2015 Special Report On Energy and Climate Change

Energyand
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World Energy Outlook Special Report

Secure Sustainable Together
Energyand
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World Energy Outlook Special Report

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
The International Energy Agency (IEA), an autonomous agency, was established in November 1974.
Its primary mandate was – and is – two-fold: to promote energy security amongst its member
countries through collective response to physical disruptions in oil supply, and provide authoritative
research and analysis on ways to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy for its 29 member
countries and beyond. The IEA carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among
its member countries, each of which is obliged to hold oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of its net imports.
The Agency’s aims include the following objectives:
n Secure member countries’ access to reliable and ample supplies of all forms of energy; in particular,
through maintaining effective emergency response capabilities in case of oil supply disruptions.
n Promote sustainable energy policies that spur economic growth and environmental protection
in a global context – particularly in terms of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions that contribute
to climate change.
n Improve transparency of international markets through collection and analysis of
energy data.
n Support global collaboration on energy technology to secure future energy supplies
and mitigate their environmental impact, including through improved energy
efficiency and development and deployment of low-carbon technologies.
n Find solutions to global energy challenges through engagement and
dialogue with non-member countries, industry, international
organisations and other stakeholders.
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Foreword
We face a moment of opportunity, but also of great risk. The world is counting on the
UN climate talks in Paris later this year to achieve a global agreement that puts us on a
more sustainable path. As IEA analysis has repeatedly shown that the cost and difficulty
of mitigating greenhouse-gas emissions increases every year, time is of the essence. And it
is clear that the energy sector must play a critical role if efforts to reduce emissions are to
succeed. While we see growing consensus among countries that it is time to act, we must
ensure that the steps taken are adequate and that the commitments made are kept.
In recent years, progress has been made in developing cleaner, more efficient energy
technologies. Indeed, we are seeing signs that economic growth and energy-related
emissions – which have historically moved in the same direction – are starting to
decouple. The energy intensity of the global economy continued to decline in 2014 despite
economic growth of over 3%. But increased effort is still needed if we are to keep open
the possibility of limiting the rise in global mean temperature to 2 °C. The pledges – or
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) – made by individual countries for
the 21st UN Conference of the Parties (COP21) in December 2015 will determine whether
this goal will remain attainable.
This special report, part of the World Energy Outlook series, assesses the effect of recent
low-carbon energy developments and the INDCs proposed thus far. It finds that while global
energy-related emissions slow as a result of the climate pledges, they still increase. To
compensate, governments will need to ramp up efforts, reviewing their pledges regularly,
setting realistic and attainable longer-term goals and tracking their progress. This report
also proposes the adoption of five measures that would achieve a near-term peak in global
energy-related emissions while maintaining momentum for stronger national efforts.
The next few months could be decisive in determining our energy and climate future. Will
countries take on and abide by commitments that will make a meaningful impact? Will
they agree to additional measures to spur further innovation and action? Achieving our
goals is still possible, but the risk of failure is great: the more time passes without a deal,
the more high-carbon energy infrastructure is locked in.
COP21 presents an opportunity we cannot afford to miss.
This publication is issued on my authority as Executive Director of the IEA.
Maria van der Hoeven

Executive Director
International Energy Agency
Foreword 3
Acknowledgements
This report was led by the Directorate of Global Energy Economics (GEE) of the International
Energy Agency (IEA). It was designed and directed by Fatih Birol, Chief Economist of the
IEA. The analysis was co-ordinated by Laura Cozzi, Dan Dorner and Timur Gül. Principal
contributors to the report were Brent Wanner, Fabian Kęsicki and Christina Hood
(Climate Change Unit), together with Marco Baroni, Simon Bennett (CCS Technology
Unit), Christian Besson, Stéphanie Bouckaert, Amos Bromhead, Olivier Durand-Lasserve
(IEA/OECD), Tarik El-Laboudy, Tim Gould, Mark Hashimoto (Emergency Policy Division),
Markus Klingbeil, Atsuhito Kurozumi, Ellina Levina (Climate Change Unit), Junling Liu,
Sean McCoy (CCS Technology Unit), Paweł Olejarnik, Nora Selmet, Daniele Sinopoli,
Shigeru Suehiro, Johannes Trüby, Charlotte Vailles, David Wilkinson, Georgios Zazias and
Shuwei Zhang. Sandra Mooney and Teresa Coon provided essential support.
Robert Priddle carried editorial responsibility.
Experts from the OECD also contributed to the report, particularly Jean Chateau. The
report benefited from valuable inputs, comments and feedback from other experts within
the IEA, including Didier Houssin, Keisuke Sadamori, Liwayway Adkins, Philippe Benoit,
Pierpaolo Cazzola, Paolo Frankl, Rebecca Gaghen, Jean-François Gagné, Takashi Hattori,
Juho Lipponen, Duncan Millard, Misako Takahashi, Samuel Thomas, Laszlo Varro and
Martin Young. Thanks also go to the Agency’s Communication and Information Office for
their help in producing the report, and to Bertrand Sadin and Anne Mayne for graphics.
Debra Justus was the copy-editor.
The work could not have been achieved without the support provided by: the European
Commission (Directorate-General for Climate Action); the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, United Kingdom; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan; ClimateWorks
Foundation; and, Statoil.
A High-Level Advisory Panel provided strategic guidance for this study. Its members are:
The Honourable Tim Groser Minister of Trade, Minister for Climate Change Issues and
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand
H.E. Dr. Elham M.A. Ibrahim Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy, African Union
Mr. Fred Krupp President, Environmental Defense Fund, United States
Dr. Adnan Shihab-Eldin Director General of the Kuwait Foundation for the
Advancement of Sciences and former Secretary-General of
OPEC, Kuwait
Dr. Leena Srivastava Acting Director-General, TERI (The Energy and Resources
Institute), India
Professor Laurence Tubiana Special Representative of the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs for the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21) and
French Ambassador for Climate Negotiations
Professor Zou Ji Deputy Director-General, National Centre for Climate
Change Strategy and International Cooperation, China
Acknowledgements 5
A workshop of international experts was organised by the IEA to gather essential input
to this study and was held on 5 March 2015 in Paris. The workshop participants offered
valuable insights, feedback and data for this analysis.
Many experts from outside of the IEA provided input, commented on the underlying
analytical work and/or reviewed the report. Their comments and suggestions were of great
value. They include:
Morten Albæk Vestas Wind Systems

Venkatachalam Anbumozhi Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Doug Arent National Renewables Energy Laboratory, United States
Mourad Ayouz EDF
Georg Bäuml Volkswagen
Christopher Beaton International Institute for Sustainable Development
Carmen Becerril Acciona
Jean-Paul Bouttes EDF
David Brayshaw University of Reading
Simon Buckle OECD
Ian Cronshaw Australian National University
Matthew Crozat Department of Energy, United States
Jos Delbeke Directorate General for Climate Action, European
Commission
Bo Diczfalusy Energy Policy Commission, Sweden
Sandrine Dixson-Declève Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL)
Christine Faure-Fedigan ENGIE
Renato de Filippo Eni
Lewis Fulton Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis
Emmanuel Guérin Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
Peter Grubnic Global CCS Institute
Miriam Gutzke Deutsche Bank
Reinhard Haas Vienna University of Technology
Espen Andreas Hauge Delegation of Norway to the OECD
David Hawkins Natural Resources Defense Council, United States
Anuschka Hilke Delegation of the United Kingdom to the OECD
David Hone Shell
Takashi Hongo Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute
Brian Hoskins Grantham Institute for Climate Change
Michio Ikeda Toshiba, Europe
Lars Georg Jensen Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, Denmark
Tim Johnston Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom
6 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Christopher Kaminker OECD
1
Nathaniel Keohane Environmental Defense Fund, United States
Shinichi Kihara Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan
2
Hoseok Kim Korea Energy Economics Institute
David King Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
Hans Korteweg Westinghouse
3
Akihiro Kuroki Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
Takayuki Kusajima Toyota
4
Ariane Labat Directorate General for Climate Action, European
Commission 5
James Leaton Carbon Tracker
Astrid Manroth Deutsche Bank 6
Luigi Marras Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy
Surabi Menon ClimateWorks Foundation 7
Bert Metz European Climate Foundation
Magdalena García Mora Acciona 8
Simone Mori Enel
Joachim Nick-Leptin Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Germany 9
Patrick Oliva Michelin
Estella Pancaldi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy
10
Grzegorz Peszko World Bank
Gregor Pett E.ON
Volkmar Pflug Siemens
11
Christian Pilgaard Zinglersen Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, Denmark
Mark Radka United Nations Environment Programme
12
Ernst Rauch Munich Re
Simone Ruiz-Vergote Allianz 13
Artur Runge-Metzger Directorate General for Climate Action, European
Commission 14
Franzjosef Schafhausen Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,
Building and Nuclear Safety, Germany 15
Christian Schönbauer Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, Austria
Katia Simeonova UNFCCC
16
Stephan Singer WWF International
Cartan Sumner Peabody Energy
Jakob Thomä 2° Investing Initiative 17
Halldor Thorgeirsson UNFCCC
David Turk Department of Energy, United States 18
Acknowledgements 7
Simon Upton OECD
Stefaan Vergote Directorate General for Energy, European Commission
Daniele Viappiani Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom
Peter Wooders International Institute for Sustainable Development
Henning Wuester International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
Rina Bohle Zeller Vestas Wind Systems
The individuals and organisations that contributed to this study are not responsible for any
opinions or judgements it contains. All errors and omissions are solely the responsibility
of the IEA.
Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to:
Dr. Fatih Birol

Chief Economist
Director, Directorate of Global Energy Economics
9, rue de la Fédération
75739 Paris Cedex 15
France
Telephone: (33-1) 4057 6670

Email: weo@iea.org
More information about the World Energy Outlook is available at

www.worldenergyoutlook.org.

Table of Contents
Foreword 3
Acknowledgements 5
Executive Summary 11
Energy and climate: state of play 17

1
Introduction 18
Energy sector and CO2 emissions 20
Recent developments 20
Carbon markets 23
Historical energy emissions trends 25
Energy-related CO2 emissions in 2014 29
Projecting future developments 31
2 The energy sector impact of national pledges 35

Energy and GHG emissions trends in the INDC Scenario 36
Regional trends 41
United States 41
European Union 46
China 50
India 54
Russia 58
Mexico 59
Selected other countries and regions 60
3 A strategy to raise climate ambition 67

Introduction 68
Background 68
Near-term opportunities for raising climate ambition 68
Emissions trends in the Bridge Scenario 74
Global emissions abatement 74
Trends by policy measure 77
Wider implications of the Bridge Scenario 99
4 Achieving the transition 105

Introduction 106
Technologies for transformation 107
Variable renewables 109
Carbon capture and storage 115
Alternative fuel vehicles 122
Energy sector transformation needs smart policies 129
Table of Contents 9
5 Building success in Paris and beyond 131
Introduction 132
Energy sector needs from COP21 133
Seeing the peak: a milestone to make climate ambition credible 136
Enhancing ambition: a five-year review cycle 138
Locking in the long-term vision 141
Tracking the energy transition 145
ANNEXES
Annex A. Policies and measures 149
Annex B. Data tables for the Bridge Scenario 153
Annex C. Definitions 187
Annex D. References 193

Executive Summary
A major milestone in efforts to combat climate change is fast approaching. The importance
of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) – to be held in Paris in December 2015 – rests
not only in its specific achievements by way of new contributions, but also in the direction
it sets. There are already some encouraging signs with a historic joint announcement by the
United States and China on climate change, and climate pledges for COP21 being submitted
by a diverse range of countries and in development in many others. The overall test of
success for COP21 will be the conviction it conveys that governments are determined to
act to the full extent necessary to achieve the goal they have already set to keep the rise in
global average temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius (°C), relative to pre-industrial levels.
Energy will be at the core of the discussion. Energy production and use account for two-
thirds of the world’s greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, meaning that the pledges made at
COP21 must bring deep cuts in these emissions, while yet sustaining the growth of the
world economy, boosting energy security around the world and bringing modern energy
to the billions who lack it today. The agreement reached at COP21 must be comprehensive
geographically, which means it must be equitable, reflecting both national responsibilities
and prevailing circumstances. The importance of the energy component is why this World
Energy Outlook Special Report presents detailed energy and climate analysis for the sector
and recommends four key pillars on which COP21 can build success.
Energy and emissions: moving apart?

The use of low-carbon energy sources is expanding rapidly, and there are signs that
growth in the global economy and energy-related emissions may be starting to decouple.
The global economy grew by around 3% in 2014 but energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions stayed flat, the first time in at least 40 years that such an outcome has occurred
outside economic crisis. Renewables accounted for nearly half of all new power generation
capacity in 2014, led by growth in China, the United States, Japan and Germany, with
investment remaining strong (at $270 billion) and costs continuing to fall. The energy
intensity of the global economy dropped by 2.3% in 2014, more than double the average
rate of fall over the last decade, a result stemming from improved energy efficiency and
structural changes in some economies, such as China. Around 11% of global energy-related
CO2 emissions arise in areas that operate a carbon market (where the average price is
$7 per tonne of CO2), while 13% of energy-related CO2 emissions arise in markets with
fossil-fuel consumption subsidies (an incentive equivalent to $115 per tonne of CO2, on
average). There are some encouraging signs on both fronts, with reform in sight for the
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme and countries including India, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand taking the opportunity of lower oil prices to diminish fossil-fuel
subsidies, cutting the incentive for wasteful consumption.
The energy contribution to COP21
Nationally determined pledges are the foundation of COP21. Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by countries in advance of COP21 may
vary in scope but will contain, implicitly or explicitly, commitments relating to the energy
sector. As of 14 May 2015, countries accounting for 34% of energy-related emissions had
submitted their new pledges. A first assessment of the impact of these INDCs and related
policy statements (such as by China) on future energy trends is presented in this report
in an “INDC Scenario”. This shows, for example, that the United States’ pledge to cut net
greenhouse-gas emissions by 26% to 28% by 2025 (relative to 2005 levels) would deliver
a major reduction in emissions while the economy grows by more than one-third over
current levels. The European Union’s pledge to cut GHG emissions by at least 40% by 2030
(relative to 1990 levels) would see energy-related CO2 emissions decline at nearly twice
the rate achieved since 2000, making it one of the world’s least carbon-intensive energy
economies. Russia’s energy-related emissions decline slightly from 2013 to 2030 and it
meets its 2030 target comfortably, while implementation of Mexico’s pledge would see
its energy-related emissions increase slightly while its economy grows much more rapidly.
China has yet to submit its INDC, but has stated an intention to achieve a peak in its CO2
emissions around 2030 (if not earlier), an important change in direction, given the pace at
which they have grown on average since 2000.
Growth in global energy-related GHG emissions slows, but there is no peak by 2030 in
the INDC Scenario. The link between global economic output and energy-related GHG
emissions weakens significantly, but is not broken: the economy grows by 88% from 2013
to 2030 and energy-related CO2 emissions by 8% (reaching 34.8 gigatonnes). Renewables
become the leading source of electricity by 2030, as average annual investment in non-
hydro renewables is 80% higher than levels seen since 2000, but inefficient coal-fired power
generation capacity declines only slightly. With INDCs submitted so far, and the planned
energy policies in countries that have yet to submit, the world’s estimated remaining
carbon budget consistent with a 50% chance of keeping the rise in temperature below 2 °C
is consumed by around 2040 – eight months later than is projected in the absence of
INDCs. This underlines the need for all countries to submit ambitious INDCs for COP21 and
for these INDCs to be recognised as a basis upon which to build stronger future action,
including from opportunities for collaborative/co-ordinated action or those enabled by a
transfer of resources (such as technology and finance). If stronger action is not forthcoming
after 2030, the path in the INDC Scenario would be consistent with an average temperature
increase of around 2.6 °C by 2100 and 3.5 °C after 2200.
What does the energy sector need from COP21?

National pledges submitted for COP21 need to form the basis for a “virtuous circle” of rising
ambition. From COP21, the energy sector needs to see a projection from political leaders at
the highest level of clarity of purpose and certainty of action, creating a clear expectation
of global and national low-carbon development. Four pillars can support that achievement:

1. Peak in emissions – set the conditions which will achieve an early peak in global 1
energy-related emissions.
2. Five-year revision – review contributions regularly, to test the scope to lift the level 2
of ambition.
3. Lock in the vision – translate the established climate goal into a collective long-term 3
emissions goal, with shorter-term commitments that are consistent with the long-
term vision.
4
4. Track the transition – establish an effective process for tracking achievements in
the energy sector.
5
Peak in emissions
The IEA proposes a bridging strategy that could deliver a peak in global energy-related 6
emissions by 2020. A commitment to target such a near-term peak would send a clear
message of political determination to stay below the 2 °C climate limit. The peak can be 7
achieved relying solely on proven technologies and policies, without changing the economic
and development prospects of any region, and is presented in a “Bridge Scenario”. The 8
technologies and policies reflected in the Bridge Scenario are essential to secure the long-
term decarbonisation of the energy sector and their near-term adoption can help keep the
door to the 2 °C goal open. For countries that have submitted their INDCs, the proposed 9
strategy identifies possible areas for over-achievement. For those that have yet to make a
submission, it sets out a pragmatic baseline for ambition. 10
The Bridge Scenario depends upon five measures:
 Increasing energy efficiency in the industry, buildings and transport sectors. 11
 Progressively reducing the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants and
banning their construction. 12
 Increasing investment in renewable energy technologies in the power sector from
$270 billion in 2014 to $400 billion in 2030. 13
 Gradual phasing out of fossil-fuel subsidies to end-users by 2030.
 Reducing methane emissions in oil and gas production. 14
These measures have profound implications for the global energy mix, putting a brake on
growth in oil and coal use within the next five years and further boosting renewables. In 15
the Bridge Scenario, coal use peaks before 2020 and then declines while oil demand rises
to 2020 and then plateaus. Total energy-related GHG emissions peak around 2020. Both 16
the energy intensity of the global economy and the carbon intensity of power generation
improve by 40% by 2030. China decouples its economic expansion from emissions growth
by around 2020, much earlier than otherwise expected, mainly through improving the 17
energy efficiency of industrial motors and the buildings sector, including through standards
for appliances and lighting. In countries where emissions are already in decline today, 18
the decoupling of economic growth and emissions is significantly accelerated; compared
with recent years, the pace of this decoupling is almost 30% faster in the European
Union (due to improved energy efficiency) and in the United States (where renewables
contribute one-third of the achieved emissions savings in 2030). In other regions, the link
between economic growth and emissions growth is weakened significantly, but the relative
importance of different measures varies. India utilises energy more efficiently, helping it
to reach its energy sector targets and moderate emissions growth, while the reduction of
methane releases from oil and gas production and reforming fossil-fuel subsidies (while
providing targeted support for the poorest) are key measures in the Middle East and Africa,
and a portfolio of options helps reduce emissions in Southeast Asia. While universal access
to modern energy is not achieved in the Bridge Scenario, the efforts to reduce energy-
related emissions do go hand-in-hand with delivering access to electricity to 1.7 billion
people and access to clean cookstoves to 1.6 billion people by 2030.
Five-year revision
A five-year cycle for the review of mitigation targets is needed to provide the opportunity
for commitment to stronger climate ambition over time. The energy context in which
climate goals are being set is changing rapidly as the cost and performance of many low-
carbon technologies improves and countries start to see the success of their low-carbon
policies. The strategy set out in the Bridge Scenario can keep the 2 °C climate goal within
reach in the near-term, but goals beyond 2025 need to be strengthened in due course.
Agreeing a mechanism at COP21 that will permit reviewing the level of ambition every five
years will regularly shine a light on progress, and send a clearer message to investors of the
long-term commitment to the full extent of the necessary decarbonisation.
Lock in the vision

Translating the 2 °C goal into subordinate targets, including a clear, collective long-term
emissions goal, would provide greater ease and certainty in expressing future policy on a
basis consistent with the longer term objective. Such targets would reinforce the need for
the energy sector to adopt a long-term development pathway that is low carbon. Fostering
the development of new technologies will be necessary in order to achieve the ultimate
climate goal and, as set out in the “450 Scenario”, measures beyond those in the Bridge
Scenario could allow the necessary technologies to reach maturity before they need to be
widely deployed. Early support of wind and solar technologies has played a pivotal role
in driving down costs and achieving their large-scale deployment. A similar approach is
needed to develop and deploy technologies that safeguard the reliability of power supply
as the contribution of variable renewables increases (e.g. through energy storage), deliver
additional emissions reductions in the power sector and industry (e.g. carbon capture and
storage) and grow the share of alternative fuel vehicles in road transport. Investment in
the 450 Scenario is only a little higher than other scenarios, but is oriented more strongly
towards low-carbon energy supply and energy efficiency, emphasising the need for
effective means to finance such investments (particularly in countries where such financing
instruments may not yet exist).

Track the transition
1
There must be a strong process for tracking progress towards nationally determined
mitigation goals. Evidence of tangible results will give the necessary confidence to all
countries and energy sector stakeholders that everyone is acting in harmony. The related 2
energy data systems are, in any case, essential to underpin domestic policy-making and
identify those who are struggling with implementation and may need assistance. Details of 3
the post-2020 reporting and accounting frameworks may not be settled at COP21, but the
agreement should at least establish some high-level principles, including the need for rules 4
for the measurement and reporting of emissions and the need to develop accounting rules
for the different types of mitigation goals that are likely to be put forward by countries.
Tracking progress towards energy sector decarbonisation is complex and requires a 5
broader set of measurements than are collected and monitored in many countries today.
In recognition of this need, a set of appropriate high-level metrics to track energy sector 6
decarbonisation is proposed in the report.
7
Secure a legacy of energy change
Will 2015 be the year in which decision-makers are able to establish the much-needed 8
climate for change? The answer cannot yet be known. But to assist the process beyond
the recommendations in this report, the IEA will publish timely updates of its INDC
analysis, incorporating new submissions, in the lead up to COP21. It will also submit the
9
key findings of this report for endorsement by Ministers at their biennial meeting under
IEA auspices (17‑18 November 2015). Beyond COP21, the IEA will continue to assess the 10
impact of national contributions and collective prospects as they are further developed,
refined, revised and implemented, drawing on the wealth of energy data and indicators at 11
its command.
A transformation of the world’s energy system must become a uniting vision if the 2 °C 12
climate goal is to be achieved. The challenge is stern, but a credible vision of the long-term
decarbonisation of the sector is available to underpin shorter term commitments and the
means to realise it can, ultimately, be collectively adopted. The world must quickly learn to 13
live within its means if this generation is to pass it on to the next with a clear conscience.
14
15
16
17
18
Chapter 1
Energy and climate: state of play

A climate for energy change?
Highlights
• The 21st Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC meets in Paris in December
2015 with the aim of adopting a new global agreement to limit greenhouse-gas
emissions. The ultimate objective already adopted by governments is to limit global
warming to an average of no more than 2 °C, relative to pre-industrial levels. This
must involve the transformation of the energy sector, as it accounts for roughly
two-thirds of all anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions today.
• Global energy-related CO2 emissions stayed flat in 2014 (at an estimated 32.2 Gt)
despite an increase of around 3% in the global economy. This is the first time in at
least 40 years that a halt or reduction in emissions has not been tied to an economic
crisis. Across the OECD, emissions continued to decouple from economic growth in
2014. China’s emissions figures give early signs of a weakening in the link between
economic and emissions growth, albeit not yet a detachment.
• Renewable energy investment was flat in 2014 at $270 billion, with new capacity of
128 GW installed, representing almost half of total capacity additions. Wind power
accounted for 37% and solar for almost another third. The first commercial power
plant with CO2 capture came online in 2014. Nuclear capacity of 74 GW was under
construction at the end of 2014. Estimates for 2014 indicate that global energy
intensity decreased by 2.3% relative to the previous year, more than twice the
annual rate of the last decade.
• Carbon markets covered 11% of global energy-related emissions in 2014 and the
average price was $7 per tonne of CO2. In contrast, 13% of CO2 emissions were
linked to fossil-fuel use supported by consumption subsidies, equivalent to an
implicit subsidy of $115 per tonne of CO2. However, several countries, including
India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, used the opportunity of lower oil prices to
reform fossil-fuel subsidies.
• Over the past century, annual emission levels increased at an ever higher rate: the
energy sector emitted as much CO2 over the last 27 years as in all the previous
years. The global distribution of CO2 emissions has also shifted: at the beginning of
the 20th century, emissions originated almost exclusively in the United States and
Europe, while today together they account for less than 30%.
• Success at the UN climate summit in December 2015 hinges on how new national
pledges to reduce emissions can be integrated into an international framework.
As of 14 May 2015, Switzerland, European Union, Norway, Mexico, United States,
Gabon, Russia, Liechtenstein and Andorra, together accounting for 34% of energy-
related CO2 emissions, had submitted their pledges.
Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 17

Introduction
The world is at a critical juncture in its efforts to combat climate change. Since the first
Conference of the Parties (COP) in 1995, greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions have risen by more
than one-quarter and the atmospheric concentration of these gases has increased steadily
to 435 parts per million carbon-dioxide equivalent (ppm CO2-eq) in 2012 (EEA, 2015).1 The
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that, in the absence of fully
committed and urgent action, climate change will have severe and irreversible impacts
across the world. The international commitment to keep the increase in long-term average
temperatures to below two degrees Celsius (2 °C), relative to pre-industrial levels, will
require substantial and sustained reductions in global emissions (Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 ⊳ Avoiding dangerous climate change: the 2 °C goal
The 196 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) agreed a long-term global objective, as part of the package of decisions at
COP16 in Cancun in December 2010. Under the Cancun Agreement, Parties formally
recognised that they should take urgent action to meet the long-term goal of holding
the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels,
and that deep cuts in global greenhouse-gas emissions are required to achieve this.
The Cancun decision formalised the political agreement to a below 2 °C goal which
had been made a year earlier at COP15 in Copenhagen by a smaller set of countries.
The Cancun Agreement also set in motion a review of the adequacy of this newly
established long-term global goal as a means of achieving the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC (“to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”),
and whether it should be further strengthened, including consideration of a 1.5 °C
temperature goal. This review, to be concluded in 2015, will inform discussion of this
issue in the COP21 process.
The long lifetime of greenhouse gases means that it is the cumulative build-up in the
atmosphere that matters most. In its latest report, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that to preserve a 50% chance of limiting global warming
to 2 °C, the world can support a maximum carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “budget” of
3 000 gigatonnes (Gt) (the mid-point in a range of 2 900 Gt to 3 200 Gt) (IPCC, 2014), of
which an estimated 1 970 Gt had already been emitted before 2014. Accounting for CO2
emissions from industrial processes and land use, land-use change and forestry over the
rest of the 21st century leaves the energy sector2 with a carbon budget of 980 Gt (the mid-
point in a range of 880 Gt to 1 180 Gt) from the start of 2014 onwards. The carbon legacy
1. This refers to the concentration of all greenhouse gases, including cooling aerosols.
2. Energy sector in this chapter refers to energy supply, energy transformation (including power generation) and energy-
consuming sectors (including buildings, industry, transport and agriculture).

that is locked-in by new development of fossil-fuelled energy infrastructure underlines the
importance that attaches to success in achieving a step change in efforts to contain GHG 1
emissions in the COP21 meeting to be held in Paris in December 2015.
The path towards a new agreement at COP21 began in 2009 with the attempt at COP15
2
in Copenhagen to develop a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated in
1997 and is still in effect but is expected to cover only 10% of global GHG emissions by 3
2020. While COP15 failed to achieve a binding treaty, it did result in some pivotal political
outcomes: an agreed definition, subsequently universally adopted, of the objective to keep 4
the long-term global average temperature increase below 2 °C; the principle that both
developed and developing countries should undertake nationally appropriate actions to 5
reduce emissions; and a commitment to make available $100 billion per year of public
and private climate finance to developing countries by 2020, mainly through the Green
Climate Fund.3 Moreover, under the Copenhagen Accord, countries accounting for around
6
80% of GHG emissions made pledges to mitigation goals and actions for the period to 2020,
marking a major improvement on the Kyoto Protocol. 7
Negotiations towards a new legal agreement for the post-2020 period started in 2011 at
COP17 in Durban, South Africa. The new agreement is to apply to the 196 Parties to the
8
UNFCCC and to be adopted by 2015. By 2014 at the time of COP20 in Lima, Peru, the
new agreement was beginning to take shape. Countries agreed to communicate so-called 9
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), their pledged actions under the new
agreement, well in advance of COP21 and in a manner that is clear, transparent and facilitates 10
understanding.
All UNFCCC Parties will come together at COP21 in December 2015 in an attempt to 11
bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. A strong agreement is required to
provide a clear signal that all countries are committed to decarbonisation and to convince 12
energy sector investors that they need to adopt low-carbon options. The submission by
individual countries of their own climate contribution to the 2015 agreement (INDCs)
will form the core “bottom-up” element of the climate deal to be agreed at COP21 (see
13
Chapter 5). The INDCs will apply to a period starting in 2021 and are expected to represent
“a progression beyond the current undertaking of that Party” (UNFCCC, 2015). This follows 13
the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, in which participating countries for the first time pledged
to undertake specific actions to mitigate GHG emissions. There is no agreed form regarding 13
the structure or content of INDCs: guidance exists, but the actual scope – whether they are
to include e.g. mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, and 14
capacity-building components – is open. INDCs are generally expected to have a mitigation
component, but they are likely to take a variety of forms, since they will reflect differences
in national circumstances, capabilities and priorities.
16
17
3. As of mid-April 2015, $10.2 billion had been made available to the Fund. The UNFCCC estimates that total climate 18
finance flows from developed to developing countries range from $40 to $175 billion per year (UNFCCC, 2014).

Such national contributions are to be embraced within an agreed framework covering
such issues as the overall objective or long-term climate goal, the processes to be adopted
for measuring, reporting and verifying emissions and accounting for the achievement of
mitigation targets, a framework to promote adaptation efforts and a mechanism for the
periodic review and strengthening of national targets. Enhanced support for developing
countries is to be provided in the areas of capacity building, technology and provision of
finance. However, there are significant issues yet to be resolved, such as how different
stages of economic development should be reflected in the agreement, the legal nature
of the targets adopted and what process will be followed to increase the level of ambition
over time. Outside the formal negotiations, catalysing activity is also being pursued by, for
example, companies, non-governmental organisations and financial institutions.
Against this background, this chapter reviews recent developments in the energy sector
and in carbon markets and analyses energy sector CO2 emissions in 2014 in the context of
historical emissions trends. It concludes by providing an overview of the three scenarios
that are used in subsequent chapters to illustrate the potential energy sector contribution
to a successful outcome of the COP21 negotiations.
Energy sector and CO2 emissions

Greenhouse-gas emissions from the energy sector represent roughly two-thirds of all
anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions and CO2 emissions from the sector have risen
over the past century to ever higher levels. Effective action in the energy sector is,
consequentially, essential to tackling the climate change problem. The remainder of this
chapter concentrates on the energy sector, concluding by describing how we set about
making future energy projections on the basis of present knowledge.
Recent developments
An important change in the energy sector from 2014 to 2015 has been the rapid drop in
world oil prices and, to a lesser extent, natural gas and coal prices. After a prolonged period
of high and relatively stable prices, oil dropped from over $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to
below $50 in early-2015. Natural gas prices also declined, but the pace and extent depended
on prevailing gas pricing mechanisms and other regional factors: in the United States they
fell from $4 per million British thermal units (MBtu) in mid-2014 to below $3/MBtu in
early-2015; German import prices moved below $8/MBtu from $8.5/MBtu during the
summer of 2014, while average Japan liquefied natural gas (LNG) import prices (a weighted
average of long-term contracts and spot trading) declined to around $15/MBtu from
$16/MBtu in mid-2014. Coal prices in northwest Europe declined from $73 per tonne (t) in
mid-2014 to around $60/t at the start of 2015 due to persistent overcapacity in the market.
The projections in this World Energy Outlook (WEO) Special Report incorporate updated
energy price trajectories that reflect recent developments. As a result, fossil-fuel prices in
the near term are lower than in the WEO-2014, but we do not assume these lower prices
will be permanent.

At the global level, lower fossil-fuel prices are likely to act as a form of economic stimulus,
which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quantifies at between 0.3% and 0.7% of 1
additional growth in global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015 (IMF, 2015). Yet, so
far regional impacts have varied hugely between net importers and exporters, large and 2
small consumers and countries with fossil-fuel subsidy schemes and those without. Oil
and gas exporters have seen their expectations of economic growth trimmed and many 3
have revised government budgets as a result. For oil and gas companies, the drop in prices
has prompted a significant reduction in planned upstream investments – estimated to be
around 20% lower in 2015. Some countries, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, 4
have taken the opportunity provided by lower international oil prices to implement fossil-
fuel subsidy reform (see Chapter 2), while tax reforms in China limited the pass through of 5
oil price changes to consumers. Lower natural gas prices have improved the competitive
position of gas vis-à-vis coal in some markets (mainly in Asia), although coal still has a 6
cost advantage over gas. Despite lower fossil-fuel prices, there were no signs of weakening
appetite for renewables in 2014: global investment in renewable-based power generation
was $270 billion4 and positive policy moves have continued in many countries. India has 7
declared an aim to have an installed non-hydro renewable energy capacity of 175 gigawatts
(GW) by 2022 (of which solar PV is 100 GW). 8
Renewable technologies are becoming increasingly cost competitive in a number of
countries and circumstances, but public support schemes are still required to support 9
deployment in many others. Renewables-based power generation capacity is estimated
to have increased by 128 GW in 2014, of which 37% is wind power, almost one-third solar 10
power and more than a quarter from hydropower (Figure 1.1). This amounted to more than
45% of world power generation capacity additions in 2014, consistent with the general
upward trend in recent years. The growth in wind capacity continued to be led by onshore
11
installations (although offshore has also grown rapidly). China remains the largest wind
power market, with 20 GW of new capacity. Germany installed more than 5 GW of wind 12
capacity, while US capacity additions bounced back from the very low levels of 2013 to
almost 5 GW in 2014. Relatively high (but declining) costs for offshore wind and delays in 13
the build-up of grid connections have resulted in delays to projects in some countries or
the cutting of capacity targets (e.g. Germany), though other countries have responded by
boosting their support to the industry (e.g. Japan, Korea and China). Solar photovoltaic (PV)
13
expanded strongly in Asia, particularly in China and Japan, the Japanese expansion being
supported by generous feed-in tariffs. Lower oil prices proved to be a challenge for other 13
forms of renewable energy, including biofuels in transport and renewable heat, as the
latter competes directly with natural gas heating (the price of which is still, in many cases, 14
linked to the oil price). While biofuels face challenges arising from lower oil prices, some
other developments served to improve their outlook: to counter current bleak prospects
for biofuels in Brazil, the government increased the ethanol blending rate from 25% to 27%
16
and that for biodiesel from 5% to 7%, and increased gasoline taxes, while Argentina and
Indonesia raised their biofuel mandates. 17
4. Investment made over the construction period is allocated to the year a completed project begins operation, which 18
may result in differences from other published estimates.

Figure 1.1 ⊳ Global renewables-based power capacity additions by type
and share of total capacity additions
140 70% Other renewables*

GW
Hydro
120 60%
Wind
100 50% Solar PV
Share of total additions
80 40% (right axis)
60 30%
40 20%
20 10%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

* Includes geothermal, marine, bioenergy and concentrating solar power.
Nuclear power is the second-largest source of low-carbon electricity generation worldwide,

after hydropower. Nearly all new nuclear construction in recent years has taken place in
price-regulated markets or in markets where government-owned entities build, own and
operate the plants. China continues to lead in new capacity additions, with 28 GW under
construction at the end of 2014, while plants with a combined capacity of 46 GW are under
construction in Russia, India, Korea, United States and several other countries. Japan has
begun the necessary process to permit the restart of some of its nuclear capacity.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) achieved an important milestone in 2014, with Boundary
Dam unit 3 (net capacity of 120 megawatts) in Canada becoming the first commercial power
plant to come online with CO2 capture. The 22 large-scale CCS projects either in operation
or under construction have a collective CO2 capture capacity of around 40 million tonnes
(Mt) per year (Global CCS Institute, 2015). The present pace of progress, however, falls
short of that needed in order to achieve the pace and scale of CCS deployment necessary
to achieve a 2 °C pathway (see Chapter 4).
Any period of lower energy prices can result in neglect of action to promote energy efficiency
and the return of more profligate consumption. However, there is no evidence, as yet,
that this is occurring. Preliminary estimates for 2014 indicate that global energy intensity
– measured as the amount of energy required to produce a unit of GDP – decreased by
2.3% relative to the previous year, more than double the average rate of change over the
last decade. This was the joint result of energy efficiency improvements and structural
changes in the global economy. A major driver of the global change was the 8% reduction
in energy intensity in China.5
5. The change in primary energy intensity is higher than the official Chinese number (-5%) mainly because the IEA uses
the energy content method and Chinese authorities use the partial substitution method for renewables.

Carbon markets
1
Putting a meaningful price on CO2 emissions is viewed by many as integral to achieving
the 2 °C climate goal. The current picture, however, reveals significant challenges relating 2
to the geographic coverage of carbon markets, the prevailing price levels and, in some
cases, the need for market reform. Carbon emissions trading schemes in operation in 2014
covered 3.7 Gt (11 %) of global energy-related CO2 emissions and had an aggregate value
3
of $26 billion.6 The average price was around $7 per tonne of CO2 (Figure 1.2). In contrast,
4.2 Gt (13%) of global energy-related CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels receive 4
consumption subsidies, with the implicit subsidy amounting to $115 per tonne of CO2, on
average. 5
The value of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the world’s largest
carbon market, eclipsed that of all others combined in 2014, but was still worth only 6
one-fifth of its own level in 2008. The EU ETS is a core element of the European Union’s
strategy to decarbonise its energy sector, but it continues to suffer from a massive surplus 7
of allowances, which depresses prices and the incentive for low-carbon investments. Delay
has been imposed on the auctioning of some allowances, but this will not be sufficient 8
to overcome this problem and must be followed by structural reforms. In May 2015, the
European Union agreed on a plan to introduce a Market Stability Reserve in 2019 that
could withdraw allowances in times of surplus.
9
China’s seven pilot carbon trading schemes are all operational and, taken together, mean 10
that the country has the second-largest carbon market in the world (covering around
1.3 Gt of CO2) and China is expected to introduce a national scheme by 2020. Prices in
the Chinese markets are currently not high enough to significantly influence investment
11
decisions. Korea’s emissions trading scheme began operating in January 2015, covering
525 business entities and with a three-year cap of 1.7 Gt CO2-eq. Kazakhstan launched 12
an emissions trading scheme at the start of 2013, which covered around 155 Mt CO2 in
2014 and resulted in an average price of around $2 per tonne of CO2. In Japan, there are 13
currently three cap-and-trade schemes in the prefectures of Tokyo, Saitama and Kyoto,
which cover around 2% of Japan’s emissions. In general, little trading is currently taking 13
place in the emissions trading systems across Asia.
In North America, California’s ETS has been part of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 13
since 2007 and a formal link to Québec’s scheme was established in 2014, creating a broader
market. Since January 2015, the ETS covers around 85% of California’s GHG emissions. The 14
emissions cap applied under the Regional Greenhouse-Gas Initiative (RGGI) operated by
states in the northeast United States was revised down by 45% in 2014 and will be reduced
by a further 2.5% per year from 2015 to 2020. Elsewhere, low-priced international credits
16
prompted a price collapse in New Zealand’s ETS, while Australia abolished its carbon pricing
mechanism. 17
6. Next to emission trading systems, other carbon pricing instruments, such as carbon taxes, exist or are planned in 18
39 national and 23 sub-national jurisdictions (World Bank, 2014).

Figure 1.2 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions in selected regions, 2014
24
ssia 1.7 Gt
Ru
China 8.6 Gt
America 6.2 $107/t
rth Gt n Union 3
No pea .2
ro 21%
$8/t
Eu
Gt
CaspG
ian
0.5 t
60%
$6/t
$2/t $102/t
34% 52% $29/t pan 1.2 Gt
Ja
$9/t $36/t le East 1.7
idd $173/t
15%
8%
Gt
M
4% 4%
ia 2.0 Gt $66/t
rica 1.1 Gt Ind
Af 63%
er Asia 1.9 G 2%
$168/t th
World Energy Outlook | Special Report
t
eric
Am a 1. $104/t $68/t
n 33%
2G
i
Lat
$208/t 15%
27% stralia an
Auw Zealan d
26% e .4 Gt
0
d
$3/t
15%
Gt $/t $/t
CO2 emissions from subsidised
CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion % CO2 emissions covered by ETS and CO2 prices % fossil fuels and implicit CO2 subsidy
Notes: The implicit CO2 subsidy is calculated as the ratio of the economic value of those subsidies to the CO2 emissions released from subsidised energy consumption. ETS = emissions
trading scheme.
Historical energy emissions trends
1
One indicator of the scale of the challenge to the energy sector is the fact that the total
volume of global energy sector CO2 emissions over the past 27 years matched the total level
2
of all previous years. Fossil fuels continue to meet more than 80% of total primary energy
demand and over 90% of energy-related emissions are CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion
(Figure 1.3). Since 2000, the share of coal has increased from 38% to 44% of energy-related
3
CO2 emissions, the share of natural gas stayed flat at 20% and that of oil declined from
42% to 35% in 2014. While smaller in magnitude (and less long-lasting in the atmosphere, 4
though with higher global warming potential), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) are
other powerful greenhouse gases emitted by the energy sector. Methane accounts for 5
around 10% of energy sector emissions and originates mainly from oil and gas extraction,
transformation and distribution. Much of the remainder is nitrous oxide emissions from
6
energy transformation, industry, transport and buildings.
7
Figure 1.3 ⊳ Global anthropogenic energy-related greenhouse-gas
emissions by type
8
50 100% N2O
Gt CO2-eq
Rio Earth Summit

IPCC First COP1 and
CH4 9
CO2
40 Assessment Second IPCC Kyoto Protocol 80%
Report Report enters into force Energy share
of total GHG 10
emissions
30 60% (right axis)
11
20 40%
12
10 20%
13
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Notes: CO2 = carbon dioxide, CH4 = methane, N2O = nitrous oxide. CH4 has a global warming potential of 28 to 30 times
13
that of CO2, while the global warming potential of N2O is 265 higher than that of CO2.
Sources: IEA and EC/PBL (2014). 13
The global distribution of GHG emissions has shifted with changes in the global economy 14
(Figure 1.4). At the beginning of the 20th century, energy-related CO2 emissions originated
almost exclusively in Europe and the United Sates. This ratio dropped to around two-thirds 16
of total emissions by the middle of the century and today stands at below 30%.
17
18

Figure 1.4 ⊳ Cumulative energy-related CO2 emissions by region
1890-1919
50
Gt
United European Japan China India Russia Rest of

States Union world
1920-1949
100
Gt
50

States Union world
1950-1979
150
Gt
100
50

States Union world
1980-2014
250
Gt
200
150
100
50

States Union world
Notes: Emissions for the European Union prior to 2004 represent the combined emissions of its current member states.
Emissions for Russia prior to 1992 represent emissions from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Rest of world
includes international bunkers.
Sources: Marland, Boden and Andres (2008) and IEA (2014a).
Over the past two-and-a-half decades, global CO2 emissions increased by more than
50% (Figure 1.5). While emissions increased by 1.2% per year in the last decade of the
20th century, the average annual rate of increase between 2000 and 2014 accelerated to
2.3%, particularly driven by a rapid rise in CO2 emissions in power generation in countries

outside the OECD: since the start of the 21st century, emissions from electricity and heat
generation in emerging and developing countries have doubled, with around two-thirds of 1
this increase coming from China. CO2 emissions from the industry sector in these countries
doubled from 1990 to today being driven by large increases in the production of energy- 2
intensive materials, such as cement and steel. In the same period, total CO2 emissions
from the industrial sector in OECD countries fell by a quarter, though these countries 3
still lead global emissions from the transport and buildings sectors. For transport, this
is due to the higher level of vehicle ownership in OECD countries even though, over the
4
past 15 years, CO2 emissions from transport doubled in non-OECD countries as a result
both of higher levels of private vehicle ownership and strong growth in freight traffic.
For buildings, the higher level of emissions in OECD countries is because most non-OECD 5
countries are located in more temperate climates, requiring lower levels of space heating.
6
Figure 1.5 ⊳ Global energy-related CO2 emissions by sector and region
35 21
7
Other
Gt
Gt
30 Buildings 18
Transport 8
25 Industry 15
20 Power
generation
12 9
15 9
10
10 6
5 3 11
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 1990 2014
OECD
1990 2014
Non-OECD
12
Notes: “Other” includes agriculture, non-energy use (except petrochemical feedstock), oil and gas extraction and energy
transformation. International bunkers are included in the transport sector at the global level but excluded from the 13
regional data.
13
A large share of energy-related CO2 emissions comes from a small number of countries. In
2012, three countries – China, United States and India – gave rise to almost half of global 13
CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, while ten countries7 accounted for around
two-thirds (IEA, 2014a). Since 1990, total emissions in the United States and Japan have 14
increased slightly, while they declined by about a fifth in the European Union. After a fall of
almost 30% in emissions from Russia in the early 1990s, the emissions increase thereafter
16
has remained limited. In 2006, China overtook the United States as the biggest CO2 emitter,
while India overtook Russia as the fourth-largest emitter in 2009 (Figure 1.6).
17
18
7. The ten countries are China, United States, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Korea, Canada, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Figure 1.6 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions by selected region
10
Gt
China
8
6
United States
4
European Union
2 India
Russia
Japan
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
Even though CO2 emissions increased almost three-fold in China and two-and-a-half times
in India between 1990 and 2014, per-capita emissions in both countries are still below the
average level in OECD countries. China’s per-capita emissions in 2014 reached 6.2 tonnes,
matching the level of the European Union, but a third lower than the OECD average
(Figure 1.7). India’s per-capita emissions were 1.6 tonnes in 2014, or about 10% of the level
in the United States and 25% of the level in China. Significant differences across regions
exist, not only in terms of per-capita emissions but also in terms of CO2 emissions per
unit of economic output. While all of the major regions reduced the CO2 intensity of their
economy, China emitted 0.82 tonnes CO2 per thousand dollars of economic output in 2014,
which compares to 0.3 tonnes in the United States and 0.18 tonnes in the European Union.
Figure 1.7 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita and CO2 intensity by

selected region
2.4 Key
t per thousand dollars of GDP
(2013, MER)
1990
2.0
2014
1.6
1.2
China Russia
0.8 India
United States
0.4
European Japan
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
t/capita
Notes: Bubble area indicates total annual energy-related CO2 emissions. MER = market exchange rate.

Energy-related CO2 emissions in 2014
1
The growth trend in global energy-related CO2 emissions stalled in 2014 with an estimated
total of 32.2 Gt, unchanged from the preceding year. This occurred even with the world 2
economy growing by around 3% in the same year. Across the OECD as a whole, emissions
fell by 1.8% while the economy grew by 1.8%, on average. This continues the clear break 3
between economic growth and energy-related emissions growth that has been observed
in the OECD in recent years reflecting increased deployment of renewables and enhanced
4
efforts to increase energy efficiency (Figure 1.8).
Figure 1.8 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emission levels and GDP by selected region

5
15 1990-2007
6
Gt
OECD 2010-2014
12 7
9
China
Rest of world 8
6
9
3
10
0 10 20 30 40 50
Trillion dollars ($2013, MER)
11
Note: MER = market exchange rate.
12
Energy-related CO2 emissions in the European Union dropped by more than 200 Mt (over
6%), as demand for all fossil fuels declined: natural gas demand declined by 12%, partly 13
due to the mild winter, while power generation from non-hydro renewables grew by 12%
as they continued to benefit from active decarbonisation policies (Figure 1.9). Japan’s 13
CO2 emissions are estimated to have been down by around 3% in 2014 relative to 2013,
mainly due to lower oil demand; but LNG imports remained at a comparably high level, as
13
a consequence of the shutdown of Japan’s nuclear capacity. In the United States, energy-
related CO2 emissions in 2014 were 41 Mt higher (less than 1%) than the previous year
but were around 10% below their peak in 2005 (5.7 Gt). Emissions from the power sector 14
in the United States were down, due to an 11% increase in generation from non-hydro
renewables and only a limited increase in electricity demand, while there was an increase 16
in natural gas use in industry and buildings.
17
Placed in the context of recent trends, China’s emission figures in 2014 are also consistent
with a weakening of the link between economic growth and increased emissions, though it is
18
not yet broken. Emissions in China declined in 2014 for the first time since 1999, registering

a drop of around 130 Mt (1.5%).8 Demand for coal, which has seen extraordinary growth in
China in recent decades, declined by around 3%, an outcome that is partly cyclical and partly
structural. On the one hand, there was tremendous growth in hydropower generation in
2014 (22%), mainly due to a particularly wet year. On the other hand, power generation from
wind and solar increased by 34% and demand for natural gas grew by 9%, both suggesting
demand for coal may be suppressed on a more sustained basis. Overall, low-carbon forms of
power generation accounted for one-quarter of China’s electricity supply in 2014, up from
around one-fifth in 2013. In parallel, there are signs that economic growth in the future will
be dominated by consumption, particularly for services, rather than investment in energy-
intensive industries, which characterised the picture in the past.
Figure 1.9 ⊳ Change in energy-related CO2 emissions by selected region,

2013-2014
150 15% Change

Mt
10% from 2013

100
Percentage
50 5% change
(right axis)
0 0%
-50 -5%
-100 -10%
-150 -15%
-200 -20%
-250 -25%
United European Japan China India
States Union
CO2 emissions outside the OECD and China were up by around 290 Mt in 2014, led by
increased use of coal for power generation in India and Southeast Asia. Indeed, across
most emerging and developing countries, the relationship between economic growth and
emissions growth remains strong as these countries are in the energy-intensive process of
building up their capital stock.
The signs of a decoupling between energy-related emissions and economic growth in some
parts of the world are encouraging – for the first time in 40 years, a halt or reduction in
total global emissions has not been associated with an economic crisis. However, definitive
conclusions cannot be drawn from the data for a single year. Part of the reduction in
emissions in 2014 in the European Union, for example, was due to warmer weather which
significantly reduced CO2 emissions related to heating. Nonetheless, there are positive signs
that committed climate action has the potential to achieve such a decoupling, creating a
8. The National Bureau of Statistics in China is in the process of revising its historical coal use upwards. This revision has
not been incorporated within this study as a full energy balance is not yet available. While this revision will change the
absolute level of emissions, it is not expected to affect significantly the relative change vis-à-vis 2013.

world economy which does not rely on ever greater consumption of fossil fuels, achieving
deep cuts in GHG emissions but also supporting economic growth, boosting energy security 1
and bringing energy services to the billions who, today, have no such access.
2
Projecting future developments
3
This World Energy Outlook Special Report has the pragmatic purpose of arming COP21
negotiators with the energy sector material they need to achieve success in Paris in
December 2015. To that end, it continues the established WEO practice of using scenarios to
4
illustrate the implications of different policy choices on energy markets and climate change.
Three scenarios, differing in their assumptions about the evolution of government policies, 5
are presented: the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) Scenario, the
Bridge Scenario and the 450 Scenario.9 The Current Policies Scenario and the New Policies 6
Scenario, familiar to readers of the annual World Energy Outlook, are not referenced in
this report but will again be part of the WEO-2015, to be published in November 2015. The
7
starting year for the projections is 2014, as reliable market data for all countries were, in
most instances, available only up to 2013 at the time the modelling work was completed.
8
The INDC Scenario represents a preliminary assessment of the implications of the submitted
INDCs and statements of intended INDC content for some countries. All INDCs that had
9
been formally submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 14 May 2015 (including Switzerland,
European Union, Norway, Mexico, United States, Gabon, Russia, Liechtenstein and Andorra),
which collectively represent 34% of global energy-related CO2 emissions, have been analysed 10
in order to evaluate their overall implications (Table 1.1). Where countries (such as China and
India) have made statements indicating the likely content of an INDC yet to be delivered (or 11
otherwise announcing plans to reduce emissions), these declarations have been taken as the
basis for evaluating their implications. A range of country experts have been consulted to 12
help ensure the accuracy of the INDC analysis. For those countries that have not submitted
an INDC and have not publicly stated its likely content nor specified policies for the entire
energy sector, the INDC Scenario includes the policies defined in the New Policies Scenario
13
of WEO-2014, that is cautious implementation of the policies then announced or already in
application (see Chapter 2 for details and Annex A for policy assumptions).10 13
Over the course of 2015 more countries are expected to submit their INDCs. This means
that the INDC Scenario in its current form reflects the lower limits of the global climate
13
efforts likely to underlie the climate summit in December 2015. One purpose of this
analysis is to provide policymakers with a sound basis on which to consider further action. 14
An update, including the latest INDCs, will be published in November 2015 for the IEA
Ministerial meeting. 16
9. Tables containing detailed projection results by scenario, region, fuel and sector are available at
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimate.
17
10. The INDC Scenario is not compared with the WEO Current Policies Scenario or the New Policies Scenario
as such a comparison would be biased to the extent that it would only stress recent progress made by 18
countries but not previous efforts that are already incorporated in the Current and/or New Policies Scenario.

Table 1.1 ⊳ Greenhouse-gas emissions reduction goals in submitted INDCs
UNFCCC Party Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)

Switzerland Reduce GHG emissions by 50% below 1990 levels by 2030 (35% below by 2025).
European Union Reduce EU domestic GHG emissions by at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2030.
Norway Reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% compared with 1990 levels by 2030.
Mexico Reduce GHG and short-lived climate pollutant emissions unconditionally by 25% by
2030 with respect to a business-as-usual scenario.
United States Reduce net GHG emissions by 26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025.
Gabon Reduce CO2, CH4, N2O emissions by at least 50% with respect to a reference scenario
by 2025.
Russia Reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions by 25% to 30% below 1990 levels by 2030
subject to the maximum possible account of absorptive capacity of forests.
Liechtenstein Reduce GHG emissions by 40% compared with 1990 by 2030.
Andorra Reduce GHG emissions by 37% with respect to a business-as-usual scenario by 2030.
Note: This table contains all contributions that had been submitted to the UNFCCC by 14 May 2015 and is in the order
in which they have been submitted.
One measure of the success of COP21 will be the extent to which it carries to energy
sector stakeholders a conviction that the sector is destined to change. An important
symbol of such change would be achieving a peak in global energy-related GHG emissions.
Identifying ways to facilitate such an achievement at an early date is the purpose of the
Bridge Scenario (see Chapter 3 for details). The objective is to facilitate adoption by each
country or region individually and using only existing technology of a pragmatic near-term
strategy that is compatible with the same level of development and economic growth
that underlies the energy sector policies and climate pledges which are reflected in the
INDC Scenario. For countries which have already submitted their INDCs, the objective is
to identify policies which permit yet higher levels of climate ambition. For countries which
have not yet brought forward their INDCs, the purpose is to support ambitious target
setting. This scenario is not, in itself, a pathway to the 2 °C target – additional technology
and policy needs for such a pathway are set out in the 450 Scenario. But it indicates a
strategy for near-term action as a bridge to higher levels of decarbonisation at a later stage
compatible with the 2 °C goal.
The 450 Scenario takes a different approach (see Chapter 4 for details). It adopts a
specified outcome – achievement of the necessary action in the energy sector to serve the
internationally adopted goal to limit the rise in long-term average global temperature (with
a likelihood of around 50%) to 2 °C – and illustrating steps by which that might be achieved.
Near-term policy assumptions for the period to 2020 draw on measures that were defined
in the Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map: WEO Special Report (IEA, 2013), and welcomed
by energy ministers who attended the IEA Ministerial meeting in 2013. Significant action
beyond these measures and before 2020 is less likely, as this is the earliest date by which
any agreement reached at COP21 could be expected to take effect.

In the period after 2020, it is assumed in the 450 Scenario that one of the main deficiencies
of current climate policy is remedied: a CO2 price is adopted in the power generation and 1
industry sectors in OECD countries and other major economies, at a level high enough
to make investment in low-carbon technologies commercially attractive. This policy is 2
implemented first in OECD countries and then progressively extended to other major
economies. We assume that fossil-fuel subsidies are totally removed by 2040 in all regions 3
except the Middle East (where some element of subsidisation is assumed to remain) and
that CO2 pricing is extended to the transport sector everywhere, accelerating energy
4
efficiency improvements. There is also a further extension of the scope and rigour of
minimum energy performance standards in the transport and buildings sectors. In this
scenario, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere peaks by around the 5
middle of this century.11 The level of this peak is above 450 parts per million (ppm), a
level still compatible with the achievement of the 2 °C objective. The concentration of 6
greenhouse gases stabilises after 2100 at around 450 ppm.
The projections in all scenarios are sensitive to the underlying assumptions about the rate 7
of GDP growth in each region. World GDP is assumed to grow at an average annual rate of
3.5% from 2013 to 2040. This means that the global economy is about two-and-a-half times 8
the present level at the end of the projection period. The Bridge Scenario is built on the
foundation that it is compatible with the level of development and economic growth that 9
underlies current energy sector policies and climate pledges. The level of population, another
important driver for the demand for energy services in all scenarios, is projected to grow by
0.9% per year on average, from an estimated 7.1 billion in 2013 to 9.0 billion in 2040.12
10
While the assumptions on economic and population growth are the same, energy price
11
paths vary across the three scenarios, in part due to differences in the strength of policies
to address energy security and environmental challenges, and their respective impacts on
supply and demand. The extent of carbon pricing schemes and the level of CO2 prices 12
vary across the scenarios, according to the assumed degree of policy intervention to curb
growth in CO2 emissions. It is assumed in each scenario that all existing carbon trading 13
schemes and taxes are retained and that the price of CO2 rises throughout the projection
period. In the INDC Scenario, the CO2 price in the European Union increases from less 13
than $8/tonne in 2014 to $53/tonne (in year-2013 dollars) in 2030, while for China it is
assumed that a national CO2 price is introduced in 2020, rising to $23/tonne by 2030. In the
13
450 Scenario, it is assumed that carbon pricing is eventually adopted in all OECD countries
and that CO2 prices in most of these markets reach $140/tonne in 2040. Several major
non-OECD countries are also assumed to put a price on carbon in the 450 Scenario, with 14
prices rising to a slightly lower level in 2040 than in OECD countries.
16
11. A peak in atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations is delayed compared to a peak in emissions

17
because of the long atmospheric lifetime of some greenhouse gases.
12. Full details of the assumptions and methodology underlying all WEO scenarios presented here can be 18
found in model documentation (IEA, 2014b) and online at www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weomodel.

Chapter 2
The energy sector impact of national pledges

Determined to make a climate contribution
Highlights
• The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by countries
in advance of COP21 are to form the core of collective and increasingly ambitious
climate action. A first assessment of the impact of INDCs on the energy sector is
presented here in an “INDC Scenario”. An update, including the latest INDCs, will be
published in November 2015, during the IEA Ministerial meeting.
• In the INDC Scenario, national pledges have a positive impact in slowing the growth
in global energy-related emissions but they continue to rise from 2013 to 2030.
The link between economic growth and energy-related GHG emissions weakens,
with the global economy growing by 88% and energy-related CO2 emissions by 8%
(reaching 34.8 Gt). The share of fossil fuels in the world energy mix declines but
is still around 75% in 2030. The rate of growth in coal and oil demand slows but
volumetric demand does not decline, while gas use marches higher. Renewables
become the leading source of electricity by 2030, but subcritical coal-fired capacity
declines only slightly. The carbon intensity of the power sector improves by 30%.
• The United States achieves major cuts in energy-related GHG emissions by 2025 in
the INDC Scenario. The US power sector delivers 60% of the savings (renewables and
coal-to-gas switching) and fuel-economy standards in transport much of the rest.
In the European Union, a strong shift to renewables and greater energy efficiency
sees fossil fuel use drop by more than 20% by 2030, making it one of the world’s
least carbon-intensive energy economies. Russia’s energy-related CO2 emissions
decline slightly and it meets its 2030 target comfortably. Mexico’s energy-related
CO2 emissions increase slightly but at a much slower rate than the economy.
• The growth in China’s energy-related CO2 emissions slows and then peaks
around 2030. Though it remains the largest emitter by far in 2030, the energy
sector diversifies, becoming more efficient as well as less carbon intensive. India
makes a push to build-up renewables capacity and improves energy efficiency, in
parallel with efforts to make modern energy available to more of the population
and improve reliability of supply. Very rapid growth in energy demand boosts
related CO2 emissions by around 65% by 2030, but per-capita levels remain low.
• Neither the scale nor the composition of energy sector investment in the INDC
Scenario is suited to move the world onto a 2 °C path. The estimated remaining
carbon budget consistent with a 50% chance of keeping below 2 °C is consumed
by around 2040 – only eight months later than expected in the absence of INDCs.
If stronger action is not forthcoming, the INDC Scenario is judged to be consistent
with a global temperature increase of around 2.6 °C in 2100 and 3.5 °C after 2200.
Chapter 2 | The energy sector impact of national pledges 35

Energy and GHG emissions trends in the INDC Scenario
What impact will the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by
governments have on the energy sector and its related greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions?
Will they be sufficient to put the world on track to meet the 2 degree Celsius (°C) climate
goal or, at least, provide a satisfactory foundation upon which to build increasingly
ambitious action? For this World Energy Outlook Special Report, the IEA has undertaken
a first assessment of newly declared government intentions, with the results presented
through an “INDC Scenario” (defined in Chapter 1 and Annex A).1
As shown in Chapter 1, energy production and use accounts for around two-thirds of global
GHG emissions today, of which carbon dioxide (CO2) is the great majority (Table 2.1). As
of 14 May 2015, countries accounting for 34% of global energy-related emissions had
submitted their INDCs. Some other countries such as China had not submitted their INDCs
but had otherwise clarified their intended post-2020 actions on climate change. These
INDCs and stated policy intentions (together with previous policy declarations by countries
which have yet to disclose their latest intentions) provide a basis upon which to conduct
an initial assessment of their impact on future energy and emissions trends. While this
assessment can only be indicative rather than definitive, it still provides crucial insights for
decision makers in the preparations for the climate summit in December 2015. The IEA will
publish timely updates of INDC analysis, incorporating new INDC submissions, in the lead
up to COP21.
Table 2.1 ⊳ Global energy- and process-related greenhouse-gas emissions

in the INDC Scenario (Gt CO2-eq)
2013 2020 2025 2030

Energy-related:
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 32.2 33.9 34.3 34.8
Methane (CH4) 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Process-related:
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3
Total 37.5 39.5 40.0 40.6
In the INDC Scenario, annual global energy- and process-related GHG emissions grow from
37.5 gigatonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent (Gt CO2-eq) in 2013 to 40.6 Gt CO2-eq by 2030.
If stronger action were not forthcoming after 2030, the emissions path in the INDC Scenario
1. Tables containing detailed projection results for the INDC Scenario by region, fuel and sector are available at
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimate.

is estimated to be consistent with a 50% probability of an average long-term global
temperature increase of around 2.6 °C in 2100 and 3.5 °C in the longer term (after 2200).2 1
This global average translates into higher average temperatures over land – 4.3 °C over land
in the northern hemisphere (where the majority of the world’s population lives) – and higher 2
still in urban areas. The INDCs fall short of the action necessary to meet the 2 °C climate goal;
but they could form the basis for more ambitious action to decarbonise the global energy 3
system (see Chapter 3 for ways that countries can take further action at no net economic cost).
There is no peak in sight for world energy-related CO2 emissions in the INDC Scenario: they 4
are projected to be 8% higher than 2013 levels in 2030 (reaching 34.8 gigatonnes [Gt]),
while primary energy demand grows by around 20% (Figure 2.1) and the global economy is 5
around 88% larger. In a 450 Scenario – which reflects a pathway consistent with around a
50% chance of meeting the 2 °C climate goal – energy-related CO2 emissions are already in
decline by 2020. By 2030, there is around a 9 Gt gap between energy-related emissions in
6
the INDC Scenario and the 450 Scenario.
7
Figure 2.1 ⊳ Global primary energy demand and related CO2 emissions by
scenario 8
18 000 Primary energy demand: 9
Mtoe
INDC Scenario
15 000 450 Scenario
CO2 emissions (right axis):

10
12 000
INDC Scenario
9 000 36
450 Scenario
11
Gt
6 000 24 12
3 000 12
13
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
13
Note: Mtoe = million tonnes of oil equivalent; Gt = gigatonnes.
13
The transition away from fossil fuels is gradual in the INDC Scenario, with the share
of fossil fuels in the world’s primary energy mix declining from more than 80% today 14
to around three-quarters in 2030 (Figure 2.2). World demand for coal shows signs of
16
17
2. The temperature estimate has been derived with MAGICC6, a climate carbon cycle model. The emissions trajectory
post-2050 is between the representative concentration pathways (RCP) 4.5 and RCP 6 Scenarios from the IPCC’s 18
5th Assessment Report.

reaching a plateau by around 2020; but there are differing trends across OECD and
non-OECD regions, with the former declining and the latter continuing to increase.
Global emissions from coal use increase only slightly, relative to today, and are around
14.5 Gt in 2030. Global oil demand reaches 99 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2030,
around 9% higher than today, with actions in the INDC Scenario helping to slow demand
growth in the transport sector. World natural gas demand increases by around 30% by
2030, helping to suppress growth in emissions when acting as a substitute for other fossil
fuels but adding to emissions when acting as a substitute for renewables and nuclear.
By 2030, coal accounts for 41% of energy-related CO2 emissions, oil for 34% and natural
gas for 25%. While significant hydropower potential remains in some regions, the global
expansion of hydropower capacity is relatively modest. Solar and wind capacity increase
more rapidly. All low-carbon options collectively account for around one-quarter of
primary energy demand in 2030.
Figure 2.2 ⊳ Global primary energy demand by type in the INDC Scenario
18 000 30%
Other renewables
Mtoe
Bioenergy
15 000 25%
Hydro
Nuclear
12 000 20%
Gas
Oil
9 000 15%
Coal
Share of low-carbon
6 000 10% sources (right axis)
3 000 5%
2000 2005 2010 2013 2020 2025 2030
Note: “Other renewables” includes wind, solar (photovoltaic and concentrating solar power), geothermal, and marine.
The projected path for energy-related emissions in the INDC Scenario means that, based
on IPCC estimates, the world’s remaining carbon budget consistent with a 50% chance of
keeping a temperature increase of below 2 °C would be exhausted around 2040, adding
a grace period of only around eight months, compared to the date at which the budget
would be exhausted in the absence of INDCs (Figure 2.3). This date is already within the
lifetime of many existing energy sector assets: fossil-fuelled power plants often operate
for 30-40 years or more, while existing fossil-fuel resources could, if all developed, sustain
production levels far beyond 2040. If energy sector investors believed that not only new
investments but also existing fossil-fuel operations would be halted at that critical point,
this would have a profound effect on investment even today.

Figure 2.3 ⊳ Global energy-related CO2 emissions in the INDC Scenario and
remaining carbon budget for a >50% chance of keeping to 2 °C 1
2
40 100% Energy-related
Gt
emissions
3
32 80% Remaining global
carbon budget
(right axis)
4
24 60%
5
16 40%
6
8 20%
7
1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2040
8
Sources: IPCC and IEA data; IEA analysis.
9
The power sector continues to be the world’s dominant fossil-fuel consumer and source
of energy-related CO2 emissions in the INDC Scenario, accounting for 42% of the energy
10
sector total in 2013, with a decrease to just below 40% in 2030. A push towards renewables
in many markets and greater levels of efficiency, in the power sector and in the use of
electricity, both play an important role in helping to mitigate power sector emissions in the 11
INDC Scenario. Renewables expand across regions, but the nature of this expansion varies.
In the United States and the European Union, it occurs largely at the expense of ageing 12
fossil-fuelled capacity that is retired. In China, India and many other developing countries,
expansion of renewable capacity goes hand-in-hand with efforts to expand energy supply 13
also from other sources, to keep up with rapidly increasing demand. In Brazil, reliance
on hydropower shifts gradually towards increased use of wind, solar and biomass. In
Africa, renewables play an important role in increasing access to energy, both to those on
13
the main grid and those who benefit from distributed forms of electricity supply. In the
Middle East, the uptake of renewables helps to stem the increase in domestic use of fossil 13
fuels in the power sector. The global carbon intensity of the power sector improves in the
INDC Scenario – going from 528 grammes of CO2 per kilowatt-hour (g CO2/kWh) in 2013 14
to 370 g CO2/kWh in 2030 – as the oldest, least efficient and often most polluting fossil-
fuelled plants are retired and more efficient and more low-carbon supply enters the system.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS), a potentially important abatement option, achieves no
16
more than marginal penetration to 2030 (see Chapter 4 for more on CCS).
17
Increased efficiency measures across sectors in the INDC Scenario reduce the energy used
to provide energy services, without reducing the services themselves. For example, both
18
the fuel efficiency of new passenger light-duty vehicles (PLDVs) and their average emissions

per kilometre improve significantly by 2030, the latter declining by around half. Despite
these improvements, the transport sector accounts for nearly half of the projected increase
in global energy-related CO2 emissions to 2030. Oil consumption in the sector goes from
49 mb/d in 2013 to 57 mb/d in 2030, while the transition towards alternative vehicles
is barely underway in the INDC Scenario and continues to face a number of challenges
relating to costs, refuelling infrastructure and consumer preferences. (See Chapter 4 for
more on electric vehicles.)
Neither the scale nor the composition of energy sector investment in the INDC Scenario
is suited to move the world onto a 2 °C path. Cumulative investment in fossil-fuel supply
accounts for close to 45% of the energy sector total, while low-carbon energy supply
accounts for 15% (Figure 2.4). Global investment in fossil-fuelled power generation
capacity declines over time, to stand at around $100 billion in 2030, but investment in
coal-fired plants still accounts for more than half of the total at that time. Investment
in renewable-based power supply remains relatively stable over the period to 2030,
averaging $260 billion per year, with ongoing reductions in unit costs masking higher levels
of deployment. Global investment in nuclear power remains concentrated in just a few
markets. On the demand side, around $8 trillion is invested in energy efficiency from 2015
to 2030 in the INDC Scenario.3 One-third of this is spent by motorists on more efficient cars,
while more than another third is on improved efficiency in buildings (mainly insulation,
efficient appliances and lighting) and the rest is split between energy efficiency in industry
and road freight.
Figure 2.4 ⊳ Cumulative global energy sector investments by sector in the

INDC and 450 Scenarios, 2015-2030 (trillion dollars, 2013)
0.7 0.2 0.7 End-use efficiency: 0.6 0.4 1.1

Industry
Transport
4.4 Buildings
5.7 5.2 5.5
Power supply:
3.0 Fossil fuels
Nuclear
INDC Scenario Renewables 450 Scenario 4.6
1.7 $37.9 trillion
$35.8 trillion T&D 7.6
0.9
9.3 1.9
Fuel supply:
4.2 Oil 1.3
Gas 4.2 5.6
5.0 Coal
Biofuels
Note: T&D is transmission and distribution.
3. Energy efficiency investment is defined as the additional expenditure made by energy users to improve the
performance of their energy-using equipment above the average efficiency level of that equipment in 2012.

Under a 2 °C path (represented here by the 450 Scenario), cumulative energy sector
investment is only a little higher (around 6%), but the composition of this investment is 1
significantly different. Investment in fossil-fuel supply is lower than in the INDC Scenario
(the extent varies across the fuels), even though it is still a major part of overall energy 2
sector investment. Capital allocation in the power sector increases and moves towards
low-carbon options, i.e. renewables, CCS and nuclear (collectively $2.2 trillion higher). 3
(Increased investment in CCS acts as an enabler to investment in fossil-fuel supply and
related power generation capacity, serving as a form of asset protection strategy.) The
largest shift in investment is on the demand side (and so focused on the energy consumers
4
rather than producers), with cumulative energy efficiency investment increasing by
more than $3 trillion. Companies invest in more efficient trucks, while households buy 5
more efficient appliances, building insulation and improved space heating and cooling
equipment. (See Chapter 5 for how COP21 could help re-orient energy sector investment.) 6
The INDC process is a valuable means to aggregate national contributions into collective
global action towards the 2 °C goal, representing a solid basis for building ambition, even 7
if not yet sufficient in themselves to achieve the climate goal. (See Chapter 3 for the
presentation of a “Bridge Scenario”, which highlights a series of immediately practicable
8
steps that can enhance energy sector action at no net economic cost.)
9
Regional trends
While OECD countries have accounted for a major share of historical energy-related 10
emissions, this picture has been changing rapidly in recent decades and continues to
shift in the INDC Scenario, with the non-OECD share of total global emissions increasing 11
from less than 60% in 2013 to nearly 70% in 2030. In per-capita terms, however, levels
in the OECD (7 tonnes CO2/capita per year) are projected to still far-exceed the average
12
non-OECD per-capita level – the OECD level being nearly double the non-OECD average in
2030 – although significant national disparities occur within both groups (Figure 2.5).
13
United States
13
Within its INDC, the United States declares its intention to reduce its net GHG emissions4 to
26% to 28% below 2005 levels in 2025 and to make best efforts to achieve the upper end of
this range. This builds on its commitment in the Copenhagen Accord to reduce emissions to 13
17% below 2005 levels by 2020. The US INDC sets the 2025 target in the context of a longer
range, collective intention to move to a low-carbon global economy as rapidly as possible, 14
and keep the United States on a path to achieving 80% reductions or more by 2050. Energy
and climate policies introduced in recent years are already having a material impact on 16
the projected emissions trajectory for the United States and the INDC target builds on a
number of existing and proposed plans and policies, such as the Climate Action Plan, the
17
4. Net greenhouse-gas emissions include emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), which are a 18
net sink in the United States, meaning that emissions from LULUCF are negative.

Clean Power Plan,5 tax credits for wind and solar, state-level renewable portfolio standards,
a goal to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, vehicle fuel-economy
standards, energy conservation standards and targets to reduce hydrofluorocarbons. There
have also been important market developments, most notably the emergence of large-
scale shale gas production.
Figure 2.5 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita by selected region in

the INDC Scenario and world average in the 450 Scenario, 2030
Middle East
8.2
Korea Japan
9.4 7.3
China
United States 7.1
10.9
Caspian
6.0
450
Russia Scenario
12.0 World
3.0
Africa European
0.9 Union
4.7
India
2.1 Mexico
Latin 3.4
America Southeast
2.5 Asia
1 tonne of CO2 2.7
As of 2013, the United States was around 35% of the way towards the lower-end (26%)
of its 2025 emissions reduction target, while seeing its economy grow by around 10%
since 2005. Between 2005 and 2013, net GHG emissions were reduced by 547 million
tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2-eq), at a pace of around 60 Mt CO2-eq per
year. Energy-related CO2 emissions accounted for all of the net reductions, with around 60%
coming from the power sector, mainly as a result of lower natural gas prices encouraging
coal-to-gas switching, increasing contributions from renewables and, to a much lesser
extent, coal plants being retired in anticipation of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards
5. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed a Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants and Carbon
Pollution Standards for New, Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants. The EPA is expected to issue final rules in
mid-2015.

(in effect as of April 2015) and other environmental regulations. In end-use sectors, the
transport sector delivered by far the largest emissions reductions, achieved by tightening 1
fuel-economy standards, followed by industry and buildings.
2
Meeting the target set by the United States requires further cuts in energy sector emissions;
but these can be achieved under existing authorities (Figure 2.6). In the INDC Scenario, net
GHG emissions fall by nearly an additional 1.1 Gt from 2013 to 2025, to meet the lower- 3
end of the overall reductions target (a 26% reduction), with the pace of these reductions
projected to increase over time. Based on current INDCs, the United States is projected to 4
deliver the largest absolute reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions of any country in
the world from 2013 to 2025. However, even with a 20% reduction, average CO2 emissions 5
per capita remain among the highest levels in the world. At the same time, primary energy
demand in the United States remains broadly flat, while the population increases by
6
30 million and the economy grows by around $6 trillion ($2013, purchasing power parity
[PPP] terms).
7
Figure 2.6 ⊳ United States economy-wide greenhouse-gas emissions
reductions relative to 2005 in the INDC Scenario 8
0.4 CO2 emissions:
9
Gt CO2-eq
Power
0 Transport
Buildings
-0.4 Methane emissions: 10
Oil and gas
-0.8
All GHG emissions:
Industry
11
-1.2
Other
-1.6 INDC target range 12
-2.0
13
-2.4
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
13
Notes: INDC target range reflects the US INDC intention to reduce GHG emissions 26% to 28% below 2005 levels in 2025.
Power, transport and buildings show change in CO2 emissions, oil and gas shows the change in CH4 emissions from oil
and gas production and its transportation (presented in CO2-eq terms). Industry (including industrial process emissions) 13
and “Other” show the change in all GHG emissions, including agriculture and waste.
Emissions from the energy sector in the United States are on a clear declining trajectory 14
in 2025, led by reductions from coal and oil, and a stabilisation in those from natural gas
at levels only a little higher than today. US oil demand remains relatively flat through to 16
2020, but starts to drop after this date – around 2% per year – due largely to tightening
fuel-economy standards and increasing use of biofuels. By 2025, oil demand is 1.6 mb/d 17
lower than in 2013 and it is projected to continue to decline thereafter. A combination of
fuel-economy standards and biofuels acting on demand and higher domestic oil production
18
sees US net oil imports decline from 7.3 mb/d in 2013 to 4 mb/d by 2025 and the related

import bill drop from $283 billion to around $165 billion. Natural gas demand is showing
signs of peaking by 2025, but the decline in coal and oil emissions means that gas still
becomes the largest source of energy-related CO2 emissions around 2030 (overtaking oil).
The share of low-carbon energy in the primary energy mix goes from 16% today to 21% in
2025, led by bioenergy, wind, solar and hydropower. As for all countries, the relatively long
lifetime of many energy sector assets means that the way in which the United States meets
the 2025 target will influence its room for additional decarbonisation in the longer term.
Power sector
In the INDC Scenario, electricity demand in the United States increases by just 9% from 2013
to 2025, as energy efficiency efforts slow growth over time. Power sector CO2 emissions
are projected to be 865 million tonnes (Mt) lower in 2025 (relative to 2005 levels). This
decline is largely driven by policies linked in some way to the Clean Power Plan (which
aims to reduce power sector CO2 emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030) and efforts
to improve power sector efficiency and end-use efficiency (reducing electricity demand).
Coal-fired capacity declines by more than 20% by 2025 (Figure 2.7), as new additions are
limited to the highest efficiency, CCS-ready technologies and the oldest and least-efficient
existing capacity is retired. However, on a 2 °C path, the long-term trajectory for coal
hangs heavily on the development and deployment of CCS technology, which, if pursued
successfully, could secure a more positive outlook for coal while remaining consistent with
climate goals (see Chapter 4).
Figure 2.7 ⊳ United States power generation capacity additions and

retirements in the INDC Scenario
150 Additions
GW
Retirements
100 2004-2014
2015-2025
50
-50
-100
Gas Coal CCS Nuclear Wind and solar
Wind leads the growth in renewables-based capacity in the United States in the
INDC Scenario, averaging over 6 gigawatts (GW) per year to 2025, while solar technologies
average around 5 GW per year, with solar photovoltaic (PV) accounting for the vast majority.

Coal’s share of total electricity generation drops by 17 percentage points (to 23%) by 2025.
Continuing to benefit from relatively low fuel prices, gas-fired generation takes up half of 1
the share surrendered by coal and renewables collectively the remainder. Renewables-
based electricity generation expands from around 13% of the total in 2013 to more than 2
one-fifth by 2025, often supported by policies, such as renewable portfolio standards, tax
credits and the need for emissions reductions to comply with the Clean Power Plan, but 3
also as a result of their increasing competitiveness (as unit costs decrease). Overall, low-
carbon electricity generation increases from around one-third today to 40% in 2025, with
4
the carbon intensity of the power sector dropping by around 30%.
End-use sectors 5
Total final energy consumption in the United States is projected to be at a level similar to
2013 in 2025, while the related emissions decline. In the transport sector, tougher fuel- 6
economy standards for passenger vehicles and heavy trucks build on the improvements
that have already been achieved, making the sector the second-largest contributor to 7
emissions reductions in the INDC Scenario (310 Mt – 17% – lower in 2025 than 2005).
US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for PLDVs (54.5 miles per gallon 8
[23.2 kilometres per litre] by 2025) significantly reduce oil demand, while policies to reduce
average on-road fuel consumption by trucks help push emissions per kilometre down by
around one-quarter, relative to 2013. From 2020 onwards, total transport emissions in
9
the United States decline by around 2% per year, on average. In line with the targets set
in the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, demand for biofuels increases by 80% to reach 10
1.1 mb/d in 2025, of which around 90% is ethanol and the remainder biodiesel. In the same
time frame, the United States sees sales of electric vehicles (including plug-in hybrids and 11
battery-electric vehicles) increase to around 1.5 million, while the use of natural gas for
fleet vehicles and trucks also sees significant growth from today’s low levels. 12
Energy efficiency plays an important role across other end-use sectors, with a combination
of policies serving to tighten existing efficiency standards, encourage greater adoption of 13
energy-efficient equipment (such as tax credits for energy-efficient equipment in buildings)
and help to push efficiency levels higher through innovation. For example, several large
13
industrial energy users have committed to reduce their energy intensity by 25% over a
ten-year period under the Better Buildings, Better Plants Program, while the long-standing
Energy Star Program continues to improve energy efficiency for appliances, through 13
research, labelling and communication.
14
Other gases
Methane emissions accounted for nearly 15% of US GHG emissions in 2013, of which 16
around 30% came from the production, transmission and distribution of oil and natural
gas. Methane emissions from the oil and gas sector increased by around 50 Mt CO2-eq from 17
2005 to 2013, meaning that there is a need to save nearly 100 Mt CO2-eq to meet the low
end of the stated US policy goal (40% to 45% reductions by 2025, relative to 2012 levels). To
do this requires a combination of actions including regulation and monitoring, investment
18

to upgrade infrastructure and implementation of best practices. (See Chapter 3 for more
on minimising methane releases from upstream oil and gas operations.) Reductions of
hydrofluorocarbons in industry (in line with targets) and other gases across different parts
of the energy sector together help to reduce emissions by around 240 Mt CO2-eq in 2025.
One large uncertainty relating to net GHG emissions in the United States in 2025 is the
contribution of forestry and land-use change. While these sectors have the potential to
become a larger emissions sink, it is difficult to tap this potential through conventional
policy measures and their contribution is therefore held within the range given in the US
Climate Action Report (US Department of State, 2014).
Investment
In the INDC Scenario, energy supply investment in the United States averages around
$255 billion per year through to 2025, nearly 30% higher than the average since 2000. This
reflects the need to replace ageing power plants that are due to retire and a continuation
of the shift in power sector investment ($86 billion per year to 2025) away from coal and
towards gas and renewables. Upstream oil and gas continue to require significant investment
(around $125 billion per year collectively), while coal supply investment gradually declines.
Projected investment in energy efficiency (around $100 billion per year) is a clear step up
from historical levels. Efficiency investment increases in industry, but investment in CCS
does not grow significantly by 2025. Efficiency investments in transport double over the
period to 2025, while investments in buildings increase even more rapidly, accounting for
around 55% of all efficiency investments in the United States to that year.
European Union
The INDC of the European Union (EU) sets out a binding target to reduce domestic GHG
emissions by at least 40% in 2030, compared with 1990 levels. The target is based on the
European Union’s 2030 framework for energy and climate policies, which also sets out targets
to increase the share of renewable energy to at least 27% (of final energy consumption) and to
improve energy efficiency by at least 27% (relative to a projected reference level in 2030); but
these elements are not formally part of the EU INDC. The European Union’s own assessment
of the effects of the 2030 framework indicates that CO2 emissions from the energy sector
will fall by around 37% and non-CO2 greenhouse gases by around 55% (EC, 2014).6 The 2030
framework builds on the target to reduce EU GHG emissions by 20% by 2020, which the EU
is on track to meet, with energy sector CO2 emissions in 2014 being around 22% below 1990
levels and per-capita emissions 27% lower. At the same time, the economy has grown by
almost 50%, reflecting the continued decoupling of emissions from economic growth. Both
the 2020 and 2030 emissions targets represent important milestones towards the EU’s long-
term objective of cutting emissions by at least 80% by 2050.
6. The INDC for the European Union states that policy on how to include land use, land-use change and forestry into
the 2030 greenhouse-gas mitigation framework will be established as soon as technical conditions allow and in any case
before 2020.

In the INDC Scenario, the European Union’s energy-related CO2 emissions fall from above
3.3 Gt in 2013 to 2.4 Gt by 2030, declining at nearly double the average annual rate observed 1
since 2000 (Figure 2.8). Per-capita levels drop to 4.7 tonnes of CO2 by 2030, almost half the
level of 1990. In parallel, primary energy demand declines by 10% and the EU economy 2
expands by one-third. Emissions from coal drop to 530 Mt in 2030, while gas and oil are
both around 950 Mt. The projections in the INDC Scenario reflect the re-orientation of the 3
EU’s energy system that is already underway, with the share of low-carbon energy sources
growing from 27% of primary energy demand in 2013 to 37% in 2030. As the share of
4
fossil fuels declines, the relative weighting between the fossil fuels also moves towards
gas. Natural gas imports grow by around 18% from 2013 to 2030 (to nearly 360 billion cubic
metres), with the related import bill rising to about $155 billion. The role of nuclear power 5
declines in some countries, pulling its share of the regional energy mix down slightly over
time. While the EU’s potential for large hydropower has already been largely harnessed, 6
there is a major expansion in its use of wind, solar and bioenergy in the INDC Scenario.
7
Figure 2.8 ⊳ European Union greenhouse-gas emissions reductions relative to
1990 in the INDC Scenario 8
0.4 CO2 emissions: 9
Gt CO2-eq
Transport
0 Industry
Buildings 10
-0.4 Power
-0.8
All GHG emissions:
Other energy
11
Other non-energy
-1.2
12
-1.6
-2.0
INDC target: 40% reduction by 2030
13
-2.4
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 13
Notes: Emissions from land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) are excluded. Industry includes industrial CO2
process emissions. Exceptionally, transport includes emissions from international aviation. 13
Power sector 14
Electricity demand in the European Union increases by around 10% by 2030 in the
INDC Scenario. Growth is led by the residential and services sectors, while industrial demand 16
starts to decline in the 2020s. Renewables account for more than half of the European Union’s
power generation capacity in 2030 in the INDC Scenario (Figure 2.9). Coal-fired capacity 17
declines by nearly 40%, to stand at around 120 GW, while gas-fired capacity increases by
one-third, to reach 300 GW. The carbon intensity of the EU’s power sector halves by 2030.
18
Around one-quarter of total generation at that time is from variable renewables (wind and

solar), highlighting the need to invest in greater levels of interconnection (to help handle
the variability of supply across a broader base), as well as in upgraded distribution networks
and metering, and considering the relative merits of demand-side management options.
The effective technical and market integration of variable renewables with other forms
of supply will be an important future challenge for the EU, as for many countries around
the world. (See Chapter 4 for more on the integration of variable renewables in the power
system.) The EU strategy proposes increased interconnection across national markets, as a
means to support such integration and energy security more generally.
Figure 2.9 ⊳ European Union net capacity additions by type and share of

electricity from variable renewables in the INDC Scenario
160 32% CCS

GW
Coal and oil

120 24% Gas
Nuclear
80 16% Other renewables
Wind and solar
40 8% Share of generation from
wind and solar in final
year of period (right axis)
0 0%
-40
-80
2001- 2006- 2011- 2016- 2021- 2026-
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
End-use sectors
In the INDC Scenario, energy demand in end-use sectors declines slightly (6%) in the
European Union to 2030, while the related GHG emissions drop by around 20%. The
European Union has been a leading proponent of policies to increase efficiency and reduce
emissions in the transport sector, such as through increasingly strict fuel-economy standards
and policies to encourage modal shifts for passengers and freight. Alternative fuels, such as
biofuels and electricity, are projected to see significant growth (but from low levels), and
oil-based fuels remain dominant in the transport sector in 2030. Obstacles to the greater
use of alternative transport fuels include, but are not limited to, the high upfront costs of
electric vehicles and sustainability concerns affecting biofuels. In industry, it is not possible
to use energy carriers other than fossil fuels for all process heat applications and there is
(as yet) no viable alternative to oil-based petrochemical feedstock – a challenge facing all
regions. As other sectors reduce their emissions, overcoming these obstacles will become
increasingly important to sustaining rates of decarbonisation.
Efficiency policies are effective at avoiding growth in energy consumption without

impinging on the use of energy services. In the case of buildings and industry, energy
efficiency measures are a key factor in reducing GHG emissions in both sectors by around

one-fifth by 2030. Strong implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), and
the extension and tightening of eco-design and labelling requirements, accelerate the 1
uptake of more efficient heating equipment and appliances in the buildings sector.
Meanwhile, implementation of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and 2
actions to overcome market barriers support more rapid refurbishment of the building
stock, leading to a 16% reduction in space heating energy needs per square metre for 3
households and a 25% improvement in commercial buildings per unit of value added
(Figure 2.10). The phase-out of halogen light bulbs and the adoption of LEDs results in
4
a reduction of more than 40% in electricity consumption for lighting per square metre
in households. In industry, the EED leads to actions to encourage the diffusion of best
available technologies, supported by energy audits and the implementation of energy 5
management systems. As a consequence, newly installed electric motor systems for
pumps, fans, compressed air and material handling are, on average, 30% more efficient 6
in 2030 than current ones.
7
Figure 2.10 ⊳ European Union energy intensity levels in domestic and
commercial buildings in the INDC Scenario 8
120
Domestic Commercial
80
9
2013
value added ($2013, PPP)

kWh/m²
kWh per dollar of GDP

2030
100
60
10
80
60 40 11
40
20 12
20
Space Water Lighting Space Water Lighting 13

heating heating heating heating
Notes: kWh/m2 = kilowatt hours per metre squared. GDP is expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
13
Investment 13
In the INDC Scenario, EU investments in energy efficiency grow to reach similar levels to
those in energy supply by 2030. Energy supply investments remain relatively constant 14
at around $145 billion per year, focusing on renewables (and their integration) and
natural gas. Nearly $70 billion per year is invested in power generation, of which 70% is 16
in renewables – the largest recipient being wind (collectively, the EU is the world leader
in wind power investment to 2030), followed by solar PV. Relatively smooth trends for 17
renewables investment at the EU-level mask volatility at the country-level, where there
may be more notable peaks and troughs in activity. While the desired capacity can still be
18
delivered, such volatility may prejudice long-term industry development. The European

Union is also projected to invest over $30 billion per year in upgrading and expanding
electricity transmission and distribution networks. Outside the power sector, the EU invests
$25 billion per year in fossil-fuel supply (mainly conventional oil and gas), and nearly
$20 billion in the midstream and downstream sectors (gas transport taking the largest
single share). Investment in end-use efficiency nearly triples to $150 billion in 2030, with
improvements in transport efficiency accounting for more than half of the total. Buildings
are the next largest recipient: space heating is a major focus, as well as appliances, lighting
and cooling.
China
China’s rapid economic growth has brought huge benefits to the country and the world,
not the least of which has been the provision of electricity to around half a billion new
customers in the last few decades and a rapid increase in average incomes. But these
advances have also relied heavily on the consumption of coal, a choice driven by economic
and energy security factors but which has seen China’s GHG emissions escalate rapidly
as a consequence. China’s ongoing economic and social development will demand the
continued expansion of the energy sector, but policy and other drivers will encourage a
transition to a more efficient, low-carbon system.
While China has yet to formally submit its INDC, an important development in this regard
is its stated intention to achieve a peak in its CO2 emissions around 2030 (and to make
best efforts to peak earlier) and to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy
consumption to around 20% by 2030. These goals were declared as part of the US-China
Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation in November 2014,
the stated intention of which was to clarify intended respective post-2020 actions on
climate change. China already has a range of complementary energy and climate policies,
such as targets to reduce the carbon intensity of the economy (40% to 45% decline by
2020, relative to 2005), reduce reliance on coal in the economy (limit the share of coal
to less than 62% of total primary energy demand in 2020), introduce more stringent
fuel-economy standards in transport, reduce the CO2 intensity of industry by half by 2020
and to have a nationwide emissions trading scheme by 2020. While action has been taken
to implement some of these policies, others still require implementing action and the
effects may take some time to show up across the economy.
Given the pace at which China’s energy sector emissions have grown, achieving a peak
in emissions by 2030 will require a significant change in direction (Figure 2.11). In the
INDC Scenario, China’s energy-related emissions growth already show major signs of
deceleration by the early-2020s and is at a near-halt by the mid-2020s, before finally
reaching a plateau around 2030. Some of this change will result from restructuring the
Chinese economy away from rapid investment-led growth towards consumption-led
growth (at lower rates); but effective policy intervention across a range of sectors will also
be required if the steep emissions growth observed in recent decades is to be succeeded
by a similarly sharp slowdown in the years to come.

The relationship between economic development and emissions growth in China
weakens notably, with China moving from emitting 8.7 Gt of CO2, with GDP per capita 1
of $12 000 in 2013, to an emissions peak at around 10.1 Gt, with GDP per capita around
$30 000 in 2030. The peak in emissions comes at a lower level of GDP per capita than in 2
the United States but at a similar level to Japan and the European Union. Despite this,
China’s total energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to be around two-and-a-half 3
times the level of the second-largest emitter in 2030 (the United States). Achieving a
peak in energy-related emissions will be a major milestone for China, but the sheer scale
4
of its total emissions in the global picture highlights the importance of then moving on
to a declining path.
5
Figure 2.11 ⊳ Total and per-capita energy-related CO2 emissions and GDP
per capita by region in the INDC Scenario
6
12 1971 7
Energy-related CO2 (Gt)
China
2013
10
8
2030
8
6 United States 9
4
India European Union
10
2
Africa Japan
11
0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 70 000
GDP per capita ($2013, PPP)
12
25 1971
Energy-related CO2 per capita (t)
2013 13
20 2030
United States
15 13
10
Japan
13
China
5
India European Union
14
Africa
0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 70 000 16
GDP per capita ($2013, PPP)
17
China is, and is projected to remain, the world’s largest consumer and producer of
coal through to 2030 in the INDC Scenario. The country’s energy-related emissions
are dominated by coal (more than 80% of the total) and this picture changes only
18

gradually (Figure 2.12). In the INDC Scenario, China’s coal demand growth slows to
very low levels in the 2020s, but shows no notable sign of decline by 2030 (as projected
under a path consistent with the 2 °C climate goal). China’s oil demand grows by 44%
to 14.6 mb/d in 2030, overtaking the United States as the world’s largest oil consumer
around this time. Despite this, per-capita oil consumption in China remains relatively
low – standing at 87% of the world average in 2030 – and the share of oil in total
energy-related emissions remains around one-sixth. In line with government policy,
natural gas use increases rapidly in China, particularly in power generation, industry
and buildings, helping to mitigate emissions growth where it acts as a substitute for
higher-carbon fuels.
Figure 2.12 ⊳ China energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and carbon

intensity of the economy in the INDC Scenario
12 1.2 Gas
Gt
tCO2 per thousand dollars ($2013, PPP)

Oil
10 1.0
Coal
8 0.8 Carbon intensity*

(right axis)
6 0.6
4 0.4
2 0.2
2000 2005 2010 2013 2020 2025 2030

* Calculated as energy-related CO2 emissions per thousand dollars of GDP in purchasing power parity terms.
Power sector
In the INDC Scenario, China’s electricity demand is projected to increase by 75% by 2030,
and is twice the level of demand in the second-largest global electricity market (the United
States) at that time. The scale and age of China’s existing coal-fired power generation
capacity highlights the risk of high carbon lock-in to its energy supply infrastructure, a
potentially significant factor in determining the pace at which it retreats from its emissions
peak. Much of China’s coal-fired power capacity has been constructed since 2000, meaning
that it is technically capable of continuing to operate for decades to come. But it is also true
to say that China has taken steps to invest in developing and constructing highly efficient
coal-fired power plants and to retire some of its most inefficient existing coal-fired capacity.
In the INDC Scenario, around 95% of China’s existing coal capacity is projected to still be in
operation in 2030, and 345 GW of net new capacity is installed by that year (Figure 2.13).
Overall, China’s share of the world’s coal-fired power plant fleet increases to half by 2030,
and it accounts for 4.9 Gt of CO2 emissions, of which three-quarters is from existing plants.

The projected level of energy sector CO2 emissions inevitably means that China’s decisions
(for example, on the retirement, mothballing, life extension and retrofitting of CCS to 1
existing coal-fired power plants) will be a major determinant on the international drive to
achieve the 2 °C commitment, even if the decisions are driven by domestic priorities (such 2
as tackling local air pollution).
China accounts for 65% of global growth in nuclear capacity in the INDC Scenario, and 3
overtakes the United States as the largest holder of nuclear power generation capacity
around 2030. Renewables grow rapidly in China through to 2030, led primarily by 4
hydropower, wind and solar in the power sector. Power generation capacity from wind
increases by 220 GW by 2030 and from solar PV by 155 GW, a major expansion over
existing levels for both technologies. The traditional use of biomass in the residential
5
sector (principally as fuel for cooking) declines by around 2% per year to 2030, but remains
significant. In the INDC Scenario, the share of non-fossil fuels in total primary energy 6
demand increases from 10% in 2013 to around 20% in 2030.7
7
Figure 2.13 ⊳ China coal-fired electricity generation capacity, related
emissions and carbon intensity in the INDC Scenario 8
1 200 5 1 000
Capacity and
9
g CO2/kWh
GW
emissions: Gt
1 000 New
4 800
Existing
800
10
3 600
Carbon
600 intensity: 11
CO2 emissions 2 400
400 per unit of
electricity
(right axis)
12
200 1 200
13
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2020 2025 2030
Notes: CO2 emissions per unit of electricity produced depend on the efficiency of existing and new power plants 13
operational in the system. Statistical differences on coal use for existing power plants, in some cases due to reported or
assumed calorific values, may lead to differences in the implied efficiency of the existing coal-fired power plant fleet.
13
End-use sectors
In the INDC Scenario, energy demand in China’s end-use sectors increases by less than 2%
14
per year, on average, to 2030, while the economy grows at nearly 6% per year. Industry
(a large coal consumer) sees emissions decline from around 2020, led by a gradual decline 16
7. The non-fossil fuel share is calculated according to the methodology of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. This
17
differs from the IEA’s calculation in so far as 1) statistical differences and the traditional use of biomass are excluded;
2) the calorific value for coal is lower; and, 3) the partial substitution method (coal equivalent method) is used to 18
calculate the primary energy equivalent for renewables, while the IEA uses the physical energy content method.

in iron and steel and cement production, reflecting the structural shifts in the economy. In
transport, car ownership almost quadruples by 2030, implying consistently world-leading
levels of car sales over the period. Fuel-efficiency standards for new vehicles continue
to improve and are close to those of Korea in 2025, while old vehicles are removed by
compulsory scrappage schemes in some parts of the country, helping to suppress oil
demand growth. The stock of alternative vehicles grows, but the market penetration rate
remains low. Overall, growth in transport GHG emissions slows over time, dropping from
around 4.5% per year to 2020 to 2.2% per year from 2020 to 2030. Growth in electricity
and natural gas use in buildings helps to reduce the consumption of coal and bioenergy,
bringing ancillary benefits in terms of local air pollution and public health. By 2030, CO2
emissions per square metre of residential floor space decline by nearly 30%.
Investment
The growth of China’s energy sector is expected to slow in line with economic and population
trends, but total investment in energy supply is still projected to average $265 billion per
year from 2015 to 2030. Investment in power generation capacity accounts for around
$90 billion per year, with around 60% of this being for renewables capacity (mainly
wind, solar and hydro), 19% for coal and 18% for nuclear. Investment in transmission
and distribution accounts for around another $80 billion per year. Investment in end-use
energy efficiency increases rapidly across all sectors. In transport, efficiency investment
grows to more than double existing levels by 2030, driven by a huge increase in car sales,
the efficiency of which improves over time. In buildings, investment more than quadruples,
but from a low base, focusing on appliances and insulation.
India
There has been a huge expansion in the Indian energy sector in recent decades, as India
has sought to power a rapidly growing economy.8 The energy sector has brought electricity
to hundreds of millions of people who were previously without electricity supply, but the
task remains far from done, with about 300 million people still without access and many
more living with poor quality supply. In some ways, this situation reflects a more general
challenge to expand and improve India’s underlying infrastructure. Fossil fuels – particularly
coal – are playing a major role in powering India’s economic development, making India the
world’s fourth-largest source of energy-related CO2 emissions. India’s large (and growing)
population, its low (but increasing) levels of energy consumption per capita and the high
level of projected economic growth are powerful trends that, in the absence of concerted
action, will commit India to a high-carbon development path.
8. See a special focus on India’s energy outlook in the World Energy Outlook-2015 to be published on 10 November 2015.

India has yet to submit its INDC, and so a full analysis of its intentions is not yet possible.
However, it has indicated that the increased deployment of renewables and improvements 1
in energy efficiency are important national energy priorities. In the case of renewables,
the government announced in 2014 a target to have 175 GW of renewable-based power 2
generation capacity by 2022 (excluding large hydropower), a major increase relative to today.
Of this total, 100 GW is to be solar, 60 GW wind, 10 GW biomass-based power and 5 GW 3
small hydropower projects. Whether explicitly referenced in India’s INDC or not, such a target
is likely to be an important enabler of its achievement. Other examples of policies shaping
India’s energy sector emissions outlook include a target to reduce carbon intensity (excluding
4
agriculture) by 20% to 25% below 2005 levels by 2020 (as reflected in the Copenhagen
Accord), actions taken in the last year to reform fossil-fuel subsidies (diesel subsidies have 5
been abolished, but subsidies remain on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and kerosene) and
increased taxation on domestic and imported coal (around $3.2 per tonne) – the revenue 6
from which goes to finance renewable energy projects. There are also plans to expand the
nuclear share of electricity generation from around 3% today to 5% in 2020, 12% in 2030 and
25% in 2050.
7
In the INDC Scenario, which reflects these policy intentions, the major push on renewables
8
helps to diversify India’s energy supply. However, at a time of high demand growth, this by
no means eliminates fossil fuels from the energy mix. Coal still accounts for 40% of India’s
energy mix in 2022 (44% in 2013), and all fossil fuels together provide three-quarters of
9
total energy demand (the traditional use of bioenergy being the next largest component)
(Figure 2.14). In the INDC Scenario, India’s energy-related CO2 emissions are around 30% 10
higher than 2013 by 2022, reaching 2.4 Gt, and go on to exceed 3 Gt in 2030. Emissions per
capita also continue to grow through to 2030, but are still only around half of the global 11
average at that time (at 2.1 tCO2 per capita). Overall, there are few signs of a disconnect
between India’s energy demand growth and related emissions through to 2030.
12
Figure 2.14 ⊳ India primary energy demand by fuel type and related CO2
emissions in the INDC Scenario
13
1 400 3.5 Other renewables 13
Gt
Mtoe
Bioenergy
1 200 3.0
Hydro
1 000 2.5 Nuclear
13
Gas
800 2.0
Oil 14
600 1.5 Coal
400
Energy-related
CO2 emissions
16
1.0
(right axis)
200 0.5 17
2000 2013 2020 2025 2030
18

Power sector
In the INDC Scenario, India’s electricity consumption more than doubles to 2030, reaching
around 2 000 TWh. Renewable-based power generation capacity more than triples to meet
the stated government target of 175 GW by 2022 (Figure 2.15). However, meeting the 2022
target will be challenging. In particular, to meet India’s solar target would imply average
annual solar capacity additions of over 12 GW, a similar level has so far been observed
only in one year in one country (China). This would mean mobilising large-scale capital
investment, taking steps to ensure that projects are financially robust, that land is available
and that regulatory approvals are granted rapidly. The power network will also need to
be matched to the needs of this new (mainly variable) renewable-based supply. Even so,
setting such a target provides an important signal of the direction in which the government
intends that the energy sector should move. Even near-success in meeting the target will
signal very significant change in the scale of India’s renewable energy sector and the
creation of the necessary regulatory and industrial infrastructure to deliver it.
Figure 2.15 ⊳ India electricity generation by type in the INDC Scenario
2013 2022 2030

1 210 TWh 1 820 TWh 2 550 TWh
Coal
Oil
Gas
Nuclear
74% 58% 51% Hydro
Bioenergy
Wind
Solar PV
Other
However, as noted, even a rise of renewables sufficient to meet the stated target
would not spell the end of coal-fired capacity, which grows by 70% by 2030 in the
INDC Scenario. An important determinant of this projection is what happens
beyond India’s 2022 renewables target and, in the absence (at present) of a policy
commitment for renewables in the longer term, the INDC projections see continued
growth in demand for coal for electricity generation. The average efficiency of India’s
existing coal-fired capacity is relatively low due, among other things, to the use of
poor quality coal. The absence of control technologies in many existing power plants
leads to concerns about worsening air pollution (mainly sulphur dioxide, oxides of
nitrogen and particulate matter), with negative consequences for health and economic
development. Efforts to move to more efficient coal technologies are assumed in the
INDC Scenario and have a positive impact, but a significant share of Indian coal-fired
generating capacity in 2030 is still subcritical (Figure 2.16). A push towards higher
efficiency coal technologies could be supported by actions to improve the quality of
the coal used (such as coal washing).

Figure 2.16 ⊳ Subcritical coal capacity and retirements/additions in the
INDC Scenario by region 1
1 400
Other non-OECD 2
GW
1 200 Southeast Asia
1 000
India
3
China
Retirements Additions
800 Other OECD
OECD Europe
4
600
United States
400 5
200
6
2014 2030
7
End-use sectors
In the INDC Scenario, India’s rapidly growing economy and population drive end-use
8
energy demand one-third higher by 2022. Around three-quarters of the growth in final
energy consumption through to 2030 is met by fossil fuels, either directly or indirectly, 9
through higher electricity demand. Oil consumption in end-use sectors grows by 1.4 mb/d
by 2022 and then a further 1.6 mb/d to 2030. Net oil imports more than double by 2030 10
(to 6.2 mb/d) and the related import bill rises to around $270 billion. The projected growth
in vehicle ownership drives oil demand growth, with average incomes in India reaching a 11
level at which rapid increases are expected in car ownership. The implications of this for
oil demand would be even higher, were it not for the planned introduction of a national
fuel-economy standard of 4.8 litres per 100 kilometres (l/100 km) by 2021-2022. Due to the
12
relatively small size of cars in India, average fuel efficiency is relatively high when compared
with many other countries. 13
India’s industrial sector is the largest end-use energy sector, despite making up a relatively
small share of the overall economy. It is also relatively carbon intensive, primarily due to 13
heavy reliance on fossil fuels (mainly coal) and the significant share of energy-intensive
industries. Over time, grid-based electricity supply improves, allowing some industrial 13
users to move away from having their own back-up capacity and some others to switch to
using electricity for part or all of their energy needs. Overall, the carbon intensity of the 14
industrial sector drops by 30% by 2030 in the INDC Scenario, but remains relatively high.
India’s urban population grows by around 185 million through to 2030, putting pressure 16
on cities to modernise and expand their energy supply infrastructure. Across the country,
a strong continuing push is assumed to extend residential access to electricity and to 17
move households away from the traditional use of bioenergy as a cooking fuel. A corollary
benefit of both trends is that energy is used more efficiently, dampening the growth in
consumption (final energy consumption grows by 3.2% per year, on average, from 2013
18

to 2030, while the economy grows by 6.5%). The Energy Conservation Building Code is
assumed to become mandatory by 2017 and stricter efficiency standards to be announced
for some appliances; but significant potential for further improvements remains.
Investment
In the INDC Scenario, investment in India’s energy supply infrastructure averages around
$85 billion per year to 2022 and increases to nearly $120 billion in 2030. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the power sector accounts for around 70% of total energy supply investment
over the projection period and, in line with the expected focus on expanding renewables,
investment in solar and wind collectively more than doubles to reach $28 billion in 2022.
Overall, India’s future power sector investment moves towards a less carbon-intensive
path than in the past (with hydro, nuclear and natural gas also seeing increases over time)
but investment in coal does not cease and could grow if strong policy signals for low-carbon
energy supply were to fade after 2022. Investment in power transmission and distribution
infrastructure averages $28 billion a year to 2030 and is a high priority both to permit fuller
use of existing power generation capacity and to meet the needs of new plants coming on
stream. Investment in energy efficiency is more than two-and-a-half times current levels
by 2030. Two-thirds of efficiency-related investments are directed towards the transport
sector, particularly cars, where efficiency improves by around 25% to 2030.
Russia
Russia’s INDC proposes that it should limit its GHG emissions in 2030 to 70% to 75% of the
level in 1990 taking maximum possible account of the absorptive capacity of forests, which
play an important role in Russia’s overall emissions.9 The Russian INDC also cites legally
binding instruments that already exist to limit GHG emissions to no more than 75% of 1990
levels by 2020.
In the INDC Scenario, Russia’s energy-related CO2 emissions decline slightly from 2013
to 2030, with primary energy demand growing by only 0.1% per year, on average. Coal
demand reaches a peak around 2025 and demand for oil well before 2020. The carbon
intensity of Russia’s economy declines through to 2030, though it remains high relative to
that of many other countries (Figure 2.17), due to the continuing high share of fossil fuels
in the energy mix (led by natural gas), the inefficient use of energy in some sectors and
some non-energy factors, such as the climatic conditions. The efficiency of Russia’s thermal
electricity generation is projected to increase significantly to 2030 and the share of nuclear
in the electricity mix increases, both factors helping to suppress growth in power sector
emissions. Efficiency measures in end-use sectors help to limit the increase in final energy
consumption to 9% by 2030. Such measures include the phase-out of outdated production
processes and mandatory energy audits in energy-intensive industries, the tightening of
building codes, voluntary labelling programmes for electric appliances and incentives to
promote the purchase of hybrid and small cars.
9. LULUCF are currently estimated to absorb 540 Mt CO2 every year (UNFCCC, 2015).

Beyond energy-related CO2 emissions, Russia is one of the world’s major oil and gas
producers and its methane emissions from the oil and gas sector were around 350 Mt CO2-eq 1
in 2013. While the majority of these emissions come from oil and gas production, a significant
share also comes from Russia’s extensive pipeline network. In the INDC Scenario, methane 2
emissions from oil and gas production decline by around 15% between 2013 and 2030, to
stand at 180 Mt CO2-eq. 3
Figure 2.17 ⊳ Carbon intensity of the economy by selected region in the 4

INDC Scenario
China 1.2 5
($2013, PPP)
tCO2 per thousand dollars of GDP
1.0 6
0.8
Russia 7
0.6
United States
8
India 0.4
European Union
Japan
Mexico 0.2 9
Brazil
1990 2000 2013 2020 2030 10
11
Mexico
Mexico has already established a comprehensive National Climate Change Strategy 12
encompassing both climate change mitigation and an assessment of its own vulnerability
to climate change. It has also adopted a General Law on Climate Change that established 13
institutions and instruments to reduce GHG and particle emissions, as well as to increase
the adaptive capacity of the country. In its INDC, Mexico puts forward an unconditional 25%
reduction in 2030 in its emissions of greenhouse gases and short-lived climate pollutants,
13
relative to a reference scenario.10 This translates into a GHG emission target of 759 Mt CO2-eq
in 2030, a level slightly lower than today. The energy sector accounts for the majority 13
of Mexico’s GHG emissions, with the next largest source being methane emissions from
waste disposal in landfills. While Mexico has stated that it aims to cut emissions from 14
deforestation to zero by 2030 and tackle its relatively large methane emissions through
improvements to the waste management infrastructure, the energy sector is central to
16
future mitigation efforts.
17
10. Mexico has also expressed a conditional target of a 40% reduction below the reference scenario if, among other
things, an international carbon price and carbon border adjustments are put in place. This conditional commitment has 18
not been incorporated in the INDC Scenario.

In the INDC Scenario, Mexico’s energy-related CO2 emissions increase by 9% to reach
475 Mt in 2030, while its economy is expected to almost double in size and its population
to increase by around one-fifth over the same time period. Currently, CO2 emissions from
the energy sector in Mexico are dominated by transport and power generation, which
each account for about one-third of the total. Although the number of cars on Mexico’s
roads increases by around 60% by 2030, and the number of trucks more than doubles,
transport-related GHG emissions are projected to increase by only around 15%. Existing
emissions standards are assumed to be tightened and sales of hybrid vehicles increase
in the INDC Scenario, both helping to improve average fuel economy. Electricity demand
increases by around 50% by 2030, as a result of higher industrial activity, more appliance
purchases for households (more and larger refrigerators, washing machines and air
conditioners). Despite the significant increase in electricity demand, CO2 emissions
from power generation decrease slightly to 2030, as natural gas- and renewable-based
generation grows and oil-fired generation is drastically reduced. In line with the goals of
the National Climate Change Strategy, the share of electricity generation from low-carbon
sources increases to nearly 40%, with wind and hydropower being the largest sources,
followed by geothermal, nuclear and solar PV.
In the INDC Scenario, methane emissions from the upstream oil and gas sector (which
are included in Mexico’s INDC) peak around 2020 and then decline gradually to reach
15 Mt CO2-eq in 2030, even though oil and gas production both increase over the same
period. While not analysed here, Mexico’s INDC is notable for the positive inclusion of an
adaptation element.
Selected other countries and regions11

Decisions on the future energy mix, in particular the strategy envisaged for nuclear power,
is expected to weigh heavily on the content of Japan’s INDC, when it is announced. The
Strategic Energy Plan published in 2014 provides for nuclear power to remain an important
source of baseload electricity, but the process of regulatory approval is far from complete
and, as of mid-May 2015, none of the existing fleet of nuclear reactors supplied electricity
to the grid. The inactivity of the nuclear fleet has boosted Japan’s consumption of fossil
fuels and stepped up its reliance on energy imports. Japan has plans to increase to 20% the
proportion of electricity generated by renewables by 2030 and there are some indications
that this target may be revised upwards.
Japan’s energy-related CO2 emissions are around 25% lower than 2013 levels by 2030 in the
INDC Scenario, reaching 0.9 Gt (Table 2.2). In parallel, per-capita emissions decline from the
relatively high level of 9.5 tonnes per year to around 7.3 tonnes in 2030 (but still around
75% higher than the world average). Japan’s economy grows by 17% over the same period.
It is assumed that most idled nuclear power plants steadily return to service, after receiving
11. For countries and regions analysed in this section that have not either submitted an INDC by 14 May 2015 (all except
Gabon in Africa) or signalled the expected content of their INDC, the policy assumptions are consistent with those in the
WEO-2014 New Policies Scenario. See Chapter 1 and Annex A for more on the definition of the INDC Scenario.

regulatory approval. In parallel, renewables – led by solar and, to a lesser extent, wind –
continue to grow in the power mix. Policy actions (in the form of attractive feed-in tariffs) 1
have, in recent years, stimulated a rush into providing new solar-based electricity, but this
has prompted concerns on the part of the utilities (who also own the grid) regarding the 2
reliability of this new supply and the stability of the grid. In an effort to attract viable projects,
Japan recently revised the price level for the feed-in tariff, as well as construction and 3
purchase rules, including setting new deadlines for grid connections. As nuclear generation
resumes and renewables expand, Japan’s use of fossil fuels in the power sector declines, their
share going from around 85% of generation today to about 55% by 2030.
4
Japan’s dearth of domestic fossil-fuel resources has underlain its long-standing focus on
5
energy efficiency and relevant policy actions have put Japan among the world leaders.
Japan’s energy conservation law from the 1970s and its successful implementation via the
Top Runner Program and mandatory energy management in industry and some commercial
6
buildings have been important in securing energy efficiency gains across energy-consuming
sectors. In the INDC Scenario, these standards are expected to tighten further over time and 7
be extended to more product categories. In transport, energy efficiency efforts, together
with policies to support alternative fuels, help push oil demand down by one-third by 2030. 8
Actions across sectors that help to reduce Japan’s fossil-fuel demand bring benefits not
only in terms of emissions, but also in terms of energy security, reducing Japan’s oil-import
9
bills by more than one-fifth in 2030 with respect to 2013.
Energy-related CO2 emissions in Southeast Asia increase by 60% from today’s level to reach 10
2 Gt in 2030, with Indonesia (the largest regional economy) accounting for around 35%
of the total. The emissions increase outpaces the growth for primary energy demand,
reflecting the greater share of fossil fuels in the energy mix (Figure 2.18). The largest
11
increase in emissions comes from the power sector as a result of the rapid growth in
demand for electricity and coal becoming the dominant fuel in the region’s electricity 12
mix. The growing importance of coal is largely due to Indonesia’s abundant and low-cost
coal supply, contrasting with relatively expensive natural gas in most countries. Continuing 13
industrialisation, particularly in the regions’ three largest economies (Indonesia, Thailand
and Malaysia) pushes industrial emissions up by more than 40% by 2030. An increase in 13
personal mobility and domestic trade, and weaker fuel-efficiency standards than in many
developed markets (or lack of standards), all help to push up emissions from personal and
freight transport by nearly 45% by 2030.12
13
14
16
17
18
12. A WEO Special Report on the energy outlook for Southeast Asia will be published in October 2015.

Table 2.2 ⊳ Energy- and climate-related indicators by scenario
INDC Scenario 450 Scenario
2013 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Energy-related CO2 emissions (Gt)
World 32.2 33.9 34.3 34.8 32.4 29.6 25.6
United States 5.2 5.0 4.4 4.0 4.8 3.9 3.0
European Union 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.0
Japan 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6
China 8.7 9.6 9.9 10.1 9.1 8.0 6.4
India 1.9 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.3 2.3
Energy intensity (toe/GDP in $2013 PPP)
World 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08
United States 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08
European Union 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06
Japan 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07
China 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.08
India 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06
Carbon intensity (tCO2/toe)
World 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.7
United States 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.2 1.9 1.5
European Union 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.4
Japan 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.7
China 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.3 1.8
India 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0
Clean energy investment (billion $2013)
World 470 797 950 1 093 985 1 474 1 900
United States 60 150 184 220 178 243 328
European Union 106 167 211 222 202 268 286
Japan 37 30 34 37 42 56 67
China 139 166 164 179 222 286 353
India 22 55 53 71 59 101 160
Fossil-fuel import bills (billion $2013)
United States 278 121 152 130 127 134 113
European Union 555 474 550 552 454 467 395
Japan 259 186 203 203 172 171 147
China 304 390 539 643 372 463 484
India 135 188 268 343 179 230 255
Notes: Clean energy in this table includes energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear and CCS in the power
and industry sectors. Energy efficiency investment is measured relative to a 2012 baseline efficiency level.
PPP = purchasing power parity; tCO2/toe = tonnes of carbon dioxide per tonne of oil equivalent.
Energy demand has grown strongly in the Middle East in recent years, but often with important
distinctions between major energy exporters (such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and others),
and smaller energy exporters or importers in the region. In the INDC Scenario, energy-related
CO2 emissions rise in the Middle East by around 35%, from 1.7 Gt in 2013 to 2.3 Gt in 2030.
Today, per-capita emissions are already 75% higher than the world average and they are
projected to reach 8.2 tonnes per capita in 2030, double the world average at that time.

Figure 2.18 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions by sector and selected region in
the INDC Scenario 1
Latin America Middle East Southeast Asia Africa
1.0 Additional
2
Gt
in 2030
0.8 2013 3
0.6
4
0.4
0.2 5
6
Power
Power
Power
Transport
Other
Transport
Other
Transport
Other
Power
Industry
Industry
Industry
Transport
Other
Industry
7
Notes: Industry includes emissions from non-energy use, refineries and fossil-fuel supply. “Other” includes buildings and
agriculture. Electricity sector emissions in Latin America decline slightly from 2013 to 2030.
8
An important question for the emissions trajectory in the Middle East is whether policymakers
can get spiralling energy demand growth under control. Emissions growth is high in industry, 9
both due to low energy prices encouraging the growth of energy-intensive industries
(foremost the petrochemical industry) and wasteful use of energy because of the extent of 10
fossil-fuel subsidies. Although Saudi Arabia announced fuel-economy standards for imported
vehicles in 2014, average fuel consumption per vehicle in the Middle East is projected to 11
remain the highest in the world in 2025 (Figure 2.19). Energy demand growth in buildings
is less than in other sectors, as several countries in the region introduce thermal insulation
standards for new buildings and minimum energy performance standards for air conditioners
12
(by far the largest source of electricity consumption). Despite electricity demand increasing
by around 75% from 2013 to 2030, emissions increase by only around 15%, as the power 13
sector shifts from inefficient oil-fired power plants to gas-fired power plants and low-carbon
technologies. Some countries in the region have targets and policies in place to expand low- 13
carbon sources in the power sector (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Dubai), but progress
has typically been limited so far. 13
In the INDC Scenario, methane emissions from upstream oil and gas activities in the Middle
East are projected to increase from around 235 Mt CO2-eq (around 25% of the global total) 14
to 295 Mt CO2-eq in 2030 (around 30% of the global total), linked to significant growth in
both oil production (nearly 34 mb/d in 2030) and gas production (765 billion cubic metres 16
in 2030). Efforts, such as those in southern Iraq and elsewhere, are underway to try and
capture and utilise associated gas in power generation, petrochemicals and industry.
17
Greenhouse-gas emissions in Latin America have historically been dominated by land
use, land-use change and forestry, and, not wholly unrelated to this, agriculture. Energy-
18
related CO2 emissions in Latin America are significantly lower than the global average, not

only in terms of per-capita emissions, but also in terms of emissions per unit of economic
output. The main reason is the dominance of low-carbon technologies in the electricity
mix (particularly hydropower in Brazil), but also the high share of biofuels in the transport
sector. The regions’ energy sector is becoming a more significant source of emissions
growth and will be important in determining whether Latin America can maintain its low-
carbon profile as domestic energy demand increases rapidly. In the INDC Scenario, energy-
related CO2 emissions increase from 1.2 Gt in 2013 to 1.4 Gt in 2030, equivalent to an 18%
increase. The emissions increase is largely driven by rising industrial activity, including in
steel production and chemicals production, and by higher vehicle ownership. Emissions
from electricity generation decrease by around 7% to 2030, as the power sector is able to
meet additional demand for electricity through increased generation from hydropower,
natural gas and wind. Since 2005, Brazil (the region’s largest emitter) has embarked on
a large-scale campaign to slow deforestation, with a particular focus on how to contain
growth in energy-related emissions. In 2008, Brazil announced a National Energy Efficiency
Plan and in 2013 introduced the Inovar-Auto programme to increase the efficiency of road
vehicles; but these measures are not yet sufficient to tap into the large unrealised energy
efficiency potential (IEA, 2013).
Figure 2.19 ⊳ Average fuel-economy of passenger light-duty vehicles and

vehicle kilometres travelled by region in the INDC Scenario, 2025
14
Litres per 100 km
Chile
12 Caspian
Australia/New Zealand
10
8
Other Latin America
6
United States
Other Europe
4
Middle East
Other Asia
European
Canada
Mexico
2
Russia
Union
Africa
Korea
Japan
China
India
0 4 000 8 000 12 000 16 000 20 000

Billion km
Africa currently accounts for a small share of global GHG emissions: in 2013, the entire
continent accounted for just 3% of global energy-related CO2 emissions, with South Africa
accounting for more than one-third of the total.13 Yet Africa is expected to suffer severely
from the impacts of a changing climate. Gabon is the first African nation to submit its INDC,
pledging to keep 2025 emissions at least 50% below a business-as-usual (or “uncontrolled
development”) level, primarily through land management, but also by reducing flaring
13. See Africa Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report 2014. Download a free copy at
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/africa.

from the oil and gas sector (see Chapter 3 for more on gas flaring reduction), boosting
energy efficiency, increasing hydropower supply and setting up a domestic carbon offset 1
market.
In the INDC Scenario, electricity consumption in Africa doubles from 2013 to 2030, as
2
households purchase more electrical appliances as living standards increase. Around
500 million people are projected to gain access to electricity for the first time by 2030, 3
and the regions’ small industrial base expands significantly. Despite this, access to reliable,
affordable modern energy remains a major challenge in many parts of the continent, 4
stifling economic and social development. Africa starts to unlock its vast renewable energy
resources, with half of the growth in power generation capacity coming from renewables. 5
New hydropower capacity in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Mozambique,
among others, plays a major role in bringing down the region’s average cost of power supply.
Other renewables, led by solar technologies, make a growing contribution to supply, while
6
geothermal is an important source of power in East Africa.
7
African energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to increase by around 40% to 2030, with
Nigeria, parts of North Africa, Angola, Mozambique and others contributing to this growth
(but often starting from very low levels). Emissions in South Africa are projected to follow
8
a “peak, plateau and decline” trajectory, as announced by the South African government
in 2009. Specifically, emissions peak in the period from 2020 to 2025, plateau for a several 9
years and then start to decline in the 2030s. Key drivers of this trend are improved energy
efficiency in end-use sectors and the power sector becoming less dependent on coal, as it 10
turns more towards renewables and nuclear.
11
12
13
13
13
14
16
17
18

Chapter 3
A strategy to raise climate ambition

Five energy sector measures as a bridge to further action
Highlights
• The energy sector can achieve a peak in GHG emissions by around 2020, while
maintaining the same level of economic growth and development. The IEA proposes
a near-term strategy, building on available technology and five proven policy
measures, which are developed and illustrated in a “Bridge Scenario”. Adoption of
these measures can lock-in the recently observed decoupling of emissions growth
from economic growth, an important first step to move the energy world towards
a path consistent with the achievement (through the adoption of further measures
later) of the long-term commitment to a maximum temperature rise of 2 °C. A near-
term peak in global emissions will send a powerful signal of the determination of
governments to transform their energy economies.
• The proposed policy measures are:
Increasing energy efficiency in the industry, buildings and transport sectors.
Progressively reducing the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants and
banning their construction.
Increasing investment in renewable energies to $400 billion in 2030.
Gradually phasing out subsidies to fossil-fuel consumption.
Reducing methane emissions from oil and gas production.
• The Bridge Scenario puts a brake on growth in oil and coal use within the next five
years: oil demand rises to 95 mb/d by around 2020 and then plateaus, while coal
demand peaks before 2020. The shift towards renewables increases their share in
power generation to 37% in 2030, 6 percentage points above that in the INDC Scenario.
• China cuts energy-related GHG emissions by 1.3 Gt CO2-eq in 2030, relative to
the INDC Scenario, mainly through improved energy efficiency. The abatement in
India (400 Mt CO2-eq) and the European Union (210 Mt) is mostly driven by energy
efficiency as well, while in the United States (360 Mt), renewables contribute about
one-third of the savings. In the Middle East (550 Mt) and Africa (260 Mt), reducing
methane releases and fossil-fuel subsidies reform are central to emissions savings.
In Southeast Asia, all five measures contribute to total savings of 300 Mt CO2-eq.
• At $26 trillion, energy supply investments in the Bridge Scenario up to 2030 are
$1.6 trillion lower than in the INDC Scenario. Higher renewables investments
are more than offset by lower investment in fossil fuels. Average annual energy
efficiency investment rises to $650 billion, almost one-third over the INDC Scenario,
but household expenditure on energy generally falls. Globally, 1.7 billion people
gain access to electricity for the first time by 2030 and 1.6 billion people gain access
to their first clean cookstoves.
Chapter 3 | A strategy to raise climate ambition 67

Introduction
Background
Analysis in Chapter 2 of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and their
implications for the future conveys mixed messages. Existing national commitments and
nations’ engagement in this process are clear signals of collective seriousness of purpose in
acting to contribute to international climate objectives. The results, as exposed in Chapter 2,
lift expectations for the future. But the extent of the changes envisaged is not enough.
More can be done. But can it be reconciled with other government priorities, such as
economic growth and energy security and affordability? And in what timescale?
This chapter, the “Bridge Scenario”, suggests how the results of the INDC Scenario could
be enhanced by a series of immediately practicable steps. Taking as an absolute constraint
that the package of additional measures must not prejudice the levels of development
and economic growth underlying the INDC Scenario, the Bridge Scenario sets out a series
of steps which could be taken in the short term and what they could achieve. It is not a
judgement on the limits of what it is politically possible to achieve, nor does it attempt to
plot a path to the ultimate climate goal (see Chapter 4). But it suggests a practicable course
of short-term action, drawing only on known technologies and policy measures which are
tried and tested, which can lift the path of international achievement significantly higher
towards the ultimate objective.
One highly significant feature of the results achieved in the Bridge Scenario is that the level
of total global energy-related greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions ceases to rise after 2020.1
Such a peak is an essential feature of a successful path to a long-term temperature rise
not exceeding an average of 2 degrees Celsius (°C). Commitment to such a peak, emerging
from COP21, would send a profound signal to the energy and finance communities that
governments are collectively determined that the energy sector shall change to the extent
necessary to deliver the internationally agreed climate goals. Conveying that message wins
half the battle. For countries which have already submitted their INDCs, the Bridge Scenario
identifies productive opportunities to overachieve them. For countries which have not
yet brought forward their INDCs, the scenario offers a selection of policies which would
enhance current intentions.
Near-term opportunities for raising climate ambition

Previous analysis conducted for Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map: World Energy
Outlook Special Report showed that the adoption of four readily available and proven
measures could alone halt emissions growth by 2020, without harm to economic growth
in any of the regions or individual countries considered separately in the World Energy
1. To allow comparison with INDCs by different countries, results in this chapter are presented for 2030, given that the
focus of INDCs is the timeframe between 2025 and 2030.

Model (IEA, 2013a).2 These measures were endorsed by the ministers of all IEA member
governments at their Ministerial meeting in November 20133 and many countries have
1
been actively promoting their adoption since then (Box 3.1).
2
Taking recent policy progress into account, these proposed measures now constitute the
core of the Bridge Scenario (Figure 3.1). They are complemented by a suggested increase
in renewable energy investments, given significant cost reductions achieved in individual 3
renewable energy technologies over recent years. The proposed measures are:
 Increasing energy efficiency in the industry, buildings and transport sectors.

4
 Progressively reducing the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power generating plants
and banning the construction of new ones.
5
 Increasing investment in renewable energies in the power sector from $270 billion in
2014 to $400 billion in 2030.
6
 Gradually phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies to most end-users by 2030.
7
 Reducing methane emissions in upstream oil and gas production.
The measures in the Bridge Scenario are essential elements in an energy sector transition 8
compatible with the 2 °C goal. In order to ensure that key technologies, such as carbon
capture and storage (CCS) or electric vehicles are commercially available at the required 9
scale by the early 2020s, a further push on research, development and deployment (RD&D)
for key technologies will be essential. How this effort ties in with the long-term transition
to 2 °C is the subject of Chapter 4.
10
Figure 3.1 ⊳ On the road to 2 °C: policy pillars of the Bridge Scenario 11

INDC Bridge Scenario 2 C 12
Increase RD&D for key energy technologies
13
Limit least-efficient coal power
Raise renewable investments
Reform fossil-fuel subsidies
Reduce upstream methane

Increase energy efficiency
13
energy technologies
Commercialise key
13
14
16
2. The analytical framework is the World Energy Model comprising of 25 regions. Within these regions, 12 countries
are considered individually. The ENV-Linkages model has the same regional coverage. For further details, see
17
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weomodel/ and (Chateau, Dellink and Lanzi, 2014).
3. The Ministerial statement is available at: www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/ieaministerialmeeting2013/ 18
ministerialclimatestatement.pdf.

The Bridge Scenario assessment of the policy measures which might be applied in each
country was pursued in two steps. First, based on an in-depth analysis of existing policy
frameworks in place in each country and their implications for the energy sector, as
outlined in the INDC Scenario, additional policy opportunities were identified for each
country or region individually. Second, the impacts on regional energy consumption and
GHG emissions of pursuing such additional policy opportunities were analysed using the
IEA’s World Energy Model (WEM), and their impact on economic growth at a country or
regional level was analysed using the ENV-Linkages model of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). If the package of measures identified for each
individual country or region in step one was found, as a whole, to reduce economic growth
in the period to 2030, or to negatively affect other energy policy considerations (such as
by reducing the level of access to modern energy services in developing countries), then
the level of application of the policies with the most severe negative impact was reduced
or – where applicable – the measure was abandoned. Inversely, if the package of measures
was found to increase economic growth, then the level of ambition was raised further.
Box 3.1 ⊳ Tracking progress since “Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map”
The Bridge Scenario builds on previous analysis conducted for Redrawing the Energy-
Climate Map: World Energy Outlook Special Report (IEA, 2013a), which proposed four
measures that each country can do individually to stop global emissions growth by
2020.4 These measures have been promoted by many governments since the launch
of the report in June 2013. Some recent progress includes:
Energy efficiency: The United States has announced standards for electric motors, walk-
in coolers and freezers, strengthened Energy Star appliance standards for residential
refrigerators and freezers, and announced the extension of heavy-duty vehicle
standards beyond 2018. Vehicle fuel-economy standards for passenger vehicles have
been introduced in India, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, while the European Union and
China have extended minimum energy performance standards for certain categories
of appliances. Countries from Southeast Asia launched the ASEAN-SHINE programme
in late-2013 to harmonise efficiency standards for air-conditioners. On a broader level,
the G20 released an Energy Efficiency Action Plan at the end of 2014 to strengthen
voluntary energy efficiency collaboration.
Reducing inefficient coal use in power generation: In 2014, China published the Action
Plan for Transformation and Upgrading of Coal Power Energy Conservation and Emission
Reduction (2014-2020). It establishes the target of phasing out 10 gigawatts (GW) of
small thermal power plants by 2020. The United States put forth the Clean Power Plan
in June 2014 (to be finalised in 2015), with the objective of cutting carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from power plants. In May 2015, the European Union agreed on a plan to
introduce a Market Stability Reserve in 2019 that could withdraw allowances in times
of surplus and thus strengthen the carbon price signal.
4. The report was aimed at providing input into the work-stream 2 of the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

Fossil-fuel subsidy reform: Several countries have announced reforms to fossil-fuel 1
consumption subsidies over the past two years. While 14% of global CO2 emissions
came from subsidised fossil-fuel use in 2012, this share dropped to 13% by the end
of 2014, following the most recent reforms of diesel subsidies in India and gasoline
2
subsidies in Indonesia. The latter reforms reduce the volume of subsidised oil products
by around 2 million barrels per day (mb/d), comparable to the oil demand of Korea. 3
Reducing upstream methane emissions: The United States is in the process of adopting
additional regulations to give effect to the announced intention to cut methane 4
emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40% to 45% in 2025, relative to 2012. If
adopted, the regulations currently envisaged would apply to an amount equivalent to 5
16% of projected global oil and gas production in 2025. Several companies (including
BG Group, Eni, PEMEX, PTT, Southwestern Energy, Statoil and Total), together
representing 8% of global oil and gas production, have agreed voluntarily to reduce
6
emissions under the Climate and Clean Air Coalition’s Oil & Gas Methane Partnership.
Gabon and Mexico have made reducing methane emissions from oil and gas production 7
part of their INDC for COP21.
8
Increasing energy efficiency has been a central feature of policy in many countries in
recent years. Measures already implemented have reduced energy demand and curbed 9
GHG emissions growth, as highlighted in Chapter 1. But despite these gains, the existing
policy frameworks fail to harness the full economic energy efficiency potential. The Bridge 10
Scenario suggests the pursuit of targeted, practical measures to improve energy efficiency
in the industry, buildings and transport sectors. The focus is on improving the efficiency
of new products by increasing existing minimum energy performance standards (MEPS)
11
and introducing new ones, effectively banning the sale of the least-efficient technologies.
Further options are available, ranging from the retrofit of buildings to transforming industrial 12
production processes more efficient measures in transport. The proposed measures are
usefully complemented by supporting measures to overcome possible barriers to their 13
deployment, such as labelling and raising awareness.5
The power sector is central to climate abatement in the energy sector. Although already 13
the focus of much policy attention, previous analysis in the World Energy Outlook (WEO)
showed that the sector has the potential to reduce emissions by a further 25% by 2040, 13
yielding half the saving in overall CO2 emissions required to achieve the 2 °C target (IEA,
2014a). The Bridge Scenario proposes two main measures for the power sector: first, a
14
gradual reduction in the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants and a ban on the
construction of new ones. Coal is the backbone of power generation in many countries and
has been responsible for more than 40% of global energy-related CO2 emissions growth since 16
2000. Half of total CO2 emissions from the power sector today (6 gigatonnes [Gt]) come from
inefficient (typically subcritical) coal power plants. We do not project a complete phase out 17
of coal in the near term, in order to safeguard the reliability of future electricity supply, thus
18
5. For a discussion of such supporting measures, see IEA, 2012.

balancing environmental needs with considerations of energy security and (in some regions)
providing electricity access to those currently deprived. This policy helps both to curb GHG
emissions growth and to make room for the faster expansion of low‑carbon technologies.
The second means of reducing GHG emissions in the power sector adopted in the Bridge
Scenario is an increase in renewable energy investment to $400 billion by 2030. We
estimate that, in 2014, about $270 billion was invested in renewable energy development
in the power sector, often supported by various forms of intervention around the world.6
As a result, renewables – especially wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) – are becoming
increasingly competitive in the marketplace. For solar PV, average investment costs –
a longstanding obstacle to further commercialisation – fell by a factor of more than
four over the past few years in China, and by a factor of two on average in the OECD
(IEA, 2014b). Further market uptake beyond the levels achieved in the INDC Scenario will
require complementary regulatory attention designed to ensure system reliability, but not
necessarily a need for publicly financing renewables investment. Rather, there is a need
to create the conditions which will redirect investment in energy supply to maximise
investment in low-carbon technologies, such as renewables, by providing the appropriate
signals to all stakeholders involved.
Phasing out subsidies to fossil fuels reduces wasteful energy use by sending more accurate
price signals, while also improving the case for investing in energy efficiency and competing
non-fossil energy supply technologies. Subsidies that support the consumption of fossil
fuels are typically intended to make energy more accessible for the poor, but they are
often an inefficient means of doing so and other forms of support would cost much less.
The IEA estimates that only 8% of the money spent on fossil-fuel consumption subsidies
reaches the poorest 20% of the population (IEA, 2011). In the Bridge Scenario, we assume a
complete phase-out of fossil-fuel consumption subsidies by 2030, except in a few countries
in the Middle East, where reforms progress at a slightly slower pace. No assumptions are
made about reforms to fossil-fuel production subsidies (e.g. trade instruments, tax breaks,
risk transfers, etc.) largely due to the complexity and uncertainty associated with their
relationship on energy demand and supply trends. Even though the vast bulk of the savings
in energy use and associated GHG emissions from subsidy reform would arise from the
removal of consumption subsidies, systematic review of the efficiency and effectiveness of
fossil-fuel production subsidies could produce dividends.
In the Bridge Scenario, we also assume that policies are adopted to reduce releases of
methane to the atmosphere in upstream oil and gas production. Methane is a powerful
greenhouse gas that has a stronger effect than CO2 in trapping solar radiation in the
atmosphere (although it also has a much shorter lifetime in the atmosphere).7 Reducing
6. Investment made over the construction period is allocated to the year a completed project begins operation, which
may result in differences from other published estimates.
7. The various ways to compare the effects of methane versus CO2 on global warming are discussed in the section on
minimising methane releases that follows. The data for CO2 equivalency provided are on the basis of methane’s global
warming potential over 100 years.

methane emissions is particularly valuable because of its high short-term global warming
potential. We estimate that the energy sector currently emits around 100 million tonnes
1
(Mt) of methane (CH4) per year (or 3.0 Gt of carbon-dioxide equivalent [CO2-eq]), with
the bulk of emissions arising from oil and gas operations (an estimated 56 Mt CH4, or 2
1.7 Gt CO2-eq), of which close to 60% (32 Mt, or 965 Mt CO2-eq) as a result of upstream
oil and gas activities. When producing oil and gas, a certain amount of methane (whether 3
from associated gas in oil production or from natural gas production) escapes into the
atmosphere. These releases can be intentional (i.e. a feature of current industry practice or 4
equipment operation), or inadvertent, for example because of ageing infrastructure. They
can also occur as a result of incomplete combustion during flaring activities, both during 5
short-term flaring for safety reasons or during flaring in locations where infrastructure to
make use of the gas is lacking. There are policies to address different aspects of methane 6
emissions in some countries, for example in Norway and Russia, although implementation
is sometimes delayed. In the United States, the White House has recently requested the
7
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to propose additional rules to reduce methane
releases. In general terms, there remains a deficit in awareness and enforcement. Successful
policy intervention will need to start by raising awareness of the problem and taking steps
8
to measure its extent.
9
Box 3.2 ⊳ The role of nuclear energy in the Bridge Scenario 10
In many countries, nuclear energy is an important part of the electricity mix. In 2013, 11
the world’s 392 GW of installed nuclear capacity accounted for 11% of electricity
production, mostly in OECD countries. Use of nuclear energy has avoided the release
of 56 Gt of CO2 since 1971, equivalent to almost two years of global emissions at
12
current rates (IEA, 2014a). Further deployment of nuclear energy is stated government
policy in a number of countries, and 74 GW of capacity was under construction by 13
end-2014 (of which almost 40% in China). In the INDC Scenario, nuclear generation
rises by more than 60% over today’s level in 2030, with much of the growth occurring 13
in markets in which electricity is supplied at regulated prices, utilities have state
backing or governments act to facilitate private investment. 13
Encouragement of new nuclear power plant construction is not one of the specific
policies in the Bridge Scenario, particularly because of the long-lead times involved 14
relative to the near-term focus of the scenario. Nuclear energy nevertheless plays
an important role in curbing GHG emissions growth in the Bridge Scenario. Nuclear
16
capacity reaches 540 GW in 2030, driven by the same level of government support as
in the INDC Scenario. The share of nuclear energy in power generation increases to
13% in 2030, two percentage points over today’s level and one percentage point more
17
than in the INDC Scenario, due to the lower electricity demand as a result of energy
efficiency measures. 18

Emissions trends in the Bridge Scenario
Global emissions abatement
Effective implementation of the proposed measures in the Bridge Scenario would have
profound implications for global GHG emissions.8 Emissions would be 2.8 Gt (or 8%) lower
than in the INDC Scenario by 2025 and 4.8 Gt (or 13%) lower by 2030, meaning that energy-
related GHG emissions would peak and then begin to decline by around 2020 (Figure 3.2).
Their adoption is insufficient alone to put the world on track for reaching the 2 °C target
(the long-term global mean temperature would rise by 2.8 °C if no additional mitigation
measures were taken later), but they would put the world on track for further emissions
reductions. They would also lock-in recent trends that decouple economic growth from
emissions growth in some regions and broaden that de-linking (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.2 ⊳ Global energy-related GHG emissions reduction by policy

measure in the Bridge Scenario relative to the INDC Scenario
38
Gt CO2-eq
INDC Scenario
37 15% Upstream methane reductions
9% Reducing inefficient coal
36 17% Renewables investment
10% Fossil-fuel subsidy reform
35
34 49% Energy efficiency

Bridge Scenario
33
32
2014 2020 2025 2030
The largest contribution to global GHG abatement comes from energy efficiency, which
is responsible for 49% of the savings in 2030 (including direct savings from reduced
fossil-fuel demand and indirect savings as a result of lower electricity demand thereby
reducing emissions from the power generation).9 The power sector is the second-largest
contributor to global GHG savings, at 26% in 2030. While limitations on the use of the
least-efficient coal power plants are effective in curbing global GHG emissions until 2020
8. Tables containing detailed projection results for the Bridge Scenario by region, fuel and sector are available in Annex B.
9. The results take into account direct rebound effects as modelled in the IEA’s World Energy Model. Direct rebound
effects are those in which energy efficiency increases the energy service gained from each unit of final energy, reducing
the price of the service and eventually leading to higher consumption. Policies to increase end-user prices are one way
to reduce such rebound effects, but are not considered in the Bridge Scenario (except for fossil-fuel subsidy reform). The
level of the rebound effect is very controversial; a review of 500 studies suggests though that direct rebound effects are
likely to be over 10% and could be considerably higher (IPCC, 2014).

and achieve around half of total power sector savings, an increasingly larger part of the
additional GHG savings after 2020 come from increased investment in renewable energies 1
(providing two-thirds of power sector savings by 2030, or 17% of total GHG savings).
Minimising methane emissions from upstream oil and gas operations is effective in both 2
the short and longer term, contributing 11% of global GHG savings relative to the INDC
Scenario in 2020 and 15% in 2030. The gradual phase-out of fossil-fuel consumption 3
subsidies is an effective measure both to moderate demand growth and to support the
implementation of energy efficiency policies. It contributes 10% of global GHG savings
4
by 2030.
5
Figure 3.3 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emission levels and GDP by selected region
in the Bridge Scenario
6
10 1990
Gt
China 2014
2030
7
8
6
8
4
United States
9
India
European Union
2
Southeast Asia 10
Africa
0 10 20 30 40 50 11
Trillion dollars ($2013, PPP)
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity. 12
Implementation of the Bridge Scenario measures is effective in all regions, although to 13

different degrees depending on variables such as the respective size of the economy,
characteristics of the energy sector and the existing policy framework. For example, 13
the more ambitious the policy package put forward through existing regulations and
the INDCs, the lower the level of additional emissions savings achieved in the Bridge
Scenario (Figure 3.4). In the United States, for example, the INDC targets a reduction of
13
all GHG emissions of 26% to 28% (relative to 2005 levels) by 2025. In the INDC Scenario,
the United States achieves a reduction of energy-related GHG emissions of 1.9 Gt CO2-eq 14
by 2030, relative to 2005. The additional measures in the Bridge Scenario could save
another 360 Mt CO2-eq in 2030, helping to move to the upper-end of the US climate 16
pledge, without negative impacts on economic growth. The European Union, which
already has a comprehensive energy policy framework that would allow reducing GHG 17
emissions by at least 40% in 2030, relative to 1990 levels, under the existing INDC,
reduces total emissions in the Bridge Scenario by another 4 percentage points (or
210 Mt CO2-eq).
18

Figure 3.4 ⊳ Energy-related GHG emissions reduction in CO2-eq terms by
policy measure and region in the Bridge Scenario relative to the
INDC Scenario, 2030
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
China 1 346 Mt
Middle East 553 Mt
India 395 Mt
United States 362 Mt
Southeast Asia 302 Mt
Russia 280 Mt
Africa 260 Mt
Latin America 247 Mt
European Union 213 Mt
Efficiency Renewables Inefficient coal-fired Fossil-fuel Upstream methane

power plants subsidies reductions
Notes: The relative shares of emissions savings by policy measure have been calculated using a Logarithmic Mean Divisia
Index I (LMDI I) decomposition technique. In regions where fossil-fuel subsidies hinder energy efficiency investments
today, the existing subsidy level in each sector was used to quantify the impact of fossil-fuel subsidy reform on emissions
savings.
Although the strong growth in energy demand in China over the past decade has locked-
in a relatively carbon-intensive energy infrastructure, an earlier peak in CO2 emissions
(including process emissions) can be achieved than in the INDC Scenario: in the Bridge
Scenario, it is achieved in the early 2020s, as China’s carbon intensity (i.e. the amount of
CO2 emitted per unit of gross domestic product [GDP]) drops by 5.4% per year between
2013 and 2030, compared with 4.7% in the INDC Scenario. The share of non-fossil fuels
in primary energy demand rises to 23%10 by 2030, three percentage points above the
target in the INDC Scenario. In India, planned energy sector policies have a focus on
large-scale solar PV deployment. Making more use of the energy efficiency potential
across all sectors could help to cost-effectively reach India’s energy sector targets and
support a total reduction of GHG emissions by 400 Mt CO2-eq (or 11%) in 2030, relative
to the INDC Scenario.
As in the case of China and India, most other countries had not submitted their INDCs for
COP21 by 14 May 2015, but their existing and planned policies give a good indication of the
likely level of ambition of their targets. In Japan, for example, the existing and announced
10. Value is calculated using the coal-equivalent approach in Chinese statistics, which is likely to be the basis of the
Chinese INDC. Using IEA definitions, the share of non-fossil fuels is 20% in 2030 in the Bridge Scenario.

energy sector policies suggest that there is scope to reduce GHG emissions by a further
160 Mt CO2-eq in 2030 (or 17%) through the adoption of the policy measures in the Bridge 1
Scenario (mainly through additional energy efficiency gains). In Southeast Asia, a broad
portfolio of options is available to curb collective emissions growth by 300 Mt CO2-eq in 2
2030, relative to the INDC Scenario, with increasing use of renewables, reduced coal use in
power generation and energy efficiency improvements. About one-third of the savings is 3
achievable in Indonesia alone. In Latin America, the measures in the Bridge Scenario save
250 Mt CO2-eq by 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario, mainly from energy efficiency and
4
reductions in methane emissions (of the latter, about 40% is in Brazil). The Middle East can
save an additional 550 Mt CO2-eq of GHG emissions by 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario,
through the adoption of the measures in the Bridge Scenario. Fossil-fuel subsidy reform 5
and energy efficiency policies combined achieve 60% of the additional emissions savings
in 2030; minimising methane emissions from upstream oil and gas production contributes 6
much of the remainder. Emissions continue to rise in Africa in the Bridge Scenario, given
the low level of emissions per capita today, but at a slower pace than in the INDC Scenario 7
(at the same level of economic growth). Africa’s share in total abatement in the Bridge
Scenario is only 5% in 2030 (260 Mt CO2-eq). It stems from four main pillars: energy
efficiency, reducing methane emissions (of which around two-thirds in sub-Saharan Africa),
8
fossil-fuel subsidy reform and renewables. Further savings from additional renewables
investments are limited by the already strong level of deployment in the INDC Scenario. 9
Trends by policy measure

10
Energy efficiency 11
The adoption of energy efficiency measures offers a wide range of benefits, well beyond
12
their contribution to climate policies. These benefits include increases in disposable income
and improved industrial productivity (with positive effects for economic growth), improved
local air quality (with associated health benefits) and poverty alleviation (IEA, 2014c). All 13
of the measures adopted in the Bridge Scenario have already proven to reduce average
energy use for the same energy service. They can all be adopted immediately and do not 13
involve overcoming obstinate deployment hurdles (such as those associated with split
incentives as a result of ownership, i.e. the landlord/tenant issue, or demand substantial 13
effort in terms of consumer education). The proposed energy efficiency measures in the
Bridge Scenario include:
14
 Industry sector: minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) are introduced
for electric motor systems (including for the electric motors, gears, transmission 16
systems and motor-driven equipment) and the adoption of variable speed drives is
made mandatory (where applicable). Incentives are introduced for heat pumps that 17
provide low-temperature heat, and mandatory audit programmes raise awareness,
particularly in industries where the largest potential remains, including food, textile,
18
paper and chemicals.

 Buildings sector: MEPS support a phase-out of the least-efficient categories of selected
refrigeration and cleaning appliances11 by 2030. A phase-out of the least-efficient
category of televisions and computers is accomplished by 2030. A ban on incandescent
light bulbs in residential and commercial buildings is introduced by 2020 and on halogen
light bulbs by 2030. For heating and cooling, MEPS are set for new equipment, and
technology changes made (e.g. expanded use of heat recovery). For new buildings, an
increase in insulation levels is applied as a step towards near-zero-energy buildings.
 Transport sector: Fuel-economy standards are imposed in every country for new light-
duty vehicle sales, so that the global average fuel consumption for these new vehicles
is reduced to around 4 litres per 100 km in 2030, i.e. a reduction of 50% relative to
2005.12 For new freight trucks, standards are adopted to achieve a 30% reduction in
average vehicle fuel consumption per truck relative to today.
In the Bridge Scenario, energy efficiency is the largest contributor to additional GHG
emissions savings, with savings of around 2.3 Gt CO2-eq relative to the INDC Scenario
in 2030, or 49% of the total. Early adoption of energy efficiency policies is important,
because savings increase over time as they take effect and the proportion of more efficient
technologies in the stock rises, in particular in road vehicles and electric motors in industry,
where the average lifetime is typically in the range of 10 to 15 years.
Figure 3.5 ⊳ Energy-related GHG emissions reduction by energy efficiency

measure and region in the Bridge Scenario relative to the
INDC Scenario, 2030
Mt CO2-eq
-1 400 -1 200 -1 000 -800 -600 -400 -200
China
World other*
Mt CO2-eq
-250 -200 -150 -100 -50 Regions:
India
European Union
United States
Latin America
Southeast Asia
Africa
Russia
Middle East
Heating and cooling Appliances and lighting Industrial motors Road transport
* World other represents all countries except for China.
11. Cleaning appliances include washing machines, dryers and dishwashers.

12. The proposed level is consistent with the targets of the Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI), for details see
www.fiafoundation.org/our-work/global-fuel-economy-initiative.

The value of particular measures in different regions naturally varies with local
circumstances (Figure 3.5). China accounts for more than 40% of the additional global 1
emissions savings from energy efficiency policies in the Bridge Scenario, around
1.0 Gt CO2‑eq. Strengthening MEPS for electric motors systems in the industry sector 2
contributes a particularly large component to the savings in China (Table 3.1), as its
industry sector is responsible for around two-thirds of total electricity demand, of which 3
an estimated 60% to 70% is for motors. The buildings sector saves 450 Mt CO2-eq of GHG
emissions by 2030 relative to the INDC Scenario, although improving energy efficiency in
4
buildings is already a policy priority in China: main measures in place include efficiency
labels for some appliances (the China Energy Label), a phase-out of incandescent light
bulbs by end-2016 and a 50% target for energy-efficient buildings in new construction 5
under the National Climate Change Plan (2014-2020). Increasing fuel-economy standards
of road vehicles is particularly effective after 2020 in China. The standard already 6
set for passenger vehicles in 2020, of 5 litres/100km, is strengthened, reducing GHG
emissions by 115 Mt CO2-eq in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario, and helping to cut 7
road transport fuel use by almost 10%. New policies are also adopted for road freight
vehicles (Table 3.2).
8
Table 3.1 ⊳ Minimum energy performance standards for electric motors in 9
industry by selected region in the Bridge Scenario
United States European China India Southeast South Middle 10

Union Asia Africa East
2013 IE3 (from 2016) IE3 or IE2 +VSD* IE2 IE2 n/a n/a n/a 11
2030 IE4+VSD IE4+VSD IE4+VSD IE4+VSD IE4+VSD IE4+VSD IE4+VSD
12
Notes: IE1, IE2, IE3 and IE4 represent the efficiency levels standard, high, premium and super premium, respectively, as
defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission. For a motor with an output of 10 kilowatts, IE1 represents
an efficiency of 87%, IE2: 89%, IE3: 91% and IE4: 93%. * VSD = variable speed drive, i.e. equipment used to control the 13
speed of machinery. Where process conditions require adjustment of flow from a pump or fan, VSD may save energy.
13
India saves 230 Mt CO2-eq by increasing energy efficiency in the Bridge Scenario, relative
to the INDC Scenario. As in China, the industry sector is the largest electricity-consuming
13
sector in the economy today (more than 40%). MEPS for electric motors already exist in
India, but further increasing the efficiency of electric motor systems drives a reduction
of electricity demand by 12% (or around 100 terawatt-hours [TWh]) in 2030 and saves 14
95 Mt CO2-eq of GHG emissions, relative to the INDC Scenario. Energy demand is expected
to rise considerably in India’s buildings sector, as a large part of the population at present 16
lacks access to modern energy services. Only 4 out of 13 available labels for appliances
are mandatory in India today, so MEPS to increase energy efficiency in buildings help 17
reduce emissions growth (saving 85 Mt CO2-eq of GHG emissions by 2030) while also
improving the effectiveness of strategies to improve energy access. The road transport
18
sector contributes emissions savings of more than 50 Mt CO2-eq in 2030 relative to the

INDC Scenario, as the recently adopted fuel-economy standards for passenger vehicles of
4.8 litres/100km in 2021/2022 are further tightened and extended to 2030 and standards
for freight trucks are introduced. As in other developing countries, programmes to
improve the condition of road infrastructure can help reap the full benefit of efficient
final fuel use.
The United States has adopted a raft of energy efficiency policies over the past few years
but, given today’s level of energy consumption per capita, further improvements are
possible without significant changes to current lifestyles. The pursuit of energy efficiency
measures in the Bridge Scenario achieves additional savings of 120 Mt CO2-eq in 2030,
relative to the INDC Scenario. The principal contribution to the savings comes from the
buildings sector, where emissions are reduced by an additional 90 Mt CO2-eq in 2030. The
transport sector saves another 45 Mt CO2-eq of GHG emissions in 2030, mainly through
further improving and extending to 2030 the fuel efficiency standard for trucks.
Table 3.2 ⊳ Performance levels for selected new products in the residential

and transport sectors in the Bridge Scenario, 2030
Cleaning Heating and Passenger Heavy

Refrigerators Lighting
equipment cooling vehicles trucks
(kWh/appliance) (kWh/appliance) (kWh/m²) (2013=100) (l/100km) (l/100km)
2013 720 375 9 100 6.8 46
United
2030 485 265 5 32 3.9 32
States
(Energy Star) (Energy Star) (Energy Star)
2013 305 255 4 100 5.3 30
European
Union 2030 220 235 2 29 3.4 21
(A++) (A) (A)
2013 375 135 6 100 7.3 38
China 2030 365 170 6 49 4.4 27
(Grade 3) (Grade 3) -
2013 365 135 5 100 6.1 40
India 2030 335 170 5 73 4.1 28
(3 Star) (3 Star) -
Southeast 2013 480 435 3 100 6.9 44

Asia 2030 395 485 3 100 4.6 31
2013 350 295 4 100 6.6 38
South
Africa 2030 180 275 4 85 4.0 27
(A) (C) -
Notes: Cleaning equipment refers to washing machines, dryers and dishwashers. For appliances, the average
consumption in 2030 can be higher than today if the size of the equipment rises with higher income per capita. For labels,
values in parentheses represent the level of the least-demanding label in 2030. In the United States, labels have no
range. The voluntary label “Energy Star” represents an increase of efficiency of 10% to 30%, relative to the current level
of energy efficiency standards, and is considered as mandatory by 2030 in the Bridge Scenario. For passenger vehicles,
the values represent test cycle fuel consumption of new sales; for heavy trucks (above 16 tonnes), they are estimated
on-road fuel consumption of new vehicles.

The European Union has been similarly active in improving energy efficiency over recent
years, including through the Energy Efficiency Directive and through vehicle fuel-economy 1
standards. Residential electricity demand has barely changed over the past decade (as
a result, for example, of improving the efficiency of appliances and heating equipment) 2
and oil demand for road transport has been on a steadily declining trend since 2007. But
scope for further improvements exists and its exploitation results in a total saving of close 3
to 150 Mt CO2‑eq from energy efficiency by 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario. Further
tightening fuel-economy standards for passenger vehicles to 85 grammes CO2 per kilometre
4
(km) in 2030 (from 95 g CO2/km in 2020) and adopting standards for freight trucks (a strategy
to reduce emissions from freight is currently under development) contributes 40 Mt CO2-eq
of additional GHG emissions savings. For other sectors, the 2030 framework for climate and 5
energy policies foresees a review by 2020 to assess the possibility of raising the level of energy
efficiency ambition beyond current targets. In the Bridge Scenario, greater energy efficiency in 6
the buildings sector saves an additional 100 Mt CO2-eq in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario.
Potential GHG emissions savings in other countries are necessarily smaller in absolute terms 7
than those from the above regions, given their relative size, even though the degree of ambition
of existing and planned policies (as considered in the INDC Scenario) is generally lower. But, on 8
aggregate, savings in the Bridge Scenario from other countries do make a significant difference.
For example, recent WEO analysis shows that around three-quarters of the economic efficiency 9
potential of Southeast Asia remains untapped until 2035 under existing and planned policies
(IEA, 2013b). The adoption of more stringent energy efficiency requirements in the region
could save 90 Mt CO2-eq emissions by 2030 (of which almost 40% is in Indonesia), relative to
10
the INDC Scenario. The co‑benefits for energy security are significant (Figure 3.6): oil demand
is down by 0.2 mb/d in 2030 relative to the INDC Scenario and electricity demand growth is 11
moderated to 3.5% per year, compared with 4.1% in the INDC Scenario.
12
Figure 3.6 ⊳ Fossil-fuel savings from energy efficiency and fossil-fuel subsidy
reform in the Bridge Scenario relative to the INDC Scenario, 2030 13
Oil: mb/d Gas: bcm Coal: Mtce
-1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 -80 -60 -40 -20 -200 -150 -100 -50 13
United States
European Union
13
China
India
Southeast Asia
14
Africa
Middle East 16
Latin America
Rest of world 17
Savings from fossil-fuel subsidies Savings from energy efficiency
Notes: mb/d = million barrels per day; bcm = billion cubic metres; Mtce = million tonnes of coal equivalent.
18

In the Middle East, addressing energy efficiency is complex, as fossil-fuel subsidies weaken
the end-user incentive to economise. In the Gulf region, mandatory building codes are
in place in all countries, but they generally lack enforcement. The overall potential for
energy savings in new buildings has been estimated to be larger than 60%, while retrofit
pilot efforts have revealed potential to increase energy efficiency by 25%. Almost 20%
of electricity demand in the buildings sector in the Middle East comes from the need
for cooling, but MEPS for air-conditioning are not widespread; their adoption reduces
electricity demand growth in the Bridge Scenario (Figure 3.7). In the transport sector, Saudi
Arabia has adopted fuel-economy standards for passenger vehicles, but their impact on
fuel savings is likely to be obstructed by low fuel prices. The energy efficiency measures
taken in the region in the Bridge Scenario, in combination with fossil-fuel subsidy reform,
reduce GHG emissions by around 330 Mt CO2-eq in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario.
One co-benefit for the region is increased availability of fossil fuels for export.
Figure 3.7 ⊳ Electricity demand reduction by sector and region in the

Bridge Scenario relative to the INDC Scenario, 2030
TWh
-1 500 -1 200 -900 -600 -300
China
World other*
TWh
-200 -160 -120 -80 -40 Regions:
India
Middle East
United States
European Union
Southeast Asia
Africa
Latin America
-20% -16% -12% -8% -4%
Heating and cooling Appliances and lighting Industry Change in electricity demand
(bottom axis)
* World other represents all countries except for China. Note: TWh = terawatt-hour.
As in India, the case for improving energy efficiency in Africa is closely linked to providing
energy access to those currently without supply: today, more than 620 million people lack
access to electricity, and nearly 730 million rely on the traditional use of biomass for cooking
purposes. The potential to improve energy efficiency on the continent is vast; at the basic
needs level, biomass cookstoves often have very low conversion rates (10% to 15%), and
improving their efficiency can reduce indoor air pollution and certain GHG emissions. In

some cases, even a switch to modern fuels, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), might
reduce GHG emissions (Spotlight). Vehicles across Africa are often second-hand and one 1
highly productive measure is to impose restrictions on vehicles above a certain age (as has
been done in Angola, Botswana and Kenya, for example). MEPS for household appliances 2
can help moderate the pace of capacity build-up required in the power sector to meet
growing demand. Allowing for accompanying measures taken in the Bridge Scenario to 3
ensure no worsening in energy access relative to the INDC Scenario, energy efficiency in
the Bridge Scenario saves around 80 Mt CO2-eq of emissions in Africa in 2030 relative to
4
the INDC Scenario.
Power sector: reducing inefficient coal use and additional investment in renewables 5
Two-thirds of global power generation today comes from fossil fuels, making the sector
responsible for more than 40% of global energy sector-related CO2 emissions. This scale 6
of emissions, combined with the availability of low-carbon alternatives, makes the power
sector central to any mitigation strategy. The required transformation can materialise only 7
if the right signals to investors are in place. An analysis of power sector investments over
the past decade, undertaken for the IEA’s World Energy Investment Outlook (IEA, 2014d), 8
shows that a transition has begun, around 60% of total power plant investments since 2000
have been made in low-carbon technologies, in particular hydro, wind and solar PV. But
the process needs to go much further: every year that passes locks in further fossil-fuel
9
generation and consequent emissions growth from the power sector.
10
Energy efficiency policies curb electricity demand while safeguarding essential supply;
their adoption is a key enabler to power sector decarbonisation. In the Bridge Scenario,
the other two pillars are: 11
 Progressively reducing the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power generating plants
12
and banning the construction of new ones.
 A further increase in investment in renewable energy technologies from $270 billion
13
in 2014 to $400 billion in 2030.
In some cases, these policies will need to be complemented by other power sector reforms 13
to facilitate the transition and maintain system reliability (the considerations differ by
country). This mainly involves ensuring adequate capacity in the system and strengthening 13
and expanding grid interconnections to enable full use of the flexibility of the power plant
fleet. At very high levels of renewables penetration, necessary additional measures might
extent to energy storage, use of smart grid technologies and demand response measures
14
(Chapter 4); but in the Bridge Scenario, the integration challenge is not exacerbated in
any region, compared with the INDC Scenario. In regions where access to electricity is 16
inadequate today, as in India or Africa, the Bridge Scenario reaches the same level of
electricity access in 2030 as in the INDC Scenario. 17
18

Box 3.3 ⊳ Protecting fossil-fuel assets through CCS
The policy framework in the Bridge Scenario includes a reduction in the use of the
least-efficient coal-fired power plants. But the adoption of this policy does not mean
that investment even in efficient coal power plants is without risk. Any strategy to
realise the long-term 2 °C target will require a level of decarbonisation of the energy
sector that cannot be achieved even with the most efficient coal power plants, as they
are constituted today. In the very long term, gas-fired power generation will also be
incompatible unless measures are taken to abate their CO2 emissions. Investors in new
fossil-fuel power plants, especially coal-fired power plants, need to ensure not only
the high efficiency of the plants, but also that they are, where possible, suitable for
later modification to incorporate carbon capture and storage (CCS), i.e. that they are
“CCS-ready” to ensure that the capital invested in these assets is not wiped out as climate
targets are strengthened. Action can be taken at the time of design and construction to
improve the technical and economic feasibility of retrofitting CCS, notably:
 Ensuring sufficient space available on-site for the installation of additional CO2
capture equipment.
 Locating the plant in reasonable proximity to an existing possible CO2 storage site,
or one that is likely to become available by the time of retrofit.
 Verifying that local water will continue to be available in sufficient quantities for
the needs of the plant, as CCS increases water requirements.
The gradual reduction in the use of the least-efficient coal-fired power plants has three
key stages:13 first, a ban on the construction of new inefficient coal-fired power plants
(typically conventional subcritical power plants)14; second, a gradual reduction in the level
of operation of the least-efficient plants that are currently under construction (i.e. 83 GW
of capacity, but ensuring that they can still recover the investment costs); and, third, the
retirement or idling of all ageing inefficient coal-fired power plants that have already repaid
their investment costs, to the full extent possible without affecting power system reliability.
Relevant measures are already in use in many countries. They include CO2 pricing (such as
through an emissions trading scheme, as in the European Union and in selected pilot regions
in China, or carbon taxes, as in the Nordic countries); the imposition of power production
limits for each generator; the allocation of generation quotas favouring operation of low-
emission plants; renewing (or failing to renew) operational licenses or altering the dispatch
schedule in favour of more efficient plants; and the adoption of standards on the energy
efficiency of coal power plants, on their average level of CO2 emissions per kilowatt-hour
(kWh) or on the average level of air pollution.
13. See also (IEA, 2014e).

14. Small power systems may not be able to deploy large, more efficient coal-fired power plants such as supercritical
or ultra-supercritical technologies. In such cases, it will be important to deploy the most efficient feasible technology,
which may be subcritical.

Further increasing investment in renewable energy technologies in the power sector, to
$400 billion per year by 2030, as assumed in the Bridge Scenario, is a substantial increase 1
over the $270 billion invested in 2014 and the $285 billion in the INDC Scenario in 2030.
The majority of this additional investment goes to variable renewables, particularly for wind 2
power and solar PV.15 Scaling up renewables investment to this extent is not thought to be
constrained by limits on the availability of finance, provided appropriate signs are given 3
to investors and markets. These include CO2 pricing, which improves the competitiveness
of renewables versus fossil‑fuel power plants; clear and stable financial support measures
4
from governments (such as feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums or tax credits); auctions for
long-term power purchase agreements; or defined requirements for the contribution
from renewables, either in terms of capacity (as in China or India) or generation (as in the 5
European Union and parts of the United States). All these measures help lower investor
risk, in turn lowering the cost of capital for renewables investments. In some high-risk 6
environments, such as in some developing countries, framework conditions will need
to go further, including more political stability, effective regulatory systems and greater 7
market transparency. Where possible, preference should be given to measures that foster
competition and innovation (e.g. transparent auctioning systems), in order to support
renewables deployment at minimal cost.
8
9
Figure 3.8 ⊳ Global energy-related CO2 emissions savings from the power
sector in the Bridge Scenario relative to the INDC Scenario
10
Savings by fuel Policy drivers
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Coal
11
Gas
-0.5 Oil 12
Improved coal
-1.0 efficiency
-1.5
Renewables
Reduced
13
electricity
demand
-2.0
13
-2.5
13
Gt
-3.0
Note: Besides reducing CO2 emissions from power generation, the suggested policies indirectly reduce methane
14
emissions from coal mining, contributing 1.0 Gt CO2-eq to cumulative savings from the reduced use of coal.
16
17
15. Variable renewables are renewable energy technologies with output that depends on variable renewable energy 18
inputs, such as solar irradiation and wind, and which do not incorporate energy storage technologies.

Relative to the INDC Scenario, the cumulative emissions reductions from coal-fired power
plants in the Bridge Scenario account for around 90% of power sector reductions to 2030
(Figure 3.8), the amount of CO2 emissions from inefficient coal power plants dropping from
6 Gt today (around 50% of total power sector emissions) to 1.4 Gt in 2030 (around 15%). The
installed capacity and the use of subcritical power plants changes significantly: the operational
subcritical coal capacity is around half that of today (compared to only a marginal reduction
in the INDC Scenario), with some 620 GW either idled or not built at all (Figure 3.9). Around
60% of the capacity reduction takes place in developing Asia, where reliance on electricity
generation from subcritical coal-fired power stations is almost halved in 2030, compared with
the INDC Scenario. A further 30% of the capacity reduction takes place in the United States
and the European Union, where the role of subcritical generation almost disappears by 2030.
Figure 3.9 ⊳ Changes in capacity of subcritical coal in the Bridge and

INDC Scenarios
1 400 Other
GW
Africa
1 200
Developing Asia
1 000 European Union
Other required additions
United States
Under construction
Retirements
Additions not required

and early retirements
800
600
Idled plants
400
200
2014 2030: INDC 2030: Bridge
In the Bridge Scenario, the increase in renewables investment is particularly effective after 2020.
While total capacity of renewable energy technologies in the Bridge Scenario is only marginally
higher than in the INDC Scenario in 2020, it is 285 GW, or 8%, higher in 2030, reaching around
4 000 GW (Figure 3.10). In 2030, around 70% of total capacity additions in the power sector are
from renewable energies in the Bridge Scenario, 14 percentage points above the level achieved
in the INDC Scenario in 2030, and up from around 45% in 2014. The increase in investment in
renewable energy technologies in the power sector in the Bridge Scenario varies by region,
depending on the prevailing power mix, the level of climate ambition in the INDC Scenario and
the regional cost of renewables deployment. In some regions, investment in certain renewable
energy technologies is lower than today, even if capacity additions are higher, as technology
costs gradually decline. But the renewables investment of around $400 billion in 2030 in the
Bridge Scenario is an increase of $110 billion (or almost 40%) over that in the INDC Scenario.
The strongest increases occur in China ($27 billion more than in the INDC Scenario), the United
States ($15 billion), Southeast Asia ($13 billion) and India ($12 billion).

Figure 3.10 ⊳ World power generation capacity mix and capacity additions
in the Bridge Scenario 1
Installed capacity Additions: 2015-2030 2

6 180 GW 8 800 GW 3 900 GW
100%
Other 6% 3
renewables 12%
80%
Solar PV 17%
Wind 4
60%
Hydro 21%
40%
Nuclear
5
Oil
Gas 23%
6% 1%
20%
Coal 14% 6
2014 2030
7
The power sector policies of the Bridge Scenario achieve remarkable reductions in average
8
emissions from the power sector in all countries and regions (Figure 3.11). Today, the
power sector emits around 530 grammes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour (g CO2/kWh)
on a global level. This is reduced to 430 g CO2/kWh in the Bridge Scenario in 2020 and 9
around 300 g CO2/kWh in 2030.
10
Figure 3.11 ⊳ Average CO2 emissions per kWh by selected region in the 11
Bridge Scenario
800 2013
12
g CO2/kWh
2030
600
13
400
13
13
200
14
United European China India Southeast Latin Africa Middle
States Union Asia America East 16
In many countries, the measures adopted in the Bridge Scenario simply increase the 17
effectiveness of policies that are already in place today (as in the European Union),
under development, or further extend their application to 2030. In the United States, for
18
example, the Clean Power Plan significantly constrains the use of coal-fired power plants

in the INDC Scenario, but spurring additional investment in renewables means that less
reliance is put on emissions reductions from coal‑to-gas switching, making the compliance
pathway more compatible with long-term decarbonisation goals. China, over the course
of the 11th Five-Year Plan, closed 77 GW of small inefficient coal power plants and then
targeted another 20 GW during the 12th Five-Year Plan (to 2015), of which 10 GW is known
to have been closed to date. The primary goal of these measures was to combat air
pollution, but together with the stated intention to enhance the emissions trading scheme
to a national level (it currently operates in seven provinces), they could also contribute
towards achieving the targets of the Bridge Scenario.
The challenge for India is different to that which is facing many other countries. India’s power
sector relies on fossil fuels, mostly coal, for more than 80% of electricity generation, and a
significant part of the population has no access to electricity today. In the Bridge Scenario,
an additional 400 million people obtain access to electricity by 2030. Chronic issues persist
over high transmission and distribution losses and problems with financing power sector
investment in an environment in which revenues from power generation are insufficient
to provide an adequate return on investment (IEA, 2014d). In the Bridge Scenario, solar
PV provides most of the variable renewables capacity in 2030, at 135 GW, followed by
110 GW of wind power, extending stated power sector targets (Chapter 2). Compared to
the INDC Scenario, the capacity of the least-efficient coal power plants operating in 2030
is reduced by almost 160 GW, due to lower electricity demand. Increased use of flexible
capacity, such as hydropower, helps to accommodate variable renewables generation.
The two power sector policies proposed in the Bridge Scenario are particularly effective
in regions with high shares of coal in power generation. Southeast Asia, for example, has
cumulative coal-fired capacity additions of around 80 GW by 2030 in the INDC Scenario.
In the Bridge Scenario, the average amount of subcritical coal installed per year is reduced
by 1.5 GW relative to the INDC Scenario, while the share of renewables in total electricity
generation increases 8 percentage points, to 26%, by 2030. As a result, the power sector in
Southeast Asia saves 230 Mt CO2-eq of GHG emissions by 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario.
In the Middle East, where oil is frequently used for power generation, partly as a result of
the phase-out of fossil-fuel subsidies, renewable generating capacity additions rise to 8 GW
per year in 2030 (40% over what is achieved in the INDC Scenario), reducing emissions from
the power sector by 140 Mt CO2-eq in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario. In Africa and
Latin America, average annual installations of renewables for power generation to 2030
reach 7 GW (about 15% above what is achieved in the INDC Scenario) and 8 GW (around
10%), respectively. Achievement beyond this is limited by the already ambitious plans
considered in the INDC Scenario.

S P O T L I G H T
1
How increased electricity access and decarbonisation work together
The IEA has been providing in-depth analysis on energy access for more than a decade 2
and consistently highlights that achieving universal access adds less than 1% to overall
energy demand and energy-related CO2 emissions by 2030 when compared to planned 3
policies (IEA, 2013c). The threat to global warming from achieving greater access to
energy for the under-privileged is negligible. 4
There are even examples that suggest a positive impact on climate mitigation. One
relates to the use of kerosene lamps or candles for lighting, which is prevalent among 5
most of the 1.3 billion people without access to electricity today. In this case, providing
access to electricity has multiple benefits: most importantly, access to cleaner lighting 6
solutions, such as electricity or solar torches, would reduce adverse health impacts
from indoor air pollution, reduce the incidence of fires and represent an important
income benefit for households. From a climate mitigation perspective, a kerosene
7
lamp emits between 3 and almost 40 times more CO2 emissions than a grid‑connected
compact fluorescent lamp (depending on the power mix). As a result, providing 8
electricity access to replace kerosene lamps could save an estimated 35 Mt CO2 per
year.16 Additional climate mitigation potential lies in the fact that around 8% of the 9
kerosene used in a simple lamp is converted into pure black carbon, which can trigger
regional climate forcing (CCAC, 2014; Lam N., 2012). 10
A second example relates to clean cooking solutions. Today 2.7 billion people rely
on the combustion of solid fuels for cooking purposes. A shift towards modern fuels 11
such as LPG is essential to prevent associated health problems and reduce premature
deaths; but there is also a potential co-benefit for reducing GHG emissions. Even 12
though biomass is considered a renewable source (if sustainably harvested), its use
may emit more GHG emissions than LPG stoves. There is much uncertainty around GHG
emissions of traditional cookstoves using solid biomass, since their efficiency is widely
13
variable; but the efficiency is typically low and the combustion process incomplete.
Further uncertainty is associated with the methane emissions of traditional cookstoves. 13
The IPCC reports emission factors ranging from 4 to 38 kilotonnes (kt) of CH4 per million
tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), with the default value at 12.5 kt CH4/Mtoe. Experimental 13
studies with traditional and improved stoves conducted mainly in Asia found an even
higher range, from 10 to 78 kt CH4/Mtoe. The threshold for greater emissions of 14
GHG from the traditional use of biomass for cooking than from the use of LPG lies
at emissions from the traditional stove of 15 kt CH4/Mtoe (Figure 3.12). Failure to
16
re-plant biomass crops in many developing countries shifts the GHG advantage further
towards the use of modern fuels, such as LPG.
17
18
16. These estimates do not take into account oil lamps used in small businesses.

Figure 3.12 ⊳ Ranges of GHG emissions from different combinations of
cookstoves and fuels
25 Maximum
Mt CO2-eq per Mtoe
emission factor
20 Minimum
emission factor
15
10
LPG Kerosene Biogas Improved Traditional

wood stove wood stove
Notes: Mtoe represents the useful energy, i.e. the delivered energy to the cookstove (taking into account the
efficiency of the cookstove). GHG emissions take into account CO2 emissions for LPG and kerosene, and methane
and nitrous oxide for all fuels.
Reform of fossil-fuel consumption subsidies

Fossil fuels receive many types of subsidy, provided through both direct and indirect
channels. Some are designed to confer benefits to consumers, others to producers.
Although some fossil-fuel subsidies have well-intentioned objectives (such as holding down
the cost of energy to poor households for social reasons), they have, in practice, usually
proved to be unsuccessful or inefficient and often have profound and adverse impacts.
One of their most harmful effects is that they damage the competitiveness of low-carbon
technologies. This hinders investment in renewables, enhancing reliance on fossil fuels.
They can also undermine the financial attractiveness of investment in more energy-efficient
equipment, appliances and practices, thereby encouraging excessive energy use. Where
energy suppliers suffer financial losses because of under-pricing, subsidies can create a
vicious cycle of under-investment, poor maintenance and under-supply.
Despite their economic, social and environmental costs, subsidies to fossil fuels are
stubbornly persistent. Based on preliminary data, subsidies that artificially lowered the
end-user prices of fossil fuels in 2014 totalled $510 billion (Figure 3.13). Currently, around
13% of global energy-related CO2 emissions are from fuels that are subsidised to a greater
or lesser extent. This equates to an average incentive to emit CO2 of $115 per tonne. A total
of 40 countries have been identified as subsidising fossil-fuel consumption, with oil and gas
exporters in the Middle East and North Africa accounting for almost half of the worldwide
spending. Globally, the value of fossil-fuel consumption subsidies amounts to around
four-times the value of subsidies to renewable energy. In addition, the OECD estimates
that other types of subsidies in its member countries fluctuated between $55 billion and
$90 billion per year between 2005 and 2011, with preferential tax treatment supporting
fossil-fuel production making up around two-thirds of the total.

Figure 3.13 ⊳ Economic value of global fossil-fuel consumption subsidies
by region 1
600 120 Eastern Europe/
2
Dollars per barrel

Billion dollars (nominal)
Eurasia
500 100 Americas
Africa 3
400 80 Asia
Middle East
300 60 IEA average crude 4
oil import price
(right axis)
200 40 5
100 20
6
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
7
*Estimate using preliminary data for 2014.
Momentum for reform of subsidy programmes has been building for several years now,
8
with good prospects that this will continue (Table 3.3). Recognition of the case for reform
can, in large part, be attributed to the extended period of persistently high energy 9
prices until mid-2014, which pushed the cost of subsidies to crippling levels in some
countries, particularly those with fast-growing energy demand. It can also be attributed 10
to the initiatives of groups such as the G20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (a group of non-G20 countries that support
11
the reform of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies) and the Global Subsidies Initiative. Some
loans by international lending agencies and the International Monetary Fund for energy
projects now have conditions attached relating to subsidy reform. Moves have been made 12
in developing countries to reduce consumption subsidies and in developed countries to
reduce producer subsidies for investment in fossil-fuel extraction. 13
Somewhat paradoxically, given what is said above about the motivational force of high oil
prices, the plunge in oil prices since mid-2014 could add further momentum to the phase- 13
out of consumer subsidies, by making withdrawal of subsidies less politically controversial.
Indeed several countries, including India, Indonesia and Malaysia, have already seized the 13
opportunity. On one hand, by reducing the cost of subsidising energy consumption, lower
international prices may be said to reduce the budgetary urgency for governments to take 14
action. But they also present a unique opportunity to abolish subsidies – or increase energy
taxes – without having a major upward impact on prices – or inflation – and provoking public
outcry. However, the durability of such reforms will be tested if and when international
16
prices again move higher. Observance of a few guidelines can increase the likelihood of
long-term success (Box 3.4). 17
18

The bulk of subsidies are now concentrated in the major oil and gas exporting counties.
The opportunity cost to them of pricing domestic energy below market levels has declined;
but export revenues have also shrunk, making budgetary pressures more acute and so
increasing pressure to rein in expenditure wherever possible. The task of persuading the
public in energy exporting countries that fossil fuels should be sold at their opportunity
cost is a tough one – all the more so when the spoils from exploiting resources are not
otherwise shared by the population at large. Nonetheless, a number of key fossil-fuel
exporters are implementing reforms or are reported to be considering them, including Iran,
Kuwait and Venezuela.
Table 3.3 ⊳ Selected recent fossil-fuel subsidy reforms
Main fuels
Country Recent developments
subsidised
China LPG, natural gas, In February 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission
electricity announced plans to group existing and new industrial gas consumers
under a single pricing mechanism.
India Kerosene, LPG, Stopped subsidising diesel in October 2014, following similar reforms to
natural gas, gasoline in 2010. In January 2015, a cash transfer scheme was introduced
electricity for residential LPG consumers with the key objective of stopping the
diversion of subsidised cylinders to commercial use.
Indonesia Diesel, electricity At the end of 2014, subsidies to gasoline (88 RON) abolished and the
diesel subsidy capped at IDR 1 000 ($0.08) per litre.
Iran Gasoline, diesel, The parliament approved a 5% increase in gasoline prices for fiscal year
kerosene, LPG, 2015-2016. The revised price of regular gasoline will be IRR 7 350 ($0.27)
natural gas, per litre.
electricity
Kuwait Gasoline, diesel, In January 2015, prices of diesel increased from KWD 0.055 to 0.170 ($0.59)
kerosene, LPG, per litre. At the end of January 2015, prices of diesel and kerosene
natural gas, were cut back to KWD 0.110 following political pressure. Plans to remove
electricity subsidies on gasoline and electricity have been postponed.
Malaysia LPG, natural gas, In December 2014, subsidies for gasoline (RON95) and diesel were
electricity abolished, with prices for both now set monthly to track international
levels. In January 2014, electricity tariffs were increased by 15% on
average to MYR 0.38 ($0.12) per kWh. Fuel cost pass-through, based on
international gas price movements, was resumed in the same month.
In May 2014, natural gas prices were increased by up to 26% for certain
users.
Morocco LPG Ended gasoline and fuel oil subsidies at the beginning of 2014 and diesel
subsidies in January 2015.
Oman Gasoline, natural In May 2014, plans were announced to gradually reduce fuel subsidies,
gas especially for gasoline. In January 2015, gas prices for industrial
consumers were raised by 100% to OMR 0.041 per cubic metre ($3.01 per
million British thermal units). A 3% annual rise is to be introduced for
industries.
Thailand LPG, natural gas, In October 2014, the price of compressed natural gas for vehicles was
electricity increased by THB 1 ($0.03) per kilogramme. In December 2014, subsidies
for LPG were ended.

In the Bridge Scenario, fossil-fuel consumption subsidies are completely phased out in
net importing countries within the next ten years. In net exporting countries, they are
1
phased out by 2030, with the exception of countries in the Middle East where reforms
progress at a slightly slower pace (the average subsidisation rate is reduced to around 2
20% by 2030, compared with around 75% today). We have adopted this differentiated
approach, rather than a uniform approach across all countries, in recognition of the fact 3
that reforms are likely to be more difficult to achieve in countries where cheap energy is
often considered a means of sharing the nation’s natural resource wealth. The assumed 4
pace of reform may be considered ambitious. However, if fully effected, energy prices in
countries that currently subsidise consumption would still remain relatively low as there
5
is no assumption that new excise taxes will be introduced. For example, under these
assumptions, average gasoline prices in the Middle East would be almost 65% cheaper
than in OECD Europe in 2030.
6
7
Figure 3.14 ⊳ Global GHG emissions savings from fossil-fuel subsidy reform in
the Bridge Scenario relative to the INDC Scenario 8
2014 2020 2025 2030
9
-0.1 10
Middle East (54%)
-0.2 11
Eastern Europe/
-0.3 Eurasia (13%) 12
Africa (13%)
Gt CO2-eq
-0.4 Americas (11%)

Asia (9%)
13
-0.5
13
Note: Percentage shows the region’s share in cumulative global emissions savings from fossil-fuel subsidy reform.
13
In the Bridge Scenario, subsidy reform reduces GHG emissions by around 160 Mt CO2-eq
in 2020, relative to the INDC Scenario. This represents 13% of the total savings between 14
the two scenarios (Figure 3.14). Savings increase to about 480 Mt CO2-eq in 2030 (10%
of the total), as rising international prices provide consumers with growing incentive to 16
change their behaviour and purchase more energy-efficient equipment and renewables
producers with improved competitive prospects. While the contribution of subsidy reform 17
to abatement may seem modest at the global level, in some regions it is a major factor.
Savings are greatest in the countries of the Middle East, where subsidy reform accounts for
18
almost 50% of total abatement in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario. It accounts for 35%

of the total abatement in the Caspian region, around 20% in both Africa and Latin America
and 13% in Southeast Asia. There is an important relationship between the fiscal and
climate benefits from subsidy reform: reforms could lead to even greater abatement than
indicated here if some of the financial savings are directed into programmes to improve
energy efficiency, deploy renewables and expand public transport.
Box 3.4 ⊳ Common elements to successful subsidy reform
National circumstances and changing market conditions mean that there is no single
path to follow when reforming fossil-fuel subsidies. However, past experience has
shown that the prospects for success can be enhanced by adherence to some simple
guidelines (Figure 3.15):
 Get the prices right – One of the basic pillars of successful subsidy reform is
to ensure that prices reflect the full economic cost of the energy that is being
supplied. Prices before tax should be set with reference to international market
prices and be adjusted as necessary to reflect inflation and currency volatility. This
process is more complicated with electricity than, say, oil products: it is necessary
to ensure that tariffs are sufficient to cover not only the costs of the fuel inputs but
also of transmission and distribution, while also giving utilities a return on their
capital. Public authorities need to ensure that pricing systems are transparent,
well-monitored and enforced. Government controls on pricing may be warranted
in certain situations, for example, to ensure that the poorest households have
access to clean cooking fuels and electricity, but other forms of social support are
often more efficient.
 Implement reforms in steps – Subsidy reforms should typically be introduced in
small steps; to do otherwise risks abrupt and large price rises that may crystallise
strong opposition. As a country makes the transition away from subsidies, it is
advisable to introduce a formula-based pricing system that ensures retail prices
track international benchmarks. To de-politicise the process, an independent
body should be set-up to oversee energy pricing, helping consumers understand
and accept the reasons for price changes.
 Manage the effects – Subsidy reform can have undesirable consequences for some
groups, and social reforms may need to be implemented in parallel to protect
vulnerable groups, such as the poorest households. For example, conditional cash
transfers to those with the lowest income may be required; but the effectiveness
of such measures must be regularly monitored and evaluated.
 Consult and communicate at all stages – A comprehensive communication
strategy is essential to convince citizens of the need for reform and the justice
of its implementation. Such a strategy must speak to all energy users, but
especially those most affected by the reforms. Public inquiries, speeches, debates,
workshops and printed material can all contribute.

Figure 3.15 ⊳ Critical steps of a process to reform fossil-fuel subsidies
1
Market reform Managing impacts Communicating benefits
2
Identify subsidies to Assess impact of Consultations with
be eliminated reform on social all stakeholders
STRATEGIC
PLANNING
3
groups and sectors
Devise transition to Raise public
free-market pricing Assess merit for awareness of need
Draw up sector special assistance for reform
restructuring programmes
4
Communicate plans
Devise fiscal reforms
5
AND INSTITUTIONAL
CAPACITY BUILDING
Prepare interim Develop assistance Communicate progress

administered pricing programmes where with reform, including
mechanism deemed to be justified
REFORM
timetable
Implement
restructuring
Create institutions
needed to implement
programmes
6
Create pricing and
competition authorities
7
Step 1: Introduce
8
IMPLEMENTATION
administered pricing Implement targeted Advertise achievements

sectoral measures
Step 2: Deregulate Respond to concerns
PHASED
in parallel with
prices when changes in prices
competition
becomes viable
Step 3: Adjust taxes
Evaluate outcomes 9
and remove non-price
subsidies
10
11
Market determines Targeted social Public acceptance of
OUTCOME
prices freely welfare and economic subsidy removal

assistance
Taxes reflect Pre-tax prices
externalities and understood to be
12
revenue needs independent of
government
Sources: IEA based on Beaton, et al. (2013); IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank (2010). 13
Minimising methane releases from upstream oil and gas operations 13

Methane is a powerful contributor to global warming, many times more potent than CO2. 17
It remains in the atmosphere for a shorter period of time, compared with CO2, but these 13
characteristics, taken together, mean that reducing methane emissions has the potential to
yield a relatively rapid climate response. This is no substitute for long-term measures to cut 14
CO2 emissions, but the potential to slow the near-term rate of warming means that action
to minimise methane emissions plays an important role in our Bridge Scenario.
16
17. There are different ways to evaluate the effects of methane on global warming. This section uses a value of 30 for the
17
global warming potential (GWP) of fossil-fuel methane, relative to CO2, averaged over 100 years (meaning that volumes
of methane are multiplied by 30 to give equivalent volumes of CO2). The GWP in the shorter term is higher: over 20 years, 18
fossil-fuel methane is estimated to be 85 times more effective at trapping heat than CO2 (IPCC, 2013).

Box 3.5 ⊳ Addressing methane emissions from downstream operations
Methane releases to the atmosphere occur both during the production of oil and gas
and during their transmission and distribution, in particular in the case of natural gas. We
estimate that downstream releases amounted to around 24 Mt in 2013 (710 Mt CO2-eq),
or 42% of methane emissions from the oil and gas sectors. Methane leakages from natural
gas pipelines are largest in the United States, Russia, the Middle East and China (which
are the countries with the largest pipeline networks), particularly where the pipelines
are old or poorly maintained. The main causes of leakage are the high permeability of
some pipeline materials (the oldest pipelines are more than 100 years old and made of
cast iron), maintenance activities and incidents due to corrosion, damage or equipment
failure.
The replacement of ageing infrastructure can make a major difference to the incidence
of leaks, but is a challenging and expensive task. Significant improvements can be
made by using materials with lower permeability (such as polyethylene) wherever
possible and optimising the network to reduce the number of joints (i.e. the area most
vulnerable to leakage). Emissions during maintenance are often unavoidable, but
can be mitigated through the flaring of the leaked methane. Reducing the incidence
of leakage is a continuous challenge, involving regular monitoring and efficient and
prompt responses. The benefits have been documented in a study in 2015, sponsored
by the US Environmental Defense Fund and various downstream operators, which
included bottom-up measurement of thirteen urban US distribution systems (Lamb
et al., 2015). The study produced estimates for downstream emissions from 36% to
70% lower than data from the 2011 EPA inventory, with the decrease attributed to
better maintenance activities and improved infrastructure components.
Preventing methane leakage is in the first place a matter of safety, as the accumulation of
gas leaked from pipelines can lead to explosions and is therefore particularly dangerous
in urban distribution networks. Regulation to ensure proper maintenance of pipelines
for safety reasons can have important co-benefits for the climate (measuring the gas
amounts between inlet and outlet stations can help identify major leaks, if the relevant
metering stations are in place). But beyond the assumption of regular maintenance
schedules, no major pipeline rehabilitation is included in the Bridge Scenario, since
this can easily take between 10 to 15 years to implement, involving major investment
and large construction works.
It is estimated that 550 Mt of methane is released into the atmosphere every year, of
which 350 Mt come from anthropogenic sources, amounting to 10.5 Gt CO2-eq. The
contribution of the energy sector to these emissions is highly uncertain, as measured data
are very limited. We have further deepened our analysis of methane emissions for this
special report, and estimate that annual energy-related methane emissions were around
100 Mt (3.0 Gt CO2-eq) in 2013, of which about 56 Mt came from the oil and gas sectors,
31 Mt from coal mining activities and 15 Mt from other sources (mostly the burning of

biomass).18 These estimates are based primarily on standardised emissions factors for
different energy sector activities; the emissions factors are derived from studies made by
1
the EPA19 and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC (IPCC, 2006). Using the
EPA emissions factors for the United States as a guide, the estimated levels of methane 2
emitted to the atmosphere are equivalent (in energy terms) to up to 2% of total oil and
gas production. New studies, mostly US based, are ongoing to obtain better bottom-up 3
and top-down measurements of amounts leaked by source, but much greater efforts are
required globally in order to define more accurately the magnitude of the problem and the
4
investment required to address it effectively.
Of the estimated 56 Mt (1.7 Gt CO2-eq) of methane emissions from the oil and gas 5
sectors today, upstream operations account for around 30% and 27% respectively. These
upstream releases represent the “low-hanging fruit” for reducing methane releases (and
are therefore the focus for action in the Bridge Scenario), as both the sources of these
6
emissions and the technologies and operational procedures to address them are relatively
well-known. Tackling the share of downstream emissions, those estimated to come from 7
transmission and distribution networks, is enticing from a climate mitigation perspective,
but the timelines involved and efforts required are daunting (Box 3.5). 8
In the Bridge Scenario, methane emissions from upstream oil and gas operations are
reduced by 5 Mt of CH4 (0.1 Gt CO2-eq, or 14%) in 2020, and 24 Mt (0.7 Gt CO2-eq, or 9
73%) in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario. Our previous assessment of the scope for
reducing emissions by 2020 has been revised downwards, given the absence of new policy 10
initiatives outside the United States and the current focus on cost‑cutting in the oil and
gas industry. Unsurprisingly, the largest savings can be achieved in places with large oil
11
and gas production activities such as the Middle East (190 Mt CO2-eq savings in 2030),
Russia (130 Mt CO2-eq) and Africa (80 Mt CO2-eq) and Latin America (70 Mt CO2-eq). In the
case of Africa, the opportunities for reducing methane emissions from upstream oil and 12
gas production are largely concentrated in Nigeria, Algeria and Angola, where the lack of
infrastructure and incentives to market associated gas continues to be a major cause of gas 13
flaring. Globally, the reduction of methane emissions from upstream oil and gas operations
in the Bridge Scenario requires a cumulative investment of $31 billion until 2030. For 13
countries with large mitigation potential and inadequate or weakly enforced regulation
in place, this represents a very cost-effective way to raise climate ambition, potentially
13
drawing on the international community to finance the required investment.
14
18. Other sources derive different estimates for global methane emissions. The Emissions Database for Global
16
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) and the EPA estimate that energy-related methane emissions (including the coal, oil
and gas sectors) were 129 Mt in 2010, while the UNFCCC reports these emissions to be 38 Mt for Annex I countries
in the same year. Such variations stem both from differences in the emissions factors used for each activity, as well as
17
differences in the data for activity levels.
19. Our new global estimate takes into account EPA’s latest available data for US methane emissions, which have been 18
revised down in the context of a review process and recent measurements (US EPA, 2015).

Figure 3.16 ⊳ Methane emissions from upstream oil and gas operations by
selected region in the Bridge Scenario
Oil activities Gas activities

600 Rest of world
Mt CO2-eq
United States
500
China
INDC
Africa
INDC
400
Bridge
Russia
Bridge
Bridge
300 Middle East
200
100
2013 2030 2013 2030
Two factors account for most of the upstream methane savings in the Bridge Scenario. In
the first case, the pursuit of energy efficiency measures across all end-use sectors reduces
demand for oil and gas and thereby the amount of methane leaked during oil and gas
operations (i.e. a reduction in activity levels). The second reason is a series of measures
directly designed to reduce the emissions associated with upstream activity, all based on
known technologies and operational best practices:
 Enhanced efforts to reduce flaring of natural gas, not only a wasteful and unproductive
use of gas, but also a practice that, as with many end-uses, results in methane releases
because of incomplete burning (especially in windy conditions).
 Increased inspection and repairs to reduce involuntary or “fugitive” emissions from
leaky valves, seals or pipes.
 Application of best practice to reduce the venting that occurs as part of normal
operations: there are relatively low-cost measures available to achieve this, such as
minimising emissions during work-overs and reducing the frequency of start-ups and
blow-downs.
 A focus on reducing emissions during well completion operations: this is a particular
concern in the case of unconventional gas, because of the large amount of methane
that can be released to the atmosphere during the flowback phase after hydraulic
fracturing. Best practice is to use a so-called “green completion” to recover
hydrocarbons, including methane, from the flowback fluid (instead of allowing them
to be vented or flared. The methane can then be marketed, offsetting the additional
cost).
 More complex reductions, involving modifications such as the installation of pressurised
storage tanks with vapour recovery units: these take time and larger investment, and
so have a strong impact on emissions reduction only towards 2030.

In all cases, collaborative efforts between industry, policymakers and research institutes
– including concentrated efforts to gain better data through measurement and monitoring – 1
are essential to deliver tangible and cost-effective results. Good examples of industry and
government collaboration and exchange of best practice and technical solutions exist in the 2
US EPA Natural Gas Star Program and the United Nations Environment Program/Climate
and Clean Air Coalition Oil and Gas Methane Partnership. Yet more could be achieved if 3
systematic, statistically significant measurements relative to the size and type of gas and oil
infrastructure were collected and analysed. 4
From a policy perspective, measurements that are statistically representative for a given
sector and country are an essential step towards sound policy formulation. The United 5
States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) airborne measurement
initiative is an important example of an effort to identify emission differences at geological 6
basin level. Further bottom-up data are required to identify major emission sources and
opportunities for mitigation (some of which can turn into profitable investments, as product
7
loss is minimised, in particular in the upstream sector). Baseline analysis can prepare the
way for an implementation plan that is well-targeted and that takes into account factors
such as the availability of infrastructure and proximity of gas markets, as well as covering 8
issues of compliance and enforcement. Policymakers and industry will need to agree on
a timeline of implementation, given that the solutions will range from easy and cheap to 9
difficult and expensive.
10
Wider implications of the Bridge Scenario
Economic benefits 11
In the Bridge Scenario, global GDP grows on average by 3.8% per year from 2013 to 2030,
with growth at 2.1% per year in OECD countries and 4.9% per year outside the OECD. This 12
growth rate is the same as that in the INDC Scenario, which means that the policy package
adopted in the Bridge Scenario does not affect global or regional prospects for economic 13
growth and development.20 This should not imply that the adoption of every single policy is
neutral with regards to economic growth; rather, the combination of measures as a whole 13
is tailored to regional characteristics with a view to ensuring the same level of development
of the countries or regions which are separately analysed (Figure 3.17). 13
14
16
20. The IEA’s World Energy Model (WEM) was coupled with the OECD’s ENV-Linkages model to determine the level of
17
policy ambition that complies with GDP-neutrality relative to the INDC Scenario in any region or country considered
individually in WEM. The analysis of GDP-neutrality does not extend to certain co-benefits such as those arising from 18
reducing local air pollution or avoiding climate change, which have the potential to further boost economic growth.

Figure 3.17 ⊳ Average annual GDP growth by scenario by selected region,
2013-2030
8% INDC
Scenario
Bridge
6% Scenario
4%
2%
2.4% 1.7% 0.9% 5.8% 6.5% 5.0% 2.9% 4.8% 3.9%

United European Japan China India Southeast Latin Africa Middle
States Union Asia America East
Source: OECD ENV-Linkages model. Growth rates are calculated on a PPP-basis.
Within the total package of policy measures adopted in the Bridge Scenario, there are
some which will have a positive effect on economic growth, while others will reduce
the value added from individual sectors, due to the additional costs that sector will
bear. The latter is particularly true for energy sectors that are concerned with supply
and transformation. The power sector incurs additional costs to compensate for the
reduced availability of inefficient coal-fired power plants and to increase investments
in renewable forms of energy. Total investment in transmission and distribution (T&D)
grids is reduced, as electricity demand (and therefore generation) is lower than in
the INDC Scenario, although this effect is partially offset by increased investment
to integrate variable renewables. In the Bridge Scenario, cumulative power sector
investments to 2030 are $360 billion lower than in the INDC Scenario. In oil and gas
production, reduction of upstream methane emissions involves additional cost,
estimated at $31 billion to 2030, but overall investment in fossil-fuel extraction and
distribution is reduced by $1.2 trillion, compared with the INDC Scenario, due to lower
fossil-fuel demand (Figure 3.18).
The investment required to exploit the economic potential for energy efficiency in the
industry, buildings and transport sectors is higher in the Bridge Scenario relative to the
INDC Scenario. The increase of energy efficiency investment limits the ability of households
(which are responsible for a large part of the investment made) and firms to invest in
other activities. But the reduction of fuel bills outweighs the additional investment needs
in both sectors, freeing up additional resources to such an extent that, overall, action on
energy efficiency boosts economic growth. Increasing the energy efficiency of appliances
and lighting, for example, helps to reduce household electricity bills in 2030 in the Bridge
Scenario by 6% on a global average.

Figure 3.18 ⊳ Global average annual investment in the energy sector by
type and scenario 1
2 800 Efficiency
2
Billion dollars (2013)
2 400 Low-carbon
Power T&D
2 000
Fossil fuels 3
1 600
1 200 4
800
5
400
INDC Bridge INDC Bridge INDC Bridge 6

2015-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030
7
Household consumption, in general, is a particularly important driver of economic growth.
The share of disposable income that is allocated to energy expenditures varies by country,
depending, for example, on the level of taxation and extent of domestic energy resources. 8
Oil consumption (e.g. for mobility purposes) usually accounts for a large share of household
energy expenditure. While the recent sharp drop in international oil prices may temporarily 9
relieve household budgets, our view on the longer term outlook for oil price developments
remains generally unchanged and suggests a significant increase over today’s level.
10
Increasing energy efficiency can help insulate households against such price increases – in the
Bridge Scenario, households in developed countries see a reduction of their average annual
energy expenditures in 2030, relative to today (Figure 3.19). In developing countries, energy 11
expenditures are rising due to increasing energy demand; but, in the Bridge Scenario, the rise
until 2030 is generally lower than in the INDC Scenario, due to improved energy efficiency. 12
Figure 3.19 ⊳ Household energy expenditures by fuel and region in the 13

Bridge Scenario and savings relative to the INDC Scenario
6 000 90 Savings per
13
Dollars per household (2013)
household
5 000 75 Other 13
Gas
4 000 60
Oil
14
3 000 45 Electricity
Total savings of
2 000 30 all households 16
(right axis)
1 000 15
17
2013 2030 2013 2030 2013 2030 2013 2030 2013 2030 2013 2030
European United Japan China India Southeast 18
Union States Asia

Energy security
The dependence of countries on fossil-fuel imports is one indicator of energy security. In
2013, the European Union spent around $555 billion on the import of fossil fuels, followed
by China ($304 billion), the United States ($278 billion), Japan ($259 billion) and India
($135 billion). In the INDC Scenario, existing and proposed policies successfully reduce, or
at least stabilise, at current levels the import bills in most industrialised countries by 2030.
But in all developing countries the strong rise in energy demand means that those relying
on the import of fossil fuels become increasingly exposed to global price developments
(the fossil-fuel import bills of China and India more than double in the INDC Scenario). In
the Bridge Scenario, the total spending on fossil-fuel imports in importing regions by 2030
is generally lower than in the INDC Scenario (Figure 3.20). In exporting regions, the lower
demand for fossil fuels in the Bridge Scenario generally results in a reduction in export
markets and a loss in revenues compared with what they would achieve under existing
and planned policies in the INDC Scenario. The impacts vary by country and region. In
Southeast Asia, for example, the loss in earnings from a shrinking export market for coal is
fully offset by savings in the oil import bill. For other regions, such as the Middle East, oil
export revenues in the Bridge Scenario keep rising, by almost $160 billion in 2030, relative
to 2013, and a 1.3 mb/d decline in oil demand in 2030, relative to the INDC Scenario, frees
up additional resources for export.
Figure 3.20 ⊳ Change in fossil-fuel trade bills by selected region in the

Bridge Scenario relative to the INDC Scenario, 2030
60 Coal
50 Oil
Gas
40
30
20
10
-10
-20
United European China India Southeast
States Union Asia
Note: Positive values are net savings in fossil-fuel trade bills, relative to the INDC Scenario.
Energy access
Secure access to modern energy has underpinned the development and prosperity gains of
every advanced economy to date. Expanding access to modern energy services, including
electricity and modern cooking facilities, is an important objective for many developing
countries. Aligning these priorities with decarbonisation goals is a crucial challenge.

In 2012, nearly 1.3 billion people had no access to electricity and 2.7 billion people relied
on the traditional use of biomass for cooking. The majority of people without access to 1
modern energy live in sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia. In the Bridge Scenario, the
number of people with access to electricity rises by 1.7 billion people until 2030, while 2
access to clean cooking devices rises by 1.6 billion (Figure 3.21). These are important
improvements, but they still leave almost 1 billion people without access to electricity in 3
2030 and 2.4 billion people without access to clean cooking, given the pace of growth of
the world’s population. The level of energy access reached in the Bridge Scenario is similar
4
to that in the INDC Scenario.
5
Figure 3.21 ⊳ Global population with and without access to electricity and
clean cooking in the Bridge Scenario
6
100% Without
electricity access 7
80% With electricity
access
Without clean
8
60% cooking access
With clean
cooking access
9
40%
5.7 6.5 7.0 7.4 4.3 5.0 5.5 6.0
20%
billion billion billion billion billion billion billion billion
10
11
2012 2020 2025 2030 2012 2020 2025 2030
12
In order to achieve a similar level of energy access as in the INDC Scenario, care in policy
design is required to protect the poorest against possible adverse impacts from the
13
proposed policies in the Bridge Scenario. For example, careful implementation of fossil-
fuel subsidy reforms needs to protect the poorest by redirecting at least a proportion of
savings to social programmes (Box 3.4). Under most existing forms of policy intervention, 13
the benefits tend to accrue disproportionately to wealthier segments of society. One
example of successful reform is the Kerosene to LPG Conversion Programme in Indonesia, 13
designed to facilitate a switch to the use of LPG for cooking purposes, thereby improving
access to modern energy and reducing the financial burden for the state associated with 14
the subsidies to kerosene. A similar programme has reduced kerosene use in New Delhi
and is currently being rolled out in several other Indian cities.
16
Energy efficiency policy also requires specific provision for the poorest. At a macro level,
increasing energy efficiency reduces the need to build supply-side capacity in order to 17
provide electricity access, usually allowing more people to be connected at the same
level of investment. It can also reduce the adverse health effects of using kerosene
lamps for lighting, or diesel generators for electricity during times of outage. At a micro
18

level, improving energy efficiency may increase purchasing costs when the least-efficient
appliances and light bulbs are banned. Where this is the case, careful design is required
to ensure that additional market barriers do not preclude the poorest segments of society
from being able to afford basic appliances. Measures to improve energy access may also,
of course, increase overall efficiency, such as where inefficient cookstoves are replaced by
more efficient ones.
Increasing investment for renewable energies generally has positive effects on increased
electricity access, for as long as the investment is additional. Off-grid renewables solutions,
such as solar home systems or small hydroelectric plants, can boost electricity access in
regions with important renewables potential, such as sub-Saharan Africa or India. In cases
where a large-scale push is being made to increase on-grid renewables, the integration
costs of renewables could increase electricity tariffs and put affordability at risk. Lower
tariffs for a basic level of consumption in the residential sector may be a satisfactory means
to mitigate the problem (while simultaneously incentivising energy efficiency), but the
system will need to be carefully monitored for unintended effects.

Chapter 4
Achieving the transition

Long-term energy sector transformation
Highlights
• The long-term transition to an energy system consistent with the 2 °C climate
goal, reflected in the 450 Scenario, entails fostering the development of new
technologies alongside the measures in the Bridge Scenario in the short term. These
developments make way for the widespread deployment of emerging technologies
to 2040 and beyond, keeping emissions in line with international climate goals.
• Deploying low-carbon technologies that are mature and commercially available in
most regions achieves close to 60% of the additional emissions reductions in the
450 Scenario relative to the Bridge Scenario. The remaining portion comes from
the deployment of emerging technologies. Government action to bring forward the
additional low-carbon technologies in the 450 Scenario rely on intensifying RD&D,
supporting market development and providing enabling infrastructure.
• Variable renewables account for significant investment today and are one of the most
strongly deployed low-carbon options in the 450 Scenario, saving 37 Gt CO2 over
the period to 2040. Integrating increasing levels of variable renewables eventually
requires more flexibility in the power system to maintain reliability, including
conventional power plants, energy storage and demand response. Speeding up
progress for some technologies, such as batteries, could ease the transition.
• CCS technologies are vital to decarbonising the power supply and industry in the
450 Scenario, capturing 52 Gt CO2 from 2015 to 2040, of which 5.1 Gt CO2 is in 2040.
The fuel consumption by CCS-equipped facilities creates revenues of $1.3 trillion
for both coal and gas producers respectively from 2015 to 2040. Deploying CCS
at scale drives down costs and improves its competitiveness as a CO2 abatement
option in the power sector. Knowledge of CO2 storage opportunities is expanding,
but national level attention is needed to support the widespread adoption of CCS.
• Today, transport-related emissions account for over 20% of global energy-related
CO2 emissions and are set to increase without the strong uptake of alternative fuel
vehicles. In the 450 Scenario, the deployment of electric vehicles and use of advanced
biofuels reduce oil consumption by 13.8 mboe/d in 2040 and reduce CO2 emissions
by 11.5 Gt from 2015 to 2040. The falling emissions intensity of grid electricity over
time, which fuels electric vehicles, helps to lower transport-related emissions.
• The transition to a low-carbon economy depends upon overcoming current
challenges and giving the right signals to innovators and financiers within an
appropriate market structure. Government intervention is needed to create
sustainable markets for low-carbon technologies, fill in RD&D funding gaps, create
the enabling infrastructure and encourage international collaboration.
Chapter 4 | Achieving the transition 105

Introduction
The Bridge Scenario, presented in Chapter 2, shows how the level of ambition to reduce
energy-related greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions can be raised appreciably at no cost to
global economic activity. Its outcome holds no suggestion that it represents some sort of limit
to what is politically feasible, nor is it offered in any sense, as an alternative to the existing
internationally adopted goal. On the contrary, the level of limitation of global energy-related
CO2 emissions is still far short of that goal. But it advances the level of achievement likely to
be reflected in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to be submitted
before the COP21 meeting in December 2015 in Paris, notably, bringing global energy-related
emissions to a peak by around 2020. The 450 Scenario (the main features of which are
discussed in Chapter 1), which is presented here, carries this process further by offering an
energy pathway to 2040 compatible with a 50% probability to limit the average temperature
rise to no more than 2 degrees Celsius (°C) (which entails limiting the concentration of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to no more than 450 parts per million).
Achieving an energy system which is compatible with climate goals remains a daunting
task. All the required tools are not yet to hand. But this chapter sets out a feasible path
consistent with the 2 °C goal, building on the achievements of the Bridge Scenario and
showing what steps are required. The world must manage the legacy of its existing energy
system, while harnessing established low-carbon energy sources and accelerating the
development and deployment of new technologies that have yet to be adopted at scale.
The analysis in this chapter is one of a number of possible pathways to 2 °C. One defining
element of the 450 Scenario is the increasing presence and weight of carbon pricing
around the world, supporting the expansion of all low-carbon technologies. It draws on the
potential contributions of emerging technologies across the energy system, but does not
rest on technological breakthroughs which are as yet only aspirations, nor is it offered as a
definitive, optimal pathway. Instead, the 450 Scenario depicts a pathway to the 2 °C climate
goal that can be achieved by fostering technologies that are close to becoming available at
commercial scale. Consistent with established and recent policy trends, it also incorporates
a host of regionally specific factors, including the extent of policy support for technologies,
public acceptance of different technologies, technology supply chains, areas of research,
development and demonstration (RD&D), consumer behaviour, energy market frameworks
and resource endowments. The world invests around $1.7 trillion per year on average from
2015 to 2040 into its energy-supply infrastructure in the 450 Scenario. However, this is
within 1% of the average energy-supply investment over the same period in the Bridge
Scenario, as energy demand is moderated through energy efficiency efforts and emerging
technologies reach maturity.
This chapter focuses on three essential requirements of a decarbonised world: widespread

deployment of low-carbon technologies in the power sector, technological advances to
sharply reduce the GHG emissions intensity of industrial energy use and achieving low-
carbon road transport. The analysis highlights the urgent need to develop the technologies

that help achieve a long-term decarbonisation path. In the absence of the full uptake of
these technologies, other pathways would require more difficult changes in how energy 1
is supplied and used, could reduce the quality of energy services and would incur higher
costs. A more comprehensive discussion of emerging technologies and the innovation 2
process are available in IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives 2015 (IEA, 2015a).
3
Technologies for transformation
The remaining global carbon budget is shrinking and the link between energy use and GHG
4
emissions must be broken for the world to meet agreed upon long-term climate goals.
While low-carbon technologies are being deployed in greater number already, the pace of 5
transformation needs to be accelerated and must overcome formidable new challenges as
they present themselves. This puts an important emphasis on bringing to maturity the most 6
promising technologies in terms of emissions reductions in the future. Transformational
change in the energy sector can be a very long process, reflecting the need to reconfigure 7
both the supply infrastructure and end-use energy equipment, while conforming to consumer
preferences. For example, it took 60 years to move from the first commercial production of
oil to its capturing 10% of the primary energy mix and 50 years before the volume of liquefied
8
natural gas (LNG) reached 30% of global gas trade. For emerging technologies, policies to
create initial markets must run alongside research and development programmes, far ahead 9
of the widespread deployment of the technologies, and draw on competitive market forces
where possible, paving the way for exponential growth. 10
In the 450 Scenario, many separate efforts help to reduce energy-related CO2 emissions
by 113 gigatonnes (Gt) more than in the Bridge Scenario over the period 2015 to 2040 11
(Figure 4.1). Half of the additional emissions reductions come from decarbonisation efforts in
power supply, followed by efforts in the industry sector (26% of total reductions), transport 12
(16%) and buildings (6%). Stronger deployment of technologies that are familiar and available
at commercial scale today delivers close to 60% of the emissions reductions of the 450
13
Scenario relative to the Bridge Scenario. Low-carbon power generation technologies that
have long been employed, such as hydropower (the largest source of low-carbon generation
today), nuclear power (the second-largest source), bioenergy and geothermal continue to 13
play an important role to decarbonise the power sector. In the 450 Scenario, an additional
245 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear capacity is built compared with the Bridge Scenario (in countries 13
where it is politically acceptable), leading nuclear power to make up 6% more of total power
generation in 2040 and to account for 12.9 Gt CO2 abatement from 2015 to 2040 (11% of 14
the total additional reductions). Hydropower, bioenergy and geothermal, already strongly
deployed in the Bridge Scenario, deliver an additional 6.6 Gt CO2 abatement (6% of the total).
16
In transport, gains in fuel economy for internal combustion engines and the expansion
of biofuels in regions where they have constituted a significant proportion of the fuel 17
supply for years (Brazil, United States and European Union) and in newer markets (China,
India and Southeast Asia), deliver an additional 15 Gt CO2 abatement over the period to
18
2040. Energy efficiency is a central pillar of the Bridge Scenario, yet substantial potential is

untapped. In the 450 Scenario, the majority of additional emissions reductions related to
end-use efficiency stem from a broader set of efficiency measures in industry, expanding
from a focus on electric motor systems to steam systems and the provision of process heat.
Taken together, the 450 Scenario includes energy efficiency measures in industry, buildings,
agriculture and other energy sectors that contribute 22 Gt of additional CO2 abatement
relative to the Bridge Scenario, one-fifth of the total additional emissions reductions.
Global cumulative CO2 emissions reductions in the 450 Scenario relative

Figure 4.1 ⊳
to the Bridge Scenario by measure, 2015-2040
113 Gt CO2 abatement
Advanced biofuels
Electric vehicles
End-use efficiency
CCS industry
Conventional biofuels
CCS power
Nuclear
Supply-side efficiency
Other renewables
Wind and solar PV Hydro, bioenergy and geothermal
Notes: End-use efficiency includes the effect of reduced activity levels, process changes and fuel switching. Supply-side
efficiency includes fuel switching by sector, such as coal-to-gas switching in power generation. Electric vehicles here take
into account pure-electric and plug-in passenger and commercial light-duty vehicles.
Fostering the development and deployment of emerging technologies expands the number
of low-carbon technologies available at scale on a commercial basis, providing more flexibility
for national mitigation strategies and lowering the overall cost. In the 450 Scenario, about
40% of the cumulative emissions reductions over the Bridge Scenario are attributable to the
widespread adoption of emerging technologies. Variable renewables, mainly wind power and
solar photovoltaics (PV), account for about 6.3 Gt of additional CO2 abatement beyond their
central role in reducing emissions in the Bridge Scenario. While wind power and solar PV
technologies are available today at commercial scale, they are grouped here with emerging
technologies because further improvements are expected to drive down costs substantially
and unlock more widespread deployment. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) becomes viable
in the 450 Scenario and is widely deployed in the power and industry sectors, accounting
for one-third of the additional CO2 reductions needed to put the world on track to 2 °C.
Alternative fuel vehicles contribute a smaller share of the total reductions, but are rapidly
gaining market share by 2040 and point the way to deeper emissions reductions thereafter.
Each of these three sets of technologies requires a carefully targeted approach to overcome
the associated challenges if it is to contribute on the necessary scale to the realisation of the
450 Scenario pathway and even deeper decarbonisation of the energy system beyond 2040:

 Variable renewables – to accommodate high shares of variable renewables, the power
system will have to be equipped with the flexibility needed to maintain the reliability 1
of the electricity supply. In the 450 Scenario, variable renewables increase from 3% of
global electricity generation today to more than 20% by 2040. 2
 Carbon capture and storage – wide deployment of CCS technologies in industry and
in the power sector depends on substantial unit cost reductions and the identification 3
of storage opportunities. In the 450 Scenario, rapid CCS expansion occurs after 2025,
matching the pace of expansion of gas-fired capacity between 1990 and 2010. 4
 Alternative fuel vehicles – technical and consumer challenges have to be overcome
in order to accelerate the transition to low-carbon forms of road transport, notably 5
electric cars. In the 450 Scenario, sales of electric vehicles (EVs) take-off, exceeding
40% of total passenger car sales worldwide in 2040. 6
Though local circumstances vary, the remainder of this chapter gives general guidance on
the requirements for success in these three areas. 7
Variable renewables 8
Opportunity
9
Driven by widespread policy support and declining costs, annual global investment in
renewables based power generation technologies already exceeds that in other types of
power plants and these technologies will feature increasingly as an essential element in 10
decarbonising the power sector. Annual investment in renewables reaches $400 billion in
2025 in the 450 Scenario, a level attained five years earlier than in the Bridge Scenario. 11
Investment continues to increase after 2025, with average investment in renewables over
2026-2040 running at $470 billion per year. Total installed renewables-based capacity more 12
than triples from today’s level to reach 6 200 GW in 2040, almost 60% of total installed
capacity at that time.
13
Installed capacity of variable renewables grows from about 450 GW today to 3 300 GW in
2040, representing more than 30% of total global installed capacity. Investment in variable 13
renewables accounts for more than half of total annual renewables investment throughout
the period 2015 to 2040 and far outpaces investment in other low-carbon technologies
13
(Figure 4.2). The increased investment creates a positive cycle, driving down the capital
costs of new projects, making them increasingly financially attractive and so expanding
market opportunities, in turn leading back to higher investment and greater deployment. 14
Together, variable renewables become a significant share of the power generation mix in
many regions by 2040; they account for over 30% of total generation in Europe, more than 16
20% in the United States, Japan and India, and close to 15% in Latin America and Africa.
The expansion of variable renewables saves about 37 Gt CO2 from 2015 to 2040, compared 17
with emissions if the rest of the power mix in each region were expanded proportionally
to replace variable renewables. While investment in low-carbon power technologies is
18
substantially higher in the 450 Scenario compared with the Bridge Scenario, it does not

raise total investment to the same extent: cumulative investment in the power sector from
2015 to 2040, including power plants and supporting infrastructure (i.e. transmission and
distribution), is only 13% higher overall, in part due to lower electricity demand achieved
through end-user energy efficiency efforts.
Figure 4.2 ⊳ Global average annual investment by low-carbon power

generation technologies in the 450 and Bridge Scenarios
2015-2025 2026-2040
300 450 Scenario
Solar PV
250
Wind
200 Other
Bridge Scenario:
150 Total
100
50
Var. Hydro Other CCS Nuclear Var. Hydro Other CCS Nuclear
renew renew renew renew
Note: Var. renew = variable renewables; other renew = other renewables.
Challenges
The reliability of power supply depends on the ability to match supply and demand in
real time, a task which will become more difficult at high penetration levels of variable
renewables. While variable renewables have been capturing large portions of recent
investment in new power capacity, there is little experience as yet of integrating these
technologies into power systems at medium penetration levels, let alone the higher levels
reached by 2040 in the 450 Scenario. Even in the Bridge Scenario, where one of the five
measures is enhanced investment in renewables, experience in handling high shares of
variables renewables is limited to a few regions, mainly the European Union and India.
While in the 450 Scenario, the deployment of variable renewables is widespread across all
regions and is pushed to higher levels of penetration, meaning integration challenges will
be faced in many more regions to some degree.
Integration challenges are related to the fact that output from a variable renewable energy
technology at any point in time depends on the momentary availability of renewable energy
sources (not including those which incorporate energy storage, such as concentrating solar
power [CSP] with thermal storage). The degree of challenge depends on the additional
variability introduced into the system as a result of the output from variable renewables
and the flexibility of the rest of the power system (IEA, 2014a). In other words, the
challenges are related to the extent that the variability of residual electricity demand

(total electricity demand minus the output from variable renewables) exceeds that of
total electricity demand and the ability of the rest of the system to handle the increased 1
variability. Solar PV and wind power are the most variable and least predictable renewable
energy sources on short timescales. Improvements in forecasting the output of wind and 2
solar PV, along with technological advances, such as innovative wind turbine designs, are
among the possible solutions. However, there will still be a need for the rest of the power 3
system to be able to provide larger and more rapid increases and decreases in output in
order to accommodate increasing amounts of variable renewables-based generation.
4
Figure 4.3 ⊳ Illustrative electricity load curve in India in the 450 Scenario, 2040 5
500 CSP
GW
Solar PV 6
400 Wind
Bioenergy
Oil 7
300
Gas
200
Coal 8
Hydro
Nuclear
100
9
10
00:00 04:00 08:00 12:00 16:00 20:00 00:00
Notes: The illustrative load curve is based on measured hourly load data in India in June 2012. Increasing demand for 11
cooling or other evolving electricity demands could alter the pattern of electricity demand.
12
Consider an illustrative example of the hourly power supply on a sunny day in India in June
(pre-monsoon season) 2040, based on the 450 Scenario, where nearly 190 GW of solar PV 13
capacity represents close to 40% of peak demand (Figure 4.3).1 The example balances supply
and demand over the whole of India, assuming the complete integration of the regional
power grids. The rapid expansion of solar PV output around mid-day has a large effect
13
on the rest of the power system. In total, output from the rest of the power system must
be reduced by about 40% in three hours; and, shortly thereafter, waning solar PV output 13
means that the rest of the system needs to ramp up strongly (increasing output by some
100 GW in three hours). In the system illustrated, output from coal- and gas-fired power 14
plants, hydropower and CSP can be adjusted to the extent and at the speed necessary to
accommodate the variable solar PV output. However, the adjustments required of these
16
power plants are much larger in order to accommodate the variable output of solar PV
than they would be to match changes in electricity demand. On the one hand, transmission
17
1. World Energy Outlook 2015, to be released 10 November 2015, will contain a special focus on the energy outlook in 18
India.

constraints that might be present in 2040 could make the situation more difficult, limiting
the full use of the flexibility of the power plant fleet. On the other hand, other measures,
such as energy storage, could alleviate some of the strain by shifting some demand to the
hours when solar PV output is highest.
The integration of high levels of variable renewables into power systems may also require
market framework reforms to guarantee a sufficient level of investment in the conventional
power plants needed to keep the system in balance, together with other measures to shift
demand when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing. Failing to address these
needs in advance will negatively impact the reliability of the power system. For example,
failing to expand grid interconnections can leave small regions with an imbalance of supply
and demand which could have been accommodated over a larger region with sufficient
interconnections. Difficulties of this sort, if not overcome, could stifle the support of
further renewables deployment and put greater pressure on other low-carbon options,
such as nuclear power and CCS.
Solutions
A range of solutions, both on the supply and demand sides, can help overcome the
integration challenges facing variable renewables, each with different strengths and
weaknesses (Table 4.1). Initially, there is unlikely to be a problem, but as variable renewables
gain market share and increase the variability that the rest of the power system has to
manage, some measures will be needed, such as ensuring that the grid infrastructure is
sufficiently developed in order to balance the output from variable renewables over a large
region. Expanding grid infrastructure also helps to take advantage of the flexibility of the
rest of the power plant fleet. Eventually, at high levels of variable renewables, demand-
side measures must also be part of the solution. Indeed, some demand-side measures are
available at low cost and should be considered well before they are necessary to maintain
reliability. While many measures exist today, not all have yet achieved the performance
or cost level needed to make them attractive. Further technology development, through
RD&D activities, is an essential element in facilitating the degree of decarbonisation of the
power sector that is required to stay on the path to 2 °C beyond 2040.
On the supply side, fossil-fuelled generators and dispatchable renewables (such as

reservoir hydropower, bioenergy-based power plants and CSP plants with thermal storage)
can contribute to the flexibility of the power system. Nuclear power plants can also adjust
their output in line with demand changes (as in France, though they are generally operated
at a constant level of output). Another way to balance electricity supply and demand is by
curtailing renewables output when it is disruptive to the system (typically when supply is
high but demand is relatively low), but this reduces the amount of electricity generated
and net project revenues (a disincentive to investment). Hydropower is one of the most
flexible conventional technologies as it is able to rapidly ramp up to full capacity or down
to zero output over the span of minutes. This characteristic means that countries with
large amounts of hydropower, such as Brazil and Canada, potentially are well-positioned
to integrate high levels of variable renewables without significant operational challenges.

Expanding grid interconnections and smart grid development are important supply-side
measures that help to optimise grid operations by improving the use of the available supply 1
and demand options. However, in and of themselves, grid infrastructure can integrate only
low to moderate levels of variable renewables before other measures are required. 2
Table 4.1 ⊳ Power system flexibility options and characteristics 3

Adjusts Adjusts Speed of Ability to Ability to 4
Measure power power power integrate improve power Affordability
supply demand adjustment renewables* quality**
Interconnections
5
    
Conventional capacity
6
• Hydropower     
• Coal-fired     
• Gas CCGT     
7
• Gas and oil GT     
Curtail renewables
8
    
Smart grids       9
Energy storage
• Pumped hydro       10
• Batteries      
Demand response      11
*Indicates the ability of a system with a high penetration of the measure to integrate high shares of variable renewables,
for example, without additional measures conventional capacity (even hydropower) cannot accommodate very high 12
levels of variable renewables. **Indicates the ability of a measure to provide ancillary services, such as frequency
regulation.
13
Notes:  = high,  = moderate,  = low to none. CCGT = combined-cycle gas turbine; GT = gas turbine.
13
Energy storage technologies are able to adjust both the supply of electricity to the grid and
13
demand for electricity from the grid, making it both a supply- and demand-side measure
to some degree. Moreover, energy storage technologies may be deployed in large-scale
projects by electricity suppliers or small-scale projects by households and other end-users. 14
Energy storage technologies have impressive performance capabilities to address many
needs related to the integration of variable renewables, but many are relatively expensive. 16
Pumped hydropower is the exception, as its relatively low cost explains why it makes up
almost all energy storage capacity connected to the grid today. Other grid-connected 17
energy storage options collectively account for a very small share of total energy storage
capacity and employ a wide array of technologies that could play an increasingly important
18
role in power systems at higher penetration levels of variable renewables and as their

costs improve (Box 4.1). For example, at low to medium levels of variable renewables, the
main need is to counterbalance rising and falling output on a timescale of minutes. Despite
recent declines in battery costs (see Alternative Fuel Vehicles below), gas-fired gas turbines
(GTs) can, at present, meet this need for a fraction of the cost of batteries.
Box 4.1 ⊳ Prospects for energy storage
Today, energy storage technologies account for about 145 GW of installed capacity
worldwide (2% of global installed power generation capacity). Pumped storage
hydropower accounts for nearly all of this capacity, supplemented by a mix of battery
systems, compressed air energy storage, flywheels and hydrogen storage. Strong
decarbonisation efforts in the power sector could push global storage installations to
well over 400 GW by 2050 (IEA, 2014b). The value of storing electricity varies according
to the circumstances. Beyond storing electricity when it is abundant and supplying it
when it is scarce, electricity storage can offer a variety of services, including improving
grid power quality, improving the quality of energy services in off-grid electrification,
reducing investment needs in transmission infrastructure, providing independence
from the power grid and enabling electrification of end-uses, e.g. transport.
Additional RD&D spending on storage can lead to cost reductions that, combined with
ongoing cost reductions for variable renewables, could change the face of the power
system. For example, batteries are an attractive RD&D target, as they offer modularity,
controllability and responsiveness; but their energy density, charging times and overall
costs need considerable improvement to unlock their full potential. Battery technology
improvements would provide gains in applications beyond the power sector, particularly
in transport. While electricity storage receives most attention and RD&D funding, other
storage options, including thermal storage, should not be overlooked. In many cases,
thermal storage is more economic than electricity storage and increases the efficiency
of the energy system by using waste heat. Other technologies that consume electricity
to produce a useful product that can be stored in large quantities, such as hydrogen or
desalinated water, should also be given increased attention in RD&D efforts.
Regulatory frameworks need to be designed to leverage the value of adjusting

electricity demand to ease the strain on the supply side. As an example of how this
can be addressed, since 2007 the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
has issued several orders amending market rules in order to allow demand response
and energy storage technologies to participate in established energy markets (e.g. for
ancillary services) and to receive a higher level of remuneration for higher levels of
performance (e.g. faster responding frequency regulation).2
2. For example, FERC Order 755 in 2011 and Order 784 in 2013 opened ancillary markets to energy storage and
Order 1000 in 2011 requires the consideration of both transmission and transmission alternatives, which includes energy
storage and demand response, during regional transmission planning processes.

Demand-side measures can ease the burden on supply-side measures at every stage of
variable renewables penetration by improving the alignment of electricity demand with 1
variable renewables output. At high levels of variable renewables penetration, demand-
side measures become a key option to maintain power system reliability. In addition to 2
energy storage technologies, demand response is widely available across regions and end-
use sectors. Industry has the most accessible potential, followed by the services and the 3
residential sectors. Programmes are in place in these three sectors in the United States,
where 30 GW of demand-side resources were available in 2013 (SEDC, 2013), and in the
4
European Union, while initial efforts have also been made in industry in China. Residential
potential is the hardest to tap, facing co-ordination, predictability, verification and
consumer behaviour challenges. 5
Power market frameworks will need to be modified to provide sufficient economic
incentives to bring forth the needed supply- and demand-side measures to maintain the
6
reliability of the power supply as large amounts of variable renewables are deployed.
Numerous measures are possible. Capacity payments to reflect the ability to generate 7
electricity at any time can provide an additional revenue stream to help maintain enough
conventional capacity to ensure system adequacy. Care should be taken in the design 8
of capacity mechanisms to be technology neutral, including between existing and new
power plants. Measures that support the strengthening of regional grid interconnections, 9
development of smart grid technologies, steps to encourage energy storage and support for
demand-response programmes all have a part to play. In competitive wholesale electricity
markets, allowing price spikes at times of scarcity and dips at times of abundance can
10
increase revenues to generators and energy storage technologies, but public acceptance is
likely to be a problem. 11
Carbon capture and storage 12

Opportunity
Carbon capture and storage, through a suite of technologies, separates and captures CO2
13
from power and industrial sources, then transports the CO2 to a suitable site for injection
into deep underground formations for permanent storage. CCS makes possible the strong 13
reduction of net CO2 emissions from fossil-fuelled power plants and industrial processes,
providing a protection strategy for power plants that would otherwise be decommissioned, 13
mothballed or suffer reduced operations in a carbon-constrained world (IEA, 2013a;
IEA, 2013b). As well as fossil fuels, CCS may also be used in combination with sustainable 14
biomass, resulting in so-called “negative emissions”.3
16
3. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) enables negative emissions because CO2 sequestered during the
growth of biomass is not released after the biomass is combusted or refined to produce biofuel. The CO2 captured and
stored underground outweighs the emissions related to producing the biomass, including those from land-use change
17
and transformation into the final product. BECCS could be used in a wide range of applications, including power plants,
combined heat and power plants, flue gas streams from the pulp and paper industry, fermentation in ethanol production 18
and biogas refining processes.

In the 450 Scenario, CCS is increasingly adopted from around the mid-2020s, with
deployment accelerating in the 2030s and capturing around 5.1 Gt of CO2 emissions per
year by 2040 (nearly triple India’s energy sector emissions today) (Figure 4.4), close to
4.9 Gt higher than in the Bridge Scenario. Over the period 2015 to 2040, about 52 Gt of
CO2 emissions are captured. This involves a massive increase in CCS deployment over
the 13 large-scale projects in operation today, which capture a total of about 27 Mt CO2
per year (though only 5.6 Mt CO2 at present is being stored with full monitoring and
verification). To date, CCS investments have been made in sectors in which costs are
relatively manageable (e.g. natural gas processing or refining) and where the captured CO2
has a valuable application, such as for enhanced oil recovery. Widespread deployment will
require moving well beyond these boundaries. Not all countries deploy CCS technologies
in the 450 Scenario, but it is an important part of mitigation action in China and the United
States, and to a lesser extent in India and the Middle East. Several other countries in Asia-
Pacific, Europe and Latin America may also need to rely on CCS to achieve the required
level of cuts in GHG emissions. Global investment to build CCS grows from a few billion
dollars today to about $70 billion per year in the 2020s, on average, and to $110 billion per
year in the 2030s. Investment in RD&D, mapping storage sites and other enabling factors
needs to begin now. Of the cumulative investment in CCS to 2040, around 60% goes to the
power sector and the remainder is made in industry.
Figure 4.4 ⊳ CO2 captured in the 450 Scenario by sector and region
6 Industry
Gt
Other non-OECD
5 India
China
Other OECD
4
United States
3 Power generation
Other non-OECD
2 India
China
Other OECD
1 United States
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Note: Industry includes the following sectors: steel, cement (energy- and process-related), chemicals and paper
production; oil refining; coal-to-liquids, gas-to-liquids and natural gas processing.
In the 450 Scenario, installed capacity of power plants with CCS technologies begins to
increase notably from the 2020s (averaging 20 GW per year) and growing rapidly in the
2030s (averaging over 50 GW per year). Global CCS capacity in the power sector reaches
740 GW in 2040, 20% of fossil-fuelled power generation capacity at that time. The global

average CO2 intensity of all power generation in the 450 Scenario falls to about 85 grammes
per kilowatt-hour in 2040, less than one-tenth of the average level of an unabated coal-fired 1
power plant today and one-fifth of the level of an unabated gas-fired power plant. Without
CCS, neither coal nor gas-fired power plants could retain such a significant market share 2
as they do in the 450 Scenario (gas-fired generation accounts for 16% of total generation
in 2040 and coal-fired generation accounts for 12%). Given carbon pricing or other policy 3
measures to incentivise low-carbon operations, equipping these plants with CCS can be
a commercially sound investment, allowing them to operate for more hours. The retrofit
4
of existing plants with CCS can provide plants with a new lease on life as low-carbon
generators, which could be particularly important in countries like China that already have
a large fleet of coal- and gas-fired power plants and where coal prices are anticipated to 5
remain relatively low (Spotlight).
In industry, CO2 capture increases to more than 2 Gt in 2040 in the 450 Scenario, playing
6
an important role in putting the overall emissions from the sector on a declining path.
Most of this CCS capacity is installed in non-OECD countries, led by China, India, Russia 7
and the Middle East, with lesser amounts in OECD countries, led by the United States and
Europe. Important industrial sectors, such as iron and steel, and cement, already see CCS as 8
a serious abatement option if they are to achieve deep cuts in emissions. In large part, this
is because the chemistry of their processes produces CO2 that cannot be avoided without 9
radically changing inputs and products, with major knock-on implications for their value
chains. In the 450 Scenario, CO2 capture is led by the cement sector (1.0 Gt CO2 in 2040),
iron and steel (nearly 500 Mt) and chemicals (about 300 Mt CO2). To reach these levels
10
of CO2 capture means that around half of global cement and steel production capacity is
equipped with CCS in 2040, along with a large share of chemicals production. In the case 11
of chemicals, about 60% of the savings comes from ammonia and methanol production,
which offer an attractive opportunity for early action due to the purity of the CO2 in their 12
flue gases, making its capture relatively inexpensive. Installing CCS would raise operating
costs for power plants (by lowering efficiencies); but it also acts as a safeguard for assets
13
in power generation and industry which could otherwise become stranded (see Chapter 3,
Box 3.3), as well as preserving value for fossil-fuel producers. For example, over the period
to 2040 in the 450 Scenario, facilities equipped with CCS in the power and industry sectors 13
consume about 15 billion tonnes of coal equivalent that would be worth $1.3 trillion and
4 000 billion cubic metres of natural gas worth about $1.3 trillion at the prevailing fuel prices 13
in the 450 Scenario. Countries and companies with revenue streams from the extraction
and processing of fossil fuels thus have a clear interest in supporting the development and 14
deployment of CCS.
16
17
18

S P O T L I G H T
China’s coal-fired power fleet and CCS retrofits

China’s power sector accounted for 4.5 Gt CO2 in 2013, 14% of global energy-related CO2
emissions. Combined with the expectation for continued economic and energy demand
growth in China, reducing emissions from its power sector will be important to lowering
global emissions. The installed capacity of coal-fired power plants in China was about
860 GW in 2014 (45% of global coal-fired capacity), all without CCS, and that figure is
expected to rise through to 2020. In the 450 Scenario, coal-fired capacity in China falls
by 30% percent by 2040 despite the widespread adoption of CCS (Figure 4.5). Along
with about 50 GW of new builds with CCS, about 280 GW of coal-fired power plants are
retrofitted with CCS by 2040 in the 450 Scenario. Without these retrofits, which can be
a relatively low-cost CO2 abatement option in the power sector, many more large power
plants would face closure before the end of their technical lifetime.
Figure 4.5 ⊳ China installed coal-fired power generation capacity in the

Bridge and 450 Scenarios
Bridge Scenario 450 Scenario

1 000 10 000 Unabated coal
GW
TWh
CCS retrofits
800 8 000 New-build CCS
Electricity demand
600 6 000 (right axis)
400 4 000
200 2 000
2014
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2014
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
Note: TWh = terawatt-hour.
While it is technically feasible to add post-combustion CO2 capture to almost any plant,
the economic decision to retrofit will be more attractive for larger plants that have higher
efficiencies and flue gas desulphurisation, and have yet to reach the end of their technical
lifetime. Nearly half of China’s existing fleet is likely to meet these criteria in 2025 and, as such,
could be excellent candidates for the addition of CCS. Available space onsite for the capture
equipment and good access to facilities for CO2 transport and storage will also be critical
factors for CCS retrofits. Up to three-quarters of China’s existing coal-fired power plants are
within 250 km of potential storage sites, one indicator that significant retrofit potential exists.
For new plants, it is important to ensure that they are located and built making provision for
future CCS installation, reserving the required space onsite and situated, where possible, in
proximity to CO2 storage sites. A first step is to incentivise public or private organisations to
explore CO2 storage capacity and bring CO2 storage services to the market.

Challenges
1
The two main challenges to widespread deployment of CCS technologies in the power sector
are the need to bring down the costs to a level that sustains competition with other low-
carbon technologies and to establish plant sites where CO2 storage is available and economic. 2
In addition, as with any new technology, it will be important to win public acceptance by
addressing any concerns that may arise. Stakeholder engagement and broad access to balanced 3
information on all aspects of the technology can help mitigate risks of delays and unnecessary
hurdles. The commercial-scale CCS projects underway today are providing information about 4
the costs (though they are still first-of-a-kind costs). In 2014, the first commercial-scale CCS
power plant came online in Canada (SaskPower Boundary Dam Unit 3), after the retrofitting of
5
an existing coal-fired facility at a cost of around $6 000 per kilowatt (kW) for the CO2 capture
equipment. The developer has estimated that the next project could be completed at a cost
30% lower. The Kemper County project in the United States (scheduled to begin operating 6
in 2016) is the first new-build power plant with CO2 capture (and also one of a handful of
integrated coal gasification combined-cycle [IGCC] power plants in the world). The project has 7
experienced considerable cost overruns, largely related to the IGCC technology, that put the
latest cost estimates at around $9 500/kW, including all construction costs. At these initial levels 8
of cost, government support will be necessary to create more market opportunities, thereby
generating the additional experience needed to bring down costs. Applying a learning rate of
11% (per doubling of capacity) to the cost of CO2 capture, in line with learning rates experienced
9
for other power plant emissions control technologies (e.g. flue gas desulphurisation and
selective catalytic reduction systems) (Rubin et al., 2004), the strong deployment of CCS in the 10
450 Scenario drives down the total capital cost of a new coal-fired power plant with CCS from
an estimated $6 000/kW in 2020 to $4 300/kW in 2030 and $4 000/kW in 2040. 11
What such costs mean for the competitiveness of CCS against other low-carbon
technologies depends on local circumstances. For example, consider the US power sector, 12
where hydropower and nuclear power have long been the largest low-carbon sources of
power generation and both sources will continue to expand over time in the 450 Scenario. 13
However, a range of other considerations, not least of which are public acceptance and
physical resource limitations,4 indicate the need for the strong deployment of other
13
low-carbon power generation technologies. Four additional utility-scale options to reduce
CO2 emissions related to the power supply are potentially widely available:
13
 Coal-to-gas switching, replacing coal-fired generation with gas-fired generation based
on the existing fleet of power plants.
14
 New onshore wind projects.
 New utility-scale solar PV installations. 16

 New coal- or gas-fired power plants equipped with CCS or retrofitting existing coal-
and gas-fired power plants with CCS. 17
4. Additional hydropower potential has been identified at existing dam sites (Hadjerioua et al., 2012) and for new run- 18
of-river projects (Kao et al., 2014), though environmental and political concerns have so far limited their development.

Building a new gas-fired combined‑cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant is taken as the
standard of comparison, since such plants are widely available and generally, at present,
the preferred option for new capacity. Based on the additional costs and resulting CO2
emissions reductions for each option, CCS is not generally a competitive abatement option
in the near term when compared with coal-to-gas switching or with building wind power
projects (Figure 4.6). Nevertheless, continued development of CCS is critical for the longer
term, as it expands the range of low-cost, low-carbon technologies available in the power
sector, also adding to the set of low-carbon options with controllable output that will be
needed in some regions to integrate increasing contributions from variable renewables
(see previous section). With the deployment of about 200 GW of CCS (including both gas-
and coal-fired power plants) in the United States by 2040 (and about 740 GW worldwide),
it becomes a competitive abatement option with wind power and solar PV over time, and
is more attractive than the dwindling opportunities for coal-to-gas switching, due to rising
gas prices and the fact that little unabated coal-fired generation remains.
Figure 4.6 ⊳ Costs to reduce CO2 emissions relative to gas CCGTs in the

United States by selected technologies in the 450 Scenario
2020 2030 2040

400
$/tCO2 abated
Coal CCS
6 000 $/kW
300
200 Coal CCS

4 300 $/kW
Coal CCS
4 000 $/kW
100
Coal-to-gas
CCS
Coal-to-gas
Coal-to-gas
Solar PV
Solar PV
Solar PV
CCS
CCS
Onshore wind
Onshore wind
Onshore wind
Notes: coal-to-gas compares the operating costs of existing gas CCGTs with existing coal-fired power plants. Onshore
wind, solar PV (utility-scale) and CCS compare the range of projected levelised costs of each technology with the levelised
cost of a new gas CCGT, not including carbon costs. The range for solar PV in 2020 also includes comparison with the
levelised cost of a new gas GT, as its output largely coincides with peak hours of demand. CCS includes the range of
abatement costs for new builds and retrofits of both coal- and gas-fired power plants. The levelised costs of utility-
scale solar PV are projected to fall from $105-140 per megawatt-hour (MWh) in 2020 to $80-105 per MWh in 2030 and
$70-95 per MWh in 2040.
In China, the CO2 abatement options in the power sector also include hydropower, which
offers the lowest-cost emissions reductions. Beyond hydropower and nuclear power, the
four main abatement options in the power sector are the same as those in the United States,

though higher gas prices in China make coal-to-gas switching far less attractive and change
the basis of comparison to high-efficiency coal-fired plants (the most widely available and 1
deployed technology). In 2020, onshore wind offers the lowest abatement costs after
hydropower, at less than $20 per tonne of CO2 (tCO2) abated, followed by utility-scale solar 2
PV (generally less than $50/tCO2), while the cost of abatement for CCS is in the range of
$50-100 per tCO2. Coal-to-gas switching is an expensive way to reduce emissions in China, 3
with an estimated abatement cost of $120/tCO2 or higher throughout the period to 2040.
Investment in RD&D and learning through deployment reduce the costs of abatement
4
through CCS to $10‑70 per tCO2 in 2040, still generally higher than the estimated abatement
cost for onshore wind power and solar PV projects.
5
Opportunities for the widespread use of CCS also depend on the proximity of suitable
geological CO2 storage sites. Large-scale CO2 capture projects will not be financially
attractive unless there is confidence that sufficient storage capacity is available and can
6
be reached at reasonable cost – considering both the costs of CO2 transport and storage.
In terms of the science of CO2 storage, the global knowledge base continues to grow, with 7
results accumulating from both commercial projects storing a million tonnes per year in
Norway, Canada and the United States, as well as smaller research projects. The risks of 8
leakage and other sources of harm in both the short and long term are low where best
practices are followed. However, whereas CO2 capture technologies can be transferred 9
relatively easily between countries, the subsurface knowledge needed to understand
CO2 storage potential is inherently local and can be developed only through exploration.
Development of a CO2 storage site can take close to a decade and can account for around
10
half of total CO2 storage costs, making early exploration and development a strategic
investment to enable decarbonisation. But there is currently insufficient activity focused 11
on converting storage resources to commercial capacity. The upfront cost and inherent
risk of exploration, coupled with the other uncertainties currently surrounding the 12
future of CCS and competition with the oil and gas sector for skills and capital, suggest
governments will need to play a role in encouraging development of the CO2 transport and
13
storage businesses. The Crown Estate in the United Kingdom, Gassnova in Norway, and
CarbonNet in Australia are rare examples of public bodies working towards development
of commercial CO2 storage assets. Such activities will need to be accelerated if the 13
underpinning infrastructure for CCS is to be available on a timescale consistent with the
450 Scenario. 13
Even without government support to expand market opportunities for CCS, it is still likely
to be deployed in certain applications in industry and the oil and gas sector. But the path 14
to meet the 2 °C climate goal would be more difficult, limiting the range of low-carbon
options. Renewables, including variable renewables, would need to make up some of 16
the ground and pressure would grow for some countries to expand their nuclear power
programmes. Without CCS, there would also be a higher risk of stranded assets, in a world 17
already likely to be carrying higher costs to hold to a 2 °C pathway. In industry, there are
currently no alternatives to reach the same level of emissions reductions, as maximum
fuel switching and energy efficiency measures would only achieve a fraction of the CCS
18

reductions. Ultimately, a lack of CCS would probably lead to other sectors having to carry
more of the burden to make up for higher emissions from industry. While not as detrimental
to the outlook for CCS technologies, failing systematically to increase local knowledge of
CO2 storage opportunities will slow the deployment of CCS, as individual developers have
to identify suitable sites and incur the related costs.
Solutions
Nonetheless, CCS does become a widely competitive CO2 abatement option by 2040 in
the 450 Scenario, with the United States and China accounting for about 80% of the CCS
installations in the power sector. This level of penetration can be brought forth by three
types of actions:
 Regulatory measures and targeted incentives to promote more large-scale projects.

As examples of what can be done, the Gorgon LNG project in Australia is authorised
by a law that obliges it to incorporate CCS and the Decatur bioethanol plant in the
United States is viable for CCS due to tax credits for CO2 storage. However, in sectors
where CCS represents a larger share of production costs, such as power generation
or cement, policies guaranteeing a sustained reduction in both capital and operating
costs may be needed to trigger investment in the near term. It will be essential for CCS
projects to have access to climate funds, including those being developed within the
UNFCCC, bilateral and other multilateral initiatives.
 The continued pursuit of research and development to improve technologies and
address challenges that arise during early commercialisation. In this area, the
emergence of pilot facilities that provide open access to developers to test and
evaluate CO2 capture technologies is encouraging, such as those in Canada, Norway,
United Kingdom and United States.
 Policies to encourage the early exploration for and development of CO2 storage
capacity. Insufficient incentives exist today. All investment decisions for CCS depend
on confidence that the CO2 can be safely stored. While large-scale projects and RD&D
will generate globally transferrable knowledge and safeguards, the development of CO2
storage resources needs to be undertaken regionally and well in advance of deployment.
Alternative fuel vehicles

Opportunity
The transport sector is the second-largest emitter of CO2 emissions after power generation.
It accounts for more than one-fifth (7.3 Gt) of global energy-related CO2 emissions today,
a rise from 3.3 Gt/year in the 1970s. Road transport (passenger and freight) is the primary
cause of the increase, accounting for over 80% of the growth, due to its heavy reliance on
oil. Despite many attempts, dependence on oil as a transport fuel has not been overcome.
Biofuels, in particular, have made some inroads, but still meet only 2% of road transport
fuel demand today (mostly in Brazil, United States and European Union). Natural gas, as
a road transport fuel, is important in some markets, such as Brazil, Pakistan and Iran, and

has seen impressive growth in China and the United States over the last few years; but it
remains a carbon-based fuel, which cannot deliver the long-term decarbonisation that is 1
required in the transport sector. To date, sales of electric vehicles5 represent well below 1%
of global car sales, far below the volumes required in the 450 Scenario. 2
Growing demand for mobility, particularly from emerging markets, threatens to continue
to push up transport oil demand, increasing the need for the development and deployment 3
of alternative fuel vehicles in order to decouple mobility growth from emissions growth
and put the world on track to meeting the 2 °C climate goal. In the 450 Scenario, electricity 4
(through electric vehicles) and advanced biofuels6 are the main alternative fuel options
that deliver the deeper emissions reductions required from the transport sector. Together, 5
they reduce oil consumption by 13.8 million barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2040 and
energy-related CO2 emissions by 11.5 Gt over the period 2015 to 2040, compared with
the average fuel economy of the remaining vehicle fleet. Hydrogen (through hydrogen-
6
powered fuel-cell vehicles) also plays a role, but to a much lesser extent.
7
Figure 4.7 ⊳ Global light-duty vehicle sales by type in the 450 Scenario (left)
and global cumulative oil savings by scenario from electric
8
vehicles and advanced biofuels, 2015-2040 (right)
9
200 Internal 40
Million
Billon barrels of oil equivalent

combustion
engine
vehicles
10
150 30
Electric
vehicles 11
100 Advanced 20
biofuels
12
50 10
13
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 Bridge 450
Scenario Scenario 13
Notes: Light-duty vehicles include passenger and commercial vehicles; internal combustion engine vehicles include
hybrid, natural gas and flex-fuel vehicles; electric vehicles include pure-electric and plug-in hybrids.
13
The use of biofuels (primarily in road and aviation sectors) more than doubles in the 14
450 Scenario, relative to the Bridge Scenario. Their use, reaching 8.7 million barrels
per day (mb/d) in 2040 in the 450 Scenario, displaces the need for refined petroleum
16
5. EVs here include plug-in hybrids and battery-electric vehicles.

17
6. Advanced biofuels here refer to those produced from conversion technologies that are currently in the research and
development, pilot or demonstration phase. This differs from the definition applied in the US Renewable Fuel Standard, 18
which is based on a minimum 50% life-cycle greenhouse-gas reduction and therefore includes sugarcane ethanol.

products, namely gasoline, diesel and kerosene. Around 30% of the increase in biofuels
use comes from the aviation sector, which has few viable alternatives to oil (on-board
storage is a major limitation for hydrogen and electricity). As a result, the fuel mix in
the 450 Scenario is much more diversified by 2040, and biofuels earn a share of around
17% for world transport demand as a whole. A large part of the increase in biofuels use
is due to the development and deployment of advanced biofuels that can be sustainably
manufactured from non-food, cellulosic feedstocks and algae, and can be used in vehicles
and other transport modes, e.g. as aviation jet fuel. Advanced biofuels are assumed to be
commercially available at scale from 2020 onwards in the 450 Scenario. As biofuels can
readily be supplied through the existing refuelling infrastructure, the use of advanced
biofuels can expand rapidly, reaching more than 10% of road transport fuel demand by
2040, and 33% in the aviation sector.
Sales of EVs also grow rapidly in the 450 Scenario. From around 2020, they make a
notable impact on global vehicle sales, reaching nearly 25% by 2030 and more than 40%
by 2040 (Figure 4.7). Total annual EV sales reach nearly 80 million vehicles by 2040,
equivalent to the global vehicle sales of all types in 2010. Primarily, the increase in sales
in the 450 Scenario is driven by the large vehicle markets: China, India, United States and
European Union. Road transport provided by EVs reduces global oil demand by around
1.5 mb/d in 2030 and nearly 6 mb/d in 2040. One primary benefit of using EVs, which use
a highly efficient electric motor for propulsion, is that they can shift transport emissions
from millions of mobile sources to a much smaller number of stationary sources in the
power sector. If centralised power generation relies on low-carbon sources, as in the
450 Scenario, EVs effectively reduce overall GHG emissions. Climate change is not the
only reason to promote electric vehicles; as EVs do not emit air pollutants and make
little noise, they are well suited to urban use. In China, for example, air quality concerns
have already supported the introduction of 230 million electric scooters in place of diesel
scooters (IEA, 2015b). Innovative programs, such as the Autolib system in France, can
also serve to increase the uptake of EVs in urban areas, displacing the need for personal
vehicles.7
A shift to EVs always reduces CO2 emissions directly from the transport sector, as there
are no emissions at the point of use. However, power sector emissions may increase due
to the additional electricity demand from EVs (which also have the advantage of higher
motor conversion efficiencies compared with conventional cars). Therefore, the extent to
which EVs can contribute to energy-related CO2 emissions reductions depends critically on
the carbon-intensity of the power mix. Today, EVs generally offer overall CO2 mitigation
benefits compared with new gasoline internal combustion engines (ICE) cars, unless the
power system is heavily dominated by coal and the overall emissions intensity of electricity
is 800 g CO2/kWh or above. Due to their relatively carbon-intensive power mix, the benefit
7. Autolib is a subscription-based electric vehicle sharing programme in Paris, France. Autolib estimates that
3 000 vehicles will displace ownership of 22 500 private vehicles, www.autolib.eu/en/.

of EVs is lowest today in some countries in Asia, including China, India and Indonesia, but
with increasing power sector decarbonisation, such as in the 450 Scenario, the emissions 1
reductions become more pronounced over time (Figure 4.8).
2
Figure 4.8 ⊳ On-road emissions intensity of gasoline-fuelled and electric
vehicles by selected region in the Bridge and 450 Scenarios 3
200
Gasoline ICE Electric vehicles
2013
4
g CO2/km
2030:
160 Bridge Scenario 5
450 Scenario
120
6
80
7
40
8
Global Global United China European India
States Union
Notes: Emissions intensity of electric vehicles is based on the emissions intensity of grid-supplied electricity by region. 9
The global figure is based on the world average emissions intensity of electricity.
10
Hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles can also contribute to decarbonisation of the road transport
sector. The idea of hydrogen as a transport fuel for vehicles has attracted the interest of
11
industries, government and the public since the 1960s. There are signs of renewed attention
today. Toyota has just launched the Mirai (“Future”) in Japan, the first commercially
available hydrogen fuel-cell car; Hyundai is targeting to sell several thousand vehicles soon 12
(the Hyundai Tucson Fuel-Cell Electric Vehicle has been available for lease since mid-2014);
and Honda has announced its intention to launch a hydrogen-powered car in 2016. During 13
the past decade, several global public-private partnerships have been created to secure
funding for co-ordinated action to promote the application of fuel-cell technology beyond 13
the car industry (e.g. in California, Europe, Japan, Korea and recently in Dubai). But no such
alternative applications on a commercial basis have yet been announced and widespread
adoption of hydrogen has so far failed to materialise.
13
One big potential advantage of hydrogen-fuelled vehicles is that their range is not limited 14
like that of an EV, a subject of considerable consumer anxiety. The refuelling time is also
generally much lower than the charging time of a battery. If hydrogen is produced from
low-carbon sources, the CO2 benefits offered are comparable to those of EVs. There are,
16
however, serious challenges constraining the outlook for deployment of hydrogen vehicles
(discussed below) and their use in the 450 Scenario remains limited. 17
18

Challenges
For EVs, the key barriers that currently hold back their deployment include their relatively
high cost, the low energy density (and correspondingly heavy weight) of batteries and
the lack of recharging infrastructure. Despite recent cost reductions, batteries remain the
most costly component of EVs. From an industry perspective, the prize for developing a
battery that makes EVs competitive with conventional cars is potentially huge, as is already
reflected in the significant level of research and investment (IEA, 2015c). Industry-wide
estimates of the cost of batteries declined by approximately 14% annually between 2007
and 2014 (from above $1 000/kWh to around $400/kWh) and the cost of the battery packs
of market-leading manufacturers are even lower ($300/kWh), revealing cost reductions of
6% to 9% for each doubling of cumulative production (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015). In some
cases, EVs have had significant success in the marketplace in recent years: for example,
in Norway, EVs were reported to make up 10% to 15% of monthly passenger vehicle
sales in 2014 supported by tax breaks and other incentives. Electric vehicle fleets – such
as taxis, buses, delivery vehicles – and EV sharing schemes are increasingly common in
many parts of the world, particularly in cities where concerns about the vehicle’s range
are less pronounced. The number of EV models has continued to increase, many from the
world’s largest car manufacturers. Despite these positive signals, however, total sales of
EVs worldwide have been far slower than expected. Policy targets set for achievement by
2015 are likely to be missed in all regions, in particular the United States and China. In the
absence of new support measures, 2020 targets might need to be adjusted as well.
The widespread adoption of EVs requires an expansion of the recharging infrastructure.

The convenience of charging can be a major factor for people considering investment in an
EV, including a safety net for emergency charging. By the end of 2014, the number of slow-
chargers installed globally is estimated to have reached more than 94 000, while the number
of fast-chargers was around 15 000 (IEA, 2015c). For comparison, the United States alone has
around 120 000 gasoline filling stations. The European Union agreed upon a directive in 2014
specifically to support the deployment of infrastructure for alternative transport fuels across
its member countries and similar action will be essential elsewhere to support EV deployment
on the scale projected in the 450 Scenario. Global charger costs in the 450 Scenario are of the
order of $20 billion per year on average to 2040. Although this is just a fraction of expected
investment in land transport over the same period, it will be a demanding challenge to
mobilise the required investment and to put the required infrastructure in place in a system
that is currently almost entirely reliant on oil-based transport fuels.
Progress related to the production of advanced biofuels has also been slow and currently
they are not commercially available at scale. However, some notable progress was
registered in 2014. Five commercial-scale advanced biofuels production plants opened,
three in the United States and two in Brazil (IEA, 2015b). The combined capacity of these
plants, at 9 000 barrels per day (in volumetric terms), makes up about one-fifth of current
global advanced biofuels production capacity but less than 1% of total biofuels production
capacity today. The United States is the only country which has volume requirements for
advanced biofuels in 2015 (Renewable Fuels Standard), though it has had difficulty meeting

targets to date. In late 2014, Italy set national targets for advanced biofuels as a share of
transport fuel demand, rising from 1.2% in 2018 rising to at least 2.0% in 2022. In April 1
2015, the European Union also set an indicative target of 0.5% for advanced biofuels by
2020. During 2014, several companies announced new advanced biofuels projects, but 2
several others have been cancelled in recent years.
The two major challenges associated with advanced biofuels are reducing production costs
3
and ensuring sustainability. Most of the technologies today have total production costs
significantly greater than $3/gallon (IRENA, 2013), which is well beyond the untaxed price of 4
petroleum products. The price level of conventional oil will be of critical importance to the
long-term prospects for biofuels as a competitive fuel. The second issue, the sustainability 5
of conventional biofuels, has been in question for many years. As a result, the European
Union, to take one example, has restricted the extent to which conventional biofuels can
6
contribute to biofuels targets. It is therefore imperative to ensure that advanced biofuels
do not raise the same concerns.
7
As to the use of hydrogen in road transport, the challenges are numerous, ranging from
the high costs of the hydrogen fuel-cell vehicle to the absence of refuelling infrastructure 8
and consumer scepticism. Despite the recent notable step forward of the launch of the first
commercial models, hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles still have many hurdles to overcome before
they can achieve mass commercialisation. The most fundamental challenge is the need
9
to build-up an entirely new hydrogen generation, transmission and distribution and retail
network (IEA, 2015d). Although decentralised hydrogen production is feasible, large-scale 10
deployment of hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles is likely to hinge on the development of such a
dedicated integrated infrastructure. 11
Solutions 12
Given the variety of new technologies under development in the transport sector and the
early stage of their deployment, it is important for government actions to enable innovation 13
across a broad set of technologies in road transport. Market-driven, technology- and fuel-
neutral policies (e.g. such as greenhouse-gas emissions standards per vehicle-kilometre
travelled), based on sound science and offering cost-effective pathways to achieve societal
13
goals of energy security and GHG emission reduction, are to be preferred. Technology
neutral policy measures can be complemented by targeted and temporal incentives to help 13
overcome obstacles during early advancement and market introduction. The 450 Scenario
assumes the (supported) emergence of a variety of solutions, without imposing a shift to 14
other modes of transport, i.e. to non-private, non-motorised transport modes, or measures
to suppress demand for mobility. It will nevertheless be important to keep open the 16
opportunity for more radical possibilities, especially in urban areas where good planning
might induce behavioural changes which contribute significantly towards decarbonising
transport or, more broadly, the demand for mobility (Box 4.2).
17
To put EVs on track for their role in the 450 Scenario, RD&D must continue with 18
government support to overcome obstacles to commercial success, particularly related to

batteries, in order to lower costs and increase vehicle range. Second, support to cities and
regions needs to be offered for sustainable business models in the creation of battery-
charging infrastructure. Third, encouragement is required for the development of smart
grids which can support a larger role for the EV fleet as an electricity storage option.
In addition, governments may need to consider countermeasures, such as increased
fuel or emissions taxes and systems of fees or rebates for vehicles depending on their
environmental credentials, if the current period of low oil prices persists, reducing the
relative attractiveness of alternative transport fuels.8
Box 4.2 ⊳ Policies to avoid or shift transport activity
Technological change is not the only route to reducing carbon emissions from transport.
Policies to reduce travel needs include land-use planning instruments that favour
compact urban design and mixed-use development (e.g. commercial and residential),
pricing and other measures encouraging travel demand management, such as the
promotion of virtual mobility (e.g. tele-working), freight delivery co-ordination and
logistical optimisation to decrease travel volume by finding shorter, more efficient
routes. Such measures can be complemented by policies to encourage movement
from private motorised travel to more energy-efficient modes, such as public transit
systems, cycling, and rail. In densely populated urban environments, the availability of
affordable, frequent and seamless public transport connections can be provided cost
effectively, especially when taking into account the advantages of lower road space
utilisation, lower exposure to pollutant emissions and reduced congestion.
The impact of such policies can be large. Cuenot et al. (2012), using the IEA Mobility
Model, have shown that a 25% reduction in car and air travel in 2050 can reduce global
energy use and CO2 from transport by 20%. The IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives
has shown that policies such as those considered here can reduce global transport
energy consumption and emissions by 15% or more by the middle of this century in a
stringent mitigation case, primarily through better management of travel demand and
moving passenger and freight travel to more efficient modes (IEA, 2015a).
The measures necessary to achieve these effects include integrating urban and
transport planning, facilitating investment in public transport infrastructure, supporting
well-integrated public transport networks and options that lead to quicker vehicle
utilisation turnover (e.g. car-sharing schemes). Some developments might take place
naturally: the younger generation, particularly in urban areas, tends increasingly to
prefer alternative transport options to the use of personal cars (e.g. public transport,
cycling, walking), recognising that what counts is the transport service, rather than the
means (personal cars). Transport demand reduction may also stem from the use of
modern information and communication technologies.
8. For more on the implications of lower global oil prices prevailing into the long term, see the IEA’s World Energy
Outlook 2015, to be published on 10 November 2015.

To address the challenges associated with advanced biofuels, government support is
required for the development of cellulosic biofuel refineries to drive down costs through 1
learning. In addition, government- and industry-funded RD&D efforts are necessary to
develop innovative processes to produce advanced biofuels, particularly from agricultural 2
and forestry waste products. Governments have a particular role in supporting the
development of indicators, such as those described by Franke et al. (2012), to set standards 3
of sustainability in the production and use of biofuels which must be met, particularly in
relation to competition with food production and any direct or indirect land-use change.
4
Energy sector transformation needs smart policies
5
The transition to a low-carbon economy requires changes to the global energy system that
depend upon giving the right signals to innovators and financiers within an appropriate
6
market structure. Existing arrangements are insufficient to stimulate deployment in line
with the 450 Scenario. Government intervention will be required in, at least, the following
respects: accelerating the creation of sustainable markets for low-carbon technologies; 7
investing in RD&D where there are critical funding gaps; supporting the creation of the
necessary infrastructure; and encouraging international collaboration. 8
Sustainable low-carbon markets must provide an enduring incentive to improve
technologies. As a policy, carbon pricing (i.e. penalising higher emissions technologies) 9
has yet to be pursued sufficiently rigorously to create long-term investor confidence: the
price is often low and there is political uncertainty surrounding its future. More successful 10
forms of intervention, so far, have included capital grants, tax breaks, production subsidies
and performance standards, re-shaping investment decisions in CCS projects, electric 11
vehicle fleets and solar PV value chains. Electricity markets are beginning to require more
fundamental adjustments to accommodate emerging patterns of supply and demand.
Well-designed government interventions can reduce technology costs, support more
12
efficient supply chains and financing, and help technologies to become established. As
their efforts become more apparent and a low-carbon transition takes hold, affordable 13
capital is expected to flow more freely, allowing such policies to be withdrawn.
Government investments in RD&D can provide the leadership necessary to yield major
13
returns in terms of jobs, investment and results. Financing for large-scale CCS projects
is needed in the near term to generate the improvements that will allow lower costs to 13
emerge from large-scale activity in the long term. In the case of EVs, the commercial race
to develop the best battery has already begun. For variable renewables, attention may 14
need to be directed more to the provision of system flexibility than simply to more efficient
generation technologies.
16
To achieve a self-sustaining low-carbon transition will require parallel investments in the
enabling infrastructure. Governments have a crucial role to play in ensuring that such 17
projects go ahead in a timely manner, in many cases, by investing directly in them, but also
by providing the conditions which attract multilateral financial commitments. CO2 storage
18
capacity development, provision of EV charging stations and encouragement of additional

transmission grid interconnections are just three examples where this may be the case.
Alongside these physical considerations, technology collaboration between countries and
across sectors can be highly productive.9 Though the comparative advantages of different
countries and their comparative needs for particular energy technologies will differ in a low-
carbon transition, innovation can be stimulated by joint activity and sharing deployment
experience. Initial deployment may not always be in countries with the highest potential
(consider, for example, solar PV in Germany and Italy), but shared experience can help to
reduce costs more broadly. Pooling such learning sometimes can be important in accelerating
technology development and should be prioritised in appropriate international fora.
9. For example, IEA Energy Technology Initiatives enable independent groups of experts from industry and government
to share resources and expertise in order to find solutions to energy challenges. The Innovation for Cool Earth Forum
(ICEF) is another example of an international platform that brings together different stakeholders to consider how
innovation can best address climate change.

Chapter 5
Building success in Paris and beyond

Features of success
Highlights
• The emergence from COP21 of unity and clarity of purpose at the highest political
level, expressed as ambitious near-term action and clear commitment to a low-
carbon future, can transform the energy sector. The submission of national climate
goals to COP21 is not the end of a process, but the basis on which to create a
“virtuous circle” of increasing ambition. Four key pillars are needed to make the
Paris agreement a success:
1. The agreement should set the conditions necessary for a global peak in total
energy-related emissions to be reached in the near future. The integration of
the energy sector measures of the Bridge Scenario into nationally determined
climate goals for 2025, coupled with an immediate start to action, could
achieve such a peak by 2020, without prejudice to sustained economic growth
and development. Seeing global emissions peak and a growing number of
countries decouple economic growth from emissions growth will transform
national expectations and action.
2. A five-year review cycle is needed to provide the opportunity and incentive for
agreement on setting higher objectives over time. Following the Bridge Scenario
to 2025 enables emissions to pass their peak and makes power sector investment
fully compatible with a 2 °C scenario (committed emissions from new power
generation in the INDC Scenario would be 19 Gt higher). From 2025, the level of
ambition must rise beyond that of the Bridge Scenario to bring global emissions
well below 2010 levels by 2030, onto a path consistent with the 2 °C goal.
3. The current goal to keep temperature rise below 2 °C should be supplemented
by re-expressing it as a collective long-term emissions goal coupled with
nationally determined low-carbon development pathways informed by a vision
of the long-term collective goal. Such supplementary expressions of the target
can guide energy sector investment, retirement and operational decisions,
provide an incentive for the development of new technologies, drive the
necessary adaptation of market structures and spur implementation of strong
domestic policies, such as carbon pricing – all necessary to achieve the required
level of energy sector emissions reductions beyond 2030.
4. The COP21 package and subsequent decisions should provide for a transparent
tracking process to measure progress toward both short- and long-term
objectives as a means of building trust and confidence. Tracking of energy sector
metrics would provide much needed clarity on how quickly the energy sector
is transforming and would provide key information to underpin countries’
domestic energy policy efforts.
Chapter 5 | Building success in Paris and beyond 131

Introduction
The decisions that come out of the COP21 meeting in Paris in December 2015 must address
the needs and the responsibilities of the energy sector – by far the largest greenhouse-gas
emitter – if the outcome is to carry conviction about governments’ determination to achieve
the 2 degree Celsius (°C) climate goal and the existence of a realistic pathway to get there. To
achieve the necessary transformation of the world’s energy system, the energy community
must be persuaded that energy investments must be redirected so as to lock-in a widespread
switch to low-carbon development that delivers economic growth and social development
expectations, while simultaneously making deep cuts in emissions and strengthening global
energy security.
Significant climate action is already underway and, as seen in Chapter 1, there are some
encouraging early signs that emissions growth may be starting to decouple from global economic
growth. The cost of renewable energy continues to fall, many countries are implementing more
demanding energy efficiency measures, reform of fossil-fuel subsidies has started and various
forms of implementing action are being taken by cities around the world. Public demands for
clean air and clean water are a strong supporting motivation for change. Governments’ pledges
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for the period
after 2020 have begun to arrive (Chapter 1), and China and India have both announced climate
and low-carbon energy strategies. The private sector is also engaging in mitigation actions: a
coalition of almost 1 450 companies has reported saving around 420 million tonnes (Mt) of
carbon-dioxide equivalent (CO2‑eq) in 2013, linked to $170 billion of low-carbon investment.
But much of the transformational change needed in the energy sector to meet the 2 °C climate
goal has yet to take place. To bring this forth requires scaled-up national, regional and local
action, guided by appropriate policies and standards, and mobilisation of both public and
private finance for low-carbon energy supply and infrastructure. An international framework is
needed to co-ordinate and generate confidence in these national efforts and then progressively
to amplify them until low-carbon energy investment becomes the global norm. Clear signals
of the need for transformational change are required from the highest political level, with all
major emitting countries on-board.
This chapter focuses on how the decisions to be taken at COP21 can best encompass and
address the challenges put forward in previous chapters. How can COP21 both recognise
existing efforts and help countries to do more? How can it best facilitate a long-term transition
to low-carbon energy systems, while also delivering short-term achievements? How can it
overcome the dual trials of deepening the decarbonisation of the energy system while also
building in greater resilience to the new challenges created by the degree of climate change
which is already inevitable?

Energy sector needs from COP21 1
The COP21 agreement alone will not provide a comprehensive package of solutions to deliver
the 2 °C goal. Instead, it is expected to establish a platform and process for country-led 2
action that will evolve and strengthen over the coming decades, bringing collective efforts
into line with the 2 °C goal over time. Building an agreement that is durable, applicable to
3
all countries and sensitive to varying stages of economic and social development will
require flexibility within an overarching framework. In this light, governments are working
towards an agreement that emphasises “solution sharing”, i.e. starting from what countries
4
are already able to do and intent upon doing and then building ambition via support and
collaboration. This contrasts with a “burden sharing” approach whereby a fixed budget of 5
allowed emissions is allocated by a formula (Figure 5.1).
6
Figure 5.1 ⊳ Approaches to international climate negotiations
7
Burden sharing approach Solutions sharing approach
Capacity
Fixed
building
carbon
budget 9
y
Pr rack
og
og in
ol
t
hn
re g
ss
c
10
Te
Divided
among Nationally
parties Markets determined Finance
actions 11
Increased ambition of
nationally determined action 12
13
13
There will inevitably be some overlap between these approaches. For example, although
the solutions sharing approach is founded on nationally determined contributions, the 13
2 °C goal implies a carbon budget at the global level that provides a reference for the
adequacy of collective efforts. Similarly, although countries are free to determine their 14
own contributions under a solutions sharing approach, considerations of equity will create
expectations about the type and ambition of various Parties’ actions: in particular, the
16
least-developed countries are concerned to ensure they are left with sufficient “carbon
space” within the 2 °C goal to allow for their sustainable development.
17
Submitting national climate contributions for COP21 will not be the end of the process,
but rather provide a basis from which to create a “virtuous circle” of growing ambition
18
(Figure 5.2). After setting mitigation goals, many countries will need assistance in mobilising

finance and technology for low-carbon investment, in building capacity and in policy
implementation. Solution sharing through the provision of financial support and policy
co-operation can expand the boundaries of what hitherto has been considered possible.
Growing investment in low-carbon energy will result, in turn, in growing momentum
towards progressively more ambitious mitigation goals. However, adoption of weak targets
or evidence of lack of implementation would be perceived as wavering in countries’
commitments to tackle climate change, deterring investors and perpetuating the lock-in of
high-carbon energy solutions.
Figure 5.2 ⊳ Elements to support a “virtuous cycle” of strengthening

mitigation ambition over time
then
Strentigon
tiga goals Su
m i
ca pp
p
or city,
ul
a
t t fina
ssf
ech nce
e
Succ
nolo
Continuous
gy
cycle of
increasing
action
To send the necessary signals to the energy sector, the COP21 agreement should be built
on four pillars:
 Setting the conditions for a near-term peak in global energy-related emissions.

Building on evidence of an increasing decoupling of economic growth from energy
sector emissions, short-term mitigation ambition needs to be strengthened, leading to
total global energy-related emissions finally turning downwards.
 Providing for a five-year review cycle of mitigation targets to encourage and lock-in
increasing ambition over time. Following the Bridge Scenario (Chapter 3) can keep
the 2 °C climate goal within reach in the short term, but mitigation goals need to be
strengthened from 2025.
 Locking in the long-term vision embodied in the 2 °C climate objective by elaborating
a long-term global emissions goal and nationally determined low-carbon development
pathways to spur long-term investment and technology research, development,
demonstration and deployment (RDD&D) (Chapter 4).
 Transparent tracking of the energy transition (toward both short- and long-term
objectives) to support successful implementation and build trust and confidence.

Figure 5.3 ⊳ Four pillars of the Paris COP21 Agreement
1
Peak Five-year 2
in emissions revision
4
Lock in Track the
the vision transition
5
6
These four pillars (Figure 5.3), which are explored in the following sections, need a set of
tools to deliver them. A strong agreement on finance at COP21 is critical, to re-orient energy 7
sector investment flows (public and private) towards delivering low-carbon, climate resilient
projects and portfolios. Carbon pricing will be needed as a feature of the national and
8
international policy response and should be supported by the COP21 agreement (Box 5.1).
9
Box 5.1 ⊳ Pricing energy correctly
One of the strongest elements as an economy-wide signal to move to a low-carbon energy

10
system is appropriate energy pricing: phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies and introducing
carbon pricing. Where governments invest directly in the energy sector and in energy 11
sectors with relatively few actors, much progress is possible through selective investment
or regulation. However, to reach across the whole of the economy (and particularly to 12
influence private investors) there is no substitute for correct energy pricing, including the
creation of expectations of a rising trend in carbon prices. Fossil-fuel subsidies reform is
13
picking up speed, with countries taking advantage of the current lower price environment
to act while the impact will provoke less opposition. Carbon pricing efforts are also
increasing, but prices to date are weak, partly due to concerns about damaging industrial 13
competitiveness by moving too far too fast and about the social impact of rising energy
prices. Three aspects of the COP21 agreement could help in this regard: 13
 Make sure that the COP21 agreement includes participation by all Parties, so that
all countries are taking action together, even if particular policy measures differ. 14
 Include a provision that affirms countries may use international carbon markets,
as long as this is accounted for transparently and contributes to both buying and 16
selling countries achieving an efficient, low-carbon economy.
 Provide for policy collaboration (in the UNFCCC processes or through other 17
partnerships) to ensure that best practice in fossil-fuel subsidy reform, emissions
trading, carbon taxes and other measures becomes standard practice. 18

The Paris agreement can also create a process for Parties to co-operate on policies of mutual
interest, as a means of closing the mitigation ambition gap and improving integration of
energy policies with social and economic goals such as energy access and affordability.
The economic diversification of countries or regions currently highly dependent on
fossil fuels is necessary to the success of decarbonisation, and an issue many countries
are already struggling with. Detailed recommendations are now available for successful
implementation of fossil-fuel subsidy reform (Box 3.4): similar attention needs be given to
issues such as managing employment loss in the shift away from coal mining and handling
high-emissions assets which become “stranded” in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
The facilitative rather than prescriptive approach to be taken at COP21 may make it difficult
immediately to assess the outcome. Success will ultimately be judged by whether it sends a
clear message of worldwide commitment to decarbonisation and low-carbon development,
thus providing the signal that public and private investors need to embrace this new world.
Seeing the peak: a milestone to make climate ambition credible

It is already clear that known and expected Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDCs) for COP21 collectively will fall well short of what is needed to be on a path to the
2 °C goal (Chapter 2). Insufficient climate action in the near term increases the need for
more challenging and costly corrective action in the longer term. Such costs increase as
time passes due to the need for a more rapid transition later and the eventual need to
retire more high-carbon infrastructure before the end of its economic life. In the absence
of prompt and determined additional action, there will also inevitably come a point at
which keeping global warming below 2 °C is no longer feasible.
For the door to 2 °C to remain open, global energy-related emissions must peak as soon
as possible. The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the widespread integration into intended
national climate contributions of a handful of energy sector measures would result in total
global energy-related emissions ceasing to rise by 2020, without prejudice to regional
economic growth and development (Figure 5.4). The Bridge Scenario is not, in itself, a 2 °C
scenario, but the near-term peak in emissions that it delivers is a necessary step towards a
2 °C pathway. A near-term peak in global emissions is also critical for credibility of overall
climate efforts: if investors and policymakers see global emissions slow then peak, this in
itself will be a hugely significant signal that the transition is underway.
While achievement of an early peak in emissions implies success for decoupling at global
level between economic growth and growth in greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, it does
not imply that this decoupling occurs in all countries within the same timeframe. The
implementation of the five energy sector policies proposed in the Bridge Scenario locks in
the decoupling observed in OECD countries since 2011. It also enables the initial signs of
decoupling observed in China’s emissions in 2014 to hold through to 2025, enabling a near
doubling of the economy with an almost flat emissions trajectory. In other countries, though
there is a clear weakening in the link between development and emissions; emissions still
rise, but only at one-fifth of the growth in gross domestic product (GDP).

Figure 5.4 ⊳ Global energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario
1
36
Gt
INDC Scenario 2
33
3
Bridge Scenario
30
4
27
5
450 Scenario
24 6
2015 2020 2025 2030
7
With this backdrop, countries that have yet to submit an INDC for 2025 could consider
putting forward a mitigation goal that is at least in line with the scale of ambition reflected 8
in the Bridge Scenario presented in Chapter 3. Countries that have already submitted INDCs
for 2025 could consider whether to: 9
 Strengthen mitigation goals for the period to 2025, preferably at COP21, but at least
before 2020, so that they, at a minimum, reflect the level of ambition expressed in the 10
Bridge Scenario.
 Seek to significantly over-achieve stated 2025 goals by implementing the energy 11
policies outlined in the Bridge Scenario.
The COP21 agreement must therefore set the conditions for a near-term peak in emissions,
12
by creating an opportunity for countries to revisit their 2025 mitigation goals before these are
finalised and encouraging consistency of goals and planned policy actions with longer term 13
nationally determined low-carbon development pathways in line with the global 2 °C goal.
Setting strong mitigation goals for 2025 will encourage an early start to national actions, 13
including the GDP-neutral actions of the Bridge Scenario. Strong support for pre-2020 action
could be provided by mobilising public and private finance, capacity building, technology 13
transfer and policy collaboration to assist countries to “step onto the Bridge” as soon as
possible. Although the actions in the Bridge Scenario are cost-effective, considerable effort 14
and expertise will be required to make them a reality.
Some countries or regions could choose to go beyond the Bridge Scenario. Investing in 16
deeper emission reduction actions in line with a more optimal path to a 2 °C scenario pays
off in the long term: the delays built in to the Bridge Scenario involve higher long-term 17
costs than an optimal 2 °C Scenario. Countries that are willing to act early not only lower
their transition costs, but play a significant role in demonstrating what is achievable and
18
catalysing greater action elsewhere.

Giving visibility to the policies that underpin mitigation goals also builds confidence and
can support early action. Targets need to be ambitious but demonstrably achievable, and
reporting the intended policies to deliver these targets can underscore their feasibility.
Particular energy sector goals (such as targets for renewable energy or energy efficiency),
complementing broader GHG targets, can highlight the drivers of energy system change,
not just emissions outcomes. They can also aid public justification because of their
associated benefits (e.g. improved standards of living, cost savings, improved health,
competitiveness, energy security) and the required implementing measures may be more
readily identified. Short-term energy sector goals can also be set which are consistent with
long-term decarbonisation, such as one of setting the pattern of infrastructure investment
or with milestones for RDD&D (IEA, 2014a; Prag, Kimmel and Hood, 2013).
Enhancing ambition: a five-year review cycle

As a second pillar, COP21 needs to agree a clear and timely review process for the
progressive strengthening of mitigation goals to meet the 2 °C goal. The environment in
which these goals are being set is changing rapidly: the cost and performance of many
low-carbon technologies are improving (some rapidly); countries are beginning to see
success in implementation of low-carbon policies; and there is a growing sense that a
low-carbon future is possible and preferable (albeit not within easy reach). Within such
a rapidly changing context, agreeing a mechanism at COP21 to strengthen mitigation
goals at least every five years (as opposed to the alternative proposal on the table in the
negotiations of leaving them fixed for ten-year periods) creates an opportunity for political
ambition to keep pace with external events. A five-year cycle that creates an expectation
of rising ambition would also send a clearer message to investors of countries’ long-term
commitment to progressive decarbonisation. As well as setting explicit five-year goals,
countries could provide information looking further out (for example, an early indication
of likely 2030 goals by 2020).
An important aspect of this five-year review cycle will be the expectation, which should be
set out in the COP21 agreement, that these nationally determined short-term mitigation
goals should be consistent with longer term nationally determined low-carbon development
pathways (which themselves would be updated over time with changing circumstances).
Consistency between short- and longer-term intentions allows decarbonisation to fit within
the context of development and reduces the risk that weak goals will be set in the short
term to allow room for later strengthening, since the additional long-term economic cost
of such an approach will be apparent.
In addition to achieving a peak in global emissions, following the Bridge Scenario to 2025
keeps new build of electricity infrastructure on track. Thanks to efficiency measures and
a push towards renewables, the committed emissions from new power plants built to
2025 in the Bridge Scenario are fully compatible with a 2 °C target trajectory (Figure 5.5).
By contrast, new power plants built by 2020 in the INDC Scenario would result in
cumulative emissions through 2040 of 4.6 Gt CO2 above levels consistent with a 2 °C path,

rising to 19.3 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2 when plants built in the following five years are taken
into account. From an infrastructure perspective, delaying to adopt a Bridge strategy 1
significantly increases the size of the challenge of wrenching power sector emissions back
onto a 2 °C path thereafter. Such a high level of high-carbon infrastructure also increases 2
the risk of assets becoming stranded if strict climate policies are adopted later.
3
Figure 5.5 ⊳ Global committed CO2 emissions through 2040 from new
power plants 4
100 Built after 2025 5
Gt
Built 2021-2025
80
Built to 2020 but
not yet under
6
construction
60
7
40 2025:
extra 19.3 Gt
8
20
2020:
extra 4.6 Gt 9
INDC Scenario Bridge Scenario 450 Scenario
10
Note: “Committed emissions” are the cumulative emissions to 2040 from these plants, operating under the conditions
of the corresponding scenario.
11
With a five-year review cycle, mitigation goals for the 2025-2030 period would be set
before 2025 for those that do not have them, and existing 2030 targets reviewed, and 12
if appropriate, revised for those that do. If countries have brought their 2025 climate
contributions into line with the measures recommended in the Bridge Scenario, then global 13
energy-related GHG emissions will have already peaked by the time 2025-2030 goals are
being set, building momentum for greater action after 2025. 13
The level of mitigation ambition countries put forward for the 2025-2030 period will be a key
determinant of whether the global 2 °C goal remains within reach. The Intergovernmental 13
Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report found that very few scenarios with
annual GHG emissions above 2010 levels in 2030 still had at least a 50% chance of meeting 14
the 2 °C goal, and these all require net global CO2 emissions to become negative before
2100.1 In 2 °C scenarios that do not rely on net negative CO2 emissions, GHG emissions
must fall substantially below 2010 levels by 2030 (IPCC, 2014).
16
17
1. “Negative emissions” refers to net storage of CO2 through measures such as afforestation, combining biomass power
generation with CCS to store the resulting CO2, or direct air capture and storage of CO2. Achieving net negative emissions 18
would entail total annual storage higher than total annual emissions.

Box 5.2 ⊳ Reducing emissions from international aviation and shipping
The international aviation and maritime sectors are major consumers of oil; together
they consumed around 7.0 million barrels per day of oil in 2013, 8% of global oil
demand. These sectors’ contribution to global emissions is on the rise as well; while
they accounted for only 4% of global CO2 emissions growth between 1990 and 2013,
they are expected to be among the fastest growing sectors over the next decades.
This does not mean that progress has been absent. Continuous improvements have
been achieved in the efficiency of new aircraft, containing emissions growth. In the
maritime sector, “slow steaming”2 has helped to reduce emissions growth in recent
years (partially driven by high oil prices). Both the shipping and aviation industries have
also been actively seeking to implement other forms of mitigation. The International
Maritime Organization (IMO) has made the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)
mandatory for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan is similarly
mandatory for all ships; the EEDI standards will be implemented in progressive phases,
evolving towards a 30% improvement (compared with the average efficiency of ships
built between 2000 and 2010) by 2025. The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) has put in place a voluntary 2% annual efficiency improvement target to
2050 and an aim for “carbon neutral growth” from 2020 (ICAO, 2010). Pursuant to a
resolution by the ICAO Assembly in 2013, the organisation is developing a package of
measures to achieve carbon neutral growth goal, including a CO2 emissions standard
for aircraft engines and a global market-based measure (MBM) for CO2 emissions from
international aviation, for consideration at its next assembly in October 2016.
However, efforts to build a broader global framework so far have not materialised.
There are a number of policy options that could help curtail further emissions growth.
They include regulatory instruments, such as fuel efficiency and emission standards at
an aircraft/vessel or system level or regulations targeting the GHG intensity of fuels, that
could foster the deployment of low-carbon fuels; and market-based approaches such
as the global MBM being developed by ICAO (and more generally including emissions
trading under caps, or fuel or emission taxes – international aviation and shipping are
exempted from fossil-fuel taxation). But all these instruments require agreement at
an international level, a long and difficult process. Although not explicitly part of the
agenda of the UNFCCC negotiations, the upcoming COP21 meeting is an opportunity
to take stock of progress in these key sectors in an attempt to boost collective efforts
at the IMO and ICAO.
Energy-related CO2 emissions in the Bridge Scenario are still above 2010 levels in 2030,
so to follow a pathway realistically consistent with 2 °C, countries must step-up ambition
from 2025. To move from the Bridge Scenario in 2025 onto a 2 °C pathway would require
2. This refers to ships operating at lower speeds to reduce fuel consumption thereby reducing costs and
carbon emissions.

a sustained reduction in global energy CO2 emissions intensity (energy-related CO2/GDP),
averaging 5.5% per year between 2030 and 2050 (up from 5.0% in the 450 Scenario). The 1
challenge of delivering this rate of change should not be underestimated. Infrastructure
transitions of this magnitude have been achieved in the past in exceptional circumstances 2
in some IEA member countries, during periods of government-led reform, such as the
nuclear build programmes in France and Sweden.3 In emerging economies with greater 3
potential for efficiency improvement, high rates of decoupling have also been shown to
be possible, though they are exceptional – for example China experienced a 5.9% annual
4
emissions intensity improvement between 1990 and 2000. However across both developed
and developing countries, the average rate of improvement in emissions intensity to date
has been far lower, averaging only 1.5% per year between 1990 and 2010. 5
Given the two-year delay in production of official emissions statistics, countries will
6
inevitably be developing targets for the next five-year period before the final results of the
current period are known – with biennial reporting of emissions inventories, countries may
only have one data point from the current five-year period before they put forward their 7
next target. This highlights the importance of developing capacity to track the evolution of
the domestic energy sector (which ideally would be supplemented by capacity for energy 8
sector modelling) to give a clearer understanding of probable developments.
9
Locking in the long-term vision
The international community has adopted a common goal for action on climate change 10
– the 2 °C target – in the UNFCCC. While this is a valid long-term goal, it is not easy to
translate it into practical policy and investment needs. Further steps are needed in the 11
COP21 agreement to lock in the 2 °C vision more strongly, so that it anchors future
expectations, guiding policymaking and both public and private energy sector investment 12
decisions, and acts as a standard against which short-term government targets and
actions can be assessed. These further steps form the third key pillar of our recommended
approach to the COP21 agreement.
13
Failure to link short- and long-term decisions is costly. Many energy sector investment 13
decisions relate to long-lived capital-intensive infrastructure, emphasising the need
to make effective risk assessments about future developments. A focus only on short-
term emissions targets to 2025, themselves important to avoid excess emissions in the
13
short term, could lead to the adoption of a technology mix that is far from optimal if not
devised in the light of a longer term decarbonisation plan, resulting in increasing the cost 14
of achieving critical climate goals.
A first step to lock-in the 2 °C vision more strongly in the COP21 agreement would be
16
to re-express that goal in terms of a long-term GHG emissions target. This would be
more straightforward to apply in the energy sector and lend itself to easier accounting 17
3. The nuclear power programmes resulted in a reduction in France’s energy-related CO2/GDP ratio averaging 5.4% per 18
year between 1978 and 1988, and in Sweden averaging 6.2% between 1979 and 1989.

for monitoring. A number of possible options for supplementing the 2 °C goal in this way
have been tabled for consideration in the run-up to COP21, including a target level for
2050 emissions, a target date for net-zero emissions in the second-half of this century, or
a timeline for the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels. Adoption of such specific, emissions-
focused long-term goals to complement the existing 2 °C goal would be a valuable additional
signal to the energy sector of the need for transformative change.4
The second step, needed to ensure that any long-term goal is meaningful – whether framed
in terms of temperature or emissions – is to create a clear link between it and countries’
actions, rather than it being just an aspirational statement. The global goal should be used
by all countries to inform nationally determined decarbonisation or low-carbon development
pathways (SDSN, 2014), which would in turn provide an important benchmark for the
short-term goals countries set in the five-year review cycle. Whether the national pathway
involves an immediate fall in total emissions (such as in the United Kingdom’s carbon budget
framework) or a peak then later decline (such as in South Africa’s pathway) will usually
depend on the country’s development status. Many developing countries give priority to their
economic and social development. The COP21 agreement must recognise this, embedding
climate goals in plans which permit countries to achieve these aspirations.
Figure 5.6 ⊳ Global emissions from power plants, existing and under

construction
16
Gt
12
8
INDC Scenario
Bridge Scenario
450 Scenario
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
As well as assisting in sending a clear signal to investors in new long-lived assets, the newly
expressed long-term goal and low-carbon development pathways will shape decisions on
the operation or retirement of existing capital stock and technology development. Goals and
actions reflected in the INDC Scenario result in operating existing power plants and those
under construction in such a way that they emit some 275 Gt from 2015 to 2040 (Figure 5.6).
4. The particular form of the goal would need to take into account the uncertainty in translating temperature rise
probabilities into specific emissions targets and the need for flexibility to incorporate updated scientific knowledge.

The efficiency measures and the push towards renewables adopted in the Bridge Scenario
would reduce this by almost 10%; but a trajectory compatible with a 2 °C objective that fully 1
internalises a long-term decarbonisation vision would need to cut cumulative emissions by
around 35% by driving action to ensure the retirement of old high-emitting capital stock, 2
allowing only very efficient or low-carbon generating plant to operate.
A long-term global emissions goal can also boost further energy technology development. 3
The benefits of earlier investment in solar and wind generation are now being seen in
rapidly falling prices. As explored in more detail in Chapter 4, the same process will need 4
to be followed to bring forward carbon capture and storage, battery storage, electric
and other low-emissions vehicles and other emerging technologies (Figure 5.7). A clear, 5
measurable long-term vision in the COP21 agreement will underpin investment in those
key technologies that are essential to unlock long-term emission reductions compatible
with a 2 °C trajectory.
6
7
Figure 5.7 ⊳ Global investment in variable renewables, CCS and electric
vehicles in the 450 Scenario
8
800 CCS
700 Electric vehicles 9

and plug-ins
600
Wind and solar PV
500
10
400
11
300
200 12
100
13
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
13
There are also a number of more detailed ways the COP21 decisions (and subsequent
technical work programmes) can address aspects of technology development (IEA, 2015a):
13
reporting on technology progress ahead of each five-year review; global goals for RDD&D
levels; country reporting on low-carbon technology actions; and strengthening the link
between the technology and finance aspects of the UNFCCC. The technology needs 14
assessments and technology action plans prepared by developing countries should be
integrated into wider low-carbon development strategies, improving alignment between 16
these countries’ development, mitigation and technology goals (Box 5.3). Parties should also
be encouraged to increase international co-operation to scale-up low-carbon technologies. 17
There are many existing multilateral technology and policy collaborations on topics such as
carbon pricing, renewable energy and energy efficiency. Care should be taken to build on,
18
consolidate and not duplicate these efforts.

Box 5.3 ⊳ Climate resilience of the energy sector
Energy supply, transmission and demand can all directly be affected by changes to
the climate, including higher temperatures, more frequent and extreme weather
events, changes in water availability, sea level rise and permafrost melting. The long
life of many energy sector assets, which rightly are classified as essential national
infrastructure, underlines the need for governments and industry to develop and
implement effective strategies to improve climate resilience (IEA, 2013). Climate-
induced changes in the availability of water are a major concern for energy supply
and power generation. This is because reduced water availability will constrain
energy production from fossil fuels, nuclear power, biofuels, hydropower and some
solar power systems. Both thermal and nuclear power plants require water for
cooling; apart from reduced water availability, a rise in water temperature reduces
the overall plant efficiency.5
The risks posed to the energy sector from climate change and the need to adapt is
increasingly recognised, but there is still a long way to go in terms of improving climate
resilience. Some countries have launched climate change risk assessments, as well as
national adaptation strategies and programmes that include specific energy sector
analysis. In recent years, the European Union, United States, Canada and China have
all launched adaptation strategies.
The UNFCCC National Adaptation Programmes of Action and National Adaptation
Plans (NAPs) processes can help least-developed countries to communicate their most
urgent adaptation needs. Further actions that could be taken in countries’ INDCs and
through the COP21 decisions include:
 Exploring energy sector mitigation actions that also enhance resilience (e.g.
energy efficiency, decentralised renewable generation).
 Integrating or interlinking low-carbon development strategies to underpin
mitigation with NAPs to support resilient, low-carbon growth.
 Encouraging countries to include the energy sector in their NAPs.
 Incorporating climate risks to energy infrastructure, supply and demand into

Green Climate Fund investment decisions.
While developing countries, especially the least developed, are often the most
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, all countries around the world will be
affected and need to adapt. An important task is to protect energy infrastructure
and ensure energy security. Governments should support the private sector through
policy and regulatory oversight, technology development and providing information
about expected future climate developments.
5. The link between water and energy will be analysed in a chapter of the World Energy Outlook-2015 to be
published 10 November 2015.

Tracking the energy transition
1
Whatever the outcome of COP21, the actions to reduce emissions will be driven largely
by countries’ domestic policies and, after COP21, policymakers’ attention will turn to
2
the design and implementation of effective policy packages to deliver their short- and
long-term emission goals. Given its reliance on nationally determined action, the COP21
agreement will need to provide a strong framework for tracking progress. This is the fourth
3
pillar of these recommendations. Each country needs effective tools to track policy results
over time; and tangible evidence of results will reassure the international community that 4
others are acting diligently. Tracking progress will identify countries that are struggling
with implementation and enable timely assistance to be provided if needed. Successful 5
management depends both on what is measured (the choice of metrics), and how
thoroughly tracking is done (the quality of the processes for measurement and reporting
6
of emissions and of accounting for achievement of targets).
The UNFCCC process already includes biennial reporting of GHG emission inventories and 7
mitigation actions for both developed and developing countries,6 as well as more detailed
national communications every four years, providing a solid basis to work from. Details of
the post-2020 reporting and accounting frameworks may not be agreed at COP21: these
8
can be the subject of subsequent technical work programmes. The COP21 agreement,
however, must set the high-level principles, including the need for agreed rules for the 9
measurement and reporting of emissions (such as use of latest IPCC guidelines), and the
provision for developing accounting rules for the wide range of goal types countries are 10
likely to put forward. The COP21 agreement should provide for progress toward long-term
objectives (the global goal and nationally determined low-carbon development pathways) 11
to be reported and tracked, in addition to measuring progress towards each five-year goal.
Tracking progress toward long-term objectives will require a wider focus on the drivers of
change, such as energy sector investment patterns, not just GHG levels.
12
Some countries may express their nationally determined contributions to the COP21
13
agreement in terms of particular energy sector objectives, such as the share of total
energy supply to come from renewables, the rate of decline in fossil-fuel subsidy levels,
or the scale of energy intensity improvement, possibly within an overall GHG reduction 13
target. The UNFCCC will need to develop processes to account for the achievement of
such energy sector goals, as well as setting details of how to account for more traditional 13
GHG targets. Even where countries frame their nationally determined contribution only
as a GHG emissions goal, reporting and tracking other key energy sector details could 14
provide useful supplemental information regarding contributing developments, while also
contributing to co-operation between nations on areas of common interest, such as the
16
effective promotion of energy efficiency or the phase-out of fossil-fuel subsidies.
17
6. The details are currently different for developed and developing countries, with developed country reports containing
more detailed information such as projections of future emissions, and being subject to more stringent review processes. 18
Developed countries also report GHG inventories annually.

Tracking progress toward deep energy sector decarbonisation is complex and requires
a broader set of measurements than are collected and monitored in many countries
at present. At the highest level (Table 5.1) these measurements should cover energy
supply and demand and include measures of the overall state of the energy system
(such as aggregate energy demand) as well as of the underlying drivers of change (such
as the investment rate in low-carbon energy) (IEA, 2014a; IEA, 2015a; Prag, Kimmel and
Hood, 2013).
Table 5.1 ⊳ High-level metrics to track energy sector decarbonisation
Sector Metric Unit
Aggregate • Carbon intensity of primary energy supply t CO2/toe

energy • Energy intensity of GDP toe/$
sector
• New investment in low-carbon energy supply and energy efficiency $
• Share of renewables in final energy demand %
• Population and share of population without access to electricity Million, %
and/or reliant on traditional biomass use for cooking.
• Fossil-fuel subsidies $, % of GDP
• Percentage of energy sector emissions covered by carbon pricing %
• Public and private investment in low-carbon energy RDD&D $, % of GDP
Power • CO2 emissions per unit of electricity g CO2/kWh

• Average efficiency of all fossil-fuel plants %
• Share of low-carbon generation in new additions* %
Transport • New passenger cars: CO2 emissions per vehicle-kilometre g CO2/v-km

• Road freight vehicles: CO2 emissions per tonne-kilometre g CO2/t-km
• Carbon intensity of total transport fuel demand t CO2/toe
Buildings • Residential: energy demand per dwelling kWh/dwelling

• Services: energy demand per square metre of floor space kWh/m2
• Retrofit rate for existing buildings %/year
Industry** • CO2 emissions per unit of value added t CO2/$1 000

• CO2 emissions in steel production (includes blast furnaces and t CO2/tonne
coke ovens) per unit of steel produced
• CO2 emissions in cement production per unit of cement produced t CO2/tonne
Fossil-fuel • Share of natural gas vented or lost out of total gas produced %
systems • GHG emissions from fugitive emissions, gas venting, flaring and t CO2-eq/toe
losses per unit of energy extracted
* Includes renewables, nuclear and plants incorporating carbon capture and storage (CCS). For CCS, the relevant
measurement includes only the portion which is captured. ** Sub-sectoral metrics for steel and cement are shown here
as examples; other sub-sectors should also be tracked.
Notes: toe = tonnes of oil equivalent, g CO2/kWh = grammes of CO2 per kilowatt-hour, g CO2/v-km =grammes of CO2 per
vehicle-kilometre, g CO2/t km= grammes of CO2 per tonne-kilometre.

As well as high-level metrics, the IEA recommends that countries build capacity to collect
detailed energy data at the sectoral and sub-sectoral level in order to better understand the 1
changes occurring in national energy systems and better inform policymaking (IEA, 2014b).
The precise set of metrics used should be tailored to fit with national targets and objectives, 2
taking into account that some data will be quickly available (such as power generation),
while others make take up to two years to collect. Support for capacity building in energy 3
statistics will be important for many developing countries.7
Frameworks, both national and international, need to look beyond activities with a short- 4
term effect and include tracking of those which may have little impact on GHG emissions
in the near term. Examples include more compact urban development, public transport 5
promotion, strengthening building codes to improve efficiency and requiring the use of
best-available industrial technology in new investments.
6
Figure 5.8 ⊳ CO2 emissions intensity of electricity generation by selected
7
region in the Bridge Scenario
800
8
g CO2/kWh
2013
2025
-32% -35% 9
600
- 47%
10
400 -34%
-42% 11
200
12
United States European Japan China India
Union 13
13
Widening the range of data tracked can usefully illustrate the commonality of the challenge
faced by both developing and developed countries to decarbonise their energy systems. For
example, Figure 5.8 shows how the emissions intensity of electricity generation changes
13
in key regions in the Bridge Scenario. Although the starting points vary substantially,
assessing the percentage change compared to 2013 levels makes the common endeavour 14
more obvious: all five regions reduce the GHG emissions intensity of power generation
substantially by 2025. 16
7. Specific guidance on energy efficiency metrics can be found in Energy Efficiency Indicators: Fundamentals on Statistics
17
(IEA, 2014b) and Energy Efficiency Indicators: Essentials for Policymaking (IEA, 2014c). The Tracking Clean Energy
Progress Report (IEA, 2015b) could be extended to cover a wider range of sectoral measurements, including individual 18
country data, needed within the UNFCCC reporting framework to track energy sector developments.

Annex A
Policies and measures
General note to the tables

The tables detail underlying assumptions about government policies for the INDC Scenario
by region. This scenario represents a preliminary assessment of the implications of the
submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and statements of intended
INDC content for some countries. An update, including the latest INDCs, will be published in
November 2015 for the IEA Ministerial meeting.
All INDCs that had been formally submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 14 May 2015 have
been included in Table A.1 in the order in which they have been submitted. Liechtenstein
and Andorra have not been included in Table A.1, but the high-level target is included in
Chapter 1, Table 1.1. Table A.2 sets out the details about policies for countries that have
made statements indicating the likely content of an INDC that has yet to be delivered (or
otherwise announcing plans to reduce emissions). These declarations have been taken as the
basis for policies assumptions. For countries that have not yet submitted an INDC and have
not publicly stated its likely content, or specified policies for the entire energy sector, the
INDC Scenario includes the policies defined in the New Policies Scenario of the World Energy
Outlook 2014.
Annex A | Policies and measures 149

Table A.1 ⊳ Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) by selected UNFCCC Party (submitted by 14 May 2015)
150
UNFCCC Party Copenhagen pledge (GHG) INDC Recent developments/targets and possible strategies for the energy sector
Switzerland 20%/30% below 1990 levels Reduce GHG emissions by 50% below 1990 levels by 2012 Ordinance for the Reduction of CO2 Emissions:
by 2020. 2030 (35% below by 2025). • Limit emissions relative to 1990 levels: from buildings to no more than
78%; from industry to no more than 93%; and from transport not to
exceed 100%.
European 20%/30% below 1990 levels Reduce EU domestic GHG emissions at least 40% 2014 Climate and Energy Policy Framework for 2030:
Union by 2020. below 1990 levels by 2030. • Achieve at least 27% of renewables and energy efficiency targets for 2030.
Norway 30%/40% below 1990 levels Reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% compared to 2015 White Paper priority areas:
by 2020. 1990 levels by 2030. • Reduce emissions from transport and industry.
• CCS; renewables and low-carbon shipping.
Mexico Up to 30% below with Reduce GHG and short-lived climate pollutant 2013 National Climate Change Strategy:
respect to business-as- emissions unconditionally by 25% by 2030 with • At least 40% of power generation from clean sources within 20 years;
usual by 2020. respect to business-as-usual. incentive systems to promote energy efficiency and reduce methane
emissions from oil and gas production.
World Energy Outlook | Special Report
United States Relative to 2005 levels: 17% Reduce net GHG emissions 26-28% below 2005 levels 2013 Climate Action Plan:
below by 2020, 42% below by 2025. • Carbon pollution standards for new and existing power plants.
by 2030 and 83% below
• Post-2018 heavy-duty vehicle fuel efficiency standards.
by 2050.
• Achieve a 40-45% reduction in methane emissions from 2012 levels by
2025 from oil and gas production.
Gabon Several actions to reduce Reduce CO2, CH4, N2O emissions by at least 50% with 2012 Climate Plan:
emissions from forestry and respect to a reference scenario by 2025. • Reduction of CH4 flaring via reinjection and use in power generation.
the energy sectors.
• 80% of power generation from hydropower by 2020.
Russia 15-25% below 1990 levels Reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions by 25-30% 2010 Energy Strategy to 2030:
by 2020 (25% affirmed by below 1990 levels by 2030 subject to the maximum • Reduce energy intensity 56% below 2005 level by 2030.
presidential decree). possible account of absorptive capacity of forests.
• Increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy demand to 13-14%
by 2030.
Table A.2 ⊳ Assumptions for selected countries
Annex A | Policies and measures
UNFCCC Party Copenhagen pledge (GHG) Assumptions in the INDC Scenario Recent developments/targets and possible strategies
Japan 25% below 1990 levels by Target to increase renewables to over 20% of power April 2014: New Strategic Energy Plan.
2020. generation by 2030. Gradual restart of electricity March 2015: Cabinet decision on the proposed Act for the Improvement of
generation from nuclear power plants. the Energy Saving Performance of Buildings.
Korea 30% below business-as- 30% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 with respect 2013 2nd National Basic Energy Plan.
usual emissions by 2020. to business-as-usual. 1st stage of emissions trading (2015-2017).
Renewable portfolio standards.
China Emission intensity 40-45% Peak CO2 emissions by around 2030. Increase 2011 12th Five-Year Plan:
below 2005 levels by 2020. non-fossil fuel share in primary energy to 20% by • 16% reduction in energy intensity from 2005 by 2015.
2030.
2014 Energy Development Strategic Action Plan and National Climate Change
Plan (2014-2020):
• Maximum 4.8 billion tonnes of coal equivalent per year (primary energy
consumption).
• Limit the share of coal to less than 62% of total primary energy demand
in 2020.
• 20% non-fossil fuel share of primary energy consumption by 2030.
• 100 GW of PV and 200 GW of wind capacity.
India Emission intensity 20-25% Target to increase renewables to 175 GW by 2022, of 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change.
below 2005 levels by 2020. which, 100 GW of solar. 2013 12th Five-Year Plan (2012–2017).
Target of 175 GW of renewables by 2022.
Brazil 36-39% below projected 36% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 with respect Ten-Year Plan for Energy Expansion.
emissions by 2020. to business-as-usual. National Energy Efficiency Plan.
151
A
Annex B
Data tables for the Bridge Scenario
General note to the tables

The tables detail projections for energy demand, gross electricity generation and electrical capacity
and carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil-fuel combustion in the Bridge Scenario. The following
regions are covered: World, OECD, OECD Americas, the United States, OECD Europe, the European
Union, OECD Asia Oceania, non-OECD, Eastern Europe/Eurasia, Russia, non-OECD Asia, China, India,
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The definitions for regional groupings can be found in
Annex C.
Data for energy demand, gross electricity generation and CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion
up to 2012 are based on IEA statistics, published in Energy Balances of OECD Countries, Energy
Balances of non-OECD Countries, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion and the IEA Monthly Oil Data
Service. Historical data for gross electrical capacity are drawn from the Platts World Electric Power
Plants Database (December 2013 version) and the International Atomic Energy Agency PRIS database
(http://www.iaea.org/pris/). The data presented for 2013 are preliminary but, wherever possible,
include the latest available country submissions. Final 2013 data will be available in World Energy
Outlook 2015.
Both in the text of this book and in the tables, rounding may lead to minor differences between totals
and the sum of their individual components. Growth rates are calculated on a compound average
annual basis and are marked “n.a.” when the base year is zero or the value exceeds 200%. Nil values
are marked “-”.
Definitional note to the tables

Total primary energy demand (TPED) is equivalent to power generation plus other energy sector
excluding electricity and heat, plus total final consumption (TFC) excluding electricity and heat. TPED
does not include ambient heat from heat pumps or electricity trade. Sectors comprising TFC include
industry, transport, buildings (residential, services and non-specified other) and other (agriculture
and non-energy use). Projected gross electrical capacity is the sum of existing capacity and additions,
less retirements. Total CO2 includes emissions from other energy sector in addition to the power
generation and TFC sectors shown in the tables. CO2 emissions and energy demand from international
marine and aviation bunkers are included only at the world transport level. Gas use in international
bunkers is not itemised separately. CO2 emissions do not include emissions from industrial waste and
non-renewable municipal waste.
Annex B | Data tables for the Bridge Scenario 153

World: Bridge Scenario
Energy demand (Mtoe) Shares (%) CAAGR (%)
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 8 790 13 579 14 623 14 999 15 370 100 100 0.7
Coal 2 231 3 973 3 963 3 704 3 448 29 22 -0.8
Oil 3 235 4 235 4 415 4 373 4 313 31 28 0.1
Gas 1 672 2 880 3 152 3 389 3 547 21 23 1.2
Nuclear 526 646 841 938 1 044 5 7 2.9
Hydro 184 320 386 434 482 2 3 2.4
Bioenergy 905 1 366 1 545 1 677 1 827 10 12 1.7
Other renewables 36 159 320 484 708 1 5 9.2
Power generation 2 987 5 173 5 516 5 659 5 846 100 100 0.7
Coal 1 225 2 472 2 342 2 058 1 801 48 31 -1.8
Oil 377 300 217 171 135 6 2 -4.6
Gas 583 1 162 1 226 1 345 1 388 22 24 1.1
Nuclear 526 646 841 938 1 044 12 18 2.9
Hydro 184 320 386 434 482 6 8 2.4
Bioenergy 60 146 233 294 376 3 6 5.7
Other energy sector 903 1 668 1 747 1 773 1 790 100 100 0.4
Electricity 183 334 362 377 394 20 22 1.0
TFC 6 298 9 095 10 027 10 400 10 729 100 100 1.0
Coal 769 934 1 021 1 036 1 027 10 10 0.6
Oil 2 608 3 671 3 941 3 962 3 965 40 37 0.5
Gas 950 1 370 1 574 1 679 1 781 15 17 1.6
Electricity 834 1 666 1 938 2 089 2 240 18 21 1.8
Heat 337 294 305 308 307 3 3 0.3
Bioenergy 796 1 129 1 200 1 260 1 322 12 12 0.9
Industry 1 804 2 654 3 045 3 219 3 350 100 100 1.4
Coal 475 752 826 843 840 28 25 0.7
Oil 325 302 321 323 323 11 10 0.4
Gas 357 564 681 745 801 21 24 2.1
Electricity 381 711 849 909 958 27 29 1.8
Heat 153 134 146 150 149 5 4 0.6
Bioenergy 113 190 218 245 272 7 8 2.1
Transport 1 575 2 535 2 795 2 856 2 914 100 100 0.8
Oil 1 479 2 350 2 546 2 549 2 540 93 87 0.5
Of which: Bunkers 201 357 386 408 431 14 15 1.1
Electricity 21 26 34 43 55 1 2 4.6
Biofuels 6 63 96 127 160 2 5 5.6
Other fuels 69 96 119 137 159 4 5 3.0
Buildings 2 252 2 987 3 111 3 175 3 251 100 100 0.5
Coal 239 124 113 104 93 4 3 -1.7
Oil 326 323 288 260 234 11 7 -1.9
Gas 435 614 651 665 678 21 21 0.6
Electricity 402 876 990 1 065 1 147 29 35 1.6
Heat 175 153 153 153 153 5 5 0.0
Bioenergy 671 868 872 871 871 29 27 0.0
Other 667 919 1 075 1 151 1 214 100 100 1.7

Electricity generation (TWh) Shares (%) CAAGR (%)
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total generation 11 825 23 234 26 734 28 672 30 620 100 100 1.6
Coal 4 425 9 612 9 485 8 428 7 478 41 24 -1.5
Oil 1 310 1 116 783 618 487 5 2 -4.8
Gas 1 760 5 026 5 913 6 818 7 223 22 24 2.2
Nuclear 2 013 2 477 3 226 3 598 4 005 11 13 2.9
Hydro 2 144 3 722 4 489 5 050 5 607 16 18 2.4
Bioenergy 132 440 757 986 1 288 2 4 6.5
Wind 4 628 1 389 2 065 2 870 3 9 9.4
Geothermal 36 71 120 186 280 0 1 8.4
Solar PV 0 134 527 820 1 136 1 4 13.4
CSP 1 6 41 95 227 0 1 23.4
Marine 1 1 3 7 17 0 0 21.9
Electrical capacity (GW) Shares (%) CAAGR (%)
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 5 956 7 221 7 989 8 809 100 100 2.3
Coal 1 878 2 025 1 955 1 854 32 21 -0.1
Oil 452 368 317 271 8 3 -3.0
Gas 1 530 1 811 1 965 2 107 26 24 1.9
Nuclear 392 449 490 542 7 6 1.9
Hydro 1 128 1 345 1 505 1 670 19 19 2.3
Bioenergy 106 154 193 245 2 3 5.1
Wind 317 623 884 1 173 5 13 8.0
Geothermal 12 18 28 42 0 0 7.8
Solar PV 136 414 621 837 2 9 11.3
CSP 4 13 28 63 0 1 18.4
Marine 1 1 2 6 0 0 15.4
CO2 emissions (Mt) Shares (%) CAAGR (%)
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 20 934 32 192 32 861 32 005 30 897 100 100 -0.2
Coal 8 317 14 324 14 062 12 888 11 672 44 38 -1.2
Oil 8 814 11 305 11 608 11 389 11 158 35 36 -0.1
Gas 3 803 6 564 7 191 7 728 8 067 20 26 1.2
Power generation 7 476 13 534 12 862 11 805 10 659 100 100 -1.4
Coal 4 915 9 864 9 307 8 119 6 995 73 66 -2.0
Oil 1 199 943 682 539 425 7 4 -4.6
Gas 1 362 2 728 2 873 3 146 3 239 20 30 1.0
TFC 12 461 17 020 18 311 18 511 18 563 100 100 0.5
Coal 3 262 4 168 4 458 4 479 4 399 24 24 0.3
Oil 7 061 9 733 10 294 10 243 10 151 57 55 0.2
Transport 4 383 7 003 7 591 7 604 7 582 41 41 0.5
Of which: Bunkers 620 1 100 1 190 1 256 1 324 6 7 1.1
Gas 2 138 3 119 3 559 3 790 4 012 18 22 1.5
B
OECD: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 4 525 5 293 5 275 5 083 4 919 100 100 -0.4
Coal 1 080 1 030 853 644 470 19 10 -4.5
Oil 1 873 1 905 1 790 1 621 1 458 36 30 -1.6
Gas 843 1 357 1 411 1 468 1 459 26 30 0.4
Nuclear 451 511 589 585 604 10 12 1.0
Hydro 102 121 127 133 139 2 3 0.8
Bioenergy 147 280 342 394 455 5 9 2.9
Coal 759 822 651 451 285 37 14 -6.0
Oil 154 79 38 26 21 4 1 -7.6
Gas 176 489 504 561 554 22 27 0.7
Nuclear 451 511 589 585 604 23 29 1.0
Hydro 102 121 127 133 139 6 7 0.8
Bioenergy 53 94 122 140 160 4 8 3.2
Other energy sector 405 502 507 493 483 100 100 -0.2
Electricity 105 127 125 123 120 25 25 -0.3
TFC 3 108 3 597 3 632 3 531 3 430 100 100 -0.3
Coal 234 119 116 110 103 3 3 -0.9
Oil 1 593 1 703 1 637 1 491 1 348 47 39 -1.4
Gas 589 722 745 741 730 20 21 0.1
Electricity 552 799 840 854 863 22 25 0.5
Heat 43 60 60 59 58 2 2 -0.2
Bioenergy 94 184 218 252 292 5 9 2.8
Industry 827 799 827 816 793 100 100 -0.0
Coal 160 95 93 89 83 12 11 -0.8
Oil 168 96 90 84 77 12 10 -1.3
Gas 226 259 268 263 254 32 32 -0.1
Electricity 222 256 275 274 269 32 34 0.3
Heat 15 25 24 23 22 3 3 -0.7
Bioenergy 37 67 75 81 84 8 11 1.3
Transport 940 1 186 1 172 1 091 1 026 100 100 -0.9
Oil 914 1 108 1 066 953 846 93 83 -1.6
Electricity 8 9 12 17 24 1 2 6.1
Biofuels 0 43 62 81 106 4 10 5.4
Other fuels 19 26 32 41 49 2 5 3.8
Buildings 985 1 224 1 226 1 218 1 211 100 100 -0.1
Coal 69 21 19 18 16 2 1 -1.5
Oil 209 155 125 101 77 13 6 -4.0
Gas 304 411 413 405 396 34 33 -0.2
Electricity 316 524 542 552 559 43 46 0.4
Heat 27 35 36 36 36 3 3 0.2
Bioenergy 56 70 77 86 97 6 8 1.9
Other 355 389 407 406 400 100 100 0.2

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 3 092 3 526 2 866 2 025 1 303 33 11 -5.7
Oil 686 343 157 106 82 3 1 -8.1
Gas 782 2 626 2 893 3 298 3 300 24 29 1.4
Nuclear 1 729 1 960 2 259 2 244 2 319 18 20 1.0
Hydro 1 181 1 408 1 480 1 544 1 611 13 14 0.8
Bioenergy 124 309 411 488 574 3 5 3.7
Wind 4 438 811 1 152 1 537 4 13 7.7
Geothermal 29 46 71 103 144 0 1 7.0
Solar PV 0 114 268 362 461 1 4 8.6
CSP 1 6 27 53 105 0 1 18.0
Marine 1 1 3 7 16 0 0 21.7
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 2 917 3 148 3 318 3 497 100 100 1.1
Coal 661 572 500 396 23 11 -3.0
Oil 209 126 97 80 7 2 -5.5
Gas 880 982 1 025 1 061 30 30 1.1
Nuclear 315 314 304 311 11 9 -0.1
Hydro 469 490 511 531 16 15 0.7
Bioenergy 68 82 95 109 2 3 2.8
Wind 194 334 458 588 7 17 6.7
Geothermal 7 10 15 21 0 1 6.3
Solar PV 109 227 297 366 4 10 7.4
CSP 3 9 15 29 0 1 13.7
Marine 1 1 2 6 0 0 15.2
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 11 099 12 078 11 090 9 869 8 613 100 100 -2.0
Coal 4 142 3 949 3 227 2 368 1 602 33 19 -5.2
Oil 5 030 4 977 4 597 4 104 3 653 41 42 -1.8
Gas 1 928 3 152 3 266 3 396 3 357 26 39 0.4
Coal 3 063 3 340 2 628 1 798 1 069 70 44 -6.5
Oil 487 248 121 82 66 5 3 -7.5
Gas 411 1 150 1 181 1 312 1 290 24 53 0.7
TFC 6 545 6 603 6 400 5 934 5 464 100 100 -1.1
Coal 1 015 521 508 483 451 8 8 -0.8
Oil 4 180 4 413 4 177 3 747 3 333 67 61 -1.6
Transport 2 681 3 267 3 144 2 811 2 497 49 46 -1.6
Gas 1 349 1 669 1 715 1 705 1 681 25 31 0.0
B
OECD Americas: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 2 262 2 684 2 731 2 630 2 550 100 100 -0.3
Coal 491 479 392 268 172 18 7 -5.9
Oil 922 1 002 992 895 806 37 32 -1.3
Gas 517 746 818 870 879 28 34 1.0
Nuclear 180 244 251 251 256 9 10 0.3
Hydro 52 61 65 67 69 2 3 0.7
Bioenergy 82 120 150 180 222 4 9 3.7
Power generation 852 1 068 1 059 1 021 989 100 100 -0.4
Coal 419 428 342 221 126 40 13 -6.9
Oil 47 22 13 9 7 2 1 -6.6
Gas 95 253 287 333 338 24 34 1.7
Nuclear 180 244 251 251 256 23 26 0.3
Hydro 52 61 65 67 69 6 7 0.7
Bioenergy 41 29 40 49 59 3 6 4.3
Other energy sector 194 274 287 284 282 100 100 0.2
Electricity 56 64 65 64 62 23 22 -0.2
TFC 1 548 1 810 1 874 1 819 1 775 100 100 -0.1
Coal 61 29 29 28 26 2 1 -0.6
Oil 809 914 913 826 746 51 42 -1.2
Gas 361 377 400 401 398 21 22 0.3
Electricity 272 391 412 419 424 22 24 0.5
Heat 3 7 7 7 6 0 0 -1.2
Bioenergy 41 90 109 131 162 5 9 3.5
Industry 361 352 380 378 371 100 100 0.3
Coal 51 28 28 27 26 8 7 -0.5
Oil 60 36 36 34 32 10 9 -0.7
Gas 138 143 156 154 150 41 40 0.3
Electricity 94 104 114 114 111 30 30 0.4
Heat 1 6 6 6 5 2 1 -0.7
Bioenergy 17 35 40 43 45 10 12 1.5
Transport 562 728 732 675 639 100 100 -0.8
Oil 543 676 664 583 512 93 80 -1.6
Electricity 1 1 2 6 12 0 2 15.6
Biofuels - 29 40 54 76 4 12 5.7
Other fuels 18 21 25 32 39 3 6 3.6
Buildings 461 567 573 570 567 100 100 0.0
Coal 10 1 1 1 0 0 0 -7.0
Oil 64 56 47 39 31 10 5 -3.5
Gas 184 201 201 197 191 35 34 -0.3
Electricity 176 281 292 295 296 50 52 0.3
Heat 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 -4.4
Bioenergy 24 25 28 33 39 4 7 2.5
Other 164 163 190 195 197 100 100 1.1

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 1 796 1 840 1 505 996 589 35 10 -6.5
Oil 211 99 60 40 33 2 1 -6.3
Gas 406 1 390 1 677 1 979 2 044 26 36 2.3
Nuclear 687 934 962 965 982 18 17 0.3
Hydro 602 710 754 777 801 13 14 0.7
Bioenergy 91 95 138 179 227 2 4 5.3
Wind 3 182 338 483 662 3 12 7.9
Geothermal 21 25 38 52 72 0 1 6.4
Solar PV 0 14 66 117 179 0 3 16.2
CSP 1 1 15 34 72 0 1 27.7
Marine 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 31.3
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 1 373 1 432 1 507 1 588 100 100 0.9
Coal 354 289 250 173 26 11 -4.1
Oil 89 57 45 40 6 3 -4.5
Gas 505 548 567 599 37 38 1.0
Nuclear 120 124 124 127 9 8 0.3
Hydro 195 204 210 217 14 14 0.6
Bioenergy 21 27 34 42 2 3 4.3
Wind 70 126 178 238 5 15 7.4
Geothermal 4 6 8 10 0 1 5.3
Solar PV 14 47 81 121 1 8 13.6
CSP 1 5 10 19 0 1 19.7
Marine 0 0 0 1 0 0 23.6
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 5 574 6 217 5 947 5 274 4 606 100 100 -1.7
Coal 1 916 1 820 1 477 979 556 29 12 -6.7
Oil 2 469 2 666 2 579 2 286 2 034 43 44 -1.6
Gas 1 189 1 730 1 891 2 009 2 017 28 44 0.9
Coal 1 643 1 684 1 340 847 430 72 35 -7.7
Oil 150 75 45 29 24 3 2 -6.5
Gas 222 591 671 775 782 25 63 1.7
TFC 3 213 3 423 3 413 3 145 2 893 100 100 -1.0
Coal 270 123 124 120 113 4 4 -0.5
Oil 2 115 2 427 2 369 2 104 1 867 71 65 -1.5
Transport 1 585 1 982 1 945 1 707 1 502 58 52 -1.6
Gas 829 873 919 922 913 25 32 0.3
B
United States: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 1 915 2 185 2 203 2 091 1 995 100 100 -0.5
Coal 460 444 358 241 152 20 8 -6.1
Oil 757 791 781 693 612 36 31 -1.5
Gas 438 598 653 693 692 27 35 0.9
Nuclear 159 214 222 224 227 10 11 0.3
Hydro 23 23 25 26 28 1 1 1.0
Bioenergy 62 90 114 140 176 4 9 4.0
Power generation 750 899 883 841 802 100 100 -0.7
Coal 396 398 315 202 114 44 14 -7.1
Oil 27 7 5 4 4 1 0 -4.2
Gas 90 210 239 281 287 23 36 1.9
Nuclear 159 214 222 224 227 24 28 0.3
Hydro 23 23 25 26 28 3 3 1.0
Bioenergy 40 22 30 36 44 2 6 4.3
Electricity 49 51 50 49 47 24 24 -0.5
TFC 1 294 1 460 1 506 1 446 1 397 100 100 -0.3
Coal 56 23 23 22 20 2 1 -0.9
Oil 683 735 728 644 569 50 41 -1.5
Gas 303 305 325 324 319 21 23 0.3
Electricity 226 321 336 340 341 22 24 0.4
Heat 2 6 6 6 5 0 0 -1.3
Bioenergy 23 68 84 103 131 5 9 3.9
Industry 284 251 273 269 259 100 100 0.2
Coal 46 22 23 21 20 9 8 -0.7
Oil 44 20 20 19 17 8 7 -1.1
Gas 110 104 115 113 108 41 42 0.2
Electricity 75 73 79 78 75 29 29 0.2
Heat - 5 5 5 5 2 2 -0.7
Bioenergy 9 27 30 31 33 11 13 1.2
Other renewables - 0 0 1 2 0 1 18.3
Transport 488 609 611 557 524 100 100 -0.9
Oil 472 562 548 471 404 92 77 -1.9
Electricity 0 1 2 5 11 0 2 19.0
Biofuels - 28 38 52 73 5 14 5.8
Other fuels 15 19 23 29 36 3 7 3.9
Buildings 389 478 479 473 466 100 100 -0.1
Coal 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 -7.2
Oil 48 41 33 25 17 9 4 -5.0
Gas 164 175 174 169 162 37 35 -0.5
Electricity 152 245 253 254 253 51 54 0.2
Heat 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 -4.4
Bioenergy 14 13 15 19 24 3 5 3.8
Other 133 122 144 147 148 100 100 1.1

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 1 700 1 713 1 387 910 533 40 12 -6.6
Oil 131 33 22 19 18 1 0 -3.5
Gas 382 1 159 1 400 1 669 1 736 27 39 2.4
Nuclear 612 822 853 861 870 19 19 0.3
Hydro 273 271 296 307 320 6 7 1.0
Bioenergy 86 78 111 145 184 2 4 5.2
Wind 3 165 278 388 529 4 12 7.1
Geothermal 16 19 28 36 47 0 1 5.5
Solar PV 0 14 60 106 162 0 4 15.7
CSP 1 1 14 31 67 0 2 27.2
Marine - 0 0 0 1 0 0 53.0
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 1 148 1 175 1 226 1 280 100 100 0.6
Coal 332 267 229 156 29 12 -4.3
Oil 64 35 29 28 6 2 -4.8
Gas 453 486 495 519 39 41 0.8
Nuclear 105 108 109 110 9 9 0.3
Hydro 101 105 108 112 9 9 0.6
Bioenergy 16 21 27 34 1 3 4.3
Wind 60 103 142 188 5 15 6.9
Geothermal 3 4 5 7 0 1 4.2
Solar PV 13 42 72 108 1 8 13.5
CSP 1 4 9 18 0 1 19.2
Marine 0 0 0 1 0 0 44.4
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 4 850 5 164 4 881 4 242 3 605 100 100 -2.1
Coal 1 797 1 678 1 344 875 480 32 13 -7.1
Oil 2 042 2 101 2 027 1 764 1 534 41 43 -1.8
Gas 1 011 1 385 1 510 1 602 1 591 27 44 0.8
Coal 1 550 1 568 1 234 770 383 75 36 -8.0
Oil 88 25 16 13 12 1 1 -4.2
Gas 210 490 558 655 664 24 63 1.8
TFC 2 730 2 762 2 735 2 477 2 235 100 100 -1.2
Coal 245 98 99 93 86 4 4 -0.8
Oil 1 788 1 956 1 890 1 638 1 416 71 63 -1.9
Transport 1 376 1 647 1 604 1 378 1 184 60 53 -1.9
Gas 697 707 747 745 732 26 33 0.2
B
OECD Europe: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 1 631 1 752 1 688 1 610 1 548 100 100 -0.7
Coal 452 310 248 193 146 18 9 -4.3
Oil 616 556 501 451 401 32 26 -1.9
Gas 260 423 428 432 414 24 27 -0.1
Nuclear 205 229 222 199 206 13 13 -0.6
Hydro 38 49 51 54 56 3 4 0.8
Bioenergy 54 138 165 182 199 8 13 2.2
Coal 279 230 171 121 79 31 12 -6.1
Oil 51 19 11 7 5 3 1 -7.1
Gas 41 127 137 151 141 17 21 0.6
Nuclear 205 229 222 199 206 31 31 -0.6
Hydro 38 49 51 54 56 7 8 0.8
Bioenergy 9 55 67 73 80 7 12 2.3
Electricity 39 46 43 42 41 31 34 -0.6
TFC 1 131 1 225 1 206 1 173 1 135 100 100 -0.4
Coal 124 51 49 47 43 4 4 -1.0
Oil 525 499 455 414 369 41 33 -1.8
Gas 201 274 270 263 254 22 22 -0.4
Electricity 193 266 278 283 286 22 25 0.4
Heat 40 47 47 47 46 4 4 -0.1
Bioenergy 46 82 96 107 117 7 10 2.1
Industry 324 290 286 279 268 100 100 -0.5
Coal 71 30 29 28 26 10 10 -0.8
Oil 59 31 27 25 23 11 8 -1.8
Gas 78 90 84 80 74 31 28 -1.1
Electricity 88 98 103 102 99 34 37 0.1
Heat 14 17 16 15 15 6 5 -0.9
Bioenergy 14 24 27 29 30 8 11 1.3
Transport 268 318 308 291 271 100 100 -0.9
Oil 262 296 276 253 226 93 83 -1.6
Electricity 5 6 7 8 9 2 3 2.6
Biofuels 0 13 21 26 30 4 11 4.8
Other fuels 1 3 4 5 7 1 2 5.1
Buildings 405 483 483 479 477 100 100 -0.1
Coal 49 18 17 16 15 4 3 -1.2
Oil 97 61 46 34 23 13 5 -5.6
Gas 105 168 170 166 162 35 34 -0.2
Electricity 97 158 164 169 173 33 36 0.6
Heat 24 30 31 31 32 6 7 0.3
Bioenergy 30 43 46 50 55 9 12 1.5
Other 134 134 128 124 119 100 100 -0.7

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 1 040 946 720 515 328 26 9 -6.0
Oil 216 68 38 24 17 2 0 -8.0
Gas 168 658 748 852 792 18 21 1.1
Nuclear 787 878 852 763 792 24 21 -0.6
Hydro 446 575 592 625 656 16 17 0.8
Bioenergy 21 168 212 235 259 5 7 2.6
Wind 1 239 421 575 732 7 19 6.8
Geothermal 4 12 16 20 26 0 1 4.5
Solar PV 0 81 130 157 178 2 5 4.7
CSP - 5 10 16 26 0 1 10.0
Marine 1 1 1 3 8 0 0 17.1
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 1 075 1 181 1 255 1 329 100 100 1.3
Coal 200 172 143 122 19 9 -2.8
Oil 63 37 27 20 6 2 -6.5
Gas 241 276 304 312 22 23 1.5
Nuclear 129 123 110 112 12 8 -0.8
Hydro 204 215 226 235 19 18 0.8
Bioenergy 39 45 48 52 4 4 1.7
Wind 117 190 247 302 11 23 5.7
Geothermal 2 2 3 3 0 0 4.6
Solar PV 78 119 142 159 7 12 4.3
CSP 2 3 5 8 0 1 7.3
Marine 0 0 1 3 0 0 16.2
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 3 959 3 636 3 233 2 880 2 497 100 100 -2.2
Coal 1 708 1 204 943 722 525 33 21 -4.8
Oil 1 674 1 460 1 305 1 163 1 022 40 41 -2.1
Gas 578 973 985 995 949 27 38 -0.1
Power generation 1 399 1 310 1 058 869 658 100 100 -4.0
Coal 1 140 953 702 493 313 73 48 -6.3
Oil 164 60 35 23 17 5 3 -7.1
Gas 95 298 321 353 328 23 50 0.6
TFC 2 382 2 149 2 013 1 865 1 704 100 100 -1.4
Coal 528 219 211 200 185 10 11 -1.0
Oil 1 394 1 299 1 178 1 059 931 60 55 -1.9
Transport 775 887 829 757 677 41 40 -1.6
Gas 460 631 624 606 587 29 34 -0.4
B
European Union: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 1 642 1 620 1 548 1 471 1 411 100 100 -0.8
Coal 456 283 217 164 121 17 9 -4.9
Oil 608 510 455 408 361 31 26 -2.0
Gas 297 391 394 399 384 24 27 -0.1
Nuclear 207 229 223 202 206 14 15 -0.6
Hydro 25 32 33 34 35 2 2 0.6
Bioenergy 47 138 165 181 196 9 14 2.1
Coal 287 220 158 109 71 32 12 -6.5
Oil 62 19 11 7 5 3 1 -7.3
Gas 55 110 118 132 126 16 21 0.8
Nuclear 207 229 223 202 206 33 33 -0.6
Hydro 25 32 33 34 35 5 6 0.6
Bioenergy 8 53 65 71 76 8 12 2.1
Electricity 39 41 38 36 35 31 32 -1.0
TFC 1 131 1 128 1 102 1 069 1 030 100 100 -0.5
Coal 122 36 34 31 28 3 3 -1.4
Oil 504 456 412 372 330 40 32 -1.9
Gas 226 262 258 250 242 23 24 -0.5
Electricity 186 239 246 250 251 21 24 0.3
Heat 54 49 49 48 48 4 5 -0.1
Bioenergy 38 83 98 109 118 7 11 2.1
Industry 343 263 259 251 240 100 100 -0.5
Coal 69 24 23 22 20 9 8 -1.0
Oil 58 29 25 23 21 11 9 -1.9
Gas 97 84 79 75 70 32 29 -1.1
Electricity 85 86 90 88 86 33 36 -0.0
Heat 19 16 15 15 14 6 6 -0.9
Bioenergy 14 24 27 29 29 9 12 1.2
Transport 259 297 287 270 251 100 100 -1.0
Oil 253 276 255 232 206 93 82 -1.7
Electricity 5 5 7 7 8 2 3 2.4
Biofuels 0 13 21 26 30 4 12 5.0
Other fuels 1 3 4 5 6 1 2 4.7
Buildings 395 447 443 438 435 100 100 -0.2
Coal 49 10 9 7 6 2 1 -2.7
Oil 90 54 41 31 21 12 5 -5.5
Gas 108 161 161 157 153 36 35 -0.3
Electricity 91 144 147 150 154 32 35 0.4
Heat 34 32 33 33 33 7 8 0.2
Bioenergy 24 44 47 51 56 10 13 1.4
Other 134 121 114 109 104 100 100 -0.9

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 1 050 896 651 453 283 28 9 -6.6
Oil 224 68 37 22 15 2 0 -8.4
Gas 193 536 601 709 678 17 20 1.4
Nuclear 795 877 856 776 790 27 24 -0.6
Hydro 289 367 379 395 405 11 12 0.6
Bioenergy 20 165 207 227 247 5 7 2.4
Wind 1 236 404 539 670 7 20 6.3
Geothermal 3 6 9 12 18 0 1 6.5
Solar PV 0 82 130 155 174 3 5 4.5
CSP - 5 10 16 26 0 1 10.0
Marine 1 1 1 3 8 0 0 17.2
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 996 1 079 1 136 1 188 100 100 1.0
Coal 194 160 129 106 19 9 -3.5
Oil 62 36 25 18 6 1 -7.1
Gas 223 248 275 281 22 24 1.4
Nuclear 129 123 111 112 13 9 -0.8
Hydro 150 159 165 169 15 14 0.7
Bioenergy 39 44 47 50 4 4 1.5
Wind 117 185 236 282 12 24 5.3
Geothermal 1 1 2 2 0 0 6.5
Solar PV 79 119 141 156 8 13 4.1
CSP 2 3 5 8 0 1 7.3
Marine 0 0 1 3 0 0 16.2
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 4 051 3 350 2 923 2 582 2 235 100 100 -2.4
Coal 1 732 1 101 823 607 427 33 19 -5.4
Oil 1 656 1 354 1 199 1 062 929 40 42 -2.2
Gas 663 894 901 913 878 27 39 -0.1
Power generation 1 497 1 233 959 774 589 100 100 -4.2
Coal 1 172 914 648 443 278 74 47 -6.8
Oil 197 60 35 22 17 5 3 -7.3
Gas 128 258 276 309 294 21 50 0.8
TFC 2 379 1 956 1 817 1 675 1 523 100 100 -1.5
Coal 523 160 150 140 127 8 8 -1.4
Oil 1 340 1 194 1 073 960 839 61 55 -2.1
Transport 748 827 765 696 619 42 41 -1.7
Gas 515 602 594 575 557 31 37 -0.5
B
OECD Asia Oceania: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 632 857 857 843 821 100 100 -0.3
Coal 138 240 214 183 152 28 19 -2.7
Oil 335 347 298 275 252 40 31 -1.9
Gas 66 189 165 166 166 22 20 -0.7
Nuclear 66 39 116 134 142 5 17 8.0
Hydro 11 11 12 12 13 1 2 1.4
Bioenergy 10 22 27 31 35 3 4 2.6
Power generation 241 380 395 398 396 100 100 0.2
Coal 60 165 138 109 80 43 20 -4.2
Oil 56 38 13 10 8 10 2 -8.6
Gas 40 109 79 77 76 29 19 -2.1
Nuclear 66 39 116 134 142 10 36 8.0
Hydro 11 11 12 12 13 3 3 1.4
Bioenergy 3 11 15 18 21 3 5 4.0
Electricity 11 17 18 18 17 21 21 0.0
TFC 429 563 552 539 521 100 100 -0.5
Coal 49 39 38 36 33 7 6 -1.0
Oil 259 290 269 252 233 52 45 -1.3
Gas 27 71 74 77 78 13 15 0.5
Electricity 86 142 150 152 153 25 29 0.4
Heat 0 6 6 6 6 1 1 0.2
Bioenergy 7 12 12 13 14 2 3 1.0
Industry 143 157 161 159 155 100 100 -0.1
Coal 38 37 36 34 32 24 20 -0.9
Oil 49 30 27 25 23 19 15 -1.5
Gas 11 26 28 29 30 17 19 0.8
Electricity 40 54 59 59 58 34 38 0.5
Heat - 2 2 2 2 1 1 -0.0
Bioenergy 5 9 9 9 9 5 6 0.6
Transport 110 140 132 124 116 100 100 -1.1
Oil 109 135 126 118 108 97 93 -1.3
Electricity 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2.7
Biofuels - 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.6
Other fuels 0 2 2 3 3 1 3 3.7
Buildings 120 174 170 169 167 100 100 -0.2
Coal 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 -2.7
Oil 47 38 31 27 23 22 14 -2.8
Gas 15 42 42 43 43 24 26 0.1
Electricity 44 85 87 89 89 49 53 0.3
Heat 0 4 4 4 4 2 2 0.4
Bioenergy 2 2 3 3 4 1 2 2.3
Other 56 91 89 87 83 100 100 -0.5

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 256 740 641 514 386 40 20 -3.8
Oil 259 176 59 41 33 9 2 -9.4
Gas 208 579 468 467 464 31 23 -1.3
Nuclear 255 148 445 516 545 8 28 8.0
Hydro 133 122 134 143 155 7 8 1.4
Bioenergy 12 46 61 74 88 2 4 3.9
Wind - 17 52 94 142 1 7 13.4
Geothermal 4 9 18 31 47 0 2 10.4
Solar PV 0 18 72 89 104 1 5 10.8
CSP - 0 2 3 7 0 0 54.7
Marine - 0 2 3 6 0 0 90.1
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 469 534 557 580 100 100 1.3
Coal 107 112 108 100 23 17 -0.4
Oil 58 32 25 19 12 3 -6.4
Gas 134 158 153 150 29 26 0.7
Nuclear 66 67 70 72 14 12 0.5
Hydro 70 71 75 79 15 14 0.8
Bioenergy 8 10 12 15 2 3 3.7
Wind 7 19 33 48 1 8 12.0
Geothermal 1 2 5 7 0 1 10.0
Solar PV 18 62 75 87 4 15 9.9
CSP 0 0 1 2 0 0 44.4
Marine 0 1 1 2 0 0 12.0
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 1 566 2 225 1 911 1 714 1 510 100 100 -2.3
Coal 518 925 806 667 522 42 35 -3.3
Oil 887 851 713 655 597 38 40 -2.1
Gas 161 449 391 392 391 20 26 -0.8
Power generation 548 1 078 816 672 530 100 100 -4.1
Coal 280 703 586 458 326 65 62 -4.4
Oil 174 113 41 30 25 11 5 -8.6
Gas 94 261 189 184 179 24 34 -2.2
TFC 950 1 031 974 925 867 100 100 -1.0
Coal 217 178 173 163 152 17 18 -0.9
Oil 672 687 629 584 535 67 62 -1.5
Transport 321 398 370 346 318 39 37 -1.3
Gas 61 165 172 178 180 16 21 0.5
B
Non-OECD: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 4 064 7 930 8 956 9 501 10 009 100 100 1.4
Coal 1 151 2 943 3 110 3 060 2 978 37 30 0.1
Oil 1 161 1 974 2 238 2 343 2 424 25 24 1.2
Gas 829 1 523 1 737 1 914 2 077 19 21 1.8
Nuclear 74 135 252 353 439 2 4 7.2
Hydro 83 199 259 302 344 3 3 3.3
Bioenergy 758 1 086 1 204 1 283 1 372 14 14 1.4
Power generation 1 268 2 978 3 339 3 551 3 786 100 100 1.4
Coal 466 1 650 1 690 1 607 1 515 55 40 -0.5
Oil 223 221 179 145 114 7 3 -3.8
Gas 407 673 722 784 834 23 22 1.3
Nuclear 74 135 252 353 439 5 12 7.2
Hydro 83 199 259 302 344 7 9 3.3
Bioenergy 7 52 111 154 216 2 6 8.8
Other energy sector 498 1 167 1 240 1 280 1 308 100 100 0.7
Electricity 78 207 237 254 274 18 21 1.7
TFC 2 989 5 141 6 004 6 454 6 857 100 100 1.7
Coal 535 814 905 926 924 16 13 0.7
Oil 814 1 611 1 918 2 063 2 187 31 32 1.8
Gas 361 648 824 931 1 040 13 15 2.8
Electricity 282 867 1 098 1 235 1 377 17 20 2.8
Heat 295 234 245 249 249 5 4 0.4
Bioenergy 702 946 982 1 008 1 029 18 15 0.5
Industry 977 1 855 2 218 2 402 2 557 100 100 1.9
Coal 315 657 733 754 757 35 30 0.8
Oil 158 206 231 239 245 11 10 1.0
Gas 131 304 413 482 548 16 21 3.5
Electricity 159 455 574 635 689 25 27 2.5
Heat 138 110 122 127 127 6 5 0.9
Bioenergy 76 123 143 164 188 7 7 2.5
Transport 434 992 1 232 1 350 1 446 100 100 2.2
Oil 364 886 1 094 1 188 1 263 89 87 2.1
Electricity 13 17 22 26 31 2 2 3.6
Biofuels 6 19 35 46 53 2 4 6.1
Other fuels 50 70 82 89 99 7 7 2.0
Buildings 1 267 1 764 1 885 1 956 2 040 100 100 0.9
Coal 170 103 94 86 77 6 4 -1.7
Oil 117 169 163 159 157 10 8 -0.4
Gas 131 204 238 259 282 12 14 1.9
Electricity 86 352 448 512 588 20 29 3.1
Heat 148 118 117 117 117 7 6 -0.0
Bioenergy 615 797 795 786 774 45 38 -0.2
Other 312 530 668 745 814 100 100 2.6

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 1 333 6 086 6 619 6 403 6 175 49 32 0.1
Oil 624 773 626 513 405 6 2 -3.7
Gas 979 2 400 3 019 3 521 3 924 19 20 2.9
Nuclear 283 517 967 1 354 1 685 4 9 7.2
Hydro 963 2 315 3 009 3 506 3 996 19 21 3.3
Bioenergy 8 131 346 498 714 1 4 10.5
Wind 0 190 578 913 1 333 2 7 12.2
Geothermal 8 25 49 82 136 0 1 10.4
Solar PV 0 21 260 458 675 0 4 22.8
CSP - 0 14 43 123 0 1 50.2
Marine - 0 0 0 1 0 0 25.2
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 3 039 4 073 4 670 5 313 100 100 3.3
Coal 1 217 1 453 1 454 1 458 40 27 1.1
Oil 243 242 220 191 8 4 -1.4
Gas 650 830 941 1 046 21 20 2.8
Nuclear 78 135 186 231 3 4 6.6
Hydro 659 855 995 1 138 22 21 3.3
Bioenergy 38 72 98 136 1 3 7.8
Wind 123 289 426 585 4 11 9.6
Geothermal 4 8 13 21 0 0 9.7
Solar PV 27 187 324 470 1 9 18.3
CSP 0 5 13 35 0 1 30.9
Marine 0 0 0 0 0 0 26.1
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 9 214 19 015 20 569 20 864 20 935 100 100 0.6
Coal 4 175 10 374 10 836 10 520 10 070 55 48 -0.2
Oil 3 164 5 228 5 821 6 029 6 181 27 30 1.0
Gas 1 875 3 412 3 913 4 315 4 685 18 22 1.9
Coal 1 852 6 524 6 678 6 321 5 927 74 72 -0.6
Oil 711 694 561 457 359 8 4 -3.8
Gas 951 1 578 1 692 1 835 1 949 18 24 1.3
TFC 5 296 9 317 10 710 11 304 11 750 100 100 1.4
Coal 2 247 3 647 3 950 3 996 3 949 39 34 0.5
Oil 2 260 4 220 4 928 5 240 5 495 45 47 1.6
Transport 1 082 2 637 3 257 3 537 3 761 28 32 2.1
Gas 789 1 450 1 832 2 068 2 306 16 20 2.8
B
E. Europe/Eurasia: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 1 544 1 168 1 157 1 168 1 182 100 100 0.1
Coal 368 237 214 197 187 20 16 -1.4
Oil 470 240 241 237 231 21 20 -0.2
Gas 607 564 555 560 556 48 47 -0.1
Nuclear 59 76 88 102 111 7 9 2.2
Hydro 23 26 28 30 34 2 3 1.5
Bioenergy 17 22 26 32 44 2 4 4.2
Coal 197 143 123 106 97 25 17 -2.3
Oil 125 20 17 13 10 4 2 -4.1
Gas 333 306 289 285 275 53 49 -0.6
Nuclear 59 76 88 102 111 13 20 2.2
Hydro 23 26 28 30 34 5 6 1.5
Bioenergy 4 6 8 11 20 1 4 7.1
Electricity 35 41 41 42 43 19 23 0.3
TFC 1 082 720 744 769 785 100 100 0.5
Coal 114 54 55 57 57 8 7 0.4
Oil 281 172 182 188 190 24 24 0.6
Gas 266 215 222 228 232 30 29 0.4
Electricity 127 107 115 122 128 15 16 1.0
Heat 281 156 153 154 155 22 20 -0.1
Bioenergy 13 15 17 20 23 2 3 2.5
Industry 396 241 246 257 264 100 100 0.5
Coal 56 43 44 46 47 18 18 0.6
Oil 52 19 20 20 21 8 8 0.7
Gas 86 72 72 75 76 30 29 0.3
Electricity 75 48 52 55 56 20 21 1.0
Heat 127 57 56 58 59 24 22 0.2
Bioenergy 0 2 3 3 5 1 2 5.7
Transport 172 146 155 162 166 100 100 0.8
Oil 123 103 109 114 115 71 69 0.6
Electricity 12 10 10 11 12 7 7 1.5
Biofuels 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 7.6
Other fuels 37 33 35 36 37 23 22 0.7
Buildings 392 269 271 272 273 100 100 0.1
Coal 56 10 10 9 9 4 3 -0.9
Oil 37 17 16 14 12 6 4 -2.2
Gas 115 90 93 93 93 33 34 0.2
Electricity 26 46 47 49 52 17 19 0.7
Heat 145 93 92 92 91 34 33 -0.1
Bioenergy 12 13 13 15 16 5 6 1.5
Other 122 64 72 77 82 100 100 1.5

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 429 406 364 309 284 23 14 -2.1
Oil 256 37 25 15 8 2 0 -8.7
Gas 715 676 737 778 758 39 38 0.7
Nuclear 226 291 338 388 426 17 21 2.3
Hydro 267 306 321 353 394 18 20 1.5
Bioenergy 0 4 12 23 57 0 3 16.5
Wind - 7 17 26 43 0 2 11.2
Geothermal 0 0 4 8 15 0 1 23.9
Solar PV - 2 5 8 11 0 1 9.3
CSP - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Marine - - - - 0 0 0 n.a.
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 443 452 468 489 100 100 0.6
Coal 111 98 83 72 25 15 -2.5
Oil 23 17 11 6 5 1 -7.3
Gas 161 171 182 186 36 38 0.9
Nuclear 43 48 55 60 10 12 2.0
Hydro 96 102 111 122 22 25 1.4
Bioenergy 2 3 5 11 0 2 11.1
Wind 4 9 13 19 1 4 9.1
Geothermal 0 1 1 2 0 0 19.7
Solar PV 3 4 7 10 1 2 7.4
CSP - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Marine - - - 0 0 0 n.a.
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 3 986 2 734 2 625 2 560 2 495 100 100 -0.5
Coal 1 336 869 785 724 687 32 28 -1.4
Oil 1 245 592 591 583 570 22 23 -0.2
Gas 1 405 1 273 1 249 1 253 1 238 47 50 -0.2
Coal 799 591 508 437 397 43 37 -2.3
Oil 399 66 55 43 32 5 3 -4.1
Gas 778 718 679 669 645 52 60 -0.6
TFC 1 897 1 216 1 241 1 271 1 281 100 100 0.3
Coal 526 269 269 278 281 22 22 0.3
Oil 780 460 472 481 481 38 38 0.3
Transport 365 304 322 334 338 25 26 0.6
Gas 591 486 499 511 518 40 40 0.4
B
Russia: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 880 733 706 706 709 100 100 -0.2
Coal 191 124 111 105 99 17 14 -1.3
Oil 264 157 149 144 139 21 20 -0.7
Gas 367 384 361 357 348 52 49 -0.6
Nuclear 31 45 56 64 71 6 10 2.7
Hydro 14 16 16 18 20 2 3 1.6
Bioenergy 12 8 9 12 20 1 3 5.9
Coal 105 72 64 60 56 18 15 -1.5
Oil 62 17 15 11 9 4 2 -3.7
Gas 228 239 219 213 202 61 52 -1.0
Nuclear 31 45 56 64 71 12 18 2.7
Hydro 14 16 16 18 20 4 5 1.6
Bioenergy 4 4 6 8 15 1 4 7.6
Electricity 21 26 27 27 28 19 24 0.3
TFC 625 441 437 449 456 100 100 0.2
Coal 55 23 22 23 23 5 5 0.0
Oil 145 100 100 103 104 23 23 0.2
Gas 143 128 126 128 129 29 28 0.1
Electricity 71 63 65 69 73 14 16 0.9
Heat 203 124 121 122 123 28 27 -0.1
Bioenergy 8 3 3 4 4 1 1 2.9
Other renewables - - 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Industry 208 157 151 157 160 100 100 0.1
Coal 15 19 19 20 20 12 13 0.3
Oil 24 11 11 12 12 7 8 0.5
Gas 30 50 45 46 45 32 28 -0.6
Electricity 41 29 30 32 33 18 21 0.8
Heat 98 47 45 47 48 30 30 0.1
Bioenergy - 0 1 1 1 0 1 6.6
Other renewables - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Transport 116 96 98 102 105 100 100 0.5
Oil 73 61 62 64 64 64 61 0.3
Electricity 9 8 8 9 10 8 10 1.5
Biofuels - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Other fuels 34 27 29 30 30 28 29 0.7
Buildings 228 152 149 148 148 100 100 -0.2
Coal 40 4 3 3 3 2 2 -1.8
Oil 12 9 7 6 5 6 3 -3.4
Gas 57 42 42 42 41 27 28 -0.0
Electricity 15 25 25 25 26 16 18 0.3
Heat 98 71 70 70 70 47 47 -0.1
Bioenergy 7 2 2 2 3 1 2 1.6
Other 72 36 38 41 44 100 100 1.1

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 157 163 146 129 122 15 10 -1.7
Oil 129 27 19 11 5 3 0 -9.2
Gas 512 506 503 511 482 48 41 -0.3
Nuclear 118 172 215 246 271 16 23 2.7
Hydro 166 182 189 210 238 17 20 1.6
Bioenergy 0 3 7 15 43 0 4 17.1
Wind - 0 3 6 13 0 1 60.5
Geothermal 0 0 3 7 13 0 1 22.6
Solar PV - - 0 1 1 0 0 n.a.
CSP - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Marine - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 249 247 254 264 100 100 0.4
Coal 51 42 34 28 21 11 -3.5
Oil 6 5 3 2 2 1 -7.3
Gas 114 112 116 115 46 44 0.0
Nuclear 25 30 34 37 10 14 2.3
Hydro 51 53 58 66 20 25 1.5
Bioenergy 1 2 3 8 1 3 10.7
Wind 0 1 3 5 0 2 40.9
Geothermal 0 0 1 2 0 1 18.9
Solar PV 0 0 1 2 0 1 40.0
CSP - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Marine - - - - 0 0 n.a.
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 2 179 1 682 1 576 1 537 1 489 100 100 -0.7
Coal 687 441 403 386 373 26 25 -1.0
Oil 625 366 350 339 328 22 22 -0.6
Gas 866 876 823 812 787 52 53 -0.6
Coal 432 304 271 251 237 33 32 -1.5
Oil 198 53 47 36 28 6 4 -3.7
Gas 532 561 514 500 474 61 64 -1.0
TFC 960 688 670 681 683 100 100 -0.0
Coal 253 133 128 131 133 19 19 -0.0
Oil 389 264 256 259 259 38 38 -0.1
Transport 217 180 181 187 189 26 28 0.3
Gas 318 291 286 290 292 42 43 0.0
B
Non-OECD Asia: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 1 587 4 703 5 452 5 811 6 142 100 100 1.6
Coal 694 2 575 2 754 2 721 2 647 55 43 0.2
Oil 318 956 1 145 1 231 1 315 20 21 1.9
Gas 69 375 516 628 736 8 12 4.0
Nuclear 10 49 147 226 291 1 5 11.0
Hydro 24 103 140 163 187 2 3 3.6
Bioenergy 466 583 623 653 697 12 11 1.1
Power generation 330 1 839 2 173 2 343 2 504 100 100 1.8
Coal 226 1 434 1 491 1 430 1 352 78 54 -0.3
Oil 46 42 34 27 21 2 1 -4.0
Gas 16 137 181 229 270 7 11 4.1
Nuclear 10 49 147 226 291 3 12 11.0
Hydro 24 103 140 163 187 6 7 3.6
Bioenergy 0 32 82 115 158 2 6 9.8
Electricity 26 118 140 152 164 17 21 2.0
TFC 1 216 2 947 3 532 3 816 4 081 100 100 1.9
Coal 395 728 813 829 822 25 20 0.7
Oil 238 844 1 043 1 138 1 232 29 30 2.2
Gas 31 176 284 353 423 6 10 5.3
Electricity 83 561 742 841 940 19 23 3.1
Heat 14 77 92 95 94 3 2 1.2
Bioenergy 455 539 529 525 526 18 13 -0.1
Industry 400 1 223 1 509 1 640 1 743 100 100 2.1
Coal 239 590 660 674 673 48 39 0.8
Oil 51 105 122 126 130 9 7 1.2
Gas 8 81 148 192 234 7 13 6.4
Electricity 51 337 441 492 537 28 31 2.8
Heat 11 52 67 69 68 4 4 1.6
Bioenergy 39 56 71 85 99 5 6 3.5
Transport 104 471 630 709 791 100 100 3.1
Oil 91 438 580 646 712 93 90 2.9
Electricity 1 7 11 14 18 1 2 6.0
Biofuels - 4 10 16 22 1 3 10.7
Other fuels 12 23 29 33 40 5 5 3.3
Buildings 590 938 988 1 013 1 049 100 100 0.7
Coal 111 87 79 71 63 9 6 -1.8
Oil 34 91 85 80 77 10 7 -1.0
Gas 5 49 73 88 103 5 10 4.5
Electricity 22 187 253 292 338 20 32 3.5
Heat 3 25 26 26 26 3 2 0.2
Bioenergy 415 480 447 423 402 51 38 -1.0
Other 121 315 404 455 498 100 100 2.7

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 729 5 391 5 941 5 788 5 595 68 44 0.2
Oil 165 147 114 88 68 2 1 -4.4
Gas 59 678 975 1 275 1 552 9 12 5.0
Nuclear 39 190 563 866 1 116 2 9 11.0
Hydro 274 1 193 1 629 1 900 2 171 15 17 3.6
Bioenergy 1 75 255 372 521 1 4 12.0
Wind 0 172 499 784 1 134 2 9 11.7
Geothermal 7 19 31 49 74 0 1 8.2
Solar PV 0 18 232 392 541 0 4 22.3
CSP - 0 6 15 49 0 0 43.9
Marine - 0 0 0 1 0 0 25.0
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 1 873 2 697 3 151 3 616 100 100 3.9
Coal 1 057 1 293 1 306 1 319 56 36 1.3
Oil 65 62 58 53 3 1 -1.2
Gas 185 274 331 387 10 11 4.4
Nuclear 29 77 117 151 2 4 10.2
Hydro 375 508 596 685 20 19 3.6
Bioenergy 22 50 70 96 1 3 9.0
Wind 113 259 379 512 6 14 9.3
Geothermal 3 5 8 12 0 0 7.6
Solar PV 23 168 281 387 1 11 18.0
CSP 0 2 4 13 0 0 33.9
Marine 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.8
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 3 556 12 354 13 679 13 893 13 945 100 100 0.7
Coal 2 559 9 075 9 586 9 340 8 939 73 64 -0.1
Oil 862 2 439 2 909 3 102 3 293 20 24 1.8
Gas 135 839 1 184 1 451 1 713 7 12 4.3
Coal 886 5 643 5 868 5 603 5 274 93 88 -0.4
Oil 149 134 107 85 67 2 1 -4.0
Gas 38 321 424 535 632 5 11 4.1
TFC 2 327 5 786 6 789 7 176 7 479 100 100 1.5
Coal 1 613 3 243 3 525 3 550 3 486 56 47 0.4
Oil 654 2 155 2 639 2 852 3 061 37 41 2.1
Transport 271 1 308 1 734 1 931 2 128 23 28 2.9
Gas 60 388 625 775 932 7 12 5.3
B
China: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 879 3 057 3 494 3 648 3 751 100 100 1.2
Coal 533 2 080 2 158 2 095 2 002 68 53 -0.2
Oil 122 482 583 620 646 16 17 1.7
Gas 13 140 231 290 347 5 9 5.5
Nuclear - 29 111 177 221 1 6 12.7
Hydro 11 75 106 117 123 2 3 2.9
Bioenergy 200 217 229 242 264 7 7 1.2
Power generation 181 1 277 1 490 1 585 1 658 100 100 1.5
Coal 153 1 106 1 109 1 060 1 001 87 60 -0.6
Oil 16 5 5 5 4 0 0 -1.3
Gas 1 30 60 82 104 2 6 7.7
Nuclear - 29 111 177 221 2 13 12.7
Hydro 11 75 106 117 123 6 7 2.9
Bioenergy - 18 51 71 96 1 6 10.3
Electricity 15 79 90 94 98 15 17 1.3
TFC 669 1 797 2 140 2 259 2 344 100 100 1.6
Coal 318 584 628 609 570 32 24 -0.1
Oil 87 441 542 584 615 25 26 2.0
Gas 9 90 159 200 241 5 10 6.0
Electricity 41 388 514 569 618 22 26 2.8
Heat 13 76 91 93 93 4 4 1.1
Bioenergy 200 199 178 171 168 11 7 -1.0
Industry 245 863 1 044 1 097 1 119 100 100 1.5
Coal 181 462 491 470 435 54 39 -0.3
Oil 21 57 63 63 61 7 5 0.4
Gas 3 32 72 99 123 4 11 8.2
Electricity 30 260 344 382 411 30 37 2.7
Heat 11 52 66 69 68 6 6 1.6
Bioenergy - - 7 13 19 0 2 n.a.
Transport 35 252 341 377 410 100 100 2.9
Oil 25 230 310 340 363 92 88 2.7
Electricity 1 5 9 12 15 2 4 6.8
Biofuels - 1 4 7 11 0 3 13.8
Other fuels 10 15 18 18 21 6 5 2.0
Buildings 314 497 512 511 516 100 100 0.2
Coal 95 71 63 57 49 14 9 -2.2
Oil 7 42 33 27 20 8 4 -4.2
Gas 2 35 55 66 78 7 15 4.7
Electricity 6 108 144 158 173 22 34 2.8
Heat 2 24 25 25 25 5 5 0.2
Bioenergy 200 198 167 149 136 40 26 -2.2
Other 75 186 243 274 298 100 100 2.8

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total generation 650 5 427 7 019 7 710 8 330 100 100 2.6
Coal 471 4 110 4 339 4 171 3 993 76 48 -0.2
Oil 49 5 5 4 4 0 0 -1.8
Gas 3 126 300 433 569 2 7 9.3
Nuclear - 111 427 681 849 2 10 12.7
Hydro 127 875 1 231 1 358 1 431 16 17 2.9
Bioenergy - 48 174 246 329 1 4 11.9
Wind 0 137 399 591 840 3 10 11.2
Geothermal - 0 1 3 6 0 0 21.4
Solar PV 0 14 140 212 274 0 3 19.2
CSP - 0 4 11 35 0 0 80.8
Marine - 0 0 0 1 0 0 23.1
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 1 306 1 830 2 077 2 296 100 100 3.4
Coal 829 951 957 955 63 42 0.8
Oil 11 10 9 9 1 0 -1.1
Gas 49 93 116 135 4 6 6.2
Nuclear 17 58 92 114 1 5 11.8
Hydro 280 375 414 436 21 19 2.6
Bioenergy 9 30 43 57 1 2 11.5
Wind 91 205 280 367 7 16 8.5
Geothermal 0 0 0 1 0 0 22.9
Solar PV 20 107 164 212 2 9 15.0
CSP 0 1 3 9 0 0 45.0
Marine 0 0 0 0 0 0 24.0
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 2 278 8 692 9 297 9 171 8 899 100 100 0.1
Coal 1 942 7 187 7 313 6 962 6 499 83 73 -0.6
Oil 308 1 193 1 440 1 517 1 559 14 18 1.6
Gas 28 311 544 692 840 4 9 6.0
Power generation 651 4 451 4 533 4 365 4 164 100 100 -0.4
Coal 597 4 364 4 376 4 158 3 906 98 94 -0.7
Oil 52 17 17 15 14 0 0 -1.3
Gas 2 70 140 192 244 2 6 7.7
TFC 1 541 3 959 4 465 4 510 4 448 100 100 0.7
Coal 1 294 2 644 2 756 2 631 2 429 67 55 -0.5
Oil 229 1 115 1 359 1 438 1 487 28 33 1.7
Transport 73 689 927 1 017 1 085 17 24 2.7
Gas 18 200 351 441 532 5 12 5.9
B
India: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 316 770 940 1 054 1 182 100 100 2.6
Coal 103 340 388 405 416 44 35 1.2
Oil 61 177 232 267 311 23 26 3.4
Gas 11 44 69 89 114 6 10 5.8
Nuclear 2 9 17 28 44 1 4 10.0
Hydro 6 12 15 21 30 2 3 5.3
Bioenergy 133 185 203 213 223 24 19 1.1
Coal 56 230 242 226 208 81 51 -0.6
Oil 5 7 6 5 4 2 1 -2.4
Gas 3 13 24 34 48 5 12 7.8
Nuclear 2 9 17 28 44 3 11 10.0
Hydro 6 12 15 21 30 4 7 5.3
Bioenergy - 9 18 24 32 3 8 7.7
Electricity 7 26 34 39 45 36 39 3.2
TFC 250 519 657 754 861 100 100 3.0
Coal 42 91 120 147 173 17 20 3.9
Oil 50 150 209 244 289 29 34 3.9
Gas 6 23 36 44 52 4 6 4.9
Electricity 18 78 106 128 154 15 18 4.0
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 133 176 184 189 191 34 22 0.5
Industry 69 175 237 286 334 100 100 3.9
Coal 29 80 109 137 163 45 49 4.3
Oil 8 18 27 31 35 10 11 4.0
Gas 1 13 21 25 29 7 9 4.8
Electricity 9 35 45 53 62 20 19 3.5
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 23 30 35 40 45 17 13 2.4
Transport 21 75 115 142 177 100 100 5.2
Oil 18 71 108 132 163 96 92 5.0
Electricity 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 2.0
Biofuels - 0 1 3 4 0 2 17.4
Other fuels 2 2 4 6 8 2 5 10.0
Buildings 138 215 233 245 258 100 100 1.1
Coal 11 11 11 10 10 5 4 -0.8
Oil 11 27 30 32 36 13 14 1.7
Gas 0 2 3 3 4 1 2 3.0
Electricity 5 29 40 51 64 13 25 4.9
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 111 145 148 146 142 67 55 -0.1
Other 22 54 71 81 92 100 100 3.2

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 192 892 1 000 983 955 74 41 0.4
Oil 13 21 19 17 14 2 1 -2.1
Gas 10 70 137 204 292 6 13 8.8
Nuclear 6 33 64 109 168 3 7 10.0
Hydro 72 144 174 247 346 12 15 5.3
Bioenergy - 16 46 64 91 1 4 10.7
Wind 0 33 87 149 210 3 9 11.6
Geothermal - - 0 1 2 0 0 n.a.
Solar PV - 3 83 157 211 0 9 29.3
CSP - 0 2 4 13 0 1 33.3
Marine - - - - 0 0 0 n.a.
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 266 460 586 718 100 100 6.0
Coal 157 229 224 224 59 31 2.1
Oil 8 9 8 8 3 1 0.0
Gas 24 42 61 82 9 11 7.4
Nuclear 6 10 16 24 2 3 8.8
Hydro 43 58 82 114 16 16 6.0
Bioenergy 6 10 13 18 2 3 6.4
Wind 20 48 80 109 8 15 10.4
Geothermal - 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Solar PV 2 54 100 135 1 19 27.2
CSP 0 1 1 4 0 1 28.5
Marine - - - 0 0 0 n.a.
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 580 1 858 2 249 2 450 2 664 100 100 2.1
Coal 396 1 282 1 461 1 522 1 558 69 58 1.2
Oil 164 478 633 725 847 26 32 3.4
Gas 21 98 156 203 259 5 10 5.9
Coal 215 890 938 877 805 95 87 -0.6
Oil 16 21 19 17 14 2 1 -2.4
Gas 8 31 55 80 111 3 12 7.8
TFC 323 843 1 153 1 385 1 633 100 100 4.0
Coal 175 389 518 639 748 46 46 3.9
Oil 139 404 557 650 772 48 47 3.9
Transport 55 215 327 397 491 26 30 5.0
Gas 9 50 79 96 114 6 7 5.0
B
Middle East: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 211 689 792 840 888 100 100 1.5
Coal 1 3 4 4 4 0 0 2.0
Oil 137 337 372 377 374 49 42 0.6
Gas 72 345 403 433 464 50 52 1.8
Nuclear - 1 5 13 18 0 2 18.0
Hydro 1 2 2 3 3 0 0 4.1
Bioenergy 0 1 3 5 9 0 1 15.2
Coal 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 13.7
Oil 27 100 79 64 50 42 19 -4.0
Gas 34 132 157 168 180 56 67 1.8
Nuclear - 1 5 13 18 0 7 18.0
Hydro 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 4.1
Bioenergy - 0 1 2 4 0 1 43.7
Electricity 4 15 18 20 21 21 26 1.9
TFC 150 461 566 612 655 100 100 2.1
Coal 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 -0.9
Oil 102 229 281 298 311 50 47 1.8
Gas 31 164 201 219 237 36 36 2.2
Electricity 16 65 79 87 97 14 15 2.4
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 0 1 2 3 5 0 1 12.0
Industry 40 149 182 197 214 100 100 2.2
Coal 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 -1.0
Oil 19 33 37 37 37 22 17 0.7
Gas 17 100 125 138 150 67 70 2.5
Electricity 4 14 17 19 21 10 10 2.3
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy - - 1 2 4 0 2 n.a.
Transport 48 128 161 174 180 100 100 2.0
Oil 48 121 153 164 170 95 94 2.0
Electricity - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4
Biofuels - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Other fuels - 6 8 10 11 5 6 3.1
Buildings 33 111 127 135 146 100 100 1.6
Coal - 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.6
Oil 18 19 17 15 14 17 10 -1.5
Gas 3 45 50 53 56 40 39 1.4
Electricity 11 47 58 64 71 42 49 2.4
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 4.0
Other 29 73 96 105 115 100 100 2.7

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total generation 224 930 1 129 1 241 1 374 100 100 2.3
Coal 0 0 3 4 5 0 0 16.2
Oil 98 340 277 233 187 37 14 -3.5
Gas 114 565 786 881 963 61 70 3.2
Nuclear - 4 20 48 71 0 5 18.0
Hydro 12 20 28 35 40 2 3 4.1
Bioenergy - 0 3 6 14 0 1 43.7
Wind 0 0 3 9 23 0 2 31.9
Geothermal - 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Solar PV - 0 5 14 42 0 3 87.1
CSP - 0 3 10 28 0 2 109.1
Marine - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 277 340 371 413 100 100 2.4
Coal 0 1 1 1 0 0 7.8
Oil 78 85 78 64 28 15 -1.2
Gas 183 226 247 269 66 65 2.3
Nuclear 1 3 7 10 0 2 14.4
Hydro 14 18 22 24 5 6 3.1
Bioenergy 0 0 1 2 0 1 48.0
Wind 0 2 4 10 0 2 29.2
Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Solar PV 0 3 8 24 0 6 39.7
CSP 0 1 3 9 0 2 28.4
Marine - - - - 0 0 n.a.
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 550 1 703 1 879 1 935 1 973 100 100 0.9
Coal 1 10 12 13 14 1 1 1.9
Oil 392 930 968 957 927 55 47 -0.0
Gas 157 763 898 965 1 032 45 52 1.8
Coal 0 1 3 4 5 0 1 13.7
Oil 86 311 244 200 156 50 27 -4.0
Gas 79 309 368 391 417 50 72 1.8
TFC 348 959 1 141 1 213 1 270 100 100 1.7
Coal 1 9 8 8 7 1 1 -0.9
Oil 282 578 678 709 726 60 57 1.4
Transport 142 359 453 487 502 37 40 2.0
Gas 65 373 455 496 537 39 42 2.2
B
Africa: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 391 750 880 960 1 039 100 100 1.9
Coal 74 104 110 110 109 14 11 0.3
Oil 86 169 201 216 227 23 22 1.7
Gas 30 98 116 134 149 13 14 2.5
Nuclear 2 3 3 3 6 0 1 4.6
Hydro 5 10 16 21 27 1 3 6.0
Bioenergy 194 363 422 452 473 48 45 1.6
Coal 39 65 67 65 61 41 25 -0.3
Oil 11 25 24 23 21 16 9 -0.9
Gas 11 51 58 65 70 33 29 1.9
Nuclear 2 3 3 3 6 2 3 4.6
Hydro 5 10 16 21 27 6 11 6.0
Bioenergy 0 1 3 6 9 1 4 14.2
Electricity 5 12 15 17 20 11 11 2.7
TFC 292 545 639 690 739 100 100 1.8
Coal 20 19 21 22 24 4 3 1.2
Oil 71 143 175 191 203 26 28 2.1
Gas 9 28 36 41 48 5 7 3.2
Electricity 22 52 67 79 94 10 13 3.6
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 171 303 339 356 368 56 50 1.2
Industry 55 84 102 114 128 100 100 2.5
Coal 14 11 13 15 17 13 13 2.5
Oil 15 15 18 20 21 18 16 2.1
Gas 5 16 21 24 28 19 22 3.4
Electricity 12 21 26 28 31 25 24 2.1
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 10 21 24 27 31 25 24 2.3
Transport 38 89 110 120 126 100 100 2.1
Oil 37 87 108 117 122 98 97 2.0
Electricity 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1.9
Biofuels - 0 1 1 1 0 1 39.0
Other fuels 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1.9
Buildings 184 345 393 420 445 100 100 1.5
Coal 3 6 6 5 5 2 1 -1.4
Oil 11 24 28 32 35 7 8 2.3
Gas 1 7 8 10 11 2 3 2.9
Electricity 9 29 39 48 60 8 13 4.4
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 160 279 311 325 332 81 75 1.0
Other 15 27 34 37 40 100 100 2.2

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total generation 316 742 944 1 103 1 310 100 100 3.4
Coal 165 257 277 276 268 35 20 0.2
Oil 41 91 92 89 84 12 6 -0.5
Gas 45 260 330 377 426 35 32 2.9
Nuclear 8 12 13 13 25 2 2 4.6
Hydro 56 116 181 242 312 16 24 6.0
Bioenergy 0 2 9 18 31 0 2 18.0
Wind - 2 16 24 36 0 3 17.1
Geothermal 0 2 9 18 35 0 3 19.3
Solar PV - 0 13 31 55 0 4 34.9
CSP - 0 5 16 40 0 3 113.5
Marine - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 175 246 298 365 100 100 4.4
Coal 42 53 56 58 24 16 1.9
Oil 36 36 35 35 20 10 -0.2
Gas 68 95 109 126 39 34 3.7
Nuclear 2 2 2 4 1 1 3.7
Hydro 25 41 56 73 14 20 6.5
Bioenergy 0 2 4 6 0 2 17.2
Wind 1 6 10 14 1 4 15.1
Geothermal 0 1 3 5 0 1 20.7
Solar PV 0 8 19 33 0 9 31.2
CSP 0 2 5 11 0 3 29.5
Marine - - - - 0 0 n.a.
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 545 1 052 1 190 1 260 1 304 100 100 1.3
Coal 234 328 346 340 323 31 25 -0.1
Oil 249 502 588 629 658 48 50 1.6
Gas 62 222 256 291 323 21 25 2.2
Coal 152 251 260 250 228 56 50 -0.6
Oil 35 77 76 71 66 17 14 -0.9
Gas 25 119 136 151 164 27 36 1.9
TFC 302 543 653 710 762 100 100 2.0
Coal 82 78 86 90 95 14 12 1.2
Oil 202 405 491 533 566 75 74 2.0
Transport 109 259 321 347 364 48 48 2.0
Gas 18 60 76 87 101 11 13 3.1
B
Latin America: Bridge Scenario
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

TPED 331 621 675 722 759 100 100 1.2
Coal 15 24 27 28 31 4 4 1.6
Oil 150 272 280 283 277 44 37 0.1
Gas 52 141 147 160 172 23 23 1.2
Nuclear 2 5 9 10 12 1 2 5.1
Hydro 30 58 73 84 93 9 12 2.8
Bioenergy 80 117 130 142 149 19 20 1.5
Coal 3 8 8 6 5 5 2 -2.7
Oil 14 34 25 18 12 20 6 -5.8
Gas 14 47 36 38 39 28 19 -1.1
Nuclear 2 5 9 10 12 3 6 5.1
Hydro 30 58 73 84 93 35 45 2.8
Bioenergy 2 12 17 20 24 7 11 4.1
Electricity 8 20 22 24 26 23 26 1.4
TFC 250 468 523 567 597 100 100 1.4
Coal 6 11 14 16 18 2 3 2.9
Oil 122 222 238 249 251 48 42 0.7
Gas 24 64 81 90 100 14 17 2.6
Electricity 35 81 94 106 118 17 20 2.2
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 63 88 95 103 107 19 18 1.2
Industry 86 158 180 194 207 100 100 1.6
Coal 6 11 14 16 18 7 9 2.9
Oil 21 34 35 36 36 21 17 0.4
Gas 15 35 47 53 59 22 29 3.1
Electricity 17 35 39 42 44 22 21 1.5
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 27 44 44 47 49 28 24 0.7
Transport 72 159 175 185 184 100 100 0.9
Oil 65 136 143 147 144 86 79 0.3
Electricity 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2.6
Biofuels 6 15 23 28 29 9 16 3.9
Other fuels 0 7 8 9 10 4 5 2.0
Buildings 67 100 107 117 127 100 100 1.4
Coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.5
Oil 17 17 18 18 19 17 15 0.4
Gas 6 13 14 16 18 13 14 1.8
Electricity 17 43 51 59 68 43 53 2.6
Heat - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
Bioenergy 27 25 23 22 22 25 17 -1.0
Other 26 50 62 71 79 100 100 2.6

1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Coal 9 32 34 25 23 3 1 -1.8
Oil 64 158 119 88 58 13 4 -5.7
Gas 45 222 192 210 225 19 14 0.1
Nuclear 10 21 33 39 48 2 3 5.1
Hydro 354 679 850 977 1 079 58 65 2.8
Bioenergy 7 49 67 78 91 4 5 3.7
Wind - 8 43 69 97 1 6 15.7
Geothermal 1 4 5 8 12 0 1 7.0
Solar PV - 0 5 13 25 0 2 36.2
CSP - - - 1 6 0 0 n.a.
Marine - - - - - 0 0 n.a.
2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total capacity 271 338 383 430 100 100 2.8
Coal 7 8 8 8 2 2 1.5
Oil 41 42 38 33 15 8 -1.2
Gas 54 63 71 78 20 18 2.2
Nuclear 3 5 6 7 1 2 5.1
Hydro 148 185 210 234 55 54 2.7
Bioenergy 14 16 18 20 5 5 2.3
Wind 4 14 21 30 2 7 11.8
Geothermal 1 1 1 2 0 0 6.5
Solar PV 0 4 9 17 0 4 31.5
CSP - - 0 1 0 0 n.a.
Marine - - - - 0 0 n.a.
1990 2013 2020 2025 2030 2013 2030 2013-30

Total CO2 577 1 172 1 196 1 216 1 218 100 100 0.2
Coal 45 92 106 103 107 8 9 0.9
Oil 416 765 765 758 733 65 60 -0.3
Gas 116 314 326 355 379 27 31 1.1
Coal 15 40 40 27 22 15 15 -3.3
Oil 44 106 79 58 38 42 25 -5.8
Gas 32 110 85 88 91 43 60 -1.1
TFC 423 813 886 933 959 100 100 1.0
Coal 26 49 61 71 79 6 8 2.9
Oil 342 622 647 665 661 77 69 0.4
Transport 194 406 427 438 430 50 45 0.3
Gas 54 142 178 198 219 17 23 2.6
B
Annex C
Definitions
This annex provides general information on units and conversion factors for energy units
and currencies; abbreviations and acronyms; and regional and country groupings.
Units
Coal Mtce million tonnes of coal equivalent (equals 0.7 Mtoe)
Emissions ppm parts per million (by volume)

Gt CO2-eq gigatonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent (using
100-year global warming potentials for different
greenhouse gases)
g CO2/km grammes of carbon dioxide per kilometre
g CO2/kWh grammes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour
Energy Mtoe million tonnes of oil equivalent

MBtu million British thermal units
Gcal gigacalorie (1 calorie x 109)
TJ terajoule (1 joule x 1012)
kWh kilowatt-hour
MWh megawatt-hour
GWh gigawatt-hour
TWh terawatt-hour
Gas bcm billion cubic metres
Mass kg kilogramme (1 000 kg = 1 tonne)

kt kilotonnes (1 tonne x 103)
Mt million tonnes (1 tonne x 106)
Gt gigatonnes (1 tonne x 109)
Monetary $ million 1 US dollar x 106

$ billion 1 US dollar x 109
$ trillion 1 US dollar x 1012
Oil b/d barrel per day

mb/d million barrels per day
Power kW kilowatt (1 watt x 103)

MW megawatt (1 watt x 106)
GW gigawatt (1 watt x 109)
Annex C | Definitions 187

General conversion factors for energy
Convert to: TJ Gcal Mtoe MBtu GWh
From: multiply by:
TJ 1 238.8 2.388 x 10-5 947.8 0.2778
Gcal 4.1868 x 10 -3
1 10 -7
3.968 1.163 x 10-3
Mtoe 4.1868 x 104 107 1 3.968 x 107 11 630
MBtu 1.0551 x 10-3 0.252 2.52 x 10-8 1 2.931 x 10-4
GWh 3.6 860 8.6 x 10-8 3 412 1
Note: There is no generally accepted definition of boe; typically the conversion factors used vary from 7.15 to 7.35 boe
per toe.
Currency conversions
Exchange rates (2013 annual average) 1 US Dollar equals:
British Pound 0.64
Chinese Yuan 6.20
Euro 0.75
Indian Rupee 60.52
Japanese Yen 97.60
Russian Ruble 31.76
Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAAGR compound average annual growth rate
CAFE corporate average fuel-economy standards (United States)
CBM coalbed methane
CCGT combined-cycle gas turbine
CCS carbon capture and storage
CH4 methane
CO2 carbon dioxide
CO2-eq carbon-dioxide equivalent
COP Conference of Parties (UNFCCC)
CPS Current Policies Scenario
CSP concentrating solar power
EPA Environmental Protection Agency (United States)
EU European Union
EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading System

EV electric vehicle
F-gases fluorinated gases, including hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gases
GT gas turbine
GWP global warming potential
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMO International Maritime Organization
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LCOE levelised cost of electricity
LPG liquefied petroleum gas
LULUCF land-use, land-use change and forestry
MBM market-based measure
MER market exchange rate
MEPS minimum energy performance standards
NAP national adaptation plan
NAPA national adaptation programmes of action
N 2O nitrous oxide
NPS New Policies Scenario
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLDV passenger light-duty vehicle
PPP purchasing power parity
PV photovoltaic
R&D research and development
RD&D research, development and demonstration
RDD&D research, development, demonstration and deployment
SO2 sulphur dioxide
TFC total final consumption
TPED total primary energy demand
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US United States
WEO World Energy Outlook
WEM World Energy Model
C
Regional and country groupings
Africa: Includes North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
Caspian: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
China: Refers to the People’s Republic of China, including Hong Kong.
Developing countries: Non-OECD Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America regional
groupings.
Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Romania,
Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. For statistical
reasons, this region also includes Cyprus1,2, Gibraltar and Malta.
European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus1,2, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
G20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States and European Union.
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and other non-OECD
America countries and territories.3
Middle East: Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the
Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of
United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
2. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is
recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates
to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
3. Individual data are not available and are estimated in aggregate for: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guyana, Grenada,
Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Pierre et Miquelon, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname and Turks and Caicos Islands.

Non-OECD Asia: Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Chinese Taipei, India,
Indonesia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar,
Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam and other Asian
countries and territories.4
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Western Sahara (under UN
mandate).
OECD: Includes OECD Americas, OECD Asia Oceania and OECD Europe regional groupings.
OECD Americas: Canada, Chile, Mexico and United States.
OECD Asia Oceania: Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.
OECD Europe: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom. For statistical reasons, this region also includes Israel.5
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries): Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, the

Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates and Venezuela.
Southeast Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. These countries are all members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde Cameroon,
Comoros, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic
of Congo (DR Congo), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo,
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
4. Individual data are not available and are estimated in aggregate for: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cook Islands, East Timor,
Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Macao (China), Maldives, New Caledonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.
5. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of
such data by the OECD and/or the IEA is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli
settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
C
Annex D
References
Chapter 1: Energy and climate: state of play
EEA (European Environment Agency) (2015), Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Concentrations,
EEA, Copenhagen.
European Commission (EC), Joint Research Centre (JRC)/PBL Netherlands Environmental

Assessment Agency (2014), Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR),
release version 4.2., Brussels.
Global CCS Institute (2015), The Global Status of CCS: 2014, Global CCS Institute, Melbourne,
Australia.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2013), Redrawing the Climate-Energy Map: World
Energy Outlook Special Report, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014a), CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2014, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014b), World Energy Model Documentation - 2014 Version, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2015), World Economic Outlook - Update January
2015, IMF, Washington, DC.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2014), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis
Report: Contribution of Working Group I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Geneva.
Marland, G., T. Boden and R. Andres (2008), Global, Regional, and National Fossil Fuel
CO2 Emissions, in Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, United States: Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, US.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2014), 2014 Biennial
Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report, UNFCCC, Bonn.
– (2015), Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 20th session, held in Lima from 1 to
14 December 2014 - Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at
its 20th session, UNFCCC, Bonn.
World Bank (2014), State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, World Bank, Washington DC.
Chapter 2: The energy sector impact of national pledges

EC (European Commission) (2014), Impact Assessment - A Policy Framework for Climate and
Energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030 SWD(2014), 15 final, 22 January 2014, Eur-Lex
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0015&from=EN,
accessed 18 May 2015.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2013), World Energy Outlook 2014, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014), Africa Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Annex D | References 193

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2015), GHG emission
Profiles for Annex I Parties and Major Groups, UNFCCC, Bonn.
US Department of State (2014), United States Climate Action Report 2014, US Department
of State, Washington, DC.
US EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency) (2015), Inventory of US Greenhouse-Gas

Emissions and Sinks, 1990-2013, US EPA, Washington, DC.
Chapter 3: A strategy to raise climate ambition

Beaton C., et al., (2013), A Guidebook to Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform for Policy Makers
in Southeast Asia, Global Subsidies Initiative, International Institute for Sustainable
Development, Geneva.
CCAC (Climate and Clean Air Coalition) (2014), Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce
Short-lived Climate Pollutants, Scientific Advisory Panel Brief: Kerosene Lamps & SLCPS,
CCAC, Paris.
Chateau, J., R. Dellink and E. Lanzi (2014), An Overview of the OECD ENV-Linkages
Model: version 3, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 65, OECD Publishing, Paris,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz2qck2b2vd-en.
– (2012), World Energy Outlook 2012, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2013a), Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map: World Energy Outlook Special Report,
OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2013b), Southeast Asia Energy Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report,
OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2013c), World Energy Outlook 2013, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014a), World Energy Outlook 2014, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014b), Medium-term Renewables Market Report, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014c), Capturing the Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014d), World Energy Investment Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report,
OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014e), Energy, Climate Change and the Environment: 2014 Insights, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank (2010), Analysis of the Scope of Energy Subsidies and
Suggestions for the G-20 initiative, prepared for submission to the G-20 Summit Meeting
Toronto, Canada, 26-27 June 2010, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2006), 2006 IPCC Guidelines for
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, prepared by the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories
Programme, Eggleston H., et al., (eds.), Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan.
– (2013), Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing, Chapter 8 in IPCC, Climate Change
2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment

Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, pp. 659-740.
– (2014), Drivers, Trends and Mitigation, Chapter 5 in IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation
of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPPC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, pp.351-411.
Lam N. (2012), “Household Light Makes Global Heat: High Black Carbon Emissions from
Kerosene Wick Lamps”, Environmental Science & Technology 46(24):13531-13538, ASC
Publications, Washington, DC.
Lamb B., et al., (2015), “Direct Measurements Show Decreasing Methane Emissions from
Natural Gas Local Distribution Systems in the United States”, Environmental Science and
Technology 49(8):5161-5169, ASC Publications, Washington, DC.
US EPA (US Environmental Protection Agency) (2015), Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2013, US EPA, Washington, DC.
Chapter 4: Achieving the transition

Cuenot, F., L. Fulton and J. Straub, J. (2012), “The Prospect for Modal Shifts in Passenger
Transport Worldwide and Impacts on Energy Use and CO2”, Energy Policy, Vol. 41, pp.98-106.
EC (European Commission) (2013), Clean Power for Transport: A European Alternative Fuels
Strategy COM(2013) 17 final, 24 January 2013, Eur-Lex http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0017&from=EN, accessed 2 April 2015.
Franke, B., et al. (2012), Global Assessments and Guidelines for Sustainable Liquid Biofuels,
GEF Targeted Research Project, Heidelberg/Paris/Utrecht/Darmstadt.
Hadjerioua, B., Y. Wei and S. Kao (2012), An Assessment of Energy Potential at Non-powered
Dams in the United States, prepared for the US Department of Energy, Wind and Water
Power Program, Budget Activity Number ED, 19(07), 04 2, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge Tennessee, US.
– (2013a), Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2013b), Redrawing the Climate-Energy Map: World Energy Outlook Special Report,
OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014a), The Power of Transformation: Wind, Sun and the Economics of Flexible Power
Systems, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014b), Technology Roadmap: Energy Storage, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2015a), Energy Technology Perspectives 2015, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2015b), Medium-Term Oil Market Report 2015, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2015c), Global EV Outlook 2015, www.iea.org/evi/Global-EV-Outlook-2015-Update_
1page.pdf, accessed 2 April 2015.
– (2015d), Technology Roadmap: Hydrogen and Fuel Cells, OECD/IEA, Paris.
D
Annex D | References 195
IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) (2013), Road Transport: The Cost of
Renewable Solutions, IRENA, Abu Dhabi.
Kao, S. et al. (2014), New Stream-reach Development: A Comprehensive Assessment

of Hydropower Energy Potential in the United States, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
No. ORNL/TM-2013/514, Oak Ridge Tennessee, US.
Nykvist, B., and M. Nilsson (2015), “Rapidly Falling Costs of Battery Packs for Electric
Vehicles”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 5, pp.329-332.
Rubin, E., S. Yeh and D. Hounshell. (2004), “Experience Curves for Power Plant Emission
Control Technologies”, International Journal of Energy Technology and Policy, Vol.2,
pp. 52-69.
SEDC (Smart Energy Demand Coalition) (2013), A Demand Response Action Plan for Europe:
Regulatory Requirements and Markets Models, SEDC, Brussels.
Chapter 5: Building success in Paris and beyond

IEA (International Energy Agency) (2013), Redrawing the Climate-Energy Map: World
Energy Outlook Special Report, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014a), Energy, Climate Change and Environment: 2014 Insights, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014b), Energy Efficiency Indicators: Fundamentals on Statistics, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2014c), Energy Efficiency Indicators: Essentials for Policymaking, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2015a), Energy Technology Perspectives 2015, OECD/IEA, Paris.
– (2015b), Tracking Clean Energy Progress Report, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment
Report, Edenhofer, O., et al. (eds.), IPCC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York.
Prag, A., M. Kimmel and C. Hood (2013), “A Role for More Diverse Metrics in Framing
Climate Commitments?” Presentation by C. Hood at COP19 side-event, 13 November 2013.
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SDSN and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, 2014,
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This publication reflects the views of the IEA Secretariat but does not necessarily reflect
those of individual IEA member countries. The IEA makes no representation or warranty,
express or implied, in respect of the publication’s contents (including its completeness or
accuracy) and shall not be responsible for any use of, or reliance on, the publication.
Unless otherwise indicated, all material presented in figures and tables
is derived from IEA data and analysis.
This publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status
of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers
and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
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Energyand
Climate
Change
The world is moving towards a crucial climate change meeting in Paris
in December 2015 (COP21). The negotiations there will be based on
national pledges, formally known as Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions, with the goal of setting the world on a sustainable path.
The International Energy Agency has long emphasised to its members
and the world at large that energy production and use which is not
compatible with international environmental requirements is not
sustainable: it fails the test of energy security. The IEA, therefore,
feels an obligation to make a contribution to COP21 – a contribution
which reconciles climate and energy needs. That is the purpose of this
special report in the World Energy Outlook series.
The report:
n resents a detailed first assessment of the energy sector impact of
P
known and signalled national climate pledges for COP21.
n roposes a bridging strategy to deliver a near-term peak in global
P
energy-related greenhouse-gas emissions, based on five pragmatic
measures that can advance climate goals through the energy
sector without blunting economic growth.
n ighlights the urgent need to accelerate the development
H
of emerging technologies that are, ultimately, essential to
transforming the global energy system into one that is consistent
with the world’s climate goals.
n ecommends four key pillars on which COP21 can build success,
R
from an energy sector perspective.
For more information, and the free download of the report, please visit:
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimate

2015 Special Report On Energy and Climate Change

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World Energy Outlook Special Report

World Energy Outlook Special Report

COP21 presents an opportunity we cannot afford to miss.

This publication is issued on my authority as Executive Director of the IEA.

Maria van der Hoeven

Robert Priddle carried editorial responsibility.

Morten Albæk Vestas Wind Systems

6 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to:

Dr. Fatih Birol

Telephone: (33-1) 4057 6670

More information about the World Energy Outlook is available at

8 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Energy and climate: state of play 17

2 The energy sector impact of national pledges 35

3 A strategy to raise climate ambition 67

4 Achieving the transition 105

10 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Energy and emissions: moving apart?

What does the energy sector need from COP21?

12 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Lock in the vision

14 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Energy and climate: state of play

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 17

Box 1.1 ⊳ Avoiding dangerous climate change: the 2 °C goal

18 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 19

Energy sector and CO2 emissions

20 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 21

140 70% Other renewables*

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Nuclear power is the second-largest source of low-carbon electricity generation worldwide,

22 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 23

Rio Earth Summit

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 25

United European Japan China India Russia Rest of

United European Japan China India Russia Rest of

United European Japan China India Russia Rest of

United European Japan China India Russia Rest of

26 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 27

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014

Figure 1.7 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita and CO2 intensity by

28 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Figure 1.8 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emission levels and GDP by selected region

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 29

Figure 1.9 ⊳ Change in energy-related CO2 emissions by selected region,

150 15% Change

10% from 2013

30 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 31

UNFCCC Party Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)

32 World Energy Outlook | Special Report

11. A peak in atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations is delayed compared to a peak in emissions

Chapter 1 | Energy and climate: state of play 33

The energy sector impact of national pledges

Chapter 2 | The energy sector impact of national pledges 35

Table 2.1 ⊳ Global energy- and process-related greenhouse-gas emissions

2013 2020 2025 2030

Box 1.1 ⊳ Avoiding dangerous climate change: the 2 °C goal

Figure 1.7 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita and CO2 intensity by

Figure 1.8 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emission levels and GDP by selected region

Figure 1.9 ⊳ Change in energy-related CO2 emissions by selected region,

Table 2.1 ⊳ Global energy- and process-related greenhouse-gas emissions

Figure 2.2 ⊳ Global primary energy demand by type in the INDC Scenario

Figure 2.4 ⊳ Cumulative global energy sector investments by sector in the

Figure 2.5 ⊳ Energy-related CO2 emissions per capita by selected region in

Figure 2.7 ⊳ United States power generation capacity additions and

Figure 2.9 ⊳ European Union net capacity additions by type and share of

Figure 2.12 ⊳ China energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and carbon

Figure 2.15 ⊳ India electricity generation by type in the INDC Scenario

Figure 2.17 ⊳ Carbon intensity of the economy by selected region in the 4

Figure 2.19 ⊳ Average fuel-economy of passenger light-duty vehicles and

Figure 3.1 ⊳ On the road to 2 °C: policy pillars of the Bridge Scenario 11

Box 3.1 ⊳ Tracking progress since “Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map”