ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1
OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary
of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity
as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
CORONA J.:
FACTS
Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list, invoking their right as
taxpayers, filed a petition challenging the constitutional
validity of RA 9335 and attempted to prevent herewith
respondents from establishing and enforcing said law. The
Attrition Act of 2005, also known as Republic Act No. 9335,
was passed into law in order to improve both the revenue-
generating capacity of the BIR and the collection efforts of the
BOC. The law aims to provide a system of rewards and
restrictions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in order
to encourage their officials and employees to surpass their
revenue targets. This will be done in order to fulfill the
purpose of the law.
The Boards in the BIR and BOC, which will be composed of
their respective Commissioners from the DOF, DBM, and
NEDA, have been tasked with the responsibility of prescribing
the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution, and
release of the fund; establishing the criteria and procedures for
the removal of service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; and further issuing rules and
regulations. In addition, the law charged the Department of
Finance, the Department of Budget and Management, the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Board of
Commissioners (BOC), and the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) with the responsibility of promulgating and issuing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
(RA) 9335, subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee, which was established solely for the
purpose of approving the After some time had passed, the
JCOO declared an IRR that had been formed by the agencies
to be acceptable, at which point it became functus officio and
ceased to function. Petitioners filed this petition contesting the
validity of Republic Act 9335 and attempted to prohibit
respondents from adopting and executing the statute in
question. Petitioners did this by using a right they had as
taxpayers to do so.
Petitioners argue that the establishment of a congressional
oversight committee violates the principle of the separation of
powers because it authorizes legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law. This is despite
the fact that the legislative function should have been
considered accomplished and finished upon the enactment of
the law, which is the basis of their argument. Respondents,
through the OSG, counter this by affirming that the formation
of the congressional oversight committee under the law
improves rather than contravene separation of powers, as it
ensures the gratification of the legislative policy. This
assertion is made in response to the claim that the law violates
separation of powers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the congressional oversight
committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers under
the Constitution.
RULING
Yes, since RA 9335 authorized the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR,
BOC, and CSC IRR on May 22, 2006, the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee became functus officio and ceased to
operate. So, its purported encroachment on executive law
implementation and enforcement may be academic. Despite
this, now may be a suitable moment for the Court to address
the Joint Congressional.
Congressional oversight is not unlawful per se, meaning it
neither encroaches on executive authority nor undermines
separation of powers. It's part of the democratic checks and
balances. It may even strengthen separation of powers by
preventing presidential overreach. Beyond that, the
Constitution's separation of powers will be undermined. This
includes legislative vetoes.
Statutory vetoes require the President or an administrative
agency to send proposed implementing rules and regulations
to Congress, which may accept or reject them before they take
effect. A legislative veto in the shape of a congressional
oversight committee is an inward-turning delegation meant to
leash an agency to which Congress has delegated enormous
powers. It modifies the Constitution's diagram of power by
entrusting Congress with enforcing, executing, or
implementing its own laws.
Administrative rules made by administrative authorities to
execute and interpret legislation have legal effect and must be
respected. Congress, acting as a monitor, cannot approve their
legitimacy without upsetting the Constitution's balance of
powers. In exercising discretion to approve or reject the IRR
based on compliance with RA 9335, Congress arrogated
judicial jurisdiction solely conferred in this Court by the
Constitution.
Any provision of legislation that allows Congress or any of its
members to execute or enforce the law is unconstitutional the
minute it takes effect. An unconstitutional provision is one
that requires Congress or its members to adopt implementing
regulations after a legislation has taken effect, or that permits
Congress or its members to reverse any direction or decision
issued by members of the executive branch entrusted with
executing the law.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12
of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations
of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore
NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.

VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ AND ALL THE OTHER
CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HONORABLE
SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN AND DIRECTOR
LUZ M. CANTOR, respondents
G.R. No. 153266 March 18, 2010
ABAD J.:
FACTS:
Classification Act of 1989, which, under Section 12,
authorized the consolidation of allowances and extra pay
currently being received by workers into their normal wage
rates. This was done in accordance with the directive.
However, some extra compensations that workers could be
receiving were excluded from the consolidation's scope of
application.
In accordance with the same, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) published Circular Circular Number 59
(NCC 59), in which it enumerated the specific allowances and
additional compensations that were deemed integrated in the
basic salaries. These allowances included the Cost of Living
Allowance (COLA) and the Inflation Connected Allowance
(ICA) (ICA).
In addition, on October 2, 1989, the DBM published
Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10, which was
directed at all GOCCs and government financial institutions.
This circular was re-issued by the DBM on February 15, 1999,
and it was published the following month on March 16, 1999.
As a result of this, the Commission on Audit (COA) decided
not to authorize the payments of honoraria and other
allowances since they were of the opinion that these benefits
were already included in the ordinary wage rates. Because
CCC 10 was never made public, several workers at firms
owned or controlled by the government questioned whether or
not it was legitimate.
In the meantime, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) published Budget Circular 2001-03 on November 12,
2001. This circular clarified that only the exempt allowances
under Section 12 of Republic Act 6758 may continue to be
granted to the employees. All of the other allowances were
deemed to be integrated into the standardized salary rates. As
a result, the payment of allowances and compensation such as
COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, amongst others,
which were previously regarded incorporated in the base wage
were illegitimate and hence prohibited.
The workers of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a
petition for certiorari and mandamus on May 16, 2002. In the
petition, they questioned whether it was appropriate to include
their cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) into their normal
compensation rates. Workers in other departments and
agencies of the national government did the same thing.
The petitions were consolidated by the court, and the court
decided to treat them as a class action lawsuit on behalf of all
government workers, with the exception of those who worked
for GOCCs and government financial institutions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COLA should be deemed
integrated into the standardized salary rates of the
concerned government employees by virtue of
Section 12 of R.A. 6758.
2. Whether or not the ICA may still be paid to officials
and employees of the Insurance Commission.
3. Whether or not the GSIS may still pay the allowances
and fringe benefits to COA auditing personnel
assigned to it.
4. Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated
September 30, 1989 in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation nullifies the
integration of the COLA into the standardized salary
rates.
5. Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and
police personnel to the exclusion of other government
employees violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
First, the petitioners subscribe to the widely held belief that
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) must first
issue rules and regulations before the cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA) that they were receiving prior to the enactment of
Republic Act 6758 can be considered to be included in their
standard salary rates. The respondent DBM argues that the
relevant provisions of R.A. 6758 have previously indicated the
allowances and perks that are not to be included into the new
compensation rates. The DBM adds that any and all additional
allowances, such as COLA, are considered to be incorporated
into those pay rates.
Second. The petitioning officials and employees of the
Insurance Commission question the disallowance of their ICA
on the grounds that it is a benefit comparable to the
educational assistance granted by the Court in National
Tobacco Administration. This is based on the second sentence
of Section 12 of R.A. 6758, which states that any other
additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 and not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall be deemed to
be a taxable benefit.
Three. The Court of Appeals made an excellent point when
they said that Section 18 of R.A. 6758 was complete in and of
itself and that it could be put into effect without the need for
any further or enabling legislation. Only for those sections,
like item (7) of Section 12, which required additional
explanation and interpretation did the implementing rules and
regulations become necessary. Therefore, the disallowance of
petitioners' allowances and fringe benefits as COA auditing
staff assigned to the GSIS was justified upon the effectivity of
R.A. 6758, notwithstanding the fact that CCC 10 was initially
not published. The denial of the request in this circumstance is
correct and justified.
Fourth. Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2,
1989, which covered all GOCCs and government financial
institutions, was ineffective until its re-issuance and
publication on March 16, 1999, NCC 59 dated September 30,
1989, which covered the offices of the national government,
SUCs, and LGUs, should also be regarded as ineffective until
its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. This is
because CCC 10 was ineffective until its re-issuance and
publication.
As a consequence of this, the fact that CCC 10 and NCC 59
were not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
with a wide distribution does not render null and void the
incorporation of COLA into the standardized wage rates upon
the implementation of R.A. 6758. According to what the
Supreme Court ruled in Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. COA, the legality of Republic Act 6758 should
not be made to rely on the legality of the procedures that it
establishes for its implementation.
Fifth. There are, without a doubt, compelling arguments for
distinguishing between the treatment of members of the armed
forces and that of other officials in the national government.
They are expected to be stationed nearly everywhere in the
nation due to the fact that they are in responsible of the real
defense of the state as well as the preservation of domestic
peace and order. They are likely to be posted in a range of
locations with varying levels of living expenses, from low to
moderate to high. Because there is no geographic component
to their base pay, they are eligible for a continuing cost-of-
living adjustment (COLA), which is designed to assist
mitigate the impact of residing in higher cost locations.
 BPI LEASING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX
APPEAL AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL RULING:
REVENUE, Respondents. Statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, are
G.R. No. 127624 November 18, 2003 only allowed to operate in a prospective manner. This is the
case unless the legislative intent to do otherwise is made clear,
AZCUNA, J.: either explicitly or by necessary implication, in the text of the
statute. This principle has been well established. There is no
FACTS: evidence to suggest that the revenue rule will apply in a
BLC is a organization in which centered in the business of retroactive manner in this particular instance. In addition,
leasing out various types of real estate. Based on its gross there is a clause that states quite explicitly that it will go into
rentals from equipment leasing for the year 1986, which effect on January 1, 1987, and that it will apply to any and all
totaled P27,783,725.42, BLC made a payment to the leases that are written on or after that day. This provision is
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) in the amount of applicable to all leases. It is essential to give it its literal
P1,139,041.49, which represented the four percent contractors meaning and then put it into practice without providing any
percentage tax that was then imposed by Section 205 of the extra interpretation since its potential applicability is quite
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). This payment was evident. Therefore, BLC is unable to make use of the
made for the calendar year 1986. provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rents that it
received before to the first of the year 1987.
The Internal Revenue Service (CIR) published Revenue
Regulation 19-86 on November 10th, 1986. According to
section 6.2 of that act, financing and leasing firms that are
registered under Republic Act 5980 are liable to a gross
receipt tax of five percent, three percent, and one percent,
respectively, on the actual revenue that they make. This
indicates that businesses registered by Republic Act 5980,
such as BLC, are not subject to the contractors percentage tax
imposed by Section 205 of the NIRC. Instead, these
businesses are required to pay the gross receipts tax imposed
by Section 260 (formerly Section 122) of the NIRC. As a
result of the fact that BLC had already settled its obligation to
pay the aforementioned contractors percentage tax, the
company recalculated its tax obligations under the gross
receipts tax and determined that they amounted to
P361,924.44 in total.
On April 11, 1988, BLC submitted a claim to the CIR for a
refund in the amount of P777,117.05, which represented the
difference between the amount of P1,139,041.49 that it had
paid as contractors percentage tax and the amount of
P361,924.44 that it should have paid for gross receipts tax.
The claim was for a refund of the gross receipts tax that it
should have paid. Petitioner then waited another four days
before submitting a request for review to the CTA in order to
halt the ticking of the clock that started the prescriptive time
for refunds. The petition was rejected by CTA, and BLC's
request for a refund was not granted. The CTA came to the
conclusion that the new version of Revenue Regulation 19-86
may only be implemented prospectively, meaning that it
would only apply to leases that were negotiated on or after
January 1, 1987. The CTA came to the conclusion that since
all of BLC's rental income was received before the year 1986,
this must have been the result of lease transactions that
occurred before January 1, 1987, and it is for this reason that
the revenue regulation does not apply to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Revenue Resolution 19-86 can be applied
retroactively.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and WINSTON F.
GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General
Manager, Petitioners, vs. ALBERT M. VELASCO and
MARIO I. MOLINA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170463 February 2, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Velasco was accused of engaging in serious misconduct by the
Board of Trustees, and they were placed on preventive
suspension for a period of ninety days as a result of their
alleged participation in a demonstration held by GSIS
employees condemning the alleged corruption in the GSIS and
calling for the resignation of its president and general manager
Winston Garcia. The request for the execution of the
respondent Molina's step increase was sent to the SVP
Madarang. The GSIS Board Resolution 372 that was issued by
the Board of Trustees which authorized the new GSIS wage
structure, its IRR, and the approval of the supplementary rules
on step increment and promotion was cited by SVP Madarang
as the reason for the denial of the request.
An employee who is placed on preventative suspension will
not get their step raise until such time as a decision has been
made about their case. This provision is in place to protect the
company. Respondents made a similar request for the
Christmas raffled rewards, but it was similarly refused on the
grounds that their administrative case is still ongoing.
Employees who have ongoing administrative cases are unable
to receive promotions, step increases, performance-based
bonuses, and other perks and privileges, as stated in another
Resolution 197 issued by the Petitioner Board. The respondent
submitted a petition for ban to the RTC, stating that they were
unsuccessful in their attempt to acquire the benefits to which
GSIS workers are legally entitled. They assert that they are
being punished without hearing.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the jurisdiction over the subject
matter lies with the CSC or RTC
2. Whether or not the action against GSIS Board is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC
3. Whether or not internal rules and regulations need
not require publication with the Office of the
National Administrative Register for their effectivity
4. Whether or not regulation withholding benefits to the
employees in preventive suspension unconstitutional
5. Whether or not nullification of the Bord Resolution
within the power of the RTC
RULING:
First. The petitioners contend that since the allegation
concerns employee benefits, the CSC, and not the RTC,
should have jurisdiction over the matter. The petition for
prohibition with a plea for the issue of a writ of preliminary
injunction is located in the civil case with the number 03-
108389. Respondents requested that the trial court declare null
and invalid any and all actions that were carried out in
accordance with Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 and forbid
petitioners from carrying out any future enforcement of the
aforementioned resolutions. As a result, the petition for
prohibition that respondents filed is within the jurisdiction of
the trial court, and not the CSC.
Second, the petition for prohibition that was submitted by the
respondents is a unique kind of civil action that may be
submitted to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, or the regional trial court, depending on the
specific circumstances of the case. Because it does not have
any impact on the plaintiff's title, it is also classified as a
personal action. The petition might legitimately be submitted
to the trial court in the City of Manila given that the
respondent Velasco, who was also the plaintiff in the case, is a
resident of the City of Manila. Rule 4 of Section 2 of the Rules
of Court permits the parties to choose their own location for
the hearing.
Third, the UP Law Center is not required to get copies of all of
the rules and regulations that are passed by any one federal
agency. Only those that are generic in nature or have a
permanent nature should be submitted. "interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency
and not the public," are not required to be filed with the UP
Law Center, as stated in the guidelines for the receiving and
publication of rules and regulations that are provided by the
UP Law Center. These rules and regulations govern how rules
and regulations are received and published. Resolution No.
306 addressed the power to pay for the 2002 Christmas
Package. Resolution No. 197 addressed the GSIS merit
selection and promotion plan. Resolution No. 372 addressed
the newly implemented remuneration structure for the GSIS.
Evidently, the challenged resolutions were solely referring to
GSIS's internal regulations that were intended to govern the
organization's staff. There was no need to publish these
resolutions or file them with the UP Law Center since they
were unnecessary actions.
Fourth. Consequently, if an employee who was suspended as a
penalty will be treated like an employee who is on approved
vacation leave without pay,40 then it is only fair and
reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee who was
preventively suspended, especially considering that preventive
suspension is not a penalty. This is because preventive
suspension is not a penalty. The continuation of an employee's
government employment will be effectively disrupted if the
employee is preventively suspended. During this time, the
employee is not really doing any duties for the government.
Therefore, an employee who was preventively suspended will
still be eligible for a step increment after serving the time of
his preventive suspension, even if the pending administrative
case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. This
is the case regardless of whether or not the case has been
resolved or dismissed. The official or employee's step increase
will only be withheld for the same number of days—up to a
maximum of ninety days—that they were serving the
preventative suspension. As a result, the petition will not be
granted.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs. AZUCENA T. REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 159694 January 27, 2006
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
FACTS:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) carried out an
examination into the estate of the deceased person and then
issued a preliminary assessment notice against the estate. After
that, a final estate tax assessment, notification, and a demand
letter were sent to the heirs of the deceased person's estate. On
behalf of the heirs, a certain Felix M. Sumbillo, filed a protest
against the assessment on the grounds that the subject property
had already been sold by the deceased person at some point in
the year 1990.
After some time had passed, a warrant for the estate's distraint
and/or levy was served. The notification of levy was met with
opposition from Reyes. On the other hand, on March 11, 1999,
the heirs presented a compromise settlement proposal in the
amount of one million pesos. The CIR did not take Reyes up
on his offer. Due to the fact that the estate was unable to settle
its tax debt by the deadline of April 15, 2000, the BIR
informed Reyes on June 6, 2000 that the property in question
would be put up for sale at a public auction on August 8, 2000.
On the 13th of June in 2000, Reyes submitted a protest to the
Appellate Division of the BIR. The CIR decided not to act on
Reyes's complaint or offer and instead authorized the
Collection Enforcement Division to go through with the
auction sale that was scheduled for August 8, 2000. The CIR
responded to the petition by submitting a motion to dismiss it
on the grounds that the assessment against the estate is already
final and may be carried out. Reyes submitted an application
to the BIR on November 25, 2000, requesting a compromise
settlement of the assessment levied against the estate in
accordance with Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, as embodied
by Revenue Ruling No. 6-2000 and Revenue Memorandum
Order No. 42-2000.
She said in her motion that the reason the CIR had not yet
approved the agreement was due to the bureaucratic red tape
that required the initials of four Deputy Commissioners on
pertinent papers before the CIR could sign the compromise.
According to Reyes's theory, the fact that the papers in
question do not include the obligatory initials and signatures
does not invalidate the finalized compromise. The CIR said
that an application to compromise a tax due under Revenue
Ruling No. 6-2000 and Revenue Management Order No. 42-
2000 must be evaluated and approved by either the National
Evaluation Board (or "NEB") or the Regional Evaluation
Board (or "REB"), depending on the circumstances.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's assessment against the
estate is valid.
2. Whether or not the respondent can validly argue that
she, as well as the other heirs, was not aware of the
facts and the law on which the assessment in question
is based, after she had opted to propose several
compromises on the estate tax due, and even
prematurely acting on such proposal by paying 20%
of the basic estate tax due.
RULING:
Under Section 228 of the Tax Code is unambiguous and has to
be followed. In the event that the legislation and the facts on
which the assessment is based are not communicated to the
taxpayers in a written form, the assessment in question will be
null and invalid. In the matter at hand, Reyes was not provided
with written notification of the legislation and the
circumstances on which the valuation of the estate taxes had
been based. She was just provided with notification of the
findings by the CIR, which had simply relied upon the terms
of the previous Section 229 prior to its change by Republic
Act (RA) No. 8424, also known as the Tax Reform Act of
1997.
The portion of Section 229 that deals with protesting an
evaluation has already been changed thanks to RA 8424. The
old requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIR's
findings was changed in 1998 to require informing the
taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts on which an
assessment would be made; otherwise, the assessment itself
would be invalid. If the taxpayer was not informed of both the
law and the facts on which an assessment would be made, the
assessment itself would be invalid. The estate was served with
a notice of preliminary assessment on February 12, 1998. This
notice was issued against the estate. Both the final notice of
inheritance tax assessment and the demand letter were both
sent out on April 22, 1998. During the times in question,
Republic Act 8424 was already being implemented. Under the
new legislation, the notification that was necessary in order to
comply with the previous law is no longer enough.
It is not possible to draw the conclusion from this conduct that
Reyes was already familiar with the legislation or the facts
upon which the evaluation was based. It in no way satisfies the
obligatory criterion outlined in Section 228, which must be
met. In light of the prior decision that the tax assessment
levied against the estate was invalid, it would be premature for
this Court to pronounce that the compromise on the estate tax
due has been accomplished and consummated. There has been
no agreement reached or conclusion reached. In accordance
with the provisions of Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, the
National Exchequer Board (NEB), which is comprised of the
petitioner and four deputy commissioners, must give its
approval to any compromise where the amount of basic tax at
issue is greater than one million pesos or where the amount of
the settlement offered is lower than the minimum rates
prescribed by law. In conclusion, the appeal court reached the
proper conclusion when it found that this law applies to all
agreements, regardless of whether the compromise was
proposed by the government or not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguere debemos. In areas in which the law does not
make distinctions, we should not make them either.
DUE TO THIS, the Petition is thus DENIED, and the
Decision that has been challenged is AFFIRMED. There has
been no announcement about prices.
ROSARIO L. DADULO, Petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., in
his capacity as City Mayor of Quezon City and GLORIA
PATANGUI, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175451 April 13, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Gloria Patangui (Patangui) filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
on September 26, 2002 against petitioner Rosario Dadulo, the
Barangay Chairperson of Barangay Payatas A in Quezon City;
against Barangay Security Development Officers (BSDOs)
Edgar Saraga and Rogelio Dumadigo; and against Deputy
Barangay Security Development Officer Efren Pagabao.
Patangui stated in her Salaysay ng Pagrereklamo3 that on
September 22, 2002, at approximately 4:30 in the afternoon,
while she was out of their house, petitioner and the said
BSDOs stole several galvanized iron sheets, lumber, and
rolled plain iron sheets from her backyard.
Patangui was not present during the theft. Reportedly present
at the event were Patangui's two daughters, who observed two
men being ordered by a lady who was standing nearby to cart
away the belongings. The woman's instructions came from
Patangui's children. Patangui was informed by a BSDO who
was on duty that the petitioner was the one who had
authorized the seizure of the aforementioned building items.
Elsie Castillejos, who must remain nameless, was the one who
shared the knowledge with her. Patangui learned the next day
that some of the galvanized iron sheets that had been stolen
from her property were used in the construction of the new
barangay outpost. Because she is acquainted with the
campaign stickers that are still affixed on the galvanized iron
sheets, she was able to distinguish the things in question.
Respondent Patangui said in her testimony that the building
supplies were stolen from her home and delivered to the
barangay outpost. He learned that the petitioner had requested
the confiscation of the property. Petitioner believes that the
judgment made by the Office of the Ombudsman, which found
her guilty of behavior harmful to the best interest of the
service and imposed upon her the punishment of suspension,
which was upheld by the CA, should be adhered to. Petitioner
and BSDO Edgar Saraga were found guilty of behavior that
was detrimental to the best interests of the service, and the
Office of the Ombudsman issued a decision that found them
guilty and imposed the punishment of a six-month suspension
on them both. This decision is now being appealed. Because
BSDO Rogelio Dumadigo and Deputy BSDO Efren Pagabao
could not be positively identified as being among the
individuals who stole the building supplies belonging to the
petitioner, the accusations against them were dropped.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of the suspension order
premature.
RULING:
Even if an appeal is successful, the judgment will still be put
into effect. In the event that the respondent wins the appeal, he
will be treated as if he had been placed under preventive
suspension and will be awarded the salary and any other
emoluments that he was denied because he was suspended or
removed from his position. In the event that the penalty is
removal or suspension, the respondent will be considered to
have been under preventive suspension. In matters pertaining
to administrative law, it is customary to put into action any
ruling handed down by the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is responsible for ensuring that
the decision is rigorously enforced and carried out in the
appropriate manner. Any officer who, without a sufficient
justification, refuses or fails to comply with an order from the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
or censure another officer is subject to disciplinary action.
This refusal or failure constitutes a reason for disciplinary
action. The rule that procedural laws should be read to be
applicable to activities that were pending and undecided at the
time of their passing, and should be considered retroactive in
that sense and to that degree, is one that has been well-
established throughout the course of time. As a general rule,
the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be
regarded a violation of any personal rights since no vested
right may attach to or originate from the application of these
laws in a retrospective manner, nor can it be considered a
violation of any personal rights.
The findings of fact made by the Office of the Ombudsman
are considered conclusive when they are backed by significant
evidence, and they are granted the respect and weight that is
due to them, particularly when they are upheld by the Court of
Appeals. A review of the factual findings may be conducted in
an appropriate manner only in the event that the Ombudsman
has committed a serious abuse of discretion. In the process of
reviewing decisions made by administrative agencies, it is not
within the purview of this Court to assess the weight of
conflicting evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
in any other way replace the judgment of the administrative
agency regarding the sufficiency of the evidence with its own.
It is not the responsibility of this Court to examine and
consider the evidence presented by the parties once more, with
the exception of situations in which there is strong reason to
assume that a probable miscarriage of justice would be the
outcome of doing so. Reviewing the potential legal mistakes
that the Court of Appeals may have made is the only thing that
we can do in an appeal that was brought to us by way of a
petition for review on certiorari since we do not have the
authority to do anything else.
As a RESULT, the petition is DENIED and AFFIRMED is the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 89909,
which found petitioner Rosario Dadulo guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed upon
her the penalty of suspension for six months. The decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-0470-J was
handed down on March 4, 2003.