You are on page 1of 18

Introduction

Humanity, in this age of globalization, is far more interconnected than any point of its

history. This age of globalization – characterized by great innovations – has given mankind the

capability to bridge continents, achieve prosperity, and communicate efficiently with one

another. In effect, different values, ideas and interests are gradually transcending from the

boundaries of their own cultures and forming what seems to be an international society – a global

community characterized by openness, understanding and respect. One might then come into the

conclusion that the world is approaching the end of history, wherein the consciousness of

mankind has finally reached its actuality. But such conclusion is dangerously naïve as it is

divorced entirely from reality.

Concluding that a cosmopolitan community would necessarily emerge from an

interconnected world is purely being misled. Such thinking presupposes that the kind of

interconnection that humanity is experiencing through the process of globalization that

transcends physical and ideological realities. Thereby a common understanding is possible

through such ‘progressive’ outlook towards the world. And this spirit of ‘progressiveness’ will

inevitably culminate with the formation of a cosmopolitan society. But in reality our globalized

world is far from being a utopian community. Our globalized world is in truth a dystopian one,

ultimately constituted not by a transcendental but rather trendsetting dominant cultures.

Humanity – in its aim to establish a peaceful utopian world grounded on mutual

understanding among human beings – had opened the global arena through the process of

globalization to the hegemonic clash of cultures. It seems to be inevitable since if humanity

wants to have a common way of relating with each other the only way of realizing it is to have a

sole hegemonic global culture that will determine what is that ‘common’ way. But the
hegemonic culture only emerges from a fierce competition for hegemony of mankind’s cultures

as each of them exemplifies their own ‘superiority’ and imposes their valuations of reality on

others. And in their pursuit for hegemony, their spheres of influence inevitably absorb every

individual as pawns of their demands. This entangles individuals’ very existence to their

demands in a way that their own receptivity becomes assimilated to the “understanding” they

define. Nonetheless if that hegemonic competition did really establish a cosmopolitan

community under one hegemonic culture then it would seem acceptable however it failed.

Reality unveils a globalized world paradoxically far from having such utopian community. An

individual as long as they are assimilated within the influence of a certain dominant global

culture can only truly understand other individuals who share that culture. ‘Understanding’

imposed by dominant global cultures will only be absorbing but never be encompassing.

Therefore this hegemonic competition among cultures will either culminate in their

successful incorporation into a cosmopolitan society under the hegemony of a triumphant culture

or will intensify as their different values clash and radicalize one another. Clash of cultures is

seemingly the future of the global landscape. In this clash of different cultures not only

humanity’s pursuit for a common understanding is severely constrained but also at the same time

by being absorbed by the “common” understanding of its globalized cultures the individual has

fallen away from his own self-understanding.

How then the individual can emancipate himself from this senseless clash of cultures?

And how can he change the increasingly condescending understanding of our cultures into such

kind that is actually inclusive and cooperative? These are the questions that plague the

philosophy of international relations. This essay shall be reflecting upon these questions through

Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy. This essay divides its philosophical reflection into three
parts, (1) Authenticity – this part reflects on the transformation of the existence of the individual

from being inauthentic to an authentic one, (2) Understanding – this part discusses how the

authentic individual transcends the intersubjectivity of the ‘They’ to form a new kind of

intersubjective relations that cultivates authenticity, and (3) Humanity – this part confronts the

challenge in realizing authentic intersubjectivity – the problem of beginning anew.

Part I. Authenticity

(Individual’s Emancipation from Global Inauthenticity)

The world, now in its globalized form, has highlighted quite fascinatingly the different

ways of life of humanity. Individuals through various channels of communication are being

opened up to the world itself. Cultures – no longer bounded geographically and sociologically –

are now transcending across the world, interacting with other cultures. This phenomenon of

cultural interaction appears to gradually turn the world into a great melting pot that emancipates

the individual from the totalizing grip of his own native culture. In effect, such global

phenomenon of cultural diffusion gives every human being the freedom to ‘choose’ what way of

life he wants to live. No culture has now the monopoly over his existence.

The diffusion of ideas and values of various cultures into the global arena has indeed

insinuated cultural interaction but it does not always end in cultures embracing each other’s

differences. Most often it ends in inter-cultural hostilities and conflicts. This is due to the

inherent totalizing characteristic of our cultures that stems from their ontological definition of

truth and falsity, and creates the “we and the others” perception of the world. And globalization

has given cultures the opportunity to demonstrate their ‘ontological correctness’ and achieve
cultural hegemony across the globe. This phenomenon, as Samuel Huntington pointed, will

culminate into a clash of civilizations.

Cultural globalization frees us to choose a life we want to live but at the same time it

forces us to choose a way of life due to the hegemonic competition that makes it impossible to

escape assimilation. Thus one way or another, in this global phenomenon of hegemonic clash of

cultures, we cannot not choose for sooner or later, willingly or unwillingly, our existence will be

absorbed by either one of them. The ‘They’ will inevitably consume our existence in this

increasingly globalized world. As a consequence, humanity’s existence falls into what Heidegger

calls as “inauthenticity”.

Inauthenticity, as Heidegger defines it, is a mode of existence in which the individual has

been so consumed by the trends of the dominant culture of his society (also called by Heidegger

as the ‘They’) that he lacks the sense of deciding on his own what to do with his own life.1 But

now with the phenomenon of cultural globalization, the concept of inauthenticity turns global.

The trends an individual adhere may not now necessarily be of his society but trends that

emanate from an already dominant culture in the global arena – the globalized ‘They’. But

nonetheless the consequence is more or less the same. His thinking is intensely wired to the logic

of a globally popular ‘They’ that he already forgets his own capacity to live his own in his own

terms. Thus his actions reflect not his own conscious decisions but that of the demands of the

dominant culture in which he along with other individuals in his society or in other societies

across the world is absorbed into.

But is it the individual’s fault to fall into inauthenticity? Given that he lives already in a

world where cultures clash for hegemony, it seems inevitable that he will be absorbed by one of

the cultures diffused in the global arena. This apparent given condition in human existence is

1 Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 223-228


what Heidegger calls “thrownness”. Thrownness is the historical, social and existential

conditions in which the individual finds himself and these conditions constrain him in fully

shaping his own life thereby making him realize that his self is a determinate self, which means

his choices of what kind of being he can be is limited. 2 Such existential condition does not

necessarily entail immediate inauthenticity supposedly but considering the contemporary

condition of cultural globalization, it seems that one way or another the individual has to kowtow

to a certain culture. Inauthenticity appears to be inevitable in a world where the ‘Theys’ compete

for global hegemony.

Nonetheless Heidegger believes that the way out of our inauthentic existence comes from

our own selves – the call of conscience. The call of conscience is the call that brings the feeling

of guilt caused by our conformism with the ‘They’, and demands the individual to take charge of

his own life. But in an inauthentic existence, our way of thinking can be so absorbed by the

culture that our psyche becomes that of the culture itself. So if our conscience is calling us, it

may appear to be from our own being but ultimately it is a subtle call from the ‘They’ itself. Our

conscience therefore acts as an instrument of our culture to make us conform to its demands. But

of course we are now in the era where the knowledge of cultural diversity is present thus we are

no longer constrain to the culture where are thrown into. However as argued earlier, this

diversity emancipates us from one culture but it forces us to choose another. This means that in a

globalized world, one’s call of conscience may not now be from his own culture but from

another globally dominant one – his freedom from the demands of the culture he was thrown into

costs him a life of servitude to the demands of another.

Thus it is only a romantic idea that our self-awareness comes ultimately from our own

selves because of the given contemporary global reality that shows that even our selves is not

2 Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 204-211


ours but of the globalized ‘Theys’. The consequence of that seemingly inability of individuals to

escape the hegemonic grip of cultures is that their understanding of the world is limited to the

ontology that their cultures impose on them – they only see the truth in their own ‘world’ and

understand only those people who share that world. Nonetheless we see this limitation, due to the

totalizing characteristic of our cultures, as already the completeness of reality. And the

“completeness” of our culture gives us a sense of transcendence but in reality it is what can be

called as “hegemonic transcendence” – the delusion that we are now able to see the world in-

itself but in truth we see it only through the lens of our culture. Hegemonic transcendence

compels us to own the world in the name of ‘They’ we serve as if our view of reality is the truth

and others’ interpretations of it are misguided. And in the process of doing so, our interactions

with one another become dominating, assimilating and ultimately conflictual. However such

interaction, geared towards total dominance, is also at the same time severs our connection with

our own source of meaning – our own very culture – as we demean one another’s values and

assimilate each other’s worlds. This then leads to an ontological breakdown called

“worldlessness”.

Worldlessness is an existential condition caused by one’s alienation from ‘They’ and

wherein every meaning that the he holds dear becomes meaningless. Thus worldlessness is like

an “ontological limbo”. Such existential condition is caused by the demeaning actions of culture-

driven humanity that deprive persons of their own values in life thus consequently separating

them from the world they lived in.3 But if we come to think of it, it is through the existential state

of worldlessness that an individual truly frees himself from the inauthenticity of our time. It is in

this condition, where everything has become meaningless and only Death becomes certain, the

individual is fully individuated from the ‘Theys’. However this individuation comes with the

3 Existential Utopia, 36-39


price of being confronted by the Angst, the feeling of dread. Angst compels him to either re-

impose into the world more intensely the meanings that had been deprived from him or to accept

his mortality and own up his life thereby making his existence authentic.

Authenticity is a mode of existence in which the individual is able to interpret his own

life however not like that of Nietzsche’s “ubermensch” ideology wherein the individual is the

sole creator of the meanings of his world. We cannot do that because as Heidegger pointed out,

we are beings-thrown-into-the-world and beings-with-others, which means that we always find

ourselves in a certain conditions of reality and one fundamental existential condition is that we

live with other individuals with certain cultures – the ‘They’ – and we live our daily lives by

engaging with them. The ‘They’ and our activities with them therefore is a primordial existential

condition. Thus being able to interpret our own existence lies in the deeper participation with the

‘Theys’ of our globalized world, which enables us to see the ‘They’ not as masters but as

fellowmen that will help us realize our goals and potentials thereby enabling us to define our

own life. Thus the ‘They’ can be a source of inauthenticity but also of authenticity. But having a

deeper participation with the ‘They’ means being critical of our own participation itself.4 This

critical outlook towards our engagement with the ‘Theys’ enables us to break away from our

conformity with the absorbing trends. However this critical outlook towards our cultures is only

possible within the neutrality of the state of wordlessness. Thus we become authentic but at the

same time we fall into a seemingly solipsistic existence. But in such existence, our authenticity

has no value at all. Authenticity achieves its actuality by having an emancipative value that can

only be if it can be demonstrated in our engagement with the ‘They’. But how then do we

participate with the world but at the same being critical about it? How do authentic beings re-

engage with the world and make a difference?

4 Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 228-231


Part II. Understanding

(Formation of Cooperative Relations with Others)

The first part leaves us with two controversial problems, (1) Does the achievement of

authenticity necessitates demeaning experiences of separation from the meanings we hold dear?

(2) How can an authentic individual from the state of worldlessness re-emerge himself into the

conflict-ridden world of the ‘Theys’ and confront the challenges of fully realizing his

authenticity? We will answer these two questions in this second part of the essay as we built up

the philosophical discourse of how authenticity leads humanity into cooperative, inclusive and

transcendent understanding.

First that must be discussed is the re-emergence of an individual’s consciousness from

the state of worldlessness back into the world of the ‘They’. It must be pointed out that the

individuation that occurs within the state of wordlessness does lead to a solipsistic state of

consciousness but we must differentiate it from the solipsism of Descartes. The Cartesian

solipsism is an epistemological solipsism, which presupposes that the consciousness of the

individual is all that can be known and other minds do not simply exist. This means that the price

of being authentic is that we severe totally our relations with others. But as Heidegger has

pointed out, we live with the ‘They’ and sooner or later we will have to engage with them in

order to continue with our lives. The kind of solipsism that occurs within the state of

worldlessness is an existential solipsism, which emerges from one’s break from common

understanding of the ‘They’ and the anxiety that comes with it.5 It is a condition in which the

consciousness itself is devoid of any entanglement not with the ‘They’ itself but with the

demands of the ‘They’ – we are no longer mere slaves of our culture. Thus such solipsism does

not constrain us from interacting with the world but it does enable us to be critical in our

5 The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s Concept of Solus Ipse, 1-14; Critique & Disclosure, 43-48
interactions with it. So this means that through the existential state of worldlessness, the

individual achieves his authenticity as he re-engage himself with the world of the ‘Theys’ in a

critical attitude.

Now as the authentic individual reemerges in the world of the globalized ‘Theys’, his

authenticity cannot be fully actualize and can quickly fall into inauthenticity if his participation

and engagement with the hegemonic ‘Theys’ lacks criticality. If he is critical, he will be able to

realize that the world is made up different spheres of realities of different globalized ‘Theys’.

And each of their spheres of realities has their own common understanding that is ultimately

rooted in their ontology. The ‘Theys’ operate through an inauthentic intersubjectivity, a mode of

relation that traps individuals in the dangerous delusion that he possesses an encompassing

understanding of the world, but in truth he can only truly understand those who share his culture.

But how then can he – an authentic individual – relate with these people without being absorbed

by their cultures? Nonetheless he must be able to relate with these people for they are crucial in

his pursuit of self-actualization.

Considering the absorbing tendency of inauthenticity, the only way an authentic

individual can relate with culture-constrained individuals is that he must be able to emancipate

them from the shackling demands of their cultures in order for them to realize their authenticity.

Only then he can relate to them without being absorbed into inauthenticity. And this relation

between authentic individuals that leads to a mutual understanding in which one sees the other as

a part of his pursuit of actualizing his own being. This then brings forth an authentic

intersubjectivity.6

Positive solicitude is a unique ability of an authentic individual. This kind of relation

enables him to free another individual from an inauthentic existence. Thus the inauthentic

6 The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s Concept of Solus Ipse, 1-14; Critique & Disclosure, 43-48
individual does not have to go through demeaning experiences just to question his own culture.

However, Heidegger is careful to differentiate two kinds of positive solicitude, (a) coercive, and

(b) emancipative.7 Positive solicitude becomes coercive when the authentic individual dictates to

the inauthentic individual what he must or must not concern himself with. It takes away a

fundamental character of a human being and that is being a being-of-care. Thus in such coercive

solicitude, the authentic individual ultimately acts as an external force that separates the

individual that he is relating with from the culture that had given that individual meaning. This

leads to the situation wherein the individual is individuated in the state of worldlessness that can

only end into two scenarios, it may be either realize his authenticity or vengefully re-impose his

culture on the authentic individual. Given the possibility of vengeful retribution, such kind of

solicitude is flawed and ineffective in bringing about others’ authenticity. On the other hand,

positive solicitude becomes emancipative when the authentic individual demonstrates rather than

dictates how can the inauthentic individual himself be free – it is like becoming a role model to

other people. This demonstration of authenticity discloses and deformalizes the latent hegemonic

power structures of the inauthentic individual’s culture that inevitably opens his awareness to a

new level and clears the way for his own realization of his own authenticity. 8

With authentic individuals being able to emancipate others, the formation of a mutual

understanding is now possible. But what makes it distinctive from others is that the mutuality of

the understanding comes not from any hegemonic culture but entirely from the individual itself.

Thus this authentic intersubjectivity operates not on the basis of coercion but of cooperation of

7 Being and Time, 158–159/122


8 Although Heidegger’s idea of positive solicitude is problematic since we have no way of determining if the other is
really authentic or not. The other’s internalization of the demonstration of an authentic individual of his authenticity
does not always entail that he realizes his own inauthenticity and thereby pave the way to his authenticity. Because
according to Copeland (2000) there are three degrees of internalization, (1) internalization out of fear, coercion or
pressure, (2) internalization out of self-interests, and (3) internalization out of conscious recognition and voluntary
acceptance.
authentic individuals. Nevertheless the primary criticism on such philosophical discourse is that

it only deconstructs and does not construct anything transformative. By divorcing themselves

from the normative structures of their cultures, the relationship of authentic individuals is

confronted by the problem of beginning anew. What values should be created, adopted and

discarded in order to build a culture, which will realize, cultivate and sustain cooperative

relations and authenticity? What global system that will enable the authenticity of whole of

humanity?

Part III. Humanity

(Structuring the Global Community of Free Authentic Individuals)

This part of the essay looks into the difficult and controversial problem that our

philosophical discourse faces – the problem of beginning anew. This problem in essence, and

with the consideration of the contemporary global reality, poses the question of how do we put

into reality this cooperative kind of intersubjectivity in a world plagued by hegemonic

competition. The problem of beginning anew is a normative problem that arises in the

individuation of the individual and the creation of an authentic intersubjectivity. 9 With our

existence being divorced from the old relational structure of our cultures, what normative

structure will then arise from the intersubjective relationship of authentic individuals?

The problem of beginning anew can be divided into three central issues, (1) ontological:

there are no objective criteria in evaluating what normative structure is better than the other, (2)

political: there are no political systems that can really be devoid of an ideology due to the fact

that it gives the system stability and order, (3) ethical: the question of where does the moral

responsibility of a free authentic individual lies. The essay will first discuss the ontological issue

9 Critique & Disclosure, 8-13


concerning the lack of normativity since the political and ethical questions ultimately require a

normative framework to be answered.

In the ontological level, one of the seemingly challenges of finding a common normative

structure is that in an authentic intersubjective relationship the incorrigible truth is that no

authentic individual has the monopoly of what truth is and no one can impose his or her own

truth on others. Among authentic individuals, no ontology is true for all ontologies are true in

their own right. Thus the criteria of each free individuals of evaluating reality are

incommensurable and relativistic. But it can be argued that the fundamental normative

framework that will arise from an authentic intersubjective relationship lies not exactly from the

wisdom of the authentic individuals themselves but on the phenomenon that brings about such

relativistic condition wherein no truth can fully monopolize the Truth of reality. Authentic

intersubjectivity can only be such if there is a mutual recognition of authenticity. And that

mutual recognition stems from the fact that the authenticity of the other is crucial to our own

authenticity because as argued earlier our authenticity can only be fully realized if we are

relating with another authentic being – they are part of our pursuit of self-realization. And by

recognizing each other’s authenticity, we in effect recognize each other’s freedom to determine

one’s own life and its importance to each of us. Therefore, if we come to think of it, the meta-

criterion that will serve as the common ontological structure of authentic intersubjectivity is the

freedom of being authentic.

This meta-criterion then provides authentic individuals the normative basis of

constructing a socio-political system that will fully materialize authentic intersubjectivity into

reality. Because of their mutual recognition of each other’s freedom, it drives authentic

individuals to create necessary conditions (creation of norms and institutions) that will facilitate
the continuous realization of their freedom. Thus the freedom that they had come to feel through

authentic intersubjectivity unites them into committing themselves to cooperate for the

proliferation and preservation of their freedom. And in the process of cooperating with one

another, by aiming for the development of each other’s freedom, they become more receptive of

the needs of the individuals for self-expression. Thus the socio-political system that will emerge

from authentic intersubjectivity is reflective of the meta-criterion, which is grounded on the

mutual recognition of authenticity of the individual and the freedom to exercise it. Freedom to

become and be authentic is the meta-ideology of this socio-political system.

But what kind of socio-political system is that? Is it liberalism? Liberalism appears to

resemble the socio-political system that emerges from authentic intersubjectivity but nonetheless

it permits a certain political entity, the State, to have the monopoly of force over individuals.

Thus even though the individuals themselves has the political power, by the fact that there is an

entity that has been legitimized to use force whenever individual freedom is “compromised”,

their freedom can be sacrifice for the enigmatic phrase “for the greater good” – for the freedom

of the whole. But if we come to think freedom is not an object that can be measured, there is no

lesser or greater freedom, thus if the freedom of an authentic individual is compromised then the

freedom of other authentic individuals within the authentic intersubjective community is also

compromised. Furthermore by creating an entity that has the monopoly of violence, we are

giving up our authenticity, our power to determine our own destiny, resolve matters and regulate

order cooperatively together with other authentic individuals. Authentic individuals’ socio-

political system operates radically through self-regulation. Therefore it is not a liberal but an

anarchist socio-political system that will emerge from authentic intersubjectivity. Anarchism in

its individualistic form ultimately reflects the meta-criterion for (1) it does not have any ideology
but only the ideology that no ideology is legitimate enough to be imposed, and (2) it is places

importance on the beliefs that an individual adheres to therefore to some extent open to cultures

but not to their demands.10 Anarchism is the socio-political system of a free community.

Along side with an anarchical socio-political system, the ethical system that will emerge

in the free community of authentic individuals will be then be grounded on the obligation of

ensuring that the freedom of individuals is secured together with the needs that will positively

realize and enhance it. We acquire the obligation to ensure individual freedom when our

consciousness becomes part of an authentic intersubjectivity – which is the moment that we

realize that the other authentic individuals are part of our pursuit for self-actualization – that then

binds us to the obligation of preserving their freedom to be authentic individuals.

Having reflected on the three main issues of the problem of beginning anew, we have

now to put our realizations in the context of the globalized contemporary world. Can authentic

intersubjectivity be manifested in a global level thereby culminate into a free cosmopolitan

community of humanity? Yes it can and will attain a cosmopolitan character because the scope

of authentic intersubjectivity – due to its primacy on individuality and openness – is inevitably

and radically inclusive thus it cannot be contained in a communal, regional or national level,

sooner or later its scope will be global. And from this cosmopolitan understanding will arise a

global community that is anarchic in nature and regulated not by any dominant hegemonic

cultures but of humanity itself and its pursuit for authenticity.

Conclusion

The world has been increasingly more dangerous as globalization has opened up the

global arena to the hegemonic competition of cultures – clash of civilizations. Without a

cosmopolitan understanding based on cooperation, receptivity and authenticity, humanity is

10 http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_anarchism.html
doomed to fall into an endless cycle of hatred, as it becomes a slave to the hegemonic aspirations

of its cultures driving it to commit horrendous acts against its own self, tearing itself apart

leaving only cold vengeance as its only meaning. The world can only know peace if humanity

realizes its authenticity. This whole philosophical discourse might seem to be naively utopian by

positing the possibility of the authenticity of humanity but nonetheless its realization starts from

the realization of our own.

References

 Copeland, Dale C. "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay."

International Security. Vol. 25. N.p.: MIT, 2000. 187-212. Print.

 Guignon, Charles B. "Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy." The Cambridge

Companion to Heidegger. N.p.: Cambridge UP, 1993. 215-40. Print.

 Guignon, Charles B. "Chapter 7: Death, Time, History: Division II of Being and Time." The

Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. N.p.: Cambridge UP, 1993. 195-213. Print.

 Ha, Peter. "The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Heidegger’s Concept of Solus Ipse." (n.d.): 1-

14. Web. 3 Nov. 2015.

<http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/rih/phs/events/200405_PEACE/papers/PeterHa.pdf>.

 Kompridis, Nikolas. "Chapter 1: What Is Critical Theory For?" Critique and Disclosure:

Critical Theory between Past and Future. Cambridge, Massachusets, London: Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, 2006. 3-30. Print.

 Kompridis, Nikolas. "Chapter 2: Dependent Freedom” Critique and Disclosure: Critical

Theory between Past and Future. Cambridge, Massachusets, London: Massachusetts Institute

of Technology, 2006. 43-81. Print.


 Viera, Patricia. "Existential Utopia: Of the World, the Possible, the Finite." Existential

Utopia: New Perspectives on Utopian Thought. By Michael Marder. New York: Continuum

International Group, 2012. 35-50. Print.


University of the Philippines Diliman

The Authenticity of Humanity

(An Existentialist Analysis of Human Relations in a Globalized World)

Luis Jacob Retanan

Philo 114

Prof. Manaloto

December 10, 2015

You might also like