Searches and Seizures

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles
City,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the
Order1 dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57,
denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to
Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized, and the Order2dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime
Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to
search: (1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City3 and (2) the
premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga,4 both for Violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly
alleged that SI Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his
personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a
series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners’ house. The purpose of the
application for search warrants was to seize the following articles/items:
Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "SHABU,"

"MARIJUANA," weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia, all
of which articles/items are being used or intended to be used in Violation of Republic Act 6425 as
amended, and are hidden or being kept in said house/premises. 5
Executive Judge Mario Guariña III (Judge Guariña III) examined in writing and under oath SI
Lagasca and Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on
facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and
control, inside their house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City, an
undetermined amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu and marijuana. Pursuant
these findings, Judge Guariña III issued a search warrant docketed as Search Warrant No. 02-2677,
which commanded any peace officer "to make immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not
beyond 10 days from date hereof, of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take
possession of the properties subject of the offense and bring to his court said properties to be dealt
with as the law directs."6
On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division, namely, SI
Lagasca, Primitivo M. Najera, Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, Horten Hernaez, and Ritche N. Oblanca, in
coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched petitioners’ house on
February 19, 2002 at around 5:00 in the morning.7They were able to seize cash in the amount of
₱15,200.008 and the following items:
1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a packing tape marked "RCL-1-2677,"
(net weight - 915.7 grams);
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped in a newsprint marked "RCL-2-2677"
(net weight - 491.5 grams);
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen (16) transparent plastic bags,
altogether wrapped in a newsprint marked "RCL-3-2677" (net weight - 127.9 grams); and
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9) plastic tea bags, altogether placed in
a yellow plastic bag marked "RCL-4-2677" (net weight - 18.2736 grams).9
On February 20, 2002, an Information10 for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57,
presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.
On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized11on the following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed outside the
territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the
court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial
jurisdiction; (3) the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence illegally seized
by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Documentary Evidence,12 asking
the court to admit the following documents: (1) application for Search Warrant No. 02-2677; (2)
authorization letter dated February 12, 2002 with the signature of NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco
(Director Wycoco); (3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor Emmanuel G. Lansang with the Signature of
Director Wycoco; and (4) Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Proposed Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure [Rules 110-127, Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim that the issuance
of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was "defective considering the application was not personally
endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco," and that the latter’s signature in the authorization letter is different from
that as appearing in the identification card, and therefore it is "not the true and genuine signature of
[Dir.] Wycoco."13
In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,14 the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City
claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,15 which authorizes the
Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all
applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and
provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City.
On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition and/or Answer to the Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized.16 He avers that Judge Guariña III issued Search
Warrant No. 02-2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 20-9717 issued on February 12, 1997. He
also claims that it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who signed the
authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a search warrant in the
house/premises of petitioners on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and Maria Aquino
St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga for violation of R.A. No. 6425. 1avv phi 1
In an Order18 dated September 6, 2002, Judge Omar T. Viola denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows:
The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guariña
III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in order considering that AM 99-10-09-
SC allows or authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI.
The NBI also was able to explain that the authority to apply search warrant was personally signed by
Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who is authorized to sign and that he was
delegated the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director on documents of this like. Deputy
Director Fermin Nasol having that authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director, Reynaldo
Wycoco, there is, therefore, compliance with the law regarding the issuance of authority to apply
search warrant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation, the Court has no other recourse but to agree with the views
of the prosecution as well as the NBI. And this being so, the Court finds not enough ground to quash
the search warrant issued against Spouses Joel and Marietta Marilma.
The motion filed by them and their supplement, is therefore denied, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
On September 23, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 on the ground that the
denial of their Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized is not in
accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence. They claim that no evidence was presented by
Deputy Director Nasol that he was authorized to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco.
Said Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent court on the ground that the
issues raised therein were mere reiterations of petitioners’ arguments that had already been
considered and passed upon in the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized. Respondent court added:
To elaborate, this Court believes and is of the opinion that the Deputy Director of the NBI possesses
the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director requesting for the issuance of a search
warrant and nothing in the Administrative Matter 99-10-09 prohibits the delegation of such ministerial
act to the Deputy Director who is an alter ego of the NBI Director. It is also quite clear that the NBI
Director approved said authorization for SI Ray Lagasca to apply for a search warrant because said
document was never recalled or amended by the Office of the Bureau Director up to the present.
The Court is also of the view that A.M. 99-10-09 is still valid, binding and legal by virtue of the fact
that not even the Supreme Court (sic) did not make any pronouncement … withdrawing and or
declaring the same ineffective, hence, until such order is issued, this Court must interpret and rule
for its continued validity and applicability.21
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners claim that the search warrant was issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and
Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders
dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
At the onset, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of this petition on the
ground that the filing of the said petition directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. The OSG argues that while this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
(CA) over petitions for certiorari, this petition should have been filed with the CA. The OSG contends
that the petitioners have not shown any compelling reason to justify the filing of the petition directly
with this Court.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.22 In this case, the Court opts to take
cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the
exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.23
At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the
Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the two issuances
below:
Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC
Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants
In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
firearms.
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City
filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task
Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of
places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property of things as prescribed in the
Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be served in places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of said courts.
The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and the
result of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Resolution is effective immediately and shall continue until further orders from this Court and
shall be an exemption to the provisions of Circular No. 13 dated 1 October 1985 and Circular No. 19
dated 4 August 1987. x x x
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
Rule 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. – An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant
shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b)
for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioners contend that the application for search warrant was defective. They aver that the
application for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head,
Director Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and that while SI Lagasca
declared that Deputy Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of
Director Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated. Petitioners conclude that the absence of the
signature of Director Wycoco was a fatal defect that rendered the application on the questioned
search warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant null and void "because the spring cannot
rise above its source." 24
We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and
REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to
their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an
assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by
their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads:
Chapter 6 – POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES

Sec. 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates. – (1) Assistant heads and other subordinates
in every bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or regulations, or as
may be specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law.
(2) The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the assistant
head to act as chief of any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties,
without additional compensation, and
(3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a
subordinate officer or employee from being assigned additional duties by proper authority,
when not inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law.
Director Wycoco’s act of delegating his task of endorsing the application for search warrant to
Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law unless it is shown to be
inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasol’s endorsement had the same force and effect
as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the questioned
Orders that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of Director
Wycoco is unassailable.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the
application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the
later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the
territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
The petitioners’ contention lacks merit.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided
therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-
SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of
Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that
the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila
and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:25
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision
Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or
are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme
Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly
describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the
warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of
Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the
searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (italics ours)
In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for
denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On
the contrary, Judge Guariña III had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for
issuing the questioned search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6,
2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of the RTC of Angeles
City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172775 December 19, 2007
HON NE CHAN, YUNJI ZENG, AND JOHN DOE, Petitioners,

vs.
HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD., AND HONDA PHIL., INC., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85353, granting respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and setting aside the Orders dated
20 February 2004 and 18 May 2004, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46.
On 14 November 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through Special Investigator (SI)
Glenn Lacaran, applied for search warrants with the RTC against petitioners for alleged violation of
Section 1682 in relation to Section 1703 of Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of
the Philippines.4
On the same date, RTC Judge Artemio S. Tipon issued two search warrants. The first warrant,
Search Warrant No. 03-4438,5 was directed against petitioner "Hon Ne Chan and John Does,
operating under the name and style ‘Dragon Spirit Motorcycle Center,’ located at No. 192 M.H. del
Pilar Street corner 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila."
On the other hand, the second search warrant, or Search Warrant No. 03-44396 was issued against
petitioner "Yunji Zeng and John Does, operating under the name and style ‘Dragon Spirit Motorcycle
Center,’ located at No. 192 E. Delos Santos Avenue, Caloocan City, Metro Manila."
Except for the names of respondents and addresses to be searched, both search warrants stated
the following:
SEARCH WARRANT7
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath the applicant Special
Investigator Glenn M. Lacaran of the National Bureau of Investigation, and his witnesses Atty. Elmer
NA. Cadano and Mr. Rene C. Baltazar, that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that a
violation of Sec. 168 in relation to Sec. 170 of the R.A. No. 8293 has been committed and that there
are good and sufficient reasons to believe that the following :
a) Motorcycles bearing the model names and/or markings "DS-110", "DSM-110", "SUPER WAVE",
"DS-125","DSM-125", "WAVE R", and "WAVE" and the engines, moldings, spare parts, tires and
accessories for the manufacture and assembly of such motorcycles;
b) Papers, documents, brochures, documents, receipts, invoices, ledgers, books of accounts, labels,
materials, paraphernalia, effects, computer software, computer systems, central processing units,
hard disks, floppy disks, diskettes, date storage and retrieval devices, monitors, and vehicles used or
intended to be used in importing, producing, manufacturing, assembling, selling, marketing,
distributing, dealing with and/or otherwise disposing of motorcycles bearing the model names and/or
markings "DS-110", "DSM-110", "SUPER WAVE", DS-125, DSM-125", "WAVE R", and WAVE",
are in the possession and control of Respondents HON NE CHAN8 and JOHN DOES, operating
under the name and style "DRAGON SPIRIT MOTORCYCLE CENTER", located at No. 192 M. H.
Del Pilar Street corner 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and are being kept
and concealed at the said address.9
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day of the premises
above-described and to search for, and seize, the above-described personal properties which are
the subject of the aforesaid offense and bring to this Court said properties to be dealt with as the law
directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL this 14th day of November, 2003 at the City of Manila,
Philippines.
ARTEMIO S. TIPON
Judge
On the strength of these search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of petitioners’ premises
and seized the following items:
1. from petitioner Hon Ne Chan’s premises:
a) seven (7) motorcycles bearing the model name "DSM WAVE R;"
b) three (3) motorcycles bearing the model name "DSM SUPER WAVE", and
c) one (1) motorcycle bearing the model name "WAVE CX".
2. from petitioner Yunji Zeng’s premises:
a) twenty-one (21) motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE CX 110;"
b) eight (8) motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE 110;"
c) thirty-five (35) motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE 125";
d) one (1) motorcycle bearing the model name "WAVE R";
e) eight (8) motorcycles bearing the model name "SUPER WAVE 110;" and
f) two (2) plastic bags containing various documents.10
On 1 December 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Joint Motion to Quash Search Warrants and
to Return Illegally Seized Items,11 averring therein that the search warrants were issued despite the
absence of probable cause and that they were in the nature of general search warrants.
Respondents filed their Opposition thereto on 7 January 200412 but despite this, the trial court still
issued an Order dated 20 February 2004 which quashed both Search Warrants No. 03-4438 and 03-
4439 and ordered the NBI to return to petitioners the articles seized. In quashing the search
warrants, the trial court held that the return of the twenty-two "WAVE CX 110" motorcycle units was
proper for they were never specifically mentioned therein. As regards the rest of the items seized by
the NBI agents, the trial court decreed that their return to petitioners was justified due to lack of
probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants.
Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 March 200413 was denied by the court a quo
through its Order of 18 May 2004.14 This prompted respondents to seek recourse before the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari.15
On 31 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed Decision granting
respondents’ petition and setting aside the RTC’s Orders dated 20 February 2004 and 18 May
2004.16 The appellate court likewise denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration due to lack of
merit.
Hence, the present petition imputing error to the Court of Appeals because of the following:
i.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE WARRANTS COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF VALID SEARCH WARRANTS NOTWITHSTANDING
THE LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE TO
SEARCH AND SEIZE THE MOTORCYCLE UNITS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THE LACK OF
PARTICULARITY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE THINGS TO BE SEARCHED.
ii.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED GOODWILL IN HONDA WAVE
MOTORCYCLE DESPITE OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD
SUPPORTING THE CLAIM.
iii.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN RULING THAT

THE PETITIONERS PASSED OFF THEIR GOODS AS THAT OF THE RESPONDENTS BY USING
THE MODEL NAME WAVE AND EMBODYING THE PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DESIGNS,
WHICH IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF UNFAIR COMPETITION.17
We are primarily tasked to resolve the questions of: 1) whether probable cause existed in the
issuance of the subject search warrants; 2) whether said search warrants were in the nature of
general search warrants and therefore null and void; and 3) whether there existed an offense to
which the issuance of the search warrants was connected.
We affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on the issuance of a search warrant provides:
Rule 126
Search and Seizure
xxxx
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
Thus, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.18
In this case, petitioners argue that the requirements enumerated in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
pertaining to the issuance of a search warrant were not fulfilled when Search Warrants No. 03-4438
and 03-4439 were issued by the trial court. First, they contend that no probable cause existed
meriting the issuance of the search warrants in that it was stated in the Application for Search
Warrant of National Bureau of Investigation Special Investigator (NBI SI) Lacaran that "(h)e has
information and verily believes that (petitioners) are in possession or has in their control properties
which are being sold, retailed, distributed, imported, dealt with or otherwise disposed of, or intended
to be used as a means of committing a violation of Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic
Act No. 8293 otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines"19 Said statement,
petitioners insist, failed to meet the condition that probable cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.20
It is settled that in determining probable cause, a judge is duty-bound to personally examine under
oath the complainant and the witnesses he may present. Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the
oath required must refer to "the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause."21 Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or on mere
suspicion or belief.22
In the case at bar, petitioners capitalize on the first paragraph of the Application for Search Warrant
executed by NBI SI Lacaran to support their argument that he lacked the personal knowledge
required by both the Rules of Court and by jurisprudence. However, the very next paragraph of the
application reveals the tremulous nature of their argument for it is clearly stated therein that far from
merely relying on mere information and belief, NBI SI Lacaran "personally verified the report and
found [it] to be a fact."23 This, to our mind, removed the basis of his application from mere hearsay
and supported the earlier finding of probable cause on the part of the examining judge. We cannot,
thus, agree in his Order of 20 February 2004 quashing the search warrants he earlier issued on 14
November 2003.
It is likewise well to reiterate here that "probable cause," as far as the issuance of a search warrant is
concerned, has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.24 Equally
important is our declaration in Microsoft Corporation and Lotus Development Corporation v.
Maxicorp, Inc.25 that –
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves,
"probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.26
Applying these standards, we hold that the trial court overstepped its boundaries as far as
determination of probable cause is concerned when it ratiocinated in its Order dated 20 February
2004 that –
With respect to the other units seized by the NBI, their immediate release is likewise proper since
there is no showing of probable cause that justified the issuance of the search warrant. The (herein
respondents) claims (sic) that the (herein petitioners) are guilty of Unfair Competition because of the
alleged similarities between its motorcycle units and those of the (petitioners). There maybe
similarities as claimed by the (respondents) but the differences far outweigh the similarities that any
confusion to the consumer is remote and speculative. These differences are quite evident from the
very comparative pictures attached by the (petitioners) in its (sic) application for Search Warrant as
well as in the Opposition filed relative to the pending "Joint Motion to Quash Search Warrants and to
Return Illegally Seized Items."
Aside from the differences in features, the motorcycle units sold by the (petitioners) prominently bear
the distinct trade name "DRAGON SPIRIT." This is not the same trade name of the (respondents),
which is Honda. The fact alone would practically eliminate any possible confusion on the part of the
public that the motorcycle units they would be buying from the (petitioners) are those manufactured
and/or sold by (respondents).27
Such pronouncement by the RTC is utterly premature for, at that point, all that was presented before
it by respondents was evidence, which to their minds, was sufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. The trial court’s above-cited declaration unmistakably conveys the message that no unfair
competition exists in this case – a conclusion that is not within its competence to make, for its task is
merely confined to the preliminary matter of determination of probable cause and nothing more. The
evidence it requires to dispense this function is, as stated before, far less stringent than that required
in the trial on the merits of the charge involving unfair competition.
Petitioners also argue that the search warrants in question partook the nature of general search
warrants in that they included motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE." They insist that word
"WAVE" is generic and that it fails to pass the requirement of particularity of the items to be seized.
They also maintain that had the word "WAVE" been enough, there would have been no need for
petitioners to state in their application for search warrants the specific motorcycle models, i.e., "DSM
WAVE," "DSM SUPERWAVE 110," and "WAVE R 125."28
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the
wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized
and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.29 It is not, however, required that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities.30
In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,31 it was pointed out that one of the tests to determine
the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. A reading of the search warrants issued by the trial court in this case reveals that the items
to be seized, including motorcycles, are those which are connected with the alleged violation of
Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, notwithstanding the use of the
generic word "WAVE." We, therefore, adopt the following finding of the appellate court:
We may say this of the Wave motorcycles. It is evident that Wave is the model name of the
motorcycles produced by the (herein respondents) Honda and, therefore, any imitation unit that is in
the possession of the (herein petitioners) and carries the name Wave is the fit object of the warrants
– whether some other name or figure is affixed to it or not. The name Wave CX 110 is but a
[species] of units under the generic name Wave. The warrant that directs the seizure of Wave
logically includes Wave CX 110 and is by no means converted into a roving commission when it
allows the officer to seize it.32
Anent petitioners’ contention that the search warrants were issued in relation to no particular
offense, they rely on the holding of this Court in Savage v. Judge Taypin,33 where it was held that –
There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the
controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for
the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused, for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication
or any equitable consideration.34
A reading of said case readily exposes its stark inapplicability to the instant Petition.
To be sure, the search warrant in Savage was issued in the face of possible violation of Republic Act
No. 8293. The acts complained of in said case were the alleged manufacture and fabrication of
1avv phi 1
wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by private respondent therein sans any license or
patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding private respondent and the buying
public.
In making the above-quoted declaration in said case, this Court recognized that paragraph 3 of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code stating that –
3. Any person who, by means of false or fraudulent representations or declarations, orally or in

writing, or by other fraudulent means shall procure from the patent office or from any other
office which may hereafter be established by law for the purposes, the registration of a tradename,
trademark, or service mark, or of himself as the owner of such tradename, trademark, or service
mark or an entry respecting a tradename, trademark, or servicemark.
was not included in the enactment of Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293.
On the other hand, in the Application for Search Warrant filed by NBI SI Lacaran, it is clearly stated
that what respondents are complaining about was the alleged violation of the goodwill they have
established with respect to their motorcycle models "WAVE 110 S" and "WAVE 125 S" and which
goodwill is entitled to protection in the same manner as other property rights. It is quite obvious then
that their cause of action arose out of the intrusion into their established goodwill involving the two
motorcycle models and not patent infringement, as what existed in Savage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the present petition for review is DENIED, and the 31 January
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 17 May 2006 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 85353 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174570 February 22, 2010
ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG,
SY YU SAN and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated
December 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 and the
Resolution2 dated August 18, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On January 11, 2006, an Information3 for the crime of Robbery was filed against respondents Sy
Tiong Gue, Felicidad Chan Sy, Sy Chim, Sy Tiong Yan, Sy Yu Bun, Sy Yu Siong, Sy Yu San, Bryan
Sy Lim, Sy Yu Hui-Pabilona, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Mamerto J. Madronio, and PO1 Marvin Sumang
for the alleged taking of P6,500,000.00 cash, 286 postdated checks, five boxes of Hennessy
Cognac, a television set, a computer set, and other documents from the Guan Yiak Hardware,
committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence against or intimidation of persons and force
upon things, to wit: by forcibly entering the Office of Guan Yiak Hardware located at 453-455 Tomas
Pinpin Street, Binondo, Manila, while being armed with guns, and thereafter, take rob and carry
away cash in the amount of P6,500,000.00 from the vault; 286 postdated checks with total face
value of P4,325,642.00 issued by several customers payable to Guan Yiak Hardware, Five (5) boxes
of Hennessy XO Cognac valued at P240,000.00 more or less; a television set valued at P20,000.00
more or less; Computer set valued at P50,000.00 more or less and other papers/documents or all
valued at P11,135,642.00 more or less belonging to SY SIY HO AND SONS, INC. (Guan Yiak
Hardware) represented by Romer S. Tan, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner in the
total amount of P11,135,642.00 more or less, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.4
Consequently, on April 22, 2003, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edgar A. Reyes filed two separate
applications for the issuance of a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. The
applications were later docketed as Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 and raffled off
to Branch 7, RTC, Manila.
In the said applications, P/Insp. Reyes alleged that he had personal knowledge that respondent
Felicidad Chan Sy had in her possession five boxes of Hennessy XO, as well as 286 company
checks taken from Guan Yiak Hardware. He prayed that the court issue a search warrant authorizing
him or any other agent of the law to take possession of the subject property and bring them before
the court.
In support of the applications, P/Insp. Reyes submitted the sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy
Tan5 and witnesses Maricho Sabelita6 and Anicita Almedilla.7 On April 22, 2003, presiding Judge
Enrico A. Lanzanas posed searching questions to the applicant and his witnesses to determine if
probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.
Thereafter, or on April 22, 2003, Judge Lanzanas issued Search Warrant Nos. 03-36118 and 03-
3612,9 directing any peace officer to make an immediate search of the 8th floor, 524 T. Pinpin,
Binondo, Manila for five boxes of Hennessy XO; and the 7th floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for
various checks payable to the Guan Yiak Hardware, respectively; and, if found, to take possession
thereof and bring the same before the court.
The warrants were later served in the afternoon of April 22, 2003. Under Search Warrant No. 03-
3611, three boxes containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs,
were seized. However, the enforcement of Search Warrant No. 03-3612 yielded negative results.
On May 21, 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants,10 which petitioner
opposed.11
On September 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the motion. Respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,13 but it was denied in the Order14 dated October 28, 2003.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari15 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA arguing that:
I.
The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he refused to quash the subject search warrants, notwithstanding the manifest
absence of probable cause.
II.
There is no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
from the assailed Orders.16
On December 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
respondent court in Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.17
The CA opined that quashing the search warrants for lack of personal knowledge was unwarranted.
It added that the description of the items to be seized complied with the requirement of particularity.
Moreover, the CA found the inquiries made by the judge to be sufficiently probing. However, the CA
agreed with the respondents and concluded that there was no probable cause for the issuance of
the subject search warrants; thus, respondents’ motion to quash should have been granted by the
RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the assailed Resolution dated
August 18, 2006.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
The honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in setting aside the
search warrants issued by honorable executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila.
The honorable court of appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in granting the
petition for certiorari filed with it by the respondents, despite lack of showing that honorable
executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its orders (annexes "l" and "p") denying respondents’
motion to quash search warrants and motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that there was substantial basis for the findings of facts and circumstances, which
led the issuing court to determine and conclude that the offense of robbery had been committed by
the respondents. Petitioner insists that there was probable cause, which justified the issuing judge to
issue the questioned search warrants. Petitioner maintains that the RTC issued the search warrants
after determining the existence of probable cause based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the affiants
and the testimonies given by them during the hearing of the applications for search warrant.
On their part, respondents maintain that the CA’s finding that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants was in accordance with the facts and the law. Respondents contend
that the CA correctly appreciated the numerous statements and admissions of petitioner and his
witnesses, all of which, taken together, clearly negate any finding of probable cause for the issuance
of the subject search warrants.
The sole issue to be determined in the instant action is whether or not there was probable cause
warranting the issuance by RTC of the subject search warrants. We answer in the affirmative
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and to bring it before the court.18 The issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, the relevant sections of which provide:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. 1avvphi1
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.19
In the case at bar, the CA concluded that the RTC did not comply with any of the requisites required
for the issuance of the subject search warrants. The CA ratiocinated that although the RTC judge
personally determined if probable cause existed by examining the witnesses through searching
questions, and although the search warrants sufficiently described the place to be searched and
things to be seized, there was no probable cause warranting the issuance of the subject search
warrants. We do not agree.
Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is
such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that
his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.20 In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,21 this Court stressed that:
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants.
A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay22 and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes23 reveals that
Judge Lanzanas, through searching and probing questions, was satisfied that there were good
reasons to believe that respondents, accompanied by five maids, took five boxes of Hennessy XO
owned by the Guan Yiak Hardware and brought them to the 8th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo,
Manila; and that a person named "Yubol" took various checks from the company’s vault, which was
later brought to the 7th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila. When they entered the premises,
Felicidad Chan Sy was accompanied by two policemen, which stunned Romer Sy Tan, so that he
was not able to do anything in the face of the calculated and concerted actions of his grandmother,
Felicidad Chan Sy, and her seven companions. Based on the foregoing circumstances, Romer Sy
Tan believed that the crime of robbery was committed by the respondents.24
The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their
judicial functions.25 A finding of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant,
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused.26 The determination of whether probable cause exists as to
justify the issuance of a search warrant is best left to the sound discretion of a judge.27 Apparent in
the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge, there was probable cause justifying the
issuance of the search warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the
testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the
witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient
justification for the issuance of the subject search warrants.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction, or to prevent it from
committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.28 This Court
finds nothing irregular, much less, grave abuse of discretion, committed by the RTC judge in issuing
the subject search warrants. The RTC judge complied with all the procedural and substantive
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. This Court is, therefore, bound by the RTC
judge’s finding of probable cause for issuing Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612.
It is to be noted, however, that while this Court affirms the sufficiency of probable cause in the
issuance of the search warrants in connection with the crime of robbery allegedly committed by the
respondents, the guilt of the accused still remains to be determined in the appropriate criminal action
against them, not in the present case which is limited only to the propriety of the issuance of the
subject search warrants by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and
October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is
SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174570 February 22, 2010
ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG,
SY YU SAN and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated
December 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 and the
Resolution2 dated August 18, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On January 11, 2006, an Information3 for the crime of Robbery was filed against respondents Sy
Tiong Gue, Felicidad Chan Sy, Sy Chim, Sy Tiong Yan, Sy Yu Bun, Sy Yu Siong, Sy Yu San, Bryan
Sy Lim, Sy Yu Hui-Pabilona, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Mamerto J. Madronio, and PO1 Marvin Sumang
for the alleged taking of P6,500,000.00 cash, 286 postdated checks, five boxes of Hennessy
Cognac, a television set, a computer set, and other documents from the Guan Yiak Hardware,
committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence against or intimidation of persons and force
upon things, to wit: by forcibly entering the Office of Guan Yiak Hardware located at 453-455 Tomas
Pinpin Street, Binondo, Manila, while being armed with guns, and thereafter, take rob and carry
away cash in the amount of P6,500,000.00 from the vault; 286 postdated checks with total face
value of P4,325,642.00 issued by several customers payable to Guan Yiak Hardware, Five (5) boxes
of Hennessy XO Cognac valued at P240,000.00 more or less; a television set valued at P20,000.00
more or less; Computer set valued at P50,000.00 more or less and other papers/documents or all
valued at P11,135,642.00 more or less belonging to SY SIY HO AND SONS, INC. (Guan Yiak
Hardware) represented by Romer S. Tan, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner in the
total amount of P11,135,642.00 more or less, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.4
Consequently, on April 22, 2003, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edgar A. Reyes filed two separate
applications for the issuance of a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. The
applications were later docketed as Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 and raffled off
to Branch 7, RTC, Manila.
In the said applications, P/Insp. Reyes alleged that he had personal knowledge that respondent
Felicidad Chan Sy had in her possession five boxes of Hennessy XO, as well as 286 company
checks taken from Guan Yiak Hardware. He prayed that the court issue a search warrant authorizing
him or any other agent of the law to take possession of the subject property and bring them before
the court.
In support of the applications, P/Insp. Reyes submitted the sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy
Tan5 and witnesses Maricho Sabelita6 and Anicita Almedilla.7 On April 22, 2003, presiding Judge
Enrico A. Lanzanas posed searching questions to the applicant and his witnesses to determine if
probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.
Thereafter, or on April 22, 2003, Judge Lanzanas issued Search Warrant Nos. 03-36118 and 03-
3612,9 directing any peace officer to make an immediate search of the 8th floor, 524 T. Pinpin,
Binondo, Manila for five boxes of Hennessy XO; and the 7th floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for
various checks payable to the Guan Yiak Hardware, respectively; and, if found, to take possession
thereof and bring the same before the court.
The warrants were later served in the afternoon of April 22, 2003. Under Search Warrant No. 03-
3611, three boxes containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs,
were seized. However, the enforcement of Search Warrant No. 03-3612 yielded negative results.
On May 21, 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants,10 which petitioner
opposed.11
On September 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the motion. Respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,13 but it was denied in the Order14 dated October 28, 2003.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari15 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA arguing that:
I.
The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he refused to quash the subject search warrants, notwithstanding the manifest
absence of probable cause.
II.
There is no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
from the assailed Orders.16
On December 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
respondent court in Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.17
The CA opined that quashing the search warrants for lack of personal knowledge was unwarranted.
It added that the description of the items to be seized complied with the requirement of particularity.
Moreover, the CA found the inquiries made by the judge to be sufficiently probing. However, the CA
agreed with the respondents and concluded that there was no probable cause for the issuance of
the subject search warrants; thus, respondents’ motion to quash should have been granted by the
RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the assailed Resolution dated
August 18, 2006.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
The honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in setting aside the
search warrants issued by honorable executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila.
The honorable court of appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in granting the
petition for certiorari filed with it by the respondents, despite lack of showing that honorable
executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its orders (annexes "l" and "p") denying respondents’
motion to quash search warrants and motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that there was substantial basis for the findings of facts and circumstances, which
led the issuing court to determine and conclude that the offense of robbery had been committed by
the respondents. Petitioner insists that there was probable cause, which justified the issuing judge to
issue the questioned search warrants. Petitioner maintains that the RTC issued the search warrants
after determining the existence of probable cause based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the affiants
and the testimonies given by them during the hearing of the applications for search warrant.
On their part, respondents maintain that the CA’s finding that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants was in accordance with the facts and the law. Respondents contend
that the CA correctly appreciated the numerous statements and admissions of petitioner and his
witnesses, all of which, taken together, clearly negate any finding of probable cause for the issuance
of the subject search warrants.
The sole issue to be determined in the instant action is whether or not there was probable cause
warranting the issuance by RTC of the subject search warrants. We answer in the affirmative
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and to bring it before the court.18 The issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, the relevant sections of which provide:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. 1avvphi1
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.19
In the case at bar, the CA concluded that the RTC did not comply with any of the requisites required
for the issuance of the subject search warrants. The CA ratiocinated that although the RTC judge
personally determined if probable cause existed by examining the witnesses through searching
questions, and although the search warrants sufficiently described the place to be searched and
things to be seized, there was no probable cause warranting the issuance of the subject search
warrants. We do not agree.
Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is
such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that
his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.20 In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,21 this Court stressed that:
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants.
A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay22 and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes23 reveals that
Judge Lanzanas, through searching and probing questions, was satisfied that there were good
reasons to believe that respondents, accompanied by five maids, took five boxes of Hennessy XO
owned by the Guan Yiak Hardware and brought them to the 8th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo,
Manila; and that a person named "Yubol" took various checks from the company’s vault, which was
later brought to the 7th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila. When they entered the premises,
Felicidad Chan Sy was accompanied by two policemen, which stunned Romer Sy Tan, so that he
was not able to do anything in the face of the calculated and concerted actions of his grandmother,
Felicidad Chan Sy, and her seven companions. Based on the foregoing circumstances, Romer Sy
Tan believed that the crime of robbery was committed by the respondents.24
The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their
judicial functions.25 A finding of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant,
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused.26 The determination of whether probable cause exists as to
justify the issuance of a search warrant is best left to the sound discretion of a judge.27 Apparent in
the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge, there was probable cause justifying the
issuance of the search warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the
testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the
witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient
justification for the issuance of the subject search warrants.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction, or to prevent it from
committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.28 This Court
finds nothing irregular, much less, grave abuse of discretion, committed by the RTC judge in issuing
the subject search warrants. The RTC judge complied with all the procedural and substantive
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. This Court is, therefore, bound by the RTC
judge’s finding of probable cause for issuing Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612.
It is to be noted, however, that while this Court affirms the sufficiency of probable cause in the
issuance of the search warrants in connection with the crime of robbery allegedly committed by the
respondents, the guilt of the accused still remains to be determined in the appropriate criminal action
against them, not in the present case which is limited only to the propriety of the issuance of the
subject search warrants by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and
October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is
SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189669 February 16, 2015
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution dated
1 2
September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set
aside.
The antecedent facts are:
Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured byand bearing the duly
registered trademark and device of respondent Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a
paralegal investigation team who sent their people to investigate. The investigators went to
respondent's premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty
cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled.
Respondent's employees then refilled said empty cylinders at respondent's refilling station. The
refilled cylinders were brought to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that
respondent was not authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products,
and/or use or imitate any Petron trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of apprehending and
prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale of LPG products using
the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts constitute a violation of Section 168, in relation
3
to Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
4
of the Philippines, and/or Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the
5
Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron
Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse. They also witnessed trucks
coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded with Gasul, Shellane and Marsflame cylinders,
which then deposit said cylinders in different places, one of them a store called "Edrich Enterprises"
located at 272 National Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought Shellane
and Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which they were issued an official receipt.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-
Naga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1, in relation to
6
Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293 against respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the
7
RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and
2002-28 were issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in
an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-
28, where the only grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse
of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most
of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich
Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21, 2003,
the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash.
However, on March 27,2003, respondent's new counsel filed an Appearance with Motion for
Reconsideration. It was only in said motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of
the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged
crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. Respondent
pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to
justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the
commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late
for respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the application for search
warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
In an Order dated July 28, 2003,the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated March 13,2009,
affirmed the RTC Order quashing the search warrants. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated September 14, 2009.
Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner presents herein the
following issues:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE IN AN APPLICATION

FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE
IS NOT A CRIMINAL CASE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO

QUASHIS NOT SUBJECT TO THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE AND THATTHE ISSUE OF LACK
OF JURISDICTION MAY NOT BE WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL. 8
Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant
in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-
Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction
over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search warrant
was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of
compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over
the place of commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants
constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search
warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a search warrant was indeed insufficient for
failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the
application in a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime
was committed.
Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application, the more pressing
question that would determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking
into consideration the issue of said defect in resolving respondent's motion for reconsideration where
the issue was raised for the very first time? The record bears out that, indeed, respondent failed to
include said issue at the first instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover a
motion to quash search warrants?
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands
that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be
deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in
said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of
limitations. It should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the
9
omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants. Furthermore, the Court
10
distinctly stated in Abuan v. People, that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the
11
accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections
not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised
in the hearing of the motion to suppress x x x." 12
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of
an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available
and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the
newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.
In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in respondent's motion for reconsideration was
an issue of jurisdiction, the CA rationcinated, thus:
It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil
cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. 13
Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because as pronounced by
the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web
14
Corporation v. People of the Philippines, to wit:

15
x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a "special

criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus
categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts,
as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a
search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of
1âw phi 1
the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature,
and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search
warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
16
The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion. It gravely erred in
equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants with criminal actions themselves. As
elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the
rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application
should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as
stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to have even taken into
consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to
issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.
Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses Anunciacion v.
Bocanegra, that: 17
We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining supplemental motions x x x which
raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to
file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs
cause of action.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 13,
2009, and the Resolution dated September 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80643 are REVERSED.
The Order dated February 21, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur,
Branch 24, denying respondent's motion to quash, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009

SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "SHABU,"

Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC

Chapter 6 – POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES

The petitioners’ contention lacks merit.

G.R. No. 172775 December 19, 2007

HON NE CHAN, YUNJI ZENG, AND JOHN DOE, Petitioners,

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

1. from petitioner Hon Ne Chan’s premises:

c) one (1) motorcycle bearing the model name "WAVE CX".

2. from petitioner Yunji Zeng’s premises:

a) twenty-one (21) motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE CX 110;"

b) eight (8) motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE 110;"

c) thirty-five (35) motorcycles bearing the model name "WAVE 125";

d) one (1) motorcycle bearing the model name "WAVE R";

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN RULING THAT

Search and Seizure

3. Any person who, by means of false or fraudulent representations or declarations, orally or in

G.R. No. 174570 February 22, 2010

ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner,

The antecedents are as follows:

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

G.R. No. 174570 February 22, 2010

ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner,

The antecedents are as follows:

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

G.R. No. 189669 February 16, 2015

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioners,

The antecedent facts are:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE IN AN APPLICATION

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO

Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.

Corporation v. People of the Philippines, to wit:

x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a "special

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