ELECTRICAL DESIGN, INSTALLATION AND APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVED SAFETY IN CEMENT PLANTS. By: William F. Robertson, PE Robert J. Sagmeister Consulting Electrical Engineer Cement Industry Consultant AMEC, Inc. Abstract This paper addresses electrical design concepts that can have a significant impact on safety of Personnel and equipment. Specific areas addressed include system and equipment grounding; medium voltage, mobile equipment grounding; application of equipment within their short-circuit ratings; safety switches; electric shock protection; arc fault flash hazards; egress lighting; and identification of equipment. Keywords include electric shock hazard, arc fault flash hazard, incident energy, high resistance grounded systems, and ground potential ris Introduction ‘This paper examines principal hazards associated with electrical systems and presents options for improved safety in the work place. Safety of personnel and equipment begins inthe design stage. This is true both for new plants and modernizations of existing facilities, itis far easier and less costly fo design safe installations than to correct poorly conceived ones, Choices made in the design stage can enhance safely, often in cost effective ways. Equipment ratings and features selected to enhance safety often improve plant operating flexibilities, Safe installations are truly win-win-wn situations for plant owners and operators, employees and families, and insurers, Investments in safe designs pay dividends for years to, come Electric Shock Hazard The principal hazards to humans are electrical shock and the explosive nature of an arc fault flash. The physiological effects of electric current on a human body, stated in order of increasing current magnitude, are perception, muscular contraction, unconsciousness, fibrillation of the hear, respiratory nerve blockage and buming [1]. Currents in the 9-25 mA range may make it hard or impossible to release lan energized object, Higher currents induce muscular contractions, making breathing difficult. Currents in the range of 60-100 mA can cause death due to ventricular fibrillation, stoppage of the heart, or inhibition of fespiration. The importance of keeping shock currents below the threshold of fibrillation cannot be over ‘emphasized. Electric shock hazards generally do not occur on systems rated < 50 V ac rms and 120 V ripple-tree de (2. Of electrical systems typically found in the industrial sector, only 24 V de control and instrumentation ‘systems would normally not be exposed to electric shock. However even these systems could present ‘shock hazards, should they come in contact with higher system voltages. For this reason, National Electrical Code Article 725 requires Class 2 and 3 control and signal circuits be separated from electric light, power, Class 1, non-power-limited fire alarm circuit conductors and medium power network-powered broadcast communication cables. One often associates electric shock with energized systems. Electric shocks can also occur while touching de-energized equipment. Consider a 115 kV line-to-ground fault in a substation yard with an impedance-to- ground of 1 ohm. Assume 3 kA of current flows into the ground and returns to the source, The potential at grade in the substation yard will ise 3 kV above an ideal zero ground plane. This potential will be transferred to conducting bodies coupled to, or electrically connected to, the substation grounding grid. {In most industrial installations, the substation grounding grid is bonded to the plant's grounding grid. A high voltage line-to-ground fault in a substation yard would be transferred to all non-current carrying, conducting surfaces in the plant. In the above example, building steel and equipment frames would rise 3 kV above an ‘deal ground plane. However if all non-current carrying, conducting surfaces are bonded together, an equipotential plane is formed. This is analogous to a bird sitting on a high voltage line, Both feet are at the same potential, and electric shock hazards are avoided,It may not be practical to create equipotential ground planes in some work areas. Consider a mining ‘environment, such as a quarry, where itis not practical to create equipotential planes throughout a work area. Transfers of potentials to the frames of electrical equipment can represent shock hazards to workers. ‘System and equipment grounding in mining environments require careful attention to ensure safety of personnel and equipment, These issues are addressed below in Grounding Medium Voltage, Mobile Equipment. Arc Fault Flash Hazards ‘The release of energy into a phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase fault can cause violent generation of arc plasma, hot gases, incandescent metal shrapnel and explosive pressures. Temperatures generated in an arc fault can approach 19,000° C, roughly four times the surface temperature of the sun [3]. Worker's skin temperature can easily reach levels that produce incurable burns. Explosive pressures generated can rupture eardrums, collapse lungs and blow workers backwards with tremendous force. Exposure to arc fault lash hazards is greatest when working on energized electrical equipment with the enclosure doors open. Most electrical equipment is tested to ensure an arc fault flash would be contained within an enclosure with the doors closed. Factory Mutual and UL do not perform open door, fault testing ‘The 2000 ecition of NPFA Code 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces, includes formulas that may be used to calculate safe working distances from a potential arc fault. Charts are provided to determine types of protective clothing and equipment recommended when personnel work on energized electrical equipment. In the content of NFPA 70 E, safe working distances {and protective clothing and equipment are intended to limit injuries to curable bums to a human body. Protective clothing and equipment can greatly reduce flash burns. However, they offer minimal protection against explosive shrapnel and the tremendous forces generated in a high level arc fault. Are fault flash tests conclusively demonstrate that working on energized electrical equipment with open doors represents extreme peril to personnel, Generally, here is no practical way to protect personnel from arc fault flash hazards while working on energized electrical equipment with enclosure doors open, Risks associated with arc fault fash hazards can be reduced, but not eliminated. For example, current limiting fuses can greatly reduce energy released into a fault, However, they offer litle protection for low level faults, below the current limiting threshold of a fuse. Naturally, they offer no protection for faults on the line side of fuses. High resistance grounded 480/277 volt systems essentially eliminate arc fault lash hazards for a single phase-to-ground fault. However, they offer no arc-fault flash protection for phase-to- phase faults. It's important to remember phase-to-ground faults on different phases can result in a phase- to-phase fault involving ground System Grounding System grounding plays a significant role in safety of personnel and equipment. In the industrial sector in the USA, medium vottage systems typically are low resistance grounded. Neutral grounding resistors typically are rated 400 A, 10 s. Medium voltage systems serving mobile equipment typically emplay 25 A, Continuous rated, neutral grounding resistors. A neutral grounding resistors time rating usually is selected to coordinate with protective relaying schemes. However on medium voltage systems serving mobile equipment, continuous rated resistors are required for safely of personnel, Neutral resistors must remain in service in the event protective relaying does not clear phase-to-ground faults, Grouns-faults in medium voltage systems are isolated immediately to limit equipment damage. Most equipment faults begin phase-to-ground and escalate to phase-to-phase. Energy released into a fault is a function of It. Lower phase-to-ground fault currents offer a better chance to avoid escalation and the ensuing damage to equipment. Arc fault flash hazards for a single phase-to-ground are also reduced, because ground-fauit currents are limited to 2 or 400 A. These values compare favorably with phase-to- phase fault currents, which typically range 29 ~ 47 kA on medium voltage systems found in the industrial sector. Traditionally, 480/277 V three-phase, three-wire systems in the cement industry have been solidly grounded. However, high resistance grounded low voltage systems have been widely used in continuous Process industries in the USA for the last 25 years. In high resistance grounded systems, a single phase-to-ground fault will not cause a process interruption, Neutral resistors are chosen to limit ground-fault ‘currents to values slightly higher than system charging currents. _Ground-fault currents on high resistance ‘grounded systems fed from 2500 kVA and smaller transformers typically are 1 to 3A. Ground detection ‘systems are provided to alarm ground-fault conditions, so maintenance personnel can locate faults and plan corrective action. Ground detection systems include provisions to assist in locating ground faults in feeders and equipment. In high resistance grounded low voltage systems, overcurrent devices will not respond to low current levels. associated with a single phase-to-ground fault. If there is no phase-to ground fault on the other two phases of a system, faulted equipment will remain in service. Operations and maintenance staff may choose to postpone repair or replacement of faulted equipment until an orderly shutdown can be scheduled. [See caveat below] Many industrial plants have converted ungrounded and solidly grounded, low voltage systems to high resistance grounding. High resistance grounded low voltage systems provide a stabilized neutral, avoiding transient overvoltage conditions except for unusual circumstances [i.e., physical contact with a higher system voltage; extended winding failures in autotransformers; and faulty capacitor-welder circuits] Where 4807/27 V solidly grounded systems are converted to high resistance grounded systems, 480- 480/277 V isolation transformers must be installed to serve 277 V loads. The NEC prohibits line-to-neutral loads on high resistance grounded systems. Distribution panelboards connected directly to 480/277 V high resistance grounded systems must be rated 480 V, not 480Y/277 V. UL tests 480Y/277 V rated equipment with a maximum voltage-to-ground of 277 V._ On high resistance grounded systems, a single line-to-ground fault will raise the voltage to ground on the other two phases from 277 to 480 V. This condition will continue until the fault is removed. Properiy installed high resistance grounded systems offer higher system reliability, compared to solidly {grounded systems, because a single line-to-ground fault should not cause a process interruption. High resistance grounding can also be applied to systems powered from emergency generators. Improved reliabilty of emergency systems is another win-win situation, particularly for cement plants. Loss of a kiln auxiliary drive or a cooling water pump due to a single line-to-ground fault, while operating on emergency ower, could result in significant process equipment damage. Subsequent loss of production capability ‘would compound financial losses ‘Arc fault flash hazards are essentially eliminated in high resistance grounded, low voltage systems, for a single phase-to-ground fault. This is another win-win situation. However, there is a caveat that must be clearly understood. If'a second phase-to-ground fault occurs on another phase in the same system, a phase-to-phase fault involving ground would result. Arc fault flash hazards to personnel and equipment ‘could be similar to those for phase-to-phase faults. To guard against this hazard, phase-to-ground faults should be detected and repaired as soon as possible. Ifa phase-to-ground fault is allowed to remain on a high resistance grounded system, warning systems should be implemented. Increased risks associated with this condition must be clearly communicated to operating and maintenance personnel. This point cannot be overemphasized. Contrast this to solidly grounded systems. On 480 volt solidly grounded systems in industrial distribution systems, ground-fault current magnitudes are similar to those of three-phase fault currents. Overcurrent devices are likely to clear faults immediately, causing process interruptions. Arc fault flash hazards to personnel are a constant danger. Plant Grounding Grid Aplant’s grounding electrode system is a keystone for electrical safety. System and equipment grounding rely on low impedance, grounding electrode systems. A plant's grounding grid is formed by interconnecting {grounding electrode systems of all building and structures. Consequently it covers a large area, and its impedance-to-ground is usually very small, less than one ohm is not uncommon in a well designed Industral plant ‘The grounding electrode system for each building or structure should include reinforcing bars (rebar) in caissons, footings, foundations and floor slabs. In a large industrial plant there are thousands of meters of rebers available for use in grounding electrode systems. Except for deep well grounds, this is usually thebest grounding electrode system available, particularly in sandy or racky terrain typical of cement plant sites Grounding conductors should be installed on top of the lowest level of rebars in footings and foundations, ‘The bottom of a concrete foundation is more likely to contain moisture, and thus provide a lower resistivity. Rebars need not be bonded to grounding conductors to participate as grounding electrodes, as wet Concrete is a semiconducting medium. The resistivity of wet concrete is typically 21-100 0-m. However, lower impedances-to-ground can be achieved if grounding conductors are in physical contact with, or bonded to, reinforcing bars. Bonding grounding conductors to reinforcing bars is far more costly than placing them in contact with rebars. A combination of the two methods is usually employed. Installation techniques include securing grounding conductors to reinforcing bars with tie wires or plastic cable ties. Grounding conductors should be bonded to selected rebars using exothermic welds, ‘compression fitings or mechanical clamps. The longest and largest rebars should be selected for bonding Rebars in individual caissons, footings and foundations should be connected together using bare copper conductors. These electrodes should be supplemented with driven rods, if practical, and metallic water pipes, where available. Grounding electrodes at each building or structure should be connected together using bare copper cables installed at least 0.76 m below grade. Interconnections of grounding electrode systems of all building and structures are made using bare copper cables, including those installed in reinforced concrete, underground Conduit banks. Other interconnections are made via metalic fire water lines, metallic conduits, conveyor ‘Support steel, pipelines, pipe bridges, railroad tracks and equipment grounding conductors in distribution system feeders, Exothermic welds should be used for above grade, grounding conductor-to-steel connections, Mechanical Clamp and bolted connections tend to loosen with time. Risers from the grounding electrode system should be installed in schedule 80 PVC conduits, where subject to physical damage. Steel conduits should not be Used, unless both ends of a conduit are bonded to the grounding conductor. A steel conduit enclosing 2 {grounding electrode conductor forms an inductive choke, increasing the impedance of the circuit. In dry sandy or rocky terrain, deep well ground rods should be considered for supplementary grounding electrodes [4]. Drilled wells are typically 18-25 cm in diameter and should extend into the water table, if Practical. Conventional ground rods should be installed in wells and back-filled with a bentonite slurry or conductive concrete. Bentonite is @ natural clay containing montmorillonite, a mineral formed by volcanic action. Its is noncorrosive, stable and has a resistivity of 2.5 ©-m at 300% moisture. The low resistivity results from water combining with the minerals in bentonite. It forms a electrolyte with a ph ranging from 8- 10. Unlike salt beds or chemical ground rods, this electrolyte will not leach out. It will swell to about 13, times its dry volume and adheres to most surfaces. However in very dry soils, where it cannot maintain its ‘moisture content, it will shrink away from a ground rod, increasing its resistance Bentonite needs moisture to form an electrolyte. It should be installed as a slurry. Thereafter, it relies on the presence of ground moisture to maintain its beneficial characteristics, The hygroscopic nature of bentonite will take advantage of ground water and rain peculating through soils, Drilling wells into the water table tends to ensure a reliable source of moisture, Equipment Grounding ‘The term equipment grounding refers to interconnection of all noncurrent-carrying, conducting surfaces together, and to earth, to form an equipotential ground plane throughout a building, structure or work area, This is accomplished by bonding building steel, metallic tanks, stacks, handrails, ladders, and the frames of ‘major electrical and process equipment to grounding electrode systems. Metallic pipes and conduits are bonded to the grounding electrode system by virtue of being supported on, or from, structural steel, The objectives of equipment grounding are to: * Minimize electric shock hazards to personnel * Provide a low impedance return path for ground-fault currents, so that overcurrent devices can readily detect and clear faultsElectric shock injuries can result when energized conductors unintentionally contact metal equipment enclosures. This contact tends to raise the voltage-to-ground on metal equipment enclosures. Ifthe equipment enclosure and all other noncurrent-carrying conducting surfaces in the work area are bonded together and to earth, an equipotential ground plane is formed. Electric shock hazards to personnel are minimized Electrical equipment grounding is accomplished by bonding a metallic equipment enclosure to a grounding Conductor installed in the cable or raceway serving a device, The other end of the grounding conductor is bonded to the ground bus in the enclosure of the source of electrical supply. This ground bus is connected to the neutral circuit of grounded systems. The intent of equipment grounding conductors is to provide a low impedance return path for ground-fault currents, so that overcurrent devices can readily detect and clear faults. ‘The NEC permits metallic raceways to serve as equipment grounding conductors. However this concept is problematic, unless supplemented by an equipment grounding conductor installed in each raceway. For a ‘metallic raceway to be an effective equipment grounding conductor, all of the following conditions must be in place: + All raceway connections must be made wrench-tight. ‘+The raceway must provide a low impedance back to the source ‘+ Acorrosion-free environment must be maintained throughout the life of the installation, While software is available to determine if a properly installed raceway provides an adequate retum path for fault currents, the first bullet above remains problematic. In the authors’ opinion, itis far better to permit, metallic raceways to serve as supplemental equipment grounding conductors. A properly sized cable installed in each raceway is the most reliable equipment grounding conductor. Equipment grounding conductors in high resistance grounded systems are sized the same as in solidly {grounded systems. The first phase-to-ground fault in a high resistance grounded system will not cause enough current to flow to interrupt the fault. However if a second fault occurs on another phase of the same system, a phase-to-phase fault involving ground will result. Fully sized equipment grounding conductors {are needed to provide low impedance return paths for ground-fault currents, so overcurrent devices can Clear the faults, Equipment grounding conductors must be sized with adequate ampacity to safely conduct maximum fault currents. Where circuit conductors are increased in size to compensate for voltage drop, equipment grounding conductors should be adjusted proportionally according to circular mil area [5] The authors recommend equipment grounding conductors in all raceways or cables serving equipment operating at 50 V or higher. The National Electrical Code requires: ‘+ Equipment grounding conductors be installed with Class 1, 2 and 3 remote-control and signaling Circuits, and fire alarm circuits, where system grounding is required [6] * System grounding, where the maximum voltage-to-ground on ungrounded conductors does not exceed 160 V [7], For installations typical of the industrial sector, equipment grounding conductors are required for all power Circuits operating at over 180 V to ground and 120 V control circuits. Equipment grounding conductors are ‘not require on instrumentation and control circuits powered from 24 V de power supplies Medium Voltage, Mobi Medium voltage, mobile equipment in the cement industry are usually confined to quarry operations. Examples include shovels and crushers. Mobile equipment are usually fed from 4.16 kV systems via trailing cables. Large equipment may be fed at higher voltages. Both the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and the NEC specify requirements for system and equipment grounding of medium voltage, mobile equipment. The requirements are similar and may be summarized as follows: ‘Medium voltage systems serving mobile equipment must be impedance grounded* Voltages developed between a mobile equipment frame and ground by the flow of maximum fault current must not exceed 100 Vv. = Ground-fault detection and relaying must be provided to automatically de-energize any medium voltage system component that develops a fault ‘= Continuity of the equipment grounding conductor in medium voltage feeders serving mobile equipment ‘must be continuously monitored, Feeders must be automatically de-eneraized upon loss of continuity (of equipment grounding conductors. ‘= The grounding electrode system to which medium vottage, mobile equipment is connected must be isolated from, and separated in the ground by at least 7.6 m from any other system or equipment ‘grounding electrode. There must be no direct connection between the electrodes, such as buried pipe, fences, etc. Note the separation specified in NEC Section 250.188(E) is 6 m, versus 7.6 m for MSHA, Figure 1, based on (8, illustrates medium voltage system and equipment grounding complying with MSHA regulations. Two separate ground beds (\.e., grounding electrode systems) are shown. Substation high voltage equipment frames, primary-side surge arresters and fencing are bonded to the system ground bed. ‘This ground bed will be principally composed of buried copper cables installed in a grid or lattice formation inthe substation yard. Its function is to limit step and touch potentials within the substation to safe levels. Figure 4 Neutral grounding resistor, overcurrent devices, fencing and frames of mobile equipment frames are ‘connected to the safety ground bed. The neutral grounding resistor will be sized to limit maximum voltage- to-ground on medium voltage, mobile equipment frames to less than 100 V. ‘Separation between system and safety ground beds is intended to isolate a large ground potential rise (GPR) on the system ground bed from the safety ground grid. However, it can be demonstrated that even if the two beds are separated by 7.6 m, and there are no metallic bonds between the two ground beds, a high percentage of a GPR on the system ground will be transferred to the safety ground [9]. spacing of 7.6 m may be grossly inadequate to isolate two ground beds, especially for high GPR's typically encountered in Ulilly-tie substations serving large industrial plants.Achieving isolation between system and safety ground beds may be impractical, if both a cement plant and ‘a quarry are fed from the same utilty-tie substation. Consider a substation ground grid resistance-to- ground of 1 ohm and 3 kA of fault current flowing through earth and returning to a remote source. This would generate a 3 KV GPR on the system ground grid. Even if there are no metallic bonds, direct or indirect, between the substation and remote safety ground beds, the ground grids are still coupled through soil resistivity. The amount of potential transferred to the safely ground bed will mainly depend on the size of the substation ground grid and the physical separation between the two grids. Figure 43g, from [9], shows earth potential distribution from the edge of a 150 m’ power station ground grid with respect to a remote earthing point. Assume single layer soil with a resistivity of 100 Om, a 3 kV GPR and a safety ground bed located 7.6 m from the edge of the system ground bed. This chart indicates about 45% of a GPR will be transferred to the safety ground bed. Since mobile equipment frames are bonded to the safety ground bed, a 1.35 KV GPR on the safety grid would be transferred frames of mobile equipment. To limit voltages-to-ground on mobile equipment frames to 100 V, a separation of about 200 m would be required now PN eh al 10 100 1000 10.000 Distance trom edge of grounding ged {mn NOTE 1—Two-layer sol, 100/20 2m (top layer is 6 min depth) NOTE 2— Nor Jerlayer soll 100m Two-layer sol, 100/100 (2m (lop layer is 6 m in depth Figure 43g—Earth potential distribution from edge of power station grid with respect toa remote earthing point (150 m? grid) Figure 43h, from [9], is similar to figure 43g, except the substation ground grid covers 3,250 m’. For this size substation yard, a separation of about 760 m would be required to reduce a 3 kV GPR to 100 V. Clearly a 7.6 m separation is grossly inadequate.: ‘2 109 "000 10000 Distance tom edge of runing gin) NOTE 1—Twe-aye St, 10020 op ayer mn oth NOTE 2S NOTE 9—Twolae sol 1001000 ten paar nn eth Figure 43h—Earth potential distribution from edge of power station grid with respect to a remote earthing point (3250 m? grid) ‘The zone of influence of a utly-tie substation’s ground grid may not be limited by its physical size. If itis adjacent and bonded to a plant's ground grid, it is logical that its zone of influence would be affected by the Plant's ground grid. The zone of influence of a substation’s ground grid may be significantly larger due to the plant's ground grid Isolation ofa utiity-tie substation’s ground grid from the plant's ground grid is rarely attempted in an industrial, non-mining environment. This is because a plant's ground grid usually covers a very large area, it's impedance-to-ground is very low, and i's zone of influence covers a large area. in adcition to coupling due to soil resistivity, coupling may occur to underground pipelines and conduit banks, overhead transmission lines, conveyors, fencing and railroad tracks. Geological formations may also contribute to coupling of ground grids. Underground water systems, streams and bedrock close to the surface, along with ground water, may effectively couple portions of an industrial complex, ‘Where a quarry is adjacent to a cement plant, perhaps the best solution is to provide a utility-tie substation dedicated to mining operations. It should be located outside the plant's ground grid zone of influence, The safety ground bed should be located outside of the system’s zone of influence. Couplings between these ‘ground grids must be carefully considered if isolation is to be achieved. Isolation may be a difficult if conveyors are installed between a quarry and a plant, Quarry conveyor support steel will serve to couple the plant and quarry ground grids. However, it may be practical to isolate ‘quarry-to-plant conveyor support steel from the quarry's safety ground bed, Where isolation is attempted, ‘adjacent portions of conveyor support steel or support structures must not be close enough that workers ‘could touch both sides. This option should be addressed when planning quarry material handling layouts Medium Voltage Distribution Systems ‘A plant’ distribution system design begins with a single ine diagram, A single line diagram is a plan showing how plant loads will be served. It includes power sources and primary and secondary voltage distribution systems. It should also define how a distribution system would be expanded to accommodate future power sources and loads. This concept is often overlooked,‘Selection of a plant's primary system voltage should consider both normal and upset operating conditions. For example, a sudden loss of a major source, unusual switching conditions, and lower or higher than normal voltages on a utilty’s system. ‘Traditionally the cement industry has embraced 4.16 KV primary systems, with split buses and dual utilty-tie transformers [10]. A typical system is shown in figure 4. As connected and running loads have increased in modem cement plants, this system's design limitations become apparent. On a 4.16 kV system, the highest available interrupting current rating for metal-clad switchgear type circuit breakers manufactured in the USA is 46.9kA. The highest available continuous current, self-cooled circuit breaker rating is 3000 A. ‘These ratings would prevent closing the bus-tie breaker with both transformers in service, for all but the ‘smallest of modem cement plants. This is because maximum fault current duties would exceed circuit breaker short-circuit current ratings. Loss of one of the utlty-tie transformers would cause a major process interruption, should the running loads exceed the continuous current rating of circuit breakers in transformer-tie or bus-tie applications, s2] [se] [52 ; 32] [se] [se ee Ahiigher plant primary system voltage (e.g., 13.8 kV) offers both operating advantages and lower fault currents. Currents on 13.8 KV systems are 30% of those on comparable 4,16 kV systems. In addition, 1 AV Class inetal-clad switchgear type circult breakers offer nigher interrupting current ratings, compareo to kV Class equipment. it is easier to design safer, more reliable distribution systems where equipment can be applied well within their continuous and short-circuit current ratings. ‘Arc-fault flash hazards on 13,8 KV systems also are about 30% of those on comparable 4.16 KV systems, a incident energy from an arc fault fash directed on the body of a person depends primarily on available ‘fault current, overcurrent protection operating time and the distance from the arc. The tabulation in Table 1, based on calculations using equations and data from [11], shows arc fault currents and incident eneray levels for comparable 4.16 and 13.8 KV distribution systems serving an 800,000 STPD cement plant Circuit breaker operating time and typical working distance used in the calculations were 0.096 seconds and 910 mm, respectively, for both 4.16 and 13.8 kV systems, System Maximum Fault ‘Arc Fault Incident Voltage (kv) | Current (kA) Current (kA) Energy (Jiem’) 416 46.0 43.50 22.95 138 133 1313 697 Tablo1To put the data into perspective, an incident energy of 5.0 J/cm® will cause a just curable burn (second degree bum). fa butane lighter is held one centimeter away from a person's finger for one second, with the finger in the biue portion of the flame, a square centimeter area of the finger will be exposed to about 5.0 diem’. (11] ‘Arc fault flash protection is based on incident energy on a person’s face and body at the working distance, The typical working distance for 4.16 and 13.8 kV switchgear is 910 mm. Working distance is based on the distance from a person standing in front of a switchgear cubicle to the potential arc point within the enclosure. Severity of injury depends on the percentage of a person's skin burned. The head and arms are a large percentage of total surface area, and injury to these areas is more life threatening than burns to hands and arms, [11] Ahigher primary system voltage offers operating advantages under upset conditions. Consider the distribution system in figure 2, but rated 13.8 kV. Assume both transformers have forced-airfforced-oil kVA, ratings sufficient to serve the entire plant load. Either transformer could be removed fram service without interrupting plant operations. While transformers are perhaps the most reliable equipment in a plant, they do require periodic service. Ancillary systems, such as neutral grounding resistors, can fail and require replacement or maintenance. While a 13.8 kV system's initial cost may be slightly higher, these costs may be offset by increased uptime due to system operating flexibility. Operating losses in major feeders would certainly be lower. Medium voltage systems often include power factor correcting capacitors, usually as part of harmonic fiters. Capacitor switching capabilities of medium voltage switches and circuit breakers are always significantly less than for switching loads. Medium voltage capacitors should be switched from circuit breakers or NEMA Class E2 motor controllers. Fused ewitches are not recommended for capacitor switching duty. Generally, fused switches found in 5 kV Class MCC line-ups have not been tested, or rated, for capacitor switching duty. Low Voltage Distribution Systems Low voltage distrioution system design should also consider upset operating conditions. Protective and ‘switching devices should be applied well within their short-circuit ratings. Both short-time and interrupting current ratings must be evaluated. Consider a 480 V three-phase, three-wire system fed from a 1500 kVA Unit substation. Assume the transformer is fed from a primary system with a maximum short-circuit Capability of 350 MIVA. Assume the intial instalation generates maximum short-circuit duties on 480 V ‘switchgear and MCC buses, including motor contribution, of 39 and 38 kA, respectively. These ratings may appear adequate, but consider what happens as a plant matures, ‘As.a plant matures, load growth occurs, A 3% load growth per year is not unusual. As connected loads on Unit substations grow, short-circuit current duties on 480 V systems increase. Insulated-case and molded- case circuit breakers applied near their short-circuit ratings are particularly vulnerable to load growth. As connected loads exceed transformer base KVA ratings, short-circuit duty multipliers for these devices increase. In the above example, short-circuit duties could eventually exceed 42 KA, a commonly specified equipment rating. In this example, 42 KA rated equipment should be avoided, Short-cirult interrupting current ratings of 50 or 85 kA should be specified. These ratings are commonly avaliable for 480 V air- break type power switchgear circuit breakers. A 65 kA short-circuit rating is standard for mast MCC manufacturers in the USA For continuous process industry applications, secondary-side switchgear should contain air-break type power circuit breakers, rather than insulated-case or molded-case breakers. In addition to the problem described above, molded-case breakers do not have short-time current ratings, Insulated-case breakers have limited short-time ratings, but they are not sufficient to provide adequate coordination with circuit breakers in 480 V MCC's. Misccordination leads to process interruptions, Low voltage air-break type power circuit breakers should be equipped with true rms sensing overcurrent trip units, wth adjustable long-time and shorttime settings. Instantaneous trip unts should be avoided, as they vill not coordinate with downstream ercut breakers. Overcurrent trp unite should include ground-fault protection, ifthe unit substation transformers solidly grounded. igh esistance grounded. ow voltagesystems are recommended, and they do not require ground-fault protection on secondary-side power circuit breakers, Automatic transfer switches are often found downstream of unit substations in cement plants. In-plant generation is usually needed to provide back-up power for kiln auxiliary drives, process equipment cooling water pumps, and other essential systems. Automatic transfer switches have limited standard short-circult current withstand ratings. Higher withstand ratings are usually available as an option, Automatic transfer switches should be specified to coordinate with the maximum available short-circuit current and short-time current rating of the upstream power circuit breaker. For example, power circuit breakers typically have a 30 cycle short-circuit current withstand rating. Automatic transfer switches typically have a 3 cycle short- circuit current withstand rating as standard, Electrical equipment applied beyond their short-circuit current ratings are hazardous to personnel. Distribution panelboards are also occasionally misapplied, perhaps in part because Underwriters Laboratories’ (UL) testing requirements typically are not published in manufacturer's literature Panelboards and circuit breakers rated 480/277 V, three-phase, three-wire are suitable for solidly grounded systems. They have not been tested, and are not suitable, for applications on ungrounded or high resistance grounded 480 V systems. Circuit breakers rated 480/277 V should be used only on ‘systems where the maximum voltage-to-ground does not exceed 277 V. On ungrounded and high resistance grounded 480 V systems, 2 line-to-ground fault may persist indefinitely. On these systems, the maximum voltage-to-ground is 480 V, and panelboards and circuit breakers rated 480 V are required ty Switches Non-fused safety switches are simple devices, but they are often applied incorrectly. These devices are commonly used as local disconnects for motors, hoists and HVAC equipment. Principally due to UL testing requirements, non-fused switches have a short-circuit withstand current rating of 10 KA, unless protected by an upstream current limiting fuse or a specific circuit breaker. UL standards do not include provisions for testing non-fused safety switches at higher short-circuit current levels, except where protected by an upstream current limiting fuse or a circuit breaker. The authors cannot site a non-fused switch that has been tested, and rated for use, with an upstream circuit breaker. There are simply too many combinations and ratings of circuit breakers to justify such testing. If protected by an up-stream current limiting fuse, non-fused switches have a short-circuit withstand current rating equal to that of the fuse. NEC Section 110.3(B) states: “Listed or labeled equipment shall be installed and used in accordance with any instructions included in the listing or labeling.” Thus where non-fused safety switches are fed from circuit breakers, or circuit breaker type combination starters, correct application requires knowing the short- circuit duty at a non-fused switch is less than 10 kA, Maximum available fault currents on 480 V MCC buses fed from unit substations common to cement plants are typically much higher than 10 kA. Fault duties downstream of MCC buses will be lower, due to cable impedances. If a non-fused switch is fed from a circuit breaker in an MCC, one must determine the length of cable required to reduce the fault duty at a switch to less than 10 kA, The tabulations in Table 2 show cable sizes and minimum cable lengths for various motor KW ratings required to reduce fault duties at local non-fused safety switches to 10 kA or less. Assumptions used in the calculations are described below.Motor | Cable Size] Calculated | Momentary | Momentary | Momentary Rating kW mm? Feeder Duty Sym. Duty Duty Asym. (hp) (AWG-kemil) | Length kArms | Multiplying kA rms m (ft) Factor (10) 4 (12) 43.14) 9.406 1 9.406, 45 (20) 6 (10) 67 (22) 9.915 4 3915) 22 (30) 108) 10.4 (34) 9.825 4 9.825, 30 (40) 16.6) 16.2 (53) 9.914 1 ‘9.914 37 (50) 25 (4) 247 (81) 3.919 1 9.919 45 (60) 35,2) 38.4 (126) 9.933 1 9.933 56 (75) 50.(1) 48.2 (158) 9.883 1 9.883 75 (100) 70.210) 71.6 (235) ‘3.978 001 9.984 93 (125) 420 (4/0) 106 (348) 9.927 7.006 9.983 112 (150) | 120 (4/0) 108 (354) 9.878 1.009 9.963. 749 (200) | 185 (350) 164 (538) 9.429 7.056. 9.961 187 (250) '300 (500), 204 (670) 9.050, 1.102 93.972 Calculations based on a 13.8 KV primary system with a 750 MVA system short-circuit capacity: 2 MVA, 13.8-4807/277V; 5.75% transformer, close-coupled secondary-side switchgear, 7-3/C 500 kcmil motor ccontrol center feeder: 1942 KW motor load with 2/3 > 37 KW and 1/3 < 37 KW, plus the motor identified in the chart. Metric cable sizes shown are nearest to English sizes used in calculations. Table 2 - Cable sizes and minimum cable lengths for various motor kW ratings required to reduce fault duties at focal non-fused safety switches to 10 kA or less for equipment fed from a 2 MVA substation ‘AC Drive Applications Safety of personnel and equipment should also be considered in ac dive installations. Problems and solutions associated with ac drive installations are thoroughly described in technical papers. Assuming an ac drive and motor combination are propery specified and installed, the remaining issues relate to Cable type and its installation AC drives typically generate common mode voltages at their output terminals, Currents associated with ‘common mode voltages travel to 2 motor viaits feeder cable. These currents seek a low impedance return path back to the ac drive. Ifa low impedance path is not provided, these currents tend to flow through motor bearings and building stee! back to a drive. Typically this ieads to fluted bearings on larger motors. Proper cable selection, and proper grounding of cable terminations, usually will prevent ths. In the USA, the cable of choice for ac drive motor feeders is a multiconductor design with three symmetrically positioned equipment grounding conductors, aluminum CLX armoring and an overall PVC. jacket. Aluminum CLX armoning is a continuous, butt-welded tube, corrugated to provide flexibility. Itis not as flexible as an interlocked armored cable, but aluminum CLX armoring offers much lower impedance. CLX cables are usually installed in trays, due to the difficulty of puling them through a ‘conduit system, ‘Some ac drive manufactures permit ac drive motor feeders to be muiticonductor, non-armored cables with a single equipment grounding conductor, an overall copper braid shield and a PVC jacket. This cable Construction is currently offered in sizes up to 70 mm (1/0 AVG), which usually limits i to motors rated 30 KWand less. This cable construction is flexible enough to be installed in conduit systems. If properly grounded, both cable constructions offer low impedance paths for currents generated by ‘common mode voltages. Cable terminators that provide full contact with CLX armoring are an essential part of a low impedance path, Termination of equipment grounding conductors, and cable shields if ‘applicable, are also critical issues, Both are well addressed in the literature and ac drive manufacture's installation guidelines, Testing of grounding connections must not be overlooked. AC drive field service “engineers often find improperly installed armored cable terminations, even though they look perfectly fine.Equipment Nameplates ‘The safest way to work on equipment is to de-energize it. Nameplates installed at motors and other {electrical equipment should match exactly nameplates on MCC compartment doors. As a minimum nameplates at motors should include an equipment name, equipment number, MCC number and MCC compartment number. Electric rooms numbers are sometimes included on nameplates The concept is. simple. The implications for personnel safety are enormous. GECI Protection for Personnel UL Class A ground fault circu interrupters (GFCI's) are designed to protect personnel from electric shock ‘on circuits where one of the conductors is solidly grounded. GFCI's are designed to interrupt a circuit ‘when the current to ground has a value in the range of 4-6 mA. This is the safe upper limit for children and small adults GFCI protection is available in both circuit breaker and duplex receptacle construction. Portable GFCI protective devices are also available. Circuit breakers are generally limited to applications where circuit lengths are 75 mor less. Longer circuit lengths can produce enough leakage current to cause nuisance tripping, Properly installed and tested GFCI receptacles offer excellent protection for line-to-ground shocks. They offer no protection for line-to-neutral shacks. Generally, specification grade type GFCI receptacles should be specified for wet and outdoor applications. These devices include additional filters and have conformal coatings on electronic circuit boards. Both features improve reliabilty. FC! receptacles and breakers should be tested regulary; before each use is a good work practice ‘These devices have buil-in test circuits, GFCI receptacles built and tested to UL Standard 943 are designed fail in the OPEN circutt position if GFCI protection is lost. ‘On most GFCI receptacles, pressing the TEST button creates an imbalance within the current transformers in the device, exactly the same as if there was a ground-fault present. This is done by ‘connecting the load side hot terminal tothe line side neutral terminal through a resistor calibrated to ‘conduct 8-10 mA at 120 V. Pressing the TEST button completes the circuit through the resistor. fa GFC! is operating properly, it will detect the imbalance and trip. On at least one manufacturer's GFCI, pressing the TEST button mechanically trips the device by pushing the latch that holds the contacts closed. When the RESET button is pushed, the test circuit described ‘above is energized and creates a current imbalance. If a GFCI is operating propery, it will sense this {and fire the solenoid used to trip the CFCI, Finng of the eolencid will move shutters that black the latching mechanism for the contacts, If the GFCI does not sense a ground-fault and fire the solenoid correctly, the device will not reset. NEC Section 210.8 specifies locations where GFCI receptacles are required. In the industrial sector, all receptacles in bathrooms, kitchens and rooftops are required to have GFCI protection. In addition, the ‘Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires GFCI protection for all circuits supplying power to portable tools used in all construction, remodeling, maintenance, repair or demolition. See NFPA Code 70E, paragraph 2-2.4 Cement plants fall under the jurisdiction of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), by mutual agreement with OSHA. MSHA regulations do not require GFCI protection for portable tools. However, MSHA regulations require safe installations where portable tools are used. An injury or fatality due to electrical shack while using a portable tool could be interpreted as an unsafe installation, Emergency Lighti NFPA Code 101 addresses emergency lighting for means of egress. This code is not enforceable except where adopted by Federal, State and local governments. However, a growing number of state and localgovernments are adopting the International Building Code (IBC). The IBC incorporates NFPA Code 101 OSHA regulations incorporate NFPA Code 101 for specific installations (e.g., pulp and paper mills), Emergency lighting for means of egress in cement plants is not addressed in MSHA regulations. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 30 - Mineral Resources; Subchapter N, Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health; Part 56, Subpart P — Illumination; Section 56.17001, simply states: ‘illumination sufficient to provide safe working conditions shall be provided in and on all surface structures, paths, walkways, stairways, switch panels, loading and dumping sites, and work areas.” However, MSHA fines are likely should injuries or fatalities be attributed to inadequate illumination during a power outage. Clearly itis prudent to provide emergency lighting for safety of personnel and equipment. NEC Article 700 defines acceptable power sources for emergency systems. They include battery- powered unit equipment, UPS units and generators. A separate utllty service is permitted if acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction Battery-powered unit equipment usually offers lower initial installed costs but higher life cycle costs. UPS and generators usually offer higher initial installed costs but lower life cycle costs. Life cycle costs include the initial installation, periodic testing, testing record keeping, maintenance and equipment replacement. NEC Section 700.4 requires periodic testing and written records of tests and maintenance of emergency systems. ‘Generator-powered emergency lighting systems are cost effective, particulary if included in the initial design. Most cement plants have standby generators to power essential process equipment upon loss of normal power. Usually these generators are capable of starting and stabilizing output voltage within 10 seconds of a power interruption. If so, they qualify as a power source for emergency lighting Conclusions itis easier and less costly to design safe installations than to correct poorly conceived ones. Choices made in the design stage can enhance safety, often in cost effective ways. Equipment ratings and features selected to enhance safety often improve plant operating flexibiities. Safe installations are win- ‘win-win situations for plant owners and operators, employees and families, and insurers, References 1. ANSV/IEEE Standard 80-1986; AC Substation Grounding; p 27. 2. Giuseppe Parise, “A summary of the IEC Protection Against Electric Shock’, IEEE Industry Applications, Vol. 34, No. 35, September/October 1998, PP 911-922 3. Tim Crnko and Steve Dyrnes, “Arcing Fault Hazards and Safety Suggestions for Design and Maintenance’, IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, Vol 7, No. 3, May/June 2001, pp 23-32 ANSIV/IEEE Standard 80-1986; AC Substation Grounding 2002 NFPA Code 70, National Electrical Code, Section 260-122(b) 2002 NFPA Code 70, National Electrical Code, Section 250-112(i) IEEE Standard 142-1991, Grounding of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems William F. Robertson and J.C. Das, "NEC requirements of Isolated Safety Ground for Medium Voltage ‘Mobile or Portable Equipment in an Industrial Environment”, IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, Vol. §, No. 3, July/August 2000, pp 20-24. 9. ANSI/IEEE Standard 367-1996[R2000], Recommended Practice for Determining the Electrical Power Station Ground Potential Rise and Induced Voltage From a Power Fault 10. IEEE Standard 277-1994; IEEE Recommended Practice for Cement Plant Power Distnbution; p 27, figure 1 11, IEEE Standard 1584-2002; IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations exams