(29)

ANICETO G. SALUDO JR. V. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTL INC, and/or IAN FISH and DOMINIC MASCARINAS, G.R. NO 159507
(2006)
1ST DIVISION: Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario
PONENTE: J. Callejo Sr.

Carla Paz B. Manto and Ronette O. Franco for petitioner

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez and Gatmaitan for respondent

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the CA decision dated May 22, 2003 which
ordered RTC Maasin to set aside its orders (Sept 10, 201 and Jan 2, 2002) and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from
proceeding with the case, except to dismiss the complaint on improper venue.

FACTS: Aniceto Saludo filed a complaint for damages against American Express and/or its officers Ian Fish (VP and Country
Manager) and Dominic Mascrinas (Head of Operations) with RTC Maasin, Leyte (Branch 25)
1. The complaint alleged that Saludo is a member of HOR and resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Leyte, while AMEX is
corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and other
allied services
2. The complaint stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner’s AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter
 a. First dishonor: Saludo’s daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in US in April 2000
b. Second dishonor: petitioner Saludo used his AMEX card to pay his account at Hotel Okawa in Tokyo
(Congressional Recognition in honor of Hiroshi Tanaka)
3. The dishonor of the AMEX cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from AMEX’s unilateral act of
suspending Saludo’s account for failure to pay his balance for March 2000. Saludo denied receiving the SOA
and alleged he was wrongfully charged late fee for payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his cards were
cancelled by AMEX on July 20, 2000
4. Saludo claimed moral damages as a result of AMEX’s act which was committed in gross and evident bad faith
5. In their answer, AMEX et al denied the allegations in the complaint and alleged lack of cause of action and
improper venue. They prayed that the complaint be dismissed
a. None of the parties are residents of Leyte
b. Saludo is not a resident of Leyte as evidenced by his CTC attached to the compliant (Pasay)
c. Complaint was prepared and signed by a lawyer of said city
6. Thereafter, AMEX filed an opposition to ex-parte motion (to set the case for pre-trial) and motion for preliminary
hearing (on defense of improper venue) to which Saludo argued against, citing that the allegation that he was
not a resident of Leyte was baseless considering that he was the congressman of the lone district of Leyte at the
time of the filing of the complaint. He was also an IBP member of Southern Leyte Chapter. Saludo argued that
the CTC is not determinative of one’s residence
7. The court denied the defenses interposed by AMEX (order dated Sept 10, 2001) and found that the allegations
in the complaint constitute a cause of action against respondents. MR denied.
8. On appeal, CA held (dated May 22, 2003) that the reversed the decision of the trial court and found that venue
was improperly laid. CA explained that the action filed by Saludo was covered by Sec 2, Rule 4 ROC which
provides that personal actions may be commened and tried where plaintif/s reside or where defendant/s reside,
at the election of the plaintiff. CA held that not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte hence, venue
was not properly laid
a. Concept of venue according to CA: for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his actual or physical
habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided that he resides there with continuity and consistency
b. Residence is not the same as domicile
c. Domicile refers to the relative more permanent abode of a person (intent to remain for an unlimited time

ISSUE: WON venue is improperly laid in this case

RULING: No, venue is properly laid with RTC Maasin.

RATIO: Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As
such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because
the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just
and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.
The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be
found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin
City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.

The concept of residence as discussed in Dangwa Transportation Co v. Sarmiento:

In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the
term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed
with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the
defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has
the intention of returning.

"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and
personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking
into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term
domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in
Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a
temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the
Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place
of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.'

ISSUE: What does the term ‘resides’ mean?

HELD: the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence
or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary."

CAB: As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as
possessing the requirements for the said position, including that he was then a resident of the district which he was
representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile.

ISSUE: WON Saludo is has residence in Leyte

HELD: Yes. It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that
it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." When
parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2)
personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated,
"the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to
mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or
domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his
residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile
of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a
quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the
House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-
shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.

ISSUE: WON instant petition for review was not properly verified by Saludo

HELD: Rule 7, Sec 4 ROC provides, Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents thereof
[referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis
of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of
Court.

Venue of actions against non-residents

BARITUA vs CA G.R. No. 100748, February 3, 1997

Facts:

Private respondent filed with the RTC Pangasinan a complaint against petitioner as owner and operator
of J.B Bus Lines to recover damages after a bus owned by petitioner rammed private respondent’s car.
Private respondent in his complaint, alleged that he is a resident of Pangasinan before he went to
United States where he now lives and that he is being represented by his attorney in fact. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue alleging that since respondent was not a resident of
the Philippines, the complaint should be filed in petitioner’s resident which is in Sorsogon.

RTC – denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent was merely temporarily out
of the country. CA – Affirmed

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petitioners claim for improper venue.

Held:

Section 2(b) speaks of the place where the defendant or plaintiff resides (in which case, the complaint
shall be filed). “Residence” does not mean fixed permanent resident to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. For purposes of venue, actual residence is the place of abode and not necessarily
the legal residence or domicile. The physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than temporary and
must be with continuity and consistency. Private respondent was not a mere occasional resident of
United States. He fixed his place of abode in California and stayed there continuously and consistently
for over a year at the time the complaint was filed in Pangasinan. The choice of venue is given to the
plaintiff but not left to his caprice. It cannot unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred
upon him by the rules of court. When the complaint was filed in Pangasinan, not one of the parties was
a resident of the town – private respondent was a resident of California which his atty in fact was a
resident of QC and petitioner’s business address in in Pasay City. Hence, venue was improper.
Universal Robina Corporation vs. Lim Case Digest

A court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as
it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on
the basis of the pleadings.

********

Facts:

Universal Robina Corporation (URC) sold to Lim grocery products in the amount of P 808,060.
After partial payment, Lim defaulted in his obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands.
Thus, URC filed a complaint for sum of money before the RTC of Quezon City. The
RTC dismissed the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue considering that URC's principal place of business is in Pasig City while Lim's residence
is in Laoag City.

Issue:

May the court dismiss the complaint motu proprio on the ground of improper venue?

Held:

No. Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the Rules provide:

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.
Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or
her residence or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a
specific venue which could be in a place where neither of them resides.

Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances when the trial court
may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to
dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu
proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court
may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. (Universal Robina
Corporation vs. Lim, G.R. No. 154338, October 5, 2007)

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA et.al. vs. CA

[G.R. No. 108547. January 13, 1999]

Facts:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.
Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Marykane Cabrera was ordered to vacate the portion of Lot 2238 occupied
by them and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, as ordered by the CA adverse from what the RTC
had decided which is reconveyance of the said parcel of land to Felicidad.

These are their prayers:

xxx “WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and hearing on the merits of this case; to issue
order or orders;

1. Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal owner of that portion which was sold to them
by Felicidad Teokemian and which was included in the title of plaintiff;

2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and that they have personal knowledge of the
same when the plaintiff filed and secured the title under the Administrative Proceeding;

3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion only in an implied trust in favor of the
real owner;
4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation of the portion at their expense and deliver
formally the said portion to the real owners, the defendants.

5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any instrument or document to finally vest in
the Defendants absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the portion which the plaintiff holds
title in trust in defendant’s favor. xxx

The respondent court held that such a petition has been barred by laches due to inaction for more than
thirty years. An act by Felicidad though as stated: “the registration of the plaintiff’s title over the subject
property was fraudulent insofar as it involved the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian who did not
sign the Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest and, therefore, the latter held that
portion as a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil
Code.” Needless to state, these conclusions, being matters of fact, are entitled to our full affirmation,
since they are congruent with the findings of the trial court.”

Issue: WON Felicidad could not have recovered the land due to laches.

Held:

The right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject property arising from an implied trust under
Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet lapsed, as
erroneously submitted by the plaintiffs, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiff’s action. In the case of Heirs of
Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based
on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this
rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property,
since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendant
is in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property,
does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.

As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and
positive.

In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter, the Cabreras, were in actual
possession of the property since it was left to Felicidad Teokemian by her father in 1941, which possession
had not been interrupted, despite the sale of the two-third portion thereof to the plaintiff in 1950, and
the latter’s procurement of a Certificate of Title over the subject property in 1957. Until the institution of
the present action in 1988, plaintiffs, likewise, have not displayed any unequivocal act of repudiation,
which could be considered as an assertion of adverse interest from the defendants, which satisfies the
above-quoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the right of reconveyance on the part of the
defendants, and its use as defense in the present suit, has been lost by prescription.

Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the plaintiff,
the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has,
therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a
co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period
too long to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio possidentis).

Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the portion subject
matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by laches.

[G.R. No. 108547. January 13, 1999]

FELICIDAD VDA DE CABRERA, et al. vs. CA, et al.

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 13, 1999.

G.R. No. 108547 (Felicidad Vda, De Cabrera, Maryjane Cabrera And Felicidad Teokemian vs. Court Of Appeals
And Virgilia Orais De Felicio, represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Ernesto M. Orias.)

For resolution is respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the decision promulgated in this case on February
3, 1997, which granted the Petition, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the decision
of the trial court of origin.

Movants place reliance on the following grounds:

"That the doctrine of laches was misapplied and Exh 'A' was not appreciated.

II

No trust but double sale (Art. 1544) is the factual/legal issue."

Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points raised and arguments advanced by movants merely
reiterate the thrust of the "Comments To The Petition Dated February 26, 1993 With Prayer For Immediate
Dismissal" which the court found to be wanting of sustainable merit. For instance, movant's submission that
the "doctrine of laches" was misapplied, and Exh. "A" was not appreciated had been discussed and passed
upon in the formulation of the decision sought to be reconsidered, which after giving a second hard look, we
discern no ground to disturb.
Time and again, this court has succinctly ruled that a motion for reconsideration based on grounds found,
upon due deliberation, to be barren of merit, should be denied. Such is the inevitable fate of the motion at
bar.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, dated February 21, 1997, under consideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON

Clerk of Court

Parties to Civil Actions

AngvsAng

G.R. No. 186993

August 22, 2012

Facts:

On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and EmAng (respondents) obtained a loan in the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang
(petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the
petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount, with interest at the rate
of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the
respondents failed to pay the petitioners.

Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to
pay their outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen
Thousand, Six Hundred Seventy-One U.S. Dollars and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23),
inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual interest that had accumulated over the years.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their
loan obligation.

On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United
States of America (USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney6 in favor of
Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court
against the respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed
a Complaint7 for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the
respondents.

Issues:
WON Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not the real party in
interest in the case.

Held:

Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real party in interest in
the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 2.Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the
right sought to be enforced.

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case
below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely
appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and
prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not
mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real
party in interest.

Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not
have the right to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what
he did, in behalf of the petitioners – the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be
enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty.

Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.

Philippine Banking v. Tensuan G.R. No. 106920

December 10, 1993

FELICIANO, J.

SUMMARY: In this case, the promissory notes of Respondent all contained the stipulation that the
latter “expressly submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action” and thus
when the petitioner instituted a case against him for collection of his loans at the RTC of Makati,
the respondent assailed that this was not the proper venue. Court held that although there was
a stipulation that respondent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela, the
stipulation does not require the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The
stipulation merely authorizes or permits the bringing of a suit in Valenzuela, with no indication of
intent to bar another suit in competent courts.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for a collection of a sum
of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment at the RTC of Makati. Trial judge granted the
motion, but no properties of the respondent or the other obligors could be found to attach on,
so the respondents were served summons. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that venue was improperly laid as the agreement had fixed the venue in Valenzuela only—this
was found meritorious by the Judge so petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which when
denied, was followed by the present action of Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS: - In 1983 and 1984, Respondent Circle Financial Co., through its representatives,
obtained loans amounting to Php1,000,000 from petitioner - Correspondingly, respondent
delivered to petitioner 4 promissory notes, each containing the stipulation that: “I/We hereby
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise
out of this promissory note.” - As security for the payment of the loans, eight individuals
(impleaded as defendants in the complaint) executed a Continuing Surety Agreement, and
undertook to pay jointly and severally the obligations of respondent Circle - However, Circle
failed to pay its loans as did the 8 sureties when the Bank demanded payment from them - Bank
moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, alleging that Circle had become
insolvent and had been placed under receivership by the Central Bank. This was granted by the
trial judge, but the sheriff’s return indicated that no properties belonging to the respondents
could be found, so they tried to serve summons on all the respondents (some successful, some
not) - A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle and sureties) on the ground that
the venue of the action was improperly laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions
arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila only—this was granted and the
Order of the Judge is the subject of the present action

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: - Stipulation found in the promissory notes is merely an agreement to

add the courts of Valenzuela to tribunals to which the parties may resort, it did not restrict or limit
the permissible venue of actions arising out of the notes to the courts of Valenzuela to the
exclusion of all other courts, recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted under the
RoC

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT: - Words used in the stipulation are clear and unambiguous, a
promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a specific court, without an express reservation of the right
to resort to one of more of the tribunals accessible under the Rules of Court is an agreement
definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one place (in this case, Valenzuela) to the exclusion
of other competent courts

ISSUE: WON venue was improperly laid as the promissory notes from respondent contained the
express stipulation that he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela for any
legal action arising out of those notes – NO, can resort to other competent courts

MORTELL, KHRISKA VIKTORIA M. CASE # 20

HELD: - Permissive stipulations have been received with judicial approval and court has
declared in the past the either of the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court
named in the stipulation. However, the stipulation may not deprive either party of its right to
elect, or option to have to resort to, another competent court - The stipulation merely
confers/confirms a right upon the party to elect recourse to that particular venue stipulated but
not to the exclusion of others - The stipulation must be distinguished from others which require or
compel parties to lay venue of an action in a specified place and in that particular place only.
In that case, it must clearly indicate, through qualifying or restrictive words, that the parties
deliberately intended to exclude actions from the operation of ordinary permissive rules on
venue and they intend to designate a specific venue—intent to establish an inflexible restriction
to one single place is not to be presumed or inferred from stipulations that (like the one in this
case) include no qualifying or exclusionary terms - Reading the stipulation, it does not require the
laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The ordinary import of the stipulation is
the mere authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela, with no indication of any intent
of the parties to bar suit in other competent courts - Court also noted that not one of the
respondents had claimed to have been put to undue hardship or inconvenience as a result of
the institution of the action in Makati. Venue relates to the trial and touches more upon
convenience of parties rather upon the substance or merits of the case.