Paat vs. Court of Appeals

3/22/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 266
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 167

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997.
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge

(OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and
JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO),
both of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA
DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;

Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him.—This Court in a long line
of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause
of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel
the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000169a5b199a78be06e8a003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses

and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no
less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity
and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity
to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions.—
However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
Same; Same; A party cannot, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.—It was easy to
perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the
Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By
appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate
and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their
relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
169
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 169

Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of

primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.—Moreover, it is important to point out that the
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the

protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within
its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of
the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
Same; Same; Due Process; Deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.—To sustain the claim of
private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy
beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore
stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this
case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there
was violation of due process because they did not receive the May
23, 1989 order of confiscation of petiioner Layugan. This
contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity
or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably
and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present
their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 which was,
170

however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director

Baggayan.
Statutes; Statutory Construction; Statutes should be construed
in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.—The Secretary and his duly authorized representatives

are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances
utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough
to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a
way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
Same; Same; When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.—With the introduction of Executive
Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products
without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now
from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear
from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated
the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code”
and inserted the words “shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.”
When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for
any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a
condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondent’s right of
action,
171
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 171

is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.—From the

foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and
retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal
of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently
issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of
the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition

precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of
action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
Remedial Law; Replevin; Under the Rules of Court, it is
indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show
by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of
property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not
been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or
attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and
the actual value of the property.—It is worth stressing at this
point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that
the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be
recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that
are unlawfully detained. “To detain” is defined as to mean “to hold
or keep in custody,” and it has been held that there is tortious
taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property,
or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense
of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property
is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in
replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the
property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the
cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of
the property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince
this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains
in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized
by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products
without the required permit of the DENR in manifest
contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
172

amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,

unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision
of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention
of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention
exists in the case at bar.
Same; Certiorari; Courts may not review the decisions of the
Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.—Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as
a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and

forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given
under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit
that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the
said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that
courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except
through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
SECTION 8. REVIEW—All actions and decisions of the Director
are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall
be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to
the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series
of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be
reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for
certiorari or prohibition.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, may an action for replevin
prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
173
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 173

705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the

Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before
us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19,
1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de
Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose,
Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity)
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver

could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on
May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave
the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit
an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
Private respondents, however, failed
1
to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989, the Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner of
Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture
of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private
respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28,
1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director
Baggayan, which was,2 however, denied in a subsequent
order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was brought
by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents’ statement in their letter dated June
28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would
be denied then “this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 235.
2 Rollo, pp. 241-242.
174

3
Secretary.” Pending resolution however of the appeal, a
suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by
the private respondents against 4
petitioner Layugan and
Executive Director Baggayan 5
with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ 6
ordering
the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner
Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion
to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that
private respondents had no cause of action for their failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied
the motion
7
to dismiss in an order dated December 28,
1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been
likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial court’s order ruling
8
that the question
involved9 is purely a legal question. Hence, this present
petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the

decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by
the petitioners on September 9, 1993. 10
By virtue of the
Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was
granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private
respon-
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 239.
4 Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was
succeeded in office by Petitioner Leonardo Paat.
5 Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.
6 Rollo, pp. 251-252.
7 Rollo, pp. 274-275.
8 Rollo, pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred
by Justices Luis A. Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.
9 Rollo, pp. 14-35.
10 Rollo, pp. 117-119.
175
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 175

dents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation

of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within
the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1)
due process was violated because they were not given the
chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was
unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR
and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest
products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners
was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records
and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the
opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be

exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation
11
of court’s intervention is fatal to
one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case
12
is susceptible of dismissal for
lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and
legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses
_______________
11 National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987;

Atlas Consolidated Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-15809,
August 30, 1961; Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May
18, 1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.
12 Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun.
Board, L-18276, January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L4827, May 31,
1979; Gone v. District Engineer, L-22782, August 29, 1975.
176

and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It

is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons
of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are
not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is
not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness
of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence,
it is disregarded
13
(1) when there is a violation of due
process, 14 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, (3) when the administrative action is patently 15
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppel16
on the part of the administrative 17
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President 18
bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of 19
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
20
(8) when it would amount to a nullification
of a claim, (9) when the 21
subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and
_______________
13 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

14 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.
15 Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.
16 Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30,
1959.
17 De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.
18 Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959;
Bartulata v. Peralta, G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.
19 Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.
20 Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.
21 Soto v. Jareno, supra.
177
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 177

adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances

22
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. In the case
at bar, there is no question that the controversy was
pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of
the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July 12, 1989. 23
In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents
clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum
to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the
resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:
“x x x
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable
action, then24 this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.”

It was easy to perceive then that the private
respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and
disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they
acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain
remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
seek the court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin
for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands
fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By
the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a

free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which
_______________
22 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.

23 Rollo, pp. 236-240.
24 Rollo, p. 239.
178

is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial

court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into
the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged25
with an
administrative body of special competence. In26 Felipe
Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which
was reiterated in the27
recent case of Concerned Officials of
MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held:
“Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and

multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.”

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in
effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall
within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this
case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that
there was violation of due process because they did not
receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner
Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due
process does not necessarily mean or require 28a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than
_______________
25 Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.

26 G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.
27 G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.
28 Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686,
August 15, 1995.
179
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 179

29
oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully 30
equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given31the chance
to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the
instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly
given the opportunity to present their side when they filed
a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was,
however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of32Executive
Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled
that:
“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be

heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing
is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What
is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.”

Second, private respondents imputed the patent
illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the
administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no
power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted
that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as
can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision
reads as follows:
_______________
29 Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

30 Ibid.
31 Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968,

August 23, 1995.
32 G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.
180

“SECTION 68. x x x
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.” (Italics ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go
along with private respondents’ thinking not only because
the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor
include “conveyances” that can be the subject of
confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the
fact that private respondents’ interpretation of the subject
provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A,
which is quoted herein below:
“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department

or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In
all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and
all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.”
(Italics ours)

It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the
same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting
conveyances in favor of the government. The only
limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.” In
the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way
as
181
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 181

33
to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and
they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress
34
the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor
General is significant, thus:
“But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws ‘more

responsive to present situations and realities’ and in view of the
‘urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country,’ that
the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and
distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is
intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize
enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The
preamble of EO 277—the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705
—is most revealing:
‘WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest

resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and
protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from
technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize
certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;’
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision

authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only ‘conveyances,’ but
forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the ‘court’ in a criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of
confisca-
_______________
33 Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

34 De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.
182
tion cannot be exercised except only through the court under

Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all.
Simply put, Section 68-A would not have35provided any solution to
the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.”

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure
was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in
the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not
used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of
which was given to and received by the counsel of private
respondents, reads in part, viz.:
“x x x while it is true that the truck of your client was not used
by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that
the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a
criminal case be filed against her as provided
36
under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x”

We observed that private respondents misread the
content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is
contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the
truck “was not used in the commission of the crime” is that
it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft,
hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the
owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the
possibility that the truck was being used in the commission
of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.
705 as amended by E.O 277. In the same order of July 12,
1989, petitioners pointed out:
“x x x However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and

further amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides
for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of
forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She
may not
_______________
35 Rollo, pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

36 Rollo, p. 242.
183
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 183

have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in

question but the fact that she accepted
37
the goods for a fee or fare
the same is therefor liable. x x x”

Private respondents, however, contended that there is
no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other
than qualified theft, so that, when petitioner admitted in
the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not
be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private
respondents could not have committed an act constituting a
crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by
E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277
amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced
herein, thus:
“SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or

other products without license.—Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or
from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified
theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x.” (Italics ours; Section 68, P.D. 705
before its amendment by E.O. 277)
“SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
‘Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest

products without license.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x” (Italics ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending
Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
_______________
37 Ibid.
184


With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277
amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest

products without authority constitutes a distinct offense
independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be
imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of
Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase
“shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code” and
inserted the words “shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code.” When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended38
court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for
replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for
the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to
Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the
replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should have been the proper course of action by
the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return
of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to
one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
element of private respondents’ right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin
is founded solely on the claim that the defendant
wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered.
It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are
unlawfully
_______________
38 Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.
185
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 185

39
detained. “To detain”
40
is defined as to mean “to hold or
keep in custody,” and it has been held that there is
tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling
with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over
it, without any pretense of authority or right; 41this, without
manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the
Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding
that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is

entitled to the possession of property, that the property is
wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if
so seized, that it is exempt from42 such seizure, and the
actual value of the property. Private respondents
miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It
should be noted that the truck was seized by the
petitioners because it was transporting forest products
without the required permit of the DENR in manifest
contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O
277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably
warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives
of the conveyances used in violating the provision of
forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative
forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a
procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given
_______________
39 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p. 850, footnote

57; I. Tanenbaum Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and
Company, 261 NY 85, 184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.
40 Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 Ill 436; Wails vs.
Farrington, 27 Okla 754, 116 P 428.
41 Id., footnote 60; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.
42 Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
186

under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is

explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the
decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
SECTION 8. REVIEW—All actions and decisions of the

Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any
person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose

decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30)
days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision,
unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive
Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department
Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special
civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991
and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET
ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order
promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made
permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to
resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza,

JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—When the language of the statute is clear it

should be given its natural meaning. (Basbacio vs. Office of
the Secretary, Department of Justice, 238 SCRA 5 [1994])
——o0o——
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3/22/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 266

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 167

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 169

Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of

enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director

intended.—The Secretary and his duly authorized representatives

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 171

is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.—From the

the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,

a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

TORRES, JR., J.:

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 173

705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the

personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 175

dents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation

comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be

11 National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987;

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It

13 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 177

adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances

the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a

22 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial

“Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and

25 Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 179

“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be

29 Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

31 Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968,

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 181

“But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws ‘more

‘WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision

33 Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paat vs. Court of Appeals

tion cannot be exercised except only through the court under

“x x x However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and

35 Rollo, pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 183

have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in

“SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or

‘Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest