Proceedings of the IDFS 2013, pp.
25-27, November, 2013 Workshop: WRB-3
Shanghai, China
Risk Assessment on Collisions between Fishing Vessels and Cargo Vessels
Yuka Tamura *, Takeshi Shinoda **
* Hull Department, ABS Pacific, Yokohama, Japan, ytamura@eagle.org
** Department of Marine Systems Engineering, Kyushu University, Japan, shinoda@nams.kyushu-u.ac.jp
ABSTRACT
Most marine accidents are the results of human errors,
such as mis-detection, mis-judgment and mis-operation.
A particular example is collisions between fishing vessels
and cargo vessels frequently occurred in the waters off
Japan and involved in loss of life. In this context, the
risk assessment is carried out in accordance with For-
mal Safety Assessment (FSA) approved by IMO in 2002
with the following steps: 1) Identification of hazards by
VTA, 2) Construction of Marine Casualty Database, 3)
Risk Assessment by ETA, 4) Suggestion of Risk Control
Options (RCOs) and 5) Cost Benefit Analysis by CVM.
This paper proposes a consistent procedure from the es-
tablishment of the codes related to the human factors in
collisions to the risk assessment and cost benefit analysis
using the codes as the methodology of risk assessment
focused on human factors in accordance with FSA. The
effectiveness of the proposed methodology is confirmed
with the application for the collisions between fishing
vessels and cargo vessels.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, collisions between fishing vessels and
cargo vessels have been broken out in seas close to Japan,
and have been reported widely in the media. This type of
accidents remains still high ratio of occurrence and huge
damages including loss of life especially for fishing vessels.
The annual report released by the Marine Accident Inquiry
Agency shows that the collisions are most frequent (42%)
among all marine casualty types and the fishing vessel is the
highest ship type (32%) involving in the marine casualties.
This report also indicates that loss of life is the highest with
fishing vessels (40%).
Due to the frequent occurrence and high level of loss of
life, the risk assessment is carried out in accordance with
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) approved by IMO in 2002
for the collisions between fishing vessels and cargo vessels.
In this study, the practical procedure for the risk assess-
ment has been developed taking into consideration the fol-
lowing tasks and its effectiveness is introduced by the ap-
plication to the collisions between fishing vessels and cargo
vessels:
1) Quantification and encoding of human factors related to
collision using the constructed database
2) Estimation of ship traffic volume and number of
crossing situation from the navigational track data
on ship traffic survey
3) Risk assessment by ETA with the codes of human
factors related to cognition and decisionmaking and
the sequence of the crossing situation using the
constructed databse
4) Suggestion of RCOs from the results of the database
analysis and ETA
5) Cost benefit assessment by CVM for the suggested RCOs
The encoded cognition-decisionmaking factors are utilized
at each step in the proposed procedure.
Our proposal will contribute to the establishment of formal
procedure applied for the ship designs and formulations of
international regulations.
For the implementation of the practical FSA, the impor-
tance is to keep the rationality on its process and results. In
order to achieve it, the procedure of the assessment is not
to highly relay on the expert judgments, but to have general
versatility and not to require high expertness. In addition,
the same results are to be obtainable by any of analysts from
the same data. At the end, the procedure is to be reason-
able, simple, transparant and easy to apply and review.
Furthermore, “safe” is defined as the status away from the
unacceptable risk and is not to be constraint, but to be one
of the objective functions in the assessment. The weighting
in the objective functions is considered to be equivalent to
the design standard.
In this paper, merchant vessels relatively larger than fish-
ing vessels are defined as “cargo vessels” and any charac-
teristic particulars such as gross tonnage or length are not
considered, but defined with the ship types only. The types
defined as “cargo vessel” are cargo ships, cement carriers,
container carriers, car carriers, grave carriers, oil tankers,
LNG/LPG carriers, passenger ships, car ferries, tug boats
and pushers.
FLOW OF RISK ASSESSMENT BY FSA
Fig.1 shows the flow chart of the proposed process of the
risk assessment considering human factors. The process
bigins with the definition of the problem to be assessed
and follows 5 steps in FSA Guidelines: 1) Identification of
Hazards, 2) Risk Analysis, 3) Risk Control Options, 4) Cost
Benefit Assessment and 5) Recommendations to Decision-
Making.
Risk Assessment on Collisions between Fishing Vessels and Cargo Vessels

Process of identififcation of hazards

Analysis of marine casualty data

Analyzing records of adjudication Application of visualized variation
of marine accident inquiry in Japan tree analysis (visualized-VTA)

Configuration of items of database

Extracting human factor through VTA

Input casualty data Process of risk analysis

Making marine casualty database
Collision course analysis
Event tree analysis (ETA)
Analysis of navigation track data

Observation / RADAR track Navigation track database

/AIS data analysis at surveyed sea area Process of generation of risk control options

Interpolation of navigation track

Process of assessment of cost benefit analysis
Crossing situation analysis

Extraction of traffic volume and

harmful situation for collision accident Process of recomendation to decision maker

Fig. 1 Flow chart of proposed risk assessment for collisions considering human factors

Problem definition
As a preparation step, one of the issues is defined as the anal-
ysis objective for the risk assessment in accordance with FSA
from the statistic data, reports or new development area, and
so on. The analysis objective is selected considering ship cat-
egory, ship systems or functions, ship operation, external influ-
ences on the ship, accident category and risks associated with
consequences such as injuries and/or fatalities, environmental
impact, damage to the ship/port facilities or commercial im-
pact.
In this paper, the collision between fishing vessels and cargo
vessels is selected as analysis objective from the statistic data
and the public demands due to a lot of media attention as de-
scribed in INTRODUCTION, and the fact that few researches
and countermeasures against the collisions for fishing vessels
have been implemented compared for merchant vessels.
Identification of Hazards
Extract of Human Factors by VTA and Database Construction
The hazards are identified by Variation Tree Analysis Method
(VTA) focused on human factors related to collisions using
the records of the adjudication of marine accident inquiries
released by the Japan Marine Accident Tribunal. The human
factors are extracted from the reports as “variation factors”
which depart from usual procedures of navigation by VTA
method.
The marine casualty database is constructed from the results
of VTA with 217 collisions broken out between 2001 and 2008
in the areas covered by ex. Moji Marine Accident Inquiry.
The database items consist of human factors extracted from
VTA and the facts of the casualty such as date, time, location,
weather/sea conditions, related vessels’ particulars, status of
crossing situations and so on. The human factors in the da-
tabase are coded based on the sequence of crossing situation
and the actions required at each sequence. Since the encoded
factors are related to detection/watchkeeping (cognition) and
judgment (decision-making process), they are called “codes of
cognition-decisionmaking factors“ in our study.
Estimation of Probabilities
The probability of collisions is estimated from the ship traffic
volume and the number of crossing situation obtained from the
analysis of the ship traffic data and the number of collisions
obtained from the database. The estimated probabilities of col-
lision based on the ship traffic volume are 7.32x10-5 for fish-
ing vessels and 1.37x10-5 for cargo vessels, and the one based
on the number of crossing situation is 1.26x10-4 which is 10
times higher than the ones based on the ship traffic volume.
The probabilities highly depend on the application theory and
the clear policy how to calculate the probabilities and criteria
are essential for the guidelines to obtain the reliable and con-
solidated results. These results are reviewed in accordance
with the acceptance criteria in FSA Guidelines Appendix 5
and these estimated probabilities are within ALARP, then it is
concluded that the analysis objective “collisions between fish-
ing vessels and cargo vessels” is “hazard” and subject to the
formal safety assessment.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is carried out by Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
method. Event tree is developed following the sequence of
the crossing situation with the extracted human factors, the
codes of cognition-decisionmaking factors. The number of
cases at each bifurcation in the event tree is obtained from the
database. The results of ETA provide the risk distribution for
the crossing situation and also show the patterns of collisions
focused on human factors.

Table 1 List of code of cognition-decisionmaking factors
AP1 Success of detection Code C
Code A AP2 Success of detection by radar
Detection AP3 Failure of detection Judgment
AP31 Distraction by other vessels
AP32 Distraction by other works
AP33 Improper watch
AP34 Sleeping
AP35 No watch at anchoring
AJ1 Shipping route
AJ2 Judge as safe situation
AJ21 Judge from experiences
AJ22 Detect no vessels by radar
AJ23 Recognize no vessels
AJ24 Expect other vessels action
AJ25 Follow brother vessels
AJ3 Non compliance of regulations
AJ31 Improper watch assignment
AJ32 No report on other vessels
AJ33 Improper watch
AJ34 No attention to blind zone
AJ4 Fatigue
AJ41 Feel sleepiness
AJ42 Fatigue
AJ43 Posture during watch (sitting...) Operation
BP1 Watchkeeping
Code B BP2 Watchkeeping by radar detection
Watch
BP3 Failure of detection
keeping BP4 Insufficient watchkeeping
BP41 Distraction by other vessels
BP42 Distraction by other works
BP43 Postponent of decision
BJ1 Shipping route
BJ5 Misjudge on passing innocously
BJ51 Misjudgement on situation
BJ511 Judge from cursory inspection
BJ512 Improper watch assignment
BJ52 Misjudgement on crossing situation
BJ53 Take the action to avoid collision
BJ6 Expect other vessel avoidance action
BJ61 Role by regulations
BJ62 Take action to encourage other
vessels avoidance action
BJ63 Other vessel type is small vessel
Suggestion of Risk Control Options (RCOs)
From the results of the database analysis and ETA, the route
causes contributing to the collisions are identified. RCOs are
suggested to eliminate such causes or reduce their occurrence.
Their efficiencies are estimated by ETA with the impact to the
reduction of the occurrence considering the codes of cognition-
decisionmaking factors.
Cost Benefit Assessment
The cost benefit for the suggested RCOs is estimated by the
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which is a survey-based
economic technique to evaluate non-market price, such as
safety at sea, and shows the results are obtained as a “willing-
ness to pay (WTP)”. The questionnaire suveys had been car-
ried out and WTP to reduce the collisions is calculated.
Process of Recommendation to Decision Maker
When the recommendations are established through the re-
sults of the risk assessment and the cost benefit analysis, they
are reported to the decision maker with the results of their ef-
ficiency.
Yuka Tamura, Takeshi Shinoda
CP3 Failure of detection
Insufficient watchkeeping
CP4
CM1 No action to avoid collision
CJ6 Expect other vessel avoidance action
CJ61 Role by regulations
CJ62 Take action to encourage
other vessels avoidance action
CJ63 Other vessel type is small vessel
CJ64 Judge from experience
(Small vessel avoidance action)
CJ65 Expect other vessel action
CJ66 Under fishing operation
CJ67 Failure of judgement
on other vessel condition
CJ7 Failure of judgement on situation
CJ71 Failure of judgement (late action)
CJ8 Improper watch assignment
CJ81 Expect co-watchers judge
CM2 Failure of avoidance action
CJ51 Failure of judgment
DM1 No avoidance action
Code D DP3 Failure of detection
DP4 Insufficient watchkeeping
DM11 Unable to take action due to
fishing operation
DM12 Notice at close range,
but unable to take action
DM13 Expect other vessel action
DM14 Tie down
DM2 Improper/Insufficient avoidance action
DM3 Action at close range
DM31 Engine operation
DM32 Steering operation with signal
DM33 Steering operation without signal
DM34 Reminder signal (whistle/light)
DM35 Warning signal
The risk assessment of collisions between fishing vessels and
cargo vessels is attempted on the basis of the above-mentioned
methodology which shows the consistent application of the
codes of cognition-decisionmaking factors for each step in the
procedure.
CONSTRUCTION OF DATABASE
Variation Tree Analysis
VTA is a method to establish measures, that can be applied to
actual accidents, to extract “Variation Factors” from the data.
Variation factors are departed from usual procedures. Specula-
tive factors are excluded in this method. The extracted varia-
tion factors are considered as causes of accidents and arranged
sequentially to show their flow, and the measures against acci-
dents are investigated by cutting the flow of variation factors.
The sequence of variation factors is shown in a tree format
and variation factors are linearly arranged related to the pas-
sage of time. In the case of ships’ collisions, vessels’ courses
and their relative angles are important factors, accordingly the
visualized variation tree is proposed in our study to determine
Risk Assessment on Collisions between Fishing Vessels and Cargo Vessels
the sequence of variation factors at each moment at the prog-
ress of crossing situations.
VTA has been applied to 57 records issued by ex Moji Marine
Accident Inquiry between 2004 and 2005. These 57 records
were selected from the latest for two years at the time of the
database construction.
Marine Casualty Database
The marine casualty database was constructed with variation
human factors extracted from the visualized VTA and the facts
obtained from the records of adjudication of marine accident
inquiry, such as accident attribution (date, time, location, sea-
son, weather/sea condition, visibility), vessel attribution (ship
type, length, gross tonnage, speed, course, bridge resources,
roles at crossing situation (give-way or stand-on)), status of
crossing situation and other factors. It is confirmed that the
variation factors extracted from 57 cases are considered as
common among other cases and show the significant charac-
teristics by the comparison with the additional 43 cases. Ac-
cordingly they are used as database items and shown in Table 1.
The total entry is 217 cases that were judged at ex Moji
Marine Accident Inquiry from 1998 to 2008. Variation hu-
man factors are categorized into 4 majors codes based on the
sequence of the crossing situation as shown in Table 1. The
situation code is defined in Table 2 and the level of cognition/
decision-making factors are shown in Table 3. The minimum
required actions at crossing situations A through D are defined
“detection“, “watch-keeping“, “judgment“ and “operation“.
The exstracted human factors are sorted out to each situation.
Results of Database Analysis
The overall results by the database analysis focused on hu-
man factors are as follows: On the part of fishing vessels, 70%
of collisions among 217 cases are caused by mis-detection,
and the background causes of mis-detection are “AP32 Dis-
traction of the watchkeeper by other works (37%)” and “AP33
Improper watch (53%)”. Even though the crossing situation
develops, in 16% of cases, insufficient watchkeeping due to
the watchkeeper’s distraction by other works (AP32) has been
identified. At the time of a close quarters when perilous situ-
ation has arisen, fishing vessels take no avoidance actions.
This implies that fishing vessels do not reach to the phases to
assess the situation and can not take appropriate action since
they don’t realize the presence of the approaching cargo ves-
sel. At the critical phase immediately prior to contact (Situation
Table 2 Definition of situation at crossing situation
Denomination Distance between Prescriptive Maneuvering
of situation two vessels
Situation A Equal and Detection of opponent
more than 2 miles vessel
Situation B Less than 2 miles Watchkeeping
Judge of avoidance and
Situation C Less than 1 mile
formulaic maneuvering
Danger of collision
Situation D Less than 0.5 mile andcooperative
maneuvering to avoide
Situation E Close range against collision
E), 67% of fishing vessels have been found as not take any
avoidance action to prevent the collision. Since a collision is
happened due to multiple items, the total ratios of each factors
exceed 100%.
On the other hand, the situation onboard the cargo vessels is
described as follows: At the earlier phases of crossing situa-
tion, the ratio of “AP3 Failure of detection” and “BP4 Insuffi-
cient watchkeeping” is 72%. When the perilous close quarters
condition prevails, the cargo vessels do not take any avoidance
actions due to their optimistic expectation that the smaller and
more manoeverable fishing vessel will take avoidance action
(CJ63, CJ64 and CJ65) even though the cargo vessel has rec-
ognized the danger of collision and they are “give-way“ ves-
sel.
The following significant point is emphasized: 67% of fish-
ing vessels do not take any avoidance actions at the phase of
crisis condition of collision, while 59% of cargo vessels do
ultimately take actions. This results may come from the differ-
ent objectives at sea for fishiermen and crews: fishing and safe
navigation.
From the database analysis, the success of detection, continu-
ous watchkeeping and proper judgment in taking avoidance
actions are key factors to reduce the collisions.
IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD
Estimation of Probabilities of Collisions
The probabilities of collisions are estimated by combining the
marine casualty database and the navigation track data. The
navigation track data is obtained through the analysis of the
ship traffic survey carried out at Kanmon Channel for 72 hours
continuously from 00AM on 14 November 2006 to 12AM on
16 November 2006. The traffic data on all vessels were ob-
served by marine radars, AIS and visual observation at every
1 to 3 minutes, and vessel types and their sizes were observed
visually or by IMO ship identification data. The database
consists of 217 collisions happened at sea areas covered by ex
Moji Marine Accident Inquiry, including Kanmon Channel.
Since we obtain the ship traffic data at Kanmon Channel, 18
collisions are extracted from the database, which occurred at
Kanmon area for 5 years.
Table 4 shows the results of trial calculations of the prob-
abilities of collisions for both fishing vessels and cargo vessels
based on the ship traffic volume and the number of crossing
situations. In our calculations, we took into account the spe-
cial regulations at Kanmon Channel and the areas/situations
Table 3 Definition of level of recognition and judgement
Denomination Level of recognition and judgement
of level
Failure of detection of opponent vessel
Level 0
at collision risk
Level 1 Detection of other vessel at collision risk
Watchkeeping of other vessel
Level 2
at collision risk
Level 3 Judgement of peril of collision
Level 4 Taking avoiding action

Table 4 Difference of probability of collision
Calculation by ship traffic volume
Num. of vessels Num. of vessels
Type of vessel
for 3 days for 5 years (estimated)
Cargo vessel 2,152 1,309,133
Fishing vessel 404 245,767
Calculation by num. of incidence of crossing situation
Total 235 142,958
Daytime 204 124,100
Nighttime 31 18,858
affected by Vessel Traffic Control are excluded. We consider
that this proposed calculation method is versatile and also ap-
plicable to the other sea areas to evaluate the probabilities of
marine accidents using the traffic data and marine casualty
data.
In this analysis, the “crossing situation” is defined as follows:
When two vessels, Ship A and Ship B, keep their speed and
courses toward the intersection of their course, the crossing
situation appears. This intersection is defined as the “estimated
collision point”. When Ship A reaches the estimated collision
point and Ship B is within the longer vessel’s length between
Ship A and Ship B from the estimated collision point, this situ-
ation changes to a fear of collision. We try to extract the cross-
ing situation by the following calculating method applying to
the traffic data analysis. First, the course lines of both vessels
are plotted at each one minute from the traffic data by interpo-
lation. When the estimated collision point on the course line
can’t be cleared, it is defined that the crossing situation is de-
tected.
The probabilities are calculated through the following steps:
The average number of cargo vessels par 3 days is 2,152, and
the number of cargo vessels par 5 years is calculated 1,309,133
by converting the average number par day. On the other
hand, the number of cases of analyzed crossing situation par 3
days is 235, and the number of cases par 5 years is calculated
142,958. According to the database, 18 collisions occurred at
Kanmon area for 5 years. The calculation results are shown in
Table 4.
The occurrence probability of collisions of fishing vessels,
based on the traffic volume, is 5.34 times higher than that of
cargo vessels. The probability based on the number of cross-
ing situation is 1.72 times for fishing vessels and 9.20 times
for cargo vessels higher than the ones based on the traffic vol-
ume, which indicates that the risk of collision is much higher
once the crossing situation exists. The probability at nighttime
based on the number of crossing situation is 8.22 times higher
than the daytime.
Identification of hazard
As shown in INTRODUCTION, the static data shows that the
marine casualties involved by fishing vessels are occurred fre-
quently and its property damages and loss of life are extensive,
and the risk assessment for this casualty seems to meet the
public demands. In FSA, the analysis objective is to be inves-
tigated to judge whether it is considered as “hazard”.
As per FSA Guidelines Appendix 5, two points of view, In-
Yuka Tamura, Takeshi Shinoda
Num. of Probability Ratio of
accident of accident probability
1.37x10-5 1 1 - -
18
7.32x10 -5
5.34 - 1 -
18 1.26x10-4 - 9.20 1.72 -
8 6.45x10 -5 - - - 1
10 5.30x10 -4
- - - 8.22
dividual Risk and Social Risk, are suggested for the judgment
of hazard. Individual Risk is used, when the risk from an ac-
cident is to be estimated for a particular individual at a given
location. Social Risk is used to eliminate risks of accidents
affecting many people and its expressions can be generated for
each type of accident (e.g. collision) or a single overall Social
Risk expression can be obtained, e.g. for a ship type by com-
bining all accidents together (e.g. collision, grounding, fire).
Social Risk represents the risk to a (large) group of people. In
this group, the risk to individuals may be quite different. The
Social Risk value therefore represents an average risk.
In this paper, the identification of hazard is investigated with
two Social Risk indexes, the probability of collision and the
loss of life, using ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)
principal which is commonly accepted as risk criteria used to
translate a risk level into value judgment. The ALARP region
is defined between an upper bound 10 -3 and a lower bound
10-6, and a risk level is intolerable above an upper bound and
broadly acceptable below a lower bound. The risk in ALARP
region should be reduced cost-effectively. When the social
risk of the analysis objective is in ALARP region, it is defined
as hazard and the subsequent risk assessment is to be carried
out.
The probabilities of collisions based on the ship traffic vol-
ume are 7.32x10-5 for fishing vessel and 1.37x10-5 for cargo
vessel and the ones based on the number of crossing situation
is 1.26x10-4 as shown in Table 4. All of these probabilities are
in ALARP region.
A simple measure of Social Risk is the PLL (Potential Loss
of Life) which is defined as the expected value of the number
of fatalities per year. As per the database, the consequence of
collisions for 4 fishing vessels is 5 loss of life during 5 years at
Kanmon Channel. The number of collisions with loss of life
per year is calculated as 0.80 cases and its occurrence prob-
abilities based on fishing vessel’s traffic volume and the num-
ber of crossing situation are 1.63x10-5 and 2.80x10-5, and their
PLLs are 2.04x10-5 and 3.50x10-5 respectively, which are all
in ALARP region.
Accordingly, it is concluded that the collision between fishing
vessel and cargo vessel is hazard from the probabilities of col-
lisions and PLL and to be the analysis objective for FSA.
Risk Assessment on Collisions between Fishing Vessels and Cargo Vessels

RISK ASSESSMENT
Event Tree Analysis
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a method to visually represent
the sequence of events and to estimate many possible results
from an initial event. The event tree bifurcates into success
and failure at each phase of the sequence. “Success” is se-
lected when the required actions are taken successfully and
“failure” is selected when they are not taken or fail. Each
bifurcation of the event tree relates to some safety character-
istics. Probabilities are applied to success or failure at each
bifurcation respectively.
The even tree is developed as shown in Fig. 2. Four events,
related to the Sitations in Table 2, “Detection of opponent
vessel”, “Keeping watch”, “Recognition of peril of collision”
and “Taking avoidance action” are set as the principal events
of each bifurcation. The time sequence of the event tree is
expressed by four Situations. The number of cases obtained
from the database is indicated at each bifurcation for both fish-
ing vessel and cargo vessel. Since the analysis data is the re-
cords of adjudication of marine accident inquiries, the number
of successes stemming from avoidance actions is unobtainable.
Results of ETA
Pattern of Collisions focused on Human Factors
The developed event tree shows patterns of collisions. The
most frequent pattern for both fishing vessel (71%) and cargo
vessel (50%) is Sequence No. S16, where detection of the
opponent vessel at an early stage was not succeeded and sub-
sequent watchkeeping/judgment/avoidance actions were not
taken. In this pattern, the failure of detection leads directly
to the collision. The 2nd most frequent pattern for fishing
vessel is S8 (12%), where the detection was succeeded at
early stage, however, the subsequent action “watchkeeping”
was not carried out properly. The 3rd most frequent is S12
(7%), where the detection was succeeded at early stage and
the watchkeeping was also carried out properly, however the
subsequent judgment/actions were not appropriate. In fishing
vessel’s case, only 8 cases (4%) is categorized as S2 where all
the required actions were properly carried out. From the re-
sults, 84% of collisions for fishing vessels are caused by mis-
detection and insufficient watchkeeping, and the measures to
avoid these failures are required.
On the other hand, the 2nd most frequent pattern for cargo
vessels is S2 (16%), where failure of the avoidance action lead
to the collision. This occurs because a proper watch was not
kept and subsequent recognition of the danger and effective
actions are not taken while detection was succeeded. The 3rd
most frequent pattern is S8 (12%) where the detection was
succeeded at early stage, but the watchkeeping was not carried
out properly which lead collision. In case of Cargo Vessel,
30% of collisions are happened even though the detection was
succeeded at early stage.
Regarding to the collisions at nighttime, the most frequent
pattern both for fishing vessels and cargo vessels is S16 and its
occurrence ratios are 73% for fishing vessels and 47% for car-
go vessels, and the results show similar tendency to all cases
(day & nighttime). This fact implies that the collision patterns
are not influenced by the time of navigation.

Situation C Situation D
Situation A Situation B Perilous condition Crisis condition
Normal voyage Crossing situation of collision of collision
Num. of cases (Detection of ( Keeping watch ) ( Recognition ( Taking avoidance Sequence number
at Kanmon channel opponent vessel) of peril of collision ) action ) (Event sequence)
at night 3(3) <2(2)> S S1 ( E1S2S3S4S )
Num. of cases S 3(3) <2(2)>
3(4) <2(2)> 24(7) F S2 ( E1S2S3S4F )
at Kanmon channel 24(7)
S 26(10) 0(1) <0(0)> S S3 ( E1S2S3F4S )
Num. of accident F
9(7) <7(3)> 2(3) F 0(1) <0(0)> S4 ( E1S2S3F4F )
by constructed database 2(3)
cargo vessel 54(34) 3(0) <2(0)> S S5 ( E1S2F3S4S )
(fishing vessel) F 6(3) <5(1)> S 7(1) 3(0) <2(0)> S6 ( E1S2F3S4F )
F
7(1)
28(24) 3(3) <3(1)> S S7 ( E1S2F3F4S )
Encounter Success F
other vessels (S) 21(23) F 3(3) <3(1)> S8 ( E1S2F3F4F )
21(23)
All vessels Failure 0(0) <0(0)> S S9 ( E1F2S3S4S )
caused accident (F) S
0(0) <0(1)> 0(0) F 0(0) <0(0)> S10 ( E1F2S3S4F )
0(0)
S 0(0) 0(0) <0(1)> S S11 ( E1F2S3F4S )
F
0(0) 0(0) <0(1)> S ( E
9(11) <3(7)> F 12 1F2S3F4F )
0(0)
46(66) 0(0) <0(0)> S S13 ( E1F2F3S4S )
F S 0(0) F 0(0) <0(0)> S14 ( E1F2F3S4F )
9(11) <3(6)>
0(0)
46(66) 9(11) <3(6)> S S15 ( E1F2F3F4S )
F
46(66) 9(11) <3(6)> S ( E
F 16 1F2F3F4F )
46(66)
Fig.2 Event tree analysis of collisions between fishing vessels and cargo vessels
 Yuka Tamura, Takeshi Shinoda

The event tree indicates the pattern and tendency of the colli-
sions focused on variation human factors, the codes of cogni-
tion-decisionmaking factors.
Calculation of Probabilities
Table 5 shows the probabilities at each bifurcation in the
event tree for fishing vessels. The probabilities of the top
event “collision” are 7.32x10-5 based on traffic volume and
1.26x10-4 based on number of crossing situation. The proba-
bilities for each sequence based on traffic volume are 4.52x10-
5 for S16 and the order of 10-6 for S2, S8, S10, S12 and S14.
The probabilities based on number of crossing situation are
1.55x10-5 for S10, 1.17x10-5 for S14 and 7.77x10-5 for S16,
which are 10 times to the probabilities based on traffic volume.
These probabilities are within ALARP region and the coun-
termeasures are to be investigated and applied when they are
cost-effective and practical. The results of ETA show the point
of time and events that require the effective measures.
RISK CONTROL OPTIONS (RCOs)
Suggestion of RCOs
Risk control options (RCOs) to prevent collisions are pro-
posed from the results of database analysis and event tree
analysis which show that more than half of the collisions are
caused by mis-detection. In addition, the probabilities at bifur-
cations in the event tree have the order of 10-5 for mis-detec-
tion and insufficient watchkeeping which are within ALARP
region. Accordingly the measures against mis-detection and
insufficient watchkeeping are suggested: 1) Improved radar
reflector, 2) Installation of bright instrument to improve the
visibility at night, 3) Installation of approach warning system
and 4) Installation of scaled-down AIS. All of the RCOs are
installed onboard fishing vessels. RCO 1 is effective to im-
prove the ability of detection by the radars from cargo vessels.
RCO 2 is also to improve the ability of detection by watch
from cargo vessels at night. RCO 3 is effective to reduce the
mis-detection and insufficient watchkeeping by fishing ves-
sel. RCO 4 is effective to support the detection and assist the
judgment of the sitation for both of fishing vessel and cargo
vessel. The effectiveness, advantage/disadvantage, benefit are
discussed for each RCO and the impact to the cognition-deci-
sionmaking factors is also examined. Table 6 shows a part of
the estimated effectiveness. “E“ means that RCO is effective,
“Fair” means effective with conditions and a blank means that
RCO is not related to that cognition-decisionmaking factor.
RCO 1 is effective to AP31, AJ22 and BP41, while RCO 4 is
effective to them but under the conditions.
The efficiencies of each RCO are estimated against each cog-
nition-decisionmaking factors with the risk reduction rate 50%
as the impact of the number of its occurrence. Table 7 shows
the results of the estimated reduction of the cases related to
the cognition-decisionmaking factors for RCO 1. As shown
in Table 6, RCO 1 is effective to AP31, AJ 22 and BP41 and
there are 20 cases caused with these cognition-decisionmaking
factors. One case of the sequence No. S8 is caused by BP41
and the number of case is reduced by 50% with RCO 1, ac-
cordingly the case will be reduced to 0.5 case when RCO 1 is
applied. For S16, there are total 17 cases and 6 cases among
them are caused by AP31, 2 by AJ22 and 1 by the combination
AP31 and AJ22. When 50% reduction is applied with RCO
1, 6 cases by AP31 is reduced to 3 cases, 2 cases by AJ22 to 1
case. These 4 cases contain one case caused by the combina-
tion of AP31 & AJ22 which is reduced to 0.5 by RCO 1 which
should be deducted from 4 cases. Then the total reduced num-
ber of cases is 3.5. This estimation is applied to all the RCOs.
The cognition-decisionmaking factors are useful for the in-
vestigation of the efficiency of RCOs and the risk assessment
phase.
The reduction ratio of 50% is estimated as follows: Accord-
ing to the comparison of the ratio of occurrence probability
of collisions focused on the recognition levels, the probability
with the recognition level 0 in Table 3 continuously is 9 times
greater than that with the recognition levels 1 to 4. The nu-
merical value of distribution factor 2.0 by calculating this in-
creased ratio of 91/3 is allocated to each recognition level 1 to 3,

Table 5 Probabilities at each bifurcation for ET in Fig. 2

A B C D&E
Situation Sequence No.
Detection Watchkeeping Judgment Operation
-6
2.26x10-6 - S1
2.26x10 (3.89x10-6) 2.26x10-6(3.89x10-6) S2
(3.89x10-6) 0.00 - S3
4.52x10-6 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) S4
(7.77x10-6) -6
0.00 - S5
2.26x10 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) S6
-5 (3.89x10-6) 2.26x10-6 - S7
7.32x10 (3.89x10-6) 2.26x10-6(3.89x10-6) S8
-6
-4
(1.26x10 ) -5
9.04x10 - S9
1.36x10 (1.55x10-5) 9.04x10-6(1.55x10-5) S10
-5
-5
(2.33x10 ) 4.52x10-6 - S11
6.56x10 (7.77x10-6) 4.52x10-6(7.77x10-6) S12
(1.13x10-4) -5
6.78x10-6 - S13
5.20x10 (1.17x10-5) 6.78x10 (1.17x10-5)
-6
S14
-5
(8.94x10-5) 4.52x10 - S15
-5 -5 -5
(7.77x10 ) 4.52x10 (7.77x10 ) S16
Based on traffic volume (based on nubmer of crossing situation)
Risk Assessment on Collisions between Fishing Vessels and Cargo Vessels
Table 6 Efficiency of RCOs
Code RCO 1 RCO 2 RCO 3 RCO 4
AP31 E E E Fair
AJ22 E Fair
BP41 E E E Fair
E：Effective, Fair：Effective with conditions
Table 7 Estimated reduction of cases by RCO1
Num of AP31 & Reduced
Seq. No. AP31 AJ22 BP41
Cases AJ22 Num.
S8 1 - - 1 - 0.5
S10 2 - - 1 - 0.5
S16 17 6 2 - 1 3.5
then the reduction rate is calculated as 50% of reciprocal value
of distribution factor 2.0. This introduced reduction rate 50%
on each recognition level during navigation is adopted for the
estimation of the efficiency of RCO as shown above.
The results show that the reduction ratios on the number of
cases are 40% for RCO 3, 31% for RCO 4 and 42% for RCO
3 & 4 (combination of RCO 3 and RCO 4) respectively. The
probabilities of the top event “collision” in the event tree
are reduced to 1.12x10 -5 for RCO1, 6.37x10 -6 for RCO 2,
4.18x10-5 for RCO 3, 5.88x10-5 (fishing vessel) and 9.12x10-
6 (cargo vessel) for RCO 4 and 4.07x10-5 for RCO 3 & 4 and
most of them are still in ALARP region, while the reduction
ratios are high for S8, S10 and S16 which indicate that RCOs
are effective for success of detection at early stage.
COST BENEFIT ASSESSMENT
The cost benefit assessment is carried out by Contingent
Valuation Method (CVM). The CVM method was adopted to
conduct the damage assessment in the accident of oil pollution
by the tanker EXXON VALDEZ. This method has the advan-
tage to expect non-market prices, such as a value of nature. In
this study, the survey asks how much money people would be
willing to pay (WTP) to reduce the collisions. The calculated
WTP is compared to the cost of RCOs, and feasibility assess-
ment of RCOs is explored. A preliminary survey had been
carried out by interviewing members of the Fisheries Coopera-
tive Association on the current situation of fisherman’s work
conditions and the incidence of collisions, and based on the
inputs the questionnares are estalibshed. The questionnaire
survey was carried out by 2 methods, by interview the fisher-
men directly and by mail. In this paper, the double-bound
dichotomous choice was introduced to evaluate WTP since it
provides better results with fewer samples.
The highest average value of WTP is JPY 13,782 per year
and the average payment period of WTP is 9.625 years. It
is concluded that fishermen will be able to bear the cost for
implementation of the measures to reduce the number of col-
lisions up to the total amount of JPY 133,000 (USD 1,330,
exchange rate in this paper: USD1=JPY100). This amount is,
however, less than the price of a scaled-down AIS (Type B) of
JPY 300,000 (USD 3,000).
The questionnare surveys were carried out not only for WPT
but for their opinions on the measures for safety at sea. The
results show that 60% of the replies are satisfied with the cur-
rent equipment. The reason why the additional measures are
not necessary are that the current equipment is sufficient or
pay enough attention to watchkeeping and actions. On the
other hand, the implementation of the measures will be sup-
ported provided they are cost-effective or highly reliable. For
the implementation of the scaled-down AIS, 56% is “Yes” at
30s and 50% at 40s, which implies that younger generation is
willing to implement the measures if they are cost-effective
and highly reliable.
Cost Benefit Evaluation by GCAF
FSA Guidelines suggest two criteria NCAF and GCAF.
GCAF, Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (Gross CAF) as index
of cost effectiveness in relation to safety of life, is used in this
paper since the cost of RCOs to install the equipment is not so
high and the estimated economic benefit is relatively small due
to the fishermen’s family-run business.
The definition is
Gross CAF = ∆C/∆R
where:
∆C is the cost per ship of the risk control option
∆R is the risk reduction per ship, in terms of the number of
fatalities averted, implied by the risk control option
∆C is calculated as the total cost divided by 9.625 years,
which is the average payment period of WTP, and this annual
cost per ship is utilized.
∆R is calculated from the reduced number of fatality per
ship & year based on ship traffic volume. Since RCO cost is
considered to be borne by a ship, the probabilities based on
the ship traffic volume divided by the average fishing days are
used. The probabilities based on the number of crossing situ-
ation are not used since it is considered that the cost for RCO
is borne at every sail and its results will be overestimated.
GCAF is calculated with the above ∆C and ∆R.
The criterion for GCAF covering risk of JPY 30,000,000
(USD 300,000). This criterion is estimated from the average
yearly income and its average payment period. The average
yearly income for fishery is JPY 2,223,000 (USD 22,230). The
average age of fishermen is 56.2 years old and it is estimated
that they will retire at 70 years old, which is obtained/assumed
from the questionnaire surveys, accordingly the average pay-
ment period is estimated 13.8 years. While these values are
much less than the ones defined in FSA Guidelines, which
are USD 1.5 million for risk of fatality only or injuries and ill
health only, and USD 3 million for risk of fatality, injuries and
ill health respectively, our estimation is reasonable value re-
flecting the actual situation.
Table 8 shows the results of GCAF estimation based on the
fatality. RCO 1, RCO 2 and RCO 3 are considered as cost
effective. When the GCAF is calculated based on the WTP
with the ∆R for RCO 4 (WTP in Table 8), its result is also
considered as cost-effective while GCAF is slightly above the
criteria. This implies that more options may be suggested as
RCOs, when the cost is set as reasonable as possible to take
into account ability to pay, such as WTP. This is important
factor for the stakeholders and decision- making process.
On the other hand, all the RCOs are considered as cost-effec-
tive when the criteria of USD 1.5/3.0 million defined by FSA
Guidelines are applied. Since the results are highly dependent
 Yuka Tamura, Takeshi Shinoda

Table 8 GCAF estimation on fatality

Fishing Vessels
No RCO
RCO 1 RCO 2 RCO 3 RCO 4 RCO 3&4 WTP
Reduction Fatality 0 1 0.5 1.5 1 1.5 1
Collisions 0 1 0.5 1 1 1 1
Num. of Case/9 yrs 4 3 3.5 2.5 3 3 3
Probability 9.04x10-6 6.78x10-6 7.91x10-6 6.78x10-6 6.78x10-6 6.78x10-6 6.78x10-6
∆R - 2.26x10-6 1.13x10-6 2.26x10-6 2.26x10-6 6.78x10-6 2.26x10-6
∆ C / year - 4,156 5,195 5,195 31,169 36,364 13,652
GCAF/ship - 10,387 25,967 12,298 77,900 90,884 34,445
(Unit for GCAF & ∆ C : thousand JPY)

to the criteria, it should be prudent to define them. REFERENCE

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This paper proposes the following methodology of risk as- Asian Association of Maritime Engineering Societies
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1) Construction of the database, quantification and encoding
of human factors related to collision using the database Tamura Y., and Shinoda T. (2011), Practical Application of
2) Estimation of ship traffic volume and number of crossing FSA to Collisions between Fishing Vessels and Cargo Vessels,
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3) Hazard identification by the database analysis and the esti
-mation of the probabilities of collisions based on the ship
traffic volume and the number of crossing situation
4) Risk assessment by ETA considering the sequence of the
crossing situation and the related human factors with the
databse
5) Cost benefit assessment by CVM for RCOs and GCAF
estimation
Through the application for the collisions between fishing
vessels and cargo vessels considering the related human fac-
tors, the effectiveness of the suggested methodology and its
procedure using the encoded cognition-decisionmaking factors
is confirmed.