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HAND OUT No.

3 – PRINCIPLES & POLICIES


By: Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Constitutional Law I, 1st Semester, SY 2014-2015
P.U.P. College of Law

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES


OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
PREAMBLE

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government
that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the
rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

 While the 1935 Constitution started with "The Filipino people ...", the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions begin the preamble with "We, the sovereign Filipino people ..." The
change from third person point of view to a first person point of view emphasizes that
the Filipinos themselves are the ones establishing the Constitution. The third person
presupposes someone talking about the Filipino people, and yet that someone is
himself a Filipino.

 While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions referred to the Divine Providence, the 1987
Constitution refers Almighty God, which is more personal.

 A preamble has two (2) functions: (1) identify the authors of the Constitution, and
(2) state the general principles upon which the Constitution is founded. (Sets the tone
for the succeeding provisions)

3 IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT THE PREAMBLE:


 Does not confer rights nor impose duties
 Not a source of power or right for any department of government
 It only sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the constitution, as such, it is
useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of
the constitution

A. PRINCIPLES

 What is a Principle in the Constitution? It is a standard to be observed because it is


required by justice or fairness or other dimensions of morality

1. SOVEREIGNTY OF ITS PEOPLE AND REPUBLICANISM

Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.


Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.

Art. V. SUFFRAGE.

Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not


otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 2 of 35

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then,
they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the
ballot.

Art. VI, Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by provision
on initiative and referendum.

 Under this principle, the Philippines is a democratic state that is, a government for, of,
and by the people. But it is not a pure democracy. Thus, while it is true that the
people are the possessors of sovereign power, it is equally the case that they cannot
exercise the powers of government directly, but only through the medium of their duly
elected representatives.

Their participation in government consists of :


1) Exercising their right to Suffrage - electing the officials to whom they delegate the right of
government.
2) Voting in a Plebiscite:
a) Ratifying the Constitution;
b) Approving any amendment thereto;
c) With respect to local matters, approving any changes in boundaries, mergers,
divisions, and even abolition of local offices;
d) Creating metropolitan authorities, and
e) Creating autonomous regions
3) Joining and voting in a Initiative and referendum - enacting or proposing laws, local or
national, in a referendum.
4) Exercising their right Recall local elective officials (Under the Local Government Code.)

Features of Republicanism:
1. It is a govt of laws and not of men;
2. There is periodic holding of elections;
3. There is observance of principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances;
4. There is observance of the role that the legislature cannot pass or enact irrepealable laws.

 Ours is a government of Law and not of man.1

2. ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

Art. II, Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of


national policy, adopt the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

 "Adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" means the Philippines
uses the incorporation theory (Doctrine of Incorporation). Without need of
statute, these generally accepted principles of international law become part of the
Philippine body of laws from the municipal point of view.

 "Adherence to the principles of international law" was adopted from the Kellogg Brian
Pact.

Art. II, Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In
its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be

1
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 3 of 35

national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the


right to self- determination.

Art. II, Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.

 "Consistent with national interest" admits of two interpretations. One view holds
that the Constitution itself has decided to have no nuclear interest as the policy of
the State. The other view holds that, as shown by the deliberations of the Constitu-
tional Commission, the phrase should be read as "subject to national interest" which
means that the issue of whether to allow the stock-piling of nuclear weapons
depends on Congressional policy.

 It is the intent and sense of the Constitutional Commission that the phrase
"consistent with national interest" xxx also means "subject to the national interest."2

Art. XVIII, Sec. 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which


have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended without the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between Republic of the Philippines and United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress requires, ratified by a majority of
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting parties.

 The reason why the agreement must be recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state is so it is approved by its own Senate, and not just by its President
(executive agreement), thus, committing its legislature to honor the agreement and
preventing it from refusing appropriations therefore.

BAYAN vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

Q. Who has the power to ratify a treaty?

HELD: In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.

Q. Which provision of the Constitution applies with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its
constitutional power to concur with the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)?

HELD: The 1987 Philippine contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or
international agreements.

Section 21, Article VII x x x reads:

“No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

“After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

2
Joaquin Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, vol. II, 1988 ed.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 4 of 35

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at
least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or
international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not
limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered
into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is
only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement
binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities”
may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by
the other contracting State.

It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some
common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed
prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause “No treaty x x x,” and Section
25 contains the phrase “shall not be allowed.” Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the
Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section
21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessels
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate x x x.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one.
Lex specialis derogat generali.

Q. Were the requirements of Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution complied with when the
Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA?

HELD: Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by
the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the
general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the
provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being
unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be
valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other
hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be “duly concurred in by the Senate.”

Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is clearly
required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true
that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty - the VFA, in the instant case - be “duly
concurred in by the Senate,” it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the
clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a
treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section
25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to Section 21, Article VII.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 5 of 35

As noted, the “concurrence requirement” under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated
under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to
concur with the treaty - the VFA in the instant case.

Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass
upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts
or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, The United States of America in
this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty . To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States
of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under
the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate should
be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the
Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement.

Arthur D. Lim vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002

Q. Are the “Balikatan” exercises covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Held: The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the
Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, for brevity). The MDT has been
described as the “core” of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States.
Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its
American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives.
It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.

The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US-
Philippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement. It should be recalled that
on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to three, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA (BAYAN v. Zamora, 342
SCRA 449 [2000]). The VFA provides the “regulatory mechanism” by which “United States military and civilian
personnel [may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine
Government.” It contains provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle
registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as
the duration of the agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite
the passage of years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and
Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.

The first question that should be addressed is whether “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement.
To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. Not much help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since
the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage,
on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is
ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must “abstain
from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.” All
other activities, in other words, are fair game.

We are not completely unaided, however. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos
governing interpretations of international agreements, state x x x.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 6 of 35

It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce
the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into
account alongside the aforesaid context. X x x

The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA.

After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word “activities”
arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in
negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military.
As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the
nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-destroy operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations,
civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that
“Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense
Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities – as opposed to combat itself – such as the
one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

3. SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY

Art. II, Sec. 3. Civilian authority is at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of that national territory.

Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in- Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines, x x x

Art. XVI, Sec. 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed
of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service,
as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for
the security of the State.

Art. XVI, Sec. 5. (1) All members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the
Constitution.

(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty.

(3) Professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and adequate


remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the
State. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be insulated from
partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any


partisan political activity.

(4) No members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the active


service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a
civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of


their service.

(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities
as far as practicable.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 7 of 35

(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or
other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may
extend such tour of duty.

Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which
shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
law.

The supremacy of civilian rule over the military is ensured by, (1) the installation of the
President, the highest civilian authority, as the commander-in-chief of the military, (2) the
requirement that members of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is
the fundamental law of the civil government, (3) the professionalization of the service and
the strengthening of the patriotism and nationalism, and respect for human rights, of the
military, (4) insulation of the AFP from partisan politics, (5) prohibition against the
appointment to a civil position, (6) compulsory retirement of officers (no over- staying of
officers), so as to avoid propagation of power), (7) a 3-year limitation on the tour of duty of
the Chief of Staff, which although extendible in case of emergency by the President, depends
on Congressional declaration of emergency, (8) requirement of professional recruitment, so
as to avoid any regional clique from forming within the AFP, as well as (9) the establishment
of a police force that is not only civilian character but also under the local executives.

IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81

FACTS: The President issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) ordering the deployment of members of the Philippine
Marines in the metropolis to conduct joint visibility patrols with members of the Philippine National Police in various
shopping malls. Will this not violate the civilian supremacy clause under Section 3, Article II of the Constitution?
Will this not amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution?

HELD: The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. x x x. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or
orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5[4], Article XVI of the Constitution.

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief
actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the
patrols. As such, there can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of
the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction.
The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally “civil” functions. x x x [S]ome of the multifarious activities
wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military
together in a relationship of cooperation, are:
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 8 of 35

1. Elections;
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
5. Development of the culture and the arts;
6. Conservation of natural resources;
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
8. Enforcement of customs laws;
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
13. Sanitary inspections;
14. Conduct of census work;
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned. What we have here is
mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

4. GOVERNMENT AS PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE AND PEOPLE AS DEFENDERS OF


THE STATE

Art. II Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulfilment thereof, all citizens may be required under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Art. II, Sec. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare, are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessing of
democracy.

 Note the emphasis on the government as servant of the people, rather than vice-
versa.

 Note also that the people may by law are required to render "personal" (not proxy)
military or civil service.

5. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Art. II, Sec. 6. The separation of the Church and State shall be
inviolable.

Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of


religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(5) xxx Religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered (as a political party, organization, or coalition by the
COMELEC).

Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to the party-list
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 9 of 35

representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election


from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.

Exceptions:

Art. VI, Sec. 28(3). Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or


convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.

Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,


paid or employed directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents
or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or
wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class
hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities
of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional
cost to the Government.

Sec. 4(2). Educational institutions, other than those established by


religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of
the Philippines or corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require
increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions.

The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested


in citizens of the Philippines.

No educational institutions shall be established exclusively for aliens and


no group of aliens shall comprise more than 1/3 of the enrolment in any
school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools
established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and,
unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.

The classic case in separation of church and state is Pamil vs. Teleron,3 which invalidated the
selection to a local post of Fr. Gonzaga, (note however, that ecclesiastics are not prohibited
from running for Congress).

It is difficult to draw the line between separation of Church and State. In Victoriano vs.
Elizalde,4 for instance, a law exempting members of Iglesia ni Kristo from the requirement
that all employees must join a union as condition for continued employment, pursuant to a
closed-shop agreement in the CBA, on the ground that it is prohibited by their religion, was
held valid.

The non-establishment clause is not violated, however, if the benefit derived by a religion
from the expenditure of public funds is merely incidental to public purpose. Thus, in Aglipay
vs. Ruiz,5 the SC held that the stamps printed by the government to commemorate the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress in Manila did not violate the separation of church and
state, because its main purpose was to promote Manila as seat of the congress and thus to

3
G.R. No. L-34854, November 20, 1978
4
G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974
5
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 10 of 35

attract tourists to its (the stamp showed the map of the Philippines, not a chalice). Not
having been inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a denomination nor to benefit the
Roman Catholic Church, whatever religious character the stamp had was only incidental and
uncontemplated.

While the Constitution mandates separation of Church and State through (1) Non-
Establishment, Free Exercise and No Religious Test clauses in the Bill of Rights, (2) the
disallowance of the religious sector from being registered as a political party and from being
appointed as sectoral representatives of Congress, yet it allows exceptions to the rule.

(1) The exemption of religious institutions from taxation is a recognition that the
Church is not all separate from State, for if they were really so, the Church should be taxed
by State like any other entity.

(2) Public funds, while generally prohibited from being spent for religious purposes as
an aspect of the Non- Establishment clause, may be applied to priest rendering religious
service to the AFP, a penal institution, or a government orphanage or leprosarium. The
reason is the exigency of the service. If members of the AFP had to go out of the barracks
to attend to their spiritual needs, national security might be endangered; If inmates were
allowed to go out of jail to hear mass, they might never return; and if lepers were allowed
out of the leprosarium, they might contaminate others.

The general prohibition, however, does not apply to a priest who, for instance,
teaches Mathematics at UP, for payment in this case is not for religious activities but for
teaching of a secular subject.

(3) The permission to have optimal religious instruction during regular class hours
upon written request of the parent or guardian, to be taught by a teacher approved by the
authorities of the religion of which the child is a member, provided it is without cost to the
government is a new provision in the Constitution. Under the old Administrative Code, the
instruction could not be within regular class hours. Under A359 of the Civil Code, religious
instruction would even be made part of the curriculum (with grades and failing marks), so
long as the parents ask for it.

(4) With the exception of sectarian schools, all schools must be owned by citizens or
60% Filipino corporations. The control and administration of all schools, including sectarian
schools, must be in the hands of Filipinos. Furthermore, they cannot be established
exclusively for aliens, and the alien population in the school should not exceed 1/3.

B. POLICIES

A policy in the Constitution is a standard which sets out a goal to be reached,


generally an improvement in economic, political or social feature of the community

1. INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND A NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINES

Art. II, Sec. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In
its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self- determination.

Art. II, Sec. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.

2. A JUST AND DYNAMIC SOCIAL ORDER

Art. II, Sec. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 11 of 35

the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all.

Art. XII, Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, wealth; a sustained increase in
the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

a. Promotion of Social Justice

 The 1987 Constitution, compared to the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution, contains the
most expanded concept of Social Justice.

The classic definition of SOCIAL JUSTICE is found in the case of Calalang vs. Williams, 6
where Justice Laurel declared as follows:

"Social Justice is 'neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,' but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex."

Art. II, Sec. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.

Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its increments.

Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.

Art. II, Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.

Art. VII, Sec. 13, par. 2. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the 4th civil degree of the President shall not during his
tenure be appointed as Member of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

6
G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940 (70 Phil. 726)
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 12 of 35

Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment


or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his


position, no appointive official shall hold any other employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries.

The President cannot hold any other post except those allowed by the Constitution, viz., (1)
Chairman of NEDA, and (2) Department Secretary.

The Vice-President can hold a cabinet seat without need of confirmation.

Members of the cabinet (Secretaries and Undersecretaries): Some are of the view that the
clause "unless otherwise provided by law" implies that when there is a law allowing so, he
may be appointed to any other government post, even if not affiliated to his cabinet position.
EO 284 limits the number of government posts of cabinet members to not more than 2.
However, EO 284 has been declared unconstitutional by the SC in the case of Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary.7 The prohibition however does not include positions held without
additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official's office. [For further discussion, see Executive
Dept.: Prohibitions.]

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case

ISSUE: One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

HELD: At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action. 8 Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the
Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

b. Respect for human dignity and human rights

Art. II, Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.

Art. XVI, Sec. 5(2). The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and
nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in
the performance of their duty.

Art. XIII, Sec. 17


(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission
on Human Rights.

Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following
powers and functions:

(1) Investigate on its own or on complaint by any party all forms of


human rights violations involving civil or political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

7
G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991 (194 SCRA 317)
8
See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 96, 100-101.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 13 of 35

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human


rights of all person within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and


information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human


rights and provide for, compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Government's compliance with international treaty


obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or


whose possession of document or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency


in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission
taking into account its recommendation.

c. Fundamental equality of women and men

Art. II, Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality of men and women
before the law.

Art. IV, Sec. 1(2) in relation with Sec. 4. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
xxx
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed under the
law, to have renounced it.

Art. XIII, Sec. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing
safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal
functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation.

Art. XIII, Sec. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 14 of 35

One significant move to equalize men and women is in the area of citizenship. Under the
1935 Constitution, a child born of a Filipino mother became a Filipino only upon election
when he reached the age of majority. The 1973 Constitution removed this stigma and made
such born after 17 January 1973 a Filipino without the need of election. The 1987
Constitution improved the situation even more by granting to those children born before 17
January 1973 who elected citizenship, whether born before or after 17 January 1973, the
status of natural-born citizens.

At the same time, Filipino women who by virtue of marriage to an alien husband, became
citizens of their husband's country no longer lost her Philippine citizenship by that fact alone,
beginning 17 January 1973.

In the area of labor it has been consistently held, beginning in the US with Sandy v. Oregon
the court requiring the company to provide stools for women workers in the factories), that
statutes (Book 3, Title III, Chapter I of the Labor Code) granting women better treatment by
virtue of their maternal function were valid.

d. Promotion of health

Art. II, Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.

Art. XIII, Sec. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Sec. 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and
drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health manpower
development and research, responsive to the country's health needs and
problems.

Sec. 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons
for their rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance, and their
integration to the mainstream of society.

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, (224 SCRA 792)

 Validity of the issuance of several Timber License Agreements


 The right of children and those yet to be born to a balanced and healthful ecology for them to enjoy in the
future
 Their right to sue (Legal Standing) to sue is being challenged in this case.

HELD: While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself x x x the day would not be
too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come – generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 15 of 35

Tano vs. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997 (278 SCRA 154)

FACTS: The Province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa enacted ordinances prohibiting the catching and/or
exportation of live tropical fishes, and imposing penalties for violations thereof, in order to stop the illegal practice of
cyanide fishing which destroys the corals and other marine resources. Several fishermen apprehended for violating
the ordinances in question challenged their constitutionality contending that the ordinances violated their preferential
right as subsistence and marginal fishermen to the use of our communal marine resources guaranteed by the
Constitution, under Section 7, Article XIII. Will you sustain the challenge?

HELD: The “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization x x x shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.” Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation x x x
imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. What must be borne in
mind is the State policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature (Section
16, Article II). The ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the
end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to
come. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

e. Priority of education, science, technology, arts, culture and sports (ESTACS)

Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to education, science,
technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social programs, and promote total human
liberation and development.

Art. XIV, Sec. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate
steps to make such education accessible to all.

Students have the constitutional right not only to education but to a quality education, up to
the secondary level, for free. But this is subject to the right of the school to impose
reasonable academic standards, and to make education available only on the basis of merit.

In Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines,9 a case involving the denial of enrollment of
student activists who took part in demonstrations and mass actions, and who, at the same
time incurred scholastic deficiencies. The Court held that participation in mass actions per
se is not a valid ground for dismissal, but that failure in academic subjects pursuant to
school regulations was a valid ground. For while the right to education is a social, economic
and cultural right, it is available only "on the basis of merit."

In Tagonan vs. Cruz Pano,10 a case of a nursing student who was denied readmission after she
failed a subject during her previous provisional admission (and her inability to take this
subject in another school after she tried to bribe the Dean of that school), the SC again
upheld the right of schools of higher learning to choose the students which it thinks could
best achieve their goal of excellence and truth, while affirming the right of students to
quality education.

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989 (180
SCRA 533)

FACTS: The private respondent is a graduate of UE with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took
the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the rule allowing only 3 chances for a student to take the NMAT. He then went to the
RTC-Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test.

9
G.R. No. L-69198, April 17, 1985 (135 SCRA 706)
10
G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985 (137 SCRA 245)
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 16 of 35

By agreement of the parties, private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT on 4/16/89 subject to the outcome
of his petition.

After the hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition on the ground that the petitioner had been deprived of her right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.

HELD: We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education.

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the 3-flunk rule.

Exercise of Police Power.-- The power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents.

The method employed by the regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive.
The 3-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion
of those not qualified to be doctors.

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.

The challenged regulation does not violate the equal protection clause. A law does not have to operate with equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable to the equal protection clause.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are
not subjected to the NMAT and the 3-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people,
unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

f. Urban land reform and housing

Art. XIII, Sec. 9. The State shall by law, and for the common good,
undertake in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program
of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged
and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall
also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In
the implementation of such program, the State shall respect the rights
of small property owners.

Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner.

No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without


adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are
to be relocated.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 17 of 35

The limitations to the power of the State in this regard:

1. Respect for the rights of property owners.

2. In the case of resettlement, said program must be with the permission of the persons to
be resettled, and the community to which they would be resettled.

g. Reform in agriculture and other natural resources

Art. II, Sec. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.

Art. XIII, Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in case
of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farm workers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers'
organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and
management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture
through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.

Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or


stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own
agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner
provided by law.

Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,


especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal
marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fish workers shall
receive a just share from their labour in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.

Sec. 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the


proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization,
employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises.
Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as
equity in enterprises of their choice.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 18 of 35

The basic philosophy behind agrarian reform is "land to the tiller" if one is a regular farm
worker and "profit sharing" in other cases. But "just compensation" and a "reasonable
retention limit" are guaranteed the land owner.

Common limitations to land reform (urban or agrarian):

It must not impair the rights of small agricultural land owners, small homestead settlers, and
small property owners;

The idea of reform is to benefit the poor and other peasants and the landless. It would
therefore, be self-defeating for the Constitution to make no reservation in favor of small
property owners and homestead settlers.

The basic philosophy behind other natural resources is the principle of "stewardship" ---
anyone who is given the chance to cultivate public land must use in trust for the succeeding
generations, and so must exercise prudence in its use.

h. Protection of Labor

Art. II. Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self- organization,


collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between


workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and
to expansion and growth.

The basic philosophy behind labor is shared responsibility and the preferential use of
voluntary and peaceful for the settlement of disputes.

The right of government workers to form unions

Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Art. IX, B, Sec. 2(5). The right of self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 19 of 35

Sec. 2(1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,


instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

The right of government workers to form unions is undisputed under Art III, sec.8 of the
Constitution. (This provision is even misplaced since the Bill of Rights only covers civil and
political rights.) The problem is whether they have the right to strike.

Those who hold the negative view say that the right to self- organization is mentioned in Art
III(8) separately from the right to strike in Art XIII(3). If it is included, there would be no
need to explicate the two anymore.

But those who hold the affirmative view say that although the Constitution does not
explicitly grant it, Congress can always grant the right to government workers. The
Constitution does not prohibit it in Art III(8) in the phrase "for purposes not contrary to law".
Besides the right to self-organization is rendered nugatory without the coercive tool of strike
(which is true because the strike at issue is only the economic strike, not the ULP strike).

It must be noted that the SC ruled in Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor,11
under the 1973 Constitution, that government workers cannot negotiate for terms and
condition of employment, for these are a matter of law. Their remedy is to report to their
own heads and to convince Congress to enact the desired law.

Said the Court: Civil servants are entitled to form societies for purposes not contrary to law.
But to form an association is one thing, and to use such association for the coercive measure
of going on strike and bargaining with the government so as to pressure it into complying
with their demands, is another.

In NHA vs. Juco, 12 the SC held that those in the government service cannot bargain
collectively as private workers because they are governed by the Civil Service Law. It also
held that all govt-owned or controlled corporations regardless of their manner of creation,
were covered by the Civil Service.

In interpreting the ruling in the above cases, we have to distinguish between two kinds of
government corporations in accordance with Art. IX, B, Sec. 2(1): a) those which were
organized with special charters, in case the employees are governed by the Civil Service Law
and arguably by the SC ruling in Alliance, and b) those which were organized pursuant to
the general law (Corporation Code), in which case their employees can without doubt
bargain collectively and go on strike.

The grant of the right to form unions is a social economic right included for the first time in
the Constitution. Previously, only political and civil rights were guaranteed government
employees.

Question: Does the right to self-organization given to govt. employees include the right to
strike?

SSS Employees Assn vs. CA, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989 (175 SCRA 686)

FACTS: SSS filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS building preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from
transacting business with SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work
but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on strike because SSS failed to act on the union's demands.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied. The restraining
order which was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners

11
G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983, (124 SCRA 1)
12
G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985 (134 SCRA 172)
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 20 of 35

appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not
allowed to strike.

HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like
workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede to their demands. As now provided under
Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self-Organization
which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the Govt, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations with original charters, are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof.

The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant
as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. workers in the private sector and govt employees with regard to
the right to strike?

Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law, govt. workers cannot use the
same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion of law. Relations bet. private employers and their employees rest on
an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor
and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are
settled through the process of collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the
terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's

EO 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of govt employees, while clinging to the
same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law.

Govt employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment
of the terms and conditions of employment which are w/in the ambit of legislation or negotiate w/ the appropriate
govt agencies for the improvement of those w/ are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the
dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.

Manila Public School Teachers Association vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 95445, August 6, 1991 (200 SCRA 323)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national office of the
DECS and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the DECS Secretary's RETURN TO
WORK order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the
questioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under
suspension. Two separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to work order and his decisions in
the administrative proceeding.

ISSUE: whether or not the mass actions are considered as strikes?

HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work, which it
was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.

ISSUE: whether or not public school teachers can strike?

HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to self
organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working conditions.

ISSUE: whether or not due process was observed during the administrative proceedings?

HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or that
the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It can not resolve the issue
which requires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the administrative
proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If pending said administrative
proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with the RTC where there
would be opportunity to prove relevant facts.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 21 of 35

i. Independent People's Organizations

Art. II, Sec. 23. The State shall encourage non- governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare
of the nation.

Art. XIII, Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent
people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect,
within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with


demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with
identifiable leadership, membership and structure.

Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State, shall by law,
facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

This is in recognition of people's power, aside from the provision on initiative and
referendum.

3. FAMILY AS A BASIC AUTONOMOUS SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

This provision seems to be the basis of an argument that abortion is prohibited by the
Constitution. It might also be the basis of a stand against family planning. The root of the
problem, of course, is the determination of when life begins.

The right of parents to rear their children is the only natural right recognized by the
Constitution. This is a declaration that the State does not espouse fascism which holds that
the State owns the life of everyone.

Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of


the family and shall be protected by the State.

Some cite this provision as the basis of a stand against divorce. And yet not really. The
phrase "inviolable social institution," was lifted from Art. 52 of the Civil code, and under that
Code, divorce was part of the proposed draft submitted to Congress by the Code
Commission and was almost approved if not for reasons other than compatibility with Art.
52.

Sec. 3. The State shall defend:


(1) The right of spouses to found a family according to their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 22 of 35

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and


nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the


planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the
State may also do so through just programs of social security.

Art. II, Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civil affairs.

Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social


institution. Its nature, consequence and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements
may be to a certain extent fix the property relations during the
marriage. (Civil Code)

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a


man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Family Code)

4. SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC ORDER

Art. II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private
sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to
needed investments.

Art. XII, Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and
private groups, including corporations, cooperatives and similar collective
organizations, shall have the right to own, establish and operate
economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.

These provisions reveal that the economic policy of the Philippines is one closer to socialism
than capitalism. The State adopts a policy of balancing the private sector's pursuit for profit
and the concern of the State to promote distributive justice.

The use of "distributive justice" is based on the Aristotelian notion of giving each one what is
due him on the basis of personal worth and value, and not merely what he has contracted
for.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 23 of 35

Tanada vs. Angara, G.R. No.118295, May 2, 1997 (272 SCRA 18)

HELD: The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services . It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy
in the international community.”

Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries
that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Garcia vs. BOI, G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989 (191 SCRA 288)

FACTS: The BOI approved the transfer of the site of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and shift of
feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint
venture between the PNOC and the BPC which is a Taiwanese group. According to the BOI, it is the investor which
has the final say as to the site and the feedstock to be used.

HELD: Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of
national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the devt. and utilization of
scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are
too explicit not to be noticed and understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. The petrochemical industry is essential to the
national interst. The BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion when it approved the transfer of the petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorized the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG.
No cogent advantage to the govt. has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy
of the govt. expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the
national interest.

5. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION IN NATION-BUILDING

Art. II, Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication
and information in nation-building.

Art. XVI, Sec. 10. The State shall the provide the policy environment
for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the
nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the
country, in accordance with a policy that respect the freedom of speech
and of the press.

Sec. 11(1). The ownership and management of mass media shall be


limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or
associations, wholly owned and managed by such citizens.

The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass


media when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint
of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.

(2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall
be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of
general welfare.

Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per


cent of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to
engage in the advertising industry.

The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in


such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital
thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must
be citizens of the Philippines.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 24 of 35

Art. XVIII, Sec. 23. Advertising entities affected by paragraph 2,


Section 11 of Article XVI of this Constitution shall have five years from its
ratification to comply on a graduated and proportionate basis with the
minimum Filipino ownership requirement therein.

Both ownership and management of mass media must be in the hands of Filipinos, 100%.

While monopolies in mass media may be regulated or prohibited, combinations in restraint of


and unfair competition in information matters are absolutely prohibited.

Commercial advertising is now defined as being vested with public interest, and can thus be
owned and managed only by 70% Filipino corporations.

6. AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Art. II, Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.

Art. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the


Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local


autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, elections, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general


supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.

Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.

Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined


by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.

Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the


proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within
their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing
the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay


officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 25 of 35

such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which
he was elected.

Sec. 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral


representation as may be prescribed by law.

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,


divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.

Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created
shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.

Sec. 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or


coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly
beneficial to them in accordance with law.

Sec. 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or
other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives
from non-governmental organizations with the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region.

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao


and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics which the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over


autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from
a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define
the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 26 of 35

property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution


and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved


by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.

Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organizations;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the region shall be
the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws.
The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.

Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the
National Government to the local government units.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 27 of 35

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and
people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court :13

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the
policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from
which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their
inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense
of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted
by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best
resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today
conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles
on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.

HELD: The Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez,14 described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a
recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project." Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the
relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national
development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central
agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.15 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of
PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally
established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the
LGU concerned cannot afford.16

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division
limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been
taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount
of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped"
compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives –
and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent
which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective
control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 17 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions

13
230 Phil. 379, 387-388 (1986).
14
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
15
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘"
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited October 17, 2013).
16
<http://www.gov.ph/2013/08/23/english-statement-of-president-aquino-on-the-abolition-of-pdaf-august-23-2013/> (visited
October 22, 2013).
17
Section 106 of the LGC provides:
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 28 of 35

are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment
authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on
his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional

 This topic will be thoroughly be discussed in your subject of PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

7. RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES

Art. II, Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development.

Art. XII, Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights
of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws


governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain.

Art. XIII, Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform
or stewardship whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the
public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject
to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Art. XIV, Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect and protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies.

Art. XVI, Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to
advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural
communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.

Cruz vs. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 (347 SCRA 128)

1. Enumerate the Constitutional provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the
indigenous peoples.

HELD: The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers,
fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to reach
out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the

Sec. 106. Local Development Councils. – (a) Each local government unit shall have a comprehensive multi-sectoral
development plan to be initiated by its development council and approved by its sanggunian. For this purpose, the
development council at the provincial, city, municipal, or barangal level, shall assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 29 of 35

fundamental law several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to
wit:

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development. (Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles
and Policies)

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. (Article XII of the
Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony)

Section 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and
its increments. (Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights)

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources,
including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, subject to prior rights, homestead
rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Section 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of cultural communities to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies. (Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education,
Science, Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports)

Section 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies
affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from
such communities. (Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions)

2. Discuss the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (R.A. No. 8371).

HELD: Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing
Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a
distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and
empowerment (Sections 13 to 20), social justice and human rights (Sections 21 to 28), the right to preserve and
protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own
sciences and technologies (Sections 29 to 37).

3. Define "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities."

HELD: 1. Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the
politically-correct conjunctive term “indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities” as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) INDIGENOUS PEOPLES/INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES. - refer to a group of people or


homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and
who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized
such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 30 of 35

cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country at the
time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and
cultures, or the establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains x x x.

2. The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the
Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term “ICCs” is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of “IPs” is the contemporary
international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or,
they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures,
became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who
inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic,
cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains.

4. Define “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands.” Do they constitute part of the land of the public
domain?

HELD: Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute
part of the land of the public domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral
lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3(a) and (b) of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act x x x.

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators (Section 3[a], IPRA).

ANCESTRAL LANDS are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that
these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the
ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots (Section 3[b], IPRA).

5. How may ICCs/IPs acquire rights to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands?

HELD: The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1)
by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

6. What is the concept of “native title?” What is a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)?

HELD: NATIVE TITLE refers to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected (Section 11, IPRA). Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the
territories identified and delineated.
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 31 of 35

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of
private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Carino v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935
[1909], 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594). Carino firmly established a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.

7. Distinguish ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the
State.

HELD: Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his
predecessor-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State,
that is, Spain or its successor-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no
transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In
contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of the character of the
property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private
person.

8. Discuss the concept of “jura regalia” and how it evolved in the Philippines. Does it negate native title
to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial?

HELD: Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or
implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine
Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because
title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere .

In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal grants, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a
right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.

The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands
was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained
the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source
of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit
of conquest.

The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.
In the landmark case of Carino v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594 [1909]), the United
States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following
pronouncement:

Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed
to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. (Carino v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941)

The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant
from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

Carino was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as
precedent in our jurisdiction (Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902). We applied the Carino doctrine in the 1946 case of
Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]), where we stated that “[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the
Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.

9. Does R.A. 8371, otherwise known as “the Indigenous People’s Rights Act” infringe upon the State’s
ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral domains?
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 32 of 35

HELD: Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and
other natural resources, as well as the State’s full control and supervision over the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources. Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3[a], 5, and 7 of
IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that “[a]ll lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.” (Section 2, Article XII,
Constitution) They would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3[a] of IPRA because the inclusion of
natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership over
these resources.

Section 3[a] merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and composition of
ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be
considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3[a] serves only as a yardstick
which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of
ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a
right or title.

The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is x x x important to ensure that no unnecessary
encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process. The
mere fact that Section 3[a] defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso
facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly,
Section 5 in relation to Section 3[a] cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous peoples over
the natural resources simply because it recognizes ancestral domains as their “private but community property.”

The phrase “private but community property” is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership
as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. x x x. In contrast, the indigenous peoples’ concept of
ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character of
ownership, the property held in common “cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed” because it was meant to benefit
the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member.

That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from
the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples
over their ancestral domains x x x.

Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources.
In fact, Section 7[a] merely recognizes the “right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains.” Neither does Section 7[b], which enumerates certain
rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any
recognition of ownership vis-à-vis the natural resources.

What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in relation to the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, including the preservation of the ecological balance therein and the
need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced when the State-approved activities involving
the natural resources located therein are undertaken.

10. Has the concept of native title to natural resources, like native title to land, been recognized in the
Philippines?

HELD: The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been recognized in the
Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza (40 Phil. 1017 [1909], 215 US 16, 54 L Ed
72) in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction. X x x.
However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the
Court did not recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples
to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

While native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of time immemorial possession in the
concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the
Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources.

11. What is the underlying reason for the State’s consistent assertion of ownership and control over natural
resources from the Spanish regime up to the present?

HELD: The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for
its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the
present. Natural resources, especially minerals, were considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 33 of 35

finance its battle in wars against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever
these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and that over
minerals which may be found therein.

On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals. As the owner
of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow
both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private
mineral lands. Although the United States made a distinction between minerals found in public lands and those found
in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution
found it necessary to maintain the State’s ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for future
generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through economic domination; and to avoid
situations whereby the Philippines would become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its
internal security and independence.

12. What was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia? Is this also the
basis of the declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public
domain are owned by the State? Consequently, did Spain acquire title over all lands in the Philippines
in the 16th century?

HELD: Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The declaration
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is
likewise founded on dominium. If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands
which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-private lands, because it could only acquire lands which
were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were
unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands.

8. HONEST PUBLIC SERVICE AND FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Art. II, Sec. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State


adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of


public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.

Honesty of Public Officials

Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the
case of the President, Vice- President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law.

Art. VI, Sec. 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of
their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of
proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
Notes in Political Law
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 34 of 35

annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for


each Member.

Art. IX, D, Sec. 4. The Commission (on Audit) shall submit to the
President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual
report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government,
its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject
to its audit and recommend measures necessary to improve their
effectiveness and efficiency.

Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the


Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the


Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as the
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment
may likewise be appointed.

Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office


of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.

Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the govt., or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including govt. owned or controlled corporations
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action
taken and the result thereof.

Art. XI, Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, duties:

(1) Investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any


public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter; to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a


public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned in any appropriate case, and subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information


necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so


warrant and with due prudence.
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Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
1st Semester, P.U.P. College of Law. SY 2013-2014
Page 35 of 35

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement,


fraud and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for
their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Sec. 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees, from them or their nominees, or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Foreign Loans

Art. VII, Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign
loans on behalf of the Republic with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days form the end of every
quarter of the calendar year, submit to Congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.

Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance
with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on
foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made
available to the public.

Executive Agreements on Natural Resources

Art. XII, Sec. 2.


xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions pro-
vided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(pars. 4 and 5 thereof.)

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