Sudden Collapse of the 27-Story Space

Building in Medellin, Colombia

Luis E. Yamin, Ph.D. 1; Juan F. Correal, Ph.D., M.ASCE 2; Juan C. Reyes, Ph.D., M.ASCE 3;
Fernando Ramirez, Ph.D. 4; Raul Rincón 5; Alvaro I. Hurtado, M.ASCE 6; and Juan F. Dorado 7

Abstract: This paper summarizes the different activities undertaken in order to identify the main causes of the collapse of the Space
Building, a 27-story reinforced concrete framed building in Medellín, Colombia. Site investigations, field and laboratory tests, and a detailed
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analytical work including structural analysis under different considerations were carried out. The main cause of the collapse was associated
with the deficient structural capacities of the columns of the building in relation to the dead and service loads imposed at the time of the
collapse. The occurrence of high differential settlements, the high compressive stresses in main columns, the repair works that were carried
out minutes before the collapse, and the probable shear failure of beams and compressive failure of partitions walls during repair works were
identified as probable secondary causes and detonating factors of the building collapse. The authors of this investigation considered that if the
building had been designed adequately using the Colombian building design codes available at that time, it would not have collapsed, even if
most of the aforementioned detonating events had occurred. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0001148. © 2018 American Society of
Civil Engineers.

Introduction
Collapses of reinforced concrete residential buildings because of
gravitational loads have caused not only devastating life and eco-
nomic losses, but are also an important detriment to the engineering
profession’s reputation. Therefore, it is important that the engineer-
ing community not only study the causes of collapses but also
document each case in order to learn from the mistakes and avoid
them happening again. One of the most tragic cases reported in the
literature was the collapse of the Zumrut residential apartment
building, located in the city of Konya in Turkey. This 9-story re-
inforced concrete building collapsed on February 2, 2004, causing
the death of 92 people. In this case, the investigators found the fol-
lowing building problems (Kaltakci et al. 2013): (1) important
1
Associate Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia (corresponding
author). E-mail: lyamin@uniandes.edu.co
2
Associate Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia. E-mail: jcorreal@
uniandes.edu.co
3
Associate Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia. E-mail: jureyes@
uniandes.edu.co
4
Associate Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia. E-mail: framirez@
uniandes.edu.co
5
Instructor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Universidad
de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia. E-mail: jr.rincon3391@
uniandes.edu.co
6
Research Assistant, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia. E-mail: ai
.hurtado77@uniandes.edu.co
7
Research Assistant, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia. E-mail: jf
.dorado285@uniandes.edu.co
Note. This manuscript was submitted on April 25, 2017; approved on
October 17, 2017; published online on February 16, 2018. Discussion per-
iod open until July 16, 2018; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, © ASCE, ISSN 0887-3828.
differences between actual and design loads; (2) inadequate floor
system thickness; (3) insufficient reinforcement; (4) overloads at
the foundation level; (5) concrete strengths smaller than the mini-
mum specified; (6) dimensions of structural elements lower than
those specified; and (7) vertical elements with excessive concrete
cover. It was concluded that the building failed by creep attributable
to design flaws and errors in the construction process.
In October 2004, in an area near the Zumrut building, the failure
of two basement columns of the Altinbasak residential building
was also reported (Kaltakci et al. 2007). The causes of this event
were similar to those found in the Zumrut building. Another case
reported in the literature corresponds to the collapse of the Lian Yak
Building in Singapore on March 15, 1986, which caused the death
of 33 people. The sudden collapse of this building was mainly
attributed to the underestimation of dead loads during the design
process, which led to an inadequate design of structural elements,
especially columns (Standing Committee on Structural Safety
1987; National Geographic Channel 2005).
In October 2013, the media reported the collapse of the Space
Building located in Medellín, Colombia (García et al. 2014).
Although the building was conceived and designed as a unit, it was
constructed by stages. The 27-story stage (the last of the six stages)
was completed by the end of April 2013. Six months later, one of
the columns on the fourth level of this stage failed. The city of
Medellín authorities [Disaster Risk Management Administrative
Department (DAGRD)] decided to evacuate Stage 6 of the building.
Meanwhile, the construction company started repairing works.
On October 12, 2013, at 8:20 p.m. and with no apparent cause,
Stage 6 suddenly collapsed, killing 12 people; the largest part of the
building (Stages 1–5), occupied at that moment, did not collapsed.
This paper presents the results of a comprehensive research con-
ducted to establish the main causes of the collapse of this building,
including a general description of the building, main construction
deficiencies reported, results of field and laboratory investigations,
analyses of compliance with building code requirements, and
the computational modeling conducted to understand the causes of
collapse.

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 Building Description
The Space Building was a 27-story reinforced concrete building,
irregular in plan and height, located in Medellín, Colombia; the
building’s east elevation and typical plan view are shown in Figs. 1
and 2. According to the available official construction documents,
the structure was designed as a residential building according to the
1998 Colombian Building Design Code (NSR-98) for Seismic
Zone 5 (Aa ¼ 0.2g) and soil profile S2 (S ¼ 1.2) (AIS 2014).
The NSR-98 code and its current version NSR-10 (AIS 2010)
are based on the ACI 318-95 (ACI 1995) and ACI 318-08 (ACI
2008) requirements, respectively. Although the building was con-
structed by stages, it was designed as a unique structure. The last
stage (Stage 6) had 23 stories over four basements (Fig. 1). The
lateral load–resisting system consisted of moment-resisting frames
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(MRF) in the longitudinal and radial-transverse directions with a
specified concrete strength of 21 MPa for all structural elements,
except for the basement columns at Stage 6, where a concrete
strength of 35 MPa was specified. Both specified concrete strengths
are permitted by the Colombian building design codes. Partitions
consisted of unreinforced masonry walls without any specification
of isolation or connection to the main structural elements. All col-
umns of the lateral load–resisting system had a rectangular cross
section of 0.20 × 1.50 m [Fig. 3(a)], except those located along
the x-axis (Fig. 2) which had 0.20 × 1.00 m [Fig. 3(b)] and
those below the first story of Stage 6, which had 0.20 × 1.80 m
[Fig. 3(c)]. Unreinforced concrete masonry walls and aluminum
window panels conformed the façade of the building.
The floor system (Fig. 4) consisted of two-way slabs with var-
iable thickness supported by rectangular beams with cross section

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6

X E H K N Q T
Level

23
19
17
15
13
11

-4

Fig. 1. Elevation view of the space residential building

K L M N
J O
I P
Column R3
H
Q
G 6.60 m Column S3
R
7.17 m
F S S1
T
U
E Stage 4

Column R5
D
Column S5
C
B

X 3 4 5

1 2

Fig. 2. Typical plan including axes nomenclature; critical columns are highlighted

© ASCE 04018010-2 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

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 8 N°6
construction firm after some of the main columns presented signs
4 N°5
of compressive distresses.

N° 2 @0.15 m 4 N°5
N°2 @ 0.15 m Differential Settlements in Several Columns
N° 2 @0.15 m

10 N°4 Settlements measured during the construction phase indicated that

the column located in the intersection of Axes R and 3, Column R3

1.80 m
1.50 m 6 N°4 34 N°5

1.00 m
(Fig. 2), presented a total deflection on the order of 80 mm in
October, 2013 (6 months after the end of construction). This col-
N° 2 @0.30 m N° 2 @0.30 m N° 2 @0.30 m
umn had evidenced signs of distress in February 2013 (2 months
before the end of construction) at the fifth story. Other columns
4 N°5
presented simultaneously settlements in the order of 40–60 mm.
4 N°5 0.20 m 8 N°6
At this time, the construction firm and the designer decided
0.20 m to reinforce the foundation of Column R3 with two additional
0.20 m
piles firmly connected to the original pile. Some months later,
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Cross section for (a) typical columns; (b) x-axis columns;
(c) columns at basement of Stage 6
of 0.20 × 0.50 m in the longitudinal direction and 0.40 × 0.30 m in
the radial direction of the building. The thickness of the slab varied
from 0.06 or 0.10 m depending on the building stage to 0.40 m
[Fig. 4(c)]. The foundation of the building was composed of 0.40 ×
0.40 m grade beams and cast-in-place concrete belled piles with
typical shaft diameter of 1.20 m, and bell diameters varying from
1.90 to 3.0 m. The piles included reinforcement up to a depth of
4 m; below that depth, they were built using cyclopean concrete.
The foundation did not consider pile caps, as shown in Fig. 5.
Construction Deficiencies
A series of construction deficiencies and problems were identified
during the field investigation activities. The most relevant were
the differential settlements observed during construction, the solu-
tions adopted by the construction firm in order to correct the high
vertical deflections of the slabs, and the inadequate reaction of the
(c) on October 11, 2013, just 1 day before the building collapse,
Column S3 evidenced signs of compression failure. According
to current building design codes (AIS 2010; ACI 2014) the maxi-
mum allowable differential settlement between columns for this
building was approximately 8 mm, 1/10 the maximum registered.
However, the NSR-98 did not specify provisions about this issue.
After a detailed revision of the construction reports, it was found
that difficulties during the geotechnical excavations and the pres-
ence of pressurized ground water made it impossible to complete
the increased diameter size (bell-shaped) specified in the design for
the bottom part of the pile in Axis R3. In addition, the same con-
struction difficulties prevented the construction firm from reaching
the specified depth of foundation for this pile. To verify this situa-
tion, in the framework of the present paper, an excavation was
conducted adjacent to Pile R3. Visual inspections confirmed that
Pile R3 did not have the bell-shaped point specified in the design,
and the foundation depth was approximately 15 m instead of the
20 m specified in the geotechnical report. As it is well known,
differential settlements generate an important redistribution of in-
ternal stresses in beams and columns adjacent to the critical zones.
In particular, because of the interconnection between structural el-
ements, the axial loads in columns that evidence the highest settle-
ments tend to reduce significantly, whereas axial loads in neighbor
columns tend to increase proportionally, probably generating im-
portant overloads; in addition, beams connecting columns present

Balcony slab Excessive eccentricity

(variable thickness in beam-column joints
8.15 m from 0.30m to 0.10 m)
0.50 m
A longitudinal beam
0.20 m
(0.20 m × 0.50 m)

1.50 m 1.50 m
7.00 m
B B
Floor slab
(thickness equal to 0.06 m) (b)
7.5 m

Radial beam
(0.40m × 0.30m)
0.06 m or 0.10 m
0.40 m depending on the stage
longitudinal beam
0.30 m

(0.40 m × 0.30 m)

A Typical column Variable thickness of the

(0.20 m × 1.50 m) slab
7.00 m 0.20 m
(a) From 7.00 m to 8.15 m

(c)

Fig. 4. Details in floor system: (a) floor slab; (b) Section A radial cross section; (c) Section B longitudinal cross section

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 0.40 m 4 N°5
Typical column
Typical column B
10 N°4
11 N°6, L=4.0 m Foundation beam

N°3 @0.30 m

0.40 m
Pile

1.20 m
1.50 m
Bell

1.10 m
Concrete pile, 21 MPa

Foundation beam
11 N°6, L=4,0 m

0.20 m N°3 @0.30 m

B
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1.20 m
1.50 m
(a) (b)

Fig. 5. Column-pile connection for typical columns: (a) plan view; (b) Section B

Column location High Vertical Deflection in Slabs

R3 S3 S5
0
L=7.0 m L=7.0 m The contractor reported problems during the construction of the
Start Start floors, such as cracks and high vertical deflections in the floor slab,
10 construction. building
03/01/2011 dislocation of floor tablets, abundant cracking in masonry parti-
To tal s et tlemen ts (mm)

occupation
20 by owners, tions, and others. The construction logbooks reported deflections
30 04/03/2013
ranging from 5 to 20 cm in the central zone of typical two-way
40 Distress in slabs (clear span of approximately 8 m). Initially, in order to correct
R3 column, Differential
50 02/26/2013 Differential settlement these high deflections, the contractor ordered a concrete fill to level
S5-S3= 5 mm
60 Foundation settlement the floor surface. A mixture of mortar and polystyrene spheres was
retrofit, R3-S3= 54 mm
70 08/21/2013 used for this purpose. From the debris of the collapsed structure,
One day prior samples of this lightweight mortar were recovered to conduct
80 to colapse.
10/11/2013 density tests, which reported specific weight values from 14 to
90
18 kN=m3 . Later, the construction firm decided to increase the
Fig. 6. Differential settlement during construction and postconstruction minimum thickness of floor slabs in the central zone from an initial
value of 6 cm to a thickness of 10 cm. Considering the advance
of the construction of Stage 6, this modification was only imple-
mented above the sixth floor. However, the proposed solution
Table 1. Space Building Collapse: Chronology Events
was not effective, and mortar filling was also reported in the upper
stories. In general, the estimated overload caused by these floor
Date Event fillings ranged from 0.6 to 1.0 kN=m2 . No evidence was found of
February 2006 Stage 1 of construction started any verification or revision of the design as a consequence of the
March 1, 2011 Stage 6 of construction started change in slab thickness or generated overloads.
February 2, 2013 Allowable differential settlement were
exceeded with high values in one pile
(pile located under Column R3) Damage in Main Columns
February 20, 2013 Evidence of distress in Column R3 column at
fifth level As explained before, some columns evidenced signs of distress
April 10, 2013 Residents were allowed to use Stage 6 8 months before the collapse of the building. The first report was
August 2013 Construction of foundation retrofit in R3 piles on Column R3, which showed loss in concrete cover and partial
October 11, 2013 Structural failure in Column S3 buckling of one longitudinal bar near the upper joint at the fifth-
October 12, 2013 Building collapse story level. On October 11, 2013, the second important event was
reported in Column S3 at the fourth level (adjacent to Column R3).
Figs. 7(a and b) illustrate the compression failure observed in the
column just 1 day before the collapse of the building. The column
a considerable increase in the shear forces and moments at connect- evidenced a clear diagonal crack, loss of concrete section, buckling
ing joints. Fig. 6 illustrates the total and the differential settlements of all longitudinal bars, and tension failure of stirrups in the central
measured in some of the critical columns of Stage 6. Table 1 sum- part of the column. Total vertical displacement of approximately
marizes the chronology of the main events reported during the 85 mm and horizontal displacement of approximately 30 mm were
construction phase related to differential settlements and signs of measured. From the photographs, it is clear that concrete masonry
distresses in critical columns. partition walls were playing an important role in the prevention of

© ASCE 04018010-4 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil., 2018, 32(3): 04018010

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Fig. 7. Photography of compression failure of Column S3: (a) front view; (b) lateral view; (c) pancaked floor slabs just after Stage 6 collapse
[(a and b) images courtesy of DAGRD]

additional horizontal and vertical displacements once the column

failed in compression.
Despite the clear failure in compression that was observed in the
column and the high risk of collapse, no decision was taken in
relation to the evacuation of the building at this time. Surprisingly,
neither the designer nor the contractor, nor the technical supervi-
sors, recognized the real danger of this failure and the possibility of
a partial or total collapse of the building. A few hours later, after the
visit of the DAGRD office, the geologist Enrique Gomez (director
in charge of the office) decided to evacuate Stage 6 of the building,
occupied at this moment by approximately 60 residents.

Collapse Event

Six months after the end of construction, on October 12, 2013, at
8:20 p.m. and with no apparent external cause, the 27-story Stage 6
of the Space Building suddenly collapsed, killing 12 people. Most
of the fatality victims were workers who were trying to repair
Column S3 at the fourth level. Surprisingly, Stages 1–5 of the build-
ing did not collapse. Fig. 7(c) illustrates the final pancake-type ar-
rangement of the collapsed floor slabs, indicating a vertical collapse
mechanism with no important horizontal load participation.
A detailed field investigation was made immediately after the
collapse. Several important structural damages were observed
in Stage 5, particularly in the columns shared with the collapsed
Stage 6 at the basement level. Considering the high risk of collapse
for the rest of the building, the authorities decided to immediately
evacuate the rest of the building. Some weeks later, after an initial
assessment, the demolition of Stage 5 was ordered by the city
authorities using controlled quantities of explosive to prevent fur-
ther damage to the remaining part of the building and adjoining
constructions. Later on, after the final structural risk assessment
process of the remaining stages, the city authorities decided to
demolish the complete structure (Fig. 8).
Field Investigation
A complete field inspection was performed after the collapse of
Stage 6. Initial activities included geometric and dimensional ver-
ifications using the design drawings available. Differences between
geometric field measurements and design drawings specifications
were negligible. The plumbing of vertical structural elements such
Fig. 8. Demolition of the remaining structure (Stages 1–4) decided by
the city authorities (image courtesy of DAGRD)
as columns and structural walls was also verified. The verticality of
the elements was evaluated by means of plumbing laser levels, and
only 3 out of 53 inspected elements exhibited deviations between
ends of approximately 0.27°. Location, size, and depth of reinforc-
ing bars in the structural elements (beams, columns, and concrete
walls) were determined in more than 200 points using a Ferroscan.
Some results were verified by visual inspection once exposing
the reinforcement in some critical zones. Results indicated that the
location and size of the reinforcement bars were reasonably con-
sistent with that specified in the construction drawings for most
structural elements.
Construction Materials Quality Control
During the construction process, a material quality-control program
was followed. According to the information provided by the con-
struction company, a total of 92 tension tests were performed on
reinforcing bars and 24 tension tests were performed on welded
wire fabrics. Out of the 92 rebar tests, only four bars exhibited a
yield strength slightly below approximately 92.5% of the minimum
specified (fy ¼ 420 MPa). In addition, a total of 539 compressive-
strength test results were obtained from logbooks for specified con-
crete strength of 21 MPa. A total of 27 tests indicated values of fc0
lower that the specified value by more than 3.5 MPa. In addition,

© ASCE 04018010-5 J. Perform. Constr. Facil.

J. Perform. Constr. Facil., 2018, 32(3): 04018010

 Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage
3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6
39.0 39.0
Foundation
Foundation Slabs
Slabs
Specified f'f'c
Specified c Specified f'f'c
Specified c
35.0 35.0
Concrete strength (MPa)

Concrete strength (MPa)

f'c-3.5 MPa
f'c-3.5MPa f'c-3.5 MPa
f'c-3.5MPa

31.0 31.0

27.0 27.0

23.0 23.0

19.0 19.0

15.0 15.0
01/07/2007 20/07/2009 09/08/2011 28/08/2013 01/07/2007 20/07/2009 09/08/2011 28/08/2013
(a) Date [dd/mm/yyyy] (b) Date [dd/mm/yyyy]
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Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage Stage

3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6
39.0 39.0
Walls
Walls Columns
Columns
Specified f'f'c
Specified c Specified f'f'c
Specified c
Concrete strength (MPa)

35.0 35.0

Concrete strength (MPa)

f'c-3.5 MPa
f'c-3.5MPa f'c-3.5MPa
f'c-3.5 MPa

31.0 31.0

27.0 27.0

23.0 23.0

19.0 19.0

15.0 15.0
01/07/2007 20/07/2009 09/08/2011 28/08/2013 01/07/2007 20/07/2009 09/08/2011 28/08/2013
(c) Date [dd/mm/yyyy] (d) Date [dd/mm/yyyy]

Fig. 9. Construction quality control in concrete strength: (a) foundations; (b) slabs; (c) concrete walls; (d) columns

109 arithmetic averages of three consecutive strengths had Table 2. Drill Cores Extracted in the Building
results below the specified fc0 . For the case of 35 MPa concrete, Element Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Total
21 tests results were available, wherein all of the individual results
were above (f c0 − 3.5) MPa and nine arithmetic averages were Columns 17 9 15 11 5 4 61
Beams 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
below fc0.
Floor slabs 1 0 0 1 0 2 4
In order to check the concrete strength of those batches falling Concrete wallsa 2 3 1 2 0 2 10
below the required values, additional tests were performed at Total cores 20 12 16 14 5 14 81
56 days. For 21-MPa concrete, the test results show that, 12 indi- a
vidual results (approximately 2%) and 35 arithmetic averages Concrete walls exist only in the elevator area.
(approximately 12%) fell below the specified strength. For 35-MPa
concrete, no individual results and three arithmetic averages failed
to meet the required strengths. According to the evidence provided discarded, resulting in a total of 66 concrete drilled cores available
by the construction company, the structural engineer of the project for testing. The cores were extracted from different places and
considered the previous results acceptable and no further action structural elements as listed in Table 2. The mean of all the results
was decided. Fig. 9 summarizes all results available for the different was above 85% of the requires concrete strength, but seven
construction phases including concrete strength results and testing cores had a strength below 75% of the specified fc0 , as shown
dates. The lower limit indicated in Fig. 9 corresponds to 17.5 MPa, in Fig. 10. Additionally, four masonry prisms were taken from
which corresponds to f c0 − 3.5 MPa. partition walls to measure their engineering properties. Laboratory
tests reported mean values of compressive strength and elastic
modulus (both for gross area) of approximately 7 and 3.6 GPa,
Field Sampling and Testing
respectively.
During the field inspection after the collapse event, a total of 23
reinforcing bar samples of different diameters were recovered from
various structural elements. Tensile test results showed that all Computational Modeling
samples but one met the specified yield strength of 420 MPa;
however, the modulus of elasticity results always fell below the ex-
Model Description
pected value of 200 GPa, with an average value of approximately
182 GPa. A total of 81 concrete drilled cores were taken in the Linear analyses of the building were implemented using the
field. Some of the samples were not suitable for testing and were SAP2000 computer program. The model included documented

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 40

35

Concrete strength (MPa)

30

25

20

15

10

0
N15G3S1
N16H5N1
N08C3N3
N01X1S2
N06B1N1
N07B4N2
N07B4N2b

N08C3N3b
N09FA1N4
N11D5N6
N13C3N9
N14F5S2

N17F5N2
N17F5N2b
N18E3N3
N18E3N3b
N20H5N6
N21FA2N7
N22F5N8
N23FA2N10
N24H5N12
N26J5N2
N27K3N3
N28FA3N4B
N29I3N7
N29I3N7b
N31K3N9
N31K3N9b
N32I3N13
N34K5N15
N34K5N15b
N35L3S2
N36M3S1
N37L5N1b
N38L5N5
N39M3N6
N40FA4N7
N41FA4N10
N42L5N9
N43M3N12
N44L5N17
N45N5N9
N46F5N11
N46F5N11b
N47O3N12
N48O5N15
N49P5N17

N57FAT6a
N50DEN1
N51O3N18
N56VET6b

N58VET6a
N59CET6a
N60VET6a
N61PET6b
N61CET6a
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Nombre
f'c lab test f'c esperado
Specified f'c 0.75f'c
0.75 f'c

Fig. 10. Concrete strength for drilled cores

Fig. 11. Tridimensional computational model

modifications of the structure during its construction, such as Table 3. Considered Material Properties
larger dimensions, larger thickness of some slabs, and supplemental
Strength Elastic modulus
slab thickness for floor leveling. The computer model shown
Material (MPa) (MPa)
in Fig. 11 has the following features: (1) columns are modeled us-
ing frame elements; (2) girders, slabs, and walls are modeled using Concrete (columns) 21.0 21,538
shell elements to account for the two-way load transmission, the Concrete (columns below the 35.0 27,805
first story of Stage 6)
variable thickness of the slab [Fig. 4(c)], and in-plane stiffness
Concrete (beams) 21.0 21,538
of the horizontal diaphragm; (3) all elements are located at the Steel reinforcement 420.0 2,00,000
precise axis location in order to guarantee the consideration of real Masonry walls (gross area) 7.0 3,600
eccentricities between beam and column axes; (4) the structural
contribution of masonry partitions is modeled by adding vertical
springs connecting beams from consecutive stories (this feature is nonstructural components. Live load corresponds to the actual live
only used on Model 4); (5) columns are assumed to be fixed at the load existing in the building at the time of the collapse; in average,
base; (6) geometric nonlinear effects are considered by a standard this load was estimated in 0.11 kN=m2 for Stage 6 and 0.35 kN=m2
P-delta formulation; and (7) analyses used cracked sections with for the other stages. This difference was attributable to the occu-
the effective stiffness ratios obtained from Section C.10.10.4.1 of pancy level of Stage 6, which at the time of the collapse was ap-
NSR-10 [or Section 6.6.3.1.1 of ACI 318-14 (ACI 1998)]. proximately 30% (16 out of 53 apartments were occupied). The
Material properties used in the analyses are given in Table 3. combination of 1.0 × actual dead load þ 1.0 × existing live load
These properties were confirmed with laboratory tests, as explained is subsequently referred to as the real load at the time of the col-
in the “Field Investigation” section. Dead loads included columns, lapse. In order to include in the simulations the sequence of events
walls, slabs, beams, partitions, and flooring. These weights were described in the “Construction Deficiencies” section, the following
carefully calculated using actual dimensions of the structural and models were prepared:

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J. Perform. Constr. Facil., 2018, 32(3): 04018010

 • Model 1 represents the ideal state of the structure after its com-
pletion. No construction deficiencies or differential settlements
were included in this model;
• Model 2 includes the settlements recorded on October 11, 2013,
just before the compressive failure event of Column S3
(6 months from the end of construction);
• Model 3 simulates the state of the structure after the failure of
Column S3 and, therefore, represents the situation just before
the collapse of Stage 6; and
• Model 4 is used to simulate the possible participation of
masonry partition walls once Column S3 presented the com-
pressive failure. Masonry partitions are modeled using vertical
springs connecting beams from consecutive stories as suggested
by Devin et al. (2015). Axial stiffness of these elements is
calculated as Em Ag =h, where Em is the mean elastic modulus
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(3.6 GPa) obtained from the lab tests described in the “Field
Sampling and Testing” section, Ag is the gross area of the parti-
tions (0.28 m2 ), and h is the wall height (2.40 m). The calculated
axial stiffness is 420 MN=m. Based on the laboratory results,
the vertical strength of the walls is approximately 1,000 kN.
The following subsections present the results for each one of the
aforementioned models. The axis nomenclature mentioned in the
text and figures is presented in the typical plan view of Fig. 2.
Results of Model 1
As explained previously, this model would represent the ideal
conditions for the end of construction situation without any defi-
ciencies (no differential settlements or any other problem). In
Fig. 12, solid lines indicate the heightwise variation of axial load
on the critical columns of Stage 6 (highlighted in Fig. 2) attribut-
able to real dead plus live load (as explained before in the
“Model Description” section); the dashed lines and gray contours
Fig. 12. Axial loads in critical columns of Stage 6: ideal conditions
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J. Perform. Constr. Facil., 2018, 32(3): 04018010
represent the estimated mean axial strength  one standard
deviation. The estimated capacity of the columns was calculated
based on requirements of ACI 318-14 (assuming ties conforming
with Chapter 22.4.2.4) using the following equation:
P0 ¼ 0.85f c0 ðAg − Ast Þ þ fy Ast ð1Þ
In the calculations, the strength-reduction factor ϕ was taken to
be equal 1.0, and the concrete strength was obtained from concrete
tests results found in the logbooks. This assumptions were made to
obtain the most realistic estimation of axial capacity for the col-
umns (Nilson et al. 2010; Park and Paulay 1975). Based on the
Fig. 12, it is clear that Columns R3 and S3 (highlighted in Fig. 2)
on the fifth floor are the most critical components of Stage 6.
Furthermore, even for the real dead plus live load combination used
in Fig. 13, the axial load demanded in Columns R3 and S3 is very
close or slightly exceeds the estimated capacity. From the results of
this model, it is clear that the projected columns did not meet mini-
mum safety factors provided by NSR-10 (or ACI 318-14).
Fig. 13 shows the nominal axial load-bending moment interac-
tion diagram (using ϕ ¼ 1.00 and fc0 ¼ 21 MPa for columns above
Level 2, or fc0 ¼ 35 MPa for columns below Level 2) for Columns
R3 and S3, highlighting their demands from Model 1 with solid
circles. The minimum specified strength was used in this figure
to have a unique capacity surface. It is evident that many demands
are out of the diagram (over the compression failure zone), confirm-
ing that the columns are inadequate to sustain the loads of this
model. Demand-capacity shear ratios for the columns are very
low; therefore, the axial load/shear force interaction was not con-
sidered relevant for this paper.
As commonly reported in the literature (Iravani and MacGregor
1998), in elements subjected to sustained high axial loads, creep
causes an increase in the axial compressive strain resulting in
J. Perform. Constr. Facil.
 -20000

-15000

Axial Load (kN)

-10000

-5000

5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
(a) (b)
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-20000

-15000
Axial Load (kN)

-10000

-5000

5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
(c) Bending moment (kN·m) (d) Bending moment (kN·m)

Interaction curve Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Fig. 13. Axial load-bending moment interaction diagram for critical columns: (a) Column R-3 above Level 2; (b) Column S-3 above Level 2;
(c) Column R-3 below Level 2; (d) Column S-3 below Level 2

long-term deformations. This deformations are proportional to the
acting stress for columns subjected to axial stresses below 0.40f c0 ;
however, if the axial stress is larger than 0.70fc0 , creep deformations
become nonlinear and may lead to premature cracking and failure
of the component (Richart 1933; Rüsch 1960; ACI 1992). Fig. 14
shows in three different gray intensities areas of axial loads corre-
sponding to stresses from zero to 0.40f c0 , from 0.40f c0 to 0.70fc0 ,
and larger than 0.70fc0 . The solid line indicates the axial loads of the
most critical columns of Stage 6. Columns R3 and S3 (highlighted
in Fig. 2) in the lower stories present axial stresses larger than
0.70f c0 , implying that in the short term, creep effects may induce
a fragile failure of the critical columns of the building. The structure
was at risk of collapse even if the foundation had not suffered any
differential settlements.
Results of Model 2
The objective of this model is to estimate the stress distribution in
the main structural elements after the occurrence of the differential
settlements reported on October 11, 2013, just before the compres-
sive failure of Column S3. Fig. 15 presents the heightwise variation
of axial load on the critical columns of Stage 6 compared with their
respective capacities. These results confirm that the differential set-
tlements generated an internal redistribution of loads that led to a
significant reduction of the axial load in Column R3 (which had
presented signs of distress 2 months before the end of construction)
and a major increment of the axial loads on Column S3 (which had
presented compression failure on October 11, 2013, just 1 day
before the collapse of Stage 6) and Column R5.
Results of Model 3
Model 3 represents the new stress distribution once the compressive
failure of Column S3 at the fourth level occurred. Fig. 16 presents
the new axial load distribution in critical columns in Axes 3 and 5
(according to Fig. 2), respectively. The compressive failure of
Column S3 generated a load redistribution instantaneously to
columns in Axes R5 and S5, indicating that Column R5 could
have been the next in the collapse sequence. The sequential failure
of Column R5 and others main elements would have led to the
complete collapse of the building sometime after the compressive
failure of Column S3.
Results of Model 4
The analysis of the available information and the testimonies of the
occupants of the building suggest that the masonry partitions
played an important role in the structural stability after the com-
pressive failure of Column S3. The construction details on the other

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Fig. 14. Axial loads and creep effects in critical columns of Stage 6; gray intensities represents the axial loads corresponding to stresses from zero to
0.40fc0 , from 0.40fc0 to 0.70f c0 , and larger than 0.70f c0 ; solid line indicates the axial loads

Fig. 15. Axial loads in critical columns of Stage 6 considering differential settlements

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Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by 190.93.159.100 on 07/20/18. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
Fig. 16. Axial loads in critical columns of Stage 6 after failure of Column S3
hand, clearly indicate that some of the partitions were connecting
uninterrupted several floor slabs along the height of the building;
this detail was included in Model 4, as explained in the “Model
Description” section. Fig. 17 represents the probable axial load se-
quence in critical partition walls (those located near Column R3).
Steps 1–3 correspond to the equivalent analysis presented with
Models 1–3, but using the new stiffness distribution of Model 4.
The analysis of the evolution of events reported in the building gen-
erated successive increases in axial loads on critical masonry parti-
tions up to the point of reaching the axial load capacity estimated for
such elements (on the order of 1,000 kN each, presented in dashed
lines in the figure). Walls located on the fourth and sixth levels for
Axis 5, were probably subjected at axial loads greater than their
capacities, just after the compressive failure of Column S3. The
model was also used to analyze the evolution in the critical shear
forces in critical beams connecting Columns R3 and S3 with the rest
of the building (Fig. 18). The analysis shows that after the series of
events reported in the building, it is highly probable the occurrence
of shear failure in several of the critical beams connecting Columns
R3 and S3. The unfactored shear capacity of such beams was esti-
mated on the order of 80–100 kN (shown in gray in the figure)
whereas the estimated demands, instants before the collapse of
the building, are in some cases higher than 100 kN.
Causes of Collapse
In addition to the field investigation and computational modeling,
the occurrences of external events that may have affected the sta-
bility of the building were investigated. It was determined that
events such as local soil instability, wind overloads, earthquakes,
internal explosions, etc., did not occur in the hours or days before
the collapse. In addition, there were no geometrical inconsistencies
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with the construction drawings, and the few material tests that did
not satisfied the specified requirements were hardly relevant factors
for the collapse. Therefore, the causes of the collapse are probably
mostly related to the design, construction, and early behavior of the
building and its foundation.
As described before, the results of computer Model 1 demon-
strated that Columns R3 and S3 of Stage 6 did not have enough
capacity to withstand the real vertical loads. This fact and the
excessive vertical deflections of the slabs indicate that there were
major design flaws that should have contributed to the progressive
failure of the building. During construction, the overload caused by
the mortar leveling of slabs and settlement of Pile R3 caused the
local failure at fifth story of the corresponding column. Just at
the end of construction, the total real vertical load did not reach the
capacity of the columns. Then, differential settlements (R3–S3)
increased the vertical load on Column S3 and caused its compres-
sive failure on October 11. According to the computer simulation
(Model 3), the failure of Column S3 generated a redistribution of
loads, leading to a critical condition for Columns R5 and S5, the
masonry partitions, and some critical beams as well. The building
collapse was temporary prevented by the action of the masonry par-
titions. Once the demand exceeded the capacity of the partition
walls, failure of Columns R5 and S5 should have been the follow-
ing event in the progressive failure of the building. At this stage,
no redistribution of forces was possible and, therefore, the sudden
complete collapse of Stage 6 was just a matter of time.
Based on the information gathered in this paper as well
as the forensic analyses performed, the main cause of the collapse
was the lack of structural capacity of the columns (cross-section
area, reinforcement ratios, and details) to withstand gravity loads.
It was determined that the axial load capacity provided by
columns of the Stage 6 of the Space Building was approximately
40% of the load capacity specified by NSR-10 or ACI 318-14.
J. Perform. Constr. Facil.
 Wall near to axis 3 Wall near to axis 5 Middle-wall
1500 1500 1500
R axis R axis R axis
1250 S axis
1250 S axis 1250 S axis

Axial load (kN )

Axial load (kN )

Axial load (kN )
1000 1000 1000

Level 7
750 750 750
500 500 500
250 250 250
0 0 0
-250 -250 -250
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Steps Steps Steps
1500 1500 1500
R axis R axis R axis
1250 S axis 1250 S axis 1250 S axis

Axial load (kN )

Axial load (kN )

Axial load (kN )

1000 1000 1000

Level 5

750 750 750

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500 500 500

250 250 250
0 0 0
-250 -250 -250
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Steps Steps Steps
1500 1500 1500
R axis R axis R axis
1250 S axis 1250 S axis 1250 S axis
Axial load (kN )

Axial load (kN )

Axial load (kN )

1000 1000 1000

Level 3

750 750 750

500 500 500
250 250 250
0 0 0
-250 -250 -250
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Steps Steps Steps

Fig. 17. Axial loads in masonry walls for Stages 1–3, with walls in R and S axes

3rd level 4th level 5th level

150 150 150
125 125 125
Shear load (kN)
Shear load (kN)

Shear load (kN)

Max. shear cap. Max. shear cap. Max. shear cap.

100 100 100
75 75 75
50 50 50
25 25 25
0 0 0
Q-3_R-3 R-3_S-3 S-3_T-3 Q-3_R-3 R-3_S-3 S-3_T-3 Q-3_R-3 R-3_S-3 S-3_T-3
Beams Beams Beams

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3

Fig. 18. Shear forces in longitudinal beams located next to Columns R3 and S3

Additionally, the following deficiencies during the construction (5) compression failure of partition walls because of the overload
process may have boosted the initiation of the progressive failure: by slabs deflections and the failure of the surrounding columns.
(1) high differential settlements measured during the construction
period and high redistribution of internal loads and eccentricities
generated by these differential settlements; (2) high compressive Conclusions
stresses in main columns, which produced long-term compressive
creep and ultimately a compressive fragile failure; (3) repair works As a result of the field investigation, analysis of information, and
that were conducted after the failure of Column S3; (4) shear failure interpretation of computational models results, the authors con-
of beams attributable to the overload by slabs deflections and cluded that the main cause of the collapse was the deficient struc-
redistribution of load because previous column failures; and tural capacities of the main columns of the building. In particular,

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 the analysis indicated that the service loads acting on Columns
R3 and S3 at the moment of collapse exceeded their maximum
compressive capacity. The lack of capacity is associated with de-
ficiencies in the dimensioning and the reinforcement details of the
columns. Additionally, design deficiencies were also identified in
other main structural elements of the building, such as beams and
floor slabs.
The authors considered that, if the building had been designed
adequately using the building design codes (NSR or ACI) available
at that time, it would not have collapsed, even if the boosting events
identified in the herein had occurred.
Acknowledgments
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The authors are thankful to the Alcaldía de Medellín, Disaster Risk
Management Administrative Department (DAGRD) for providing
funds to the Material and Civil Works Research Center (CIMOC)
from Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) for developing this
research project.
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