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Wehrle Maren-Feelings As The Motor of Perception
Wehrle Maren-Feelings As The Motor of Perception
DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9159-8
Maren Wehrle
Abstract Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses
on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value
apprehension (Melle 2012). This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in
Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s
early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest,
which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl
argues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of per-
ception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to be
accompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motiva-
tional force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. This
ambiguity – or even contradiction – shall be the point of departure for the following
considerations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings in
intentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but as
a cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898
and elaborated further in Husserl’s genetic approach in Experience and Judgment.
In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, defining
it as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in per-
ceiving) – so the paper will argue – expresses itself in concrete perception as a
specific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individual
subject at a given time.
M. Wehrle (&)
Husserl Archives Leuven, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Phenomenological Research,
KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: maren.wehrle@hiw.kuleuven.be
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46 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
1 Introduction
In his manuscript on ‘‘attention as interest’’ from 1898,1 Husserl introduces the notion
of interest as an essential part of every act of explicit or ‘‘focused’’ intentionality, i.e.,
attention. Whereas the act of singling out an object ‘‘for me’’ (i.e., spezielle Meinung,
Sonderwahrnehmung) from the circumspection of a general objective context (i.e.,
Auffassung/Wahrnehmung) is deemed to be the formal condition for attention, there
has to be a concrete interest involved to describe the full blown phenomenon of
attention, an interest that is caused by or refers to an intended object. This interest
cannot be reduced to a theoretical interest (as Carl Stumpf does), but has to be
understood primarily as a perceptional one (Hua 38, p. 103). At the same time,
interest refers to the act of attending itself, in that it is described by Husserl – here
using the words of Stumpf – as a pleasure in the very act of noticing (Lust am
Bemerken) (Hua 38, p. 108). Intentionality is thus not only an epistemic process of
intending and fulfillment, but in its concreteness it is also an expression of tension and
resolution of a perceiving subject.2 Although the explicit aim of an intentional act is a
clear and adequate perception of an object, to actually achieve this aim one also needs
a certain involvement in the act of perception, which can be described in terms of a
felt intensity. What Husserl tries to describe here can be called the emotional side of
cognition (Melle 2012, p. 58). Events or objects do not appear to us in a neutral way;
they are of interest to us. That means that a certain feeling is linked to each perception
of an ‘‘interesting’’ object or part of an object. In turn this feeling, be it good or bad,
increases the intensity of the involved interest, which then influences further processes
of noticing. In this context, Husserl states that ‘‘feelings appear to be the actual motors
and sources of interest’’3 and thus of every specific kind of intentionality (attention).
Could one argue from the descriptions above that feelings play the role of a
motor for perception (and action) in general? But in what sense then does Husserl
refer here to feelings? Apparently not in the sense of a proper intentional feeling,
like joy, that presupposes an objectifying act (Wahrnehmung/Vorstellung). But it
also seems to be different from a pure sensual feeling, which is caused by the
perceived object. Concerning these questions, the above-quoted text is relevant in
two ways: first, one can see here an early form of a drive-dynamical understanding
of cognitive processes (Melle 2012, p. 58). Although Husserl abandons this
approach in the Logical Investigations (1900-01), it can be interpreted as a precursor
1
This text (,,Abhandlung über Aufmerksamkeit als Interesse’’) is part of Husserl’s lectures on attention,
which he held in 1904/05 in Göttingen. Cf. Hua 38, pp. 63-123: Über Aufmerksamkeit, spezielle
Meinung.
2
With the differentiation between formal and concrete levels of phenomenological analysis I refer to
A. Steinbock, who argues that while Husserl in earlier texts used to differentiate between deeper (earlier)
and higher (later) levels of foundation – time-consciousness is in this sense regarded as earlier in
comparison to association – from the 1920s onward he no longer speaks of a foundational hierarchy but of
formal and concrete conditions of constitution. Time-consciousness as a formal criterion of constitution
thus has to abstract from the content of experience. For the constitution of a concrete object one needs
association. See Steinbock (1995, 2002).
3
,,[…] so erscheinen Gefühle als die eigentlichen Motoren und Quellen des Interesses’’ (Hua 38,
pp. 108-109).
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 47
4
For further critical analysis of Husserl’s concept of objectifying and non-objectifying acts, see Melle
(1990).
5
The same holds true for the axiological role of feelings, as value-apprehension and value-judgments.
Value-perception also presupposes a neutral perception, the presentation of an object as object. In a
parallel or even simultaneous manner this perception is accompanied by a sensual feeling, caused by the
object. Sensual feelings then give rise to value-apprehensions and value judgments, which lead to proper
feelings like joy, disgust or happiness as their effects. Proper feelings like joy or disgust are thus founded
in value-apprehensive consciousness (,,im werterfassenden Bewusstsein‘‘ Husserl, Ms. A VI 12 II/132a).
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48 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
interests and their feeling basis indeed go beyond an actual encounter with an
object.
In Experience and Judgment Husserl tries to integrate the notion of interest into a
more genetic perspective, although not in the habitual sense described above.
Interest is here presented as a general perceptional drive or a kind of universal
drive-feeling. In this regard perception and cognition not only have an emotional
side, but rather have to be emotionally structured from the beginning: to initiate the
process of perceiving and to keep it going, a certain kind of striving towards the
world and objects is needed. Striving, in turn, would imply feelings of deficit or
curiosity that establish a tension between actual intentions and the potential
fulfillment of these intentions in ongoing perception. I will argue that this general
striving inherent in perception manifests itself in concrete perception in terms of
specific interests of the experiencing subject (be they implicit or explicit, bodily or
personal). This individual style of experiencing is to be considered as the typical
way a subject relates to the world (see Merleau-Ponty 1963), which in turn is an
emotional relating towards the world.6
This personalized and emotional form of ‘‘being in’’ or ‘‘towards the world’’
defines the threshold and saliency criteria for stimuli and things in our surrounding
environment that are able to affect us at a given time. In this sense, it provides the
genetic impetus for any further objectifying process. Rather than understanding
feelings as secondary phenomena, as presupposing objectifying acts, one could in
this sense argue the other way around: already in sensation and receptive perception,
an implicit valuing, a structuring of the experiential field, takes place in the form of
passive differentiations and preferences within the field of perception. Feeling, as a
general striving and expression of concrete preferences (habits), can thus be
interpreted as a concrete motivational necessity for every object constitution, that is,
for full-blown object perception. Although proper intentional feelings are founded in
objectifying consciousness in a static-conceptual or abstract sense, feelings
(understood as intentional striving or habitual profile) can also count as founding
in a genetic or concrete sense, as described above.7 While in the first case
objectifying acts are essentially or conceptually necessary for proper intentional
feelings and further acts of valuing, in the second case feelings are a concrete or
even existential8 necessity for object perception. They motivate or even allow for a
6
Jan Slaby (2008) would define this as affective intentionality.
7
For a similar differentiation between abstract and concrete foundational orders, see Steinbock (2002,
p. 250). Steinbock describes the static foundation as a formal way of founding that goes from simple to
complex states of consciousness, while the concrete genetic foundational order is dealing with the
complex interrelations of the genetic layers. Steinbock argues that Husserl, in his later works, no longer
differentiates between lower or more fundamental stages of constitution and less fundamental stages, but
instead speaks of formal and concrete constitution. Time consciousness is thus no longer more
fundamental but considered only as abstract or formal necessity for genetic constitution, while for a
concrete constitution the synthesis of association is needed (Hua 11, p. 128; Steinbock 2002, p. 246.).
8
For an analogous argument, see Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, which
he turns on its head in saying that existence includes the I-think and not vice versa (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
p. 403). In the same way as the movement and situatedness of existing comes first, one could argue that
feeling or drives are more fundamental than higher forms of cognition like objectifying acts. Descartes
argued instead from an epistemological point of view: only in and through thinking do we know that we
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 49
(selective) sensitivity towards (certain) outer stimuli, which then affect us and
motivate a further turning towards these stimuli, which can lead to a fully developed
object perception (objectifying acts).
In the first section of this paper, I will analyze the relation between intentionality
and feelings in the context of explicit perceptual intentionality – that is, focused,
attentive perception. According to Husserl’s definition, attention is comprised of
and defined by a formal component, i.e., the structure of intentionality, and a
qualitative component, interest. Interest as the ‘‘emotional’’ aspect of attention
seems in this context to serve the common cognitive ‘‘goal’’ of intentionality: the
clear and distinct perception of things. In this sense, it motivates and stabilizes the
progress of ongoing perception. In the second section, I turn to the relation between
operative intentionality and feelings. In Experience and Judgment Husserl
differentiates between a narrow and a broad notion of interest and includes passive
or bodily forms of interest. Interest in the broad sense is characterized as expression
of a general perceptual drive and, therefore, as a necessary motivational condition
for all higher forms of intentionality. The third and concluding section describes the
different interplays between feeling-based subjective dispositions such as moods,
interests or habitualized feelings, which motivate and shape lifeworldly experience.
Based on the findings of section one and two it aims to present a different view of
foundation, where feeling dispositions form a primary layer founding higher
processes of objectivation and intentionality. In this sense, habitual feelings can
indeed be interpreted as a psychological motor of concrete perception. The overall
thesis I present here is that intentionality understood from a concrete perspective
must always be an affective-intentionality (Slaby 2008). The way we emotionally
relate to the world influences how and if we experience things in a given time and
place.9
The expression that feelings might function as a ‘‘motor’’ for perception comes from
Husserl’s lecture on perception and attention from 1904/05, as quoted above. This
statement does not refer to a mere receptive perception, but rather to the cognitive
acts which might determine a concrete perceptual object more closely. These acts
are realized in a process of intention and fulfillment and can be interpreted as
Footnote 8 continued
exist. In Husserl one can see both tendencies – an epistemological or static approach, which has to start
with what is given, and a genetic approach, which goes back to pre-predicative and objective levels of
consciousness. In the latter, egoless activities like passive syntheses presuppose the I-perceive or I-think.
These genetic ideas can be also interpreted in an existential (Merleau-Ponty), developmental-psycholo-
gical or even evolutionary way (see Thompson 2007).
9
In radical cases this may also influence the operation of the passive syntheses such as time-
consciousness and association, as can be seen in psychopathologies. In research on patients with mood
disorders and schizophrenia, for example, it was shown that the structure of time consciousness is
deranged and fragmented (Gallagher 2005, Fuchs 2007, Bovet and Parnas 1993).
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50 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
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‘‘delight in noticing’’ (Lust am Bemerken; Hua 38, pp. 110, 118). Against Stumpf,
however, he emphasizes that this delight is not to be described as a theoretical
interest in an object but has its ‘‘main sources in feelings’’ (Hua 38, p. 108).
Husserl starts his description of interest by comparing it to similar acts like a
wish, expectation or desire (Hua 38, p. 104). In this sense, interest is different from
perceptional or thetic acts: the structure of intentions and fulfillment is not related to
the identification of the intended object through the intentions. The fulfillment of a
wish, desire, or will is thus not characterized as an intuition but more as a relaxation
of tension, a satisfaction. Interest, in contrast to other intentions, is thus connected
with a feeling of lack that leads to a tension that wants to be satisfied in further
perceptions. Although interest mostly appears as one of these acts (e.g., expectation,
wishing, willing) or as a component thereof, it has to be differentiated from them
descriptively, since it represents a necessary condition of these acts. There can be
intentionality without an involved expectation or wish, but there can be no
(thematic) intentionality without any form of interest, even if it is only a fleeting and
minimal intensity (Hua 38, p. 106).
So on the one side, Husserl tries to integrate interest into the same hierarchical schema
of foundation that he provided in the Logical Investigations. Interest that is expressed in
acts like wishing and desiring has to be founded by acts of perception or belief
(Vorstellungsakte). In contrast to the mere formal aspect of thematic intentionality, the
respective interest (expressed as wish, desire or will) is described in terms of intensity.
But this satisfaction presupposes in turn an intuition, an objectifying act: the wished or
willed object has to be first presented or given, to then be able to cause a satisfaction. In
terms of phenomenological descriptions, the function of the formal aspect of thematic
intentionality proves to be prior in relation to the role played by interest. For interest to be
effective, it logically presupposes the possibility of a representation of an item ‘‘for
itself’’ (Hua 38, p. 118). The formal structure of this specific (thematic) intentionality
ensures that something can be the object of attention at all, while interest only relates to
the how, the quality or intensity, of the current perception.
On the other side, Husserl emphasizes the emotional dimension of our cognitive
nature and argues for feelings as the motor of interest, the motor of further noticing
and therefore of intuitive fulfillment. In this sense feelings, as interest, act as a
general motor for the operation of perceptual processes and at the same time as a
stabilizer for specific intentions, which demand lasting concentration on a thing over
a long time period.14 In this context Husserl highlights the fact that our mental
nature (geistige Natur) has two sides, an intellectual and an emotional side. Both
sides manifest themselves in acts that alternate, replace or permeate each other.15
The same hold true for concrete acts of attention; only in theoretical description is it
possible to make a strict functional separation of thematic intentionality (Meinung,
Wahrnehmung) from interest. In lifeworldly experience these two aspects go ‘‘hand
14
In psychology this form of attention is called ‘‘vigilance’’. Cf. Goldhammer and Moosbrugger (2006,
pp. 16-33; here p. 24).
15
,,Unsere geistige Natur hat zwei Seiten, eine intellektuelle und eine emotionelle, die in mannigfach
wechselnden, bald einander ablösenden, bald einander durchdringenden Akten sich äußert.‘‘ (Hua 38,
p. 163)
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52 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
in hand’’ (Hua 38, p. 119) and are similarly constitutive of the phenomenon of
attention.16 Both establish a practical unity by combining that which ‘‘appears
together in experience [erfahrungsmäßig gemeinsam auftritt]’’ (Hua 38, p. 119).
In concrete experience the more familiar descriptive hierarchy does not seem so
clear anymore. Which comes first, the intellectual or the emotional aspect of the
mental? Or are they interchangeable? In the same sense as the two souls of
intentionality – the mental and the emotional – permeate or penetrate each other, it
seems that feeling here means both something that can be caused by an object and
then turn into a specific interest, and an essential emotional aspect of intentionality,
here defined as a general interest, that always accompanies a feeling, be it negative
or positive. Interest could in this sense be conceived as a striving towards the further
examination of an object, a general drive (feeling) that in its concrete manifestation
accompanies a specific feeling. Concrete perception without an interest is thus not
conceivable, since for Husserl ‘‘motives for preferences’’ always have to be in place
(cf. Hua 38, p. 108). Still, the purpose that Husserl gives for supplementing
intentionality with an emotional aspect is quite clear: it is supposed to support the
process of noticing and therefore the clear and distinct perception of things (cf. Hua
38, pp. 110, 118). But what is new here is that Husserl ascribes a genetic dynamic as
well as an aspect of urge or desire (Lust) to intentionality, which points towards the
later-developed concept of drive-intentionality.17
How then can we come to understand the relation between interest and feelings?
Husserl seems to talk about feeling in this context in quite a naı̈ve way. He does not
differentiate explicitly between different senses in which he refers to feelings. In
some contexts it seems that the feelings he talks about cause a specific interest
(mediated by the perception of an object) and in others he seems to refer to a general
form of interest that is in play in every intentionality. Does this general interest then
only tag along with changing feelings, or is it even to be considered itself a sort of
drive-feeling? Unfortunately Husserl does not further elaborate on the different
notions of feelings in use here and leaves us in uncertainty. On the one hand,
Husserl argues that interest is accompanied by a feeling – regardless of whether this
is delight or any other sort of feeling like fear or disgust – that increases the intensity
16
Husserl speaks in this context of a reciprocal influence or an operating circle (Wirkkreis). Cf. Hua 38,
p. 119.
17
But this has consequences for the ideal aim of perception, namely the distinct and clear givenness of
an object, i.e., adequate perception. This is because interest does not reach its peak when the intended
objective moments are fulfilled or ‘‘saturated’’ (gesättigt, Hua 38, p. 107) as in cognitive intentionality,
but rather reaches its peak when something is absent or the experiencing subject is literally ‘‘missing’’
something. Interest is thus drawn especially to new and potential upcoming things, and this is why interest
wanes before well-known objects, for example after an ‘‘all-sided and exhaustive inspection’’ (Hua 38,
p. 108): ‘‘When the contexts of perception are passed through several times and every detail is familiar to
us, we lose interest in the perceived thing, it becomes boring.’’ (Hua 38, p. 108: ,,Sind die
Wahrnehmungszusammenhänge öfters durchlaufen und uns jede Einzelheit vertraut geworden, so verliert
die Sache an Interesse, sie wird langweilig’’). Interest is indeed a force that facilitates noticing and thus
supports a better perception, but at the same time it opposes itself to this teleological alignment, because
the all-too-familiar weakens interest and in this sense makes room for new impressions. The adequate
givenness of things as a general ideal of phenomenology turns, in this practical sense, into a relative
optimum, which defines itself in relation to current actions and interests of the experiencing subject (cf.
also Hua 39, p. 204; Hua 11, pp. 23f).
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 53
of the interest involved (cf. Hua 38, p. 107). According to this description, feelings
seem to be attached or interwoven with the process of interest and thus perception.
But on the other hand Husserl defines feelings in the same paragraph as the actual
sources of interest. In this sense the expression ‘‘to have an interest in something’’
receives a meaning that goes far beyond its actual definition, as Husserl points out
(Hua 38, p. 108).
So it seems that we have to differentiate between a narrow and a broad
conception of interest in the text. In the narrow sense, interest is caused by a
perceived object and accompanied by a sensory feeling (caused by the same object).
In the broad sense, interest is a motivating function within perception and thus a
necessary component of every intentionality. Interest in the broad sense (as general
function and dynamical process of tension and relaxation) is then always followed
by a drive-feeling, i.e., pleasure. In concrete perception this general delight in
noticing can be ‘‘taken over’’ or even ‘‘eliminated’’ by a ‘‘‘stronger’ feeling’’ that is
tied to the perceived thing (Hua 38, p. 107). So in the broad sense, interest seems to
be tied to feelings in an even more direct and dynamic way. It is the rhythm of
tension and release in a temporally continuous act of interest that causes delight or
pleasure, i.e., that is experienced as delightful.18 But interest is not itself to be
identified with pleasure or delight. Although both are interwoven and cannot be
separated in the process of perception, Husserl insists that pleasure, as a kind of
drive-feeling, is only secondarily attached to the dynamical act of interest (Hua 38,
p. 107). While interest as a functional term is more fundamental than the felt
dimension that accompanies it, interest – both in the narrow and broad sense – in
turn presupposes for Husserl the objectifying function of perception.
In what sense, then, does Husserl speak of interest as a motor of perception? Husserl
admits that although interest presupposes an object as presented for itself (für-sich-
Vorgestelltes), which entails the objectifying function that provides such a singled out
object, one could also argue that the interest which causes the very same process
(singling out) in the first place is prior (Hua 38, p. 118). In the second sense we refer,
according to Husserl, to the psychological (concrete) achievements of interest, i.e., its
status as a motor of (further) perceptions, while in the first sense interest is described as a
current and static state of attention, i.e., the interest that is attention. This static interest
presupposes an objectifying act that separates an object from its mere surroundings to
bring it into focus. In the second sense, we refer to interest as something that makes us
notice or pay attention and thus motivates the specific singling out of an object or part of
an object in ongoing perception (Hua 38, p. 118). Only in this dynamic and concrete
sense can we call interest a motor for further perceptions.
Yet should there not always be a concrete interest or a general existential interest
to motivate something as the distinguished act of attention, i.e., focused perception?
In reducing the phenomenon of attention to the current state of concentration or
being busy with something (Hua 38, p. 118), Husserl leaves out the dynamic and
18
,,[D]elight in the rhythmic processes of interest, which is characterized likewise through processes of
tension and release […], a delight in (the progress of) attending.’’ (‘‘Lust an dem Rhythmus des sich
spannenden und zugleich lösenden Interesses […], eine Lust (an dem Fortgang) des Aufmerkens.’’ Hua
38, p. 108).
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(the objective surroundings) must first exert some allure on the ego. But, at the same
time, there has to be a ‘‘tendency to give way’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 78) from the
subjective side of the ego. Affection is therefore to be seen as the lowest level of
activity of the ego, which is based on the passive syntheses of association and
internal-time consciousness.
In Experience and Judgment the notion of interest is therefore seen as the actual
and practical expression of the ‘‘tendency of the ego in experience’’ (Husserl 1973,
p. 81). What Husserl especially emphasizes is the character of striving involved
here, which points to the motivational function of interest. This striving is described
not only as the motor of further perceptions but also as a motor for the ‘‘doings’’
(1973, p. 85) of the subject (i.e., its actions). It leads to practical, kinaesthetic,
‘‘realizations’’ of noematic horizons of the perceived object (1973, p. 84). Interest
understood as a practical tendency or striving of the ego not only relates to a
specific, thematic intentional object, but also contributes to the constitution of an
intentional object itself, in that it is continuously uncovering and realizing horizons
of the given, and hence motivating new perceptions and actions. Interest here
appears to be an integral part of intentionality, which integrates concepts of bodily
movement and the horizons of perception.
Here Husserl explicitly differentiates between a narrow and a broad concept of
interest. While the narrow concept of interest is quite similar to Carl Stumpf’s
notion of theoretic interest, as a thematic interest one has for an object or subject-
matter over a course of time – for example, during a scientific study – the broad
notion of interest is described by Husserl more as a general perceptional drive. For
Husserl, the narrow notion of interest refers to acts in which I am thematically
turned toward an object, i.e., ‘‘perceiving it, perhaps, and then examining it
thoroughly’’, while the broader notion of interest refers to ‘‘every act of turning-
towards of the ego, whether transitory or continuous, every act of the ego’s being
with (inter-esse)’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 86). Beyond Husserl, I would interpret this in a
more Merleau-Pontian way. Interest expresses itself in a narrower sense in acts of
concentration on specific topics as well as in a broader sense of being-with and
toward the world, i.e., in every form of subjective (bodily and ego-like) engagement
with the world.
This general interest (perceptional striving) then manifests or expresses itself as
concrete forms of interest (of an individual subject) on different levels of activities.
In these concrete forms, interests are either caused from the bottom up, by sensuous
stimuli or objects, or from the top down by habitual interests that precede and go
beyond the current acts of perception.
As described above, affectivity has to be considered as the lowest level of
activity. The next higher level of activity would then be a striving towards a
kinaesthetic realization (cf. Husserl 1973, p. 84), which could be defined as a bodily
form of interest. The interest in an object that has been awakened by affection leads
then to practical possibilities to see that object in different appearances. This bodily
realization of interest can take the form of a will to knowledge in higher stages of
intentionality, such as in intellectual acts like thinking. A specific bodily turning
towards, however, must be characterized as an active process that does not
necessarily include the involvement of an ego and thus can take place without a
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21
This kind of operative intentionality in Husserl is also analysed and emphasized by Lotz (2002,
p. 25).
22
Therefore it is not adequate to describe all movements and bodily processes as zombie-like behavior
or complete unconsciousness, which is stated in most approaches in the analytical debate on
consciousness and attention (Koch and Crick 2001, Frith and Rees 2007). If we argue for a ‘‘stage-
model’’ of intentionality, these operative forms of intentionality could also be characteristic of the way
children relate to the world before they acquire higher intellectual capacities such as speech, and it could
also be characteristic of certain ‘‘higher’’ animals. Infants as well as children experience their
environment and themselves in a certain way; therefore consciousness, in a phenomenological definition,
should be ascribed to both of them.
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 57
turns into the actual theme of attention. In this context Husserl must also
differentiate between different levels of interest as levels of turning towards the
world and/or objects. Not only can we relate to the world in different ways, but we
can distinguish different grades of activity or passivity in this turning towards.
These activities lead to objectivations and objective givenness, which in turn
provide and enrich the field of the pregivenness (original passivity) and motivate
further activities. Closely intertwined with this idea of different levels of activity or
engagement is the concept of horizon. In this sense not only the noematic aspect of
horizons are of importance – i.e., the inner and outer horizon of the perceived object
– but also the noetic aspects, i.e., the foreground and background experiences and
their subjective (habitual) motivations.
Prior to the selection of foreground and background by the engagement of the
ego, there must be a tendency in place that precedes the ego, ‘‘the tendency as
stimulus’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 78). This stimulus first has to ‘‘attract’’ the ego to
change its engagement from the background to the foreground of subjective
experience. But why is one stimulus or one pre-objective unity more prominent than
others? I would argue that this is because of a habitual dimension of interest
influencing every subjective experience that selectively structures the field of
pregivenness into more and less relevant parts. This subjective-habitual profile can
also be described in terms of a noetic horizon, which guides perception in a passive
and implicit way and structures the field of perception for a subject into foreground
and background. While the noematic horizon refers to the structure of the objective
field of a current perception (inner and outer horizon of a perceived object), the
noetic horizon motivates further perceiving, it makes us perceive in that it
determines our sensitivity towards certain stimuli or situations.
It is in this sense that one could argue that before a specific ‘‘tending-towards’’
and its further ‘‘realization’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 80) can take place, there has to be a
general ‘‘tendency to give way’’, a special or individual sensitivity and alertness of
the subject towards the environment.23 Interest can thus not only be understood as
something that is caused by an affection or proper object perception (and thus with
the sensual feeling that goes along with it), but could also be interpreted as
something that was already there before a concrete affection took place. If one is
interested in the question why we are affected or awakened by certain stimuli and
not by others, one has to consider the notion of interest in an habitual way, as
something that makes us take notice and even on a deeper level makes us sensitive
and open for special environmental factors. Only then could one explain the specific
or typical structure of a field of pregivenness and givenness (noematic horizon) and
get a hint as to why some parts have a special affective force for that same subject
(or a group of subjects), while others do not.
23
Lotz is heading in a similar direction when he argues that there need not always be an affection to
awake the ego. Already on the side of the ego there has to be a certain specified directedness towards the
perceptional field. According to Lotz, every consciousness has a certain attitude toward the things that
affect it. Contrary to Lotz, I would not go so far as to argue that the directedness (Gerichtetheit) or
determination of the subject must already be considered a form of value attitude (Werthaltung) (cf. Lotz
2002, p. 26).
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58 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
24
One has to be careful with the use of the term ‘‘innate.’’ Recent studies in developmental psychology
and genetics point out that this static category of innateness still involves a development, one that either
takes place in the relation of the respective organism to its environment (the womb) before being born, or
can be seen as a long-term development beyond the limits of one generation. If this article focuses on the
genetic-practical aspects, i.e., bodily aspects, of affects and feelings, that does not mean that these aspects
are seen to be innate as, for example, Johnstone presents them in his article on the bodily roots of emotion
(Johnstone 2012, pp. 179-200). In discussing the passive and bodily nature of feeling and perception, this
article rather wants to point out that the relativity and historicity of these affects and feelings are
inscribed, developed and stabilized in and through the body.
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 59
As shown above, the concept of interest can neither be reduced to the actual
operating interest in perception nor to the intellectual state of consciousness, where
the content or the mere existence of such an interest is explicitly present to the
perceiving subject. Beyond Husserl’s considerations on the role of interest in
relation to current perceptual events, it must be added that every intentional act not
only needs an accompanying interest, but moreover, the intentional act – or better
the subject of intention – needs to have an habitual horizon of interests which
motivates such acts in the first place. In the latter case, interest as a factor of
motivational reason (Rang 1973, p. 127) precedes every actual act of attention and
even every passive event of affection. Hence one has to differentiate between a
currently operating interest and the habitual interest, which implicitly influences the
openness of affection, attention and changes of attention ‘‘a priori’’.
Experience leaves not only permanent traces like habits or bodily skills, but also
temporary after-effects in the form of a certain general mood (Stimmung), which can
influence further perceptions. In the A-manuscripts Husserl speaks in this case of a
‘‘rosy light’’ which permeates all further perceptions. The rosy light may be caused,
for instance, by a beautiful experience with a loved one. This puts the experiencing
subject in a residual positive mood which is then automatically transferred to his/her
environment and the things in it: ‘‘For instance I take a book into my hand and gaze
around into the room: Everything has gained worth and attraction from her [former]
presence;’’ or in another passage, ‘‘How beautiful the world is! The whole world is
illuminated and receives light from the beloved’’ (Ms. A VI 12 II/134b).
If we stick to the logical-theoretical explanation that Husserl offers, one would
have to argue that the mood only influences the how, i.e., the valuing of the
perceived objects, and therefore presupposes an apprehension, an objectifying act.
Yet let us try to switch our perspective away from different act-classifications
toward a view that encompasses the whole of the experiencing subject. From such a
dynamic perspective one can argue that the mood or the habitual interest profile also
influences what, in a given moment, is able to affect me, i.e., what is able to ‘‘wake’’
me because of its standing out from the background of my (former) experience.
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60 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
What wakes me may thus stand out from the background because it is similar or
opposed to the former experience of the subject. This is what Husserl describes as
the passive synthesis of association, which follows the criteria of similarity and
contrast. This passive standing-out from a background is not yet a proper object but
generates a pre-objective unity, which is the foundation of any further objectifying
acts or achievements of consciousness. The mood is in this sense not only able to
influence the constitution of an object but can also influence the habitual and bodily
profile of interests, which integrate former sensations, experiences, and their
associated feelings of the subject. This profile not only influences each and every
future perception but is also concurrently constituted and changed by this very
experience itself.
Although Husserl himself does not mention such an habitual dimension of
interests explicitly – neither in his early text about attention nor in Experience and
Judgment – his descriptions of moods and steadier feelings like love can indicate
such a motivational dimension. Actual feelings (caused by an object or stimulus)
can turn into moods and thus not only motivate the current interests in an intentional
act but also help to turn these interests into habits that guide further perceptions. In
contrast to moods, which Husserl understands as after-effects of a current experience
of value – like the perception of a loved one that bathes all subsequent experiences
in a rosy light – we could also talk of something like a habitualized feeling (one that
leads to habitual interests). To love someone, for example, cannot be reduced to an
actual value-perception of a lovable object but must be characterized as an attitude
or habitualized feeling. Habitual feelings would then manifest themselves in a more
sustainable way than an elusive mood, which goes together with a typical style of
perceiving. Thus this love will not only influence further perceptions of the loved
one, but also the perceptional style of a subject in general, in that we focus or even
only come to notice things because we associate them with, or they remind us of, the
loved one. We then see the world with the eyes of the loved one; this love becomes
part of our habitual style of perception and thus motivates specific object
perceptions and actions. The noetic horizon, which we defined above as the sum of
current and habitual motivational factors of an individual subject, must also
therefore be considered an affective horizon.
In this sense it would go along with an intentionality that can be characterized as
affective intentionality, as proposed by Jan Slaby. With his notion of affective
intentionality, Slaby wants to point out that intentionality ‘‘is in the most central
cases not a cold, detached, purely cognitive affair, but is rather constitutively
feelings-involving’’ (Slaby 2008, p. 429). Intentionality understood in a broad sense
as world-directedness and world enclosing must therefore include emotional
aspects, because this turning towards a world is never detached from current desires
or habitual interests and feelings. Concrete experience then must be considered as
emotional experience: ‘‘Emotional experience discloses or makes manifest what is
currently of relevance to us’’ (Slaby 2008, p. 443). It is thus the emotional side of
cognition and experience which personalizes intentionality, in that it reveals to us
‘‘not only what is significant’’, but also informs us (implicitly) about the position/
condition of ourselves in relation to what we experience: ‘‘how things are going for
us, how things stand with regard to our well-being’’ (Slaby 2008, p. 438).
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 61
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62 Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64
26
,,Es gibt in der Wachheit (als Korrelat des Schlafes) überhaupt keine absolute Interessenlosigkeit, und
was das ‘interesselos verlaufend heißt, ist selbst ein Relevanzphänomen niederster Stufe‘‘. (Hua 39,
p. 596)
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Husserl Stud (2015) 31:45–64 63
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