JURISPRUDENCE:

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

-G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS

As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214 of the Civil Code on
the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree
with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the
time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she
could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual
contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that
passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to
Ivan.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

-AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein

by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

REBUT: WASSMER VS VELEZ

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

HE DIDN’T WALKED OUT. HE MET AN ACCIDENT BECAUSE OF THE FIGHT THAT

HAPPENED A NIGHT BEFORE THE WEDDING EVE
Are There Any Defenses to a Breach of Promise to Marry?

Most of the defenses in a breach of promise claim have to do with the party’s capacity to enter into a
valid contract. Some commonly raised defenses to breach of promise are:

 Either party lacked the capacity to enter into a valid contract

 The promise was invalid or did not fulfill contract requirements
 After making the promise, the defendant became aware of the plaintiff’s conditions such as
incapacity or disease that would make it improper or unsafe to enter into marriage

It is not a valid defense if the plaintiff was engaged to another person at the time of the promise.
Also, a defense cannot be based simply on any unappealing traits of the plaintiff.

https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/damages-for-breach-of-promise-to-marry.html

https://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/wpBreachofPromise.htm

There are a number of defences to the action for breach of promise.

A defendant is not bound by his promise where he establishes a false representation, or

fraudulent concealment in material particulars, of the pecuniary circumstances or previous
life of the plaintiff. The bad character of the plaintiff will also excuse the defendant from
performance of the contract, unless he or she was aware of the plaintiff's character before
making the promise.

Physical or mental incapacity may give rise to a right to terminate the engagement in limited
circumstances. No disease or infirmity short of absolute incapacity on the part of the
defendant will avail him or her, however, even if it is proved that the performance of marital
duties would endanger his or her life. Previous confinement in a mental hospital does not per
se render the agreement to marry void but supervening insanity will afford a defence.

The fact that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed the plaintiff to be unfit to marry
is no defence if the plaintiff was in fact fit.

Finally, it is a defence to an action for breach of promise that the plaintiff has released or
discharged the defendant from performance before any breach of the contract occurs. The
release may be express or implied.