STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CASE DIGESTS
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
GR No. 166715
Aug 14, 2008
Subject: Extent and Limitations of Legislative Power
Parties involved: ABAKADA Group PartyList (petitioners); Cesar Purisima as Sec
of Finance (respondent)
Facts:
 RA 9335 enacted to optimize revenue generation capability and collection
of BIR and BOC. Law intends to encourage employees to exceed revenue
targets by providing a system of Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue performance Evaluation Board. This covers all officials and
employees of BIR and BOC with at least 6 mos of service, regardless of
employment status
 Each board has duty to prescribe rules and guidelines for allocation,
distribution and releases of fund; set criteria and procedures for removing
from service officials whose revenue collection falls short of a budget;
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria; prescribe system for
performance evaluation; submit annual report to Congress. There will be
Congressional oversight Committee for this purpose
 Petitioners, invoking right as taxpayers, filed petition challenging
constitutionality of RA 9335 (tax reform legislation).
o They contend that by establishing system of rewards and
initiatives, employees will only do best in consideration of the
rewards. They alleged that this invited corruption and
undermined the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials.
o They claimed that limiting scope of system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of BIR and BOC
violates consti guarantee of equal protection
o law unduly delegated the power to fix revenue targets to President.
Not provided in RA 9335 (Sec 7b and c only provides that BIR and
BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%
o assailed creation of congressional oversight committee- violates
doctrine of separation of powers
 Respondents (OSG) question petition for being premature.
o Asserted that this will invite corruption was a mere speculation
o Seen with the objective of RA 9335, law validly classified BIR and
BOC because the functions they perform are unique.
o Creation of congressional oversight committee enhanced
separation of powers; fulfilment of legis policy and serves as a
check to any over accumulation of power
 This petition for prohibition sought to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of
2005).
Issues:
1. WON RA 9335 invites corruption as this will just motivate employees to
perform duties because of system of rewards and initiatives
2. WON scope of system of rewards and initiatives limitation to BIR and BOC
violates consti guarantee of equal protection
3. WON there was unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to
President
4. WON doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in creation of
congressional oversight committee
Ruling:
1. No, it does not. Public officers enjoy presumption of regularity in
performance of duties. This is also in accordance with Sec 1, Art 11 of the
Consti which states that public office is a trust and that by demanding
accountability, they have the duty to be responsive to people’s needs. Law
enacted by Congress enjoys strong presumption of Constitutionality. To
justify nullification, there must be clear breach of Consti. System of
initiatives is not anathema to public accountability. It even reinforces good
behaviour.
2. Yes. Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification and that should be a reasonable foundation and not
arbitrary. With RA 9335, since subject of the law is revenue generation
capability and collection of BIR and BOC, incentives and or sanctions
provided in law should logically pertain to said agencies. Law concerns
only BIR and BOC as they have common distinct primary fxn of generating
revenues for natl govt (sec 18 and 23)
3. No, because RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide
the President in fixing revenue targets and implementing agencies in
carrying out provisions of the law. It does not violate security of tenure of
emploees because it is included in the law the reasons for removals wth due
consideration of all other factors
a. Section 2- declared policy of the State to optimize revenue
generation capability and collection of BIR and BOC by providing
system of rewards and sanctions…
b. Section 4- Rewards and Incentives Fund; delegated power to the
President to fix revenue targets
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CASE DIGESTS
c. Section 7- specified powers and functions of the board and f. Section 12, being unconsti, will not make entire law unconsti,
identified conditions which officials may be removed from service. as evidenced by Sec 13 (Seperability Clause). Without Section
4. Yes. it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a the BIR and the BOC
democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
a. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment
"beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic
and related constraints on Congress. (1) It may not vest itself, any
of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power. And, (2) when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
b. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation only
c. Any step beyond this will undermine separation of powers
(legislative vetoes) statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right"
or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. (entrusting to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing own laws) Held:
i. Legislative power is vested in Congress composed of two
houses, (Sec 1, Art VI) so legis veto is invalid
ii. Sec 27, Art VI- Every bill passed by Congress must be
presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and Notes:
of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid
legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect
without such presentment even if approved by both
chambers of Congress.
d. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
e. Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
CASE DIGESTS
TWO TESTS TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS
a. Completeness test-law complete when it also establishes policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
b. Sufficient Standard Test-standard must specify limits of delegate’s
authority
Procedure for bill to become law (Cruz and Bernas)