanket thickness,
performance, etc. The cross section with the lowest factor of safety against uplift was
considered the controlling section for that particular reach.

A representative cross section from each reach was then examined and used as a common
geological unit representing the area so that the team could evaluate this reach as a whole
and properly estimate the likelihood of breach, taking into account the geotechnical and
geological spatial variation. In order to account for the unique geological conditions and
previous remedial measures in Reach 2, two cross sections were analyzed within the
influence of the previously installed fully penetrating cutoff wall.

Reach 2B was analyzed through the gap in the as constructed cutoff wall and Reach 2A
was analyzed near the end of the 2016 base contract cutoff wall in the “contract option
segment” to evaluate the end effects of the wall and to more fully understand the
calculated low factors of safety in this area. In addition, Reach 6 was divided further into
two cross sections since there were unique features within this reach that included
landside borrow areas and previous improvements from the area sponsor.

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 Figure 2 Reach delineation in Lower Wood River

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 RISK ASSESSMENT

To characterize the existing risk and primary risk drivers for the Lower Wood River Levee
system, a risk team consisting of 5 engineers and 1 geologist from the St. Louis District
(CEMVS), the Kansas City District (CENWK), AMEC Foster Wheeler (AMEC) (Engineer
for the local sponsor), and the USACE Levee Safety Center, with support from the Risk
Management Center (RMC), were convened to conduct a quantitative risk assessment
(QRA).

The QRA was performed between July 2017 and November 2017 and prepared in general
accordance with the methods and policies described in the draft Engineering Circular (EC)
1165-2-218, Levee Safety Program – Policy and Procedures (USACE, 2017) and Best
Practices in Dam and Levee Safety Risk Analysis (United States Bureau of Reclamation
(USBR)/USACE, 2015). As part of the QRA, a risk assessment of the existing condition
(EC) and future without action condition (FWAC) was performed to determine the
significant and credible failure modes for the levee system. Detailed probability estimates to
account for loading probability (i.e., hazard), performance (i.e., system response) and
consequences were limited to these significant and credible failure modes, which included
internal erosion and overtopping failure modes in discrete reaches throughout the Lower
Wood River system. This information will be used to help communicate with stakeholders
and risk managers in order to facilitate development of better informed risk management
options (RMOs) with due regards for uncertainty.

INCREMENTAL RISKS

USACE risk assessments results are plotted on a life safety risk matrix to help evaluate
the magnitude of the risk and whether the magnitude of risk warrants further risk
management actions. The risk matrix relates annual probability of failure (APF, assigned
the letter "f" against the average incremental life loss (assigned the letter N). The societal
risk (e.g. diagonal) and individual risk reference lines are shown on the risk matrix on
Figure 4. These lines are used to help inform one of the many aspects of tolerable risk
used in the Levee Safety Program. Guidelines for tolerable risk in the Levee Safety
Program are discussed latter in this paper under the Risk Management section.

The life safety matrix helps identify what potential failure modes (PFMs) provide the
greatest contribution to the total risk. It allows assessors and managers to target and
tailor specific actions for risk management.

The term “levee risk”, sometimes referred to as “incremental risk”, is used to refer to the
risk posed by the levee system itself. The “levee risk" for the levee system is the
combination of the likelihood of inundation due to levee breach and the consequence of
this inundation in the leveed area. Levee breach can occur prior or subsequent to
overtopping the levee. The risk assessment team considered all significant and credible
failure modes within the Lower Wood River levee system for a total of 52 identified
potential failure modes (PFMs). Due to other system wide improvements within the

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levee reaches made by the local non-Federal sponsor, backward erosion piping (BEP)
failure modes due to underseepage are the main risk drivers and are primarily contained
within discrete reaches along the system. The results of the risk assessment currently
indicate that the levee has a greater chance of failing prior to overtopping due to BEP
failure modes than it does of failing due to overtopping flows eroding the levee cross-
section.

For this system, the risk team evaluated each risk-driving PFM for scenarios with and
without intervention. Intervention is considered to be any human activity that takes place
prior to or during a flood with the intent of increasing the probability that a levee will
successfully function during a given flood. In addition to routine operation of the levee
system (patrolling and inspection of the levee system, operation of closure structures,
interior drainage structures and pump stations, mitigating sand boils) intervention as
considered by the team during the risk assessment consisted of non-routine activities if
warranted such as dumping substantial amounts of crushed stone to inhibit the flow of
water into the leveed area, placing Hesco-style barriers or flash boards, transporting and
placing multiple yards of soil, and other actions to prevent breach of the levee. Successful
intervention involves detecting a developing failure mode and then taking actions that
prevent breach due to that failure mode. BEP failure modes were determined to be
slightly above the Societal and Individual life Risk Line with and without considering
intervention for all reaches that were evaluated, with the exception of Reach 6a. Reach 6a
falls just below the societal and individual life risk line due to its unique geological
conditions and Reach 6b with intervention hovers the criteria set forth within the USACE
Levee Safety Program.

CONFIDENCE AND MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES

The best estimate or most likely estimate for loading, system response, and consequences
was considered to be a reasonable depiction of the risks associated with the significant,
credible potential failure modes.

A key outcome of a risk assessment is the explicit acknowledgement and consideration

for uncertainty. Uncertainty can be commonly divided into knowledge uncertainty (KU)
and natural variability (NV). For the most part knowledge uncertainty can be reduced
with additional data gathering, analyses or other analytical tools but natural variability
can only be understood and not readily reduced.

For this risk assessment, the uncertainties were only evaluated for the levee system’s
primary risk drivers. Uncertainty was considered for the three components of the
conceptual risk equation: loading, system response (i.e., performance), and consequences.
The phases of BEP due to internal erosion are shown in Figure 3. Risk assessment results
helped the team identify the majority of uncertainty ascribed to the underseepage failure
mode was related to progression. The risk assessment team recognized the uncertainty in
the state of the practice with regards to BEP analyses and utilized current best practices to
elicit probability estimates for each node.

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For Node 1 (Initiation) and Node 6 (Progression) on the backwards erosion piping event
tree, the risk assessment team utilized finite element seepage modeling to help inform the
elicitation of the lowest reasonable, the most likely, and the highest reasonable values.
This provided a range of values used to estimate uncertainty for these nodes and
subsequently for the backwards erosion piping system response.

Figure 3 Event Tree – Initiation & Progression

The extensive geological and geotechnical exploration and testing programs completed in
the Lower Wood River project along the centerline, riverside and landside levee toe, and
the geomorphology of the subsurface has indicated that the depositional environment
supports the presence of the physical conditions for piping (Nodes 2 – 5) to be probable
throughout the analyzed reaches and thus the uncertainty amongst the team had narrower
bounds for these nodes. However, for Reaches 2 and 6, the team had a wider range of
uncertainty tied to Node 4 for the ability of the levee and blanket to support a roof. In
these reaches the blanket and embankment are more silty and will not hold a roof as well
as a stiff clay embankment. Due to this the risk team had a slightly higher amount of
uncertainty bounded to this node.

RISK CHARACTERIZATION

The risk for the levee system is driven by the Backward Erosion Piping failure mode.
The life safety matrix chart on Figure 4 graphically depicts where risk estimates can fall
with respect to societal and individual life risk. With intervention can be plotted to show
that when standard flood fighting practices and procedures are implemented such has
flood inspections, sand bagging, and implementing standard operational procedures that a
reduction in the risk is achieved. The following summarizes the risk characterization:

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 Figure 4 Life Safety Matrix

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The potential for breach prior to overtopping is primarily driven by the BEP failure
modes of the erodible foundation materials beneath the levee. For these PFMs, the
Annual Probability of Failure ranges from 3.17E-05 up to 7.12E-04, The Average
Incremental Life Loss associated with BEP failure modes are estimated to range from 7
to 30. The combination of life loss and probability of failure from the backwards
erosions piping failure modes places all of the individual reaches above societal risk and
the individual life risk line with the exception of reach locations 6a and 6b with river
levels between elevation 435 ft. (ACE 1%) and elevation 443 ft., which is the Top Of
Levee (TOL) which provide the highest contribution to annualized loss of life for the
BEP failure modes without and with considering intervention.

The range in uncertainty has a spread of roughly 2.5 – 3 orders of magnitude within the
annualized probability of failure due to the uncertainty that lies within the system’s
elicited nodal probabilities for performance and hydraulic loading uncertainties. The
main sources of uncertainty contributing to this range in values lie within the spatial
variability throughout the site due to the constraints of limited discrete subsurface
investigations and the limited understanding of progression within the failure mechanism
of backwards erosion piping. Additional sources of uncertainty can be contributed to the
availability of minimal historical construction documentation, limited instrumentation
data collected within and beneath the levee and unknown performance of the levee for
river levels above the flood of record (Elevation 438.5 ft.).

RISK MANAGEMENT

USACE Tolerable Risk Guidelines (TRG) are used for risk-informed decision making
within the USACE Levee Safety Program. USACE is implementing risk-informed
approaches for levee systems in order to improve decision-making, choices about
prioritization of risk management actions, and understanding of levee risk. As part of
these approaches, USACE has chosen to use the “tolerability of risk” framework with
associated TRG. The concept evolved from the recognition that absolute safety is not
practical and that managing risks needs to reflect how people and society view risk. The
tolerability of risk approach is a framework for reaching decisions by focusing on the
most serious risk in a consistent, efficient, and transparent manner.

The guidelines below are the criteria USACE will use in order to determine if the risk
associated with levee systems is “tolerable.” USACE will consider the levee risk in the
context of potential for loss of life and economic and environmental damages to be
tolerable if the four TRG described in this section are all met. These four TRGs were
developed based on what is in practice for dams and in various other industries
worldwide, but adapted by USACE for risk-informed decision making in the Levee
Safety Program.

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TRG 1 - (Societal risk reference line): Society understands and is willing to live with the
risk associated with the levee system to secure the benefits of living and working in the
leveed area.

TRG 2 - (Public Engagement): There is a continuation of recognition of the levee risk,

because the risk associated with levee systems are not broadly acceptable and cannot be
ignored.

TRG 3 - (Monitoring and Risk Management): The risks associated with the levee system
are being properly monitored and managed by those responsible for managing the risk.

TRG 4 - (Further reduce risk ALARP): Those responsible for managing the risk
associated with a levee system continue to reduce the risk still further as practicable.

A risk communication plan as part of the risk framework is currently being developed
and coordinated with the levee sponsor in order to build public awareness of the flood
risks associated with levee systems and to inform individuals living in leveed areas of the
risks involved with living in those areas.

The total risk for the levee system falls above societal and individual life safety risk and
is actionable based on the guidance set forth by EC 1165-2-218. All of the individual
failure modes with the exception of Reach Location 6a with and without Intervention fall
above tolerable risk guidelines. Due to these reach locations not meeting tolerable risk
guidelines actions are warranted to reduce risk related to the levee system to a tolerable
level.

FUTURE WITH PROJECT CONDITION

Reducing flood risk in conjunction with a levee system can be accomplished by, in
general, four strategies: 1) reducing the flood hazard or load on the levee system
(magnitude and likelihood of the hazard); 2) improving the performance or response of
the levee system to the load (add to or modify features of the levee system to address
failure modes or to promote system resilience and sustainability); 3) reducing the
exposure of the people and item(s) (property, infrastructure, etc.) at risk, for example by
altering or limiting future land development or relocating current populations away from
the leveed area; and 4) reducing the vulnerability of the people and items at risk to harm,
for example through actions such as strengthening emergency action and evacuation
plans, improved warning systems, road improvements, enhanced building codes, and
fostering effective response to such warnings by households and businesses, including
vertical evacuation as appropriate.

The most effective method in terms of risk reduction was found to be a seepage remedial
component. Relief wells had previously been determined to be the most cost-effective
method to control underseepage. Therefore initial analyses determined that relief wells
would be viable measures in all reaches and were carried forward into plan formulation
considering the with intervention scenario. Three scenarios were evaluated:

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1) The Standards Plan (SP)
2) The Standards Plan (SP-RI) with risk informed reach screening
3) The Risk Informed Plan (RIP)

The SP design meets all published USACE criteria and acceptable Factors of Safety
against uplift. The SP-RI meets all published traditional guidelines and criteria and
acceptable Factors of Safety in Reaches 2, 3, and 5 however this plan utilizes the future
without action risks from Reach 6 because the life safety risk related to underseepage in
those reaches were already at tolerable levels. The RIP utilized a down scaled version of
the SP-RI where lowered flood heights with adequate factors of safety against heave were
analyzed to see if the total risk reduction from this plan was acceptable in terms of societal
and life safety risk.

FUTURE WITH PROJECT CONDITION REMEDIAL FEATURES

Under the future without action conditions (FWAC), the total (Average Annualized Life
Loss) AALL for the project exceeds the societal tolerable risk limit by approximately one
to one and a quarter orders of magnitude. Risk reduction measures (RRMs) were
identified and evaluated for the BEP risk driving PFMs “ONLY” which reduced the risks
to as low as reasonably practicable.

Backward Erosion Piping (BEP) Risk Reduction Measures

Three RRMs were evaluated for their effectiveness in reducing incremental risk
associated with the backward erosion piping potential failure modes.

• Relief Wells – In 2011 and 2016 the project delivery team for the LWR project
evaluated the cost effectiveness for remedial solutions within the design
deficiency. The most cost effective solution for reaches 2, 3, and 5 were partially
penetrating relief wells.

• Fill – During the 1993 flood an emergency seepage water berm was built in Reach
2. The remnants of the berm exist today. The area within this berm is still
problematic thus the team decided to fill in this small area with fill to mitigate
against seepage.

• Fill / Collector Pipe – In Reach 3 a landside ditch was excavated for interior water
drainage. The excavation led to a very thin confining blanket in this discrete area
thus fill is needed to correct the underseepage issue. There are existing relief
wells in this area that will be converted to T-Type wells and piped into a main
collector pipe that sits within the fill that is flush with the existing ground surface.

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Flood Loadings

Risk Reduction Measures were designed to maximize effectiveness over different flood
loadings as presented below:

• 54 ft ( 52+2) is the authorized level of protection for the Lower Wood River
Levee System. The standards plan met all USACE traditional guidelines and
criteria and a 1.6 factor of safety against uplift between the wells for this loading
level.

• 52 ft & 50 ft flood loadings were also used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
RRMs in reducing risk. For these loadings the relief wells were adjusted
accordingly to meet a 1.6 factor of safety against uplift at the different flood
loadings respectively. Then the models were ran over a full range of hydraulic
loadings and the risk team was presented with the gradients for the 5 different
flood level evaluations that were utilized during the expert opinion elicitation.
Once the risk team elicited on the new values; they were ran through the USACE
risk engine calculation tool to determine the level of risk reduction.

After the quantifiable expert opinion elicitations sessions were conducted it was
determined by the study team that the Standards Plan with Risk-Informed Reach
Screening was the most justifiable from a life safety and cost perspective (as shown in
Figure 5). This plan reduces the prior to overtopping life safety risk below the tolerable
risk reference lines for both societal and individual life safety risk. The structural features
of this plan are listed in Table 1.

Table 1 Structural Features of the Recommended Plan

Reach Features
62 relief wells, one new pump installed at
2 WRPS, ~ 600 cu yds of localized fill, and
increased ponding to EL. 415 ft
3 18 relief wells, 8000 cu yds of localized fill,
and 1 Pump Station Modification
5B 44 relief wells and 3 Pump Stations

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 Figure 5 Risk Informed Results

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 CONCLUSION

The Levee Safety Program risk framework (e.g. risk assessment, risk management, and
risk communication) utilizes the best science, techniques, and understanding of
infrastructure systems in order to make effective and efficient risk management decisions.
Risk Assessments explicitly and implicitly recognizes all contributing aspects of the risk.
This includes the consequences of the levee not performing as expected/intended,
facilitates identification, characterization, epistemic uncertainty and communication of
the risks.

The risk assessment results recognizes backwards erosion piping as the most relevant
contributor to risk for the levee system. There is evidence of seepage related issues;
however, the observed seepage does not appear to be moving large amounts of material.
This leads to the assumption that progression is limited due to the long seepage length,
low average gradients across the levee and critical vertical gradients are only achieved at
less frequent flood events. Due to these factors a risk informed solution was utilized
taking into account the less probable future without action condition underseepage risk in
Reach 6. By fully understanding and evaluating the risk in Reach 6 the project was able
to save tens of millions of dollars with choosing the standards plan with risk informed
reach screening as the recommended plan. This plan ultimately achieved all planning
study justifications of completeness, effectiveness, efficiency, and acceptable while
reducing the incremental risk prior to overtopping due to underseepage to below USACE
tolerable levels.

The science of risk analysis utilizes a framework that thoroughly evaluates the level of
risk and determines what actions, if any, need to be taken to manage that risk. Risk
Assessment, Management, and Communications are essential components of the risk
framework that work in conjunction to yield more effective decisions about
infrastructure investments. All three pieces were implemented within the Wood River
Drainage and Levee District (D&LD) Lower Wood River levee design deficiency
project in order to better understand and take action to manage the risk that exists.
Through a systematic evidence based approach, the nature, likelihood, and magnitude of
risk was determined and characterized with due regards for uncertainty.

REFERENCES

USACE (1956). Corps Technical Manual 3-430 “Investigation of Underseepage Alton to

Gale, Illinois”

USACE (2011). Wood River Levee System Limited Reevaluation Report, August 2011

USBR/USACE (2015). Best Practices in Dam and Levee Safety Risk Analysis, July
2015.

USACE (2017). Draft Engineering Circular (EC) 1165-2-218, Levee Safety Program –
Policy and Procedures.

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