28  |  ʿĀmirī, Abū al-H.
asan al-
such as the superiority of Islam to other religions.
In his Kitab al-iʿlām, he includes an introduction
to Greek philosophy. This could indicate that
the intended audience may not have been very
familiar with Greek philosophy, and it would sup­
port the claim that the work was aimed at reli-
gious scholars.
In al-Amad, he argued that faith and disbelief
are of essentially different natures, placing the for­
mer in the rational faculty and the latter in the
faculty of imagination or estimation. Elsewhere
he argues that “correct religion” and “sound intel-
lect” are complementary and are both necessary
for resolving problems associated with one or the
other. He even argued (Kitab al-Iʿlām, 213–214)
that ḥadīth, the science of Prophetic traditions, is
the basis of the other sciences and hence inher-
ently prior to them in importance, because it is
the intellect’s first tool. However, in his defense
of  ḥadīth, he broke with tradition by including
“wise sayings” of ancient philosophers and sages,
similar to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Akhlāq-e
Muḥtashamī, three centuries later.
There is an echo of some of al-ʿĀmirī’s philo-
sophical views in the writings of some later phi-
losophers, although only occasionally and not
systematically. For example, in his Sharh Ḥikmat
al-Ishrāq (Comment of the Philosophy of Illumi-
nation of al-Suhrawardī), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī
credited al-Suhrawardī for a particular argument
on the topic of the attributes of God. Centuries
later Mullā Ṣadrā would eventually trace the
argument to al-ʿĀmirī.
Bibliography
ʿĀmirī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-. A Muslim Philosopher on the
Soul and Its Fate: Al-ʿĀmirī’s Kitāb al-amad ʿalā
l-abad. Edited and translated by Everett K. Rowson.
New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society,
1988.
ʿĀmirī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-. Kitab al-iʿlām bi manāqib al-
Islām [Book on the merits of Islam]. Edited by
Aḥmad ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd Ghurāb. Cairo: Dār al-Kātib
al-ʾArabī, 1967. Reprinted in 1991.
ʿĀmirī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-. Rasāʾil Abī al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī
wa-Shadharātuhu al-falsafīyah: dirāsah wa-nuṣūṣ
[Philosophical treatises and fragments of Abu al-
Hasan al-ʿĀmirī]. Edited by Saḥbān Khalīfāt.
Amman, Jordan: al-Jāmiʿah al-Urdunīyah, 1988.
ʿĀmirī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-. Al-saʿāda wa l-isʿād (On
­Seeking and Causing Happiness). Edited by Muǧtabā
Mīnūwī. Wiesbaden, Germany: F. Steiner, ­1957–1958.
Brockelmann, Carl. Geschichte der arabischen Littera-
tur [History of Arabic Literature]. Vol. 2. Leiden,
Netherlands: Brill, 1943.
Kraemer, Joel L. Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam.
Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1986.
Lacroix, M. C. “Éducation et instruction selon Abû
l-ḥasan al-ʿÂmirî: présentation et traduction d’un
extrait du Kitâb al-saʿâda wa l-isʿâd.” Revue Philoso-
phique de Louvain 87 (1989): 165–214.
Minovi, M. “Az k̲h̲azāʾen-e Turkiyye.” Revue de la fac-
ulté des lettres de l’Université de Tehran 4, no. 3 (1957):
60–87.
Rosenthal, Franz. The Classical Heritage in Islam. New
York: Routledge, 1992.
Rowson, Everett K., ed. and trans. A Muslim Philoso-
pher on the Soul and Its Fate: al-ʿĀmirī’s Kitāb al-
amad ʿalā al-abad. New Haven, Conn.: American
Oriental Society, 1988.
Tabatabai, Sayyed J., Ebrahimi G. Dinani, and Saleh
Nejad. “Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī.” In Encyclopaedia
­Islamica, edited by Wilferd Madelung and Farhad
Daftary. Brill Online, 2013. <http://referenceworks.
brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-islamica/
abu-al-hasan-al-amiri-COM_0072>.
Hadi Jorati
Animals in Islamic Law and
Muslim Culture  The wealth and
depth of animal themes in Islamic textual sources,
particularly from the premodern period, point to
a profound sensitivity to animate life beyond the
human sphere. No doubt, in these sources ani-
mals are also treated as objects. For example,
works of jurisprudence often discuss domestic
species in their capacities as assets and grazing

animals in their capacities as a source of food and
service for humans. Alongside this dimension,
however, the tradition also takes the interests of
nonhuman animals into serious consideration,
often prioritizing them over the interests of
human beings. This entry is concerned with the
latter dimension of the animal question, that is,
animals as subjects. The first part deals with ani-
mals in the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth; the second
explores the legal protections that Muslims ac-
corded or denied to nonhuman animals and the
mechanisms that were used to implement these
protections; the third considers how the tradition
noticed, or failed to notice, the subjective realities
of nonhuman species beyond the legal sphere.
Animals in Scriptural Sources. Qurʾānic
animal themes have a bearing mostly on the
status of nonhuman animals. The Qurʾān pres-
ents several species as a source of food and ser-
vice for human beings and discusses humans
more than it does any other species. This stance
has been prevalently interpreted as an indication
of humans’ privileged status. This interpretation,
however, fails to take into account many other
themes that highlight nonhuman animals’ merit.
The Qurʾān not only says (addressing human
beings), “There is no creature crawling on earth,
nor a bird flying with two wings, but are nations
like you” (6:38), but also presents nonhuman ani-
mals as moral and spiritual beings submitting
themselves to and willingly obeying God. Be-
cause the Qurʾān considers spirituality (rather
than rationality) the ultimate criterion that de-
cides any being’s status, it is justified to conclude
that it situates nonhuman animals above the vast
majority of humankind, since most of the latter
are presented as disbelievers.
The Ḥadīth expounds on the theme of non-
human animals’ spirituality, often contrasting
humans’ haughtiness to the submission (islām)
of nonhuman beings to God. Furthermore, the
Ḥadīth engages deeply with the question of
Animals in Islamic Law and Muslim Culture  |  29
animal welfare. While authorizing Muslims to
kill certain animals for food and to kill the mem-
bers of five species that are deemed particularly
harmful (such as scorpions and mice), it imposes
innumerable restrictions on humans’ interac-
tions with other species. Thus, Muslims are disal­
lowed from mutilating, overloading, exhausting,
or otherwise compromising animals’ well-being.
In cases when killing is permissible, the Ḥadīth
urges Muslims to perform it in the least painful
method, paying attention both to the physical
and the emotional states of the animal. The Ḥadīth
also details Muslims’ obligations toward their
livestock and other domestic species. Some Pro-
phetic reports go so far as to present one act of
kindness to a nonhuman animal as a meritorious
deed that can wipe out all sins and earn a Muslim
the highest reward in the afterlife. In contrast,
cruelty to animals is presented as an act punish-
able by torture in the hellfire.
Animals in Islamic Law. Legal rulings per-
taining to animals are derived from scriptural
teachings and have developed according to the
juristic principle of qiyās (analogical reasoning).
From the various authorizations and interdic-
tions pertaining to animals in the Qurʾān and the
Ḥadīth, Muslim jurists derive a number of guid-
ing principles, such as the prohibition of inflict-
ing pain on animals save for slaughtering them
for food and the notion of nonhuman animals’
inviolability. Attempts to balance scriptural in-
junctions and human needs, however, have led to
different interpretations of these principles.
The major schools of Islamic law unanimously
agree on the prohibition of killing animals for no
purpose on the one hand and on the permissi-
bility of killing them for food on the other. There
is hardly any consensus, however, on whether or
not, and to what extent, the permissibility of kill-
ing for food can be expanded to include other
uses. Jurists from the Ḥanafī school of law, who
are generally the most inclined to prioritize
30  |  Animals in Islamic Law and Muslim Culture
humans’ interests, consider any material benefit a
valid justification for killing nonhuman animals.
Thus, even though Islamic law generally prohibits
the consumption of the flesh of predators, Ḥanafīs
allow the killing of these animals for their hides
and other useful body parts. In wars, some Ḥanafī
jurists allow Muslim soldiers to kill the enemy’s
livestock even when they do not intend to con-
sume the flesh, provided, of course, that they
believe this measure serves the interests of the
Muslim army. In contrast, Shāfiʿī jurists insist on
the impermissibility of killing animals for reasons
other than food or self-defense. Some Shāfiʿīs not
only insist that in wars Muslims are allowed to
kill animals only to satisfy their hunger and ward
off danger, but also go to great lengths to argue
against the opposite view, invoking the principles
of nonhuman animals’ inviolability and the pro-
hibition of inflicting unauthorized pain on them.
The use of animal parts and products for me-
dicinal purposes is typically examined in the light
of dietary laws, even when the medication in
question is not for oral consumption. Discussions
of this topic often consider whether a given pro-
hibited product may become permissible if it is
prescribed as a medication. Jurists generally ac-
commodate these medical needs, except if the
product consists of a body part of a swine or a
human being. Some, however, are reticent to allow
the use of any prohibited substance, invoking a
Prophetic report to the effect that God did not
place healing properties in prohibited substances.
Muslims are also allowed to kill animals which
represent a threat to their lives, health, or prop-
erty. This position is founded on Prophetic re-
ports that recommend the killing of five animal
species, called fawāsiq (transgressors). These are
scorpions, mice, ferocious dogs, crows, and kites.
As with the permissibility of killing for food,
however, many jurists expand the Prophetic
teachings through the principle of analogy to in-
clude all animals that are deemed to be harmful,
including ones that the Prophet expressly in-
structed Muslims not to kill, such as ants.
Many jurists, however, emphasize that the per-
missibility of killing any animal is contingent on
having the right intention. Some jurists disallow
the killing even of animals the meat of which is
permissible if the consumption of their flesh is
not the primary intended objective. Similarly, in
the opinion of some it is permissible to kill harm-
ful animals only if one intends to prevent their
harmfulness. To kill an animal in vain, including
the species that the Prophet expressly allowed
Muslims to kill, is prohibited. From these atti-
tudes it is possible to see that although Islamic
law did not prohibit killing, the lives of non-
human animals was still a matter of deep concern
to Muslim jurists.
The well-being of living animals was a matter
of even greater concern. This attitude can be de-
duced primarily from the strict prohibition of
mutilation and animal fights. Furthermore, al-
though all schools of law allow Muslims to use
animals of service and to consume animal prod-
ucts, they often stipulate that none of these can be
done in ways that may compromise the well-being
of these animals. Thus, Muslims are allowed to
use camels and equine for transportation, but
they are disallowed from overburdening them
with weight and work. Islamic law stipulates that
owners of domestic animals must allow lambkins,
calves, and other small animals to get their fill of
their mothers’ milk before humans consume any.
These obligations extend even to animals from
which humans do not derive any benefit. For in-
stance, the Mālikī scholar al-Dardīr (d. 1786) says
that if a blind cat establishes itself in someone’s
house, that person may not chase it away, since
the cat is unable to look after itself. The owner of
the house then must provide for and look after
the needs of this animal.
Expectedly, there are important differences be-
tween schools of law in this respect. For instance,

for Ḥanafī jurists, failure to feed one’s animals
adequately is religious, but not legal. As such, it
entails accountability only in the hereafter. For
jurists from the other schools, however, such
failure entails legal liability as well, which may
amount to losing one’s animals to government
­institutions. Moreover, when there is a conflict of
interests many of these protections are sacrificed.
For example, although all jurists agree on the
impermissibility of burning animals alive, if one’s
comfort is seriously compromised by the pres-
ence of bedbugs and is unable to do away with
their harm in less cruel ways, as a last resort many
jurists would allow that person to burn the ­insects
alive. While making these concessions, however,
jurists typically continue to emphasize their ex-
ceptional nature.
The qualification of certain liabilities as legal
rather than religious should not be interpreted as
something that materialized into considerable
concrete results, but this was not a meaningless
distinction either. Although it is justified to sug-
gest that many violations could hardly be moni-
tored, those which occurred in public spaces fell
under the jurisdiction of the market inspec­
tor (muḥtasib), who was charged, among other
things, to keep an eye on the treatment of ani-
mals. Among this official’s responsibilities was
ordering donkey drivers to lighten the burdens of
these animals if he estimated that they were over-
loaded, banning people from burning lice alive,
and, more generally, ascertaining that nonhuman
animals were treated well.
Contemporary Muslim jurists are faced with a
set of unprecedented challenges. Besides the sig-
nificant social and political changes which re-
sulted in the disappearance of institutions that
used to provide care and protection for many spe-
cies, Muslim societies have incorporated many
institutions, practices, and values that reflect little
concern for the well-being of nonhuman ani-
mals. These new developments have shaped the
Animals in Islamic Law and Muslim Culture  |  31
legal discourse. Although Muslim jurists still pro­
scribe mutilation and unjustified killing, they are
generally more willing to sacrifice the interests of
nonhuman animals for humans’ sake.
Animals in Muslim Culture. As is the case
with other traditions, Muslims take variegated
interest in other animals. Ṣūfīs often display to­
ward them a level of sensitivity that goes beyond
legal requirements. Works of zoology reflect a
fascination with their physical and psychological
constitutions. Works of Qurʾānic exegesis go so
far as to assign them rationality, accountability,
and morality. Theological texts address questions
such as animal suffering and resurrection. Some
fables borrow animal voices to discuss the plights
of nonhuman animals rather than of human
beings. The limited scope of this entry focuses
this section’s discussion on only a few disciplines
and works.
Biographical works often present kindness
toward animals as a distinctive feature of the
pious and the generous. Numerous anecdotes in
works of this genre depict Ṣūfīs sharing their
food with other animals, treating sick beasts,
and freeing caged birds. Some Ṣūfīs are careful
to treat other animals with dignity, abstaining
from using harsh or disrespectful language with
them. When harmed by insects, many pious
Muslims chose to drive them away through re-
pellent herbs and potions or through prayers.
Because of these attitudes, nonhuman animals
are often depicted as trusting Ṣūfīs to the exclu-
sion of others. Indeed, in Ṣūfī literature the trust
of another animal is often interpreted as a sign
of a person’s piety. These themes not only point
to Ṣūfīs’ unique closeness to the animal world,
they also show that Ṣūfīs hold other animals in
high esteem.
Ṣūfīs’ views of animals, however, are not without
negative associations. Although some are careful
not to deride nonhuman creatures, others hold
prejudiced views about them. What some Ṣūfīs
32  |  Animals in Islamic Law and Muslim Culture
hold to be base psychological drives are often
identified with animal characteristics. Nonhuman
animals, particularly dogs and pigs, are thus rep-
resentative of the inferior and immoral side of
human nature.
Works of zoology adopt a combined rational
and spiritual approach to animals. Motivated by
the Qurʾānic invitation to ponder the natural
world, authors of such works study animals in
their capacities as signs of creation. One of the
best known examples of this genre is al-Jāḥiẓ’s
(d. 869) Kitāb al-ḥayawān (The Book of Animals),
in which the author discusses the skills, constitu-
tions, and special features of hundreds of species
with the aim of proving God’s existence and il-
lustrating His attributes of perfection, wisdom,
and compassion toward the entire creation. An
­equally well-known work is ʿAllāmah Kamāl
al-Dīn al-Damīrī’s (d. 1405) Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān al-
kubrā (The Comprehensive Source on the Lives
of Animals). This is an alphabetically arranged
lexicon on animals written with the purpose of
correcting misconceptions about them that, the
author maintains, have become prevalent during
his days. The approach of both authors resulted in
fairly informed views and detailed knowledge
about the animal world. The descriptions they
provide of other species’ behaviors and character-
istics are often, though not always, anchored in
close personal observation and Greek literature,
particularly Aristotle’s writings on animals.
Despite a clear sense of fascination, these works
still point to an underlying anthropocentric world-
view. For example, al-Jāḥiz is amazed at ants’ ca-
pacity of carrying one hundred times the equiva-
lent of their own weight and mastering refined
skills that seem to denote complex mental skills.
Despite this, human beings stand above these and
other animals, he holds, because of their ration-
ality. The prominent Shīʿī scholar ʿAllāmah al-
Majlisī (d. 1700) expresses similar ­amazement at
the meticulous creation of nonhuman animals.
He finds in the proportion, perfection, beauty,
and skills that many species possess a clear ex-
pression of God’s grace. The recipients of this
grace, however, are not the nonhuman animals,
but rather human beings for whose sake, al-
Majlisī maintains, God created these animals.
The most remarkable work on animals in pre-
modern Arabic, Islamic, and perhaps world liter-
ature is Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s epistle The Case of the
Animals versus Man Before the King of the Jinn.
This narrative consists of a fictional legal suit in
which nonhuman animal characters dexterously
use scriptural and rational arguments to refute
humans’ claims to a superior status. Remarkably,
characters on both sides of the dispute cite mainly
the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth in support of their
claims, yet nonhuman animals’ nonanthropocen-
tric reading of these two texts is consistently more
persuasive. Time and again human beings are
forced to admit defeat.
Their dexterity notwithstanding, nonhuman
animals lose their case. This outcome is reached
when human beings argue that they are the only
species that will be resurrected after death and
will continue to live eternally thereafter in utter
heavenly bliss, thanks to the intercession of the
Prophet Muḥammad on their behalf. It is remark-
able that, contrary to other scriptural arguments
invoked in this fable, this one hardly has any basis
in Islamic scriptural texts. Obviously, this unex-
pected turn of events continues to disappoint and
puzzle readers. In spite of its unhappy end, how-
ever, this epistle still represents an admirable
attempt at questioning anthropocentric presump-
tions and challenging humans’ self-perceptions.
Assessment. Like the members of other soci-
eties, Muslims assign to the human race a privi-
leged status that they generally justify by humans’
superior rational faculties. Many have also in-
terpreted the scriptural authorizations to make
certain uses of other species as a divine acknowl-
edgement of humans’ uniqueness. Combined with

innate instincts of survival at the individual and
species levels, these ideas often resulted in the
prioritization of humans’ interests at the expense
of the interests of other animals.
On the other hand, premodern Muslim societ-
ies did not push nonhuman animals to a drasti-
cally lower status. Indeed, many texts often hold
them in high esteem due to their assumed spir-
itual nature. Furthermore, in spite of some at-
tempts to prioritize the interests of humans, the
overall tradition remains uniquely attentive to
the well-being of other animals. The protections
it accorded them may still fall short of satisfying
all modern sensitivities; however, the mere fact
that Muslim jurists took painstaking effort to reg-
ulate humans’ uses of other animals, in an epoch
when human societies could hardly survive
without such uses, is a clear indication of this re-
markable attention.
Bibliography
Primary Works
Māwardī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-. Al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr fī fiqh
madhhab al-imām al-Shāfiʿī [The Comprehensive
Book in Shafiʿī Jurisprudence]. 20 vols. Edited by
ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd
al-Mawjūd. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994.
Qarāfī, Shihāb al-Dīn al-. Al-Dhakhīra [The Treasure].
14 vols. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥajjī, Muḥammad bū
Khubza, and Saʿīd Aʿrāb. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1994.
Sarakhsī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-. Al-Mabsūṭ
[The Manifest (Book)]. 30 vols. Beirut: Dār al-
Maʿrifa, 1993.
Ṣāwī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-. Bulghat al-sālik li-
aqrab al-masālik [The Wayfarer’s Journey to the
Shortest Path]. 4 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, n.d.
Secondary Works
Bousquet, G. H. “Des Animaux et de leur traitement
selon le Judaisme, le Chrisitanisme et l’Islam.” Studia
Islamica 9 (1958): 31–48.
Foltz, Richard. Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim
Cultures. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.
Anqarawī, Ismāʿīl  |  33
Foltz, Richard. “This She-Camel of God Is a Sign to
You: Dimensions of Animals in Islamic Tradi-
tion and Muslim Culture.” In A Communion of
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pp. 149–159. New  York: Columbia University
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Sarra Tlili
Anqarawī, Ismāʿīl  (d. 1631 ce), a
great theologian-scholar, illuminationist-philos-
opher, and the most eminent commentator on
Rūmī’s Mathnawī. Born Ismāʿīl Anqarawī ibn
Aḥmad Rusūkh al-Dīn al-Bayrāmī al-Mawlawī,
and often referred to as Ismāʿīl Dede or Ismāʿīl
Rusūkhī, Anqarawī was a descendant of a pious
family associated with the Bayrāmī Ṣūfī order. As
the name suggests, he was born in Ankara, where
he received his early Islamic education from his
father, Aḥmad, a recognized local imam, and also
learned the Arabic and Persian languages from
several town scholars. With the aim of advancing
in the formal sciences of Islamic tradition, such
as tafsīr, ḥadīth, kalām, fiqh, and ḥikmah, he had
traveled to Egypt around 1599 and remained there,
fully engaged in the pursuit of those sciences,
until 1606. At some point during his seven-year
sojourn in Egypt, he became actively involved
with the religious authorities and muftis (juris-
consults) of Cairo in the resolution of certain
legal disputes. Soon after completing his studies,
Anqarawī returned to Ankara, where he began
to pursue vigorous spiritual training according
to the precepts of the Bayrāmī mystical order. He
eventually received an ijāzah (certificate of au-
thorization) that entitled him to become the
chief-master (shaykh) of the order. He is also