India's 2009 Elections - Prof Paul Wallace

List of Tables and Figures
India’s 2009 Elections

ii India’s 2009 Elections
List of Tables and Figures iii

Coalition Politics, Party Competition,
and Congress Continuity
Edited by
Paul Wallace
Ramashray Roy
Copyright
iv © Paul Wallace and Ramashray
India’s 2009 ERoy, 2011
lections
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India’s 2009 elections: coalition politics, party competition, and Congress
continuity/edited by Paul Wallace, Ramashray Roy.
â•…â•…â•‡ p. cm.
â•… Includes bibliographical references and index.
â•… 1. Elections—India. 2. India. Parliament. Lok Sabha—Elections, 2009.
3. India—Politics and government—1977–â•… I. Wallace, Paul, 1931–â•…
II. Roy, Ramashray.
JQ292.I588â•…â•…â•…â•‡ 324.954'0532—dc22â•…â•…â•…â•‡ 2011â•…â•…â•…â•‡ 2011008746
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List of Tables and Figures v
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
List of Tables and Figures vii
Contents
List of Tables and Figures ix

List of Abbreviations xiii
Preface xvii
PART I: Thematic Studies

1. Introduction: Political Stability and Governance Coherence 3
Paul Wallace
2. Regional Base and National Dream:
Alliance Formation, 2009 National Elections 21
Ramashray Roy
3. Coalition Politics: Withering of National–Regional
Ideological Positions? 42
Pramod Kumar
4. Region, Representation, and National Cohesion:
Public Space in India 64
Jyotirindra Dasgupta
5. Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes in India 94
Maneesha Roy
6. Gender Discourse in Elections: Constructing a Constituency? 110
Rainuka Dagar
7. The BSP in 2009: Still Making Progress, But Only
as a Dalit Party 140
Christophe Jaffrelot
Part II: Analytical State Studies

A.â•‡ One Favored (dominant) Party System
8. Gujarat
Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance: The 2009
Lok Sabha Elections in Gujarat 167
Ghanshyam Shah
viii India’s 2009 Elections
â•‡ 9. West Bengal

Mapping a Political Challenge: West Bengal 2009 192
Amiya K. Chaudhuri
B.â•‡Alternating Two-party Systems

10. Rajasthan
Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan: BJP Bastion Busted in 2009 217
Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat
11. Kerala
The LDF’s Debacle: Kerala Votes for National Stability 234
G. Gopa Kumar
12. Maharashtra
Maharashtra: Still a Bipolar System, But Turmoil Ahead 252
Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur
13. Karnataka
The Surge of Saffron: Some Genuine and Some Imitation? 270
14. Andhra Pradesh
Political Mobilization, Competitive Populism, and
Changing Party Dynamics in Andhra Pradesh 286
Karli Srinivasulu
C. Multi-party States
15. Bihar
Identity Politics Recycled: 2009 Lok Sabha Election in Bihar 311
Binoy Shanker Prasad
16. Jammu and Kashmir
Ethnic–Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy:
Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009 335
Praveen Krishna Swami
17. Northeast India
Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Competitive
Politics: The Case of States in Northeast India 355
Rajesh Dev
About the Editors and Contributors 394

Index 400
List of Tables and Figures ix
Tables
1.1 2009 Elections: Lok Sabha Party Results 4
1.2 2009 Elections: Coalition and Party Results 5
1.3 2009 Elections: National and State Recognized
Political Parties and Symbols 6
1.4 Support for the UPA Government in the
15th Lok Sabha 13
1.5 Leading Party Seats and Vote Percentages 1984–2009 14
1.6 State Results Lok Sabha Election 2009 15
1.7 Number of Regular and Reserved Seats in the
Lok Sabha by State, 2009 16
3.1 Performance of National and Regional Parties 45

3.2 Transfer from Center to States as Percentage of
Gross Revenue Receipts of the Center: Finance
Commission Period Average 53
3.3 Trends in Expenditure to GDP Ratio 54
3.4 Caste-wise Candidate Summary: Lok Sabha Elections,
1971–2009 55
6.1 Gender-wise Breakdown of Voters, Contestants,

and Elected Candidates in India for 1957–2009 112
6.2 Party-wise Female Candidates and Female Office
Bearers in 2009 122
6.3 Perception of Teachers from Northern India on
Women Issues Raised by Political Parties in 2009 124
7.1 BSP Vote Percentage in Seven General Elections 143

7.2 BSP Vote by State in 2009/2004
(Where It Has Crossed the 5 Percent Mark) 144
7.3 The BSP Candidates and MLAs in 2007 (2002)
in Uttar Pradesh 145
x India’s 2009 Elections
7.4 Voting Pattern of the UP Castes and Communities

in 2002 and 2007 145
7.5 Caste and Community of the BSP Candidates in
Uttar Pradesh: 2009 Lok Sabha Elections 149
7.6 Caste and Community of BSP Candidates
in Maharashtra: 2009 Lok Sabha Elections 150
7.7 Anti-incumbency Factor in UP 151
7.8 Satisfaction with Performance of UPA and BSP
Governments among UP Voters 151
7.9 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Caste and Community 152
7.10 Caste and Community of Mayawati’s Government
in 2007 154
7.11 The Dalit Vote for the BSP in Seven States 156
7.12 Congress Percent Lead over the BSP in
Different Categories of Dalits 156
7.13 The BSP Vote in UP by Caste and Community 157
7.14 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Locality 157
7.15 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Class 158
8.1 Whose Performance Was Considered while Voting

for the Lok Sabha: State or Central Government? 185
8.2 Perception of the People Regarding Improvement or
Otherwise in Gujarat between 2002–07 186
8.3 Percent Preference of 2009 Voters for the
Prime Minister after Elections 187
8.4 Vote by Class in the 2007 and 2009 Elections 188
9.1 Percent of Votes Polled by Different Parties

in Parliamentary Election 2009 in West Bengal 198
9.2 Constituency-wise Percentage Points of Valid Votes
Polled by Political Parties in Parliamentary Election
2009 in Districts of West Bengal 199
9.3 Human Development Indices of Districts in
West Bengal 202
9.4 Percentage of SC, ST, and Muslims of the Total
Population of West Bengal and Each District of
West Bengal 207
List of Tables and Figures xi
10.1 Party Results 1991–2009 223

10.2 Comparative Voting Turnouts in 2008 Assembly
and 2009 Parliamentary Elections 224
10.3 Party and Poll Percentage 2009 226
11.1 A Framework of Alliances and Parties on the

Eve of 2009 Elections 238
11.2 Vote Share and Seats of Major Alliances 239
11.3 Vote Share of Major Parties 240
11.4 Caste–Religion Wise Preference of Parties 244
11.5 Voter’s Views on SNC Lavalin Case 246
11.6 Have You Heard about the Corruption Charges
against Pinarayi Vijayan in the Lavlyn Scam? 246
11.7 Approval Rating on LDF’s Alliance with
Abdul Nassir Maudani 247
11.8 Who Should Lead the UDF in Kerala? 248
11.9 A Non-coalition View on Voter’s Party Preferences 248
11.10 Who Should Lead the LDF in Kerala:
V.S. Achutanandan or Pinarayi Vijayan? 249
12.1 Rank Order Correlations between Party Votes

and Size of Linguistic Groups: Bombay Municipal
Elections, 1985 256
12.2 Seats Contested, Won, and Share Votes of Parties 262
12.3 Seats Contested and Won by Regions 264
12.4 Share Votes of Parties by Social Background 265
13.1 Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections (2004 and 2009):

Seats Won and Share of Votes by Parties 279
13.2 Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Seats Won
Contested and Won by Administrative/Political
Regions 280
13.3 Votes of the Political Parties by Social Background
of the Voters 280
14.1 Parliamentary Electoral Profile of Parties in AP:

1984–2009 296
14.2 2009 Assembly Elections: Regional Break-up 297
14.3 Who Voted for Whom in Andhra Pradesh 298
xii India’s 2009 Elections
Figures
6.1 Party-wise Female Candidates and Member of
Parliament in 2009 123
7.1 Percentage of Votes Polled by BSP Candidates 141

7.2 Votes Polled by the Candidates of the BSP 142
8.1 BJP and Congress Votes in Lok Sabha Elections

(1991–2009) 168
8.2 BJP and Congress Votes in Assembly Elections
(1990–2007) 168
8.3 Level of Satisfaction among Voters with the
Congress-led UPA Government 187
16.1 Voter Participation in Jammu and Kashmir Assembly

Elections by District: 1996–2008 336
List of Tables and Figures xiii
List of Abbreviations
AAS Association for Asian Studies

AC Arunachal Congress
ADA Arunachal Democratic Alliance
AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AGP Assam Gana Parishad
AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
AICC All India Congress Committee
AIIMS All India Institute of Medical Sciences
AP Andhra Pradesh
APHC All Party Hurriyat Conference
AUDF Asom United Democratic Front
BAMCEF Backward and Minority Communities Employee’s
Federation
BC Backward Class
BJD Biju Janata Dal
BJP Bhartiya Janata Party
BKU Bhartiya Kisan Union
BPL Below Poverty Line
BPPF Bodoland People’s Progressive Front
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party
CDP Community Development Programme
CM Chief Minister
CNG Compressed Natural Gas
CPI Communist Party of India
CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPI(ML) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
CPI(ML)(L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
(Liberation)
CPM Communist Party Marxist
CSDS Centre for Study of Developing Societies
DAN Democratic Alliance of Nagaland
xiv India’s 2009 Elections
DIC(K) Democratic Indira Congress (Karunakaran)

DK Dakshina Kazhagam
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
DUDA Department of Underdeveloped Areas
DWCRA Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas
EBC Extreme Backward Caste
FB Forward Bloc
GSPC Gujarat State Petrochemical
HSPDP Hill State People’s Democratic Party
ICMR Indian Council of Medical Research
IFDP Indian Federation Democratic Party
INC Indian National Congress
INLD Indian National Lok Dal
INPT Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura
IOU Index of Opposition Unity
IPFT Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura
ISC Inter-state Council
IT Information Technlogy
IUML Indian Union Muslim League
J&K Jammu and Kashmir
JD(S) Janata Dal (Secular)
JD(U) Janata Dal (United)
JMM Jhakhand Mukti Morcha
JNURP Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Programme
JSM Jammu State Morcha
KC(J) Kerala Congress (Joseph)
KC(M) Kerala Congress (Mani)
KCR K.C. Rao
KPCC Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee
KYKL Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
LDF Left Democratic Front
LF Left Front
LJP Lok Janshakti Party
LS Lok Satta
MDMK Manumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
MIM Majlis Ittehad-ul Muslimeen
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly
List
List Tables
of of Abbreviations
and Figures
xv
MNF Mizo National Front

MNS Maharashtra Navnirman Sena
MP Member of Parliament
MPA Meghalaya Progressive Alliance
MPC Mizoram People’s Conference
MPP Manipur People’s Party
MRPS Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi
MUF Muslim United Front
NC National Conference
NCP Nationalist Congress Party
NCW National Commission for Women
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NDC National Development Council
NES National Election Study
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NLFT National Liberation Front of Tripura
NLHP National Loktantrik Hind Party
NNC Naga National Council
NPF Nagaland People’s Front
NREG National Rural Employment Guarantee
NREGS National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NSCN-IM National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah)
NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)
NTR N.T. Rama Rao
OBC Other Backward Caste
PDA People’s Democratic Alliance
PDP People’s Democratic Party
PDS Public Distribution System
PM Prime Minister
PMK Pattali Makkal Katchi
POTA Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act
PPP Public–Private Partnership
PRI Panchayat Raj Institution
PRP Praja Rajyam Party
RJD Rashtriya Janata Dal
RPI Republican Party of India
RSP Revolutionary Socialist Party
xvi India’s 2009 Elections
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

SAD Shiromani Akali Dal
SAIR South Asian Intelligence Review
SASB Shri Amarnath Shrine Board
SC Scheduled Caste
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SFI Students Federation of India
SHG Self Help Group
SIT Special Investigative Team
SJD Samajwadi Janata Dal
SP Samajwadi Party
SS Shiv Sena
ST Scheduled Tribe
SUC Socialist Unity Center
TDP Telugu Desam Party
TMC Trinamul Congress
TRS Telangana Rashtra Samithi
TUJS Tripura Upajati Juba Samity
UDF United Democratic Front
UDP United Democratic Party
UK United Kingdom
ULB United Left Bloc
ULFA United Liberation Front of Asom
UN United Nations
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UP Uttar Pradesh
UPA United Progressive Alliance
US United States
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad
VIP Very Important Person
WHO World Health Organization
YMA Young Mizo Association
YSR Y. Rajasekhar Reddy
List of Tables and Figures xvii
Preface
Indian democracy and politics are intertwined and complex. Elections

provide a window into the process and the basis for important
political judgments. In this—our fourth successive election volume
with Sage Publications—we continue our national and state level
presentations by outstanding analysts of Indian politics. Each volume
examines a limited number of national concerns and selected state
studies. The present volume on the 2009 elections continues this
tradition. Together, the four volumes—beginning with the 1998
elections—provide an extended presentation and analysis of national
and state politics in scope and depth that is without parallel in Indian
scholarship.
Our appreciation for the success of this, as well as preceding
volumes, is first and foremost to the authors of our chapters. They
include personnel from two research organizations, the Institute of
Development and Communications in Chandigarh (IDC) and the
Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique (CNRS) in France. The
Hindu, a leading Indian daily newspaper and Frontline, its nationally-
prominent news weekly, provides us with one of India’s leading
journalist. An exceptional group of distinguished scholars rounds
out our list of contributors.
Once again, Sage Publications India provided professional sup-
port. Dr Sugata Ghosh, Vice President Commissioning, met with
the co-editors in New Delhi to review the initial plan and provide
the go-ahead for the project. Elina Majumdar, now Commissioning
Editor, managed the bulk of the editorial work assisted by Arpita
Dasgupta, Editor and Neelakshi Chakraborty, Editorial Assistant.
We are grateful for their assistance.
A number of institutions, in addition to Sage Publications, co-
operated in making this volume possible. Once again, the Centre for
the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi graciously allowed the use
of its invaluable data from the Center’s election surveys. Official data
xviii India’s 2009 Elections
from the national Election Commission of India, as well as its state

branches provide detailed results in a wide variety of useful formats.
Appreciation also is extended to the university and research institutions
represented by our contributors.
Many individuals also contributed with valuable suggestions,
critiques, and information. Each of the contributors could compile a
lengthy list. All of us have endeavored to be accurate.
Finally, as this book goes to press, non-violent, Gandhian-type
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt raise basic issues pertaining to
democracy and elections. They suggest a comparison with India.
During the 20-month Emergency in India from 1975–77, promulgated
by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India became an authoritarian
system. Opposition leaders representing a broad spectrum from the left
to the right, secular and religious, were imprisoned. They were released
and fair elections were held. The freed opposition leaders joined in a
new umbrella political grouping, the Janata Party, which decisively
defeated Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party and then returned India to
democracy. Contributors to this volume are proud of India’s record
with democracy and elections despite its well-publicized problems.
India’s model may be appropriate to countries such as Egypt.
Differences of substance will change. An anti-Mubarak consensus
united Egypt’s population in February 2011 until he resigned on
the 11th. That allowed for the establishment of procedures and the
existence of public space that could offer an opportunity for effective
representation in a democratic system. What the emerging leaders and
the people make of their system and the evolving role of the military
will differ from time to time. Questions of effective representative
and public policy will remain, but people power provides a critical
foundation. People power won out in Tunisia and Egypt. Earlier,
it triumphed in the Philippines against dictator Ferdinand Marcos,
and in the Velvet Revolution led by Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia.
Empowerment of the people has to be continually validated through
elections and other forms of public participation as in India.
Paul Wallace
Ramashray Roy
List of Tables and Figures 1
part I
Thematic Studies
2 India’s 2009 Elections
chapter 1
Introduction:
Political Stability and Governance Coherence
Paul Wallace
India’s electorate emphasized political stability and governance

coherence in the 15th national elections in 2009. Predictions of a frag-
mented electorate and party system emboldened small groups to envi-
sion obtaining power in third and fourth fronts emphasizing regional,
caste, ideological, and personality considerations. Instead, the Congress
Party gambled successfully on a minimum rather than a maximum
winning coalition.1 The Congress initially allied with a few partners in
its minimal winning coalition, so as to highlight the Congress Party
rather than the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition label. This
successful strategic gamble provided more coherence, clearer messages,
and a revitalizing leadership. Lacking only 10 seats for a majority, the
UPA coalition quickly attracted other parties for a comfortable
majority2 (see Table 1.1 for Lok Sabha results by party, Table 1.2 for
coalition formations, and 1.3 for party symbols).
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signifies integrity, continuity,
and competence in the 2009 campaign, which contrasts sharply with
contestants burdened by criminal charge sheets. More than one-quarter
of the elected Members of Parliament (MPs) fall into this category. And
that does not include major criminal/political figures failing to win
seats.3 Party and Alliance leader Sonia Gandhi, in addition, represents
dynastic continuity. It now is a long chain stemming from Motilal Nehru
to his son Jawaharlal Nehru, to Jawaharlal’s daughter Indira Gandhi, to
her son Rajiv Gandhi, and now to Rajiv’s wife Sonia Gandhi.
4 Paul Wallace
Table 1.1
2009 Elections: Lok Sabha Party Results
Party Winners/No. of seats Party type

Bahujan Samaj Party 21 National
Bharatiya Janata Party 116 National
Communist Party of India 4 National
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 16 National
Indian National Congress 206 National
Nationalist Congress Party 9 National
Rashtriya Janata Dal 4 National
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 9 State
All India Forward Bloc 2 State
All India Trinamool Congress 19 State
Asom Gana Parishad 1 State
Assam United Democratic Front 1 State
Biju Janata Dal 14 State
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 18 State
Jammu & Kashmir National Conference 3 State
Janata Dal (Secular) 3 State
Janata Dal (United) 20 State
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 2 State
Kerala Congress (M) 1 State
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 1 State
Muslim League Kerala State Committee 2 State
Nagaland Peoples Front 1 State
Revolutionary Socialist Party 2 State
Samajwadi Party 23 State
Shiromani Akali Dal 4 State
Shivsena 11 State
Sikkim Democratic Front 1 State
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 2 State
Telugu Desam 6 State
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen 1 Unrecognized
Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi 1 Unrecognized
Bodaland Peoples Front 1 Unrecognized
Haryana Janhit Congress (BL) 1 Unrecognized
Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik) 1 Unrecognized
Rashtriya Lok Dal 5 Unrecognized
Swabhimani Paksha 1 Unrecognized
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch 1 Unrecognized
Independent 9 Independents
Source: Election Commission of India, General Elections 2009. Data on July 3, 2009.
Available online at: http://eci.nic.in/results/FrmPartyWiseTrendsAndResults.aspx.
Introduction 5
Table 1.2
2009 Elections: Coalition and Party Results
United Progressive Alliance: 262

Indian National Congress 206
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 18
Nationalist Congress Party 9
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 2
All India Trinamool Congress 19
Jammu & Kashmir National Conference 3
Assam United Democratic Front 1
Kerala Congress (M) 1
Muslim League Kerala State Committee 2
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen 1
Republican Party of India (Athvale) 0
National Democratic Alliance: 158
Bharatiya Janata Party 116
Janata Dal (United) 20
Shiv Sena 11
Shiromani Akali Dal 4
Asom Gana Parishad 1
Rashtriya Lok Dal 5
Nagaland People’s Front 1
Indian National Lok Dal 0
Third Front: 76
Communist Party of India 4
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 16
Revolutionary Socialist Party 2
All India Forward Bloc 2
Bahujan Samaj Party 21
All India Anna DMK 9
Biju Janata Dal 14
Telugu Desam Party 6
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 2
Fourth Front: 27
Samajwadi Party 23
Rashtriya Janata Dal 4
Lok Jan Shakti Party 0
Praja Rajyam Party 0
Other Parties & Independents
Haryana Janahit Party 1
Janata Dal (Secular) 3
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 1
(Continued )
6 Paul Wallace
(Continued )
Sikkim Democratic Front 1

Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi 1
Bodoland Peoples Front 1
Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik) 1
Swabhimani Paksha 1
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch 1
Independent 9
Janhit Congress Party 0
Pattali Makkal Katchi 0
Source: Party data from the Election Commission July 3, 2009. Alliance information
from the media.
Table 1.3
2009 Elections: National and State Recognized Political Parties and Symbols
National
Seven parties are recognized as national parties. They are listed by name, together with
acronym, year of formation, and the party leader.
Symbol Flag Name Acronym Year Party leader
Bahujan Samaj Party BSP 1995 Mayawati
Bharatiya Janata
BJP 1980 Nitin Gadkari
Party
Communist Party
CPI 1925[B] A.B. Bardhan
of India
Communist Party of
CPI (M) 1964 Prakash Karat
India (Marxist)
Indian National
INC 1885 Sonia Gandhi
Congress
Nationalist Congress
NCP 1999 Sharad Pawar
Party
Lalu Prasad
Rashtriya Janata Dal RJD 1997
Yadav
(Continued )
Introduction 7
(Continued )
State
If a party is recognized as a state party by the Election Commission, it can reserve a symbol
for its exclusive use in the state. The following are a list of recognized state parties as of
April 2009.
Symbol Name Acronym Year[3] Party leader States

All India Anna
Tamil Nadu,
Dravida Munnetra AIADMK 1972 J. Jayalalitha
Puducherry
Kazhagam
Social Unsecure Rajasthan,
Helicopter SUPI 2010 Neeraj Udaiya
Party of India Jaipur
All India Forward
AIFB 1939 Debabrata Biswas West Bengal
Bloc
All India
Meghalaya,
Trinamool AITC 2004 Mamta Banerjee
West Bengal
Congress
Arunachal Arunachal
AC 1996 Kamen Ringu
Congress Pradesh
Asom Gana Prafulla Kumar
— AGP 1985 Assam
Parishad Mahanta
Assam United Badruddin
— AUDF 2004 Assam
Democratic Front Ajmal
Biju Janata Dal BJD 1997 Naveen Patnaik Orissa
Tamil
Dravida Munnetra
DMK 1949 M Karunanidhi Nadu,
Kazhagam
Puducherry
Indian Federal
— Democratic IFDP — M.P. George Kerala
Party[5]
Indian National Om Prakash
INLD 1999 Haryana
Lok Dal Chautala
Jammu and
Jammu and
Kashmir National JKNC 1932 Omar Abdullah
Kashmir
Conference
Jammu and
Jammu and
Kashmir National JKNPP NA[D] Bhim Singh
Kashmir
Panthers Party
Jammu and Mufti
Jammu and
Kashmir People’s PDP 1998 Mohammed
Kashmir
Democratic Party Sayeed
(Continued )
8 Paul Wallace
(Continued )
Janata Dal H.D. Deve Karnataka,

JD (S) 1999
(Secular) Gowda Kerala
Janata Dal Bihar,
JD (U) 1999 Nitish Kumar
(United) Jharkhand
Jharkhand Mukti Jharkhand,
JMM 1972 Shibu Soren
Morcha Orissa
Kerala Congress KEC 1964 P.J. Joseph Kerala
Kerala Congress
KEC (M) 1979 C.F. Thomas Kerala
(Mani)
Lok Jan Shakti Ram Vilas
— LJSP 2000 Bihar
Party Paswan
Maharashtrawadi Shashikala
MAG 1963 Goa
Gomantak Party Kakodkar
Manipur People’s
MPP 1968 O. Joy Singh Manipur
Party
Marumalarchi
Dravida Munnetra MDMK 1993 Vaiko Tamil Nadu
Kazhagam
Mizo National Pu
MDF 1959 Mizoram
Front Zoramthanga
Mizoram People’s Pu
MPC 1972 Mizoram
Conference Lalhmingthanga
Muslim League
G.M.
Kerala State MUL 1948 Kerala
Banatwalla
Committee
Nagaland People’s
NPF 2002 Neiphiu Rio Nagaland
Front
Tamil
Pattali Makkal
PMK 1989 G. K. Mani Nadu,
Katchi
Puducherry
Pudhucherry
— Munnetra PMC 2005 P. Kannan Puducherry
Congress
(Continued )
Introduction 9
(Continued )

Revolutionary T.J.
RSP 1940 West Bengal
Socialist Party Chandrachoodan
Madhya
Pradesh,
Mulayam Singh
Samajwadi Party SP 1992 Uttar
Yadav
Pradesh,
Uttarakhand
Churchill
— Save Goa Front SGF NA Goa
Alemao
Shiromani Akali Parkash Singh
SAD 1920 Punjab
Dal Badal
Uddhav
Shiv Sena SHS 1966 Maharashtra
Thackeray[C]
Sikkim Pawan Kumar

SDF 1993 Sikkim
Democratic Front Chamling
Telangana Rashtra K. Chandrashekar Andhra

TRS 2001
Samithi Rao Pradesh
Telugu Desam N. Chandrababu Andhra

TDP 1982
Party Naidu Pradesh
United
UDP NA Donkupar Roy Meghalaya
Democratic Party
Uttarakhand Bipin Chandra

UKKD 1979 Uttarakhand
Kranti Dal Tripathi
Zoram Nationalist
ZNP 1997 Lalduhoma Mizoram
Party
Source: GOI. Election Commission of India.
Sonia Gandhi’s son, Rahul Gandhi,4 who was 38 years old then,
clearly won his credentials as the heir apparent with his tireless and
effective campaigning throughout the country. Rebounding from an
almost hopeless electoral position in the key state of Uttar Pradesh
(UP) is a particular Rahul triumph. The Congress, more than doubled
its Lok Sabha representation from 9 to 21, once again becoming
a significant political contestant in India’s most populous state.
10 Paul Wallace
Nationally, it won 206 MPs out of 543 in the Lok Sabha in contrast
to 145 in 2004, and only 114 in 1999 for a positive swing of approx-
imately 4 percent (see Table 1.4). Rahul Gandhi appears to be imple-
menting a longer-range strategy using the Youth Congress as a wedge to
energize and rebuild the Congress Party into a more democratic insti-
tution.5 India Today quotes Rahul as stating: “What I am trying to do
is to create through the youth wings thousands of Obamas. It is a ques-
tion of channeling them, moving them into the political system and
giving them more power.”6
Moreover, the major institutional leadership following the 2009
elections continues a steady post-independence trend, emphasizing
India’s diversity as evidenced in the following list:
l UPA Coalition leader: Sonia Gandhi, Catholic and woman

originally from Italy.
l Prime Minister: Manmohan Singh, male Sikh.
l Speaker of Lok Sabha: Meira Kumar, Dalit woman (see Table 1.7
for number of regular and reserved seats in the Lok Sabha

by state).
l President: Pratibha Patil, Hindu woman.
l Vice President of India: Mohammad Hamid Ansari, Muslim
male.
l Chief Minister of UP, India’s most populous state: Mayawati,
Dalit woman.
Does this Congress Party electoral triumph provide evidence for a

trend that indicates India is returning to the earlier periods of Congress
domination? Can the top-down, leader-led Congress Party change into
a more grassroots organization or will Rajiv Gandhi’s unsuccessful
efforts be duplicated during Rahul’s era? Does the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) decline from 182 seats in 1999, to 138 seats in 204, and
now to 116 in 2009 indicate a continuing slide to its becoming a
minor party? Is the Communist Party Marxist (CPM) that brazenly left
and then challenged the UPA as a fourth front now in a permanent
decline, nationally and in its core states of West Bengal and Kerala?
Statistics, of course, can be read in different ways and trends can be
reversed—nonetheless, these are important questions that are raised
by the 2009 elections and will carry over to succeeding decades.
Introduction 11
Regional parties in the north like Mulayam Singh’s Samajwadi

Party (SP) and Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) did
poorly. Neither did Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) provide
the national alternative she had anticipated. Nonetheless, regional
parties continue to be major players at the state level. The Biju Janata
Dal (BJD) in Orissa became the ruling party on its own after it opted
out of a coalition with the BJP. Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United)
[JD(U)] maintained its alliance with the BJP as the dominant partner
and did well in Bihar. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
in Tamil Nadu and Jayalitha’s All India Anna DMK continue their
alternating fortunes in Tamil Nadu, while the Shiv Sena and Sharad
Pawar’s National Congress Party (NCP) are significant parties in
Maharashtra. The Akali Dal continues to be the ruling or major oppos-
ition party in Punjab. The prognosis, based on the 2009 elections and
preceding elections, is the waxing and waning of particular regional
parties, but continuance of their major importance at the state level.
Coalition politics also make them national players.
There is at least one other primary question raised by the 2009
elections, as well as the now long history of democratic elections in
independent India. What is the nature of India’s federal system and,
in particular, its center–state relations? A somewhat new concept
may be in the process of replacing that of the older nation-state.
Reversing this either/or notion of federalism and replacing it with
a state–nation concept provides a new window into understanding
contemporary India. The older nation-state notion of a strong center
and weak states, or vice versa, can now be conceptualized as a state–
nation with a strong center and strong states. A strong ruling party
embedded in and leading a functioning national coalition also is
dependent on strong, even assertive states.7 At this point in India’s
political history, it seems to have achieved a notable balance between
the center and the states.
Part I of this volume is thematic, looking at India as a whole, while
Part II is state focused. Four analysts from various backgrounds join in
emphasizing the coherence and continuity, as well as positive changes
of India’s federalism from differing perspectives. Ramashray Roy’s
emphasis is on the strength and importance of regional parties within
the larger coalitions. Consequently, he states, “political cleavages in
12 Paul Wallace
the state and the political calculations of state leaders have assumed
centrality in determining national electoral outcomes.” Federalism,
however, is reinforced by the diversity of India’s states and regional
parties so that “political ascendance does not take place between the
same parties in all the states.”
Pramod Kumar, in the following chapter, views the changing federal
political dynamic in a very quotable phrase: “… there is a regional-
ization of national political parties and nationalization of regional
political parties.” On the whole, he views this development stemming
from coalition politics as healthy for India as “regional groups have
become strong, and the forces of regionalism have become weak.”
Similarly, Jyotirindra Dasgupta in an extensive historical over-
view focuses on the integrative elements that result in India’s diversity
becoming strengths rather than weaknesses. He looks at a limited set
of issues associated with the processes of democratic representation
involving regions and regionalism, primarily connected with electoral
contestation and organized movements. His historical analysis deals
with the development of India’s integration and national identity
as opposed to secession, a number of cultural characteristics and includes
three regional case studies: Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab.
He concludes that “the transformative effect of democratic interaction
… among regions in the federal governmental system” is resulting in
“interregional collaboration” as contrasted with “the grossly negative
picture of regionalism offered in the 1950s.”
Federalism, coalition politics, and structural changes in India over
time are the themes of Maneesha Roy’s chapter. The changing contours
of politics, reflect important changes in India’s socioeconomic reality,
and impinge on the constitutionally sanctioned schema of distribu-
tion of power among various organs, including the role of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, “the Indian political system is vibrant and dynamic” and
“is capable of retaining the allegiance of the Indian people.”
Rainuka Dagar deals in depth with women’s participation and issues
in their relation to both society and politics. She provides somewhat
paradoxical findings in women’s electoral participation in elected
offices, as well as in voting patterns that have increased, but she says
that “female leadership in state governance” continues to be low, and
a women’s “vote bank” has not emerged. Promises by mainstream
party leaders for the empowerment of women, she concludes, are
Introduction 13
“a casualty to the dominance of identity construed placement of

women in the Indian polity.” Raucous debates over reservations for
women in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies reflect the state of the
continuing problem.8
The final chapter in Part I is Christophe Jaffrelot’s focus on the
BSP and its ambitious leader Mayawati. Lok Sabha elections, he points
out, can differ markedly from state assembly elections. Based on the
preceding state elections in several states, especially Uttar Pradesh, it
could be anticipated that the BSP could win about 50 Lok Sabha seats
placing it in a “king maker” position. Mayawati’s expectations, which
included the possibility of becoming Prime Minister, had two major
contrary results as the BSP won 20 seats in UP—one fewer than the
Congress—and one in Madhya Pradesh for a total of 21. First, instead
of a leading role after the 2009 elections, the BSP joined the UPA
coalition (see Table 1.4). Second, as Jaffrelot concludes, “the party is
back to its Dalit roots.” Nonetheless, as he describes in detail, the BSP
is “continuing its forward march” in terms of valid votes polled and
seats won (see Table 1.5). With the decline of the Communist Party of
Table 1.4
Support for the UPA Government in the 15th Lok Sabha
Party/Alliance Seats won Seat %

United Progressive Alliance 262 48.3
Outside support
Janata Dal (Secular) 3 0.6
Independents and Other Parties 9 1.7
Samajwadi Party 23 4.2
Bahujan Samaj Party 21 3.9
Rashtriya Janata Dal 4 0.7
Total 322 59.4
Source: Government of India (GOI), Election Commission, and the Indian media.
Note: President Pratibha Patil dissolved the 14th Lok Sabha with immediate effect on
May 18. The President invited Manmohan Singh to form the new government
on May 20. It was sworn in on May 22, 2009.
Support for formation of UPA Government: The UPA needed 10 seats for a majority.
Unconditional support came from the Janata Dal (Secular), the Rashtriya
Janata Dal, the Bahujan Samaj Party, and the Samajwadi Party. The Nagaland,
People’s Front, Sikkim Democratic Front, and Bodoland People’s Front, each
with an MP, also decided to support the UPA government. Three independent
candidates from Maharashtra extended support. On May 25, 2009, DMK
decided to join the UPA government.
14 Paul Wallace
Table 1.5
Leading Party Seats and Vote Percentages 1984–2009
2009 2004 1999 1998 1996 1991 1989 1984

Congress 206 145 114 141 140 232 197 415
Party 28.55 26.69 28.3 25.82 29.7 36.5 39.5 48.1
Bharatiya 116 138 182 182 161 120 85 2
Janata Party 18.80 21.5 23.75 25.59 20.29 20.11 11.26 7.74
Bahujan 21 19 14 5
Samaj Party 6.17 5.33 4.16 4.67
Communist 16 43 33 32 32 35 33 22
Party 5.33 5.66 5.40 5.16 6.12 6.16 6.55 5.87
Marxist
Communist 4 10 4 9
Party India 1.43 1.4 1.48 1.75
Rashtriya 4 22 6 17 22 32
Janata Dal 1.27 2.22 2.81 2.78 (then D)
National 9 9 8
Congress 2.04 1.78 2.27
Party
Source: Compiled from past reports of the Election Commission, Government of India.
India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], the BSP has become India’s third largest
party. Jaffrelot’s prognosis is more pessimistic as he notes the loss of
BSP leaders, the formation of competing Bahujans and the inability
to build a “collegial party structure.”
Part II consists of individual state studies. Ghanshyam Shah and
Amiya Chaudhuri provide chapters on two states, Gujarat and West
Bengal that continue with dominant parties. Gujarat is the only state
in India where the BJP has continuously secured over 50 percent of
the total seats in the last six Lok Sabha elections. Shah focuses on
Chief Minister Narendra Modi who has replaced L.K. Advani as the
dominant figure at the state level, despite Advani being the BJP’s
prime ministerial candidate. Congress had no comparable state leader
to match Modi’s popularity, especially in regard to development and
Hindu identity. As Shah describes in detail, Modi has almost become
a cult leader.
CPI(M) has controlled West Bengal since 1977, but its dominance
has been challenged by the Lok Sabha elections 2009 in which it
won only nine seats (see Table 1.6), while with its allies in the Left
Front it won only 15 of the 42 seats. Chaudhuri also notes CPI(M)
Introduction 15
Table 1.6
State Results Lok Sabha Election 2009
States/UTs (Seats) INC BJP Others

Andhra Pradesh â•¯â•¯(42/42) 33 0 TRS (2),â•¯TDP (6),â•¯Others (1)
Arunachal Pradeshâ•¯(2/2) 2 0 0
Assamâ•¯(14/14) 7 4 3
Biharâ•¯(40/40) 2 12 RJD (4),â•¯JD(U) (20),â•¯Others (2)
Chattisgarhâ•¯(11/11) 1 10 0
Delhi (7/7) 7 0 0
Goaâ•¯(2/2) 1 1 0
Gujaratâ•¯(26/26) 11 15 0
Haryanaâ•¯(10/10) 9 0 1
Himachal Pradeshâ•¯(4/4) 1 3 0
Jammu and Kashmirâ•¯(6/6) 2 0 0
Jharkhandâ•¯(14/14) 1 8 JMM (2),â•¯Others (3)
Karnatakaâ•¯(28/28) 6 19 JD(S) (3),â•¯Others (0)
Keralaâ•¯(20/20) 13 0 7
Madhya Pradeshâ•¯(28/29) 12 16 BSP (1),â•¯Others (0)
Maharashtraâ•¯(48/48) 17 9 NCP (8),â•¯SS (11),â•¯Others (3)
Manipurâ•¯(2/2) 2 0 0
Meghalayaâ•¯(2/2) 1 0 NCP (1),â•¯Others (0)
Mizoramâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 1
Nagalandâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 0
Orissaâ•¯(21/21) 6 0 CPI (1),â•¯BJD (14),â•¯Others (15)
Punjabâ•¯(13/13) 8 1 SAD (4),â•¯Others (0)
Rajasthanâ•¯(25/25) 20 4 1
Sikkimâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 1
Tamil Naduâ•¯(39/39) 8 0 DMK (18),â•¯Others (13)
Tripuraâ•¯(2/2) 0 0 2
Uttar Pradeshâ•¯(80/80) 21 10 BSP (20),â•¯SP (23),â•¯Others (6)
Uttaranchal (5/5) 5 0 0
West Bengalâ•¯(42/42) 6 1 TC (19),â•¯CPIM (9),â•¯Others (7)
Union Territories
Andaman and Nicobar (1/1) 0 0 1
Chandigarhâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 1
Dadra-Nagerhaveliâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 1
Daman-Diuâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 1
Lakshadweepâ•¯(1/1) 0 0 1
Pondicherryâ•¯(1/1) 1 0 0
Total Seats (543) 203 113 237
Source: Election Commission, Government of India. Available online at http://www.
indian-elections.com/statewise-results.html
16 Paul Wallace
Table 1.7
Number of Regular and Reserved Seats in the Lok Sabha by State, 2009
Type of constituencies
Sl. No. State/Union territory General SC ST Total
â•‡ 1 Andhra Pradesh 34 6 2 42
â•‡ 2 Arunachal Pradesh 2 – – 2
â•‡ 3 Assam 11 1 2 14
â•‡ 4 Bihar 33 7 – 40
â•‡ 5 Jharkhand 8 1 5 14
â•‡ 6 Goa 2 – – 2
â•‡ 7 Gujarat 20 2 4 26
â•‡ 8 Haryana 8 2 – 10
â•‡ 9 Himachal Pradesh 3 1 – 4
10 Jammu and Kashmir 6 – – 6
11 Karnataka 24 4 – 28
12 Kerala 18 2 – 20
13 Madhya Pradesh 20 4 5 29
14 Chhattisgarh* 5 2 4 11
15 Maharashtra 41 3 4 48
16 Manipur 1 – 1 2
17 Meghalaya 2 – – 2
18 Mizoram – – 1 1
19 Nagaland 1 – – 1
20 Orissa 13 3 5 21
21 Punjab 10 3 – 13
22 Rajasthan 18 4 3 25
23 Sikkim 1 – – 1
24 Tamil Nadu 32 7 – 39
25 Tripura 1 – 1 2
26 Uttar Pradesh 63 17 – 80
27 Uttaranchal* 4 1 – 5
28 West Bengal 32 8 2 42
29 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 1 – – 1
30 Chandigarh 1 – – 1
31 Dader and Nagerhaveli – – 1 1
32 Daman and Diu 1 – – 1
33 Delhi 6 1 – 7
34 Lakshadweep – – 1 1
35 Pondicherry 1 – – 1
Total 423 79 41 543
Source: Election Commission of India, Government of India. Available online at http://
www.indian-elections.com/india-statistics.html
Note: States were not formed. They were part of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar
Pradesh respectively.
Introduction 17
losses in elections at other levels that indicate a trend that may end
an “astonishingly stable [Left Front (LF)] coalition for 32 years.” He
examines the various reasons for the decline including problems with
the CPI(M)’s rural base, its policies including the use of violence in
rural areas such as Nandigram and Singur, other law and order prob-
lems, poor economic performance, strategic mistakes such as leaving
the UPA alliance, and the vigorous challenge from Mamata Banerjee
and her Trinamool Congress Party.
Five case studies involve alternating two-party systems: Rajasthan
and Maharashtra in northern and western India, respectively, and
Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh in the south. Congress and
BJP alternate in Rajasthan, while Congress and Sharad Pawar’s NCP
compete with the regional Shiv Sena allied with the BJP. Rajasthan’s
BJP, according to Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat, was
“plagued by factional rivalry and a leadership schism.” These factors led
to the BJP’s defeat in the 2008 assembly elections. Congress, under
the leadership of Ashok Gehlot, took advantage of this situation. Caste
differences between the Meenas and Gujjars became important, as did
the perennial Jat, Rajput, and Brahmin rivalries.
“Normal elections” took place in Maharashtra. Raghavendra
Keshavarao Hebsur concludes that the “bipolar alliance system still
holds good,” despite problems faced by all the contending parties.
Hebsur also provides the chapter on Karnataka, explaining the
“incremental” growth of the BJP from its entry into the state’s politics
in 1983 to its “exponential” growth since 1999. Paradoxically, three-
fourths of the formerly anti-Brahmin Lingayat community now finds
itself part of the BJP base, along with more than half of the forward
castes, including Brahmins. By focusing on local, state issues, the
BJP “bucked the national trend of the party’s nationwide decline.”
Congress stays in contention with 38 percent of the vote and a stable
support base.
Congress’ projection as a “regional” party is attributed by Karli
Srinivasulu as a major reason for its success in Andhra. Under Sonia
Gandhi, the national Congress Party has allowed increased autonomy
to the state party. Sonia Gandhi, the NCP has allowed increased
autonomy to the state party. Caste identity along with a “focus[ing] on
18 Paul Wallace
development and populist mobilization facilitated the electoral victory

of the Congress.” Srinivasulu also emphasizes the marginalization of
civil society initiatives.
According to G. Gopa Kumar, anti-incumbency is one of the factors
leading to the Congress’ success in Kerala. The Congress almost reversed
the 2004 Left Democratic Front (LDF) landslide in which it won 18
of 20 seats, by winning 13 of the 20, and a total of 16 for the United
Democratic Front in 2009. The CPI(M)’s “big brotherly attitude” and
its “controversial alliance” with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
damaged the LDF. By contrast, the Congress enjoyed “strong unity.”
Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir are two states that can be considered
multiparty states. Bihar, under the leadership of Nitish Kumar and
his regional JD(U) Party, as the major partner in the NDA alliance
with the BJP, also did not succumb to the anti-incumbency factor.
A combination of developmental efforts, social engineering, and “a
strategic positioning of candidates in redrawn parliamentary constitu-
encies” led to the landslide NDA victory according to Binoy Shanker
Prasad. Nitish Kumar provided a secular image, while his alliance partner
the BJP “kept a low profile and did not use anti-Muslim rhetoric.”
Kumar also undercut his opponent’s reliance on Other Backward
Castes (OBCs) by fashioning “special privileges for Extreme Backward
Castes,” about 28 percent of the total vote. Congress decided to contest
alone, abandoning its former alliance with Lalu Prasad Yadav’s RJD.
Praveen Swami points out that the 2008 Assembly elections in
Jammu and Kashmir followed six weeks of protests, violence, and called
for a 100 percent boycott, but turned out peacefully with a “record
number of voters.” Lok Sabha elections in 2009 continued the success
against secessionists, as well as the People’s Democratic Front in the
Valley and the BJP in Jammu. The National Conference alliance with
Congress dominated. Swami asks the obvious question. How did
“mass uprising against Indian rule yield so quickly to competitive dem-
ocratic politics?” He explains it in part by focusing on the Amarnath
Shrine Yatra—what he terms the “Shrine War—of the the previous
summer. “Electoral democracy,” Swami concludes, “guarantees no par-
ticular outcomes.” Politicians will have to “find the answers.”
Northeast India is the final chapter in this volume. It consists of
seven states involving an enormous diversity and a history of being
Introduction 19
peripheral to India. However, according to Rajesh Dev, the intro-

duction of competitive democratic politics “has transformed the ‘trad-
itional’ structures of power, redefined political practices and crafted
novel political traditions.” He concludes that in all the states, “personal-
ities and their kin-affiliations are politically more significant than
ideologies and substantive issues.” Elections accordingly, serve pri-
marily as “entry-points to a lucrative patronage network,” rather than
“political accountability through competitive engagement.”
Rajesh Dev does not directly deal with the political violence present
since independence. Elections were successfully held in 2009, while
total fatalities dropped from 1,054 in 2008 to 843 in 2009. “Dramatic
reverses” against insurgent groups also have taken place.9 To what
extent this is a trend, and what is the role of democratic elections in
the northeast are major questions for continued analysis.
Notes
1. For the seminal book on maximum and minimum winning coalitions, see
William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1962). Also see, William H. Riker’s online article in American Political Science Review,
Vol. 76, December 1982, pp. 753–66. Available online at: http://www.jstor.org/cgi-
bin/jstor/printpage/00030554/di961007/96p002q/0.pdf?userID=9803f96d@duke.
edu/01cc99331a00503f125f&backcontext=results&config=jstor&dowhat=Acrobat
&o.pdf
2. Detailed election tables by party, alliances, states, and other characteristics are
included within this chapter.
3. India Today, “Taint: Criminal Lapses,” June 1, 2009, pp. 11–12. Data cited is
from the Association for Democratic Research, National Elections Watch.
4. For a detailed laudatory article, see S. Prasannarajan with Subhash Mishra,
“Newsmaker 2009, Rahul Gandhi The Catalyst,” India Today, January 4, 2010,
pp. 10–20.
5. Private communications, November 2009.
6. India Today, note 4, p. 16.
7. I am indebted to Ashutosh Varshney, Professor of Politics at Brown University, for
this insight. He is well along into a book manuscript that includes the state–nation
concept for contemporary India in detail. Jyotirindra Dasgupta informed me that
an early version of this concept in a comparative context is Alfred Stepan, Arguing
Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). In particular,
see p. 309. Stepan explores the concept further with Juan Linz and Yogendra
20 Paul Wallace
Yadav, in Democracy in Multinational Societies: India and Other Polities (Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Forthcoming).
8. Following two days of near chaos, the Rajya Sabha passed a Bill on March 9, 2010
to amend the Constitution, so as to reserve one-third of the seats for women in the
Lok Sabha and state assemblies. As in the past, it is highly questionable that
the Lok Sabha and half of the state assemblies also will approve. The New York
Times, March 9, 2010.
9. South Asian Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. 8, No. 29, January 25, 2010.
chapter 2
Regional Base and National Dream:

Alliance Formation, 2009 National Elections
Ramashray Roy
The 2009 elections conducted in five waves have come and gone. In
their wake, they have left everybody surprised, some of them even
shocked since the media and other sources of information continued
to inform the people up until the last that no party or any combination
of parties, was expected to win a majority of parliamentary seats in
order to be able to form the national government. Some commen-
tators went to the length of even predicting that the current elections
would most likely reproduce a stalemate like the 1996 situation where
no political party was able to form a government on its own or survive
for long in a large coalition. From all accounts then, the complexity of
the party system and the unpredictability of election results emphas-
ized the plethora of parties taking part in the 2009 elections and their
inability to group themselves into viable governing alliance systems.
The formation of four different fronts also clouded the likelihood of
the emergence of two competing alliance systems.
It is against this background that the question of the emergence of
two national parties out of the crucible of the 2009 elections assumes
importance. This is for two reasons. The first reason is theoretical.
Students of party systems refer with respect to Maurice Duverger’s
thesis that wherever the electoral system is based on single-member
constituencies with a simple majority of votes deciding the winner,
a two-party system is most likely to emerge.1 Barring a few Indian
states, India does not conform to this theoretical observation. In these
exceptional states, historical and sociological factors have helped
22 Ramashray Roy
two-party systems to emerge. The question of why the party system

in India has, at least at the national level, diverged sharply from
Duverger’s theoretical observation is important, but this is not the
theme of this chapter.
The second reason is practical, involving the issue of efficient and
effective functioning of the government at the national level. This
issue has become all the more important in view of the fact that the
last two decades have witnessed the twin phenomena of the progressive
decline in the electoral strength of the two major parties, the Congress
and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), on the one hand, and the phe-
nomenal rise in the number and strength of state/regional parties, on the
other. In addition, it is also to be noted that the influence of the latter
in determining who rules at the center has also been increasing.2
Given the plurality of political parties, the forging of a winning coali-
tion becomes a highly difficult process.3 Even when the ruling coalition
somehow completes its five-year term, it does not have a comfortable
existence and tends to frazzle and eventually disintegrate. Coalitions
necessitate constant management and reformulation. This factor has
a decisive influence on the effectiveness of the national government.
The two aspects of the question—the theoretical and the practical—
of the emergence of two principal parties nationally, competing with
each other for controlling the power apparatus of the country need to
be systematically explored. However, this is beyond the scope of this
chapter. We do not propose to engage in a lengthy theoretical dis-
cussion about why a two-party system has not emerged in India,
instead, the emphasis here is on the process of the forging of political
alliances in order to highlight some of its crucial aspects. In particular,
we are interested in those aspects that promise to provide a clue to an
answer to the question of the bipolarity of the coalitional situation.
As we shall see later, Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the president of the Congress
Party, took personal initiatives and made strenuous efforts to forge a
winning coalition against the BJP in 2004. However, she reversed her
position and rebuffed attempts by some of the former UPA alliance
partners to forge a fresh alliance in 2009. Thus it can be asked why
coalition-making was so important in 2004, and why it was derailed
in 2009. It is important to understand its effect on the formation of
Regional Base and National Dream 23
alliances, on the one hand, and on the formation of the government,

on the other.
In particular, we focus on three different aspects. First, we propose
to take a brief look at the experience of coalition formation prior to
the 2009 elections. This takes us on a short historical journey during
which we will take account of the troubled process of forging, as well
as the unraveling of alliances and their formation on the eve of the
2009 elections. Second, we focus on the process of alliance forma-
tion during the 2009 elections. What is distinctive about it is almost
a fresh attempt to contrive new alliances after the disintegration of
those assiduously crafted in 2004. Two aspects are of special interest,
(a) calculations and strategy that distinguish the formation of alliances
and (b) the composition and character of the different alliances that
came into being. Finally, since the process of alliance formation failed
to forge two well-matched competing alliances, the question of the
formation of a winning coalition becomes especially important. Also,
interesting in this regard is the question of the possibility of alliance
formation in a situation of frozen likes and dislikes and mutual
abhorrence, keeping several parties apart so that they are less likely
to join in an alliance.
The Historical Background
The fragmentation of the party space is not new in India. Even just
after independence, when one-party dominance characterized the
Indian party system, several minor parties existed and competed for
influence, ascendance, and control. However, the immense power and
prestige that the Congress Party enjoyed kept competing parties from
effectively participating in the harsh game of politics. What is different
now is that smaller parties, based mostly in single states or a limited
region, have become quite powerful and are well entrenched in their
home states where they define the terms of the game of politics. Due to
the relative weakness of the two major national parties—the Congress
and the BJP and their nation-wide networks—state/regional parties
have acquired enough muscle power to influence the formation of
24 Ramashray Roy
national government. Along with it, they also make inputs into and
influence the formulation of policies and programs. To some extent,
this transformation in the fortunes of political parties has been gradual,
but not insignificant. It signifies not only a recurrent pattern of fluc-
tuation in the fortunes of different parties, but also at times a radical
shift in the pattern of power distribution. This has a great bearing on
how the government is formed, what it aims at doing, and to what
extent it succeeds.
Three distinct phases of the evolution and change in the party sys-
tem in post-independent India are reflected in the results of elections to
the Parliament since 1952. The first phase in which the Congress
party enjoyed the status of a dominant party lasted till 1967. This year
happens to be the cut-off point between the initial phase of the one-
party dominance system and the subsequent phase of the decline and the
struggle of the Congress party to hold on to its dominance or to regain
it when it has been weakened. Note, for example, that till 1967 the
Congress party continued to obtain about 45 percent of popular votes,
the exception being 1957 when it polled 48 percent of votes. In terms of
seats, its share was well above 70 percent. But, beginning with the 1967
Parliamentary elections, a marked fluctuation can be seen in its share
both of votes and seats. Thus, 1967 marks the beginning of the second
phase in two senses. First, in the 1967 elections, the Congress share of
popular votes came down to 41 percent and secondly, the number
of seats it won came down to 284.
During the second phase from 1967 to 1984, electoral fortunes of
the Congress had registered a very unstable pattern of gains and losses
in terms both of popular votes and the number of seats.4 At this time,
two notable developments mark the changes. One, non-Congress
governments were formed in a few states and, two, the Congress saw
violent fluctuations in its electoral results. It polled only 34.5 percent
of votes and won only 154 seats in 1977, while in 1984 it won an un-
precedented number of parliamentary seats, 415 out of the 517 seats
it contested. However, after this, the Congress records a steady decline
till it was reduced to a principal national party, but without the elec-
toral energy to recapture its lost dominance. With it begins the third
phase of the evolution of the party system in India.
The third phase of the evolution of the party system in India began
after the collapse of the Congress party in 1989 as a principal party
straddling the political space like a ruthless Colossus. Since then, no
political party has been able to gain an electoral majority and form
a government at the national level on its own. Two very prominent
features characterize this phase. First, this phase saw the emergence of
state and regional parties playing a very significant role in the forma-
tion of the government at the national level. This phase symbolizes
what E. Sridharan calls “multiple bipolarity.” It means that the main
contenders in all but eight states involve two state parties, which alter-
nately control the power apparatus of the state. In addition, elections
to state assemblies have assumed autonomy, as well as the capacity to
shape the outcome of national elections.5
The debility of national parties and the autonomy of the state elec-
toral process allow main political cleavages in the states to determine
national electoral outcome. As such, “national politics is not the pol-
itical arena of political choices; political preferences and loyalties at
the national level derive from primary loyalties in state politics.”6
Thus, political cleavages in the state and the political calculations of
state leaders have assumed centrality in determining national electoral
outcomes. However, competition for political ascendance does not
take place between the same parties in all the states. Different pat-
terns of political alignments have given birth to what was referred to
earlier as multiple bipolarity. The emergence of the state as the pri-
mary locale of national political choices, insofar as the formation of the
national government is concerned, has a significant bearing on alli-
ance formation.
The continuation of the situation of bipolarity at the state level
does not help the emergence of a two-party system at the national level.
The reason for this lies in the fact that the state parties are primarily
and at times exclusively oriented toward state-specific issues and prob-
lems. To extend a friendly hand across the state border becomes dif-
ficult because leaders from different states have little in common. This
is a major factor in preventing heterogeneous parties to combine or
coalesce into two competing national parties acting on common pro-
grams. The need for the polarization of political forces at the national
level is frustrated by multiple polarities at the state level. It constitutes
26 Ramashray Roy
a structural characteristic of state politics, and also has an important

ramification for the motivation of state leaders and their strategy of
action at the time of national elections.
If by maintaining their separate existence, they can exercise influ-
ence disproportionate to their electoral strength, why should they sur-
render their autonomy? They have gained their autonomy by delinking
themselves from the two major national parties, on the one hand, and
by developing their support base in their own state. By merging into
a larger political formation, where they might not be allowed to play a
significant role, as such, they are likely to find their power resources
greatly diminished. This consideration prompts them to opt for a
strategy that promises to solidify, if not overly enhance their power
position in their own state. Their power in their state can be reinforced
by their alignment with a national party rather than a party in the
neighborhood. This again can help them to extend it beyond the state
boundaries. As this realization takes stronger roots, their dream of a
more important role in national political affairs by becoming part of
a national alliance also takes on dazzling colors. They become “bolder
in their imaginings as kingmakers, even as kings and queens.”7 As a
result, the fragmentation of the political space into myriad parties in
contention for political power gets frozen.
Thus, there occurs the growing debility of major national parties,
i.e., the Congress and the BJP. States emerge as autonomous arenas
that influence national electoral outcomes along with the phenom-
enon of multiple bipolarity, while state leaders display growing con-
fidence and escalating ambition for playing an ever more effective role
in national politics. These factors constitute important features of
the third phase of the evolution of the party system in India. It is these
features that have had a strong bearing on the formation of alliances
and the constitution of the national government.
Making of Alliances: 2004–09
The failure of elections to throw up a party that wins a majority of

parliamentary seats has been a recurrent feature in the past two decades.
This failure has made the formation of alliances unavoidable. Different
parties, both state and national, have to somehow arrange them-

selves in two groups to compete for capturing national power. It is true
that the two major national parties, the Congress and the BJP, con-
stitute the hub around which most state parties revolve. It is also true
that somehow two competitive alliances emerge seeking control of
the national government. Nevertheless, several factors account for the
difficulty, the complexity, the uncertainty, and the unpredictability
of alliance formation. “Nothing is more unpredictable in Indian
politics,” as one commentator puts it, “than the nature of alliances
between political groups and parties today.”8
The first factor responsible for it is the existence of multiple parties
in the states. What complicates the process of alliance formation is the
lack of homogeneity or similarity of perspective, either ideological or
pragmatic, among different parties. This makes it difficult for them to
combine or coalesce easily. Moreover, most of the parties, untouched
as they are by ideology, are driven by power considerations. When
the phenomenon of multiple bipolarities is added to it, the forging of
alliance across state borders becomes a very difficult proposition.
Also, by remaining autonomous actors, they enjoy greater bargaining
power vis-à-vis any major national party. When the formation of the
government depends largely, even exclusively, on the number of
seats a party has or can mobilize, the support of state parties becomes
necessary when either of the two national parties is unable to form
government on its own. That is why these parties exert so much influ-
ence, which they would not otherwise. And the extent to which these
parties successfully bargain with front-running national parties, is by
strengthening and consolidating their base in their respective states.
Moreover, the state party leaders are also likely to enhance their influ-
ence and visibility by becoming a member of the national ministry.
Since quid pro quo plays a strategic role in the formation of alli-
ances, it also becomes the instrument of the disintegration of alliances.
By the same token, it also acts as a dampener on the possibility of the
emergence of a working two-party system. Thus the phenomenon of
multiple bipolarities is instrumental in engendering a systematic bias,
not only against the durability of national alliances, but also against
the rise of a two-party system. In addition, there is no firm ground for
forging a reliable judgment about which party will join which alliance.
28 Ramashray Roy
One consideration is, of course, the divide due to ideological affinity

or programmatic compatibility. However, this divide can easily be
crossed, if by doing so the narrow interest of the party or its leader can
be protected and promoted. The V.P. Singh government offers the
best example. It became the national government in 1990, which was
supported both by the BJP and the left parties, two parties diametric-
ally opposed to each other. The alliance between the Telugu Desam
Party (TDP) with the BJP in 1998 is another example.
In short, state-based political parties have become key players
deciding who wins in the strenuous struggle for power at the center.
When state parties influence the national election outcome, they and
their characteristics exercise a great deal of influence on how elections
are fought and what outcomes they yield. Lines of political division
in the states, the nature of socio-political cleavages, and the perform-
ance of the party in power, all these become important desiderata of
national elections. As a result, there seems to have taken place a dis-
junction between issues and policies that shape political events in the
states and those that bear upon the concerns of the national govern-
ment. This disjunction allows state political leaders belonging to rival
camps to retain their autonomy and have a decisive say, if not in the
formulation and implementation of national policies, then, at least,
in deciding the selection of who are to rule.
There has thus developed a close linkage between the character-
istics of state politics and national electoral outcome. As a consequence,
the phenomenon of the aggregation of election results making the
national election outcome means that state-specific issues have a great
bearing on national elections. Two factors help in the continuation of
this conjunction. In the first place, there has ostensibly been a lack
of an important overarching theme that could excite people and stimu-
late political parties to take a definite policy and programmatic stance,
and combine or coalesce in major political groupings aligning with one
or the other major national party. In the second place, the absence of
an overarching national issue is also coupled with the absence of power-
ful national leaders enjoying pan-Indian popularity and charisma. All
these factors have conspired to make the state dimension of politics
very important for national elections. As such, political conflicts at
the state level loom large in national elections.
Given the central importance of state-relevant political issues,

conflicts and the characteristics of state leaders, it is not at all surpris-
ing that state leaders have grown very powerful for the purposes of
national elections. This means that they would be more influenced in
their dealings with national parties by their own considerations and
prospects. Their first consideration is likely to be the consolidation of
their base in their own state. One important source of doing this is
to extract as many concessions and promises of benefits as possible
from one of the major national parties for themselves and their state.
The second consideration has to do with the calculation of which
party or alliance is more likely to do so. This is important insofar as
states depend for developmental works on finances from the center.
Every state looks for ways and means of persuading the national
government to be favorably inclined to help it in solving its problems
by allocating to it more grants and other financial resources. The states
own resources are meager and pressures on it for undertaking devel-
opmental and nondevelopmental works are very strong. This is why
state leaders are so interested in acquiring leverage for influencing
decisions of the national government.
The difference between promise and performance on the part of the
national government proves very deleterious for the durability of alli-
ance. The compulsions of alliance formation lead the major party to
make promises. However, there are also compulsions of governance,
which may incapacitate the national government in fulfilling the
promises it made. This breeds dissatisfaction and disaffection, which,
in turn, paves the way for the disintegration of the alliance. This is
however to be expected in a febrile pre-election moment, which lacks
binding pre-poll alliances when every party wants to maximize
its advantage, especially in a situation where outcomes are uncertain.
This also accounts for the flexible stances of different parties precisely
because their flexibility suits them perfectly. This is so for the reason
that they savor the possibility of extracting rewards in the post-election
scrabble.
These factors are well reflected in the process of alliance forma-
tion during the period when quick turnover in the fortunes of ruling
coalitions happened to be a dominant feature of national politics. The
fluctuating fortunes of different national/state parties can be traced
30 Ramashray Roy
back to the demise of the Congress dominance coupled with the

growing importance of the states, especially with regard to increased
emphasis on economic development. Needless to say that while the
central government plays the primary role in promoting and sustaining
the process of economic development, it is the state governments that
are the implementing institutions.
The process of economic development strengthened the trend
toward the diffusion of political power that began as early as 1967.
Since the control of material resources, their generation, use, and dis-
tribution are located largely in the central government, it becomes
necessary for state leaders and parties to seek a greater say and share in
the authority and decision-making power at the national level. This
is necessary because state leaders and parties try to get more resources
from the center for the purposes of implementing state concerns. Also,
as state leaders acquire more influence in national affairs, the national
government finds it necessary to humor, placate, induce, and reward
state leaders. While this has contributed to the scaling down of the
separatist tendency that operated earlier in several parts of India, it
has also modified the “strong center” framework by placing de facto
curbs on the center’s sweeping powers of unilateral initiatives and
intervention.
It has also been responsible for the fluctuating electoral fortunes
of different parties for reasons alluded to earlier. When the Congress
dominance came to an end, there began a period of alliance forma-
tion and acute political bargaining leading frequently to political inst-
ability as a consequence of quick turnovers in the government. The
highest watermark of Congress prominence was reached in 1984
when it won 415 parliamentary seats riding on the sympathy vote after
Mrs Indira Gandhi’s assassination. But, it soon lost ground in the
1989 elections and its seat total came down sharply to 197. It however
emerged as the largest single group. When the Congress declined to
form a government when it was invited to do so, V.P. Singh formed
the government under the banner of the National Front after he was
assured outside support from such ideologically opposed parties as
the BJP and the left parties.
The V.P. Singh-led National Front was composed mainly by
the leftover elements of the Janata Dal and consisted of autonomous
state-based parties. The alliance was a makeshift arrangement and

always in danger of being pulled down. Moreover, V.P. Singh was par-
tial to left parties and usually ignored the BJP in running the govern-
ment, consulting its leaders only when convenient. The BJP was,
therefore, miffed and became alienated from the Singh government.
A crisis occurred when V.P. Singh accepted the recommendations
of the Mandal Commission. What added fuel to the fire of the wide-
spread resentment caused by the hasty decision of the government
were the repressive measures that the V.P. Singh government took to
crush the ensuing political agitation. The BJP withdrew its support
and the government fell.
Soon after, the Janata Dal split and Chandrashekhar, the leader of
one of the segments of the Samajwadi Janata Dal (SJD), the Janata
Dal (Secular) [JD (S)] with 55 members, was installed as the Prime
Minister. The Congress and a few Independent members supported
him. However, his government could not last long and had to resign
after the Congress withdrew its support. In the prevailing political
situation, no party was in a position to form a government or continue
in power for long, if it did somehow form a government. The Parlia-
ment was, therefore, dissolved and a fresh election was declared which
took place in May–June 1991. The Congress party emerged as the
largest single group winning 220 seats. It formed the government
under the leadership of Narasimha Rao. However, in the next election
in 1996, the Congress slipped down to second place gaining only 140
seats. The BJP with the single largest number of 161 seats formed
the government under A.B. Vajpayee. However, it had to resign just
after 13 days when it became clear that a vote of no confidence would
be passed against the government. The reason lay in the fact that the
BJP was considered to be a tainted party because of its role in the
demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992.
Vajpayee’s fall signaled the formation of one national front after
another for the purposes of forming a government. Deve Gowda,
leading an alliance of 13 parties, was the first to form the government.
He enjoyed Congress support from outside. I.K. Gujral led the next
government until the BJP returned to power following the 1998
elections. Vajpayee led a coalition government consisting of 12 dis-
parate parties drawn from different states. These parties harbored
32 Ramashray Roy
aspirations of playing important roles in national affairs. The coali-

tion, however, could not last long because the leader of the All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), Jayalalitha, made
demands, which were impossible to satisfy. The AIADMK withdrew
its support and the government resigned on April 14, 1999.The
elections that followed saw the formation of the NDA consisting of
22 parties, again parties that were largely state-based.
Alliances, 2004–09
The 22-party BJP-led alliance remained in power till the government

announced fresh elections before its term ended. The premature
opening of the electoral battle was prompted by over confidence. The
BJP, enthused by its Assembly victory in Gujarat, was convinced of
its victory at the national polls with increased strength. Its catchy
slogan, “India Shining,” a symbol of its over confidence, failed to con-
vince the voters and the BJP suffered heavy losses. It did well in its
traditional strongholds, such as Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, and
Chhattisgarh. It also made substantial gains in Karnataka but slipped,
along with its ally Shiv Sena, in Maharashtra. Its biggest losses, how-
ever, were in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar, Jharkhand, Delhi, Haryana,
and, of all states, Gujarat. However, three of the BJP’s close allies in key
states, the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, TDP in Andhra Pradesh (AP)
and the Trinamul Congress (TMC) in West Bengal suffered a spec-
tacular debacle.
The dimming of India Shining had a very adverse consequence
for the 22-party NDA alliance. It signaled its disintegration because
some of its critical components were convinced that their partici-
pation in it had harmed them. In coming together, none of the com-
ponents of any alliance surrender its autonomy completely; it remains
committed to the promotion of its own interest. But, when it seems
that it is not going to be benefited by its participation in the alliance,
the process of the unraveling of the alliance begins. The disparate
nature of the NDA is indicated by the fact that, as Paul Wallace notes,
it represented “a broad catch-all spectrum of parties.”9 It included a
left-oriented TDP with its base in AP, a Sikh-based Shiromani Akali

Dal (SAD) in Punjab, a Muslim party, National Conference (NC)
confined to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and a rabid Maharashtrian
outfit, Shiv Sena, in Mumbai. Additionally, the NDA also included
the DMK, the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), and Manumalarchi
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) from Tamil Nadu along
with a few other state parties.
The defeat of the BJP-led NDA led to its disintegration. The TDP
left the alliance because Chandrababu Naidu, its leader, attributed
the electoral rout of the TDP in the 2004 Assembly elections to his
open alliance with the BJP at the national level. This association cost
the TDP, he felt, 12–13 percent of minority vote. On top of this, the
2002 Godhra carnage in Gujarat was the last straw for Naidu. Simi-
larly, the DMK, PMK, MDMK, Indian National Lok Dal (INLD),
NC, and the Ram Vilas Paswan faction of JD(U) also left the alliance.
If the communal face of the BJP and its commitment to Hindutva
alienated the TDP in AP, it also had a significant role to play in Naveen
Patnaik’s breaking away from the NDA in Orissa just before the
2009 elections. BJP and the BJD in Orissa have been partners in the
NDA. They formed a coalition government at the state level, but
fought municipal elections separately. However, while the BJD
strength was increasing, that of the BJP was in decline.
Two things happened to separate the two partners. First, the
Municipal elections to Cuttack and Paripadain in the first week of
February 2009 confirmed the trend. In Cuttack, the BJD won 37 seats
with only two going to the BJP. The BJP had in the previous elec-
tions won a majority of the municipal seats, as well as the post of the
Mayor. Baripada, traditionally a Congress stronghold, was wrested in
the previous elections by the BJP and the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
(JMM). However, in the 2009 elections, popular support swung
away from them to the BJD. All this indicated unambiguously that
the electoral fortune of the BJD was on the rise. This was enough of
an indication to Patnaik to be sold on the idea of going solo in the
2009 elections. What seems to have firmed up this idea was the riot
against Christians in Kandhamal. Patnaik, who considered himself to
be a secularist, saw the riot as a danger to his own political survival.
34 Ramashray Roy
Negotiations for seat sharing with the BJP were never seriously begun.
Finally on March 7, 2009 Patnaik announced his decision to leave
the NDA.
Despite all this, the BJP’s hope of coming to power was running
high; it was confident of putting L.K. Advani on the prime ministerial
throne. The atmosphere of unpredictability and its judgment of
Manmohan Singh as a weak prime minister were reinforcing its hope
of coming back to power by winning a majority or a better seat count
in the 2009 elections. To increase its electoral prospects, and especially
to attract voter support in the south, the BJP toned down its Hindutva
zeal and put the Ram Mandir issue on the back burner. It also made
a seat-sharing arrangement with the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP),
Shiv Sena in Mumbai, and JD(U) in Bihar. Thus, the BJP entered the
electoral fray in 2009 with high hopes.
In contradistinction to the BJP, which had a longer experience of
alliances, the Congress fought shy of alliance politics till 2004. The pro-
gressive decline of seat share of the Congress compelled it to engage
in the painful process of soul searching. This process gathered speed
when Mrs Sonia Gandhi became the president of the Congress in
1998. Two focal issues galvanized this process. In the first place, the
Congress never reconciled itself to the loss of its dominance. Political
circumstances forced it to recognize, that also very tardily, the need for
forging a coalition in order to return to power. Nonetheless, it never
fully shed its aspirations of once again enjoying political dominance.
Second, despite the yearning for the revival of the past glory, pol-
itical reality was pushing it toward alliance formation with, what
the Congress leaders emphasized, “like-minded secular parties.” The
stress on secularism as a binding force was necessitated for preventing
the BJP, its rival, from getting an upper hand in the electoral battle.
The Congress took pleasure in accusing it as the rabid champion of
Hindutva and responsible both for the demolition of the Babri Masjid
and the Godhra carnage. To come to power and to defeat the forces
of communalism was thus the prime objective of the Congress. This,
however, depended on the Congress’ willingness to align with other
parties and share power with them if it formed the government.
Perhaps the Congress may be successful in reviving its past glory by
working through the alliance. And looking back, this seems to be a
better explanation for the effort mounted by the Congress to win

friends and influence people. The strategy that it adopted in 2009
also seems to be influenced by this same consideration.
The birth of the UPA occurred during this process of soul
searching. The seeds of the UPA were sown on January 16, 2003 when
Mrs Gandhi invited a few “like-minded secular” leaders to dinner with
the avowed purpose of coordinating in the Lok Sabha the actions of
different parties in opposition on the Ayodhya issue.10 What speeded
up the formation of the NDA was the defeat of the Congress in as-
sembly elections in three states—MP, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan—
in December 2003. Defeat in these states provided the needed impetus
to the Congress to formalize the informal process of coordination into
a formal alliance. It is thus that the UPA was born. It was this alliance
that fought the 2004 elections and came out victorious at the polls,
reducing the BJP to the second position with 138 seats in contrast
to the Congress, which emerged as the single largest group winning
145 seats as against its seat share of 114 in 1999.
Thus the Congress entered into an alliance for the first time in 2004
and this gambit delivered victory to it. Its share of seats increased by 31
and its vote share rose to 28.3 percent, which was higher than the BJP’s
23.8 percent. But what is more significant is that the alliance partners
of the UPA also recorded a considerable rise in the share of their
seats. For example, the seat total of its allies rose from 23 in 1999 to
77 in 2004, while their vote share increased from 5.7 percent in 1999
to 10.1 percent in 2004. This is a pointer to the fact that the major
factor influencing the outcome of the 2004 elections was the polit-
ical calculus working in different states independent of the political
calculus operating in the entire country. This is symptomatic of the
fact of small electoral results in different states producing the grand
outcome at the national level.
Given the importance of state politics, it was natural that NDA
alliance partners expected rewards from the coalition. If these expect-
ations were belied, alliance partners found it very difficult to stay with
the alliance; they would rather pull out and seek new, greener pastures
elsewhere. This is exactly what happened with the Congress-led
UPA also. The first to pull out was Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)
in August 2006 because its expectation of a separate Telangana state
36 Ramashray Roy
was not fulfilled. In March 2007, the MDMK left the alliance accus-
ing the UPA government of neglecting the interest of Tamil Nadu in
interstate water disputes and of failing to implement many central
schemes in the state. Next was Mufti Mohammad Syed’s PDP of
J&K who left the Congress over the Amarnath Yatra row. He formally
left the UPA in January 2009 after the Congress allied itself with the
National Conference to form the state government. Then, the left
parties that were supporting from the outside withdrew their sup-
port on the issue of the Indo-American Nuclear Treaty.
Further depletions occurred in the UPA ranks caused by the resolu-
tion of the Congress Working Committee, taken on January 29, 2009,
not to have a national alliance with any party. On the other hand,
Congress needed coalition partners so as to broaden its support. It
attempted to do both. The former flowed out of the latter inasmuch
as the Congress was sold on Rahul Gandhi’s long-term plan to revive
the party especially in what is known as the cow-belt in northern
India. Earlier, in 2007 at the All India Congress Committee (AICC)
session in New Delhi, Mrs Gandhi had given voice to the party’s inten-
tion by stating: “Coalitions mean positive support from all sides. But
working in a coalition does not mean that we lose our political space.”
She added further: “Such a coalition cannot be at the cost of the revival
of the Congress, particularly in States where its base had eroded.”11
Four years earlier, she had said at a function: “Our main aim is to do
all we can to strengthen the Congress so that we come to power on our
own. But we do not have a closed mind to working with like-minded
secular parties if and when necessary.”12
This is enough to suggest that the forging of an alliance for fighting
national elections constituted, for the Congress, only an expediency
measure taken with a view to gradually consolidate its power base for
once again emerging as the ruling party on its own strength. But as
long as it remained beyond the range of possibility, the party’s choice
was to forge alliance with like-minded parties. Even this choice was
preferable because it would be the Congress that remained the focal
point of any alliance it chose to enter into because of its electoral
strength, either as the first or the second largest group in the Parlia-
ment. But then what explains the refusal of the Congress to forge alli-
ances even with its trusted friends at the national level? The question
assumes added importance in view of the radical change in the behavior

of Mrs Gandhi in 2004 and in 2009 insofar as the formation of alli-
ances is concerned.
In 2004, for instance, she went out of her way to woo new friends.
She went to the extent of walking and driving to the houses of several
leaders, including that of Mayawati of the BSP in Delhi, in mobil-
izing their support for the UPA. In contrast, in 2009 when the alliance
partners showed their concern about the Congress’ resolution of not
entering into a national alliance at the national level, the Congress
issued no reconciliatory statement.13 While the Congress worked hard
to strike up an alliance with the NCP in Maharashtra, the TMC in
West Bengal, and JMM in Jharkhand, it showed no willingness to do
so with the RJD, the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) in Bihar, and the SP in
UP—all formerly important members of the UPA and all from the
cow-belt. Also, Mrs Gandhi kept Lalu Prasad Yadav waiting, who
sought an interview with her, for two days and Yadav had to cancel
his request because the call for the interview never came.
The explanation lies in the unannounced but not well-concealed
intention of the Congress party to make a bid for its long awaited
revival, at least in the cow-belt. This bid was prompted by indications
from several sources, which hinted that the Congress was favorably
placed in the battle of the ballot. Note, for instance, that the Congress
hired a private agency to carry out a survey to find what prospects
awaited the Congress in the forthcoming electoral battle. The survey
indicated that the Congress was sure to get at least 185 seats. Of course,
some of its partners had not deserted the alliance then, which they
did later. The AP Chief Minister had assured the party that it would
capture at least 25 seats in the state. Reports from Gujarat led the party
to expect 12 seats in that state. Similarly, reports from some other
states were also very encouraging. All these various indications
reinforced the resolve of the Congress to make a bid for recovering
its past glory. And this bid could not have yielded good results if the
party remained aligned with the RJD, LJP, and the SP. It is not, there-
fore, surprising that no seat-sharing arrangement could be made
with these parties.
The failure in arriving at seat-sharing arrangement with these
parties led to the formation of the Fourth Front comprising the RJD,
38 Ramashray Roy
the LJP, and the SP. Also, the PMK in Tamil Nadu left the alliance and
went over to the AIADMK. Another front, the Third Front consisted
of the left parties, the BSP, the TDP, the AIADMK, and the [JD(S)].
The BJD also joined its rank. The impetus for forging the Third Front
goes back to the decision of the left parties to vote on August 8, 2008
against the UPA government on the issue of the Indo-American
Nuclear Treaty. They sought assistance from the then United Dem-
ocratic Progressive Alliance. The idea of the Third Front took its birth
then and after a lot of discussion, the Front was launched on March
12, 2009 at Timkur in Karnataka.14 However, it lacked a formal organ-
ization, which was to take place after the elections. In the meantime,
each of its constituents were to engage in friendly contests with non-
Congress and non-BJP parties.15 However, these friendly contests were
beset with reciprocal animosity and unbridgeable gaps. Each partner
was to fight the election on its own in its own state and was then to
form a formal organization.16
Concluding Observations
The results of the 2009 Parliamentary elections conclusively demon-

strate that the Congress strategy of alliance formation paid it a rich
dividend. It had state level alliances where it needed support, and ab-
stained from it where it wanted to strengthen its position such as in
the cow-belt states, UP and Bihar. As the results show, the Congress
alliance won 262 seats, with the Congress alone getting 206 seats
thus crossing the 200 mark for the first time since 1991. Also, its share
of popular votes rose to 28.6 percent, an increase of 2.1 percent over
2004. Insofar as the cow-belt states are concerned, its gain was large in
UP, with 12 seats as against nine in 2004. With the base of 262 seats,
it was easy for the Congress to get a majority along with the promise of
support from the RJD, the LJP, and the SP. On all accounts, then, the
position of the Congress in the Parliament is impregnable. However,
with victory achieved, the UPA had to deal with a new range of issues,
which if left unresolved, may prove its undoing in the future.
The question whether or not we are witnessing a revival and a steady

march of the Congress toward its coveted goal of unchallenged dom-
inance hinges mainly on two factors. The first factor is, of course,
the ability of the Congress party-led alliance to resolve differences
that arise in its ranks. The immediate problem that the UPA faced
was the disposal of ministerial and cabinet ranks. Certain differences
were already discernible in the drama that the DMK staged for getting
ministerial posts for satisfying the aspirations of different members
of Karunanidhi’s family. While it was resolved, intense lobbying for
ministerial berths delayed the expected expansion and distribution
of portfolios. The reason for this lies in the several issues involved
in achieving a proper balance. These include young faces, good gov-
ernance, merit, regional balance, and the representation of different
states where the Congress did well. These issues proved a hard nut to
crack, but they have now been resolved. And yet, as the saying goes,
“there is many a slip between cup and lip.” There may yet develop
pockets of discontent that may make the UPA-II stumble and fall
between now and five years hence.
Thus, the answer to the question whether the Congress is moving
toward recovering its past glory or not, depends primarily on its per-
formance as the leader of the ruling coalition. In the meantime,
what is important to note is that in the 2009 elections, there was no
overarching issue; the national electoral result was, if anything, the
aggregation of state results. Political cleavages at the state level pro-
duced the national election outcome. It should also be noted that
despite the fact that the Congress increased its seat share by 61 seats,
its share of popular votes rose only by a mere two percentage points, a
situation similar to 1999 when the NDA formed the government. It is
against this background that the second factor becomes important
in answering the question whether the Congress is moving toward
reviving its past glory. This second factor concerns the ability of the
Congress party to revive its electoral strength in especially major
Indian states.
In the northeastern states, the Congress is strong except in Tripura.
However, electoral strength of the Congress in these states does not
ensure its emergence as a national party that can win majority of parlia-
mentary seats on its own. It has to win big in major Indian states for
40 Ramashray Roy
that. In the case of major states, the Congress polled between 40 to 49

percent of votes in eight states. However, in only two states does it
faces weak opposition; in the rest of the six states, there exists almost
a bipolar situation. In six of the states, it polled between 10 to 19
percent of votes and in five states between 30 to 39 percent. Here also,
non-Congress parties or an alliance rules three states. These figures are
revealing in the sense that the Congress has not done quite well even
when there has been a small upsurge in its electoral fortunes.
Thus the question boils down to the possibility of the merger of the
state parties into the Congress or their decimation on the electoral
battleground at the hands of the Congress. Both these possibilities are
unlikely to become reality. If state parties are strong enough and have
dug their roots deep in state politics, they will remain stronger and
control power apparatus in their own state. In that case, they would not
think of merger with any party. However, they can always enter into
alliances with any party or parties. Here also it is not at all clear why
they align themselves with the Congress when it has shown a strong
tendency toward using them as stepping-stones for climbing up
on the power ladder. As such, the revival of the past glory of the Congress
party does not seem to be in the near future. As the Lokniti Team of the
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi, notes:
[Its] recovery is still very partial, especially in States such as Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar where the Congress has been unable to access the bottom of the
social pyramid. Also, there are many states where the Congress is in no
position to take on the BJP. The Congress cannot overgrow its allies in other
parts of the country, at least not yet. But to say this is to imply that the party
has not yet peaked. The Congress still has a lot of room to grow.17
Notes
1. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern
State (New York: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1954).
2. It should be noted that the party space in India is cluttered with six national
parties and more than 500 small and medium parties.
3. For instance, the UPA-led Congress consisted of 14 parties and the BJP-led NDA
had 22 parties in it.
â•‡ 4. For details, see Ramashray Roy, Democracy in India: Form and Substance (Delhi:
Shipra Publications, 2005), pp. 192–94.
â•‡ 5. See Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Principal State Level Contests and
Derivative National Choices,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 6,
February 2009, p. 57.
â•‡ 6. Ibid., p. 56.
â•‡ 7. Vandita Mishra, “Small but Powerful,” The Indian Express (New Delhi) February
17, 2009.
â•‡ 8. Pramod K. Kantha, “The BJP and Indian Democracy: Elections, Bombs, and
Beyond,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), Indian Politics and the 1998
Elections; Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
1999), p. 359.
â•‡ 9. Paul Wallace, “Introduction: The New National Party System and State Politics,”
in Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds), India’s 1999 Elections and 20th Century
Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 5.
10. The leaders who attended the dinner included Sharad Pawar of the NCP, who
had not until then broken bread with Sonia Gandhi having left the Congress five
years earlier on the issue of her foreign, Italian origin. Others included Mulayam
Singh of the SP, Lalu Prasad Yadav of the RJD, and Ram Vilas Paswan of
the LJP.
11. D.K. Singh, “Why the Congress is Going Solo,” The Sunday Indian Express
(New Delhi) March 29, 2009.
12. Ibid.
13. Only in the case of Sharad Pawar did the Congress show some concern when
he talked of exploring other avenues. Rahul Gandhi was sent to Pune to mollify
Pawar.
14. For details, see T.A. Johnson, “The Third Front First Force,” The Indian Express
(New Delhi) March 19, 2009.
15. These parties were: CPM, CPI, JD(S), TDP, TRS, AIADMK, and BSP.
16. See The Indian Express (New Delhi) March 16, 2009.
17. The Hindu, “How India Voted,” Supplement Section (New Delhi) May 26,
2009.
chapter 3
Coalition Politics: Withering of

National–Regional Ideological Positions?
Pramod Kumar
Electoral politics in the 20th century has been mirrored by a nation-

building project propelled by a one-party dominant system. Politics
since 1989 redefined the role of national and regional political parties,
as it transformed the content of electoral discourse and use of ideo-
logical filters as per convenience. In this chapter, an attempt has been
made to capture the tensions between state politics, populist politics,
and people’s politics. It also deals with the politics of “presence” and
of “representation” in their interaction with democracy, federalism,
and diversity as reflected in elections. To undertake this task, there is
a need to capture the changing spectrum of interactive relationship
between political parties, citizens, and the policymakers in formulating
and setting the agenda for governance. These interactive relationships
shape the nature and level of political participation of the citizens,
regions, and their diversities. All of these considerations have vital
implications for federalism, the electoral system, and social democracy
in terms of the stakes of social cleavages in political decision-making,
and the extent of social and economic inclusiveness.
The shift from a command to market economy has redefined the
role of the state. The mandate of governance changed from welfarism
to fiscal management, public sector growth and employment to lever-
aging public resource for private growth, and retrenchment of jobs in
the public sector and subsidies to the private sector for making pro-
vision for health and education, and imposition of user charges on the
citizens. This shaped two divergent kinds of discourse, one emanating
Coalition Politics 43
from the shift in the path of development manifesting in what has

been termed as “state politics,” and another found articulation at the
time of elections in the form of “populist politics.”
It has been argued that the practice of democracy has a select domain
restricted to those who govern and those who avail its governance.
The two have entered into a collaborative relationship and emerged as
custodians of the state shaping the terms of political discourse under
the banner of “state politics.” People on the margins, outside the realm
of democratic practice need doles for their survival that is provided
by electoral politics, which becomes their mainstay, lending content
to what is known as “populist politics.” This has provided dominant
space in mainstream politics to a coalition of interests in negation to
the participation of citizens, diversities, and regions in democratic gov-
ernance. This tension has been reflected in the dichotomous relation-
ship between populist politics and state politics. In populist politics, it
emanates from an articulation of politics of representation as synony-
mous with the presence of citizens, diversities, and regions in exclu-
sion of their stake building in state politics.1 The “politics of presence”
has overtaken politics of ideas, values, and purpose. The outcome of
this vacillation is that the ideological difference between political par-
ties has got blurred while the difference between “populist” and “state
politics” has become more manifest.
Political transformations in a decade starting from 1967 were sig-
nificant, insofar as one-party dominant system was concerned. It led
to the polarization of the Indian party system into two blocks with
anti-Congressism being the only unifying factor for the opposition
parties. From 1989 onwards, the Congress party’s hegemony of being
an umbrella party became questioned and the space thus vacated was
appropriated by regional political parties. Examples include the BSP,
JD(U), BJD, SP, DMK, and the AIADMK. A perusal of the electoral
results shows that since 1989, the multiparty character of the party
system is illustrated by the fact that the values of the Laakso-Taagepera
Index (N) (of the effective number of parties) by votes/seats were
4.80/4.35, 5.10/3.70, 7.11/5.83, 6.91/5.28, 6.74/5.87, 7.6/6.5, and
7.6/5.0 in 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, and 2009, respectively,
whereas prior to 1989, the effective number of the parties by seats
44 Pramod Kumar
exceeded three only once (3.16 in 1967) and the effective number of
parties by votes exceeded five only once (5.19 in 1967).2
Further, within the multiparty character of the party system, the
space occupied by the regional political parties in terms of votes and the
elected members has increased. For instance, the percentage share of
votes of the national parties is on the decline. Their share of votes was
around 78 percent in the 1984 parliamentary elections, which declined
to 64 percent in the 2009 parliamentary elections. In comparision, the
share of the regional parties increased from 12 percent to 31 percent
during the same period. Further, the share of the national political parties
in the elected members of parliament has decreased from 85 percent to
69 percent and that of the regional parties increased from 12 percent to 29
percent in the 1984 and 2009 elections, respectively (see Table 3.1).
The change in the nature of party system from one-party dominance
(with greater emphasis on the unitary aspects of Indian federation and
the moderate level of political participation of the citizens, regions, and
social cleavages) to the multiparty system (with higher participation
of the people on the margins of society in the elections and greater
presence of the diversities in legislatures) has unfolded the para-
doxes of the Indian democracy.
In political science literature, the first phase of the party system —up
to the mid-1960s—has been characterized as a one-party dominance
system.3 In this, the agenda of governance and of electoral discourse
were in consonance with each other. This was the phase of one-party
dominance in Indian politics. In this phase, it was assumed that there
is a consensus on state-led capitalism, where state intervention was
meant to create conditions of development in underdeveloped regions
and groups. There was a broad understanding in politics about the
strategy of state-led capitalism for moderating the uneven impact of
development on regions, citizens, and social cleavages. For instance,
there were conscious attempts to assign central dole to the public sector
to take the economy to “commanding heights” and “build a social-
istic pattern of society.” Election manifesto of the Congress party in
1962 declared that:
[T]he public sector will increasingly expand and play a dominant role,
both for the purpose of accelerating the speed of industrialisation and
Table 3.1
Performance of National and Regional Parties
Party-wise representation amongst elected members Percentage votes

Party 2009* 2004 1999 1998 1984–85 2009 2004 1999 1998 1984–85
National parties 69.24 67.03 67.96 71.27 85.40 63.58 62.89 67.11 67.98 77.86
Regional parties 29.10 32.04 30.94 27.62 12.20 31.23 32.87 30.15 29.66 12.73
Independents 1.66 0.92 1.10 1.10 2.40 5.19 4.25 2.74 2.37 9.41
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections from 1984 to 2004, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
Note: *For 2009, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/results_of_the_2009_Indian_general_election_by_party
45
46 Pramod Kumar
yielding additional resources. Public, private and co-operative sectors

should function in unison as parts of a single mechanism. Government
should exercise effectively its powers of control and the use of appropriate
fiscal measures.4
Public investment was made to create physical infrastructure, land

reforms legislation was enacted, affirmative action for providing
reservations in jobs for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Tribes (STs)
was taken, and the Community Development Programme (CDP) for
creating rural infrastructure was also launched. The assumption was
that the logic of development and broadening the base of democracy
will lead to overall empowerment of the underprivileged sections and
create conditions for the withering away of the primordial identities
based on caste, region, and religion. The outcome of these initiatives,
no doubt, blurred the divergence between economic policies under
the banner of state capitalism and political mobilisation for building
“socialistic pattern of society.” But the contradiction between the path
of development, electoral promises, and social expectations became
glaring. As a consequence, people’s politics found expression through
various protest movements of the youth, the Naxalite movement, and
unrest among the Dalits, peasantry, and public sector employees.
In the sphere of electoral politics, people on the margins could see
the importance of their votes and political leadership realized that elec-
toral outcomes were dependent upon the garnering of votes from the
poor. The Garibi Hatao slogan, nationalization of banks, and aboli-
tion of the privy purses were used as major planks to woo voters in
the 1972 elections. Election manifesto of the Congress party in 1977 made
promises with a tinge of apologetic welfarism. It assigned the private
sector a national role and hoped to make the public sector efficient.
In its 1977 election manifesto, Congress party declared, “To enlarge
the role and efficiency of the public sector, to give proper scope to the
private sector to play a national role without concentration of eco-
nomic power, to control prices and ensure supplies of essential com-
modities.”5 These pronouncements were adequately reflected in the
plan documents and government policies.
These policies and programs provided content to these slogans by
introducing a number of poverty alleviation programs. They sought
to provide income to the poor, such as Food for Work and subsidies
to agriculture. In this phase also, the attempt was to reflect electoral
promises in the government programs and policies. However, the
outcome of this phase was the emergence of regional politics as
reflected in multiparty competition in the electoral domain and protest
movements across the regions.
In the political domain, the Congress party suffered a setback and
a number of regional parties emerged at the state level. The strategy
adopted was to vanquish dissent and negate regionalism, but to
the contrary, the strategy strengthened the opposition parties. As a
result, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi attempted to curb the
opposition through divide and rule politics and an authoritarian
mode, which reached its peak with the imposition of emergency rule
in the country. However, her emergency could not be sustained as
India’s multicultural ethos blended with political democracy required
an institutional mechanism which could articulate the coalition of
diverse regional, cultural, and class interests. A new political forma-
tion representing this diversity under the banner of the Janata Party,
a replica of the earlier Nehru Congress Party, captured the political
space and facilitated the return of political democracy. Political inst-
ability continued and the Janata regime was replaced by Indira Gandhi
in 1980. The politics of populism was unleashed to woo the regional
interests, religious and caste spectrum, and the poor for electoral com-
petition. The arena of conflict shifted from eradication of poverty
to issues relating to federalism including decentralization of power,
autonomy for states and right to self-determination. Regional move-
ments took the form of terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab, and in several
parts of the north-eastern states. The political system failed to cope
with these issues. Paradoxically, due to excessive centralization, the
leaders became all powerful, but with a weak institutional base that
rendered them powerless to mediate between the conflicting interests,
conflicts, and to bring about social transformation.
From 1989, the crisis in politics deepened coupled with economic
reforms and the emergence of coalition politics.
Electoral compulsions, which required the support of the people through

their votes, unleashed a competitive politics of populism. Political parties
48 Pramod Kumar
and political leaders across the board sought to woo the people with sops…
The number of promises made multiplied, but the number of promises
kept dwindled.6
The state increasingly abdicated its governing role to market forces

and in elections, political parties made promises which were in con-
tradiction with the economic reforms agenda.
For example, the Congress party in Punjab, caught between
Assembly elections (2002) and Parliamentary elections (2004), became
a victim of the paradox between electoral promises and government
mandate. In the 2002 Assembly elections, its promise of free electricity
to farmers contributed to its victory over its opponent the Akali Dal.
After coming to power, at both the state and central levels, the party
started implementing the government mandate to introduce economic
reforms. At the state level, it imposed electricity tariff on agriculture and,
consequently, it performed poorly in the 2004 national elections.
The Congress party was quick to announce the implementation
of sops like free electricity to the farmers in the wake of the next elec-
tions in 2007. This ambivalence between electoral compulsions and
their commitment to implement an economic reforms agenda led to
a tension between populist politics and state politics. Not only the
national, but even the regional political parties also promised sops to
the electorates at the time of elections. In the 2007 Assembly elections
and 2009 Parliamentary elections, the SAD in Punjab promised free
electricity to the farmers. But, in the wake of fiscal reforms in 2010,
the SAD–BJP coalition government imposed electricity tariff on the
farmers.7
Furthermore, the national and regional parties promised a number
of other sops at the time of elections. For instance, the answer to the
price rise was to subsidize atta–dal and this was used to spearhead their
election campaigns. For example, the SAD manifesto read:
Prices of wheat atta have gone up from `â•›6.50 per kg in 2002 to `â•›17
at present. Similarly, the price of ordinary pulses has also shot up from `â•›18
per kg in 2002 to `â•›65 at present. Diesel prices have gone up from `â•›14.50
per litre to `â•›32 per litre whereas a cooking gas cylinder which cost only
`â•›210 in 2002 now costs `â•›375. The new government will provide atta
at `â•›4 per kg and dal at `â•›20 per kg to the poor.8
And in Tamil Nadu, the DMK election manifesto promised the

sale of rice at the rate of `â•›2 per kg to the ration cardholders.9
Similarly, the Congress campaign took up this issue belatedly and
their manifesto read:
Strengthen Public Distribution System (PDS) in the state to ensure timely

availability of sufficient foodgrains and cereals to the Dalits, economically
weaker sections and BPL [Below Poverty Line] families at affordable prices.
Ensure provision of 35 kg of wheat/Atta and 10 kg of rice @ `â•›2 per kg for
the poorest of the poor (Antyodaya families). Ensure provision of dal up
to 5 kg to the poorest of poor (Antyodaya families) @ `â•›20 per kg.10
Political parties have not cared to analyze the causes and ways to
reduce the prices and raise the purchasing capacity of the poor, and
are silent on formulating policies for ensuring food security. This
situation led to a disconnect between the people, the political parties,
and the government. In government, these political parties give sub-
sidies as doles to the poor and as a right to the interest groups and stake-
holders. However, during elections, subsidies are promised as rights to
the poor. It is because of this reason that subsidies directed at the
poor are termed as doles and subsidies directed to protect profits are
described as rescue packages. The former is presented as populist and
the latter a survival need.
Coalition politics functioned more as coalition of interests between
big business, land speculators, big farmers, and government con-
tractors. As a leading political analyst, Alan Altshuler, commenting on
the claims of political parties in the USA said: “Though their little favours
went to little men, the big favours went to land speculators, public utility
franchise holders, government contractors, illicit businessmen and, of
course, the leading members of the machines themselves.”11 Within the
party system, coalition politics functioned more as a “coalition of pat-
ronage for sharing spoils between the national and regional political
parties.” The state was:
...increasingly unable to mediate between conflicting interests and com-

peting demands resorted more and more to a politics of patronage. This
patronage, which came to be extended in a bewildering variety of ways, was
a means of sharing the spoils among the constituents of the ruling elite.12
50 Pramod Kumar
Consequently, in order to appease regional political parties so as to

form a coalition government at the national level, national political
parties shifted their stance in the electoral discourse in favor of greater
autonomy for the regions, while regional political parties also amended
their position from anti-centrism to cooperative federalism. In its 2009
election manifesto, the Congress Party claimed:
It is only the Indian National Congress that has demonstrated its com-
mitment to a strong Centre, to strong States, and to strong panchayats
and nagarpalikas. India’s political system must have space for institutions
at each of these three levels. Each has a vital and specific role to play.13
And the BJP in 2009 elections declared: “We will place Centre–
State relations on an even keel through the process of consultation.
The genuine grievances of States will be addressed in a comprehensive
manner. The moribund National Development Council will be revived
and made into an active body,”14 “…for devolution of more financial
and administrative powers and functions to the States. We will take
suitable steps to ensure harmonious Centre-State relations in the light
of the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.”15
But, on the contrary, the BJP implemented policies which com-
promised autonomy of the states and reinforced the tendencies of
centralization.
In the political domain, the emphasis on mutually acceptable trade-
offs between the national and regional political parties was loud in
accommodation and feeble in substance. It only meant reconciliation
to achieve power equilibrium. The language of political discourse was
strongly influenced to construct “coalition through patronage” across
the ideological spectrum of political parties. Moreover, there is a region-
alization of national political parties and nationalization of regional
political parties. For instance, the Congress government in Punjab
passed the Punjab Repealing Act of 2004 on the Satluj Yamuna Link
(SYL) much to the annoyance of the central leadership of the Congress
Party. In other words, the Congress in competition with a regional
alliance started appropriating the anti-center constituency in the state.
The BJP changed its position from a strong center to greater auto-
nomy for states.16
Similarly, the SAD shifted its position from anti-centrism to anti-

Congressism to co-operative federalism. The Akali Dal in its 1973
resolution proclaimed that “it would endeavor to have the Indian Con-
stitution recast on real federal principles, with equal representation at
the Center for all the states.” The same Akali Dal through its president
Parkash Singh Badal, who was party to the 1973 resolution, asserted
in the year 2000, that “Our constitutional framework was for more
federal structure, but owing to the rule of the Congress government,
both at the Centre and in the states, the powers of the states were
slowly usurped and a unitary set-up was nearly established.”
The shift in the Akali Dal’s position is mainly due to the emergence
of coalition politics and the decline of one-party dominance. As a
result, the thrust of the Akali Dal agenda changed from anti-centrism
to co-operative federalism:
The Akali-BJP government has opened a new chapter in Centre–State

relations, ushering in the age of co-operative federalism in the country.
The era of confrontation has been effectively ended and replaced with a
forward looking thrust on working together for the overall good of the
state and the nation.17
This position marks a radical shift from the anti-center stance

as reflected in the 1973 autonomy resolution and in its later 1985
memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission. The shift was first made
public on the occasion of the Hola Mohalla festival near Gurdwara
Takht Keshgarh at Anandpur Sahib in a political conference. The
resolution passed stated:
Today’s conference demands of the centre that for the prosperity of the
country, in favor of development of people, the centre-state relations
should be redefined in the light of the Anandpur Sahib resolution. Setting
up of a true federal structure in the country was the need of the hour.18
The issue of greater autonomy for the states was nurtured in a pol-
itical climate marked by over centralization of power and one-party
dominance since independence. This has worked in two ways: on
the one hand, it has provided greater access to regional parties to share
spoils of power reducing the alliance between the national and the
52 Pramod Kumar
regional political parties as “coalition for patronage” and, on the other

hand, it has made the regional parties stand on redefining the center–
state relations as ambivalent.19
Interestingly, in coalition politics, regional groups have become
strong, and the forces of regionalism have become weak. It has, no
doubt, created opportunities for the small regional opposition parties
to have important ministerial berths as rewards, but the same has
weakened the regional agenda and interests. Consequently, it has made
Indian politics less federal and more centralized, extending adhoc
benefits to those regions which are strategic partners in the coalition.
A few illustrations to prove the point. In the center–state fiscal rela-
tionship, the statutory transfer of funds to the states have become
secondary and the role of discretionary grants to finance the state plans
by the center have become more prominent (see Table 3.2).
This is especially noticeable between the eighth and ninth Finance

Commission even when the total transfers had increased. Between the two
components of transfers from the Finance Commission, the share of grants
has substantially increased in the reform period, suggesting a declining
access to the collective pool of national tax resources by the provinces, put
differently greater access to revenue to the Central government.20
Further, the central government expenditure has declined and

states’ expenditure share has multiplied (see Table 3.3). This acquires
significance in view of the states’ declining access to resources.
Not only this, in the centrally sponsored schemes, funding has
increased in the social sector. In most of the cases, these schemes are
not commensurate with the needs of the local people. This results in
nonperformance of the states which adversely affects their claim to
central resources.
In other words, the apportionment of resources is to the dis-
advantage of the states irrespective of the fact that the regional parties
have emerged as important players in the national politics. And, the
national parties along with the regional parties have also promised to
build a genuine federal structure in the electoral discourse, but the
character of the state and the policy regime continue to be in favor
of centralization.
Table 3.2
Transfer from Center to States as Percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Center: Finance Commission Period Average
Finance Commission Transfers Other Transfers Total

Share in Total transfer through Grants through Nonplan grants Other transfers Total transfers
Year Central taxes Grants finance commission (2+3) planning commission (non-statutory) (5+6) (4+7)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
VII FC 22.39 1.96 24.35 12.11 1.66 13.77 38.11
VIII FC 20.25 2.52 22.77 13.56 1.54 15.10 37.86
IX FC 21.37 3.42 22.79 14.48 1.06 15.54 40.33
X FC 21.40 2.34 23.75 10.57 0.63 11.19 35.79
XI FC 20.93 5.20 26.13 10.39 0.82 11.21 37.20
(first two years)

Source: 11th Finance Commission Report, Government of India.
53
54 Pramod Kumar
Table 3.3
Trends in Expenditure to GDP Ratio
Combined (%) Center (%) States (%)

1990–91 26.83 17.74 14.3
1991–92 26.3 16.52 14.84
1992–93 26.11 16.37 14.43
1993–94 25.89 16.49 14.21
1994–95 25.03 15.27 14.37
1995–96 24.2 14.66 13.78
1996–97 23.38 14.13 13.46
1997–98 24.16 13.64 13.76
1998–99 25.19 14.27 14.06
1999–00 26.26 14.79 14.95
2000–01 26.1 14.5 14.8
2001–02 28.1 15.2 15.8
Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IIPFS), various issues.
In practice, the emphasis of politics has shifted from ideology of

representation of the regions in governance to the distribution of
patronage to the regional parties and interest groups. Similarly, in the
case of common citizens and social cleavages, the focus has been to
“privilege political presence over common interests.” In the dominant
discourse, the arguments are advanced to make voting compulsory or
provide reservation of seats in the legislature on the basis of gender,
social cleavages, and minorities or the apportionment of the state
resources on the basis of target groups.
The politics of presence was practiced not only to co-opt regions,
but also the citizens and social cleavages based on caste and religion.
The test of democratic participation is seen through voters turnout,
number of contestants, and the representation of common people
in the legislatures rather than the outcomes in terms of mainstreaming
the poor and disadvantaged and also to achieve a more just and
equitable society. A study of voters turnover shows an increase from
58.07 percent in the 2004 elections to 58.43 percent in the 2009
elections. The number of contestants has also increased from 5435 in
2004 to 8070 in the 2009 elections (see Table 3.4). In addition, the
representation of people from low social origins has also multiplied.
For instance, the number of SC candidates increased from 10 percent
(630) in 1989 to 24 percent (1933) in the 2009 parliamentary

elections. Similarly, the number of ST candidates increased from
4 percent (224) in 1989 to 7 percent (565) in 2009 elections (see
Table 3.4).
But the basic issue remains—how far has the increase in participation
in elections benefited people with low social origins in the decision-
making process and created conducive conditions for equity? Not only
this, it is worth analyzing the shift in political discourse from, to use
Benedict Anderson, categories “unbound serialities” and “bound serial-
ities.” In electoral politics in the earlier phase, the language of politics
referred to nation-building, citizen rights, equality for all religion,
castes, and ethnicity largely remained within the domain of “unbound
serialities.”21
Table 3.4
Caste-wise Candidate Summary: Lok Sabha Elections, 1971–2009
Year General SC ST Total

All India 2,263 343 163 2,769
1971
% from Total 81.73 12.39 5.89 100
All India 2,026 291 122 2,439
1977
% from Total 83.07 11.93 5.00 100
All India 3,913 502 214 4,629
1980
% from Total 84.53 10.84 4.62 100
All India 4,661 592 240 5,493
1984–85
% from Total 84.85 10.78 4.37 100
All India 5,306 630 224 6,160
1989
% from Total 86.14 10.23 3.64 100
All India 7,508 899 342 8,749
1991–92
% from Total 85.82 10.28 3.91 100
All India 12,123 1,356 473 13,952
1996
% from Total 86.89 9.72 3.39 100
All India 3,936 571 243 4,750
1998
% from Total 82.86 12.02 5.12 100
All India 3,816 602 230 4,648
1999
% from Total 82.10 12.95 4.95 100
All India 3,674 1,372 389 5,435
2004
% from Total 67.60 25.24 7.16 100
All India 5,572 1,933 565 8,070
2009
% from Total 69.05 23.95 7.00 100.00
Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
56 Pramod Kumar
In 1962, the Congress party in its election manifesto declared it

would build:
a social order based on justice and offering equal opportunity to every

citizen … The social services and, more especially, education and health
should be expanded, greater attention being paid to economically and edu-
cationally backward people. The test of giving particular attention should
be that of economic backwardness. Thus, low income groups, irrespective
of castes and communities should receive special consideration.22
In the 1977 elections, the Congress party promised “to safeguard

the interests of the minorities and weaker sections, to end privy purses
and other such privileges, to provide the basic requirements of the
people, speedily through dynamic rural programmes, to provide new
employment avenues.”23
However, after the mid-1980s, sectional interests based on caste
and religion were articulated in the elections and the slogan of “justice
for all” was replaced by “justice for backward castes, Dalits, and
minorities.” These exclusive category usages for “inclusive govern-
ance” led to polarization in the elections. For example, in the 2009
parliamentary elections, the projection of Mayawati, a Dalit leader, as
the prime ministerial candidate by the Third Front led by Communist
Parties, may have polarized the middle class non-Dalit votes to the
advantage of the Congress party. This can be seen from the increase
in the urban votes in favor of the Congress party. The main thrust
of the argument is that in the post-economic reforms, competition
for the scarce resources is being shaped around sectional interests and
identities. The tension between economics of the market, i.e., state
politics and populist politics, led to the inclusion of sectional interests
based on religion and caste. This became a major factor for electoral
mobilizations by the competing political parties. For instance, the
Mandal Commission has promised job opportunities to the Backward
Castes in an environment where jobs opportunities in the public sector
are shrinking. This also acknowledges that politics of populism can
only promise hope.
It is not at all our contention that by offering a few thousand jobs to

the OBC candidates we shall be able to make 52 per cent of the Indian
population as forward, but we must recognize that an essential part of the

battle against the social backwardness is to be fought in the minds of
backward people, when a backward class candidate becomes a Collector
or a Superintendent of Police, the material benefits accruing from his pos-
ition are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological
spin-off of this phenomenon is tremendous, the entire community of that
backward class candidate feels socially elevated.24
The state has abdicated its responsibility to build a secular society

through affirmative action, where caste shall not be the basis of dis-
pensation of justice, and religious identities shall not be the basis of
entitlement of national resources. On the contrary, it consolidated the
hold of regional, communal, and caste-based parties in elections. Most
of the regional parties have provided impetus to the “sons of the soil”
and articulated these concerns in their electoral discourse.
For example, in Maharashtra, it has been reported that the Congress
party benefited in the 2009 parliamentary and state assembly elections
due to the radical assertions of Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS)
Chief Raj Thackeray. These assertions brought about a division in the
vote bank of Shiv Sena. MNS Chief Raj Thackeray attempted to
involve “sons of the soil” parochialism when he asserted that:
Nashik was facing an influx of north India. They are earning here and
sending the money to their native place … I am not against them, but
they should have some affection for Maharashtra … He warned that north
Indians who did not speak Marathi and did not respect Marathi culture
would be driven away,25
The Congress government in Maharashtra has made their support to

the MNS agenda explicit in announcing it would strictly implement the
eligibility criteria for a taxi driving permit, which stipulated that a per-
son must be a resident of Maharashtra for a minimum 15 years and can
read, write, and speak Marathi.26 These articulations acquire significance
in the backdrop of the political parties mobilizing support for elections
on the basis of region, caste, and religious group affiliations. A perusal
of the election manifestos of the political parties clearly shows that
the parties promised subsidies, social security, and safety nets to the
electorates based on social cleavages.27
58 Pramod Kumar
In the 2009 elections, the Congress party asserted that “The

empowerment of the weaker sections of society—scheduled castes
(SCs), scheduled tribes (STs), OBCs, minorities, and women—has
been an article of faith with the Indian National Congress. This will be
carried forward with emphasis on education, particularly skill-based
and professional education.”28 For instance, communalism has been
used to even present problems like unemployment as affecting the
Hindus or the Muslims or the Sikhs. Articulation of the findings rela-
ting to backwardness of Muslims in the Sachar Commission Report,
reservation of jobs for backward castes, and social and economic back-
wardness of Dalits have been used as vote catching devices.
The logical outcome of this approach is the feeling of a deep sense
of discrimination amongst those who are either denied access to
employment opportunities or who remained on the margins of the
employment market. “Coalition of presence” became rather the norm
to co-opt social cleavages and offer doles to the common citizens under
the banner of citizen-centric governance.
But a majority of the women representatives in the local bodies, as
per a pre-election survey conducted in 2008, were dissatisfied as they
were promised at the time of election that the “politics of presence” shall
provide answers to their claims to equity, access, and accountable gov-
ernance.29 But these political parties, while in government pursued an
agenda of downsizing the public sector and have, in fact, leveraged
public sector resources to the private sector with a claim to provide
efficient and accountable governance to the people. People have been
reduced to “consumers with the ability to choose and complain
(although) not the ability to proactively shape services.”30
Results in developing countries especially have shown that the interests of

the powerless, the hardcore poor, the ethnic minority and the aged have
been sidelined while the existing democratic institutions (the represen-
tative democracy) have been hijacked by the rich and the lobbyists and
continued to function as a platform for the vested interests and not that of
the poor. This has mirrored the regulatory dimension of the ‘state politics’
and the abdication syndrome ingrained into the practice of politics.31
The postcolonial state has failed to transform the status of people

from colonial subjects to citizens. It has been very aptly described by
Nicholas Dirks when he termed the colonial states as ethnographic

states.32 In other words, the states do not seek participation of the
citizens in decision-making, but claim to provide for the welfare of
population. This made governance less a matter of politics and more
of administrative policy. The foremost ingredient of this has been
mistrust in the subjects or populace. It can be exemplified in a number
of ways, but the most visible is the filing of affidavits for almost every
interaction with the government.
These affidavits are required in support of the facts given by the
applicants for various services provided by the government. In other
words, these are affirmations by the applicants in some cases supported
by third parties. These affidavits in most of the cases are given on legal
papers sworn before a Magistrate or public notary. For instance, affi-
davits are even required for public utilities such as new connections for
electricity, sewerage, and water supply. Besides resulting in citizen’s
harassment and corruption, it has perpetuated the dichotomy between
the state and the nation. Instead of providing universal representation
for the citizens as expected, these elections contribute nothing, but
“plundering rotating government … in many of these countries,
multi-party elections are but a vehicle to legitimise an existing political
economy and perpetuate an equation of patron/client dependency
relationship in a society.”33
A major casualty of this is citizen-centric democratic governance.
If the citizens are treated as population and targets of governance,
rather than participatory stakeholders guiding the democratic pro-
cesses, democracy becomes redundant and citizens’ backlash is built
up even against the right kind of intervention.
Conclusion
Coalition politics in pre and postelection 2009 has shown that it is

the politics of presence that played a predominant role in shaping
issues relating to citizenship, federalism, and multiculturalism. Pol-
itical parties have formed coalitions in contradiction to their professed
electoral ideological pronouncements. While in partnership with each
other, they nurtured coalitions for patronage rather than articulation
60 Pramod Kumar
of their professed political agenda. For example, most of the regional

political parties bargained for the ministries of their choice rather than
the restructuring of the policies which govern center–state relations.34
The regionalization of the national political parties and nationalization
of the regional political parties as reflected in the electoral discourse
melts down in the power-sharing coalition matrix. It is not only the
economic meltdown, but the political meltdown in the coalition era
which should merit the attention of political analysis. It is a coalition
of bargaining through which stability of the tenure of government
is ensured.
The coincidence between ideological flux and dichotomous rela-
tionship between populist politics and state politics with an emphasis
on privileging presence over representative stakeholding of the re-
gions, social cleavages, and citizens is not accidental through patronage.
There are heterogeneous needs which defy any general formula and
its solutions are situational, strategic, and historical-specific. How far
a coalition of interests and coalition through patronage shall be able
to balance the needs to transform entitlements of regions, diversities,
and citizens particularly living on the margins into rights is a moot
question?
Notes
1. This distinction between politics of representation and politics of presence has

been very aptly described by Zoya Hasan who argued that politics of presence blurs
the under-representation and the representation of interests of the constituents,
specifically vulnerable sections. Zoya Hasan, Constitutional Equality and the
Politics of Representation in India (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, and New Delhi:
Sage, 2006).
2. E. Sridharan, “Coalition Strategies and The BJP’s Expansion, 1989–2004,”
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 194–221.
For 2009, the data was gathered from the Institute for the Development and
Communication (IDC) Unit.
3. The distinction between one-party dominance system and one-party system has
been described by Rajni Kothari. He noted that one-party dominance system is
competitive-party system, but one in which the competing parties play rather
dissimilar roles. It consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure. See
for details, Rajni Kothari, “The Congress System in India,” Asian Survey, Vol. 4,
No. 12, 1964, pp. 1161–73.
â•‡ 4. Lok Sabha Elections 1962: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress.
â•‡ 5. Lok Sabha Elections 1977: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress.
â•‡ 6. Deepak Nayyar, “Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction
of Economics and Politics in Independent India,” in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.),
Democracy in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 381.
â•‡ 7. The Hindustan Times. 2010. “Cabinet Yes to Tax Punjab”, The Hindustan Times
(Chandigarh) January 23. Available online at chdnewsdesk@hindustantimes.com
â•‡ 8. Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal).
â•‡ 9. Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The DMK.
10. Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress.
11. Quoted in Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin Press,
1974), p. 141.
12. Nayyar, “Economic Development and Political Democracy,” p. 381.
13. Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress.
14. Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Bhartiya Janata Party.
15. Lok Sabha Elections 1999: Manifesto of The National Democratic Alliance.
16. The BJP in its 1962 election manifesto declared that:
The present Constitution which, by calling the Centre as ‘Union’ and pro-
vinces as ‘States’, has recognized a separate and somewhat sovereign status
of the constituents, is also a hindrance to national unity. The Bharatiya Jana
Sangh will amend the Constitution and declare India a Unitary State, with
provision for decentralisation of power to the lowest levels.
The Congress Party manifesto was more explicit on issues relating to national
integration and unity in diversity. The issue of center–state relationship did not
find any expression in its 1962 manifesto.
17. Lok Sabha Elections 1998: Manifesto of The Shiroman Akali Dal.
18. Staff Correspondent. 1997. “Redefine Centre-State Relations: SAD,” The Hindu
(Delhi) March 24.
19. For instance, the Akali Dal in Punjab in its 1973 autonomy resolution and, later
in its 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission, asked for apportionment
of financial resources within the framework of command economy. In the 1973
resolution, the Akali Dal demanded, “Complete nationalisation of the trade
in food grains and, as such, shall endeavour to nationalize the wholesale trade in
food grains through the establishment of state agencies.” It further stated that
“the SAD shall try to fix the prices of the agricultural produce on the basis of the
returns of the middle class farmers. Such prices would be notified well before the
sowing season and only the State governments would be empowered to fix such
prices.” However, in its 2007 election manifesto these issues were not raised.
20. For detailed analysis of this aspect, please see Atul Sood, “Deepening Disparities
and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway,” in Social Watch India (Delhi: Sage,
2007), pp. 89–94.
62 Pramod Kumar
21. Partha Chatterjee has very perceptively reflected on Anderson’s categorization

of bound and unbound serialities and has observed that for each category of
classification any individual can count only as one on zero, never as a fraction,
which in turn means that all partial or mixed affiliations to a category are ruled
out. For limited purpose, in this chapter these categories have been used with a
qualification that the identity perceptions are real and that which of the elements
of ethnic identity like caste, religion, language, etc., shall acquire dominant
manifestation is history-specific and contextually-based. Partha Chatterjee, The
Politics of the Governed (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), p. 6. Also, Benedict
Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South-East Asia, and the
World (London: Verso, 1998).
24. B.P. Mandal, Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Government of India,
1980), Vol. 1, Chapter XIII, Recommendations, pp. 57–60.
25. “Raj Thackeray booked for his speech,” March 22, 2009. Available online at
http://www.rediff.com/election/2009/apr/27slde1-raj-thackeray-attracts-crowds-
everywhere.htm.
26. Ketaki Ghoge, “Marathi must for cab drivers,” The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh)
January 21, 2010. Subsequently, the Congress government in Maharashtra
moderated its statement in response to adverse reactions from north-Indian
states.
27. The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a Com-
mission for Minority Educational Institutions to provide direct affiliation for
minority professional institutions to central universities. Special steps will be
taken to spread modern and technical education among women in minority
communities particularly. (Lok Sabha Elections 2004: Manifesto of the Indian
National Congress. A comprehensive national program for minor irrigation of
all lands owned by Dalits and adivasis will be introduced. Landless families will
be endowed with some land through the proper implementation of land ceiling
and land redistribution legislation. (Ibid.)
29. The study indicated that women representatives were assigned the task to look
into social engagements such as marriage alliances, information on birth, health,
and household activities in the domain of gender segregated roles. See for details,
Rainuka Dagar, Authority Systems and Construction of Masculinities (Chandigarh:
Institute for Development and Communication, 2008).
30. M. Adil Khan, “Engaged Governance”: A Strategy for Mainstreaming Citizens into
the Public Policy Processes (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 13.
31. M. Adil Khan, Ibid., p. 13.
32. For an elaborate analysis of this aspect, please refer to Chatterjee, The Politics of
the Governed.
33. Khan, “Engaged Governance,” pp. 8–9.
34. In post-2009 elections, DMK, the key ally of the Congress, demanded an increase
in its ministerial berths as compared to 2004. It also made a determined pitch for
lucrative ministries like Telecom, Information Technology, Surface Transport,
and Shipping. On the other hand, Trinamool Congress smoothly bargained for
the Ministry of Railways and five Ministers of States. It also demanded the impos-
ition of President’s Rule in West Bengal, in contradiction to the demand of
the regional parties for the imposition of Central rule in any state only in extreme
circumstances. Anita Katyal, “Allies Bargain Hard for Berths, Karuna to Give
Outside Support, DMK, Didi Keep UP on Ties,” The Tribune (Chandigarh)
May 22, 2009.
chapter 4
Region, Representation, and

National Cohesion: Public Space in India
Jyotirindra Dasgupta
Parliamentary elections in India provide an opportunity for exploring

connections between popular preferences and prospects of political
coherence at the national level. It is not unusual for national level elec-
tions in the country to be preceded by fears of regional concerns and
organizations negatively affecting national priorities or even national
cohesion. The 15th general election was also expected to significantly
increase the importance of regional political organizations and their
allies in the national contention for power.1 While predicting the gains
of the regional organizations and the losses of their national rivals, the
media icons tried to scare the country with ominous inferences.
They offered foreboding images of “regional eruption,” “revenge of
the regions,” and “provincial pachyderms” out to create “so many little
Indias” in a distressingly “fragmented polity” to warn the electorate
just in time.2 What was the impending crisis about? Why was the pro-
spect of a “thriving multiplicity” of political parties so dangerous for
a country that had clearly sustained many decades of democratic and
federal political development?3 What was the record of regions in con-
tributing to this process of democratic becoming in such a multi-
cultural developing country? How should one read the impact of cultural,
social, economic, and other differences among the regions in terms of
their centrifugal or centripetal consequences on interunit coherence
in the larger national public space? How are we supposed to make
sense of the burden of theorizing in the discourses on both demo-
cracy and nationalism that clearly celebrates cultural homogeneity,
Region, Representation, and National Cohesion 65
denying any strong case for multicultural democracies?4 Why should

cultural or regional differences impede either democratic or national
institutional development? Does democratic choice necessarily accel-
erate propensities to promote implacable difference, distance, and
discord among cultural or regional formations? Or could democratic
articulation, representation, and mobilization be pragmatically com-
patible if not strategically compelling for collaborative gains on inter-
regional or national scale? In other words, are there ways of recognizing
some positive consequences of trans-regional enterprise for common
political action across lines of cleavage that may be discerned as divid-
ends of difference?5
This chapter examines the relevance and reasonableness of some
of the questions mentioned above. I will briefly explore the connections
between the concepts of region, regionalism, and their bearing on
regional organizations in India. My major intention is to focus on the
implications of particularist presumptions regarding the alleged
regionalist turn in politics and the centrifugal, i.e., disintegrating anx-
ieties attached to it. In order to read these implications in the context of
recent political history, I will analyze the regional claims, their modes
of contention, negotiation, collaboration, or confrontation. I will
call special attention to a limited set of issues associated with the pro-
cesses of democratic representation, primarily connected with elec-
toral contestation and organized movements.
The basic idea is to indicate the importance of mediating relations
and processes that regional representatives normally recognize more
in practice than in rhetoric. The compulsion of political processing of
regional claims in democratic public space in India offers a number
of transformational opportunities.6 I will examine selective regional
contexts of such evolving opportunities to show how civic engage-
ment of regional representatives in recent decades has explored such
possibilities. The notions of regional identity, affinity, or regionalist
ideology, when examined in a dynamic context of political contest-
ation, may reveal unusually diverse implications. It is important to
see how frozen notions of regionalist particularism tend to melt under
the heat of electoral competition giving way to fluid prospects of un-
anticipated combinations. What kind of centripetal intimations have
66 Jyotirindra Dasgupta
such combination conveyed to the country? Did they help dispel

major apprehensions regarding regionalist danger? A brief discussion
of the concepts of region, regionalism, and regionalist particularism
is necessary at this stage in order to set the context of our analysis.
Regional Claims
and Regionalist Variations
Region, as a political category used in recent discussions regarding

India, refers to specified areas of assumed collective affinity usually tied
to language, culture, or other sources of identification.7 These areas
normally, but not necessarily, carry territorial referents. The bound-
aries of a region, however, may shift, depending on how the collective
voices are authorized, articulated, and translated in practice. How
the voices emerge and the maps of the regions unfold in history raise
complex questions of deliberate initiatives, strategic interactions, and
other contextual issues that challenge many essentialist notions of
regional core or identity. The notion of an inflexible core of a region
is understandably dear to advocates—and feared by opponents—of
regionalist ideologues because it serves to recruit and mobilize sup-
port favoring their cause.
In fact, the participants of the regional cultural communities
normally make much less of their collective affinity than what outside
observers often imply or ascribe. It is more often the outsider, Indian
or otherwise, who tend to impute a more stable form, than what most
insiders might recognize.8 A select set of leaders from inside may also
help promote cases, causes, or even ideological platforms to make
claims on behalf of a larger passive population. Whether that attempt
to speak for collectivity, merits justification or not is, of course, another
story. When regional leaders seek to convey the impression of repre-
senting the voice of their constituent populace, they usually offer
a sense of implied authorization.9 In a modern democratic setting,
such authorization may be recognizable in electoral processes. Even
in a democracy, authorization processes are partial at best, and prob-
lematic in many ways. Obviously, the problems of authorization and
authenticity of regional claims and creeds in nondemocratic con-

texts are likely to be more serious in view of the capricious scope for
misrepresentation of the voices of the community concerned.
At this stage, it is important to reiterate that a dynamic view of
regional coherence, culture, or identity should imply a flexible idea
of group consistent with internal divisions, dissentions, and tensions
that may also disturb many cherished lines of boundary. For some
multiculturalists such potentially contested foundations and group
boundaries may be conceptually uncomfortable.10 However, this
notion of shifting centers of groups, often contending with their pre-
sumed peripheries, sets the proper context for understanding plural
political possibilities that may be associated with the same regional or
cultural structure of unity. This will enable us to draw analytical lines
to separate narratives of regions from those of regionalism and
regionalist leaders. How will these analytical lines of distinction aid
our understanding of the contrasting and interacting discourse of
regionalism, nationalism, and democracy in contemporary India?
Region, Identity, and Political Affinity
Regional divisions in a continental country like India can be enumer-

ated in different ways, including geophysical, historical, linguistic,
cultural, or along other dimensions.11 For our purpose, the relevant
dimension concerns politically valued markers of identification that
may utilize one or more evocative symbols, derived from elastic rep-
ertories comprising language, culture, or other sources. There is a
growing literature on the emergence of enduring patterns of regional
identification associated with considerable political significance that
may be traced from the end of the 9th century.12 It has been sug-
gested that by this time the southern part of the country witnessed—
initially in the case of the Kannada area—a significant process of ver-
nacularization, leading to crucial transition toward the rise of regional
political communication and conviction. The rise of the Kannada
language and consequent decline of Sanskrit assured the prospect of
regional culture, literature, and political order growing together.13
Within the span of a few more centuries, roughly similar processes led
to impressive strides of regionalization of cultural and political space
in proximate areas. Prominent examples were, with some variation in
transition, Telugu, Tamil, and Marathi language areas.14
Innovative literary projects promoting regional language or their
politically powerful royal sponsors, however, never really assured that
their desired boundaries of regional extension or closure necessarily
concurred with popular acceptance or support. This is understandable
because the expansion of domain or even domination of a language
in a territory need not necessarily imply a commensurate extension of
identity sentiments. Sharing a language as an efficient means of com-
munication may or may not produce emotional bonds of solidarity.
Persuasive studies of Telugu regionalism concerned with pre-modern
as well as later periods, for instance, leave little doubt about the lack
of necessary linkage between language use and regional identity claims
or boundaries.15
Regional histories in other areas of India and elsewhere may offer
many persuasive instances that would reject any facile association be-
tween language allegiance and political loyalty. The history of Punjabi
and Bengali language areas in undivided India, to take selected
examples, clearly shows how religious bond can deeply cut into lan-
guage community. Similarly, the history of the division of Pakistan and
formation of Bangladesh can demonstrate how the passionate gain
of Bengali language movement could still leave the two Bengals pol-
itically separated in the same sub-continent.16 There was no primordial
or essential social compulsion, inexorably dictated by religion, lan-
guage, or culture that could offer convincing explanation of regional
closure and its necessary congruence with political perspective or
formation.
Regions in South Asian history thus can be more reasonably ana-
lyzed as being less unitary or coherent, and considerably more contin-
gent compositions of multiple material and contested narratives than
what many ideologues and intellectuals normally presume. Insiders of
any region know what divides them and how many voices can legit-
imately contend to speak for them. How many subregional fragments
or divisions reaching lower layers may seek to reserve their voices with-
out necessarily letting them aggregate for common cause or action
is too complex a question to deserve simplistic answers. Such simpl-

istic notions, unfortunately, have tended to play a prominent part in
unfairly equating regional claims and regionalist politics with dan-
gerously disintegrative implication and destabilizing enterprise.
It is no wonder that even after six decades of inter regional collab-
oration sustaining the country’s democratic federal governance, India’s
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh considered it appropriate to warn
the citizens of the evils of factors like “regionalism and linguism.”17 In
doing so, he was quoting the warning uttered by Jawaharlal Nehru,
the first Prime Minister in the founding moments of Indian dem-
ocracy. Such negative sentiments were also expressed in campaigns
before the 15th general elections. The anxiety concerning regionalism
stems from an unfortunate convergence of selective perspectives asso-
ciated with some cosmopolitan national leaders and many commen-
tators from abroad carrying mixed messages for new nations. In
general, nationalist leaders in India, with some exceptions like Nehru,
had a hard time ignoring the fact that their support base was regional,
moderately trans-regional and in times of overriding collective need,
super regional.
The Indian National Congress began as a federated platform
of regional associations.18 Its subsequent history reads like a narrative of
conciliation involving trans-regional institutional construction across
lines of divisions and differences based on cultural, social, economic,
or other alignments.19 At the same time, there was also a layer of im-
patient leadership that enjoyed people’s support, but distrusted their
emotional discipline or direction, especially as their gaze turned from
the center of the urban nation to the rural periphery.20 Leaders like
Nehru, tirelessly reminded their colleagues and followers that “ . . .
India is more than the little corner of India that we represent” and that
the regional views tainted with traces of localism, “parochialism,” or
“separatism” tend to disrupt “the larger considerations” of India.21 A
rationalist anxiety regarding regionalist threats to the larger interests
of the nation pervaded those of elitist calling devoted to mentoring
apparently misguided masses.22 The didactic mission of such leaders
was blissfully timed to generally coincide with a strong suspicion of
regionalism delivered in impressive social scientific packaging from
the Western centers of modernity.23
Relevant academic works on modernization and economic devel-

opment that dominated the intellectual marketplace during the initial
decade of Indian democracy confidently condemned regional claims
as signals of danger for civility, integration of nation, democracy, and
development. The specter of dark forces jointly driven by poverty and
primordiality haunted the Western discourse of modernity addressed to
the issues of stability, civility, and immunity from communist infection
in the developing countries. Sociologists, anthropologists, economists,
journalists, and others intellectual notables were alarmed.24 Many of
them were deeply disturbed by the vast scale of “deep-seated centri-
fugal forces” unleashed by “militant group awareness” in the “uniquely
compartmentalized Indian social setting” that could spell disaster.25
They theorized that “regional chauvinism” and other parochial forces
would attain greater unity and militancy as “competition for the spoils
of a new time of progress … will impart a tenseness … which will be
aggravated, in India’s case … by the strength of her ancient and
rigid rivalries.”26
Grave misgivings of the early decades, as expressed by Indian
elitist leaders and anxious Western scholars proved to be significantly
misplaced. The expected “convulsive” derangements or national dis-
solution did not take place as a result of regional scramble for spoils,
either propelled by poverty or compelled by rivalry. In fact, the collab-
oration of regions in a federated democratic developmental system
instead unfolded constructive decades that world history has rarely
witnessed. But the contagion of anxiety was not easily arrested, prob-
ably due to the trained incapacity of the experts who insisted on using
an improper frame of reference that was grossly out of place.27 Highly
favored myths in the West predicted vicious circles of poverty, popu-
lation bombs, growing misery, and rising frustration of mounting
expectations. Equally misleading was a widely shared bias of scholars,
in regard to developing countries that an erasure of differentiated
regional claims should count as a compelling criterion of national con-
solidation and durability.28 Nearly 50 years later, even when the
probable virtues of multicultural nationalism cultivated notably in
Canadian soil attained some Western respect, the delayed gaze was
scarcely turned to the pluralist precursors in poorer Asia.29
Region, Representation,
and Differentiation in Public Space
For a proper understanding of the reason of region in the history of

national engagement in India, one may begin with a general analysis
of the relational nature of regional structure. When exactly regional
social group is perceptibly formed is a matter of internal conjecture
or external inference. Unlike associations, such groups are rarely, if
ever “explicitly constituted.”30 As one theorist puts it in a general con-
text, “they emerge from the way people interact.”31 For social groups
based on perceived cultural similarity in language, for instance, the
members come to value expressive facility and communicative efficacy.
Relational notion of group implies the possibility of various degrees
of social differences within its structure. Members of cultural groups
are not always confident about the implication of cultural norms or
requirements of belonging. Internal differences are frequently muted
but not erased by external interactive practices or compulsions.
Emphasis on common elements or shared identity usually tends to
exaggerate the importance of the selective voices, interpretations or
norms of some prominent members, while marginalizing or muting
those of others.
Frequently, the conflict among cultural groups is based less on cul-
tural factors than, for example, on rivalry over land, employment, or
other resources. Thus, a regional group based on cultural affinity is likely
to be composed of complex webs of relationship among members, and
in many cases with outsiders. It is not intelligible by a simple analysis
of identity, recognition or other comparable political perspectives.32
A relational view of a region, however, will make it immensely difficult
to make facile inferences about what political directions, regionalist
ideologies, or political actions may follow.33 This is why holistic views
that enable observers to attribute to regional collectivities a coherent
and undifferentiated totality, seem to be particularly seductive to those
who tend to deprecate regionalism as a destructive force.
However, the differentiated nature of regional groups and their
multiple political possibilities become increasingly transparent when
they participate in a public space such as elections. Historically,
assurance of democratic representation in a federated institutional

system in India made a critical difference for the operation of regional
groups in many significant ways. For instance, the design of the consti-
tutional system left respectable room for regions.34 Also, rules remained
flexible, with respect to relative boundary markers and autonomy pro-
visions, consistent with the logic of systemic coherence.35 More than
the rules, it was the long and fortunate lineage of institutional experi-
ence of representation that was inherited by the political leaders and
actors that made the systemic assurance credible.36 Central leaders,
even of Nehru’s stature, could be held accountable by moderate insur-
gent modes mobilized by regional publics through either their own
party or social movements outside.37 The processes of negotiation
seeking to enable the participant publics to use the democratic system
proceeded considerably beyond the normally expected limits of access
implied in voting, interest aggregation, or formal constitutional legal
methods included in conventional liberal theory of democracy.38
The pre-independence legacy of the contested public space, offering
wide scope for conspicuous representation and organized action
beyond the state, was an enviable resource for democratization in
India. A long list of social, political, educational, and constructive
economic movements highlighted a rare density of organizational
networks that strengthened the institutional and procedural culture of
democratization many decades before the advent of independence.39
But the transition to freedom and the building of the new political
order after 1947 was marked by many disquieting developments.
The catastrophic flames of violence accompanying the partition,
however, did not consume all the components of democratic lineage,
although the developing legacy of the pre-independence civil society
suffered a big loss.40 The rush to gain state power to control violence at
the time of independence put a premium on national statists like
Jawaharlal Nehru. This contingency, unfortunately, relegated the major
architects and practitioners of civic resources outside the state like
Mahatma Gandhi to a secondary role.41 No wonder when the Congress
organization rushed for a secure, though divided, nation after part-
ition, the case for a centralizing bias for stability was significantly
privileged with patriotic values.42
Equally privileged was the norm of national unity for the anxious
leaders, who were afraid that populist “heat and passion” would gravely
endanger their mission of constructing “an organic nation.”43 These
leaders, apparently, never paused to ponder over what exactly entitled
them to claim a clearly superior reason of nation and to deprecate the
people who allegedly fail to consider “the whole picture” because their
“mind is clouded.”44 More specifically, such negative reference was
almost always directed to the supporters of regional claims or lan-
guage rights of citizens. This rhetoric of a pressing national unity, as
articulated by the excited new leaders of the federal state, even seemed
to question the multicultural and multiregional foundations of their
own nationalist movement. Yet, these foundations unmistakably
imparted rare strength and general acceptability to the constitutional
system across regional and cultural differences.
What really made the statist leaders, at the outset of democratic
governance, discredit regional claims or voice of dissent? What justi-
fied their resentment of the very notion of differentiated bases of
unity and national coherence that had served the democratic move-
ments and processes before independence reasonably well? What or
who authorized them in the new democratic representation system to
assume a privileged role to set the terms of discourse relating to auto-
nomy, unity, and accountability? At the same time, exactly the same
questions of representation can also be addressed to the leaders and
activists connected with regional claims or regionalist ideologies, as
well as movements. What does the democratic representation system
offer to the regional individuals, groups, or mobilizing organizations
in terms of intra and intergroup interaction processes? What trans-
regional promises do they carry in terms of their implications on
national or federal coherence?
Representation, Mediation, and

Differentiated Cohesion
There are many ways of exploring the issues raised concerning author-
ization, accountability, autonomy, and differentiation, as opposed to
unitary notions of political cohesion. Our selective emphasis on
representation may enable us to investigate some complex connec-

tions among political actors located in public space. For our purpose,
the most productive way of analyzing the role of representation in the
Indian context would be to consider it as a “differentiated relation-
ship between constituents and representative” where connection and
disconnection are issues that demand patient understanding over
time and space.45 No easy evaluation of the movements of authorization
and accountability is possible, unless one conveniently seeks to rely
on some simplistic assumptions regarding a common will of a consti-
tuency or its facile transmission, as a mandate to a representative agent
or institution.
Conventional discussions of the relative autonomy of the represen-
tatives with respect to mandate tend to ignore many important issues.46
How mandates evolve, particularly in a developing democracy bearing
visible traces of authoritarian past, through participatory and deliber-
ative processes in public space over time, may be more informative
than the question of relative location of authority. Major issues in con-
tention or the terms of conflict affecting the deliberative processes may
set the context of how a representative can persuade other represen-
tatives of the merits of her case. Prudent and flexible persuasiveness
rather than an artless pursuit of the mandate is required for reaching
just decisions to serve both the norms of authority and accountability.47
This emphasis on process, amenability to amendments, or even trans-
formation through debates and discussions of the original intimation
makes the system of representation so important for a democratic
politics of difference.
If the issue of representing the constituents impels us to recognize
the importance of a plurality of voices that need to be organized
through a number of mediating processes that may never yield pre-
scripted consequences, then it should prepare us for some additional
possibilities of politics of difference. In a vast public space like that
of India or even her component regions and subregions, represen-
tation is unavoidable for communicating popular voice. But the very
multiplicity of cultures, positions in the social and economic structure,
interests, ideologies, and affiliations raise the question of how dem-
ocracy in such a perplexing setting can specially utilize relevant pro-
cesses of “... pluralizing the modes and sites of representation.”48
Young calls attention to “three general modes through which a

person can be represented: according to interest, opinion, and per-
spective.”49 Within each mode, again, there may be several ways in
which a person may be represented. One can add other aspects to this
list. However, these three aspects have the merit of reasonably covering
the major problem areas of individual and group representation in a
democratic system. The fact that they are logically independent may
significantly aid differentiated possibilities of representation.50
It is precisely these kinds of pluralized representational possibilities
that remain obliterated in the intellectual or political propensity to
criticize or reject regionalist claims and movements after independ-ence
in India. For example, alarming pictures of regionalism were based
on an unwarranted assumption regarding a rigid sense of collective
identity allegedly shared by all the participants in a regional culture.
Independent India’s first major regionalist movement demanding
the formation of an Andhra state, based on the unity of Telugu lan-
guage areas within the national federal system, may offer an interesting
example of external critics’ denial of differentiation in the regional
group.51 This denial extended to the insiders’ relations among them-
selves and with others located outside the group. The participants or
supporters of the Telugu movement widely differed in terms of their
economic classes, political ideologies, and perspectives associated with
religion, culture, or oppressed status groups like Dalits or tribals. One
issue or movement can only reflect a moment of claim in public space,
without reference to the internal differences and the external link-
ages of the Telugu people.
The legitimacy of the demand to bring all the Telugu-speaking
people, who were divided in a number of administrative areas carved
out for colonial convenience, was never seriously challenged by the
nationalist leaders. From 1920, the general principle of language-based
autonomy was conceded by the Congress organization. During the
following decades, and particularly after 1927 when Andhra’s claim
for autonomy was endorsed by the Congress organization, there was
little compelling drive either for radicalizing the respective regional
movement or to mobilize large mass support in its favor. However,
the ruling central Congress party leaders after Independence tried
to soft-pedal the process of formation of the new Andhra state.52
Centralist leaders like Nehru, while deprecating the reasonable move-

ment, in fact, supplied it with a new strength.
Instead of treating the movement as a subnational threat to unity
and stability, the new leaders of the country could easily negotiate with
its leaders recognizing that they were indeed authorized to represent a
legitimate set of economic, regional, and cultural perspectives. Such
a spirit of acknowledgement could enhance the inclusionary appeal
of both the national ruling party, as well as the new democratic sys-
tem. But the statist bias of the centralist leaders encouraged them to
ignore the popular autonomy demands. Their arrogance of power,
appropriating the exclusive right to speak for the nation, in fact, helped
unite the political voices across the heterogeneous components of the
Andhra region in an unprecedented manner. The fertile coastal belt
and the dry uplands of Rayalaseema were parts of the colonial Madras
Presidency province, while Telangana was under the rule of princely
state of Hyderabad until 1948. The Telugu speaking people of these
three areas were “characterized by cultural discontinuities, economic
imbalances, and political rivalries.”53
The dominance of the leaders from the coastal areas over the
movement for autonomy reflected their pervasive prominence in the
domains of language, economy, and polity. For the Telugu speakers
of Telangana, which is the most disadvantaged area of the region, the
term “Andhra” evokes substantially less positive passion than it does
for the coastal area notables.54 This was evident in the early phase of
the movement and more so later when many of them were even pre-
pared to turn separatist and break away from the region. When the
coastal leaders and followers appropriated the voice of the dissenters
within their region, they were sure that the outsiders, including the
national leaders, would conveniently ignore the lines of differentiation.
The centralist leaders were, of course, not eager to negotiate a solution
until a dramatic event forced them to concede Andhra state.
What a democratic movement supported by a wide spectrum of
political forces was unable to obtain from some obstinate national
leaders, ironically, was accomplished by a Gandhian activist’s fast to
death in 1952. It is interesting that Potti Sriramula had a long record of
involvement in Gandhian activism including at least four episodes
of public fast for what he believed to be pressing issues. Most of them
were related to struggles for justice for the most disadvantaged caste
groups and none related to language issues.55 His death had a major
public impact, as well as a tremendous effect on leaders like Nehru in
large part because of his well-earned Gandhian credentials. However,
his admittedly crucial role also reminds us what the Andhra regionalist
movement lacked in terms of large-scale mass mobilization, depth of
community involvement, or support across three subregions. The
sporadic events of violence that followed his death were, as later
investigations seem to have established, probably not integrally related
to the regionalist movement.56 The alarming picture of regionalist
movements as militant platforms of mass action creating convulsive
disorder, as painted by centralist leaders and western scholars, prob-
ably appears to be more politically accusatory than empirically per-
suasive, particularly when the Andhra movement is considered.
The fact that the Communist Party supported the Andhra move-
ment raised a note of alarm in many quarters. Again, the outside obser-
vers were soon proved wrong. There was an apprehension that the new
state of Andhra would witness the major success of the Communist
Party in the forthcoming elections. In fact, both in the 1955 mid-term
elections for Andhra and in the 1957 elections in the larger Andhra
Pradesh (following the inclusion of Telangana in 1956), it was the
Congress party that scored a decisive victory.57 Rather than harming
the nation, here then was the case of democratically accommodated
regionalist claim leading to a consolidation of a national party’s
strength in the new state. Moreover, the Congress organization in the
state was also able to mobilize extensive support from the cultivating
peasant castes after the abolition of the intermediary tenures.58
The Communists had led the struggles for these peasant groups
but due to policy success the Congress administration was able to grab
the political dividend. These democratic, as well as socioeconomic
gains, of the new recognized state, could hardly be anticipated from
the assorted negative accounts of regionalism that we have noted
before. Probably, the most important positive effect was reflected in
the national impact on the reorganization of states that followed.
From 1956, following the Report of the States Reorganization
Commission, and allowing for the normal hesitation of the national
leaders, new adjustment of state boundaries took place on a massive
scale.59 The effect, in most cases was regionally pleasing and nationally
constructive.
The Gifts of Public Space:

Dividends of Difference
If the Andhra case showed the way to make region and nation go
together, it also raised a number of questions pertaining to its future
possibilities, and comparability with other Indian cases. The initial
success of the Congress party in the new state based on the appeals
of language and cultural consolidation obviously needed something
more than emotional capital or sentimental solidarity. Emotional
mandate needed to be strategically supplemented by durable bases of
social and economic sector support from agricultural, industrial, and
other influential segments of society. Despite early success in mobil-
izing support from the cultivating peasant castes, gradually, strategies
of balancing castes and classes became increasingly unproductive.
The decline of the populist accommodation system scared various
support groups including business, the educated middle classes, and
the youth.60
If emotions helped the Congress party to win power by the late
1970s, economic interests were poised to pull it down. Moreover, with
strong opinion resenting the central Congress and government
leadership of Indira Gandhi, and the perspective of the Muslim con-
stituents increasingly turning negative to the ruling leadership of
the state, another turning point was about to begin. The crisis of the
Congress system in Andhra presented a great opportunity to a charis-
matic hero of the region’s movie world to play a savior’s role. N.T.
Rama Rao (NTR), who played god in Telugu movies, decided to
transfer his script to the real world of politics. His TDP scored a dra-
matic victory in the 1983 legislative assembly elections and registered
an impressive presence in the national parliament.
His combination of the emotional issues of Telugu community’s
dignity and economic welfare of the poorer members of the society,
worked well enough to earn him four terms of power.61 NTR’S
successor, N. Chandrababu Naidu, gaining power in 1995 tried to

depart from the populist tradition initiated by the TDP. His prefer-
ence for liberalization and penchant for global connections even-
tually cost him dearly. He lost power in 2004 and was unable to restore
it in 2009.62 On both occasions, the Congress party scored impressive
victories under a leader, Y. Rajasekhar Reddy (YSR), whose ability
to reach the poor people set him apart as a model to emulate in any
region.63 His accidental death in September 2009 became an occasion
of national mourning.
The most important theme that cuts across all these different styles
and modes of representation of the Andhra regional community is
the national sensitivity and connectivity that unmistakably shines
through their concern for regional dignity. When NTR talked about
Telugu Desam (country), he also mentioned Bharat Desam to show
his national concern. Chandrababu Naidu played a critically important
national role in a difficult time of coalition problems at the central
level. When the 1998 parliamentary elections failed to return a maj-
ority for any political party, it was the TDP that played a crucial role
to assist democracy at the central level.
YSR’s second term in 2009 was marked by a rare prominence
among all the Congress Chief Ministers (CMs) because of the striking
record of his first term, as well as his impressive contribution to the
national Congress leadership in terms of an increase of Lok Sabha
seats (33 out of 42) scored in his state. He openly claimed that he was
“planning to make Andhra Pradesh the mainstay of the Congress.”64
No wonder, he was also successful in securing a large share of federal
resources and “made sure of its effective use.”65 His confident grip on
electoral support encouraged him to favor reservation policies for
Muslims and Christians that was not exactly expected to excite many
leaders of the majority Hindu community.66 All this should tell us
something different from what one normally hears about the region-
alist propensity to contribute to centrifugal tendencies.
YSR’s success in his state and his striking ability to connect the
Telugu country with the nation may be largely explained by his
eagerness to focus on the politics and economics of positional differ-
ence as compared to the politics of cultural difference.67 As argued
above, it is an important property of public space that its constant
encouragement of communication and contestation tends to bring

out and publicize the pressing issues of the public role to redress
injustice and compensate for lack of capability. Emphasis on culture,
frequently forces issues of the underprivileged to retreat. Democratic
competition in Andhra offered a signal opportunity to YSR to specially
focus on the rural constituents without neglecting the needs of rapid
industrial development. His administration succeeded in giving
farmers small scale loans at a nominal interest rate, free electricity
to farmers for several hours a day, large scale waiver of farmer loans,
impressive housing and health insurance projects for low income
families and rural areas, pension systems for women, and liberalized
public distribution of food and other facilities.68 Major investments in
projects connected with justice and development, however, frequently
require financial linkages with the federal government. The gains of
coordination on this front may not be unimportant for centripetal
engagement and federal coherence.
Regional Springs and

Centripetal Sentiments
I am using the term centripetal to designate a number of tendencies

to move inward within the national public space, and not necessarily to
a limited process of inclining toward or relating to the central gov-
ernment in India. One can think of a wider notion of centers that
hold together, progressively more extensive entities, like a constitu-
tional order, a political system including civil society, or a composite
pluralized national culture of cosmopolitan orientation. The context
of my actual political reference will make the specific implications
clear. There is no normative intention here to privilege the notion
of the center. Neither is there an assumption that centripetal
engagements have to be consciously intended by the units in the
unity, as for example, the states in the Indian federation. In fact,
I am especially interested in the cases of unintended contribution
to centripetal sentiments or engagements, on the part of units like
regions, subregions, or other fragments.
While YSR succeeded in cultivating the central leaders’ and gov-

ernment’s affection, his hard line against the disaffected leaders of
the Telangana subregion of his own state might have posed a some-
what disturbing question. Time and again, the demand for a separate
state for Telangana, based on a shifting combination of grievances
has been expressed as a strong representation of resentment against
the ruling leaders of the region. At times, the anger is directed to the
coastal leaders and notables. On other occasions, like more recent
ones, the target is mainly the party in power. The participants in the
movement make use of political association for cultural education,
and party organizations of moderate as well as radical ideological
persuasion.69 For electoral purposes, their recent taste for alliance has
included eclectic party assortments that seem to care more for power
than principle. But, the 2009 elections disappointed both the sepa-
ratist TRS and its allies.70
Once again, the representative claims of speaking for the consti-
tuents did not electorally authorize the disaffected cultural community.
On the other hand, if the TRS and its allies can gain the mandate of
the community to proceed to a negotiated statehood, it would never-
theless become a part of the national federal system. In fact, a good
part of the craving for separation from a region is frequently moti-
vated by a desire for direct access by a group to a federal club of wealth
and power. India’s constitutional system can be used by separatist
groups to seek revised boundaries by utilizing popular votes, as well
as movements for peaceful representation in public space.71 However,
when separatist groups are less secure about their mass support they
understandably turn to coercive tactics.
Separatism is a misunderstood term. Most of the regional move-
ments to reorganize boundaries after independence were constructive
attempts to correct an old colonial practice serving imperialist
objectives. Carving, large states based on a reasonable cultural col-
lectivity, as in the cases of Maharashtra or Gujarat for example, involved
delay mainly due to the intransigence of the central leadership. The
mass movements that led to the formation of these states were actually
supported by almost all the national parties of different ideological
colors. The success of these collaborative popular movements, that
also energized significant segments of cultural associations, imparted
a necessary element of strength to the developing democratic system.

If these are cases of system-compliant separatism, there are also some
system-defiant cases that merit closer attention.72 In fact, it is the latter
that dominate the negative literature on regionalism to the almost
total neglect of the compliant variants.
Some movements begin with a hard line of defiance only to change
to moderate tracks when wider appeal demands more represen-
tative connections with the constituent publics. Thus, the Dravidian
movement that began with a secessionist voice of the Dakshina
Kazhagam (DK), even before independence, gradually gave way to
popular campaigns under the leadership of the DMK that tremen-
dously enriched the public space in southern India.73 The DK’s dream
of a common Dravidian regional community did not materialize.
However, its more democratic successors, in the form of DMK and
AIADMK, have contributed many stable institutional contributions
to the public space in Tamil Nadu that can be counted as much more
than a regional political resource.74 On more than one occasion, the
DMK has rendered critical assistance to national governmental sta-
bility proving that regions may often nurture the nation better than
its own guardians of “larger interest.”75 In the 2009 survey of overall
accomplishments in social, economic, and other developments in the
20 largest states, Tamil Nadu is ranked third and among the large
southern states, it is ranked number one.76 Such records also suggest
a long story of coordination between the region and the nation,
despite all the differences and tensions between the two respective
governments.
A state like Punjab, with a memory of violent system-defiance from
1980–93 and a long lineage of regional movements for autonomy,
nevertheless, consistently maintains the top position in the list of large
states published for the last seven years, as of 2009.77 In most economic
lists going back to at least 1950s, the rank was not very different. How
does a region with a political reputation for insurgent turmoil, deliver
such enviable resources for the nation? Unlike some other states
suffering from a high incidence of violence, however, Punjab with
its relatively small size has earned a disproportionately prominent
share of national role and leadership in food production, defense of
the country, eminence in sports, movies, and popular music. With
only 1.5 percent of the land of India, by 2009 this state takes care of
40 percent of rice and more than 40 percent of wheat procured by
public agencies for the country. But the central government “decides
on its own prices of agricultural products …” leaving no choice to
the states.78 The increasing land and water constraints of Punjab
agriculture calls for better responsiveness from the national leaders
at the center. The interdependence between the center and the state
in this case is critical.
A legitimate confidence of having an eminent place in the country
was probably an important reason why the people of Punjab were
able to overcome one of the most explosive episodes of militant insur-
gency in the world in their state. After 1947, the Sikh community
comprised 33 percent of new Punjab’s population. A language move-
ment for Punjabi speakers’ autonomy helped reconstitute a Punjab
with a 61 percent Sikh and 37 percent Hindu population in 1966.79
This composition provided a springboard for a separatist movement
based on Sikh religious identity. However, a public space puts a
premium on exposure of differentiation within and among com-
munities. Democratic communication involved in electoral contest-
ation encourages strategic fashioning of connections cutting across
caste, class, occupation, and other categoric divisions. The Akali Dal,
speaking for the Sikh religious community was unsure about its
credential to represent it because the Dal could at best claim the
mandate of the upper caste Jat Sikhs, but not of the non-Jat Sikh
lower caste groups.80
Even that mandate was clouded, particularly in the 1980s, by
internal factional and doctrinal struggles.81 The lower caste and deviant
sect Sikhs, had apparently more to gain from secular inclusionary
political aggregations across the lines held sacred by the separatists
concerned with panthic (Sikh religious community) purity. No
wonder, the inclusionary secular banner of the Congress party, as well
as its taste for taking advantage of factionalism on the other side,
helped it win the highest percentage of votes in all of the five state
assembly elections before 1985.82
What the separatists lost in the open test of representation in
public space became replaced by sophisticated firepower. A vicious
circle of violence engulfed Punjab following federal military action
in 1984. However, it did not turn out to be a simple federal versus

Sikh or bipolar ethnic battle. It became a three-way struggle among
the moderate Akali, armed Separatists, and Congress party leaders
at state and federal levels, whose manipulative games did not always
accord with their professed secular principles. For over a decade vio-
lence claimed thousands of civilian lives.83 Militant brutality was
confronted with large scale military and police mobilization. Extensive
Sikh participation in the federal and state-level armed action prevented
the impression of religious war that the secessionists eagerly wanted
to convey to the world.84 In fact, it has been suggested that “…the
creation of the elite Punjab police commandos helped channel a sense
of Sikh nationalism and pride back into service for the state instead
of into the insurgent movement.”85
By 1992, the voice of the public space was resumed; vertical dif-
ferences caught up and cut through the veil of religious solidarity.
Democratic competition among parties and productive linkages with
the federal system returned. Both the Akali Dal and the Congress party
remained active on the scene. Following the 2009 elections, the Akali
Dal remained in power at the state level but the Congress won eight
out of the 13 Lok Sabha seats. The renewal of the public space seems
to have encouraged the expressive freedom of those underprivileged
groups whose voices were marginalized by the combative issues of
religious war (dharma yudh), Sikh separatism or secessionism. A
militant privileging of such issues tend to suppress the structural or
positional inequalities suffered by the lower caste, class, gender, or
other deprived segments within the holistic identity category called
the Sikh community.
Lower caste Sikh groups have increasingly organized themselves
around religious institutions called deras offering their own gurd-
waras for religious services.86 Most of the major villages in Punjab now
have two gurdwaras, one for upper caste Jat Sikhs and another for
lower caste Sikhs. The Vienna episode in May 2009, when two dera
leaders were killed, created extensive and violent reactions from dera
followers in Punjab to the extent that the army had to be deployed
in several cities.87 In fact, several dera episodes in recent times have
shown how the lower caste Sikhs are becoming aware and organized,
to affirm their dignity and power of numbers in the public space.
One report is aptly indicative: “… come election time, leaders of all

political parties flock to dera chiefs for committed vote banks.”88
This is one indication of how the democratic politics of differ-
ence promoted by open interactions in public space can challenge
unwarranted claims of group, community, or regional solidarity. As
we have seen before, both the leaders of identity communities, or ob-
servers from outside, tend to exaggerate the inflexible rigidity of the
composition and the structure of such groups. To know how partici-
pants in places of worship—even in egalitarian religions—can be
stratified, is to realize how calls for religious wars may not be equally
evocative for all strata of members of an identity community. This
will also indicate who will go for a politics of difference and who will
call for its obliteration.
Conclusion
The logic of representation in open public space clearly brings out the
issue of relative legitimacy of those who claim to speak for their own
people. By focusing on mediation in practice, we come to know how
even democratic representation can consistently misuse mandates.
This is why our attention to the movements and oppositional civil
societies allowed us, as in the case of Andhra Pradesh, to go beyond
conventional liberal theory. The transformative effect of democratic
interaction both in public space and through connections among
regions in the federal governmental system has enabled a story of
interregional collaboration, as for example, in the YSR case that was
sadly unanticipated in the grossly negative picture of regionalism
offered in the 1950s.
However, even the most careful account of regional politics may
fairly raise some issues that are not easy to answer. How should region-
alists deal with subregional or even smaller unit demands for auto-
nomy and justice? From Andhra to Jharkhand, why do the poorest
agricultural workers get so deeply disaffected? What degree of dis-
content may force lower caste and class into desperate transition from
democratic to violent insurgency? Armed Dalit and tribal groups led by
Maoist militants have challenged regional governments of Congress,
Communist, and other persuasions.89 Regional governments now

need much more than their own resources to counter the armed
rebels. The new contingency calls for wider interstate collaboration,
as well as deeper attention to the issues of equity and mobility. On a
different level, state–center collaboration to counter ethnic violence
has been frequently used in cases discussed above, and also notably
in the northeastern and other areas.
It is not difficult to see that a system of differentiated cohesion,
linking different regional interests, opinions, and perspectives together
seems to have worked reasonably well. Democratic representation has
enabled processes and institutions to acknowledge the importance of
respecting and not erasing differences. Extensive networks of edu-
cation, communication, arts, and entertainment have contributed to
the socialization of many Indians to appreciate the values of dwel-
ling together in a context of multiple cultures. A child in an Indian
school knows how to be appreciative of region and nation at the same
time.90 As of 2009, most of the large states historically associated with
regional movements have also been top performers in terms of com-
posite indices of development.91 Small states, such as Mizoram and
Nagaland, with a history of militant regionalism, score close to those
of larger states in the top 10 grouping.
The 2009 General Elections helped dispel many apprehensions
concerning “regional eruption.” The results ensured a reasonable man-
date for a national party and its regional allies. Congress party and its
allies won 261 out of 543 seats, a gain of 44 over the tally for 2004.92
The incumbent government was reelected. Voters in the regions
favored the national alliance over strictly regional parties and another
alliance led by a largely region-based party (BJP). Six months later,
the Congress party and its regional ally confidently won a consecutive
third term in the Assembly elections in Maharashtra and gained power
also in two other states. The victory in Maharashtra was particularly
reassuring for the Congress party. It got many more seats in 2009, 82
compared to its 69 seats in 2004, and the strident regionalist party,
Shiv Sena, suffered a big loss, 44 seats compared to 62 in 2004. The
BJP, Shiv Sena’s ally, also performed poorly, 46 seats against 54 in 2004.93
Democratic representation has not failed to promote a system in India
that is at the same time regionally pleasing and nationally coherent.
Notes
â•‡ 1. See the “Cover Story: Opinion Poll,” reporting the results of a survey commis-
sioned by India Today, April 13, 2009, pp. 22–31, esp. p. 25 (Indian edition).
â•‡ 2. Prabhu Chawla, “The Great Prime Minister Bazaar,” Opinion Poll essay, India
Today, Ibid., p. 21.
â•‡ 3. See Ibid., p. 21.
â•‡ 4. For a good discussion of how important theorists contributed to such bias in
the fields of representative democracy and nationalism ranging from John Stuart
Mill to Ernest Gellner see, for example, Alfred Stepan, “Modern Multinational
Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron,” in John A. Hall (ed.),
The State of the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp.
pp. 219–23.
â•‡ 5. The literature on the politics of difference and its implication on multicultural
political systems is vast and growing. For a balanced treatment, see Iris Marion
Young, “Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference,” in Anthony
Simon Laden and David Owen, (eds.), Multiculturalism and Political Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 60–88.
â•‡ 6. The notion of public space as a field of promise for processing claims in multi-
cultural contexts is discussed in, for e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 18–22.
â•‡ 7. For a general discussion of relevant concepts and historical analysis see Paul
Wallace (ed.), Region and Nation in India (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH
Publishing, 1985), esp. chapter 12, Ramashray Roy, “Region and Nation: A
Heretical View,” pp. 269–86.
â•‡ 8. For a discussion of distinction between the viewpoints of the observer and the
participant that has aided our analysis, Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 5.
â•‡ 9. The concept of authorization in the context of issues of representation is
elaborated in Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 128 ff. Her analysis builds on Hanna Pitkin’s classic,
The Concepts of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
10. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib’s critique of Will Kymlicka’s “holistic” notion
of societal cultures in The Claims of Culture, op. cit., pp. 59–61. For Kymlicka’s
concept of societal cultures see his Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), p. 76.
11. See Chandra Pal Singh (ed.), Readings in Political Geography (New Delhi: Heritage
Publishers, 1994).
12. Probably, the best account and analysis of this period and later with reference
to the emergence of regional cultural and political processes is Sheldon Pollock,
The Language of the Gods in the World of Men, Sanskrit Culture, and Power
in Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), esp.
pp. 330ff.
13. Ibid., p. 337.

14. Ibid., p. 380–410 and passim.
15. A critical study offering insightful analysis of language and identity in the rele-
vant phases of the Telugu language and regional development is contained in
Lisa Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 45–49.
16. In fact, the story is more complex. The reference is to the Partition of India in
1947 when the larger part of Punjab became part of Pakistan and the other
remained in India. Bengal’s larger part became East Pakistan in 1947 and the
other part remained in India. In 1971, the Bengali speakers of Pakistan seceded
to form the state of Bangladesh. Across the border, however, the political
identification of Bengali speakers in India did not change since 1947. For a
brief background of the 1947 partition, see Judith M. Brown, Modern India,
The Origins of Indian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.
331ff. For the 1971 partition of Pakistan, see Jyotirindra Dasgupta, “Language,
National Unity, and Shared Development in South Asia,” in William R. Beer
and James E. Jacob (eds.), Language Policy and National Unity, (Totowa, N. J.:
Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), pp. 201–05.
17. See The Forty-third Report of the Commission of Linguistic Minorities in India.
(New Delhi: Government of India, 2006). Available online at: http://nelm.nic.
in/shred/linkimages/36.report%20english, (last date of access: August 26, 2009,
p. 20).
18. See B.B. Majumdar and B.P. Majumdar, Congress and Congressmen in the
Pre-Gandhian Era, 1885–1917 (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1967),
pp. 5, 44–45, and passim.
19. For details, see Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence (New Delhi:
Penguin, 1989), pp. 75 and passim.
20. A concise description of perspective variations is offered by T.N. Madan,
“Linguistic Diversity and National Unity: Dimensions of a Debate,” in C.H.
Hanumanthan Rao and P.C. Joshi (eds.), Reflections on Economic Development
and Social Change (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1979), esp. pp. 395–99.
21. See Lok Sabha Debates on the Report of the States Reorganization Commission
(14th December–23rd December, 1955), Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha
Secretariat, February 1956), p. 864.
22. The rationalism component, its link with faith in science, and deep resentment
of “pre-rational” political issues such as language, as parts of Nehru’s “almost
theological” “passionate conviction” are discussed in Robert D. King, Nehru
and the Language Politics of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp.168–71.
23. Many of the influential works were the products of American investment in
research on new nations, their vulnerabilities, and their prospects in terms of
contribution to world order and susceptibility to communist control. Scholars
from other settings also did their share but probably with less enchantment with
the cold war issues.
24. For example, Edward Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,” British
Journal of Sociology, June 1957, pp.130–45; Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative
Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in his
edited volume Old Societies and New States (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), esp.
p. 109; Selig S. Harrison, India, The Most Dangerous Decades (Madras: Oxford
University Press, 1960), Indian edition, pp. 3–5, passim.
25. Selig S. Harrison, Ibid., pp. 5–6.
26. Ibid., pp. 5–7 and passim.
27. See Harold A. Gould, “On the Apperception of Doom in Indian Political Analysis,”
in Paul Wallace (ed.), Region and Nation in India, op.cit., pp. 287–99. Regarding
the problems of incompatible frame of reference, see Richard Rorty, Achieving
Our Country (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 29.
28. The homogenizing bias is discussed in Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and
Modernity,” in J. A. Hall (ed.), The State of the Nation, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), pp. 191–218.
29. For example, probably the most cited work in this area of multiculturalism by
Kymlicka. See (Kymlicka 1995) cited earlier in note 10, contains only one entry
in the text. Other works of more recent period are not very different. See the
2007 publication, Multiculturalism and Political Theory, cited in note 5.
30. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 90.
31. Ibid., p. 90.
32. Ibid., pp. 90–108 for a useful and innovative analysis of some of the ideas dis-
cussed here and also a relevant critique of literature including a concise appraisal
of Charles Taylor’s theory of the politics of recognition. See also Patchen
Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), esp.
pp. 154–76.
33. This is because, following Young, in this view, a regional collectivity is likely to
include different interpretations or even notions of regional culture, networks
of position, powers, privileges, and subregional variations. See Young, Inclusion
and Democracy, esp. pp. 90–91.
34. See J. Dasgupta, “India’s Federal Design and Multicultural National Construc-
tion,” in Atul Kohli (ed.), The Success of India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge
35. Ibid., p. 58 for a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of
India.
36. Ibid., pp. 50–51.
37. Insurgent democracy refers to an expanded role of democratic action, and
corresponding theoretical analysis, that can challenge the established power
structures and go considerably beyond legalistic limits of liberal theory. It respects
the oppositional components of civil society. See John S. Dryzek, Deliberative
Democracy and Beyond, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 2, 85,
and passim.
38. See Ibid., for an analysis of the limits of liberal notions of democracy, esp.
pp. 9–30.
39. For a concise account of movements, associations, organizations, and other

resources extending to various fields allied to the INC and other political organ-
izations before independence see, for example, Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for
Independence, 1857–1947 (New Delhi: Penguin, 1989). This is a useful survey
including valuable sections on constructive work with interesting civil and political
implications described, for instance, in pp. 245–46, 512, and passim.
40. For a brief history of the partition, see Mushirul Hasan (ed.), India’s Partition:
Process, Strategy, and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994),
pp. 1–43.
41. By national statists, I refer to leaders with relatively higher preferences for the
authority of the modern state and its association with the notions of rationalism,
science, and central planning as revealed, for example, in the writings, speeches,
and actions of Nehru. See, for instance, Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Vol. 3,
March 1953–August 1957, (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Government
of India, 1958), esp. pp. 56–89, 137–144.
42. The role of leaders like Nehru in rushing for power, even at the cost of a cata-
strophic partition has been debated for a long time. A renewed media debate
over Jaswant Singh’s new work may offer some interesting observations. See,
for instance, Ayesha Jalal, “Masters of Mutilation,” (pp. 34–36), and M.G.S.
Narayanan, “The Third Accused,” (pp. 37–39) in India Today, August 31, 2009.
It is interesting that Singh (former BJP senior leader and minister), his work,
and expulsion became post-election issues in 2009.
43. See Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Vol. 1, September 1946–May 1949, (New
Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1949), pp. 36, 39,
41. For example, note his notion that many “clouded” minds missing the “long
perspective” may impair the task of “building up an organic nation.”
44. Ibid., p. 36.
45. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 129. Her careful conceptualization, and
especially, sensitivity to the role of representation in multicultural contexts makes
her work particularly valuable for analyzing the politics of difference in India.
46. For an interesting analysis of some relevant issues and recent literature see
Andrew W. Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and
Gyroscopes in the study of Political Representation and Democracy,” American
Political Science Review, Vol.103, No.2, May 2009, pp. 214–230, esp. pp.
215–16.
47. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, op.cit., p. 131.
48. Ibid., pp.133–134 for a general theoretical analysis with practical implications
for a wide range of democratic countries.
49. Ibid., p. 133.
50. Ibid., p. 140.
51. For an excellent analysis of differences within the Andhra region, see Mitchell,
Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India, pp. 39ff.
52. For the reorganization process, see Bipan Chandra, India After Independence
(New Delhi: Viking, 1999), pp. 98–130.
53. G. Ram Reddy, “The Politics of Accommodation: Caste, Class, and Dominance
in Andhra Pradesh,” in Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (eds), Dominance
and State Power in Modern India, Vol.1, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989),
p. 266.
54. See Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India, pp. 42–48 for a
perceptive treatment of why the Andhra region and Telugu Language need not
be considered as necessarily co-extensive (esp. p. 47).
55. For details see Ibid., p. 205; also King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India,
p. 112.
56. See Lisa Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India, op.cit.,
p. 205ff.
57. See Reddy, “The Politics of Accommodation,” p. 280. The reference is to
Legislative Assembly elections.
58. Ibid., p. 281.
59. See the Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955, Government of
India, (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1955); and for an account of the modi-
fications of the Indian map, King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India,
p. 120ff.
60. Reddy, “The Politics of Accommodation,” p. 287.
61. For a brief account see Paranjoy Guha Thakurta and Shankar Raghuraman,
A Time of Coalitions, (New Delhi: Sage, 2004), pp. 221ff.
62. See Karli Srinivasulu, “Political Articulation and Policy Discourse in the 2004
Elections in Andhra Pradesh,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), India’s
2004 Eelections (New Delhi; Sage, 2007), pp. 180–205.
63. Sreenivas Janyala, “A Village in Mourning,” Indian Express (North American
Edition), September 11, 2009, pp. 7–8. See also Amarnath K. Menon, “The Man
of Action,” India Today, (Indian edition), September 14, 2009, pp. 44–46.
64. Menon, “The Man of Action,” p. 45.
65. Ibid., p. 45.
66. The reference is to his case for 4 Percent reservation for Muslims and Christians
among Dalits respectively. His own Christian background, probably, did not
make such choices politically easy. See Ibid., p. 45.
67. See Iris Marion Young’s insightful distinctions of types of difference in her
“Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference,” in Laden and Owen (eds),
Multiculturalism and Political Theory,” pp. 64ff.
68. For details see S. Janyala, “A Village in Mourning,” Indian Express, September
11, 2009, p. 8.; and Amarnath K. Menon, “The Man of Action,” India Today,
September 14, op.cit., p. 45, and “The Second Coming,” India Today, May 25,
2009, pp. 34–38.
69. See Karli Srinivasulu, “Political Articulation and Policy Discourse in the 2004
Elections in Andhra Pradesh,,” in India’s 2004 Elections, pp. 194–195 and 204; also
in the same book see Ramashray Roy, “The Text and Context of the 2004 Lok
Sabha Elections in India,” esp. p. 32 for a story about the formation of the
Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), narrating how a former TDP leader, K.C. Rao
(KCR), quit the party because he was denied a cabinet position and formed the
TSR in 2001; pp. 23 and 32.
70. In the Andhra Pradesh Assembly elections of 2009, the TRS won (out of 294)
10 seats (compared to its 26 in 2004), Menon, “The Second Coming,” p. 34.
71. See, for example, a discussion of the relevant reorganizing powers in Durga Das
Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, 19th edition, reprint 2007, (New
Delhi: Wadhwa, 2007), pp. 70–73.
72. By system-compliance, I mean that the object of reference is much wider than the
bureaucratic state. Similarly, system-defiance may go to the extent of challenging
the entire political system and not just its state or government components.
73. For the early phase see Arun Swamy, “Parties, Political Identities and the Absence
of Mass Political Violence in South India,” in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli,
(eds)., Community Conflicts and the State in India (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1998), p. 114.
74. See Ibid., pp.146–147; especially notable is the record of the two-party com-
petitive process “for 70 years” including the pre-independence phase, p. 147.
75. The reference is to the role played in the late 1960s and 1999 to maintain
stability.
76. See Shankar Aiyar, “India’s Best and Worst States,” and “State of the States,” special
number, India Today, (Indian edition), September 28, 2009, pp. 22 and 35.
77. Ibid., p. 21.
78. Ibid., September 28, 2009, p.49; statement by Chief Minister Prakash Singh
Badal. He might as well remind his audience that Punjab’s agricultural yield
of 4,017 kg per hectare compares rather well with Maharashtra’s of 940 kg per
hectare, “India in Numbers,” Ibid., p. 44.
79. See Chandra, India After Independence, pp. 325–328.
80. How the caste system affects different religious communities including the Sikhs
in Punjab is analyzed in a contemporary empirical report in Paramjit S. Judge
and Gurpreet Bal, “Understanding the Paradox of Changes Among Dalits in
Punjab,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIII, No. 41, October 11, 2008,
pp. 49–55. Dalits account for nearly 29 percent of the population of Punjab.
81. For an account of Akali factionalism, see Jugdep S. Chima, “ Back to the future in
2002? A model of Sikh Separatism in Punjab,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
Vol. 25, No. 1, January–February 2002, esp., pp. 27ff.
82. See Paul Wallace, “Religious and Ethnic Politics: Political Mobilization in Punjab,”
in Frankel and Rao (eds)., Dominance, Vol. 2, pp. 416–81.
83. See B. Chandra, India After Independence, op. cit., pp. 328–38 for details. This work
notes that of the nearly 12,000 people killed by the militants during 1981–93,
“more than 61 percent were Sikhs.” p. 338.
84. For details of Sikh participation in Punjab’s anti-insurgency operation, see Jugdep
S. Chima, “Controlling the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: ‘Political’ and ‘Military’
Strategies from Successful Counterinsurgency in Punjab, India,” Small Wars and

Insurgencies, Vol.18, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 615–37.
85. Ibid., p. 630.
86. See Judge and Bal, “ Understanding the Paradox of Changes Among Dalits in
Punjab,” p. 52 for a description of different kinds of gurdwaras in contemporary
Punjab.
87. For accounts of firing in a Vienna dera and its impact in different parts of Punjab
immediately after, see Vipin Pubby, “Firing in Vienna, Fires in Punjab,” Indian
Express, (North American Edition), June 5, 2009, p. 7. There is also a report
of violent mass reactions on the same page. The particular dera connected with
the leaders killed was Dera Sachkhand.
88. Ibid., p.7.
89. See Abhijit Dasgupta, “The Last Gasps,” and M. G. Radhakrishnan, “The Lost
Slogan” in India Today, November 2, 2009, pp. 19–25.
90. See Veronique Benei, Schooling Passions (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2008), pp. 80–82.
91. See Shankar Aiyar, in India Today, September 23, 2009, p. 21. Out of 21 large
states, nine out of the top 10, to be precise.
92. Prabhu Chawla, “The Comeback Couple,” India Today, May 25, 2009, pp.
19–23.
93. Swati Mathur, Jhilmil Motihar and Malini Bhupta, “The Third Coming,” India
Today, November 2, 2009, pp. 32–35.
chapter 5
Federalism, Party System,

and Structural Changes in India
Maneesha Roy
No political arrangement, even if it is sanctioned by a constitution,

remains unchanged over time. It is generally expected that the con-
stitution shapes political processes and events without being affected
by the changing character of politics. And yet the fact remains that
political processes and events also have a great impact on how political
institutional arrangements work and change over time. This is also true
of India where a dominant party administered the federal constitu-
tion in the initial years of the functioning of the Indian Constitution.
However, changes have gradually occurred to adversely affect the
destiny of the Congress party, a party that enjoyed unchallenged dom-
inance since the days of the freedom movement.
With the decline in Congress dominance, the federal arrangement
has also undergone some vital changes. Coalition politics has now
become the dominant pattern in Indian politics, especially at the
national level. India’s 2009 parliamentary elections highlight the con-
tinuance of coalition politics. For over a decade, no single party has
been able to gain an electoral majority, nor does it seem likely that coal-
ition politics will cease to operate in the foreseeable future.
Indian politics has undergone a three-phase evolution in the last six
decades. Starting with a one-party dominance system, it saw the rise
of an incipient two-party competition, which gave way subsequently
to a multiparty system, making coalition governments at the center
necessary. Given the fact that the Indian Constitution provides for a
very strong union government, the structural changes overtaking
Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes 95
politics in India has meant the rise of state leaders as important players
in the game of politics at the national level. This has further meant
a disjunction between state election outcomes and national election
results. This situation has certain ramifications for the working of
the federal principle and the distribution of power and influence
between the union and the states. It also has certain consequences
for coalition formation and the working of coalition government.
This chapter explores some important aspects of the question of
the relationship between the federal structure of Indian politics and
coalition politics.
Federalism: Background
No system of governance can be properly understood without a

reference to the socioeconomic and political context in which it was
born and consolidated. India’s rise as a free nation following the
1947 transfer of power is thus historically conditioned and textured.
While explaining its distinctive features, one is inexorably drawn to
her immediate colonial past. Not merely the colonial structure that
arose after independence, but the path of development that India pre-
ferred, was largely the outcome of a dialectical interaction between
the political system and the socioeconomic milieu; this had a direct
bearing on the growth of the nation-state. Given the complex and
peculiar circumstances in which the nation became independent in
1947, it is not difficult to grasp the arguments defending a centralized
government. It is also obvious that in view of India’s well-entrenched
multicultural character, federalism was considered to be the best possible
structure.
The 1950 Constitution of India represents two contradictory ten-
dencies. While the Constitution retained the centralized structure,
there was also a diametrically opposite tendency, which sought to
justify federal governance as integral to India’s multicultural character.
The net result was the articulation of a semi-hegemonic federal struc-
ture that drew largely upon the 1935 Government of India Act, even
as the federal system that supported centralization of power appeared
to be the most suitable alternative for nation-building. However, the
96 Maneesha Roy
situation changed radically following the articulation of new demands

by hitherto peripheral sociopolitical groups.
The Indian federal system has been dynamic in accommodating
political and societal changes and keeping the country together since
its constitutional blueprint was drawn in 1950. However, there has
been a fundamental transformation of the operative principles of
federalism since the 1990s. The rhythm and the beat of the political
system, and the federal system within it, have changed on account of
a variety of socio-economic and political factors. However, this is pri-
marily due to the disarray of the party system, neo-liberal economic
policies, and judicial decisions. The centralizing thrust of the earlier
years has yielded to some kind of a “confederal” operation of the pol-
itical system, making the formulation and implementation of public
policies a “consociational” exercise between political elites at the two
levels of government, central and provincial.
However, with the passage of time, a third level has now emerged.
It consists of local institutions of self-governance, now constitutionally
entrenched and waiting in the wings. My attempt in this chapter is
to trace the trajectory of the Indian federal system and to grasp the
processes that contributed to its metamorphosis.
Historical Background
During the British rule of nearly 200 years, a strong colonial authority
at the center contained conflicts among regional kingdoms on the
subcontinent. The British rulers, as well as Indian elites considered the
federal system necessary when the transfer of power became inevit-
able in 1947. Even before the 1950 Constitution was made, the British
Raj had already attempted a federal experiment under the govern-
ment of India Act, 1935. However, this experiment remained abortive
at the federal level due to the reluctance of the princely states to join
the proposed union. Thus, only the provincial component of the
1935 Act was implemented, while the central government still worked
under the 1919 Act.
The pre-1935 British Raj was a unitary system of administration.
Thus the center preceded the units in the case of the British Indian
provinces. But the notionally independent princely states under the
paramountcy of the British crown preceded the Federation. At the

time of Independence, the princely states were given the right to self-
determination whereby they could opt to remain independent or join
one of the two newly created states of India and Pakistan. However,
the right of self-determination was modified to the extent that various
pressures forced them to accede to either India or Pakistan.
By and large, the institutions established at the center influenced
the institutions established in the states. The choice of parliamentary
federal constitution for India is thus determined by the historical
experience of the country. It is frequently said that India suffered
from foreign aggression and colonization due to the weakness of the
central authority. Hence, a strong parliamentary center was consid-
ered necessary, but at the same time, India’s unity in diversity also
demanded a reasonable allowance for federal mode of integration
with regional autonomy.
The Federal Architecture

Both the Indian Constitution and the political system were tradition-
ally described as “quasi-federal,”1 emphasizing centralization to the
extent that it signified the possible withering away of federalism. This
interpretation was based on the federal design in the Constitution that
provided for: (a) single citizenship, (b) an extensive Union and Con-
current List, (c) power of the Parliament to reorganize state bound-
aries, (d ) a common integrated hierarchy of courts, (e) a unique cadre
of All-India Services, ( f ) a federal second chamber formed on the
basis of a state’s population rather than equality of states qua states,
( g) a centrally appointed Planning Commission as the creature of the
Union executive, and (h) the early predominance of the INC both at
the Union and the State levels.
However, over the years, particularly since the 1990s, the Indian
political system has significantly moved toward greater federal-
ization. The Constitution is primarily federal, and federalism is not
merely an inconsequential appendage. This is so, not only for the essen-
tially plural and federal character of Indian society, but also because
of the nature of the constitutional text. Despite overriding powers of
the Union over the state governments in normal and emergency
98 Maneesha Roy
situations, the powers of the federated states are derived from a written
constitution, the lengthiest in the world, which is subject to final inter-
pretation by the federal judiciary. Indications of the growing federal-
ization of the polity and the economy are evident both in the civil
society and the state. The transformation of the Indian party system
to a regionalized multiparty configuration, as Douglas Verney points
out, has encouraged the transition of the Indian political system from
a “quasi-federation” to “quasi-confederacy.”2
The Federal Arrangement in India: The Initial Decades

Indian politics in the first two decades after the gaining of independ-
ence in 1947 was built on a kind of consensus based primarily on elite
accommodation. The system passed uncontested “because of its
nearness to the mobilization of the national movement and the rela-
tionship of implicit trust between the leadership and the masses.” It
was a consensus of “discourse rather than ideological positions.”3 Soon
after Nehru’s demise, the system began to break down—a process
that became evident especially from 1969 onwards, when Nehru’s
successor, Indira Gandhi faced with increasing opposition strength,
rejected the principle of consensus in favor of the majoritarian
principle. Since she carried the masses with her, she ignored the party,
which had lost its democratic mainspring. Centralization, which was
once considered as “an instrument of purposive intervention by a
cohesive and disciplined elite” soon turned out to be “suicidal for the
prevalent party system and the federal structure and the wider affili-
ations that were built through them.”4
The de-institutionalization of the Congress party by dismantling
the party’s federal structure contributed immensely to the erosion
of India’s federal system. This decay led to massive concentration of
power in the central leadership. During the 1969–77 period, center–
state relations were practically reduced to a state of near nonexistence
and centralization of power triumphed under the aegis of a strong state
whose power was controlled by a ruling party, which relied exclusively
on its leader for its survival.
The 1975–77 emergency was probably the most serious affront
to federalism since it led to the consolidation of a powerful center
presiding over a federation of thoroughly enfeebled states. During the

brief interlude of the Janata regime (1977–80), no serious attempt was
made to counter the centripetal tendencies that had, by then, taken
firm roots in Indian politics. Indira Gandhi’s style of functioning com-
pletely destroyed internal democracy within the Congress party. With
the disintegration of provincial Congress organizations, the state
leaders became mere clients of the central organ of the party.
Regional Demands
The federalizing process has, in fact, been long in the making. It was
under mounting regional pressures that Indira Gandhi, in 1983,
appointed a constitutional commission on center–state relations,
chaired by justice Sarkaria. In 1987–88, the Commission submitted
its monumental two-volume report,5 which has become the most
frequently invoked document in the federal discourse. Besides sug-
gesting a federal reorientation of attitudes and styles of functioning by
functionaries, including Governors, the Sarkaria panel recommended
constitutional entrenchment of the National Development Council
(NDC) and the Planning Commission. Both were created in the early
1950s under cabinet resolutions and continue to be nonstatutory.
It also proposed the setting up of the Inter-State Council (ISC)
under Article 263 of the Constitution. This was done in 1990. The
Sarkaria Commission also proposed that the Finance Commission—
appointed by the center at five-year intervals under Article 280 of the
Constitution to recommend the pattern of revenue sharing between
the center and states—be made a permanent body. Though this has
not happened yet, the Finance Commission Reports still enjoy a good
deal of legitimacy between the two tiers of government.
In contrast to Indira Gandhi’s rigid centralist orientation, Rajiv
Gandhi adopted a more contextually specific, accommodative approach
to regional ethnic demands and movements. In quick succession, the
center reached regional accords with ethnic movements and parties
in Punjab and Assam in 1985, Mizoram in 1986, and Tripura in
1988.6 The Punjab Accord with the Akali Dal sought to resolve
the territorial and interstate river water disputes between Punjab,
Haryana, and Rajasthan. It promised an all-India Gurdwara Act by
100 Maneesha Roy
the Parliament and referred to the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of the

Akali Dal for “redefining” center–state relations for consideration to
the Sarkaria Commission. The Sakaria Commission also assured a
judicial inquiry into the massacre of Sikhs in Delhi in 1984.7 Expect
for some debatable success on the last two points, the rest of the issues
still largely remain unresolved.
The Assam Accord signed in August 1985 provided for: (a) the
detection and deletion of the names of Bangladeshi migrants entering
Assam prior to January 1966, (b)the disenfranchisement for 10 years
of the migrants entering between January 1966 and March 24, 1971;
and (c) the detection and deportation of those coming on or after
March 25, 1971. The Mizoram and Tripura Accords severally sought
to restore normalcy by cessation of insurgency and rehabilitation of
the armed underground elements. While these peace efforts have not
been fully successful in terminating the cycle of insurgency, democ-
ratic process has been somewhat restored.
Administrative dislocations of regional identities have led to de-
mands for the separation and the formation of new states. Many of these
demands have been conceded, the most recent being Jharkhand
(2000), Uttaranchal (2000), and Chhattisgarh (2000). Presently, the
Indian federation consists of 28 states and 7 union territories. Yet there
are 31 more demands for statehood, which have to be disposed off for
ensuring the smooth functioning of the federal system.
Federal Politics in the Era of Coalition Governments

Besides the structure of the Constitution, the working of the legislative
and executive Government in the Indian federation is significantly
influenced by the nature of the electoral system, party, and judicial
behavior. Contrary to the Duverger–Riker hypothesis about the
plurality of the electoral system giving rise to a two-party system,8 the
Indian experience suggests that this kind of electoral law that oper-
ates in a socially and regionally diverse federal system may lead to frag-
mentation of the party system, ultimately leading to a multipartisan
configuration.
Reasons for this are not difficult to seek. Note, for example, that state
leaders evince statist orientations even though they and their states,
are tremendously influenced by the center in many important ways.

This is further reinforced by the economic and political problems
each of the states face. Moreover, two other factors favor statist orien-
tations: one, the need to spend central funds in the states, and two,
highly competitive political stratospheres. For these reasons, state
leaders have gained much strength in national politics. This is reflected
in the fact that it is the electoral outcomes in different states that
determines the composition of the ruling and opposing coalitions.
This divergence between state and national election outcomes has
strengthened the hands of state leaders, who can now bargain and
often bargain successfully with national leaders.
The Duverger–Riker hypothesis is valid only for countries endowed
with a relatively homogenous political culture; for example, the United
Kingdom and Australia among parliamentary federal systems and the
United States as a Presidential federal system. Besides India, Canada
emerges as another counter illustration of the Duverger-Riker
hypothesis. India and Canada both historically enveloped phases of
one-party dominance at the national level, but subsequently turned
to multiparty systems with increasing politicization and assertion
of regional and ethnic identities.
Party system is perhaps the most important intervening vari-
able that significantly influences the working of the federal political
system. As mentioned earlier, India began with a one-party dominant sys-
tem, but since 1989 it has become a multiparty system. The central-
ized phase of the Indian federation, that spanned the Nehru and
Indira Gandhi phases, by and large was associated with one-party
Congress dominance. This feature of the party system was clearly
evident in the working of all the organs of the government. After an
initial dispute about the interpretation of the powers of the President
raised by Dr Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, the ques-
tion was settled in favor of a nominal head of State in the British
parliamentary tradition.
The cabinet during this phase started with the Nehru–Patel
duumvirate. However, after Patel’s death in December 1950, the
cabinet system virtually turned into a prime ministerial system under
Nehru. One party control of the legislature facilitated the emergence
of a strong prime ministerial Cabinet. Autonomy of the federating
102 Maneesha Roy
units was somewhat overshadowed by the rule of the same party in

New Delhi, as well as practically all states; yet state governments were
not as powerless as they were to become under Indira Gandhi. During
her regime that followed after a brief interlude under Prime Minister
Lal Bahadur Shastri, the political system became considerably more
centralized than in the past. The one-party control of the Parliament,
Prime Ministerial domination of the cabinet system, and the Central
hegemony over Congress-ruled state governments in particular,
and Opposition-ruled state governments in general, became further
accentuated. Central intervention in state governments under Article
356 was frequently used to topple legitimately elected governments
in the states.
This overly centralized union government was challenged by an
extra-parliamentary mass movement, popularly called the J.P. move-
ment, on the issue of authoritarianism and corruption in the govern-
ment. This confrontation led directly to the imposition of internal
Emergency by Indira Gandhi and a wholesale arrest of the opposition
leaders. The 1977 elections routed the Emergency regime and voted the
newly formed centrist Janata party to power at the center. The Janata
interlude of nearly two and a half years was followed by the restora-
tion of the Congress Party led by Indira Gandhi in 1980. Mrs Gandhi
was somewhat chastened by the Emergency imbroglio. Her second
regime was “patrimonial” for its fixation on dynasty building.9
During this period, the Gandhi household selected chief ministers
of virtually all the Congress-ruled states. Given that it was easier for
Mrs Gandhi to maintain her patrimonial regime if the state leadership
was in constant flux, she not only kept chief ministers on probation,
but also made sure that none among them emerged strong enough to
dispense with her intervention and protection. After her assassination
in 1984, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, succeeded her. During this phase, the
functioning of institutions came again to be marked by centralization,
though to a somewhat lesser degree than in the 1970s.
Unlike his mother, Rajiv resisted the temptation of toppling non-
Congress state governments (11 in 1988). Non-Congress parties
controlled several state governments during this phase. The Rajiv
Gandhi government brought a somewhat fresh approach to regional
problems, especially in relation to non-Congress states that were
marked by agitational movements. As mentioned earlier, he signed a

series of peace accords with major regional parties in Punjab, Assam,
Mizoram, and Tripura. Rajiv Gandhi also built bridges of under-
standing with the National Conference CM of Jammu and Kashmir,
Farooq Abdullah.
The 1990s witnessed a new federal fervor in the Indian political
landscape. After the collapse of the Congress party in 1989, a quali-
tatively new phase in Indian politics was ushered in with the advent of
the multiparty system, which has continued ever since. The decline of
Congress created a vacuum in which no political party has been able
to gain a majority and form a government at the national level on its
own. This phase saw the definitive emergence of state and regional
parties, which have played a very critical role in the formation of
the government at the national level. This phase symbolizes what
E. Sridharan calls “multiple bipolarity.” This means that the main
contention in several Indian states involves two state parties, expect
in a few instances (eight states to be precise), which alternatively con-
trol the power apparatus of the state. In addition, elections to state
assemblies have acquired autonomy, as well as the capacity to shape
the outcome of national elections.10
The debility of national parties in the last two decades and the auto-
nomy of the state electoral processes allow main political cleavages
in the states to determine the national electoral outcome. As such,
national politics is not the political arena, which impinges on political
choices; political preferences and loyalties at the national level derive
from primary loyalties in state politics.11 Thus political cleavages in
the states and political leanings of state leaders have assumed cen-
trality in determining national electoral outcomes and through it, they
have acquired a decisive say in determining who rules at the center
and with what effect. However, competition for political ascendance
does not take place between the same parties in all the states. Different
patterns of political alignments have given birth to what was earlier
referred to as multiple bipolarity. The emergence of the state as the
primary locale of national political choices, insofar as the formation
of the national government is concerned, has a significant bearing
on alliance formation, as well as the functioning of the coalition
government.
104 Maneesha Roy
State-based political parties have become key players, who decide

the winners of the strenuous struggle for power at the center. Lines
of political division in the states, the nature of sociopolitical cleav-
ages, and the performance of the party in power, all these become
important desiderata of national elections. As a result, there seems to
have taken place a disjunction between issues and policies that shape
political events in the states and those that bear upon the concerns
of the national government. This disjunction allows state leaders
belonging to rival camps to retain their autonomy. Thus, given the
central importance of state-relevant political issues, conflicts, and
the characteristics of state leaders, it is not at all surprising that they
have grown very powerful for the purposes of national elections.
This complex set of changes brought on by coalition and minority
governments, as well as the crucial role played by some major regional
parties has brought about a sea change in the political system. The
prime ministerial system has metamorphosed into a kind of cabinet
system that has been transformed beyond recognition, in comparison
to the Westminster system based on collective responsibility of the
Cabinet, to the popular chamber of the Parliament. The Indian cabinet
system today is in reality fragmented into segments nominated and
controlled by participating parties, some of which are led by powerful
CMs. Legally, the Prime Minister is still the kingpin of the system in
the sense that ultimate power rests in his/her hands, but the ministers
are imposed upon him by coalition partners and withdrawn from
the cabinet, sometimes against his will. One can recall the Congress
DMK Cabinet birth deadlock, which held up government formation
in May 2009.
As a matter of fact, coalition partners can hold the government to
ransom in order to get state-or-party-specific concerns and demands
not only recognized but also incorporated into the overall policy and
programmatic perspective of the national coalition government. The
inclusion of certain nominees of coalition partners in the ministry is
just one of the ways in which this can be done. There are other ways
of getting a particular concern of a coalition partner attended to by
the government. Another way is obtaining preference for the state
in the allocation of central funding. The corollary of this expresses
itself in two different ways. First, the smallest of the coalition member
enjoys, in certain situations, more power proportionate to its size and

can have its way if its continued support is vital for the survival of
the coalition government.
Second, toleration of unsatisfactory performance, even inefficiency,
of a constituent coalition partner constitutes the hallmark of the
ruling coalition. This is well illustrated by the inability of the UPA-
II, following the 2009 elections, to check the runaway prices of food
items. The Congress party, as the major partner of UPA-II, urged the
government to curb the rising prices. However, it did not produce
any effective action from the Ministry of Agriculture presided over by
Sharad Pawar, a powerful partner of UPA-II. Commenting on this
situation, Janardan Dwivedy, Congress General Secretary, remarked,
“it is a coalition government and not a full fledged Congress govern-
ment … Congress is the largest in coalition, but it is the first among
the equals.”12 The inference is clear: it cannot force its partners to
act in a particular manner if the partner is not willing or able to act. It
is in this sense that coalition governments prove to be consociational
in the sense that Lipjhart13 uses it.
Thus, it is not surprising that the principle of collective respons-
ibility is considerably strained insofar as regional party bosses exert
their influence and power. This is perhaps inevitable in federal coal-
ition cabinets, but is alien to the Westminster system. With the de-
cline of Prime Ministerial power, the presidential role has acquired
some more elbowroom, though this does not really amount to an
independent role for the President. However, recent Presidents have
shown greater initiative and drive under coalition situations, par-
ticularly in formation of governments and dissolution of the Lok
Sabha in cases of uncertain majorities, than in the past. The phase of
coalition governments has also increased the autonomy of the Parlia-
ment, as well as that of state governments than was ever the case,
under one-party majority governments.
The role of the Rajya Sabha as a federal second chamber was not
found to be particularly notable by Morris-Jones in his classical study
of the Indian Parliament in the 1950s. In his assessment, it was no
more likely to be a forum for the articulation of a state’s right any more
than the Lok Sabha. Both the Houses were more or less similar in terms
of party affiliations and economic background of the members.
106 Maneesha Roy
However, with the transformation of the party system by the 1990s,

the Rajya Sabha has emerged as a federal second chamber as it reflects
a different party configuration than that of the Lok Sabha. The dif-
ferential oppositional majority in the Rajya Sabha is attributable to a
different party configuration in the states whose legislatures form the
Electoral College for the federal second chamber. Thus, the govern-
mental majority in the Lok Sabha now must make an inter-house
legislative understanding with the Rajya Sabha to facilitate the pas-
sage of legislation and constitutional amendments.
A deadlock between the two Houses is resolved only at a joint
session. In a joint session, the Lok Sabha with its larger number is
more likely to emerge successful. But no government would like to
make joint sessions a regular feature of the parliamentary process.
The Rajya Sabha can in any case block a constitutional amendment.
Federal representative character of the Rajya Sabha is clearly reflected
in the fact that among the elected Rajya Sabha members between 1952
and 2002, 59 percent of the incumbents before their election to the
House were active in state politics.
In addition to the electoral and party systems, judicial behavior
is another factor that affects the working of legislative and executive
governance in the Indian federation. Despite its common integrated
structure, courts have generally been protective of the federal structure
of the constitution, especially in the more recent decades. The courts
have done this at least in three ways. First, as early as in Hargovind
Pant vs. Raghukul Tilak & Others (1979), the Supreme Court gave an
essentially federal as distinguished from central, interpretation of
the role of the Governor. It observed that the Governors’ “is an inde-
pendent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of
the Government of India.”
Second, in S.R. Bommai & Others vs. Union of India & Others
(1994),14 the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision on a number
of cases previously decided, wherein it had consistently maintained
that the determination under Article 356 of the Constitution, i.e.
whether the constitutional machinery in a state has broken down
or not was a “political thicket” best left in the hands of the Union
executive. The Court now maintained that the satisfaction of the
President in the matter was “subjective” but “not entirely absolute”
and must be exercised on some palpable material or evidence in the

public domain.
The Court, thus made this power of the Union executive, subject
to judicial review for the first time. This considerably reduced the
greatest threat to the autonomy of state governments from the arbi-
trary exercise of the executive power of the Union. Third, in the fore-
going judgment as well as in the Keshvananda Bharti vs. Union of India
(1973)15 and Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980),16 the Supreme
Court established the doctrine of the un-amenability of the “basic
structure of the Constitution,” of which federalism is illustratively
declared to be a part.17
By all available indicators, the current trend of greater federaliza-
tion of the political system is likely to continue. The 2004 Lok Sabha
elections produced a hung Parliament. However, the NDA lost power
to the UPA. Left-of-center coalition replaced the erstwhile right-
of-center coalition. Coalition politics is now coming of age. This was
reflected in greater stability of the 22-party BJP-led NDA alliance that
managed to remain in power till the government announced fresh
elections shortly before its term ended.
In contrast to the BJP, the Congress continued to fight shy of alli-
ance politics. However, the political reality of declining seat share
pushed it toward alliance formation with like-minded secular parties.
The stress of secularism as a binding force was necessitated for pre-
venting the BJP, its rival, from getting an upper hand in the electoral
battle. The seeds of UPA were sown on January 16th, when Sonia
Gandhi invited a few “like-minded secular” leaders to dinner with
the avowed purpose of coordinating in the Lok Sabha the actions of
different parties in opposition on the Ayodhya issue.
Defeat in three Assembly elections in MP, Chhattisgarh, and
Rajasthan provided the much-needed impetus to formalize the pro-
cess of alliance formation. Thus, the UPA was born. It not only won
the 2004 national elections, it also increased its seat share by 31 seats
and its vote share rose to 28.3 and went on to complete its full term.
The UPA again won a spectacular victory in 2009. The UPA won 262
seats with the Congress alone getting 206 seats thus crossing the 200
mark for the first time since its earlier decline. Also, its share of popular
votes rose to 28.6 percent, an increase of 2.1 percent over 2004.
108 Maneesha Roy
Concluding Observations
The preceding discussion clearly brings out the changes that have
taken over the Indian political system in the last six decades. These
changes refer to the fact that the relationship between different organs
of the government never remains static; the changing contour of pol-
itics, reflecting some important changes in socioeconomic reality,
impinges on the constitutionally sanctioned schema of distribution of
power among various organs. The Constitution itself changes because
of these changes; if it does not change, it indicates rigidity, verging
almost on passivity that refuses to take note of the ongoing changes
in its sociopolitical environment. In this situation, the Constitution
could invite its own termination.
But the fact that changes occur and these changes bring about cor-
responding essential changes in the conduct of the government testi-
fies to the fact that the Indian political system is vibrant and dynamic.
It is by virtue of this that the Indian political system is capable of
retaining the allegiance of the Indian people.
Notes
1. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964),
Fourth Edition.
2. Douglas Verney, “From Quasi-federation to Quasi-confederacy? The Trans-
formation of India’s Party System,” Publius, Vol. 33, No. 4, Fall 2003), p. 171.
3. Francine Frankel, “Decline of a Social Order,” in Francine Frankel and M.S.A.
Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order,
Vol. 2 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 502.
4. Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance (Delhi:
Ajanta, 1988), p. 30.
5. Sarkaria Commission on Centre–State Relations Report, Parts I and II, Vol. I. (Nasik:
Government of India Press, 1987–88).
6. The text of these accords is compiled in P.S. Dutta, Ethnic Peace Accords in India
(Delhi: Vikas, 1995).
7. For a discussion of the political situation in Punjab preceding this Accord, see
Robin Jeffery, What’s Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflicts, Mrs. Gandhi’s
Death, and the Test for Federalism (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1986), Chapters
2 and 3.
â•‡ 8. See William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1962) and “The Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History
of Political Science,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4, December
1982, pp. 753–66. See also Bernard Grofman and Arendt Liphart, (eds), Electoral
Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986).
â•‡ 9. B.D. Dua, “Federalism or Patrimonialism: The Making and Unmaking of Chief
Ministers in India,” Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 8, August 1985, pp.793–04.
10. See Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Principal State Level Contests
and Derivative National Choices,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV,
No. 6, February 2009, p. 57.
11. Ibid., p. 56.
12. The Times of India (Delhi) November 28, 2009.
13. For a detailed analysis see, Arend Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy:
A Consociational Interpretation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90,
1996, pp. 258–68.
14. S.R. Bommai & Others vs. Union of India, Supreme Court Cases, Judgment Today,
1994.
15. Keshvananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala, AIR, 1973, Supreme Court.
16. Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR, 1980, Supreme Court.
17. Wheare, Federal Government. Verney, “From Quasi-federation to Quasi-
confederacy.”
chapter 6
Gender Discourse in Elections:

Constructing a Constituency?
Rainuka Dagar
In the struggle for electoral numbers in coalition politics within

an identity sensitive society, gender interests have been taken as
synonymous with women’s reservation in Parliament. The connect-
ivity between women’s electoral performance and development
outcomes remains to be established. Yet, the clamor for increasing
women’s political presence continues in the rarefied well of the
Indian Parliament. No doubt, the national political leadership post-
independence has evolved with a select strand of women, but why
do political parties want more women to stand for elections now?
Is it because women will better utilize public resources for women’s
interests? Has the electorate become partial to women candidates?
Or does women’s presence increase a party’s secular and diverse
credentials? Are women leaders more judicious in allocation of
resources, protection of citizen rights, or the promotion of develop-
ment? It is in the backdrop of parliamentary elections that this article
will explore the linkages between the Indian democratic polity with
representation of women, and that of the electoral discourse on gender
with women’s development and gender justice.
The gender discourse in Indian electoral politics can be traced
to two broad themes: of inclusion and social equity. Both concerns
relate to the protection and promotion of women as a vulnerable
group. While the substantive content of inclusion remains unchanged,
the changing sociopolitical context from pre-independence to the
21st century shifted the stance on women’s representation within
Gender Discourse in Elections 111
decision-making bodies. The issue of social equity, on the other hand,

evolved as the concepts of gender rights and equity in governance evolved
globally. By its logic, it amalgamated the representation of numbers to
the representation of interests and the promotion of diversity within
the identity-strong multicultural ethos of the Indian polity.
In the first section, women’s representation in electoral politics
is mapped with a focus on 2009 elections. Thereafter, the article
explores the social equity issues as raised by political parties. Within
this context, it locates the impact of electoral politics on the scope and
limits of gender rights and justice. It traces the party commitment to
gender rights and its engagement to mobilize the electorate to shape
state resources for women’s development. Has the electoral dialogue
on gender issues made politics more gender sensitive? The last section
compiles the emerging concerns for gendering the Indian democ-
racy. Based on the inquiry into electoral discourse, it raises issues for
strengthening and gendering the democratic structures.
Political Representation of Women:

A Challenge to Democratic Claims?
Women’s presence in proclaiming the democratic process in India

has been consistent, if their voting numbers are a criterion. In each
election since 1962, more than 45 percent of eligible women voters have
cast their preference for Indian leadership. Their number continued
to be marginally less than male participation in elections until the
present elections when women voters outnumbered the male voters
forming 54.17 percent of the total voters in 2009 (see Table 6.1). The
turn-out in percentage of women participation and share of total
voters has also been increasing. In 1962, 41.38 percent of women
voted. By the 21st century, this rose to 59 percent. Male participation
of total eligible males was much higher at 70 percent, but the female
presence in the electoral process has increased significantly.1 As a vote
bank, women are in a position to influence the selection of the party
governing the country. Massive participation of women has put to
rest the contentious history of women’s right to vote in the country.
112
Table 6.1
Gender-wise Breakdown of Voters, Contestants, and Elected Candidates in India for 1957–2009
Total voters Contesting candidates Elected candidates

Year Male Female Male Female Male Female
1957* 1,473 45 467 27
(97.04)/2.11 (2.96)/1.39 (94.53)/6.75 (5.47)/5.37
1962
65,802,050 46,440,421 1,919 66 463 31
(58.62) (41.38) (96.68)/2.75 (3.32)/2.04 (93.72)/6.70 (6.28)/6.16
1967
86,460,437 66,264,048 2,302 67 491 29
(56.61) (43.39) (97.17)/3.30 (2.83)/2.07 (94.42)/7.10 (5.58)/5.77
1971
87,382,907 64,153,895 2,686 83 494 24
(57.66) (42.34) (97.00)/3.85 (3.00)/2.56 (95.37)/7.14 (4.63)/4.77
1977
109,609,940 84,653,975 2,369 70 523 19
(56.42) (43.58) (97.13)/3.40 (2.87)/2.16 (96.49)/7.56 (3.51)/3.78
1980
115,357,604 87,395,289 4,487 142 501 28
(56.90) (43.10) (96.93)/6.44 (3.07)/4.38 (94.71)/7.25 (5.29)/5.57
1984–85
142,339,839 113,955,124 5,320 173 498 43
(55.54) (44.46) (96.85)/7.63 (3.15)/5.34 (92.05)/7.20 (7.95)/8.55
1989
173,290,798 135,759,697 5,962 198 501 29
(56.07) (43.93) (96.79)/8.55 (3.21)/6.11 (94.53)/7.25 (5.47)/5.77

1991–92
163,132,537 122,723,928 8,420 329 495 39
(57.07) (42.93) (96.24)/12.08 (3.76)/10.15 (92.70)/7.16 (7.30)/7.75
1996
192,279,757 151,028,333 13,353 599 495 40
(56.01) (43.99) (95.71)/19.15 (4.29)/18.48 (92.52)/7.16 (7.48)/7.95
1998
208,596,815 166,844,924 4,476 274 505 43
(55.56) (44.44) (94.23)/6.42 (5.77)/8.45 (92.15)/7.30 (7.85)/8.55
1999
207,130,100 164,539,004 4,364 284 497 49
(55.73) (44.27) (93.89)/6.26 (6.11)/8.76 (91.03)/7.19 (8.97)/9.74
2004
216,628,138 172,714,226 5,080 355 500 43
(55.64) (44.36) (93.47)/7.29 (6.53)/10.95 (92.08)/7.23 (7.92)/8.55
2009
191,028,997 225,765,026 7,514 556 484 59

(45.83) (54.17) (93.11)/10.78 (6.89)/17.16 (89.13)/7.00 (10.87)/11.73
19,59,039,919 1,602,237,890 69,725 3,241 6,914 503
Total
(55.01) (44.99) (95.56)/100.00 (4.44)/100.00 (93.22)/100.00 (6.78)/100.00
Source: Election commission of India.
Note: *For 1957 data is taken from Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007), pp., 17, 36 and 37. Percentages in Parenthesis are from Row (same year). Percentages in Italics are
from Column (all year’s total).
113
114 Rainuka Dagar
Under the British colonial government, women were first granted

the right to vote on “wifehood qualification” in 1927. The women’s
movement won women’s right to adult franchise from wifehood and
literacy constrains in 1950 when the Indian Constitution came into
existence.2
In 2009, women’s representation as potential leaders and candi-
dates of political parties has been on the rise. This is observed, both in
the proportion of total candidates standing for elections and an increase
in number of women candidates in subsequent elections. However,
women’s share in terms of leadership has been poor accounting for
only 3.32 percent of the total candidates in 1962, with a rise to 6.89
percent in 2009. Women constituted less than 4 percent of the total
candidates till 1992. From the 1996 elections, women’s share of candi-
dature rose to 4.29 percent and attained its highest proportion of
6.89 percent in 2009.
It was in the 1996 elections campaign that all major political par-
ties proclaimed one-third reservation of women in Parliament as part
of their manifestos. If a democratic polity constitutes a proportional
number of representatives to their population, then women’s repre-
sentation has a long way to go. In the 2009 elections, women make
up 48.7 percent of the Indian citizens eligible to vote, but party tickets
included less than 7 percent of women candidates and less than 11
percent of the Parliament’s representation is female (see Table 6.1).
The leadership potential of women has been credited differentially
across the states. At the level of state analysis, women leadership in
terms of candidates standing for election was the highest from Delhi.
Here, 11.25 percent of the total candidates were women in contrast
to the all-India average of 6.89 percent. Uttrakhand (9.21 percent),
Rajasthan (8.96 percent), Chhattisgarh (8.43 percent), West Bengal
(7.88 percent), and Gujarat (7.24 percent) had a higher contribution
of women candidates.3
Women in 2009 with 59 members, have the largest ever represen-
tation in the Indian Parliament (see Table 6.1). This presence has,
however, been inconsistently provided from the states. Interestingly,
states with a higher number of female candidates did not send a higher
percentage of women to Parliament. The success rate of female candi-
dates was highest in Punjab with nearly 31 percent. This was followed
by West Bengal (24.14 percent), Madhya Pradesh (20.6 percent), and

Assam (18.18 percent).4 Subsequently, women from these states had a
higher representation in the Parliament. The numbers reveal a lopsided
engagement of women with Indian electoral politics. They are active
in the supportive role of democracy with high participation in casting
of votes, but are on the margins of public life. Further, leadership
spaces are taken as role extensions of familial and identity hegemony
in politics. In South and South East Asia, the dynastic succession of
women leaders has characterized their entry into the political fray.5
Scholars note that within Indian politics, women have gained access
to the most important political posts “because of familial ties to
prominent male politicians.”6
Largely, the selection of women candidature is guided by their
affiliation to the party hierarchy via family connections or their own
elite standing. In 2009, 61 percent of elected female representatives
belonged to political families or were themselves from an elite polity.
This is in contrast to the male MPs who ranged at 25 percent.7 Of
the elected female candidates, the largest number could draw upon
family lineage to carve out their constituencies. The second claim for
leadership was from elite standing such as film stars, erstwhile royals,
or from creative arts. The emergence of leadership through the
transfer of the “cultural hero” particularly of popular film stars in
South India has been successfully catapulted into populist politics.8
Thus, women leadership included the blue blood of political lineage
at the national level, lead by the Nehru–Gandhi family, where both
daughter-in-laws of Indira Gandhi were elected to Parliament—Sonia
Gandhi as leader of the ruling UPA coalition and Maneka Gandhi
as an opposition BJP bencher. Women from the Scindia royalty of
Gwalior are also many times Parliamentarians. Of the two Scindia
sisters in politics, Yashodhare Raje won her parliamentary election.
A number of women candidates from families dominating state level
politics also were also elected. Shruti Chaudhry as a first-time candidate
was selected by the electorate on the laurels of her grandfather Bansi
Lal, a former Chief Minister of Haryana. Supriya Sule was voted into
power with the stature of her father Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra.
Harsimrat Kaur is Prakash Singh Badal’s (CM of Punjab) daughter-
in-law and wife of Akali President Sukhbir Singh Badal. Jayalalitha
116 Rainuka Dagar
is no longer the shadow of her political mentor N.T. Rama Rao,

but is a leader in her own right.
Women candidates’ interaction with the electorate followed the
avenue of selection. Affiliation to the top hierarchy of party neutral-
ized gender connotations with leadership becoming the overarching
identity. Sonia Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee, Jayalalitha, and Mayawati
on the national scene, and Jayapradha, Selja, and Mehbooba Mufti at
regional levels are “viewed as leaders” with capacity to deliver to the
electorate. “She has got a bridge made in our constituency and responds
to our needs;” “She always meets us and gets our work done” is the
common refrain of voters in response to these female leaders. Women
candidates who were a symbol of political families were further
removed from the gender lens as they remained insulated through the
hegemonic leadership status of the family and at the level of conduct
epitomized the typed gender standing. Head covered, respectful in
appropriate appeal of daughter-in-law, or daughter and reflecting the
ideal of the Indian women—to voters and media as the case may be.
The symbolic capital of gender is encashed by leaders, “reinforcing
and legitimising stereotypes in exchange of political power.”9
The stand-alone glamor of women candidates however was open
to scrutiny. The most derogatory campaign was initiated by Akhilesh
Das Gupta in Lucknow against the candidature of Nafisa Ali Sodhi,
a part-time Bollywood actress and socialite, without a political lineage.
The body politics resorted to was condemned.10 The complaint made
to the Election Commission resulted in a notice being issued to A.D.
Gupta and a subsequent censure. A case was also registered under a
false statement in connection to an election dealing with personal char-
acter or conduct of a candidate.11 While maligning of female character
received few complaints (four from Uttar Pradesh, one each from
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh),12 their incidence highlights the gender
connotations underpinning women in the election fray.
Currency, however, continued to be drawn from gender symbolism.
Among the most reported exchange was BJP leader Narendra Modi’s
dismissive comment on the opposition Congress Party as Budhiya (old
woman)—symbolic for a redundant liability.13 When this was objected
to, by raising the issue of young blood within the Congress by a female
leader, he retorted to the party being a Gudiya (doll)—superfluous and
glamorous without content.14 Reference to women found a ready link

to demeaning gendered imagery. Sanjay Dutt’s gimmick to cash in
the popularity of his blockbuster movie on the Bollywood version of
Gandhian activism to turn the other cheek became entangled in sexist
conduct. His campaigning style to label Uttar Pradesh CM Mayawati
as a corrupt, exploitative, and nonperforming politician and by
wanting to act out his movie performance of giving a hug and a kiss
to reform her, found him being accused as sexist. A polity so steeped
in sex role placements are seen as a transgression of male–female con-
duct to be projected for electoral benefits.
The gender underpinnings remained typed and femininity ori-
ented. The media remained largely blanketed on gender, but responded
to the color and glamor of women. Vivid dresses of women voters
splashed color, as did constituency woes depicting urban and rural
women in long lines of colorful attire filling water. And, candidature
coverage fell back to draw upon the rich storyline of political lineage.
Issues of domestic violence, dowry, caste and honor killings did not
find attention in the electoral speeches or as issues raised by the free
press of democratic India. Property rights, feminization of poverty
or the missing number of the Indian girl child could not capture
the attention of either the leadership or guardians of democracy—the
media, thereby depicting people’s disinterest in gender justice.
Party Commitments to Gender
Women’s claim to development benefits was, however, registered in

the manifestos of national political parties. Women’s concerns were
addressed as part of political parties campaign to promote social justice,
either as part of special groups or more specifically to empower women.
The CPI located issues pertaining to women under its commitment
to peoples’ rights and social justice. The Congress Party placed women-
identified needs along with the weaker sections. The JD(S) clubbed
women and youth as groups that need to be empowered. The BJP
signaled women’s empowerment as an imperative for inclusive
development. The BSP also chalked a women-specific “appeal.” The
118 Rainuka Dagar
emphasis was on provision of economic support, followed by pro-

tection against atrocities and support for political participation.
Political parties raised the issue of women’s social security in terms
of income generation for women. According to its manifesto, the
National Congress “endeavours to ensure that at least half of the
country’s rural women population will be enrolled as members of self-
help groups linked with banks … ” “to reserve one-third of all central
government jobs for women.”15 The BJP went further “to adopt a
national policy on women’s economic empowerment to ensure every
woman has access to livelihood and to enhance the income of all
categories of working women.”16 The CPI(M) promised to “ensure
equal remuneration for women workers in all areas of work ... health
insurance of women workers in the unorganised sector.”17 The cen-
trality to women’s economic empowerment has been a relatively recent
focus of mainstream political parties. The Left parties were, how-
ever, always geared to addressing the working class women’s rights.
Historically, manifestos of national parties have focused on three
aspects relating to women. The first being access to basic needs of
education and health, and has been a consistent theme since inde-
pendence. Second being provision of economic and civil participation
through income support and political representation. And third,
promotion of equal rights for women which has ranged from per-
sonal laws, working conditions and laws on atrocities against women.
Social equity has thus grappled with the promotion of women’s rights,
but has not yet expanded to gender justice. The gamut of rights con-
tinues to include equal rights with men in terms of access to resources—
employment, education, and property. The scope of rights became
enlarged from the welfare measures and protections of women—
nutrition, child care, legal rights against violent practices—and
special needs of female gender, to more recently the inclusion in the
development agenda. Women-specific rights of maternal benefits and
reproductive health were addressed first by the Left parties, followed
by the BJP and the Congress.18
Within this broad agreement across party manifestos to provide
women developmental access to services and facilities within an
increasingly rights-based agenda, political parties continue to screen
women issues in accordance to their political compulsions. First,
electoral issues raised are in conjunction to legislation and executive

policy, responsive to the global mandate on gender and the women’s
movement. Second, identity politics remains the largest filter for
addressing gender issues. Third, gender remains a low priority par-
ticularly in its strength to woo the electorate. Leaders’ speeches did not
address established normative gender unjust practices. Also, political
parties drew a distinction in the manifesto claims and issues they
referred to in public. In other words, electoral politics is reflective of
the people’s pulse where gender is concerned.
The 2009 manifestos of all mainstream parties commit to check
atrocities against women, ranging from laws to check female feticide,
domestic violence, and sexual harassment. While the BJP listed a
number of laws, other parties were restricted to protective legislation
in accordance to their positioning. The Left mentioned laws for sexual
harassment at the workplace, while the Congress applauded itself on
its achievement of Domestic Violence Act passed in its leadership. Laws
protecting women from violence have been a response to women’s
movement and public articulations against brutality.19 Protection of
women from dowry abuse was consistently raised in the manifesto of
the BJP party and sporadically so in the Congress Party. These laws
were, however, raised in the political party agendas after social uprisings
and even state enactments against dowry had been undertaken.20
The concern for female feticide was raised by the mainstream par-
ties, largely under the girl child rights in 2009. This was first reflected
by the BJP in 1989 and later by Congress in1991 and other parties.
However, state governments such as Maharashtra had already intro-
duced a bill to regulate the use of scientific technology for sex selec-
tion in 1988. This was an acknowledgment to the public furor and
social awareness campaigns against the misuse of technology for
deselecting the girl child.21
The Domestic Violence Bill hailed as an achievement by the
Congress manifesto (2008) passed in 2007, was first raised in the mani-
festo of the BJP in 1996. The party was responding to the National
Perspective Plan for Women 2000 that demanded a protective legis-
lation. The National Commission for Women in 1992 set up a statu-
tory body to review the constitutional and legal safeguards for women.
The Lawyers’ Collective (a women NGO) drafted and circulated a bill
120 Rainuka Dagar
on Domestic Violence in 1992 and National Commission for Women

(NCW) came with the draft bill on Domestic Violence in 1994. It was
only after the policy initiative to review laws and increasing research
on violence against women that led the BJP to acknowledge the need
for supportive legislation. Wife beating remained outside the pre-
view of other parties.
The electoral party discourse on gender has been largely policy-
driven rather than political parties mobilizing the electorate for a policy
change. It is only after the report Towards Equality compiled in the
backdrop of the international initiative on gender that attention to
women came into the political ambit.22 Prior to the International Year
of the Women in 1975, political manifestos were limited to promises
for equal pay for equal work, maternity benefits, health, and education
facilities for women. “Special steps to remove social, educational and
economic disabilities of women, so that they may fully discharge the
responsibilities to the family, society and nation”;23 equal pay for equal
work;24 “adequate financial allocation and extra facilities for educa-
tion of women.”25
The Indian political establishment responded to the “first wave of
official feminism” post the UN declaration of International Year for
Women in 1975 with a shift from welfare to development.26 The inter-
national development agenda started being reflected in the gender
policy of the government post the Sixth Five-Year Plan from 1980.
It extended women’s welfare and assistance in performing “women
roles” to economic independence. The shift from welfare and protec-
tionism to participation in the development process was notable.27
In the Seventh Plan, a separate department for woman and child was
introduced. It largely monitored 27 beneficiary-oriented schemes for
women. By the Ninth Plan, women were recognized as agents of social
growth and kept pace with the international strategies and civil soc-
iety mobilizations to promote women’s development.
The enlarged plan ranging from the education and health sectors to
participation in income generation activities started reflecting in the
manifestos of the national parties. For instance, there were special
schemes for female headed households in rural areas and increasing
employment opportunities for women (CPI,1998); provision of
working women hostels (BJP,1991; Congress, 2004); setting up

of cooperative societies in rural and urban areas to be managed by
women for the benefits of women entrepreneurs, self-employment
schemes (BJP,1991).
Issues raised in the manifestos of parties may not necessarily be
brought to the notice of the electorate. The Congress party claimed its
protective stance toward women in its manifesto and “has passed the
Domestic Violence Bill, providing property laws to women.” However,
its leadership has not ventured into voicing these claims in their
electoral speeches, for instance, in the social domain wife-beating is
considered a prerogative of the husband, and property rights is the
sole claim of males in a male dominated society. The BJP provides a
larger space to women issues in its manifestos. Both the lead parties,
however, demarcate the concerns to be raised in the manifesto and
the speeches of its leaders for wooing the electorate. Further, both the
manifestos and speeches ignore aspects of social practice that are
grossly gender unjust, with acknowledgement of this injustice likely
to impinge on their vote gathering prowess.
The politics of diversity has added an identity-based advantage
to the win-ability of candidates. Women’s quota has provided grounds
for some regional parties to extend their caste support base by de-
manding allocations for Other Backward Castes (OBC) within the quota
for women’s reservation. Raising the banner for OBC, these parties
argue that without a sub-quota, OBC women will not be selected
as candidates. Inspite of the numbers in Parliament, the bill continues
to be retabled, awaiting a political consensus. By overruling the insig-
nificant numerical minority, parties will nevertheless accede an edge
to the parties claiming OBC interests and thus want a consensus.
Historically, women’s movement has traversed a long way from
political equality to affirmative action.28 This shift can be located in
the state’s sustained approach of affirmative policy for promoting vul-
nerable groups. In a society that has been historically unequal, the
political representation of diversity is a legitimate, even if not a suffi-
cient factor in representation of interests. The visible placement of
member representatives of marginalized groups within the decision-
making forum is expected to provide a psychological spin-off effect by
122 Rainuka Dagar
registering the breaking of historical barriers and the hope of availing

equal opportunities.29 Yet, if political parties are hoping to register
women as active citizens in decision-making bodies, it is expected
that they will provide women’s active presence through organizational
posts in their own organizations.
Parties can also decree that a third of their party candidatures,
along with party positions within respective organizations, be reserved
for women. In fact, party selection and financial support to women
candidates has been identified as crucial to women’s occupation of
political office.30 The traditional authority systems are male-based
networks, constraining women’s capacity to translate social capital
into political capital,31 making party networks and institutional sup-
port more relevant. However, no party has committed itself to gender
rights with this devotion. Women representation in the party organ-
izational structure and party selection of candidatures remains below
15 percent (see Table 6.2). While, Left parties and the Congress reflect
a larger women presence, the BJP follows closely with a large gap
reflected by the BSP—a woman-headed party. In fact, of the major
political parties, the Trinamool Congress fielded the highest percent-
age of women candidates in the 2009 elections and has claim to the
highest percentage of women MPs (see Figure 6.1). Clearly, for pol-
itical parties gendering the Parliament is delinked from gendering
their own party platforms.
Table 6.2
Party-wise Female Candidates and Female Office Bearers in 2009
Manifesto promising
S. Female Female office one-third reservation
No. Party candidates bearers in parliament
1. Biju Janta Dal (BJD) 0.00 13.04 No
2. Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) 7.91 8.70 Yes
3. Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 5.04 4.00 No
4. Indian National Congress (INC) 7.73 11.86 Yes
5. Jammu and Kashmir National 0.00 7.40 No
Conference (JKN)
6. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 0.36 11.11 Yes
7. Telugu Desham Party (TDP) 0.36 15.38 Yes
8. Communist Party of India (M) 11.84 6.67 Yes
Source: Party Offices, New Delhi.
Figure 6.1
Party-wise Female Candidates and Member of Parliament in 2009
Source: Election Commission of India.
Gender: A Personal Agenda of Candidates
In the 2009 elections, women issues were raised across the election
process from two voices. National level leadership from mainstream
parties namely the Congress and the BJP and individual candidates, for
whom gender was a personal agenda. The leaders referred to gender issues
largely under the all encompassing term “women’s empowerment.” It,
however, translated to be a third allocation in income and develop-
ment schemes for women, promotion of self-help groups and women’s
education. Violence against women was sporadically mentioned in
the form of female feticide by L.K. Advani and Manmohan Singh and
in passing of the Domestic Violence Act by Sonia Gandhi. These were
contextualized as a party’s concern for vulnerable groups and did not
form a comprehensive gender campaign.
Perceptions of women issues raised by political parties was taken
from a sample of teachers across the northern region. Seventy-eight
percent of these educated voters mentioned that no party raised any
women related issues. According to them, women related concerns,
if raised, were confined to reservation of women (16 percent) and girl
child education (6 percent) (see Table 6.3).
124 Rainuka Dagar
Table 6.3
Perception of Teachers from Northern India on
Women Issues Raised by Political Parties in 2009
Raising issue of reservation Girl child education None

15.63 6.25 78.13
Source: Institute for Development and Communication (IDC), Chandigarh, Field survey
2009.
A more consistent voice on gender was raised by individual candi-

dates and was more in line with the personal agenda rather than a
party proclamation. For instance, the issue of female feticide became
a campaign agenda for Harsimrat Kaur, Akali Dal MP and daughter-
in-law of Prakash Singh Badal, the CM of Punjab. Punjab has among
the worst child sex ratios in the world since the past century. It is
perhaps the most relevant gender concern in the region. It took the
personal capacity of the elite Badal family member to raise a battle cry
against this form of violence. But, the Akali Dal only raised the issue
in its 2004 manifesto, even though its ally, the BJP, has been raising
it in its manifestoes since 1991. In sum, the 2009 elections marks the
political parties appropriation of the term women’s empowerment, but
without the corresponding commitment to unravel and undermine
the social reality that thrives on gender differentiating hierarchies.
Emerging Issues
The 2009 electoral discourse throws up a number of imperatives for

political parties committed to a gender nuanced approach. Three over-
arching concerns emerge. One, political parties need to address gender
rather than women. The doctrine of dismantling institutionalized
discrimination and gender differentiating structures is a well-accepted
and necessary directive toward gender justice. It underscores a dis-
tributive share of familial inheritance of assets, skills, status; of caste-
religious social capital, of producer–reproducer relations with
associated changes in roles, social processes, and institutions. Yet, the
political canvass limits its scope to women, without placing the gender
differentiating relations historically evolved into the social ethos and

identity construed India polity, at the center of a gender discourse. Like
the SCs, who cannot be purged of the historical psyche, identity and
now capital, by placing doles for individual consumption, the gender
identity needs to be delinked from the hegemony of collective iden-
tity. Cultural markers defining gender through family, caste, or religion
need to be shed for the enjoyment of gender rights.
Second, the momentum on gender raised by the international
development agenda, women’s movement, and the women entity as a
coalition to secular credentials has been ruptured to accommodate vote
bank identity politics. The perspective on gender issues can be placed
in a context of social equity, distributive justice, or gender justice as
the standpoint of specific parties, rather than an instrument to placate
and gather identity based ballots. Third, the reservation fervor, unless
promoted as part of a systematical and holistic gender policy may only
extend the politics of patronage through female agency. Reservation
in decision-making bodies needs to be stacked with policy initiatives,
civil society proactivism, political mobilization for gender interest
aggregation, and monitored accountability to the principals of
gender equity.
Women, Rather Than Gender Thrust
The 2009 elections have registered women issues as an entitlement

claim, but gender is yet to be promoted as a right. The electoral mani-
festos are replete with the pledge to empower women. Leaders pro-
mise women a share of development benefits and the electoral process
gears up to safeguard women’s rights. Yet the electoral discourse
addresses gender as synonymous with women. It divests the historical
constructed structures of gender hierarchy to a votive offering of
benefits and protectionisms to women. No doubt, women are the pre-
dominant victims of the practice of gender differentiation facing the
brunt of dowry exchange, domestic violence, female de-selection, sexual
harassment, unequal pay, disproportionate dropouts from the edu-
cation system, and feminization of poverty, among other discrim-
inations. The remedy is prescribed through the filters of dole-oriented
126 Rainuka Dagar
politics. Thus, dowry or domestic violence are viewed as undesirable

social practices that can be rooted out through strict legislation.
Women can be educated by opening more schools and women can
be provided economic independence through self-help groups, and
by loaning paltry amounts of money. By allocating a third of income
generating scheme, women’s independence and poverty can be
alleviated.
What is the outcome of these initiatives? A female has the least
chance of being born in India. According to United Nation’s Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), every single day 7,000 girls in India are unable to
take birth.32 The female’s checkered existence continues in her life
span. In spite of systematic commitment of national parties to women’s
health and maternal mortality, every seven minutes a woman dies
from complications related to pregnancy and child birth.33 Along with
malnutrition and anemia, morbidity and differential access to basic
social services,34 women suffer violence throughout their life cycle.
More girls than boys drop out of school. Only 14 of the 100 girls
who enroll pass out of twelfth class and even with universal free edu-
cation up to 14 years, only 60 of these girls will reach primary level fifth
class.35 Women continue to have negligible access to agricultural
land, credit, irrigation, and infrastructure.
Access and inclusion of women in executive and legislative office
has not translated into equity outcomes, particularly in developing
countries. Hassim notes that state intervention in social democracies
of the Scandinavian polity collaborated with a widespread women’s
movement to strategize the promotion of female leadership along
with gender interests in policy-making, to effect change.36 Thus, in the
Indian context, can legal rights become a standard without political
mobilization or policy support against social markers of the Indian
cultural identity? The law on Domestic Violence has been passed, but
lacks adequate budgetary provisions, institutional intergration, and
even political mobilization. No party is campaigning on the streets
against familial subjugation of a daughter-in-law or ill-treatment of a
wife. Can policy allocations be utilized without civil society creating
a demand for their value? Can a female’s right to life be celebrated
when her share in familial resources is begrudged?
The isolated approach to provide women basic needs and devel-

opmental benefits is unable to change women’s marginalized status.
While representative democracy in terms of female participation in
elections and as elected leaders in Parliament continues to rise, so does
the gender gap in women’s survival rates, atrocities, and poverty.37
Win-ability of women candidates is a function of family standing or
clout of party hierarchy rather than a women vote bank. Gender main-
streaming in the electoral process continues to be wanting. The
Election Commission does not refer to a gender sensitive conduct,
in fact it trains police officials with conduct of elections, but there
is no gender-specific training or sensitization in any materials of
the Commission.38 Even the language of Representation of People
Act continues, along with its amendments as late as 2002, to refer to
candidates as masculine maintaining the imagery of masculine
leadership,39 a clear reflection of the adhoc interventions for gendering
the electoral process.
The electoral discourse, moreover, does not link the life cycle of
denial, discrimination, and atrocities accruing differentially across dif-
ferent social placements. Patriarchy is a social phenomenon, rather than
a women-specific problem and, it is intermeshed with pervasive pri-
mordial collectivity identities. The redistribution of social and familial
resources needs to be de-legitimated from the hegemony of religious,
caste, and familial control over gender roles, norms, and practice.
Gender as a Leverage in Identity Politics
Female leadership’s access to power is legitimized for a mandate

and policy prescriptions to power a women’s agenda. By occupying
formal positions to articulate and reorganize the exercise to transform
women’s placement is itself a challenge. According to certain scholars,
the Indian female MPs powers are limited to the confines of party
lines which they are expected to follow. And, the party priority on
gender is low.40 The logic that women leadership is required in the
decision-making halls of the Parliament underlines that women will
be promoting women interests and development. The argument pre-
sumes that the interests of all women are the same and can be promoted
128 Rainuka Dagar
by a group of individual women. It also ignores that citizens can be

representatives of two or more identities and women have placements
across castes, class, religion, and locale which may be different and
even conflicting. The universalizing arguments do not hold under
the pressure of multiple identities. Inequalities of caste, religion, and
class identities in India polity intersect to hierarchize gender differen-
tially.41 The mobility of women leadership is further contained with
the multiple identity of a multicultural reality.
What happens when women’s interests clash with her caste group,
state, or religious affinity? The most infamous example of such a clash
of interest is the Shah Bano Case, an example of an individual’s right
in conflict with collective identity.42 The practice of personal law,
symbolically proclaims a group’s distinct identity. Muslim collect-
ivity was supported by an act of Parliament and Shah Bano became
relegated to a gender unjust verdict of the Muslim clergy. The personi-
fication of women as group identity is eulogized and reflected by polit-
ical parties appropriating the identity such as the BJP at the heights of
Ram Rajya movement.43 The identity driven populist politics in India
is “fragmenting and destabilises the political agenda.”44 Yet, female
leadership is expected to overcome the religion and identity-cultivated
vote banks of their political parties and forge a gender just agenda.
The fracturing of a fragile gendered polity is perhaps best reflected in
the present context by the issue of women’s reservation in Parliament.45
Not only do the national parties, but a majority of regional parties
promise to provide reservation for women in their 2009 manifestos. In
spite of the relevant number in Parliament to pass this act since 1996,
the bill still awaits a democratic consensus. Like the pre-independence
reservation for women seats under minority community allocation,
some regional parties want an OBC quota within the women reserved
constituencies. The argument that women from the backward class
will be marginalized by the general category women seems mis-
placed given the SC and OBC representation of women in open
constituencies. Thirty-eight percent of total SC women candidates in
2009 fought elections in nonreserved constituencies accounting for
10 percent of the total women candidates.46 In Haryana, in the past
decade, OBC women candidates formed 40 percent of the elected
representatives. In state assembly elections in Punjab, women leaders
from the OBCs constituted 23 percent of the elected female leaders

in this decade. These numbers are more than the representative
OBC population in the states.47
The elite women leadership in politics is certainly not caste defined.
Yet the ready acceptance of mainstream parties to accommodate
posturing of caste politics relegates women as a nonentity in the pol-
itical fray, at all layers—as vote banks, as leaders, and in the relevance
of gender interests to political parties. The assertive vote for caste is
further revealed in context of the honor killings sanctioned by caste
institutions. The CPI in the party manifesto calls for laws relating to
honor killings48 and the Congress “reiterates its unflinching resolve
to combat communalism of all kinds and deal ruthlessly with those
perpetuating atrocities on weaker sections like Dalits and women”
without mentioning caste violence against gender.49
In Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, rules of brotherhood
disallow marriage within the same patrilineal class. Exercise of indi-
vidual rights in preference to marriage partners have led to violation
of the caste code and a matter of honor resulting in violent penalties
of the involved, in accordance to caste decree.50 Yet party voices have
remained silent and leadership in the region sensitive to the ire of
the caste panchayats. As a vote bank they hold the electoral fortunes
of candidates and even parties. Violation of gender rights, including
physical annihilation can be ignored, without a ripple being felt. In
an identity fractured polity, competitive politics asserts the privilege
of identity over citizen or other identities. Not only is gender recon-
structed in accordance to the identity values, but gender rights become
subordinated to that of the group identity.
Women’s Representation:
Gendering Democratic Institutions
to Promote Gender Rights
The under representation of gender in political decision-making

bodies and positions of governance has been argued from perspectives
of social justice, socially constructed skills, and styles of management
130 Rainuka Dagar
of populations in the margins, to essentialist conceptions of women

leadership. Biological leadership capacities of natural nurturance and
peaceful inclinations remain outside the mainstream.51 And, female
leadership in India has been found to be no less autocratic or more
equal than male leaders.52 The dominant thrust for women’s inclu-
sion in decision-making bodies remains the gender mainstreaming
in resource allocation by reshaping political priorities.53 One-third
reservations of women is expected to provide the critical push to
gender interests being advocated.
Women neither exist in a social vacuum nor have a biological pro-
pensity for overcoming the norms, values, and practices of a gender
differentiating system. Women are as likely as men to prefer male
children, demand dowry, discriminate against girl children in terms
of health, education, property, employment, and be party to familial
violence, accept female honor to be that of family’s, concede that
women’s primary role is that of nurturer and caretaker while that of the
men is to earn, lead, and protect women. Certainly, the female gender
is no filter for patriarchy.
Representation within the framework of existing normative
standards which are the markers of masculinity may not result in
better utilization of public resources for gender interests. One, at the
leadership level, elected women “act as agents on behalf of their male
relations and exercise power in their interests.”54 Second, the insti-
tutions are not gender responsive. The strategy of increased access to
promote women’s development “tends to assume that the necessary
institutions can be created relatively easily through political forces,
underestimating the impact of weak and fragile institutions.” The
corresponding relevance of traditional social capital, outside the
formal sphere undermines the endeavors for gender equality.55
To illustrate, representation in panchayats—introduced almost
three decades ago—could not build women’s leadership profile as
reflective of authority, socially valued attributes of power, and political–
cultural hegemony.56 Panchayat members continue to be identified
as those who possess measures of control ranging from influence, threat,
use of force, and in local parlance raub, dabka, leadri. It is expected
that the panchayat leader shall perform multifarious functions. To
quote:
One has to answer calls at all times of the night—if a fight breaks out
immediate attention is needed—one has to gather a number of people
to intervene—difficult enough for a man, impossible for a woman—if a
woman is a panch/sarpanch then these duties are carried out by her hus-
band or a son—people respond to one who has the capacity to under-
take their work—so a female remains a titleholder only—a privilege
deemed by the government, she has no money of her own, no standing
of her own in the community, no physical or social might to intervene
and control incidents of violence.57
Since the standards of leadership are masculine characteristics at

the panchayat level, women representation is seen either as supportive
to male leadership or are represented through proxy variable. Classic
instances of visitors being directed to a sarpanch’s house, the epitome
of a leader, owner of a large landholding, affluent, huge house with a
ready crowd of hanger-ons, eventually leads to the information that
the post of sarpanch is actually held by a wife or servant (often a Dalit)
in the household. Such an established pattern, while making a mockery
of reservation highlights the situational requirements dictated by
informal management that resides in caste and gender structures.
Women’s representation is further restricted by the predominant
value of protectionism toward the weak. This continues to be the male
domain and women representation is seen as legitimate to the extent it
promotes masculine norms, condones values, and abides by the codes
of conduct of restrictive mobility. In this framework, representation
becomes symbolic without reflecting the cultural ethos where violence
is seen as a legitimate instrument of resolution of conflicts. Local leader-
ship is further characterized as capable in terms of providing hospi-
tality and timely patronage.
Being a panch is an expensive and time consuming proposition. The
kitchen must continually respond to the streams of people visiting for
grievances, show of solidarity or for establishing contact—petrol has to
be burnt to run around for peoples work.58
Another important aspect of value of protection is dispensation

of justice in the case of conflict and violence, land encroachment,
water distribution, and domestic disputes. At the micro level of gov-
ernance, i.e., village panchayats, land related disputes and water
132 Rainuka Dagar
distribution fall within the domain of male arbitration, whereas

domestic disputes are assigned to women. In this also, negotiations
are done by male panchayat leaders and the lady panch is involved in
counseling the parents and womenfolk. The conduct of conflict
negotiations bring out three aspects: first, women representatives are
involved in private domain on issues relating to domestic violence;
second, women leadership is only confined to interpersonal gender
domain; and third, the male leadership continues to be involved in
the business of conflict resolution and interest management. These
gender cultural predispositions incapacitate women to perform the
required role.
My wife is sarpanch and the work is handled by me. I don’t like that girls
of Jat Sikh family should go to the BDO Office and chat with him or go
to police stations to get cases sorted out. These men have to be handled
in different manners and at times their hands have to be greased. Women
do not understand such things and if women start doing such work what
respect will be left for them.59
Not only are the domains gender segregated but the dealings in
panchayats are through masculine concepts—use of tacit or implicit
force, use of public influence, money, mobility across time and group,
protectionism, exercise of control over group affiliates, inspiring rev-
erence and awe, entertaining, and hosting officials.
In a gender defined society, leadership is sought and provided on
the basis of gender values and subjectivities. Irrespective of the formal
position, the political positioning is that of the social structure. Further,
the symbolic prestige and positional aura is codified in symbols such as
the pagri (head gear), brandishing a sword, forceful voice, and visible
authority. National leaders like Sonia Gandhi to local leaders like
Shruti Chaudhary (grasping the mantle of her grandfather legacy),
were publicly presented pagris—a symbol of family head reserved
for men, endorsing their leadership. Swords were also accepted by
women leaders—a typically masculine symbol of power. Gender then
remained a tool to be divested or used according to the need. Where
public leadership demanded masculine gestures and symbolism, these
were used by women candidates. Simultaneously cultural sensibilities
of gender norms and conduct were cultivated through codes of

conduct, style, and dress.
There is no doubt that social institutions of decision-making, gov-
ernance, implementation of justice, and enforcement of law have
customarily been constructed and historically mainstreamed in ac-
cordance to male norms. It has been suggested that structural resist-
ance to gender entitlements is now being dealt by entry of a critical
mass of women to promote redistribution of resources in the failure
of exclusive agendas.60 The quota representation continues to be
promoted as a mode for pursuing legislative and policy change.
The issue remains whether a gender specific agenda can be sustained
in the face of institutionalized mechanisms of gender conduct codified
in patterns of exchange and leadership values. “Institutionalisation of
hegemonic masculine behaviour as the behavioural norms” has led
to suggestions that female leadership absorb these masculine organ-
izational norms.61 Such organizational mechanisms and norms may
make women relevant leaders, but without gendering the political
culture.62 Further, women’s representation at the grassroots level
faces different hurdles, as compared to those at the national level. The
leadership profile and conduct of business operative at the grassroots
level may not be the same as that at the state or national level, but
operative gender norms are similar.
A review of women’s representation in elected bodies at the grass-
roots level, the state assembly level and that at the national parliament
reveals a different gender discourse at each level. At the grassroots level,
women representation is within the domain of the stereotyped gender
roles. Women leaders are an extension of family representation and
that of the collectivity. To that extent the norms of conduct, practices
of engagement and leadership is defined by the dominant local gender
functioning. At the state legislative level, women graduate to be the
symbol of party, largely through their membership within the elite.
Their role of leadership reinforces the social reality at the grassroots
level since the nature of issues requiring decisions and allocation of
budgets remains in the boundary of the normative gender functioning.
However, at the national parliament level, women are representatives
of their party and draw on the party positioning within the electorate,
national discourse on democracy, justice, and rights.
134 Rainuka Dagar
Conclusion
To sum up, the 2009 elections have shown following distinct trends
with key findings:
1. Women candidature in Parliament elections has increased along

with the number of elected representatives. Yet, they provided
a contrasting presence. Female participation in the democratic
process was supportive with its large turnout of female voters,
but even with increased numbers, the female leadership in state
governance was low.
2. Gender issues were sprinkled by political leaders in their
electoral campaign. Political parties continued to be more dole-
oriented and protectionist in their promise for women rights.
Party leadership of mainstream parties occasionally referred to
promote women’s empowerment, education, and income gen-
eration in their appeal to populations on the margins. How-
ever, women issues were a casualty to the dominance of identity
construed placement of women in the Indian polity.
3. Electoral discourse was gender discriminatory at the micro level,
whereas at the macro level the Election Commission, media and
political parties took exceptions to sexist articulations select-
ively. Symbolic capital from gender stereotypes continued to
add flavor to the electoral discourse.
4. Women participation in elections as voters has increased,
but has shown no signs of its becoming a vote bank. Women
electorate is not roused on women rights nor do political
parties cultivate a gender support base. Raising of women right
issues remains the personal agenda of candidates. Further, in
a context of diversity, politics and global standards of social
equity, women are a wild card entry into politics. Public office
is sought by leveraging gender entitlements, to safeguard and
extend family constituencies, and for gaining party credentials
to diversity.
5. The electoral discourse established gender as an entitlement
claim within the Indian polity. However, enabling these
entitlements for the practice of rights remain unfettered. Women

have poor representation in leadership—as candidates in party
positions—institutionalized mechanisms for implementing
laws are lacking, as is the universal access to basic facilities
and resources and public mobilization to realize these rights
remain unaddressed. Social reorganization of gender identity
with the inter-sectionality of family, caste, or religious iden-
tity was accepted to promote the subordination of gender rights.
There is a notable delink of the electoral discourse on women
with the political discourse on gender in the country.
Notes
1. Government of India, Statistical Report on General Elections to the 15th Lok Sabha,
Vol. I (New Delhi: Election Commission, 2009).
2. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, wifehood qualifications were the main
criterion of women’s enfranchisement and six million women and 29 million
men became eligible to vote. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya, Awakening of Indian
Women (Madras: Everyman’s Press, 1939).
3. Only larger states with more than 10 seats have been analyzed. Election
Commission of India, 2009.
4. Ibid.
5. Linda K. Richter, “Exploring Theories of Female Leadership in South and South-
East Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 4, Winter 1990–91, pp. 524–40.
6. Ibid.
7. Data collated on the basis of Political Background which includes Relations by Blood
or Marriage and Elite Class which includes Excellence associated with Superior Social
Groups by Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh, 2009.
Women linkages to male relatives (61 percent) was reported by Outlook, June 8,
2009. p. 8.
8. Henry. C. Hart, “Political Leadership in India: Dimensions and Limits,” in
India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, ed. Atul Kohli
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 18–61. Also
see, M.S.S. Pandian, The Image Trap: M.G. Ramachandran in Film and Politics
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992). Mukulika Banerjee, “Populist Leadership
in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu: Mamta and Jayalalitha Compared,” in Regional
Reflections: Comparing Politics Across Indian States, ed. Rob Jenkins (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 285–308.
9. Carole Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India,” Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, No. 3, (2007), pp. 253–77.
136 Rainuka Dagar
10. Atiq Khan. 2009. “The SP Protests Remarks Against Nafisa,” The Hindu,
April 19.
11. Election Commission of India, Statement Showing the Complaint Regarding
Statements Made Against Women during General Election to Lok Sabha, (New
Delhi, 2009).
12. Ibid.
13. Indian Express, “Vote for Naujawan BJP, not Budhiya Cong.: Modi in UP,”
April 11, 2009.
14. Indian Express, “For Modi Congress is now ‘Gudia Congress,” April 12, 2009.
15. The Indian National Congress: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 2009.
16. The Bhartiya Janata Party: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 2009.
17. The Communist Party of India (M): Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 2009.
18. While issues of women’s development and access to services and facilities has been
responsive to the global mandate on gender, the promulgation of protective laws
particularly in relation to atrocities against women has been more in response to
the women’s movement within the country.
19. The notorious Mathura Rape Case in which a 16 year old tribal girl was raped
in a police station with a judgment vindicating the policemen caused a public
outrage and provided the impetus for an amendment of law. Subsequent
incidence involving rape by police personnel maintained the issue in public
domain and intolerance of sexual abuse of women by the Indian public was
strongly registered.
20. Government of India, The Dowry Prohibition Act (Act No. 28 of 1961) with
State Amendments of Haryana Act 38 of 1976, Bihar Act of 1976, Himachal
Pradesh Act 25 of 1976, Punjab Act 26 of 1976, and West Bengal Act 35 of
1975 (New Delhi: Ministry of Law and Justice, 1961).
21. Forum against sex determination and pre-selection was formed in 1984 in
Mumbai, Maharashtra. In 1986, number of campaigns which involved picketing
in front of clinics conducting sex determination tests had taken place. The misuse
of sex determination tests for abortion of female fetus was noted by the All-
Indian Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in 1975. Subsequently, the Indian
Council of Medical Research (ICMR) halted these tests in 1976, but by 1979
the technology had spread into private hands. By 1982, women organizations in
Delhi had condemned its misuse and recommended strict enforcement against
its use. The Ministry of Social Welfare sought the Union Health Minister’s
intervention to deal with the issue.
22. United Nations, The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945–1996,
Vol. 6 (New York: The United Nations Blue Book Series, 1996).
23. The Bhartiya Janata Party: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1957.
24. The Bhartiya Janata Party: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1957; and The
Communist Party of India: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1962.
25. The Communist Party of India: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1962.
26. Vibhuti Patel, “Gender Budgeting in India,” Paper presented at national
workshop on Gender Budgeting—An Effective Tool for Achieving Women’s
Empowerment,” by Equity Foundation, (Patna, 2007).
27. Zoya Hasan, Gender, Religion, and Democratic Politics in India (Geneva,
Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2009).
28. Pre-independence, as the Indian Constitution makers finalized the terms of
Indian democracy, women’s reservation was rejected by women leaders on
grounds of political equality. Kumud Sharma, “Power and Representation for
Women in India,” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2000),
pp. 47–87. According to Sarojini Naidu, a Congress Party President, “The demand
for granting preferential treatment to women is an admission on her part of her
inferiority and there has been no need for such a thing in India as the women
have always been by the side of men in council and in the fields of battle …”
Sarojini Naidu, “Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the AIWC,” Presidential
address to the All India Women’s Conference, unpublished, (Bombay: All Indian
Women’s Conference, 1930).
29. Government of India, Mandal Commission Report of the Backward Classes
Commission, Vol. 1, Chapter XIII (New Delhi, 1980).
30. Pippa Norris, “Conclusions: Comparing Legislative Recrutiment,” in Gender and
Party Politics, eds Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (London: Sage Publications,
1993), pp. 309–30.
Susheela Kaushik, A Study of Women Candidates for the Eleventh Lok Sabha 1996
(New Delhi: National Commission for Women, 1996).
31. Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India,” pp. 253–77.
32. United Nations Fund for Children, The State of the World’s Children, Women and
Children: The Double Dividend of Gender Equality (New York, USA, 2007).
33. UNICEF, The State of World Children, Maternal and New Born Health (New
York, USA, 2009).
34. Committee of Feminist Economist, Towards Inclusive Growth: The Gender
Dimension (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 2007).
35. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Education
for All, Global Monitoring Report: Early Childhood Care and Education. France:
UNESCO, 2007.
36. Shireen Hassim, Rethinking Gender Politics in a Liberal Age: Institution, Consti-
tutencies and Equality in Comparative Perspectives (Geneva, Switzerland: UNRISD,
2009).
37. Women are facing increasing atrocities and lower life chances with increasing
female feticide. Government of India, Crime in India, National Crime Records
Bureau New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1997 and 2007). Crime against
women in 10 years from 1997 to 2007 increased by 68.06 percent according
to Crime in India. Also, child sex ratio (0–6 years) has decreased by 42 points
i.e., 969 (1961) to 927 (2001) according to Census of India. GOI (1961 and
2001), Socio-cultural Tables, Volume I, Part II-C(i) and C-Series, Census of
India, Office of Registrar General, New Delhi.
38. Government of India, Training of Police Officials Associated with Conduct of
Election, No. 464/INST/2009-EPS, dated 9 January, (New Delhi: Election
Commission, 2009).
138 Rainuka Dagar
39. Government of India, The Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance

Act, (New Delhi: Ministry of Law and Justice, 2002).
40. Amrita Basu, “Women, Political Parties and Social Movements in South Asia,”
Occasional Papers 5, July, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development, 2005), p. 31.
41. Sunita Bose, Manisha Desai, Bandana Purkayastha, and Mangal Subramanium,
The Study of Gender in India: A Partial Review, Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No.
4, 2003, pp. 503–24.
42. Shah Bano, as a divorced woman, had the right to demand maintenance under
Indian Civil Law, which the Muslim Personal Law did not provide. Resorting to
the Indian Civil Law was perceived by certain sections of Muslims as interference
in undermining the Muslim identity.
43. The demand for uniform civil code by the BJP is claimed as necessary for gender
justice. In 1967, their manifesto mentioned “A uniform civil code will be enacted
to govern the laws on marriage, adoption, inheritance etc. of all Indian citizens.
By 1996, it had specified a Uniform Civil Code (UCC), that will give women
property rights, ensure women’s rights to adoption, guarantee women equal
guardianship rights, remove discriminatory clauses in divorce law and put an
end to polygamy.” Parties projecting a secular image or outright seeking Muslim
votes denounce the uniform civil code as undermining the rights of minority
groups. In fact, the Congress denouncing a UCC like other parties such as
AIADMK, but have been proposing “legal equality for women in all spheres,”
“effective implementation of social legislation,” yet the wording and engagement
with religious groups portrays a prior religious claim according to religious
protectionism in accordance to the political positioning of the parties.
Manifesto of BJP, AIADMK, and Congress for Lok Sabha election for the year
2004.
44. John Hariss, Populism, Tamil Style: Is it Really a Success? (London School of
Economics: Development Studies Institute Working Paper Series, No. 15,
2001). Available online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collection/destic/pdg/wpis.pdf
(last date of access: November 20, 2006).
45. Even state creation and maintenance of identities, in terms of reservation
quotas, religious protectionism, and social reform have intruded to fragment
the construction of a women category. Zoya Hasan, The Gender, Religion and
Democratic Politics in India (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development, 2009).
46. Government of India, 2009: Election Commission, New Delhi.
47. According to NSSO, 62nd (2005–06) round OBC population of Punjab and
Haryana is 20 percent and 24.41 percent, respectively.
48. CPI Manifesto.
49. INC: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto 2009.
50. Prem Chaudhry, Contentious Marriages, Eloping Couples, Gender, Caste, and
Patriarchy in Northern (India: Oxford University Press, 2007).
51. Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India, pp. 253–77.
52. Rajanayagam D. Hellmann, The Quick and the Dead: The Pioneer: TheWeeping
Window (Project Discussion Paper No. 8, 2004). Available online at http://
uni-duisburg.de/Institute/OAWI/SS/institut/mitarbeifer/dynasties/publications.
htm (last date of access: November 28, 2006).
53. The Beijing Platform for action states “women in political and decision-making
positions in governments and legislative bodies contribute to redefining political
priorities, placing new items on the political agenda that reflect and address
women’s gender-specific concerns, values and experiences and provide new
perspectives on mainstream political issues.” Platform for Action (PFA), 1995:
110.United Nations, The Beijing Declaration and its Platform for Action: The
Fourth United Nation’s Conference on Women on Action of Equality, Development
and Peace (Beijing, China, 1995).
55. Hassim, Rethinking Gender Politics in a Liberal Age.
56. Rainuka Dagar, Authority Systems and Construction of Masculinities in Punjab
Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication, 2008).
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Hassim, Rethinking Gender Politics in a Liberal Age.
61. Rhoda Reddock, “Women’s Liberation and National Liberation,” in Mies Maria
and Rhoda Reddock (ed.), National Liberation and Women’s Liberalism (The
Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1982), pp. 9–13.
Chapter 7
The BSP in 2009: Still Making Progress,

But Only as a Dalit Party
Christophe Jaffrelot
Mayawati’s BSP has been classified among the losers in most of the
post-elections press reports. This is fair enough given its expectations
based on its performances in the 2007 and 2008 state elections.
In 2007, the BSP won 206 seats with 30.46â•¯percent of valid votes
in Uttar Pradesh and in 2008, it won important by-elections in Uttar
Pradesh (UP)1 and made inroads in three of the states which went to
polls. In Madhya Pradesh, it jumped from 7.26â•¯percent of the votes
in 2003 to 11â•¯percent and from two to seven seats. In Delhi it grew
even more dramatically, from 5.76â•¯percent to 12â•¯percent and from
none to two seats. Even in Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh the party
crossed the 5â•¯percent mark with respectively 8â•¯percent and six seats
and 6.5â•¯percent and two seats.2 Converted into Lok Sabha seats, these
achievements meant that in 2009, the BSP was in a position to win
about 50 seats and might be the king maker. The party got only 21.
The party leaders emphasize, and rightly so, that such a figure still
represents progress compared to the previous Lok Sabha elections.
But these elections may still mark a turning point in terms of strategy
since the party is back to its Dalit roots.
What Setback?
If we compare the performances of the BSP during the 2009 Lok

Sabha elections to previous general elections, which is the only
fair way to analyze electoral results, we come to an unambiguous
The BSP in 2009 141
Figure 7.1
Percentage of Votes Polled by BSP Candidates
Source: F Durand- Dastès, Base Map: M. Colin and M. de France.
conclusion: the BSP is continuing its forward march. Since 1999,

over the last 10 years, the party has made steady, significant progress.
The 1991 and the 1999 elections were setbacks in terms of valid votes
and seats, the 2009 one is not, in none of these respects. In fact, the
BSP has become the third largest party, thanks to its own progress
and the decline of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)],
which may be a milestone in itself.
The 2009 elections may be a turning point in the history of the BSP
and Indian politics at large not only because the party has dislodged
the CPI(M) from the third position, but because it has acquired a
142 Christophe Jaffrelot
Figure 7.2
Votes Polled by the Candidates of the BSP
Source: F Durand-Dastès, Base Map: M. Colin and M. de France.
national stand. For the first time, the BSP has crossed the 5â•¯percent
mark in about half a dozen states. Uttar Pradesh (UP) remains the
party’s stronghold, where it continues to make progress jumping
from 24.6â•¯percent of the valid votes in 2004 to 27.4â•¯percent in 2009.
Except in Awadh, where it declined by 2.5â•¯percentage points, the
party made progress in every region of UP, including a 6â•¯percent jump
in the west where it got 31.4â•¯percent of the votes (as much as in the
East).3 The BSP was the runner-up in 46 seats, among which it lost
The BSP in 2009 143
Table 7.1
BSP Vote Percentage in Seven General Elections
Year Candidates Winning candidates % of valid votes

1989 246 3 2.07
1991 231 2 1.61
1996 117 11 3.64
1998 251 5 4.7
1999 N.A. 14 4.2
2004 435 19 5.33
2009 500 21 6.17
Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Ninth General Elections to the House
of the People in India, 1989, (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1990),
p. 7; Election Commission of India, Report on the Tenth General Elections to the
House of the People in India, 1998, (New Delhi: Government of India Press,
[n.d.]), p. 9; Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections,
1996 to the Eleventh Lok Sabha, Vol. 1 (New Delhi, 1996); G.V.L. Narasimha
Rao and K. Balakrishnan, Indian Elections: The Nineties (Delhi: Har-Â�Anand,
1999); Y. Yadav and S.Kumar, “Interpreting the Mandate,” Frontline (November
5, 1999), p. 120–26; and Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu:
Explaining the Congress’ Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 33.
three by a margin of less than 10,000 votes and three others by less
than 20,000 votes. Neighboring states also have become important
places. In Uttarakhand and Haryana, the BSP multiplied its per-
formance by about three to cross the 15â•¯percent mark. In four other
states, Punjab (the only state where the party is in decline), Delhi,
Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, the BSP got about 5â•¯percent of
the valid votes.
These figures need to be disaggregated. In Madhya Pradesh, the
BSP received 12â•¯percent of the valid votes in Vindhya Pradesh, a
region adjacent to UP where the BSP has been strong for almost two
decades. In fact, this is the place where the party had its first Member
of Parliament (MP) elected and once again this is the place where
it got its only non-UP-based MP elected. Similarly, the BSP won
11.4â•¯percent of the valid votes in eastern Vidarbha, a region which
used to be a stronghold of the Republic Party of India (RPI), a party
the BSP has eclipsed in Maharashtra. BSP also won about 6â•¯percent
of the valid votes in western Vidarbha and Marathwada.4
Even in states where the party is far from the 5â•¯percent mark, the
BSP is carving out sub-regional niches for itself. In Rajasthan, for
example, where the party received only 3.37â•¯percent of the votes
against 7.6â•¯percent during the previous state elections, the party got
6.7â•¯percent of the valid votes in the western region.5
What Strategy?
If the election results do no represent a setback for the BSP as a

party, it may be one for its strategy. The 2007 UP elections had been
the testing ground of a strategy initiated by Kanshi Ram himself
in the late 1990s consisting in opening up, not only to non-Dalit
people—something he had always done, right from the creation of
the Backward and Minority Communities Employees’ Federation
(BAMCEF), as evident from the name of the organisation itself—but
also to non-Bahujans, i.e., to upper castes, provided they were not
given a share of power that would be superior to their share of the
population. As a result, Kanshi Ram nominated an increasing num-
ber of upper caste candidates in the 1999 elections, in proportion of
theirâ•¯percentage in the population.6
Kanshi Ram left the scene in 2003 after he was incapacitated
by a stroke, but Mayawati pursued the same agenda. She simply
adapted it to the conditions of UP where a Dalit-dominated party like
Table 7.2
BSP Vote by State in 2009/2004 (Where it has Crossed the 5 Percent Mark)
States % of valid votes

Uttarakhand 15.3/6.8
Uttar Pradesh 27.4/24.6
Punjab 5.75/7.67
Haryana 15.7/4.9
Delhi 5.3/2.4
Maharashtra 4.8/3.1
Madhya Pradesh 5.85/4.75
Source: “Appendix IV,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, (September 26,
2009), pp. 204–05.
The BSP in 2009 145
the BSP was in a better position to attract Brahmins and Vaishyas.

These two groups had more interests in common with the Dalits
than the Rajputs. Their common enemy was the nexus formed by the
dominant Other Backward Castes (OBCs)—including the Yadavs—
and the Rajputs, both landed groups which attempted to rule village
life and which they considered as responsible for the declining law
and order situation. This strategy culminated in the kind of ticket
distribution Mayawati made in 2007.
Table 7.3
The BSP Candidates and MLAs in 2007 (2002) in Uttar Pradesh
OBC Dalits Brahmins Muslims Vaishyas Rajputs Kayasth Total

Tickets 110(122) 93 86(37) 61(85) 14(6) 38(36) 1(3) 402
Elected 51 62 39 24 12 18 0 206
Source: The Hindu, March 14, 2007 for the candidates, interview with Suresh Mane,
Mumbai, June 8, 2009, for the MLAs.
This strategy produced good results. The BSP could rely on its
Dalit supporters in such a way that it could ask them to vote for upper
caste, Muslim, or OBC candidates who brought with them additional
suffrages from their own community. The BSP’s transferable vote
bank and this “plus vote” explained the 2007 success.
Table 7.4
Voting Pattern of the UP Castes and Communities in 2002 and 2007
Caste and OBC

community Dalits (Non-Yadavs) Muslims Upper castes
2002 69 20 10 5
2007 77 27 17 16
Source: CSDS Data unit.
Among the upper caste BSP new supporters, the Brahmins were
in the largest numbers.The “plus vote” strategy was still successful in
2008 when the BSP fielded three Brahmin candidates, out of five,
in by-elections where the party was fully successful (see Note 1).
Mayawati’s discourse, therefore, had shifted from caste to class and
from a bahujan-centered repertoire to a more open one as early as the
mid-2000s. She made it clear as early as April 2006 in an interview

she gave to The Hindu:
The majority of the people in our country are poor. Even among the
higher castes, it is a smallâ•¯percentage that is privileged, the rest are poor
and have the same wants of roti, kapda, aur makan (food, clothes and
shelter). […] We are for an equal social order. Social inequality and dis-
crimination result in economic inequality, if opportunities were truly
equal, there would be no economic inequality. Our aim is to establish a
samata muluk samaj (a society based on equality). […] I am still against
manuwad. What is manuwad? It is division of society into four varnas.
The BSP wants to end this discriminatory order, and we have succeeded
to quite an extent. As upper castes integrate with Dalits, mutual suspicion
and hatred will end. This is samajik parivartan (social change).7
After becoming Chief Minister (CM) she made it clear that she would
support any move by the center to amend the Constitution in order
to allow reservations for the religious minorities and the upper caste
poor, which implied, among other things, that the 50â•¯percent cut-
off fixed by the Supreme Court should be removed.8 As CM of UP,
she initiated an ambitious reservation program in the framework of
her “New economic policy” which relied to a great extent on public-
private partnerships, something Mayawati’s close lieutenant, Shashank
Shekhar Singh was particularly keen to expand.9 In each Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) project—where the government’s share could not
be less than 11â•¯percent and more than 49â•¯percent—10â•¯percent of the
posts would be reserved to the Scheduled Castes (SCs), 10â•¯percent
to the OBCs and religious minorities, and 10â•¯percent to the upper
caste poor.10
Henceforth, wherever she spoke in India, one of the promises she
made regarding reservations, was to have them implemented not on
the basis of caste, but on an economic basis. In Mumbai, for instance,
she held a mammoth meeting in Shivaji Park in November 2007
where she said:
The day we come to power at the Centre, we will introduce reservations

based on economic criteria even before you demand them […] If you
want this in your state, elect the BSP to power. For this, the backwards
will have to come together with the upper castes. Our party works for
The BSP in 2009 147
all communities on the principles of Sarvajan Hitaya, Sarvajan Sukhaya

(Welfare of all community and happiness of all community).11
Introducing reservations on an economic basis (arthik adhar par)

has been one of the items of the Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s)
program, right from the early 1990s. In order to hammer her point,
Mayawati not only held meetings like the Mumbai one all over
India, but more specific ones aimed at the upper castes before the
Lok Sabha elections.
These “upper caste conventions” had been initiated in 2005 in
UP.12 The man in charge of them was Satish Chandra Mishra, a
Brahmin lawyer who had been chairman of the Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh in 1998–99 and then Advocate General of UP in 2002–03
before joining politics. He became All India General Secretary of
the BSP in 2004 and was elected to the Rajya Sabha in July of the
same year.13 After the 2007 elections, Mishra became chairman of the
UP Advisory Council and, as a result, one of the close lieutenants of
Mayawati.
Mishra focussed on his caste, fellow-Brahmins. He organized
Brahmin mahasammelans (Brahmin congregations) at the district-
level in 2005 and Mayawati was able to address the first state-level
Brahmin mahasammelan on June 9, 2005. Similar meetings were
organized focussing on the Vaishyas,14 the Kshatriyas and even the
Yadavs. But the Brahmins remained the primary targets, as evident
from the Bhaichara Banao Samitis (Brotherhood Building Com-
mittees) that Mayawati set up in all the 403 assembly constituencies
of UP. As Smita Gupta puts it, “Each samiti, structured down to
booth level, had 300 brahmins and 100 Dalits, with a Brahmin
chairman and a Dalit general secretary. Each assembly area was
divided into 25–30 sectors, with each sector responsible for eight to
10 booths.”15 While they were rather successful in UP where the state
apparatus could be mobilized in their favor, the turn out has been
rather disappointing for the organizers in Madhya Pradesh.16
The BSP adopted the same strategy in states where it was still
embryonic. In Karnataka, for instance, where the party made a point
to field candidates in all the constituencies for the 2008 assembly
elections, its state president, Marasandra Muniyappa, a former Janata
Dal minister,17 announced in a quasi Gandhian vein: “We are trying

to bring in an understanding between the ‘upper’ and the ‘lower’
castes.”18 As a result, the BSP announced that it would field 10â•¯percent
Brahmins, 30â•¯percent Lingayats and Vokkaligas, 37â•¯percent OBCs,
23â•¯percent Dalits, and 12â•¯percent Muslims, i.e., 112â•¯percent, since
obviously 100â•¯percent was not sufficient to accommodate everybody.19
Mayawati continued the same strategy during the 2009 election
campaign and pursued it all over India. She made clear that she was
now aiming at reaching power at the center by starting a national
campaign on the 21st of March in Thiruvananthapuram (formerly
called Trivandrum) and by using two complementary slogans,
“…ab Dilli ki bari hai!” and “Sarvjan Hitay, Sarvjan Sukhay,” a jingle
which echoed another one, explicitly phrased in caste terms: “haathi
nahi Ganesh hai, Brahma Vishnu Mahesh” [Not elephant but Ganesh;
Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh (Gods identified with the upper castes)].
In order to become the spoke person of the whole of society,
she emphasized that, as Prime Minister of India, she would grant
reservations to the poor of the upper castes too. Hinting at the nega-
tive impact of the boosting of the private sector at the expense of the
public one, she declared: “These parties which favour the rich are
creating laws to gradually end reservation for the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in [one] form or the
other. The BSP promises to provide reservations even for the poor
among the upper castes.”20
Besides the upper castes, the BSP continued to aim at the Muslims,
one of its oldest targets. In 2006, Mayawati had criticized the way
one of Mulayam Singh’s Yadav’s Muslim ministers, Yakib Qureshi,
had offered a reward for the death of the Danish cartoonist who had
depicted Prophet Mohammed in a disrespectful manner by saying
that Muslims had a “preference” for fundamentalist leaders and
hardliners (kattarpanthis). The United Democratic Front, a Muslim
party that has become especially strong in Assam had then called the
BSP Muslim Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and MPs to
leave their party and the Samajwadi Party (SP) youth wing had burnt
Mayawati effigies.
As CM, she made a point to defend the cause of the Muslims. In
July 2008, she opposed the India/United States (US) nuclear deal with
The BSP in 2009 149
an eye on the Muslim community which was supposed to be against

it because of anti-Americanism.21 In October 2008, she demanded
a judicial probe into the Batla House encounter, sent the Azamgarh
DM and the police chief of Sanjarpur village to the families of the
Muslim boys who had been killed in the Batla House to reassure them
that no raids by the Delhi or Mumbai police would be conducted
without the assistance of the Azamgarh police. More importantly,
during the election campaign, she took a strong stand against a famous
BJP candidate, Varun Gandhi the son of Sanjay Gandhi, who during
an election speech in Pilibhit constituency, where he was contesting,
made derogatory remarks against Muslims. She immediately invoked
the National Security Act and Varun Gandhi was put behind bars.
Table 7.5
Caste and Community of the BSP Candidates in Uttar Pradesh:
2009 Lok Sabha Elections
Caste and community Number (%)

Upper castes 29
Brahmins 20
Rajputs 5
Banyas 3
Khatris 1
Other Backward Classes 15
Yadav 3
Gujar 2
Mali 2
Lodhi 2
Pal 1
Nonya 1
Kewat 1
Kurmi 1
Rajbhar 1
Other 1
Scheduled Castes 18
Chamar/Jatav 11
Pasi 5
Other 1
Muslims 14
Unidentified 2
Total 80
Source: Mrayayug, April 2009, p. 15 and interviews at the BSP Central Office (New Delhi,
June 10, 2009).
Table 7.6
Caste and Community of BSP Candidates in Maharashtra:
2009 Lok Sabha Elections
Caste and community Number (%)

Upper castes 7
Brahmin 5
Khatri 1
Other 1
Intermediate castes 5
Maratha 5
Other Backward Classes 5
Kunbi 1
Mali 1
Teli 2
Kalar 1
Scheduled Castes 12
Buddhists 12
Scheduled Tribes 6
Muslim 8
Unidentified 1
Total 45
Source: Interview with Suresh Mane, Mumbai, June 8, 2009.
The BSP did not give as many tickets as before to Muslim candidates,
but they were still almost as numerous as the OBCs in UP and second
only to the Dalits in Maharashtra.
The BSP strategy did not bear much fruit. Certainly, at an all India
level the proportion of upper castes voters who supported the party
increased by twoâ•¯percentage points and that of the Muslims by three,
but these figures fell short of the expectations of the party leaders. This
setback can be explained in many different ways:
1. The logic of general elections is different from that of state

elections. The BSP has almost always done better in state elec-
tions than in general elections, especially among upper castes
and Muslim voters. In 2009, one could have expected an anti-
incumbency factor in UP, but there was nothing of that kind
if we go by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies
(CSDS) figures.
The BSP in 2009 151
Table 7.7
Anti-incumbency Factor in UP
Parties and leaders BSP (%) BJP (%) SP (%) Congress (%)
Which party can best curb 27 22 19 16
corruption?
Which party can best 27 19 16 22
maintain law and order
in UP?
Who is the best personality Mayawati Rajnath Singh Mulayam Singh Rahul Gandhi
for Chief ministership? 28 12 27 4
Source: Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?”
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 190.
Table 7.8
Satisfaction with Performance of UPA and BSP Governments among UP Voters
UPA government BSP government

at the center in UP
Fully Satisfied 23 22
Somewhat Satisfied 42 33
Somewhat Dissatisfied 6 11
Fully Dissatisfied 10 22
No Opinion/Don’t Know 19 12
Source: Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?”
â•… At the same time, the UP voters were rather happy with the
UPA government at the center. In fact, a majority of them were
“fully” or “somewhat” satisfied with the UPA government in
Delhi and the BSP government in UP.
â•… In such a context, Mayawati could not compete with
Manmohan Singh for getting the upper castes’ vote. More gen-
erally speaking, nontraditional supporters of the BSP might
have not found in her a leader of a national standing. Besides,
54â•¯percent of the interviewees in UP responded that they were
willing to give the UPA government another chance.22
2. The Muslims have their own reasons for returning to the
Congress instead of supporting the BSP, or remaining with the
SP whose chief, Mulayam Singh Yadav in fact betrayed them
by inducting Kalyan Singh in the list of his party candidates in
order to consolidate the OBC vote behind him. Yet, 30â•¯percent

of the Muslims voted for the SP against 46â•¯percent in 2007.
Many Muslim voters might have believed in the promises of
the UPA regarding the implementation of the Sachar Commit-
tee Report and have had doubts regarding the reliability of the
BSP’s commitments to secularism. Rumors were circulated
among Muslim voters that, in case of a hung parliament, the
BSP might join hands with BJP as it had done before in UP.
â•… These considerations partly explain why the Muslim voters
were more numerous on the Congress side than on the BSP
side (25â•¯percent, i.e., + 11â•¯percentage points compared to 2007,
against 18â•¯percent, i.e., a modest + 1â•¯percentage point) and,
more importantly, why the upper caste deserted the BSP: only
9â•¯percent Brahmins voted for the party (against 16â•¯percent in
2007) and only 7â•¯percent Rajputs (against 12â•¯percent in 2007).
In UP as elsewhere, the BSP was left with its Dalit support base,
but an expanding one.
A Dalit Party First, but Which Dalits?
BSP remained a Dalit party more than anything else, in spite of a

slight diminution of oneâ•¯percentage point of its share of the Dalit
vote. While the party was still lagging behind the Congress, it could
compete with it so far as the Dalit vote was concerned.
Table 7.9
Vote of the Congress/BSP by Caste and Community
Caste and community Cabinet minister (%) Independent charge (%)

Dalit 8 11
OBC 4 7
Brahmins 4 4
Muslim 1 4
Rajput 1 4
Banya 1 –
Bhumihar 1 –
Source: CSDS Data Unit.
The BSP in 2009 153
The BSP’s ability to attract Dalit voters was even more obvious at
the state level. In the northern states where the party is flirting with
the 5â•¯percent mark, it now gets between 21–27â•¯percent of the Dalit
votes, except in Haryana where it received 57â•¯percent of the Dalit vote.
This achievement has probably much to do with the polarisation of
the electorate along caste lines. The Congress made a special effort
to woo the Jats and, indeed, the party got 42â•¯percent of their votes
(+17â•¯percent). This might have been one of the reasons why the Dalits,
who often have been oppressed by Jats in the countryside, deserted the
ruling party. Only 34â•¯percent cast their vote in its favor, i.e. a decline
of 35â•¯percentage points.23
This shift away from Congress, perceived as the party of the Jats,
in favor of the BSP was certainly not unrelated to the tussle between
Mayawati and Tikait, the Jat leader of the Bhartiya Kisan Union
(BKU), who had had made a very derogatory reference to the “Chamar”
Chief Minister at a farmers’ rally in Bijnor in April 2008. A case was
filed under the SC/STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Tikait was
arrested.
The fact that the BSP has been able to attract a larger section of the
Dalit vote might be questionable, given the fact that in many states, it
was really popular among one jati only. The Jatavs of Madhya Pradesh
are a case in point here. But this objection needs to be qualified from
two points of view:
1. To gain the support of a Dalit jati is quite an achievement

when the jati in question plays an eminent role in the public
sphere. This is obviously the case, not only of the Jatavs of
the Hindi belt, but also of the Buddhists of Maharashtra who
are by far the most educated Dalits of the state. The fact that
the BSP now gets 37â•¯percent of their vote, as against 30â•¯percent
to the UPA, suggests that the party has conquered the core of
the Ambedkarite movement in its very birthplace.
2. The BSP is not the party of one jati only in at least one
state, the most important one, UP. Here, the BSP can be
called a Dalit party because it did not only attract 85â•¯percent
of the Jatavs, but also 64â•¯percent of the second largest Dalit jati,
the Pasis (or Dusadhs), and 61â•¯percent of the other Dalit jatis.
As a whole, the Dalit support for the BSP registered an 8â•¯percent

increase in UP. This is a new development in a state where
non-Jatav Dalit groups used to vote massively for the Congress
and even the BJP (e.g., the Balmikis). This qualitative change
probably resulted from the Dalit politics of the Mayawati
government, but also from its policies.
â•… In terms of politics, she formed a government where
Dalits were in large numbers, though she made a point to
accommodate other groups as evident from Table 7.10.
Table 7.10
Caste and Community of Mayawati’s Government in 2007
Caste and community Cabinet minister Independent charge

Dalit 8 11
OBC 4 7
Brahmins 4 4
Muslim 1 4
Rajput 1 4
Banya 1 –
Bhumihar 1 –
Source: Interview with Suresh Mane, Mumbai, June 8, 2009.
In terms of policies, the BSP government paid more attention to

the Dalits than to any other social group. As soon as she took over
as Chief Minister, Mayawati issued a government order to clear the
backlog quota of SCs, STs, and OBCs on May 31, 2007. As Sohini
Guha puts it on the basis of her fieldwork in UP, including among
the Lucknow bureaucrats, the BSP has “accomplished the fullest
implementation of quotas ever achieved in the state.”24 In July of
the same year she increased the daily agriculturalist wage from 58 to
`â•›100—a measure benefiting mostly Dalits—and decided to imple-
ment new reservations among police officers in favor of the SCs/
STs (23â•¯percent quota) and the OBCs (27â•¯percent) as well as the
Muslims. A few months later she dismissed about 22,000 policemen
for corruption and maladministration, mostly Yadavs who had been
appointed by Mulayam Singh. Finally, in October, she initiated a
better promotional policy for SC/STs government employees.
The BSP in 2009 155
In addition, the Mayawati government relaunched the Ambedkar

Village Scheme, which represented one-tenth of the UP budget in
2007, i.e., `â•›10,000 crore, which has resulted in the construction of
roads, schools, and wells in many localities with an high proportion
of Dalits. It has also redistributed some land to landless peasants, who
are generally Dalits even though the availability of land was limited.
Last but not least, the government returned to a strict implementation
of the SCs and STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act by making the
administration, including the police,25 more responsive to the Dalits.
This last move has been resented by the upper and dominant castes
who are realising that not only the Dalits were asserting themselves
economically, but even more psychologically under Mayawati.
The BSP identified itself with the Dalits even more explicitly when
Mayawati declared in 2007 that a Chamar would take over from her
at the helm of the party, one day.
While the BSP is more a Dalit party than anything else after the
2009 elections, this designation needs to be qualified. All Dalits are
not supporting the party to the same extent. Certainly, caste remains a
line of cleavage with the Jatavs and the Buddhist Mahars forming the
core group of the BSP’s supporters. But class also plays an increasingly
important role. Among the Jatavs, for instance, the richer the voters
are, the more favorably inclined they are toward the Congress. Not
only class makes a difference, but also the location. Even though
this class-based differentiation is observed in the rural as well as in the
urban part of India, in the villages even the rich Jatavs do not vote
more for the Congress than for the BSP. If the rural Jatavs are the only
ones supporting the BSP more than the Congress, or as much the
BSP as the Congress, whatever their social class, the class element is
evident from the voting pattern of all the Dalit jatis: Dalits, be they
in the countryside or in an urban setting are almost systematically
more favorably inclined toward the BSP the poorer they are. It
means that the party has in a sense unified the Dalits irrespective
of their caste on a class base. The party can therefore claim to be a
Dalit party—and not a Jatav party—more than ever before because
of its capacity to attract the poor Dalits. Ambedkar used to say “the
caste system is not only a division of labor, it is also a division of
the laborers.” It is not as true as it used to be at his time, at least in
terms of political identification.
Table 7.11
The Dalit Vote for the BSP in Seven States
States % of dalit votes

Chhattisgarh 27
Delhi 23
Haryana 57
Madhya Pradesh Jatavs: 27, Other Dalits: 6
Maharashtra Mahars: 15, Buddhist Dalits: 37, Other Dalits: 9
Punjab 21
Uttar Pradesh Jatavs: 85, Pasis: 64, Other Dalits: 61
Source: CSDS Data Unit.
Table 7.12
Congress Percent Lead over the BSP in Different Categories of Dalits
Jatavs, Congress/
Charmkars and Large Small BSP re: All
Castes and classes Madigas Dalit jatis* Dalit jatis Dalits
Rural upper class –2 21 25 31/19
Rural middle class 0 28 23 32/18
Rural lower class –22 3 13 20/24
Urban upper class 35 23 45 39/7
Urban middle class 1 22 28 31/14
Urban lower class –21 12 15 26/19
Total –7 16 21 27/21
Number 2,026 2,291 1,144 N.A.
Source: Rahul Verma, “Dalit voting patterns,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV,
No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 95–96.
Conclusion
The 2009 elections have been a setback for the BSP only because
of the expectations that had arisen from the 2007 and 2008 state
elections, especially in UP with the party shifting from the Bahujan
to the Sarvajan “magic formula.” But the logic of general elections
is different from that of state elections and the policies Mayawati
implemented in UP anyway showed that she worked primarily for
the Dalits. Indeed, if the BSP has lost some of the non-Dalit support
it had got during the recent state elections, it gained additional sup-
porters among the Dalits. It is more a Dalit party than ever before
The BSP in 2009 157
Table 7.13
The BSP Vote in UP by Caste and Community
Gain/loss compared to the

Caste and community % of valid votes 2007 state elections
Brahmin 9 –8
Rajput 7 –5
Other upper castes 11 –1
Yadav 5 –3
Kurmi/Koeri 18 –5
Other OBCs 19 –9
Jatav 84 –1
Other SCs 64 +8
Muslims 18 +1
Others 23 –5
All 27 –3
Source: Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: signs of a Congress revival,”
Table 7.14
Vote of the Congress/BSP by Locality
Locality Vote share in 2009 Change from 2004

All rural 29/7 3/–1
All urban 29/5 0/2
Metros 30/4 –5/–1
Towns 29/5 1/2
All 29/6 3/1
Source: Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress’
Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV,
No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 39.
in the sense that it has been able to attract voters from many more
different Dalit jatis than before on a pro-poor agenda. The BSP,
therefore, is not back to square one. In fact, this class element may
help the party to evolve a new strategy.
Ambedkar had always oscillated between class and caste so far as
his political parties were concerned. In the 1930s, the Independent
Labour Party was supposed to be the party of the workers,26 in the
1940s, the SCs Federation was intended to be the party of the Dalits
and in the 1950s, the Republican Party of India was again aiming
at a less caste-based, restrictive constituency. The BSP is back to its
Table 7.15
Vote of the Congress/BSP by Class
Class Vote share in 2009 Change from 2004

Rich 30/5 5/2
Middle 29/5 –1/3
Lower 30/6 4/2
Poor 27/8 2/1
Very poor 25/9 –2/2
All 29/6 3/1
Source: Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress’
Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV,
No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 40.
Dalit core-group. After the 2009 elections, Mayawati focuses more

on the poor of this category. She made a symbolic gesture by ordering
that henceforth top police officers should visit areas where atro-
cities are committed against Dalits on the same day27 and she re-
launched the transfer of village lands to the Dalits. But she may also
concentrate more on the poor of the other caste groups which are
bound to become more and more differentiated in socioeconomic
terms while reforms are unfolding their impact. The BSP may have
a window of opportunity if the Congress is looked at as “pro-rich”
because of this reform process. The party already made more pro-
gress, electorally, among the rich than among the poor between 2004
and 2009 (see Table 7.14).
However, the BSP will succeed in implementing this strategy, and
possibly any strategy, if and only if it builds a robust party structure.
After the 2009 elections, which caused her some strong disappoint-
ment, Mayawati blamed the administration. She shifted 34 IPS
officers, mostly from places where the BSP lost the elections,28 and
sacked all the chairpersons and members of all state corporations,
except the Chairperson of the State Women Commission, Abha
Agnihotri, the sister of Satish Chandra Mishra.29 She could also have
blamed herself for some obvious mistakes, not so much regarding the
statues she has built to her honor all over UP,30 which is a relevant
strategy to impose the footprint of the Dalits over the public space,
but regarding the way she distributed the party tickets this time. She
The BSP in 2009 159
has probably made a mistake in three cases, so far as the party-building

process is concerned:
1. When the nomination went to non-party cadres whose only

asset was financial, like Deepak Bhardwaj, the richest candidate
from Delhi.
2. When the candidate was a well-known criminal, like Aruna
Shankar Shukla, the former SP MLC (Member of Legislative
Council) who joined the BSP to contest from Unnao in UP.
3. When old party cadres were sidelined—often at the last
minute—to accommodate new comers for which, as a result of
this move, the party workers would not canvass enthusiastically.
These mistakes are often the symptom of a nonfunctioning party

apparatus. Dalit parties have always suffered from this weakness.
Ambedkar was never able to build a party structure and cultivated the
bad habit of holding party meetings where he was and when he wanted.
In the case of the BSP, the intense personalization of power not only
resulted in wrong decisions, as the one regarding ticket distribution,
but also in the expulsion or sidelining of all those who expressed
reservations vis-à-vis one aspect of Mayawati’s policy or another.
As a result, the number of the former BSP leaders who are now out
of the party and have often founded their own is now quite signifi-
cant. Sone Lal Patel, the former BSP leader is at the helm of the UP
Apna Dal. Om Prakash Rajbhar, a former lieutenant of Mayawati
has created the Bhartiya Samaj Party which polled 3.5â•¯percent of
the valid votes in the 2007 assembly elections. R.K. Chaudhary,
a former minister in Mayawati’s government, has started the BS4
which now has seven MLAs. Masood, another former minister in
Mayawati’s government has launched the National Loktantrik Hind
Party (NLHP), and Raja Ram Pal, former BSP president has started
the Bharatiya Sarvodaya Party. These parties have formed an alliance
along with the Adhikar Manch, the Vanchit Party, and the Lokpriya
Samaj Party. Such a division of the Bahujans recalls the trajectory
of the RPI, which the BSP may follow if it does not build a more
collegial party structure.
Notes
â•‡ 1. In April 2008, one year before the general elections, BSP won all five UP
by-elections. It retained the Azamgarh and Khalilabad Lok Sabha seat. It also
retained the Bilgram Assembly seat and won the Karnailganj and Muradnagar
Assembly seats. Incidentally, three of the five winners were Brahmins and one
was a Muslim.
â•‡ 2. For more details, see A.K. Verma, “Bahujan Samaj Party: Beyond Uttar
Pradesh,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No.7, (February 14, 2009),
pp. 19–22.
â•‡ 3. Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?”
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, (September 26, 2009), p. 191.
â•‡ 4. R. Deshpande and N. Birmal, “Maharashtra: Congress-NCP Manages Victory,”
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No.39, (September 26, 2009), p. 137.
â•‡ 5. S. Lodha, “Rajasthan: Performance and Campaigning Pay Dividends,” Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No.39, (September 26, 2009), p. 187.
â•‡ 6. See S. Pai, “BSP’s new electoral strategy pays off,” Economic and political
weekly, (October 30, 1999), p. 3100.
â•‡ 7. “Mayawati: ‘No Promises, No Manifesto, Only Performance’,” The Hindu,
April 12, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041206071100.
htm (last date of access: April 13, 2006).
â•‡ 8. As early as May 2007 she declared: “If the Centre brings an amendment (to the
law) providing for reservation for poor among the upper castes and the religious
minorities we will welcome it. If not, then we will take our own measures to help
these weaker sections in Uttar Pradesh”. The Hindu, May 14, 2007, http://www.
hindu.com/2007/05/14/stories/2007051410210700.htm (last date of access:
May 15, 2007). She requested Manmohan Singh to take the lead on this front in
2008, suggesting that an amendment should be included in the Ninth Schedule
for making the arrangement permanent as already has been done for Tamil
Nadu where the quotas represent 69â•¯percent. The Hindu, February 2, 2008.
http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041206071100.htm (last date
of access: February 3, 2008).
â•‡ 9. A former pilot turned bureaucrat who became cabinet secretary under Mayawati
in 2007, Singh behaved like a working CM implementing policies when
Mayawati was concentrating more on politics.
10. Atiq Khan, “Quota System for PPP Areas in U.P.: Mayawati,” The Hindu,
December 25, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/25/stories/20071225548
50500.htm (last date of access: December 26, 2007).
11. Cited in “Eye on Centre, Maya for more Quota,” The Indian Express,
November 26, 2007, p. 2.
12. C. Jaffrelot, “The BSP in Uttar Pradesh. Whose Party is It?” in S.M. Michael
(ed.), Dalits in Modern India, (Delhi: Sage, 2007), pp. 260–86.
The BSP in 2009 161
13. For details see, http://bspindia.org/satish_chandra_mishra.php (last date of

access: April 5, 2009).
14. “Bania Sammelans” were organized in half a dozen UP cities and were rather
successful before the 2007 elections, apparently because the trading com-
munity, which was the first victim of kidnapping and extortion—both often
going together—attributed the degradation of the law and order situation to
the nexus between the Mulayam Singh Yadav government and the Rajput and
Yadav Mafiosi.
15. Smita Gupta, “BSP at the Crossroads,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV,
No. 26 and 27, (June 27, 2009), p. 21.
16. See, for instance, “BSP’s ‘Brahmin sammelan’ turns Damp Squib,” Central
Chronicle, November 27, 2007 (last date of access: November 28, 2007).
17. In Karnataka, the BSP benefited from a collective of former Janata Dal (Secular)
[JD(S)] leaders, especially those of the Surendra Mohan faction who joined
the party together. Among the 34 JD(S) cadres who made this decision, the
most prominent ones were Trishulpani Patel, the son of former Chief Minister
J.H. Patel and P.R.G. Sindhia, a former minister.
18. The Hindu, April 9, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/04/22/stories/
2008040952550100.htm (last date of access: April 10, 2008).
16. Ibid.
20. K.V. Prasad, “Mayawati Promises Quota for Upper Caste Poor,” The Hindu,
April 22, 2009, http://www.hindu.com/2009/04/22/stories/2009042258050500.
htm (last date of access: April 24, 2009).
21. The Shia cleric and Imam-e-Juma of the historic Asafi Masjid in Lucknow,
Maulana Kalbe Jawwad—a member of the All India Muslim Personal Law
Board—called on Mayawati at her residence in order to thank her for opposing
the nuclear deal (Atiq Khan, “Mayawati reaches out to Muslims,” The Hindu,
July 9, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/09/stories/2008070961111400.
htm (last date of access: July 10, 2008).
22. Beg and Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” p. 193.
23. K. Pal and P. Rai, “Haryana: Congress retains its Electoral Supremacy,” Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, (26 September 2009), p. 179.
24. S. Guha, “‘Asymmetric Representation’ and the BSP in UP,” Seminar, No. 571,
http://www.india-seminar.com/2007/571/571_sohini_guha_htm (Accessed on
June 11, 2009).
25. As Shivam Vij noticed while touring UP in late 2007â•¯: “Yadavs have been removed
from the post of SHO in police stations across the state and Dalits have often
replaced them—something the SP objected to in the Vidhan Sabha” (Shivam
Vij, “The Life and Times of Sarvajan Samaj,” mail@shivamji.com (last date of
access: September 3, 2007).
26. In fact, the word “caste” appeared only once in its 1936 manifesto. C. Jaffrelot,
Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability. Analysing and Fighting Caste, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 75.
27. “Justice for Dalit Victims on the Same Day: Mayawati,” The Hindu, May 27,
2009, http://www.hindu.com/2009/05/27/stories/2009052752751180300.htm
(last date of access: May 28, 2009).
28. Atiq Khan, “Mayawati shuffles Top Police Officers after Elections,” The Hindu,
May 23, 2009, http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041206071100.
htm (last date of access: May 24, 2009).
29. “Heads Roll after BSP’s Poor Show in U.P.,” The Hindu, May 19, 2009, http://
www.hindu.com/2009/05/19/stories/2009054430500.htm (last date of access:
May 20, 2009).
30. On April 14, 2008, Mayawati became the first Chief Minister to unveil her
own statue in the state capital, Lucknow. This life-size statue was placed next
to that of Kanshi Ram, both of them facing the statue of Ambedkar and his first
wife Ramabai, which Mayawati unveiled at the same time on the occasion of
Ambedkar Jayanti (Birthday).
Part II
Analytical State Studies

A.â•‡ One Favored (dominant)

Party System
Chapter 8
Gujarat
Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance:

The 2009 Lok Sabha Elections in Gujarat1
Ghanshyam Shah
Gujarat is the only state in India where the BJP has continuously
secured over 50â•¯percent of the total seats in the last six Lok Sabha
elections. It secured 20 out of 25 seats from Gujarat in 1991, the 10th
Lok Sabha polls. The sweeping victory paved its way to secure
power in the state in 1995 by capturing 121 of the 182 seats in the
Assembly. However, its shares in votes declined from 50â•¯percent in
the Parliament to 43â•¯percent in the Assembly polls. The polling
reversed in 2007 and 2009. In the Assembly, the party secured 127
seats and 49.85â•¯percent votes and in the Parliament, it captured
15 out of 26 seats with 46.53â•¯percent votes. The gap in votes between
BJP and the Congress is just 3.15â•¯percent as against 21.38â•¯percent in
1991, the lowest since 1991 (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2).
L.K. Advani was the hero in 1991. He led a Rath Yatra from
Somnath to Ayodhya. Following the yatra, he contested from Gujarat
for the first time, and thereafter continues to fight from Gandhinagar
Parliament constituency. But his position had changed in 2009 despite
being the party’s prime ministerial candidature. He was not the
charioteer in Gujarat. Narendra Modi was in full command. 20 years
back, Modi was considered to be a protégé of Advani. He worked as
an organizer for the Rath Yatra in 1989. This time while inaugurating
168 Ghanshyam Shah
Figure 8.1
BJP and Congress Votes in Lok Sabha Elections (1991–2009)
Source: “Statistical Report on General Election” for different elections, Election

Commission of India, New Delhi. Available online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/
index.asp?lang=eng
Figure 8.2
BJP and Congress Votes in Assembly Elections (1990–2007)
Source: “Statistical Report on General Election” for different elections, Election

Commission of India, New Delhi. Available online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/
index.asp?lang=eng
Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance 169
the party’s Lok Sabha election campaign, Advani showered praises on

Modi’s leadership and his “achievements in a relatively short time.”
After the impressive victory in the 2007 Vidhan Sabha elections,
speculations floated in political circles that Modi was trying to carve
out a national role for himself. In early 2008, hoardings appeared
with a picture of Modi waving his arm along with the slogan: “Maru
swapana: Hariyalu Bharat” (My Dream: Green India). Below the picture
it stated that Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) stations had been set
up across Gujarat,2 indicating his dream to replicate Gujarat in India.
Later, in January 2009, several important business tycoons including
Anil Ambani, Sunil Mittal, and Ratan Tata hailed Modi as “the
future prime minister.” Ambani said that the way he had transformed
Gujarat, he could change the complexion of the country. “[A] person
like him should be the next leader of the country,” Mittal asserted.3
BJP leaders like Arun Shourie and Jaitley also lauded him. A vernacular
newspaper stated in April: “Because of the pressure from RSS Advani
expressed his desire not to contest. Narendra Modi will fight elections
from Gandhinagar constituency for Lok Sabha.”4
More importantly, a majority of the BJP voters in Gujarat, accord-
ing to the National Election Study (NES) carried out by CSDS,
preferred Narendra Modi rather than Advani as the “the next Prime
Minister of India” (see Table 8.3). Thus, it was a Modi focused
elections in Gujarat. His spirit and confidence were very high and
he expected to do better in the Lok Sabha polls than the December
2007 Assembly elections. This paper explores the possible reasons for
the BJP’s victory from Gujarat, in reference to the earlier polls and
especially the role of Narendra Modi. The survey data presented here
is based on NES 2009 and 2007.
Modi’s Mission
Modi was the star campaigner of the BJP in the 2009 elections.
Among his fans and the party cadre he enjoys an image of an expert
in “personality development and party image building.”5 When he
became the Chief Minister (CM) in October 2001 by ousting Keshubhai
Patel, he lacked a social base in Gujarat. At that time the party was in
170 Ghanshyam Shah
disarray as it lost power in most of the local governments, and was also
defeated in two by-elections. After resuming office, he won elections
from Rajkot with a thin margin, a traditional stronghold of the party
and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). His strength increased after
a few months due to the emotive issue of Hindutva coupled with the
large scale 2002 carnage.
Fear psychosis with a catchy question that he raised, “Apanu kon”
(who is ours—who will protect us?) inflamed emotions. He won
Assembly elections with a thumping majority. But within 18 months,
emotions began to subside. The party’s performance in the 2004
elections in Gujarat was not as good as the previous Vidhan Sabha
and the 1999 Lok Sabha polls (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2). The Congress
regained its support in the intensely riot affected constituencies.6
Moreover BJP lost power in the center.
By this time, as a shrewd politician committed to Hindutva politics,
Modi might have realized the constraints of the CM’s office to translate
Hindutva ideology into the democratic system. Hindutva rhetoric
of the 1990s had diminishing return. RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), Bajrang Dal could be effective in raising an emotional pitch
but less useful to sustain people’s support. To nurture Hindutva,
“development” had to be embraced. It may be noted that the BJP won
power in Gujarat in 1995 not only with Hindutva plank but also with
a promise to establish “bhaya, bhukh, and bhastachar mukta” (free from
fear, hunger, and corruption) Gujarat.7 The ideologues—Golwalkar,
Sudarshan, etâ•¯al.—have repeatedly asserted that the present era was the
period of transformation based on Hindutva philosophy. Modi shares
their faith that Hindutva would lead the world in the 21st century.
Though the concept of Hindutva remains ambiguous, except the
dominance of Hindus, economic policy of the BJP has changed to
be in tune with capitalism.8
His upbringing in the Shakha culture makes him a self styled
moralist, with a holier than thou syndrome. He seems to believe that
most of the party members were interested in goodies and personal
power. Therefore they had to be under surveillance for “good gov-
ernance.” He was determinant “to run the organization in his own
way, direction and style.”9 Like Sarsanchalk of RSS, his agenda was
to have trusted and disciplined loyalists. Moreover, after winning the
2002 elections his increased confidence led him to believe he could

expand his base in civil society and also directly relate with the people
at large.
To reduce his dependence on and “interference” of the party
workers, he leaned on the government machinery. For him, the
bureaucrats were more dependable and obedient than the party
and Sangh Parivar activists for governance. In the process, he dis-
carded dissenters and competitors. Eventually BJP in Gujarat
became synonymous with Modi: “BJP is Modi and Modi is BJP.”
The state party president emphasized, “We have Narendra Modi, he
is the symbol of Gujarati asmita (pride) and he is our mascot. When
you have a leader like Modiji, why do you need anything else?”
Conquering Civil Society
During the 2002 carnage, a major and dominant segment of the

Gujarat civil society—journalists and columnists, litterateurs, phil-
anthropists, and social workers maintained more or less silence.
A few of them were disturbed by violence and blamed mobs of
religious fanatics for the “riots.” These Samaritans without assigning
responsibility for the violence, appealed for peace and harmony. Most
of them however did not believe that the violence was “large scale” and
continuous. They did not consider it to be the state’s responsibility to
control the situation. For them, the incidents were isolated, sporadic,
and an aberration in “non-violent peace loving Gujarat.” Media,
particularly of English language, allegedly exaggerated it so as to
defame Gujarat.
“This was all political for votes and we are not interested in politics,”
concluded a number of commentators. At the same time a number
of these civil society actors were of a view that all that happened
after Godhara was “inevitable” and “good” so as to put “others” in
their place in society. According to them, “Hindus have now gained
confidence.” “Muslims were taught a good lesson,” a well-known poet
said.10 Most NGO activists also shared these beliefs. Like litterateurs,
they also declared that they were away from politics. Or, “we are
concerned with our ‘constructive’ work; and we have to get grants
172 Ghanshyam Shah
from the government.”11 Without taking a political position, a few

NGOs got involved in providing “relief” to the victims. There were
of course, isolated individuals who protested against the carnage,
and blamed the state for not controlling the situation and saving the
victims. Such voices were on the fringes of the civil society.
Modi with his experience as pracharak and an activist during
the Navnirman and anti-emergency movements knows the terrain
well. He interacted directly or indirectly with the mainstream
civil society actors, and therefore was aware of their vulnerability.
Pravin Sheth, Modi’s former teacher in Political Science informs us
in 2002, “Narendra Modi was extremely alert in order to build his
own image.”12 Several media persons with whom I talked confirm
this. At the time when he resumed office, his image among those
who were close to BJP was of an organizer at best and manipulator
at worse. He was “politically exiled from the state in 1998,”13 and
was not allowed to dabble with the affairs of the Gujarat BJP. Yet, he
successfully orchestrated the ousting of Keshubhai Patel and became
the CM. A similar game was being played at the BJP’s Goa meeting,
when Vajpayee wanted Modi to resign after the 2002 mayhem.
After coming to power, first of all he managed to carve out his
image as Hindu Hriday Samrat, the King of Hindu hearts. During the
2002 communal pogrom and the subsequent elections, he repeatedly
talked about Hindutva, Hindu ethos, tolerance, and magnanimity
of Hindus and their glorious past. Simultaneously, he not only ridi-
culed Muslims as “backward” but also accused them of an agenda
to increase their population so as to become a majority. According
to him, Islam and Christianity are the “real roots” of terrorism in
India.14 With such assertions and slogans, he established himself as
the champion of Hindus. To reinforce the image, the public relations
officer of the Government of Gujarat (GOG) projected him as a
“God with a beard.” A senior journalist gave heading to his article
on Modi, “woman likes strong husband and people like masculine
leader.”15 On the eve of the Assembly elections, Modi was portrayed
as charioteer Krishna, carrying Sudarshan Chakra, and guiding State
Energy Minister Saurbha Patel shown as Arjun. The sloka (stanza)
“Yada Yada Hi Dharmasya … ” was painted just above Modi, showing
him as the savior of Dharma.16
In December 2003, Gujarat, the mouth-organ of the state

government, brought out a special issue titled Satya Samachar
(True News) on the eve of Modi’s one year rule. The editor invited
Dr Gunvant Shah, a former professor and a popular columnist known
as Chitank, a philosopher to write on that occasion. He wrote that
in one-year’s period “Narendra Modi has done his best. His inner
strength and will power are extremely useful factors for the State.”
Shah also advised him, “It is necessary to take solid steps in order
to assure Gujarat’s Muslims that they are safe and totally secured.”
Though like Vajpayee, the author did not ask him to perform his Raj
Dharma; he however underscores that “such a point of criticism was
published in Government’s own magazine.”
Later, Modi went to meet him at his residence. The columnist
wrote that on Ram Navmi day in 2005, Modi came to his home.
They talked for 56 minutes. “After the meeting was over, I was con-
vinced that Gujarat is bound to forge ahead under the regime of this
workaholic Chief Minister. A citizen may doubt about his secularism,
but regarding his competence, even his enemies may not doubt.” He
continues: “people of Gujarat have realized that this man is totally
different. He is neither humble nor ego less. Competent rulers are not
humble.”17 Noted litterateur and journalist Bhagavtikumar Sharma
appreciates Modi’s “no-nonsense” attitude, his non-corrupt image,
dynamism in his working that has enthused in the governance.
Another litterateur Chandrakant Baxi wrote that for the first time
one who is sitting on the CM’s chair “has given an aura of dignity.”18
Modi’s often repeated pronouncement: “Hau Khato nathi and Khava
deto nathi (I am not taking bribe and do not allow others to take)” has
impressed these civil society actors. They believed that the man with
the “chappen kee chati” (56 inch chest)—strong and courageous—
would end the evil. On the other hand, they abused all critics of
Modi’s leadership as pseudo secularists who were “always fanatics, anti-
Hindus, and pro-Muslims”, and responsible for communalism.19
In April 2007, Modi’s collection of poems Aankh a Dhanya Chhe
(Blessed are these Eyes) was launched in Mumbai. The audience
featured influential literary personalities. While launching the book,
a well-known poet Suresh Dalal said, “Modi is a sensitive person
belonging to the realm of heart and politics. One can see ‘kalpvriksha’
174 Ghanshyam Shah
[blesses one with what is desired] in his one eye, and ‘samkalapviksha’
[strong determination] in the other. And that yields him fruits of
abundance and achievement.”20 The Chief Minister was lauded as the
country’s representative to the world in the global context.
Gujarat Asmita (Pride)
Modi embodied Gujarati asmita; though the Jan Sangh kept a dis-
tance from the movement for the formation of Gujarat in the 1950s.
Chiman Patel, CM in the late 1980s, reinvented regional identity
politics with a slogan “naya [new] Gujarat.” Patel skillfully mobilized
the middle class on the Narmada dam issue and aggressively attacked
all those who opposed the project as “enemy” of Gujarat and its
“development.” Modi followed his footsteps and made a cocktail
combining Hindutva and the dam as “development.” The 2002
election campaign was launched with “Gujarat Gaurva [honor]”
yatra (journey of pride in Gujarat), covering 5000 km throughout
the state.
The starting point of the yatra was Phagvek, the holy place of
Kshatriyas who constitute a sizable majority in central Gujarat. The
legend associated with Phagvel is that over two centuries ago, a Hindu
warrior, Bhatiji, had waged a battle against Muslims to protect a
herd of cows. Bhatiji, in whose memory a temple had been built, is
believed to have died fighting. The purpose of the yatra, Modi said
was to instill in the people of Gujarat pride and self-confidence,
which they lost after the sectarian violence. When the opposition
parties denigrate Gujarat as “Godse’s Gujarat,” the need for restoring
Gujarat’s gaurva is all the more important, Advani asserted. In other
words, it was an exercise to justify the carnage and to take pride in it.
Civil society actors kept mum.
In 2002, Modi coined a slogan, “Aapanu [our] Gujarat, Aagavu
[distinct] Gujarat.” Next year, 2003, Modi celebrated Gujarat
foundation day as “Gaurva Day.” Now, every year this celebration is
being organized in different cities. The first was in Vadodara. In order
to manage the programs, the government roped in civil society organ-
izations, including schools and colleges. Various saffron organizations
became actively involved in the celebration. For instance in Vadodara,

the Gujarat Asmita Sangh (Organization of Gujarat Pride), an
offshoot of the VHP, organized a mahayagna ‘‘to ward off evil spirits
from Gujarat … for the honour, culture and all-round progress of
the state.’’ The Sursagar Lake Deepotsav, (Lighting in the lake) and
bhajans were organized by the Satyam Shivam Sundaram Samiti,
sponsored by a BJP leader.
The government then popularized slogans such as “Vibrant
Gujarat,” “Nirmal [clean] Gujarat.” In 2007, the government had
brought out glossy colorful stickers, with the slogan “I love my
Gujarat” on the front of the sticker and a list of the government’s
achievement on back of it. Along with the slogan, the sticker carries
a photograph of Modi facing a large gathering of people. In 2009,
the slogan was “Swarnim [Golden] Gujarat” with the CM’s picture
prominently displayed. He repeatedly said that he was obsessed
with Gujarat. One of the advertisements with Modi’s picture says:
“Body is dedicated. Mind is dedicated. For your sake this life is
dedicated. Oh God—Give me that strength so that my life—is dedi-
cated to Gujarat.”
His notion of “Gujarati asmita” is synonymous with “Hindu
identity” as conceived by Savarkar.21 The Congress had no critic
for this conceptualization. A few litterateurs, columnists, and social
scientists openly interrogated and challenged the formulation. 22
But a large segment of Gujarati intelligentsia either shares Modi’s
articulation or wishes to remain silent on this issue because they
consider themselves as “non-political.” Modi skillfully depicted all
the criticisms against him for the carnage, intolerance, anti-Muslim
attitude, and injustice to victims as adverse comments on the five crore
population of Gujarat. He repeatedly accused his critics, particularly
non-Gujarati English speaking intelligentsia, as “Gujarat haters” and
jealous of Gujarat’s development. Chandrakant Bakshi went to the
extent to say that the English speaking intelligentsia at large was
the “Anti-Gujarat, Secular Taliban.”
Another writer, S.K. Modi says:
What drives these English language men and women? Why do they enjoy
putting down their own: Their own country. Their own society. What
kind of complex are they suffering from? … The reporting by the English
176 Ghanshyam Shah
language media has been so full of bias, so vengeful towards the Hindu
community and so full of hate for the Gujarati society at large.23
In this scenario, Modi and his admirers never missed any oppor-
tunity to strike out at those who indulged in bashing Gujaratis about
the 2002 carnage, with sweeping generalizations on Gujarati society
as “intolerant” “communal.”24 Such comments also were directed
to, not only those who were on the fence, but also critics of Modi.
Pro-Modi columnists emphasized “Gujarati asmita” and labeled the
critics as “fundamentalist secularists.”
After the NDA’s defeat in 2004, Modi raised the bogey of injus-
tice to Gujarat by the central government. In his poll campaign, the
issue was hammered by twisting facts and figures. It was alleged that
the union government has a step-motherly attitude toward Gujarat.
The question was asked: “How long we should suffer from injustice?”
Answer to such an insult was “to vote for BJP.” The Congress party
countered Modi’s figures and interpretation through advertisements
during the election campaign.
Dissidents of the civil society, a very tiny segment have very limited
space. Such columnists had been told by the proprietors of Gujarati
newspapers to be careful in writing against Modi. And if some were
to write critical comments, the editors used their authority not to
publish them. Dissident NGOs often experience harassment in their
activities. A few of them, particularly working among the Dalits and
Adivasis were often asked to prove their credential, especially that
they were not involved in conversion. Those in academic institutions,
their work was under constant surveillance, regarding what they write
and say on public issues.
Politics of De-politicization: “Development”
When Modi began his inning in 2001, Congress was regaining its
ground in local governments with its social engineering formula—
alliance of deprived castes and classes. To counter this, within 15 days
of resuming office, Modi introduced samaras, i.e., social assimilation
village schemes to discourage village panchayat elections. The Congress
could not oppose the scheme as the party initially formed it when it
was in office in 1991, though with a different nomenclature.25 The
samaras villages were assumed to have, “no discussions, no disputes
but unanimous decisions taken harmoniously.”
These villages were offered a “motivation grant” of `â•›60,000 to
`â•›1,00,000 depending upon their size. After five years, the grant
was increased to 1.5 lakh. Besides financial incentives, the govern-
ment used the administrative machinery to build pressure on villages
to become samaras. Pro-BJP NGOs were also “roped in to spread
the samaras message and help achieve the ‘targets’.”26 With all these
efforts, 26â•¯percent of the villages opted to be samaras in 2001. The
number increased to 29â•¯percent in 2006. Though socioeconomic
and political conflict continues to simmer not only in the non samaras
but also the samaras villages; the message for apolitical development
gets reiterated.
The 2009 election advertisement of BJP was: “No discussion, vikas
[development] is the mantra of BJP. Rastravad is BJP’s mahamantra.”
Even the BJP MLAs were instructed what to ask and what not to ask
in the state assembly during the question hours. Intra-party debate
had been eliminated. Bureaucrats were asked to follow orders and
not to raise queries. During the 70 months of his first tenure, there
had been 2.5 days sitting per month of the state Assembly, the lowest
number in the history of Gujarat Assembly.27 No state Planning Board
had been formed. Autonomy of the state funded cultural and literary
organizations had been considerably abridged.
The dominant segment of civil society had no dispute with an
apolitical notion of “development.” They found that a “new Modi”—
the “vikas purush”—man for development had emerged. According to
them, Modi was transformed from “saffron to software brand.” His
“power point” presentations, video-conferences, “e-governance,” “broad-
band telephoney,” and “karmyoga” impressed them. But, for Modi:
Hindutva and development are not contradictory. How can Ram Rajya
be anti-development? Ram Rajya is all about providing opportunity for
those who need help. What should be on the nation’s top drawer is the
resolve to redeem Gandhiji’s pledge to wipe out every tear from every eye.
And that is Ram Rajya. Only pseudo secularists argue that Hindutva and
development cannot coexist. It only exposes their perverted thinking.28
178 Ghanshyam Shah
Development Hype and Governance
It has to be emphasized that Modi became CM of a state dominated

by entrepreneurs. Mercantile and industrial capitalism has grown since
the mid-19th century. Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) has
gone up from 3.32â•¯percent in 1960s to 4.88â•¯percent in the 1980s,
and 5.53â•¯percent in the 1990s. Various infrastructure facilities have
been built gradually to attract investment from within and outside
the country.29 As early as 1965, the GOG formed the Gujarat Export
Corporation Ltd to assist and foster the development of export trade.
In the early 1990s, on the eve of structural change in India’s economy,
it ranked next to Maharashtra in industrial growth. In the 1980s,
the state aspired to become a mini Japan. It was the first in 1990 in
announcing its new industrial policy. Therefore Gujarat has benefited
from reforms “much more than other states.”30 The industrial sector
has performed consistently well and has accelerated further in the
1990s. 2000–01 was an exception as the state experienced both
earthquake and draught. It returned to 9.5â•¯percent growth rate in
2002–03 when Modi formed the government.
Soon after taking reign, Modi announced the goal of attaining
growth rate of 10.2â•¯percent over the next five years. The growth
strategy he announced was: “Panchamrut” yojana gyan shakti [power
of knowledge], jal shakti [power of water resources], urja shakti
[power of energy resources], jan shakti [power of human resources],
and raksha shakti [power of defense].31 While highlighting the con-
cept of “Gujarat Unlimited,” the CM reiterated that his government
was “firmly committed to economic reforms.” NRI Gujaratis were
appealed to “revolutionize” Gujarat with their investment.32
Later in 2003, the Vibrant Gujarat global investor conference
was organized with lots of publicity to attract foreign investment. This
has become a regular feature every two years. Besides, transparent deals
and no pending files, the investors had been offered infrastructure
facilities at cheap rates, and more subsidiaries and tax holidays than
earlier. Investments increased with many more incentives, the devel-
opment of Industrial Parks and Special Economic Zones. Some
industrialists stated that Gujarat was becoming a “truly world class
state.” They wanted Modi to be India’s PM. People were promised

that industrial growth would provide more employment and unlimited
opportunities to prosper. Middle class became jubilant.
Jyotigram Scheme introduced in the late 2004 was another effort to
win popular support in rural areas. Though 97â•¯percent of the villages
in Gujarat were electrified by 2002, electric supply was erratic in
some parts of the state. Three-phase electricity declined from 18–20
hours in the 1980s to 10–12 hours by the end of the 1990s. Hence,
“power supply to agriculture became the key issue in Gujarat’s mass
politics.” During 2001–02, the government was considering the pro-
posal to gradually raise tariff and regularize power supply. The state
was then “in the midst of major power sector restructuring exercise
with a loan from the Asian Development Bank.” Modi quickly not
only endorsed the proposed scheme with certain changes but saw its
speedy implementation.
Rural households have been provided 24 hours electric power for
domestic use and 8–10 hours for agriculture. While doing this, he
also increased power tariff, which was an unpopular step and opposed
by a section of farmers. But the decision also reinforced his image as
a man of action and “good governance” even though some small and
marginal farmers and landless were adversely affected. The scheme was
indeed an “astute political management of intervention in an arena
surcharged with animated mass politics.”33
Construction of the controversial Narmada Dam was conceived
and planned in the 1960s to enhance irrigation and provide drinking
water. The first phase was completed in 2000. During the draught in
2001, Modi’s predecessor government decided to pump water directly
from Narmada and distribute it through a 2700 km long pipeline
to the needy villages and towns. Completion of the project did not take
place by the target date in 2006 and only 21.2â•¯percent was operative in
2007. However it did ease the drinking water problem in some parts
and provided hope to others.34 Modi took credit for the Narmada
Dam and projected himself as upholder of “good governance.” In
Kutch, he told a large gathering, “For the last 50 years, people were
being fooled with empty talk. Your dream were realized only when
we brought Narmada water to your doorstep.”35
180 Ghanshyam Shah
Along with such steps, he also sold many dreams. In 2005, the
government released water from the dam into the dry Saraswati
River in north Gujarat. He called it mahasangam (grand union) of
two holy rivers. More than a thousand sadhus were brought to the
function at state expense. The CM announced, “The resurrection of
Sarswati will enrich the people of region.” But within a few months,
“Narmada water … turned into a drainage line with sewage and waste
being dumped on the bed by the municipality.”36 The flow of water
discontinued because the municipality could not pay `â•›50 lakh per
month for the pumping of the water. Similarly, when gas was found in
a well drilled by the state-owned Gujarat State Petrochemical (GSPC)
in the Krishna–Godavari basin, Modi went on to proclaim that the
discovery was a mammoth 20 trillion cubic feet and would transform
Gujarat. He told a gathering of farmers in North Gujarat that “very
soon their farms will have oil wells, and every morning tankers would
line up outside to collect crude!”37
One finds similar hype stories on “Niramal Gujarat” or “Sujalam
Sufalam” projects, on campaigns for “girls’ education” or “Dikari
bachao” (Save daughters) and other campaigns. In 2005, while facing
revolt within the party, he announced in a public meeting, “What
has not been done in the last forty-five years, we will do in the next
forty-five months.”38 Later, on the eve of the Assembly elections he
asserted, “It is our misfortune that … after Gujarat came into existence
in 1960, no one thought about the basic infrastructure for develop-
ment. Much of my effort has gone into filling up that gap… I have
tried to bring in real democracy.”39
In 2004, India Today awarded Modi as “No. 1 Chief Minister,”
and Rajiv Gandhi Foundation ranked Gujarat No.1 in the Economic
Freedom Index. The government, business houses, and pro-Modi
NGOs placed hoardings with Modi’s picture throughout the state
congratulating him for the achievement. The government printed
his picture in newspaper advertisements, placards and government
broachers, as well as food relief packets, mid-day meal packets, and
even condoms. A government advertisement with Gandhi and Modi’s
photographs reads: “On the footsteps of Mahatma, Gujarat grows
every movement.”
Gujarat No.1 was the central thrust of the Assembly as well as the
parliament elections. A tiny section of civil society actors questioned
the nature of development which favored the rich and urban middle
class. A few highlighted Gujarat’s low rank in health and education.
It was demonstrated that the investments in industries had not
increased employment. The condition of the workers in unorganized
sector had been worsening. But majority of the middle class intel-
ligentsia was not interested in such dimensions of development.
The Congress refuted Modi’s claims and accused him of twisting
the figures. The party alleged that he had created “false impression
about safe, good education, employment for youth, twenty four
hours electricity and prosperity of farmers. These are illusions. In fact
there is a fire, anger among people because of atrocities on women,
suicide of farmers, loss of business, unemployment, poverty …”40
But the assertion was not the core of the campaign. More important,
the party did not present an alternative vision of development that
could improve their economic conditions. The Gujarat Congress
had no agenda to attract the vocal middle class mesmerized by the
Government’s tall claims of No. 1.
Election Organization and Strategy
The final say on the selection of the BJP’s candidates for all elections
in the state from panchayats to parliament was with Narendra Modi.
After a setback in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and rising opposition
in the party, he concentrated on municipal elections to wipe out inner
party opposition. He began with a “no repeat” theory in nominating
candidates to meet the anti-incumbency factor, and also to prevent
consolidation of power with any local leader. He cultivated direct
rapport with people and told party workers that he would not tolerate
anyone who is “inefficient” and “non-loyal.” In the inaugural election
campaign in Gondal Municipal elections, Modi told the people:
I am not here to beg your votes for the election but I have come here to
express my apologies. Five years back you trusted the BJP and elected us
with thumping majority. But we have failed to meet your expectations.
182 Ghanshyam Shah
I know that our sitting councilors have made this place hell. You have all
rights to punish us in this election. I have dropped them and have not given
ticket. But now you have to pardon BJP and give one chance to us.41
“No repeat” theory with a few exceptions was applied to all the
seven municipal corporation elections. People were told that those
who had not worked for them were punished by the party and a new
team was offered. The strategy had an electric effect. The BJP won
all of the Municipal Corporations with absolute majority. In the
State Assembly elections, 43â•¯percent of the sitting MLAs were
given tickets. All of them were his loyalists. For the Parliament,
out of 16 sitting BJP MPs, three were repeated—Advani, Hiren
Pathak, former Minister and Rajendra Sinh Rana, former BJP State
president. In choosing the candidates, Modi had taken into account
a combination of factors: loyalty, caste identity, and financial power.
Individual character and record of work in the party were not the
major considerations. Among the 26 candidates for the parliament,
two were not members of the party on the day of selection.
The Congress also had no other criteria for the selection of the
candidates. Moreover, intra-party faction fights dominated its selec-
tion process. Each faction pressured the High Command to select their
nominees. This was more so during the Assembly elections because
each of the faction leaders aspired to be the CM. Therefore, they
recommended tickets for those who supported their candidature.
Decisions also related to campaign strategy and operations—
including daily press notes, banners, and media advertisements—
were meticulously planned and supervised by Modi.42 In a figur-
ative and real sense, Modi’s mask dominated the campaigns of the
Assembly and parliament elections. Well before the state Assembly
elections, we learn that he collected and compiled information
regarding caste composition, influential elite in different spheres,
party workers, and local issues for each constituency. Congress lacked
such advance planning. Moreover Modi gave lessons to the party
workers regarding booth management, public relations, emphasiz-
ing which questions to be raised about the earlier governments of
Gujarat and UPA rule, and asked them to highlight achievements
of his government.43 He warned the disgruntled leaders who failed in
getting party tickets that they would have to face disciplinary actions
if they worked against the party. Whether such threats worked or not
is a different issue. But there was fear and accountability in the party.
The Congressmen lacked such accountability.
Both the parties promoted conferences of various castes at the
state and district levels to solicit support. Party leaders belonging
to certain castes were deputed to address the meetings where their
caste-fellows were in large numbers. BJP also had an advantage of
social networking of the Sangh Parivar and religious sect organizations.
Congress did not have such organizations at the ground level for
voter mobilization.
In the Lok Sabha as well as the Vidhan Sabha and local govern-
ment elections, though the main focus of Modi’s campaign was
development, his Hindutva plank was also well entrenched. In the
2002 elections, his anti-Muslim posture was blatant in his phases,
idioms, and illustrations. In the election campaign for the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation in 2005, Modi equated the sitting Congress
mayor, a Muslim woman to a Mughal period begum. He announced,
“We have decided to free the people of Karnavati [Ahmedabad] from
the shackles of Mughal rule where begum Sahebas and Badshahs are
in control.” He asked the voters “to free the people of Ahmedabad
from Mughal rule.” In his first campaign speech for the Vidhan Sabha
polls, Modi said that the design of the new two-rupee coin has been
changed, replacing the map of India with a cross, a veiled refer-
ence to Sonia Gandhi’s religious background. Modi referred to the
Central government as the Delhi Sultanate or Delhi durbar. He
frequently accused the Congress of playing vote bank politics by
appeasing minorities, particularly Muslims. BJP’s advertisements were:
“[Congress] will sell country for votes? … Reservation on religious
basis for votes … Removed POTA [Prevention of Terrorist Activities
Act] for votes, protect terrorism for votes, protecting mafias for vote
… BJP has disclosed this hypocrisy … BJP will win.”
During the Assembly elections, Modi countered aggressively
when Sonia Gandhi the Congress president accused him as a “maut
ka sodagar” (Merchant of Death). He criticized her for protecting
terrorists. Terrorism and security was another issue which Modi and
Advani frequently raised during the Lok Sabha poll. They asserted
184 Ghanshyam Shah
that Gujarat was the safest state in India with the lowest crime rate,
implying that is due to Modi’s rule. “Terrorist could not target
Gujarat.” When the Supreme Court asked the Gujarat Special
Investigative Team (SIT) to investigate role of 68 officers and
political leaders including Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi
in the post Godhra carnage, he alleged “this is the Congress’
conspiracy to send me behind bars.” On the day of polling, the BJP
advertisement was a “picture of a woman who is tying rakhi [holy
thread] to Modi. Below it was the sentence: ‘Our Narendrabhai in
jail? Do you accept this? Uproot the Congress today by voting
BJP. Defeat all those who are against Gujarat.’”44 BJP asserted that
Manmohan Singh was a weak and indecisive Prime Minister whereas
Advani, the PM in waiting was strong. The people were asked to vote
BJP for the strong leader who could take firm decisions.
Congress had no comparable local leader who enjoyed widespread
respect in all parts of the state, not to speak of matching Modi’s
popularity. In the parliament elections, all the Congress literature
carried pictures of Sonia Gandhi, Manmohan Singh, and sometimes
of Rahul Gandhi. One advertisement was issued in the name of
Madhvasingh Solanki, the former CM, an almost forgotten figure in
public memory. On the whole, its campaign was low key and sober,
though the party repeatedly exposed Modi’s claims and highlighted the
central government’s contribution in various projects in Gujarat.
The Congress appealed to “Samaju [prudent] Gujaratis.”45 The
Congress did not often mention development done by the UPA
government in the previous five years in the country, but it certainly
asserted its contribution and role in the development of Gujarat.
The main thrust of the Congress campaign featured its concern for
aam adami, i.e., the common man, and it emphasized progress rather
than development.
People’s Perception
During the Lok Sabha election campaign, Modi often declared that the
Gujarat development formula would be implemented in the country
if the BJP-led NDA was voted to power at the center.46 Other BJP
leaders also gave the same message in different parts of the country.
On the polling day, April 30, 2009, the BJP advertisement reads:
Gujaratna Gauravvanta [For whom Gujarat is proud of] CM Narendra

Modi appeals to the people of Gujarat, Gujarat’s uninterrupted (avirat)
path for development with the clearly laid down policy of my government
has continued with a mantra, ‘For the vikas of Bharat, Vikas of Gujarat’
1st May is the foundation day of Gujarat and when Gujarat is celebrating
‘swarnim’ [Golden] jubilee, let us pray homage to our martyrs and pledge
that on this occasion the Prime Minister of the country [Advani] is also
from Gujarat.47
Such messages had gone well, though not to the extent of Modi’s
expectation in Gujarat. Voting survey shows (see Table 8.1) that
for one-third of the Gujarati voters state performance rather than
the central government was the main consideration in their voting
preference in the Parliament elections. Moreover, performance of the
state, as well as the center government guided 22â•¯percent respondents
to decide on their vote. If we club them together, a majority of the
Gujarat voters were guided by their opinion about the performance of
the state government in the Parliament elections. On the other hand,
27â•¯percent of the voters gave importance to the performance of the
central government in exercising their franchise in 2009. As expected,
a majority who voted for the BJP preferred the state government’s
performance and vice versa for the Congress voters.
Table 8.1
Whose Performance Was Considered While Voting for the Lok Sabha:
State or Central Government?
Voted for Lok Sabha 2009

Consider the performance Congress BJP Others Total
Central Government in Delhi 43 11 30 27
State Government 15 46 16 29
Both the Governments 21 23 16 22
Interested in Neither 3 3 16 5
Don’t Know/Not Available 18 17 22 17
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: NES, 2009.
186 Ghanshyam Shah
The pre-poll survey of the NES in December 2007 shows that

a majority (52â•¯percent), though not an overwhelming number,
believed that during the five years of Modi’s rule “development
of Gujarat has improved” (see Table 8.2). This is more so in the
condition of roads, water, and electricity. Only one-third believed
that the situation regarding irrigation had improved. Employment, in
their perception, was more or less the same or worse than the past. It
is important to note that as many as 67â•¯percent of the respondents,
cutting across castes, classes, and also parties, felt that the condition
of the poor had either remained the same or deteriorated during
Modi’s regime.
Table 8.2
Perception of the People Regarding Improvement or
Otherwise in Gujarat between 2002–07
Remained Don’t know/

Improved the same Deteriorated not available
Item (%) (%) (%) (%)
Overall Development of Gujarat 52 22 8 18
Roads 55 25 14 6
Water 52 25 16 7
Electricity 54 27 11 8
Government Hospitals 39 33 13 15
Public Transport 40 26 17 17
Government Schools 44 28 11 16
Employment 29 25 23 24
Irrigation 33 27 15 26
Source: NES, 2007.
Note: Total Number of Respondents = 3779.
At the same time, vast majority (75â•¯percent) of the voters in

Gujarat expressed their satisfaction with the performance of the UPA
government (see Figure 8.3). Interestingly nearly 60â•¯percent of the
BJP voters also fall in this category. This perception reflects their
preference for the Prime Minister after the elections. Among the
voters, nearly one-fourth had no opinion or did not want to answer
the question (see Table 8.3) regarding their preference for the Prime
Ministerial candidature. Of the remaining, L.K. Advani was the least
preferred Prime Minister among Sonia Gandhi, Narendra Modi and
Figure 8.3
Level of Satisfaction among Voters with the Congress-led UPA Government
Source: NES, 2009.
Table 8.3
Percent Preference of 2009 Voters for the Prime Minister after Elections
Leader Congress (%) BJP (%) Others (%) All voters (%)
Sonia Gandhi 29 10 19 19
Manmohan Singh 24 6 6 14
Rahul Gandhi 13 2 3 7
L.K. Advani 0 24 0 11
Narendra Modi 3 32 6 17
Others 7 5 30 8
Cannot say/Don’t Know 24 21 36 24
Refused to answer
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: NES, 2009.
Manmohan Singh. Modi scored lower than Sonia in their preference.

Among the BJP voters, a majority preferred Modi rather than Advani
to be the PM.
Positive opinion for UPA’s performance had not correspondingly
translated into votes. Gujarat’s electorates were guided more by their
perception about the performance of the state government, thanks to
Modi’s magic rather than the central government’s achievements. On
the whole, Modi continued to enjoy his charisma, though fractured,
to win votes for BJP in Gujarat. This was more so among the rich
188 Ghanshyam Shah
and the middle class, particularly the upper social strata, though the
BJP had also not improved its position in these strata.48 It appears
that they had no grudge against Congress’ economic policy as
in the 1980s. Therefore, they appreciated the performance of the
UPA government. But regional considerations—Modi’s flamboyant
style coupled with Hindutva—led them to continue to vote for the
BJP. The Congress, however, significantly improved its support from
43â•¯percent to 53â•¯percent, and from 40â•¯percent to 56â•¯percent of the
poor and very poor strata, respectively (see Table 8.4). The party’s
projection that it stood for aam adami, and Modi government’s
failure in providing employment, education, and health care to a
majority of the population seems to have benefited the Congress
among the poor.
Table 8.4
Vote by Class in the 2007 and 2009 Elections
Congress (%) BJP (%) Others (%) Total (N)

Class* 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007 2009 2007
Rich 32 30 58 59 10 11 117 335
Middle 38 38 53 52 9 10 337 1,120
Lower 46 43 40 41 14 16 250 345
Poor 53 43 38 45 9 12 144 598
Very poor 56 40 42 43 2 16 108 255
Source: Lokniti Team, “National Election Study 2009: A Methodological Note,” EPW,
Vol. 44, No. 39, (September 26–October 2, 2009), pp. 196–202.
Note: *Computed combing family’s monthly income and assets.
Conclusion
The 2009 Lok Sabha elections in Gujarat was mainly Modi-centric.

He had mastery over publicity propaganda idioms and techniques to
project that he was the only savior of Gujarat. His message is that all
that the state has achieved is because of his commitments and unique
approach to good governance. In contrast, his predecessors, including
the earlier BJP governments, were responsible for all the shortfalls and
problems. His skill in selling dreams and slogans to mesmerize the
people is unparalleled in contemporary Indian politics. During his
rule in the last seven years, he has very skillfully dominated his party
and civil society, which articulates public opinion in general and of
the middle class in particular.
At present he and the mainstream civil society are in hand in glove.
The Congress also shares a neoliberal paradigm of development
that according to them is apolitical in nature and simply reflects the
“value free” principles uncovered by “positive economics.” In the last
elections, Modi scored over Congress in his majoritarian ideology and
projected “good governance.” His aura may now have begun to fade as
the downward trend in BJP’s share in votes in Gujarat suggests. This
may not be on ideological grounds. It may be because of the exposure
of his tall promises and his inability to resolve contradictions of his
governance. Pro-poor image of the Congress still works.
Gujarat BJP is becoming a regional party under Modi’s leadership.
The regional identity and issues that he articulated during the last
five years had given the BJP an edge over the Congress in the last
elections. Most of the voters who were satisfied with the performance
of the UPA government, nevertheless voted for the BJP in the 2009
parliamentary elections because of the perceived performance of the
Modi government. At present, the Gujarat Congress is not able to
match Modi’s electoral strategies and planning. The party is faction
ridden, lacks alternative vision, and commitment to deliver good
governance in favor of the vast majority.
Notes
1. I thank Lokniti, CSDS for providing National Election Study data.

2. As of 1st August, there were 110 CNG stations in Gujarat; nearly 80â•¯percent are
in three districts: Surat, Vadodara, and Ahmedabad. Available online at: www.
gspcgas.com/cng_about.php (last date of access: October 31, 2009).
3. Times of India, (Ahmedabad), January 15, 2009.
4. Gujarat Smachar, (Ahmedabad), April 1, 2009.
5. Recently, he gave lessons to the ministers of Karnataka government. The Indian
Express, September 29, 2009.
6. Ghanshyam Shah, “Gujarat after Godhra,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace
(eds), India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives (Delhi: Sage
Publications, 2007), pp. 151–79.
190 Ghanshyam Shah
â•‡ 7. Ghanshyam Shah, “BJP’s Rise to power,” Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 31, Nos. 2 and 3, (January 13–30, 1996), pp. 165–170.
â•‡ 8. Thomas Blom Hansen, “The Ethics of Hindutva and the spirit of Capitalism,”
in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the
Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp. 243–66.
â•‡ 9. Ajay Umat, “Swapna nu marketing karine Modi jiti shakae chhe [Modi can win
by marketing dreams],” Divya Bhaskar, (Ahmedabad), December 15, 2005.
10. One of them was Rajendra Shah, Jnanpith award winner. See Panna Naik,
“Gujarat violence in literature,” paper presented at the Association for Asian
Studies (AAS) conference, San Diego, July 4, 2004.
11. Personal interviews.
12. Sheth Pravin, Images of Transformation: Gujarat and Narendra Modi (Ahmedabad:
Team spirit, 2007), p. 60.
13. Ibid., pp. 55 and 59.
14. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), November 5, 2008.
15. Ajay Umat, op. cit.
16. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), August 30, 2007.
17. “Forward” in Images of Transformation. Sheth.
18. Ibid., p. 221.
19. Saurbh Shah, “Narendra Modi,” Aarpar, March 12, 2007.
20. Sheth Images of Transformation. p. 222.
21. V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva (Mumbai: Swatantryaveer Savarkar Rashtiya Smarak.
1999).
22. Tridip Suhrud, “Modi and Gujarati ‘Asmita’,” EPW, Vol. 43, No. 1, (January 5,
2008), pp. 11–13. See also the collection of 77 articles with most of them
contesting Modi’s concept of “Gujarat Asmita,” in Uttam Parmar, ed., Gujaratni
Ashmita: Mari Najare (Kim: Kim Education Society, 2008).
23. Rita Kothari, “Diffusing Polarization: Language and Translation at the
Time of the Gujarat Riots.” Available online at: http://translate.eipcp.net/
transversal/1107/kothari/en (last date of access: November 2009).
24. For e.g., see Ganesh Devy, “Hating Muslims is a Natural Thing in Gujarat,”
Tehelka (Delhi), May 20, 2006 and Ashis Nandy, “Blame the Middle Class,”
Times of India (Ahmedabad), January 8, 2008.
25. Dr Hedgewar, who coined this term, stresses the inclusion of brotherhood among
all Hindus. See Ghanshyam Shah, “The BJP and Backward Castes in Gujarat,”
South Asia Bulletin, Vol. 14, No.1, 1994, pp. 57–65.
26. Persis Ginwalla, Samaras Scheme and Democratic Processes: An Analytical Study
(Ahmedabad: Mahila Swaraj Abhiyan, 2009).
27. Rahul Mangaonkar, “Narendra D Modi: D for Democracy or Dictator,” Times
of India, (Ahmedabad), August 4, 2007.
28. The Economic Times, April 23, 2008.
29. Assema Sinha, The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided
Leviathan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 136–37.
30. Ravindra H. Dholakia, “Sources of Economic Growth and Acceleration in

Gujarat,” EPW Vol. 42, No. 9, (March 3, 2007), pp. 770–78.
31. The Financial Express, June 9, 2003.
32. See, Rajeev Bhattacharyya, “Modi invites investment in Gujarat.” Available
online at: http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=18327 (last
date of access: April 5, 2009).
33. Tushar Shah and Shilp Verma, “Co-Management of Electricity and Ground-
water: An Assessment of Gujarat’s Jyotigram Scheme,” EPW, Vol. 43, No. 7,
(February 16, 2008), pp. 59–66.
34. Indira Hirway and Subhrangsu Goswami, “Functioning of the Drinking Water
Component of the Narmada Pipeline Project in Gujarat,” EPW Vol. 43, no. 9,
(March 1, 2008), pp. 51–59.
35. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), April 25, 2005.
36. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), June 19, 2007.
37. Virendra Kumar, “A Modi-cum of Strategy,” The Indian Express, (Ahmedabad)
December 21, 2005.
38. Divya Bhaskar, March 7, 2005.
39. The Indian Express, (Ahmedabad), Interview with N.K. Singh. November 1,
2007.
40. Gujarat Samachar, April 30, 2009.
41. Ajay Umat, “No repeat theory vaprine Modi ae bulldozer fervyou [Modi
bulldozed by uasing no-repeat theory], Diyva Bhaskar, December 18, 2005.
42. See Parlay Kanungo and Adan Farooqui, “Tracking Moditva: An Analysis
of the 2007 Gujarat Elections Campaign,” Contemporary Perspectives, Vol. 2,
No. 2, July–December 2008, pp. 222–45.
43. Ajay Umat “No repeat theory vaprine Modi ae bulldozer fervyou.”
44. Gujarat Samachar, April 30, 2009.
45. Divya Bhaskar, April 24, 2009.
46. India News Politics, April 13, 2009.
47. Fulchab (Rajkot), April 30, 2009.
48. Mahashweta Jani, “Gujarat: BJP Scrapes Through,” EPW, Vol. 44, No. 39,
(September 26–October 2, 2009), pp. 133–36. For its social support base in
the earlier elections, see Ghanshyam Shah, (2007) op cit; also Priyavadan Patel,
“Gujarat: Signs of Anti-incumbency,” in S. Shastri, K. Suri and Y. Yadav (eds),
Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond, (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 148–175.
Chapter 9
West Bengal
Mapping a Political Challenge:

West Bengal 2009
Amiya K. Chaudhuri
State Politics under the Left Front
A stable LF government survived in West Bengal since 1977 despite a

nation-wide anti-incumbency factor. Its near demolition in the 2009
parliamentary election, winning only 15 seats out of 42, was a rude
shock. Protest movements against the fertile land acquisition actions
by the government are a major reason for the election debacle. Civil
society groups supported the popular movements. This chapter will
examine left politics in the state as also its differences with other Indian
states, and the electoral dynamics of a communist system in a liberal
democratic framework.
The LF led by the CPI(M) government not only did poorly in the
2009 parliamentary election, but subsequently in 2010 by-elections
where the CPI(M) lost 15 parliamentary and five Assembly seats,
respectively. A series of defeats in panchayat and two Assembly
elections in 2008, and other elections including local and municipal
bodies during the previous one and half years indicated a crisis for
what had been an astonishingly stable LF coalition for 32 years.
In West Bengal, Marxist parties pursued a dual strategy toward the
central government. On the one hand, they asserted that West Bengal
was discriminated against politically and economically by the central
Mapping a Political Challenge 193
government. However, in the case of a friendly but seemingly weak

center, they made demands for the autonomy of regional parties1 and
met with some success. In July 2008, the LF with its 61 MPs withdrew
support from the Congress-led UPA government opposing the
Indo–US nuclear deal. It was uncharitable for the highest leadership
of the CPI(M) to say, “the UPA coalition government survives on
the LF’s support. Therefore, if we want them to stand up or sit down
they must do that.”2
At that juncture, the CPI(M) thought it prudent to distance the LF
from the UPA, in view of their future course of action against the
Congress and the TMC in state politics. Rather, they did everything
possible to keep the Congress and the TMC at loggerheads with each
other. But this time, the mainstay of the social coalition that had
long provided support, appeared to turn their back against the LF.
They include the middle class, several groups of civil society, refugees
still living in the colonies, Muslims, and the SCs and STs. The LF’s
support base had already begun to erode because of its contradictory
positions—a pragmatic support for the Congress at the center and
throwing, at the same time, electoral challenges to the party in West
Bengal. Some of the left leaders thought that the LF should have
withdrawn support much earlier to tidy up the home turf in West
Bengal. Its failure to do so is amply reflected in the 2009 election
result (see Table 9.2).
The middle-class people, possibly for reasons of their past history,
are in the habit of thinking that they are uncompromisingly radical.3
The communists and their band of supporters considered themselves
to be a superior species because of their ideologically congruent socio-
political and economic perspective. They believed to think that their
politics was guided by a superior political objective as compared to
other political parties in different states of India.
The LF claimed that the caste and communal divides that are para-
mount in other Indian states are absent in West Bengal. However, this
is a myth as confirmed by their mode of selecting candidates at all the
levels. Instead of perceiving society in terms of caste and communal
distinctions, the left would like to divide it into two classes—bhadralok
(elite)4 and chhotolok (subaltern). They take it for granted that the
subaltern or the chhotolok can, with subtle electoral engineering and
194 Amiya K. Chaudhuri
political manipulations, be brainwashed. Howver, it is possible that

they ignore the rise of the chhotolok class in economic terms.
To the upper- and middle-class elites, Mamata Banerjee and her
party appeared to represent the rural subalterns. The TMC leader
Mamata Banerjee began mobilizing the rural masses on the basis of
their fear against the government’s land acquisition and their veiled
policy of creating Special Economic Zone (SEZ) industrial growth.
Unchallenged for such a long period of time in electoral politics, CM
Bhattacharjee was encouraged to obliterate the democratic distinction
between the party and the administration. He proceeded to think
in terms of total equation between the party run state and the civil
society. According to a perceptive author,5 this government put party
interest above the people. As he says, “Given this record of failed
reforms, non-reforms, and regressive policies, the question remains as
to how such a singularly unsuccessful government was able to achieve
the world record for being the longest ruling democratically elected
Communist government in history.”6
And, finally, the LF’s focused tirades against the central govern-
ment’s allegedly discriminatory attitude and actions have been
habitual. The fact of the matter is that the CPI(M)’s organizational
dominance in Bengal, particularly in the rural hinterland, for the
last three decades has alienated even its important partners, the
Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and the Forward Bloc (FB).
The question then arises as to why the partners of the LF, still cling
together. The answer possibly may be:
It is simple electoral arithmetic and to a great extent of certain politico-

electoral compulsion. If any of the major partners comes out of the left
fold the result would be disastrous not only for any individual partner
but the LF as a whole. The CPI (M) would also suffer a political paralysis
for years to come.7
A long history of law and order problems contributed to the LF

image. The Sain Brothers murder in 1970, the brutal Marichjhapi
murder of the refugees, the Bijon Setu (the Ballygunj Station
Flyover) murders of 17 sanyasis (including a woman) by the CPI(M)
left indelible dark spots on the history of the first phase of the LF
government in West Bengal.8 These were meticulously documented
by several private individuals.9 The Bantala incident of the rape and

murder of two World Health Organization (WHO) woman officers at
South 24 Parganas was gruesome; however, the CM Jyoti Babu took no
serious note of it and commented: “These are nothing extraordinary;
occasionally it may happen.”10
All this raised the question whether the people of West Bengal had
reconciled themselves to the atrocities caused by the LF supporters
and activists. Another gruesome incident, which occurred at Khandua,
Arambag in Howrah, involved the CPI(M) resorting to its semi fascist
method of politically controlling the entire western belt of rural West
Bengal. It was political cleansing atrocities like these that paved the
way for the overwhelming victory of the LF in elections, particularly
since 1987.11 Actually the objectives of the CPI(M) were to gag the
voices of the opposition in rural Bengal. In the 1991 elections, a group
of villagers voted for the Congress candidate. After the result was out,
the CPI(M) activists attacked the villages, burnt some of the houses
and allegedly chopped off the hands of voters.12
On July 21, 1993, the police barricaded a Youth Congress pro-
cession led by its president Mamata Banerjee to symbolically encircle
the Writers’ Building. The police fired mercilessly without heeding
the police manual. Thirteen people were killed on the spot and many
more injured. Thereafter, the police fired at the procession of the
Socialist Unity Center (SUC) near Curzon Park. One person was
killed and a few others suffered heavy injuries. Mamata Banerjee,
when still a Youth Congress leader was mercilessly beaten near Hazra
Road by the CPI(M) cadres, while protesting against a bundh called
by the CPI(M). She had to be hospitalized with serious head and
abdominal injuries for quite a long time. Such attacks on Ms Banerjee
were mounted frequently even while she was in the Congress as also
a central minister. She formed her own party TMC in 1997 after a
hitch with the state Congress leadership.
The panchayat system, as spearheaded by the LF to spread its
tentacles to the remotest part of the rural areas, became all “political
panchayats,”13 and totally centralized, politically and administratively.
Scholars from abroad, who studied the functioning of panchayat bodies
under the LF front government, eulogized the LF government for its
good work in rural areas.14 However, only D. Bandyapadhyay and
Nirmal Mukerji15 and Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mukherjee16 were

down to earth in their assessments.
What had helped the CPI(M) maintain its hegemonic domin-
ance almost all over the state was the policy of terrorization in most
of the rural hinterlands and distribution of largesse to the aspirant
elite sections including government employees, trade unionists, rich
peasants, and teachers of all categories. High-ranking government
officials and police personnel were happy and tension free for the
reason17 that the opposition was too emasculated to challenge the
CPI(M)-led regime. In the popular perception, Mamata was the only
major uncompromising opposition political leader to challenge the
“social fascist party, the CPI (M)”18 and the “misrule of the LF gov-
ernment.”19 CM Jyoti Basu refused to meet Ms Banerjee, a central
minister at that time, when she sought justice for a deaf victim who
was raped by the CPI(M) cadres. The police forcibly arrested her
and then released her late at night without any protection en route
to her way home.
Such behavior of the police officers became a regular feature in
the 33 years of LF rule. Ms Banerjee began her fight for “Maa, Mati,
Manush” (mother, earth, and men) during the Singur (Hooghly) land
acquisition incident. It was a slogan that helped the underprivileged
SCs, STs, and the Muslim community to rally around the TMC.
Ms Banerjee was prepared to stake her life to fight against the
“undemocratic fascist regime of the CPI (M).”20 She fasted for 26
days against the acquisition of the multi-cropped 997 acres of agri-
cultural land. Meanwhile, brutal killings took place at Nandigram
by the police and the CPI(M)’s hired killers in police uniforms. State
Governor Gopal Gandhi was pained to characterize the incident as
“spine-chilling violence.”21 Very important civil society groups played
an extremely important role in exposing the “fascist method of the
Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee regime.”22 After these two serious incidents,
people shed their fear and came out in the open to seek a “change.”23
It was against the backdrop of the explosion of the desire for
change that 2009 parliamentary elections were held. The results of
the election were absolutely “demoralizing for the CPI (M) after years
of its control in all aspects of life in the state.”24 The social coalition
that created the LF, was crumbling. The CPI(M) had expressed its
superiority as a party with progressive vision. The Marxists claimed

that their understanding of the “nature of Indian State”25 could not
be faulted. Only they were able to pursue a political economy of
development.26
LF’s Electoral Challenge
Fighting against the Congress in the state and giving support to

the Congress at the center was sheer “political duplicity.”27 The
Congress party in the state was also gradually losing its electoral
credibility while the TMC was coming out as the most successful
and uncompromisingly opposition party to the CPI(M)’s one-party
“misrule.”28 It was clear to the discerning public, as well as to ordin-
ary voters that the CPI(M)’s single agenda was to cling to power by
repeatedly raising their voice against “the menace [of the] communal
BJP.”29 The result, in fact, became counter-productive.
The results of the 2009 parliamentary election (see Table 9.1) are
a rude shock to the CPI(M). In 2004, the CPI(M) alone in West
Bengal had won 26 seats and CPI, RSP, and FB had three seats each
for a total of 35 seats. Getting a total of six seats—from Darjeeling (1),
South Dinajpur (1), Malda (1), and three from Murshidabad, the
Congress party was reduced to a regional party of the north and
a part of the east. The TMC had a poor parliamentary presence
with a single seat of Ms Banerjee from south Kolkata. In terms of
vote share, the CPI(M) received 38.56â•¯percent, CPI 4.01â•¯percent,
RSP 4.49â•¯percent, FB 3.66â•¯percent, Congress 14.56â•¯percent, TMC
21.04â•¯percent, BJP 8.06â•¯percent, Independent, Janata, and other
minor parties 5.62â•¯percent.
Thus, the poor showing by the LF in 2009 was not so shocking to
the other partners like the CPI, RSP, and FB as it was for the CPI(M).
The CPI general secretary openly criticized the “big brother” for the
electoral debacle30 (see Table 9.2). This is also what happened in
the panchayat (2008), parliamentary (2009), and then recently in the
16 Municipal elections (2009). In the Municipal elections, the LF
was able to retain only three boards, losing nine. The LF retained the
Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad (Sub-divisional Board), with a margin
Table 9.1
Percent of Votes Polled By Different Parties in Parliamentary Election 2009 in West Bengal
IND +
Party CPI(M) CPI RSP FB INC TMC SUC BJP SP JMM NCP BSP MUL Others
Vote Share 33.10 3.60 3.56 3.04 13.45 31.18 1.65 6.14 0.(1) 0.26 0.09 1.002 0.07 2.70
Seat (9) (2) (2) (2) (6) (19) (1) (1) – – – – – –
Source: Reports (provisional) Election Commission of India.
Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate number of seats. Total number of seats is 42.
Table 9.2
Constituency-wise Percentage Points of Valid Votes Polled by Political Parties in Parliamentary Election 2009 in Districts of West Bengal
CPM / CPI(ML) Independent

District CPI BSP AIFB RPI INC RSP IPFB AMB AITC SUCI BJP RDMP (L) & others
Cooch Behar – 2.04 *44.66 0.30 – – – 0.57 41.65 – 5.82 – – 4.93
Alipurduars 1.51 – – – *41.22 – – 29.13 – 21.40 – – 5.68
Jalpaiguri *45.51 1.43 – – 36.98 – – 0.55 – – 9.15 – – 3.27
Darjeeling 25.28 0.52 – – 19.43 – 0.27 0.38 – *51.49 – 0.39 2.19
Raiganj 38.57 0.84 – – *50.28 – – – – – 4.19 0.87 0.48 4.45
Balurghat – 1.59 – – – *44.37 – – 43.79 – 6.82 – – 1.56
Malda Uttar 41.25 0.77 – – *47.77 – – – – – 6.67 0.79 – 2.71
Malda Dakshin 37.02 0.70 – – *53.45 – – – – – 5.30 – – 2.81
Jangipur 40.52 – – – *54.23 – – – – – 2.33 – – 0.87
Baharampur – 0.90 – – *56.91 37.27 – – – – 2.90 0.32 – 0.96
Murshidabad 43.81 0.75 – – *47.20 – – – – – 4.02 – – 3.53
Krishnanagar 35.02 1.02 – – – – – – *42.42 – 16.76 – 1.38 –
Ranaghat 41.25 1.68 – – – – – *50.12 – 5.04 – – 1.89
Bongaon 42.29 1.60 – – – – – – *50.94 – 3.97 – – 0.70
Barrackpore 42.83 1.07 – – – – – – *49.27 – 3.55 – 0.58 2.66
Dum Dum 44.94 0.92 – – – – – – *49.80 – 5.70 – – 0.83
Barasat -- 1.79 38.96 – – – – – *50.95 – 5.39 – – 1.40
Basirhat 40.30 0.73 – – – – – – *46.18 – 6.55 – – 1.34
Jay Nagar -- 1.00 – – – 42.86 – – -- *48.71 2.68 0.71 – 2.14
Mathurapur 41.55 0.49 – – – – – – *53.94 – 2.61 0.19 – 1.19
Diamond Harbor 39.17 0.47 – – – – – – *53.56 – 3.56 – – 1.58
Jadavpur 44.65 0.42 – – – – – – *49.83 – 2.33 – – 1.65
(Continued )
Table 9.2 (Continued )
CPM / CPI(ML) Independent
District CPI BSP AIFB RPI INC RSP IPFB AMB AITC SUCI BJP RDMP (L) & others
Kolkata Dakshin 35.39 0.66 – – – – – – *57.19 – 4.02 – – 2.06
Kolkata Uttar 40.04 0.64 – – – – – – *52.50 – 4.22 – – 2.19
Howrah 44.27 0.57 – – – – – – *48.03 – 3.79 – – 2.32
Uluberia 41.12 0.76 – – – – – – *50.91 – 4.20 0.33 – 1.54
Srirampur 39.99 0.66 – – – – – – *52.68 – 3.55 – – 1.99
Hooghly 42.36 0.85 – – – – – – *49.37 – 3.42 – 1.03 1.46
Arambagh *54.17 2.12 – – 36.85 – – – – – 4.97 – – –
Kanthi 42.47 0.72 – – – – – – *53.95 – 2.84 – – –
Tamluk 40.47 0.51 – – – – – – *55.53 – 1.79 – – 0.77
Ghatal *53.50 1.03 – – – – – – 40.92 – 2.99 0.30 – –
Jhargram *56.89 0.83 – – 26.35 – – – – – 4.73 – – 6.12
Medinipur *47.29 1.17 – – – – – – 42.68 – 4.99 0.38 – 2.48
Purulia -- 2.26 *44.13 – 42.00 – – 0.32 – – 2.37 – – 4.50
Bankura *47.65 1.12 – – 36.70 – – – – – 4.33 0.40 0.81 5.08
Bishnupur *51.32 0.83 – – – – – – 39.05 – 3.97 – – 2.75
Bardhaman Purba *47.31 0.80 – – – – – – 42.02 – 6.37 – 0.74 –
Bardhaman *50.51 0.84 – – 40.98 – – – – – 4.41 0.46 – 1.17
Durgapur
Asansol *48.69 1.62 – – – – – – 40.52 – 5.55 – – 2.46
Bolpur *49.90 1.03 – – 38.14 – – – – – 6.49 – – 2.44
Birbhum 41.77 1.31 – – – – – – *47.81 – 4.62 – – –
Source: Election Commission of India (data supplied by the office of the CEO, West Bengal).
Note: *indicated the name of the winning political party.
of one seat only. Because of local factionalism in the Congress, the

TMC–Congress coalition did not work well in this case.
Over the years, voter turnout has been very high with an average of
79.5â•¯percent. To the Marxists, this abnormal voter turn out was due
“to the ideological contribution of Marxist parties in educating the
rural people in the state.”31 Others argued that the abnormally high
turnout was due to the absence of a viable political alternative, and
more importantly to the organizational machinery and electoral man-
agement of the CPI(M). Even in this era of coalition making, the
Index of Opposition Unity (IOU) was found to be low. Before the
recent elections, the upper and middle classes, and the poorer sections
could not trust the opposition parties warring with one another. By
showing muscle power and parading motor bike riding hired goons
with AK-47 rifles, a fear psychosis was instilled in the minds of the
rural people by the CPI(M).
The LF has, over the years, entrenched itself in rural Bengal.
Through the village, block and district level panchayat bodies, left
parties won acceptability among the people. But all this continued
only up to 1987. Thereafter the system of governance in West Bengal
began to show a downward slide (see Table 9.3).
There are important comparisons between Table 9.2 and Table 9.3.
The more underdeveloped the districts are, in respect of health,
literacy, income, and education, the more the LF won in election
after election. It appears that the CPI(M) claiming to be the party
of the toiling masses was adept enough to electorally dominate the
docile poor by various means. Over the years, the CPI(M) resorted
to political cleansing in the rural areas of the north Bengal districts
and in the entire western part of Bengal. These western districts
account for more than 70 Assembly seats. Arambag at Hooghly,
Keshpur, Garbeta, Ghatal, and Jhargram at West Midnapore were
out of bounds for the opposition parties. Even during the 2009
parliamentary election, when there was a tornado of change sweeping
over Bengal, the CPI(M) cadres did not allow civil society groups to
enter their electoral territories in these places.32 One opposition TMC
supporter, who hoisted a flag on a tree in Keshpur, was murdered33
for ignoring the diktat of the CPI(M).
Table 9.3
Human Development Indices of Districts in West Bengal
Human
Health Income Education development HDI
Districts index index index index (HDI) rank
Darjeeling 0.73 0.49 0.72 0.65 4
Jalpaiguri 0.61 0.38 0.60 0.53 10
Koch Bihar (Cooch Bihar) 0.50 0.41 0.65 0.52 11
Dinajpur 0.62 0.39 0.53 0.51 13
Malda 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.44 17
Murshidabad 0.57 0.29 0.52 0.46 15
Birbhum 0.53 0.27 0.61 0.47 14
Bardhaman (Burdwan) 0.74 0.47 0.71 0.64 5
Nadia 0.65 0.41 0.66 0.57 9
North 24-Parganas 0.72 0.49 0.76 0.66 3
Hugli (Hooghly) 0.77 0.46 0.67 0.63 6
Bankura 0.67 0.26 0.62 0.52 11
Purulia 0.61 0.18 0.55 0.45 16
Medinipur (Midnapore— 0.68 0.45 0.74 0.62 7
east and west together)
Haora (Howrah) 0.77 0.58 0.75 0.68 2
Kolkata 0.82 0.73 0.80 0.78 1
South 24-Parganas 0.71 0.40 0.68 0.60 8
West Bengal 0.70 0.41 0.69 0.61 8*
Source: West Bengal Human Development Report 2004, Government of West Bengal,
Kolkata.
Almost a repeat electoral performance by the LF was seen in 2006.

The LF won 235 seats polling 50.12â•¯percent of votes. The single
majority party in the LF, CPI(M) alone won 176 seats. The CPI(M)
tried to electorally emasculate their Front partners but did not dare
discard them. The opposition, as a whole, secured 49.88â•¯percent of
votes. The TMC won 30 seats, the Congress 23, SUC 2, and Others
5 only. Disunity among opposition parties was, therefore, a positive
gain for the LF. The attitude of the administration under the political
control of the CPI(M) failed to instill confidence and trust in the
minds of the voters and the ordinary public.
The panchayat elections in 2008 were, however, held in a context
of massive popular protests and movements, as the apogee of social
churning since 1977. The seats won by the LF in each of the elections
before 2008 were overwhelming in all the three tiers of panchayats,

acquiring more than 55â•¯percent of votes.34 But this time, the vote
share for the LF was 52â•¯percent in Zilla Parishad and 46â•¯percent
in Panchayat Samitis and Gram Panchayats taken together.35 This
indicated a danger signal for the LF.
Another ominous sign for the CPI(M), just before the 2009 elec-
tion, lay in the loss of two seats with a largest ever vote margin. The
results reflected the adverse mood of the people, a phenomenon
unthinkable before. A genuine challenge was faced by the CPI(M)
this time with civil society groups encountering the “fascist face of the
LF.”36 They vigorously campaigned against the CPI(M)’s use of the
administration, police forces, and electoral machinery. Civil society
groups had frequently appealed about atrocities against the peasants at
Singur in Hooghly, Nandigram at east Midnapore, and Lalgarh in west
Midnapore to the state Election Commissioner, but to no avail.
The CPI(M) mounted severe verbal attacks against important
personalities of civil society groups and resorted to character assas-
sination of the protestors. But all this became counter-productive.
In the process, the ordinary rural people overcame the fear psychosis
they had been suffering from because of “ferocious” 37 presence
of the CPI(M)’s organizational network and state terror in rural
hinterlands.
The 2009 election results (see Table 9.1) reflect the mood of the
majority of the people. Each of the partners of the LF, FB, RSP, and
CPI lost one seat each against the three seats they had each won in the
2004 election. The greatest loser was the CPI(M); it won only nine
seats. The decline in theâ•¯percentage share of its votes was shattering
for the party. Even when the CPI(M) had contested the Assembly
election alone in 1971, it received more than 35â•¯percent of total valid
votes cast. Its vote shares increased over the years crossing sometimes
39â•¯percent. But this time it received a humiliating 33.10â•¯percent.
Despite the continued political dominance of the LF in each of
the several elections in the past, economic development in the state
has been low as compared to many other Indian states; industrial and
unemployment situations have worsened since 1991.38 More than
55,000 medium and small industries have been shut down since the
mid-1980s. During the last several years, the state of the political
economy was bleak and the state fiscal deficit stood at a staggering
165,000 crores. Strangely people remained complacent during elec-
tions. Many language newspaper reporters smelled something
abnormal in the election observer, Afzal Amanulla’s secret report39 to
the Central Election Commission, which failed it public.
In the 2009 election, the LF was able to retain its electoral super-
iority in the districts of North Bengal and the western belt of the state
from Purulia down to West Midnapore. In these areas, the CPI(M)’s
organizational clout and oft-used method of electoral management
did not fail them. As Table 9.2 indicates, the FB won the Cooch
Bihar seat with 44.66â•¯percent votes because the BJP’s share of votes
(5.52â•¯percent) cut into the vote share of the main opponent. In
North Bengal, the LF won three seats from Cooch Bihar, Alipurduars
in Jalpaiguri, and Balurghat in South Dinajpur. Even in the 2009
election, when the LF had to face a severe challenge from the Congress
and TMC (+) coalition’s seat adjustment, the CPI(M) was able
to retain its earlier hold but with reducedâ•¯percentage of votes (see
Table 9.2). In most of the constituencies, the margin of victory for
the CPI(M) was alarmingly reduced (see Table 9.2).
Is the LF decline due to the fact that the CPI(M) functions in a
parliamentary system? Or is it simply using the political forum of
the legislature as a weapon to achieve a socialist revolution? The
hardcore leaders still attempt to dish out publicly the same version
of their thesis of a socialist revolution in a different language. It does
not matter whether the party sympathizers, cadres, promoters, con-
tractors, and other clients,40 enjoying benefits from the LF govern-
ment helped it in the manner it wanted. Like the unalloyed older
generation of the Marxists, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, and Nirupam
Sen—the minister in charge of Industry—like to propagate that
socialism and socialistic development cannot be achieved immediately.
The development of capitalism is the need of the day; socialism is
to wait till the development of capitalism is complete. This is a new
formulation for the CM and minister of Industry.41
The Marxist CM and Industry minister, Nirupam Sen, did not
mince words about their theoretical position focusing on rapid
industrialization to be achieved at any cost. In his hour-long interview
with the author, Jyoti Basu the former CM and the senior most
member of the Politburo of the CPI(M), simply smiled away the

question about establishing “socialism” in a bourgeois parliamentary
democracy. He did not even think of a “parliamentary communism.”42
He took a pragmatic view of supporting the party’s “confused theor-
etical stance.”43
Surprisingly, the opposition parties, particularly the main oppo-
sition TMC and the Congress Party began gaining substantially in
subsequent elections after panchayat elections in the first quarter of
2008. After 32 years in the guardian constituencies of the School
Managing Committee in different districts, the LF candidates were
demoralized and defeated. In colleges, the Student Federation of India
(SFI), the student front of the CPI(M), found it tough to confront
opposition candidates. The exercise of unbridled power using power
brokers, promoters, contractors, and land mafias in the rural areas
resulted in rampant corruption in the party. Leaders from top-down
began to be a demoralized lot.44 It was difficult to cope with or
overcome the emergent situation without antagonizing land mafias,
contractors, promoters, and other middle class clienteles. The State
Committee Secretary of the CPI(M), Biman Basu,45 mildly agreed
with this same characterization of the CPI(M). The CM himself said,
“Money is flowing around. From this springs wrongdoing and sin.”46
When the land scam at Rajarhat in North 24 Parganas for the con-
struction of Vedic Village, a luxury health resort, and New Township
project came out in public, a commentator wrote: “The present chief
minister is paying the price for the greed and sins of Jyoti Basu and
Pramode Dasgupta.”47 In fact, never before in the history of the state
had such a land grabbing fraud taken place.
Siliguri in the north is popularly regarded as the second capital
of Bengal. It is the gateway to foreign countries on the north and
southeast on the one hand, and south Bengal through the “chicken
neck,” on the other. That is why the area is strategically very important
and sensitive. It is the business hub of the entire Northeastern region
of the country. The Gorkhaland issue, created by the shortsighted-
ness of the CPI(M) in the mid-1980s, is still unresolved. In 2009, the
BJP candidate, Jaswant Singh, won the seat.
The opposition Congress and Trinamool coalition was trying to
encash on the LF government’s land policy. The LF failed to take into
account the serious problems of hunger and starvation among the tea
garden workers.48 These tracts of tea growing land forcibly acquired
by the government were given to promoters to build shopping malls,
multiplexes, and housing complexes.49 The people of Siliguri retaliated
through the ballot against this policy of the LF in the Corporation
election immediately after the parliamentary election. The Siliguri
Corporation’s election in all the 47 wards is a moral and electoral
booster for the opposition Congress and TMC coalition. It won 30
seats, Congress 15, TMC 14, and one supported by both the parties.
The LF managed to get only 17 seats, CPI(M) 15, RSP one, and FB
one. It is really an electoral debacle for the CPI(M). This means that
seat adjustment between the Congress and the TMC proved effective.
If it continues until the 2011 Assembly election, the CPI(M) may
confront the biggest ever challenge to its earlier electoral superiority.
The opposition coalition replaced the LF from the seat of power by
getting nearly 2â•¯percent more votes than the LF. Elections showed
the mood of the people for a change. Their silent but decisive action
swept the southern, eastern, and three other districts.
2009 Election: Fall Out
The leaders of the CPI(M) still believe in a dignified come back in

the next major election. The CPI(M) and the LF constituents con-
vincingly won the Assembly election in 2006. The LF had garnered
50.12â•¯percent votes winning 235 seats; whereas the divided opposition
parties had received 49.88â•¯percent of valid votes cast. They won only
59 seats, TMC 30, Congress 23, SUC 2 and others 3. The difference
of vote share between the LF and the opposition parties fighting
separately was only 0.24â•¯percent. It is not, therefore, the electoral
calculus but the changing political chemistry from time to time that
determines the voters’ preference.
During these last 32 years, opposition parties in West Bengal
remained, as they were when the first LF formed an invincible coal-
ition government. The LF had been enjoying the fruits of the social
coalitions of the upper class, middle class, the SCs, STs,, and above
all the Muslims (see Table 9.4) besides, teachers, professionals, service
Table 9.4
Percentage of SC, ST, and Muslims of the Total Population of West Bengal and Each District of West Bengal
Area Total population SC ST Muslims % SC % ST % muslims

West Bengal 80,176,197 18,437,555 4,406,794 20,241,541 23.02 5.50 25.25
Burdwan 6,895,514 1,860,754 441,832 1,364,133 26.98 6.41 19.78
Birbhum 3,015,422 889,894 203,127 1,057,861 29.51 6.74 35.08
Bankura 3,192,695 997,408 330,783 239,722 31.24 10.36 7.51
Midnapore 9,610,788 1,576,337 798,684 1,088,999 16.40 8.31 11.33
Howrah 4,273,099 658,707 19,168 1,044,383 15.42 0.45 24.44
Hooghly 5,041,976 1,188,881 212,062 763,471 23.58 4.21 15.14
24-Parganas (N) 8,934,286 1,840,397 198,936 2,164,058 20.60 2.23 24.22
24-Parganas (S) 6,906,689 2,218,376 84,766 2,295,967 32.12 1.23 33.24
Kolkata 4,572,876 274,835 9,810 926,769 6.01 0.21 20.27
Nadia 4,604,827 1,365,985 113,891 1,170,899 29.66 2.47 25.43
Murshidabad 5,866,569 703,786 75,953 3,735,380 12.00 1.29 63.67
Uttar Dinajpur 2,441,794 676,582 124,865 1,156,503 27.71 5.11 47.36

Dakshin Dinajpur 1,503,178 432,660 242,317 361,047 28.78 16.12 24.02
Malda 3,290,468 554,165 227,047 1,636,171 16.84 6.90 49.72
Jalpaiguri 3,401,173 1,233,577 641,688 369,195 36.27 18.87 10.85
Darjeeling 1,609,172 258,881 204,167 85,378 16.09 12.69 5.31
Cooch Behar 2,479,155 1,242,374 14,246 600,911 50.11 0.57 24.24
Purulia 2,536,516 463,956 463,452 180,694 18.29 18.27 7.12
Source: Economic Review 2004–05, Govt. of WB and Census Report of India 2001.
207
holders, and business and small time industrial communities. The

SCs, STs, and the Muslim voters have been particularly important.
Their combined strength, as Table 9.4 shows, is 53.77â•¯percent—SC
23.02â•¯percent, ST 5.50â•¯percent, and Muslims 25.25â•¯percent. They
constitute a majority in the state. Until the mid-1990s, the LF mani-
pulated this social coalition in their favor. This social coalition began
cracking during the mid-1990s. However, major opposition parties,
for one reason or the other, failed to exploit this situation. The first
UPA government at the center had to depend on the LF.
Immediately after the 2006 Assembly election, Mamata Banerjee
seriously began distancing herself and her party from the BJP, both at
the national and the state levels. After its final split from the Congress
in 1998, the TMC ultimately emerged as the major opposition party in
the state for its uncompromising political opposition against the
CPI(M). Other peripheral left parties like the Progressive Democratic
Socialist (PDS), SUC—a faction of the CPI(ML)—and 15 other
social groups with political objectives, were localized but collectively
became a tangible force when they allied with the TMC during the
land grabbing measures of the CPI(M) in Bhangar, Singur, and
Nandigram. The 2009 parliamentary election was really a watershed
in the post 1977 electoral history of West Bengal. The TMC and
Congress coalition made electoral history for this time period as the
opposition won 27 seats including one seat for the BJP.
Congress failed to provide an effective challenge to the LF before
a differently oriented Mamata Banerjee and her TMC stepped into
the scene. This signaled the beginning of the decline of the CPI(M).
The remarkable political stability of the LF coalition began crashing
when “saving agricultural land and life movement”50 at Singur and
Nandigram gathered strength in the middle of 2006. Actually, Singur
was the flash point of the ongoing politics of the opposition.
The “genocide”51 perpetrated by the CPI(M) at Nandigram took
14 lives. Under the protection of the police, CPI(M)’s armed cadres
“in police uniform” on March 14, 2007 raped a number of women.
The victims were mostly from Muslim and SC communities. During
the Singur and Nandigram days, the important leaders of the CPI(M)
continuously made unconstitutional and uncharitable remarks against
the Governor, Gopal Krishna Gandhi. Moreover, the top CPI(M)
leader’s “indecent utterances” against the main opposition leader

Mamata Banerjee and the members of civil society groups like Medha
Patekar, Anuradha Talwar, Mahasveta Devi, Aparna Sen, Saoli Mitra,
and others, were not taken kindly by the people. The land grabbing
actions of the LF affected mostly poor Muslim peasants, Scheduled
Caste groups, Tribals, marginal peasants, and day laborers.
Until then, the CM and his party did not realize that they were
in trouble. The TMC was seeking to forge a broad-based coalition
with the Krishi Bachao and Jiban O Jibika Raksha Committee, other
smaller parties and a number of sociopolitical groups. This move
supported by an overwhelming number of Muslims and caste based
communities coalesced against the LF. It also sent a signal to the
state Congress Party about their future electoral survival in the state.
At last, with an understanding unlike that of 2001, the TMC and
Congress coalition came into force. The results were electrifying for
this anti CPI(M) coalition.
The law and order system has been deteriorating since the parlia-
mentary elections. The CPI(M) monolith begins splitting in the
country side. The leadership crisis in the party is palpable. The front
partners have been seen resisting many of the politico-administrating
moves of the major partner though without parting company. The
future of the LF has been hedged with an element of uncertainty.
Conclusion
The overwhelming electoral victory in the Assembly election in

2006 under the leadership of Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee made him
“dizzy.”52 Without giving much thought to the land problems in the
state, Buddhadeb babu invited various investors to build modern
industry in West Bengal. The Salem Group of Indonesia, Prasun
Mukherjee, Ratan Tata, and Jindal group were invited. While a
huge amount of land was necessary for the purposes, no land map
was available with the ministries of land reforms. It was initially
decided, without even consulting the LF committee and the core
group of ministers that a total of 41, 000 acres of land would be given
to the Salem group.53 This group would use 120 acres for a health
and knowledge city. For a Satellite Township, it would invest at the

following places: Kukrahati (5,000 acres), Baruipur (3,750 acres),
and Bhangar (1,250 acres). Other investments included a Chemical
Hub at Haldia with 10,000 acres, a SEZ of 12,500 acres, and others
with 825 acres. But the government proposals had to be put into cold
storage because of the political turmoil.
Most of the selected investors appeared to be realtors rather than
industrialists. The idea of modern factories working with the latest
technology, promising thousands of jobs to the younger people of
peasant families was unreal. Tata too wanted to build the Singur
workshop as a center for car assembling purposes. He allotted more
than 350 acres of land to the owners of the producers of car ancillaries.
This infuriated the local peasants, small agricultural land holders, and
daily and marginal land laborers. Opposition parties, like the TMC,
the other smaller parties and civil society groups, took up the cause
of the farmers. It appeared that after the Nandigram carnage, the
CPI(M)-led LF lost its credibility. A large number of organizations
and people stood against the government of the day. Other economic
factors disillusioned the poorer sections of the people.
A look at the Human Development Index shown in Table 9.3
substantiates this observation. The central government declared 200
districts as underdeveloped. Among them, 10 districts in West Bengal
covering 4,612 villages were earmarked for special development
efforts. But the government did almost nothing during the last five
years. These earmarked villages are located mostly in north Bengal
and the western part (see Table 9.2). Paradoxically, the LF had won
most seats in the panchayat (2008) and parliamentary elections (2009)
from these areas. With the help of its organizational strength and
instilling fear about social boycott and political victimization in the
minds of the poor, the CPI(M) won election after election.
The amount the LF received from the central government in dif-
ferent heads, like National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG)
schemes or 100 days work, rural electrification programs, Indira Abas
Yojona, Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Programme (JNURP),
could not be properly utilized. Large amounts of central funds were
partially spent with some being allegedly siphoned away by the CPI(M)
leaders. As compared with other large states, West Bengal’s show in
the management of the political economy of development was poor.
This reflected laziness, inefficiency, lack of a sense of priority, and

rampant corruption at different levels of politics and administration.54
It is legitimate to expect a certain level of good governance in a state
that has the unique credit of political stability for more than three
decades. Transparency in the system of communist rule is a will of
the wisp. West Bengal is only a half-baked system within a liberal
democratic framework and the element of good governance is con-
spicuously absent.
In the light of what has happened in Singur at Hooghly, Nandigram,
and Lalgarh, the latest example of the CPI(M)’s mismanagement of
development strategy, people’s movement backed by the Maoists grew
from strength to strength. In the context of the cross fire between the
joint force and the Maoists at Lalgarh at West Midnapore the Indian
Social Development Report questions the development perspective
and deteriorating law and order situation in the state. The investment
situation is bleak. The state is placed at 18th position among 28 states
and seven union territories and primary education stands at the 11th
place. Development of infrastructure and marketing stands at 13th and
14th places, respectively, with micro economy at the 13th place.
All this does not augur well in a politically stabilized democratic
system. In West Bengal, unlike its Keralan counterpart, there is some
mismatch between occasional democratic change and the thrust of
real politics to debar change by exercising organizational muscle.
And lastly the CPI(M) monolith began cracking. Factionalism in the
CPI(M) as never before has been growing unabated. A large number
of its members and supporters began leaving the sinking ship. The
future depends on the way the Congress and TMC (+) coalition
plays the political games that the CPI(M) has been playing for the
last several years.
Notes
1. Interview, Jyoti Basu, August 4, 2004. This author interviewed him in connection
with the UPIASI project on “Coalition Politics in West Bengal.”
2. During a few LF rallies in the Kolkata Maidan after the UPA coalition came
into power at the center, the CM made this comment. The Statesman, (Kolkata),
July 12, 2008.
â•‡ 3. Marcus F. Franda, Radical Politics in West Bengal (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

MIT Press, 1971). Atul Kohli, ed., India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing
State Society Relations (Princeton, N.J,: Princeton University Press, 1988).
â•‡ 4. John. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1968).
â•‡ 5. Ross Mallick, Development Policy of a Communist Government: West Bengal Since
1977 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
â•‡ 6. Ibid., p. 214.
â•‡ 7. Kshiti Goswami, PWD Minister of the LF government told the author in a
television interview on May 16, 2009, DD (Kolkata center).
â•‡ 8. Jagadish Chandra Mondal, Marichjhapi: Naishabder Antarale (Gana hatyar ek
Kalo Itihas) (Kolkata: Bengali People’s Book Society, 2002).
â•‡ 9. Udayan Nambudri, Bengal’s Night Without End (New Delhi: India First
Foundation, 2006). See also Amitva Ghosh, The Hungry Tid (New Delhi: Ravi
Dayal Publisher, 2004).
10. The Statesman, (Calcutta), May 18, 1990.
11. Barun Sen Gupta, ed. Bartaman Patrika, a Bengali language daily wrote
extensively about the electoral malpractices of the CPI(M) after most of the
Assembly and parliamentary elections in West Bengal, particularly since 1987.
See also Prabir Ghosal, CPIM-er rigging (Bengali), (Kolkata: Mukherjee
Publishing, 2005).
12. Ibid., pp. 27–35.
13. D. Bandyapadhyay and N. Mukerji, New Horizon for West Bengal Panchayats
1993, a report that the government of West Bengal commissioned in 1992, but
the published report was withheld from circulation.
14. Glyn Williams, “Rethinking West Bengal’s Stability: From Party Organization
to Local Practices of Politics,” in John Zavos, Andrew Wyat, and Vernon Hewit
eds, The Politics of Cultural Mobilization in India (Kolkata: Oxford University
Press, 2004); Arild Engelsen Ruud, Poetics of Village Politics: The Making of West
Bengal Rural Communism (New Delhi: OUP, 2003); Neil Webster, Panchayati
Raj and the Decentralization of Development Planning in West Bengal (Calcutta:
KP Bagchi & Co, 1992); O.K. Lieten, Development, Devolution, and Democracy:
Village Discourse in West Bengal (New Delhi: Sage Publications,1996); and
Nossiter, Marxist State Government in India: Politics, Economics, and Society
(London: Printer Publishers,1988).
15. Bandyapadhyay and Mukerji, New Horizon for West Bengal Panchayats 1993.
16. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mukherjee, “Political Economy of Land Reforms in
West Bengal,” Available online at: People.bw.edu/dilipm/wkpap/wbpelref17.pdf
(last date of access: March 5, 2006).
17. Interview with Jawhar Sarkar who joined as the Secretary of Industry being
transferred from the post of the CEO of West Bengal, November 6, 2001.
18. Debabrata Bandyapadhyay, the present state General Secretary of the RSP, used
the same term while the CPI(M) led by Jyoti Basu took away the panchayat port-
folio from him and his party after the1987 Assembly election in West Bengal.
19. Mahasweta Devi, Dainik Statesman (the Bengali edition of The Statesman,
Kolkata), July 20, 2009.
20. Interviews with Mamta Bannerjee (January 29, February 20, March 12 and 28,
2009) and another on May 20, 2009 at Salt Lake, Kolkata, after the TMC led by
Ms Bannerjee won 19 Parliamentary seats and SUC, TMC’s coalition partner,
won one seat.
21. Governor Gopal Gandhi issued the statement on March 14 and published in
all the leading newspapers.
22. Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata). Reports from the beginning of the Nandigram
incident on March 14, 2007.
23. Just before the 2009 General Election in India, hoardings conceptualized by
Shuvaprasanna, the renowned Bengali artist. Several faces of eminent Bengali
intellectuals were seen in several different places in each of the 42 parliamentary
constituencies. The theme “We want Change” appeared as a surrealistic painting.
There were only a dozen faces on the hoarding, but on the faces and the ambience
created on the canvas one can imagine more than five crore voters who might
desire change after a span of 32 years.
24. Interviews with several leaders, including University teachers, one holding the
post of Vice-Chancellor, of the CPI(M), on July 20, 22, and 25, 2009.
25. Quoting the much earlier document, Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall
Windmiller, Communism in India (Bombay: The Perennial Press, 1960).
26. Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata), August 12, 2009.
27. Survey Findings (July 2004) undertaken for writing a chapter on “Coalition
Politics in West Bengal” for UPIASI, New Delhi, to be published by OUP.
28. Survey Findings, (July, 2008), Ibid. A large sample (3800) was chosen with a
structured questionnaire and an interesting feedback was recorded.
29. Field Survey, Ibid.
30. A. B. Bardhan, The Statesman Kolkata, July 7, 2009.
31. Shyamal Chakraborty, Vice-President CITU, August 4, 2006.
32. Dainik Statesman, Kolkata, May 2–May 5, 2005.
33. Interview, D. Bandyapadhyay, May 4, 2009; Shree D. Bandyapadhyay (retd
IAS), Professor Sunanda Sanyal and others from theater and culture as to what
happened in Keshpur, Garbeta, and other places.
34. Ibid.
35. The State Election Commission, West Bengal data were incomplete. Therefore,
the data in the text had to be compiled from different newspapers and news
magazines.
36. Aparna Sen, Saoli Mitra, Bratya Basu, Shuvaprasanna, Shirsendu Mukhapadhyay,
and others on what happened at Nandigram on March 14, and November 10,
2007.
37. Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata), March 16, 2006.
38. Council for Social Development, India Social Development Report (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
39. Manas Ghosh wrote a series of reports based on the Observer’s Afzal Amanulla’s
report in the Statesman Kolkata, May–June, 2004.
40. Partha Chatterjee, Dwaipayan Bhattacharya, Surajit Mukherjee, and Pranab
Das, Strengthening Decentralization, a Report, (Kolkata: Centre for the Studies
in Social Sciences, 2006).
41. Immediately after winning the election in 2006, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee and
Nirupam Sen took up the position that they were to go “from capitalism to
socialism.”
42. K.S. Subramaniam, Parliamentary Communism: Crisis in the Indian Communist
Movement (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989).
43. Singur: ekti unnayan Santras, Samiksha, May 1, 2009 (Kolkata). This was a
lecture regarding the unleashing of state terror by the LF government to carry
on an agenda of Development at Singur in the district of Hooghly. It was
delivered in Bengali by Amit Bhaduri published by Aneek, Kolkata, 2007 on
social movements led by peasants whose rich agricultural lands were taken
over by the LF government to hand over the same to Ratan Tata to build up
his small Nano Car Factory. Also interview with Jyoti Basu, August 4, 2004
and July 6, 2006.
44. Rezzak Molla, “Land Reforms and Revenue Minister, LF government—A
Comment,” Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata), September 17, 2009. Mr Molla
expressed the same opinion to the displeasure of his CM and the Minister for
Industry earlier also during the land grabbing operation at Bhangar, South 24
Parganas and Rajarhat at North 24 Parganas.
45. Arindam Ghosh-dostidar, by-line news report, The Statesman, Kolkata,
September 14, 2009.
46. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, September 3, 2009 as quoted by Arindam Ghosh-
dostidar, in The Statesman, editorial page, Ibid.
47. Dipak Kumar Ghosh, “A monster takes on its creator,” The Statesman, Kolkata,
August 27, 2009.
48. Saoli Mitra, Anyaya Je kore Ar Anyaya Je Sahe (Kolkata: Ubudosh, 2009).
49. Ibid.
50. Amit Bhattacharyya, Singur to Lalgarh via Nandigram: Rising Flames of People’s
Anger against Displacement, Destitution, and State Terror, (Ranchi, Jharkhand:
Bisthapan Virodhi Jan Vikass Andolan, 2009).
51. The Statesman Kolkata, Bartaman, (Kolkata), and Sambad Pratidin (Kolkata)
continuously brought out the news items after March 14, 2007.
52. Manoj Bhattacharya, RSP, former MP (Rajya Sabha), September 2, 2009.
53. Sajal Rai Chaudhuri and Anup Bandyapadhyay, Singur Theke Nandigra: A Survey,
(Ganaudyog, Kolkata: 2009).
54. Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari, Transforming West Bengal: Changing the
Agenda for an Agenda for Change, (New Delhi: Indicus White Paper, 2009).
B.â•‡ Alternating Two-party Systems

Chapter 10
Rajasthan
Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan:

BJP Bastion Busted in 2009
Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat
The state of Rajasthan remains perpetually in transition. Being a

conglomerate of old princely states up to 1947, Rajasthan witnessed
new political germination when it switched from a feudal to a demo-
cratic political system. The transition was peaceful with little turmoil,
which helped the state in catching up with the more advanced and
developed states of India. In terms of development indices, no other
state except Haryana and Punjab can equal her in north India.
Territorially the largest in India, Rajasthan is a political minnow in
population; therefore it sends only 25 representatives to India’s lower
chamber of Parliament.
The December 2008 Assembly election led to a change of guards,
with the Congress replacing the BJP to form the government. Ashok
Gehlot, a placid and suave individual, became the CM. Unlike his
high profile BJP predecessor, Vasundhara Raje, he always kept a low
profile, but he also is credited with having a sound and steady approach
to statecraft and political governance. The 2009 Lok Sabha contest
promised to be a repeat performance of the 2008 Assembly election,
with political gladiators on both sides sharpening their weapons to
settle scores with their adversaries. The advantage with the new CM
Ashok Gehlot was that he was not impetuous, dogged, or too rigid
in his ideological fixations and could change quickly, take U turns,
218 Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat
and indulge in strategic retreats and ideological turnabouts to suit the

political exigencies.
As against this, the BJP took a lot of time to come to terms with the
changed realities of their electoral defeat in 2008 and put its house in
order. It was still plagued by factional rivalry and a leadership schism.
It faced the 2009 Lok Sabha poll as a house divided against itself.
Dissidents, taking clandestine clues from the fallen patriarch Bhairon
Singh Shekhawat, were completely faction-ridden and operated to the
disadvantage and detriment of the Vasundhara Raje group. Reeling
under the electoral blows of 2008 in Rajasthan, it also became affected
by subsequent election setbacks to the BJP in other states. In West
Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, an erstwhile NDA partner decided to ally
with the Congress-led UPA, while in Orissa, Navin Patnaik, an old
political ally of the BJP, parted company with the BJP.
Though these developments did not directly impact the Rajasthan
BJP, they did add to the prevailing gloom. Likewise, the attitude
of BJP’s old ally Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, in drawing close to Sharad
Pawar, leader of the NCP further added to the BJP’s political woes.
The vertical split in the BJP between party President Rajnath Singh
and Arun Jaitley also cast its ominous shadow in Rajasthan. In Bihar
too, CM Nitish Kumar on whose back it was piggy riding to sail
through as a marginalized political player, clipped the BJP’s wings. In
nearby Delhi, its position was anything but worth emulating.
It should be emphasized that BJP’s growth soared in 1999 with the
Ram Temple issue, but this time it failed to couple the emotionality
of the temple issue with the political engineering of a coalitional
culture. Belatedly it decided to take the help of G.V.L. Narasimha
Rao, a pollster, to assess its fortunes in the 2009 Lok Sabha polls,
thereby exhibiting its dependence more on the mathematics of seats
to be predicted by professional pollsters than on demography, i.e., the
electorate or people of India. A party that has ruled in Rajasthan with
the support of the people became so insecure that it had to take the
help of questionable advisors in seeking the illusory hope of victory.
It adopted a new slogan, “governance, security, and development,”1
which failed to enthuse the Rajasthan voters because it lost the
governance in the 2008 Assembly poll and hence could assure neither
security nor development.
Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan 219
It began its electoral journey in Rajasthan following the 2008

electoral disaster warily, encompassing within its bosom some out-
moded moral imperatives resting on a garbled history that began and
ended with the period of Hindu dominance, ignoring the Muslim
and British periods. The BJP’s orthodox vision and its pathological
obsession with the pure blood of only Hindus rendered the Muslims
and Christians as untouchables owing to the myopic perception of
Hindu zealots. The converted Muslims and Christians were looked
upon and depicted as ethnic hybrids, as the children born of the
marital union of Muslims and British males to Hindu women. Small
wonder, the expelled BJP leader Jaswant Singh likened the BJP to an
Indian version of the American Ku Klux Klan, and another leader
Arun Shourie called it “An Alice in Blunderland.”2
Thus its ideological fixation rested on violent purities and ethnic
hybrids that created a sterile anti-minority obsession in her rank and
file, though lip service continued to be paid to “real secularism” and by
way of cosmetics and tokenism, some seats were allotted to minorities
at the state and also at the all India level. In reality, BJP was guided
by reflexive anti-Muslim phobia and remained frozen in a cultural
tableaux of religious unilateralism. Operating under the competing
pressure of the RSS parivar (family) and the overweening ambition
of second-generation leaders and their political allies, it attempted to
display the swagger of confidence that was its hallmark in 2000, but
appeared effete and weak in 2009.
Pre-poll Politics
The state of Rajasthan has always been afflicted by caste war. Earlier it
was between the Jats and the Rajputs and now it was between Meenas
and Gujjars. The Meenas belong to the ST category and the Gujjars are
included in OBC. The Meenas owing to their ST status seek upward
mobility and the Gujjars aspire to join them. This was not acceptable
to the Meenas who did not want to share their predominant position
in the ST category and the privileges that accrue to that category with
the Gujjars. In the 2008 Assembly poll, pacification of Gujjars cost
BJP its dominance. In the 2009 Lok Sabha poll, the Gujjars launched
the defeat Meena plan. This plan envisaged, supporting non-Meena

tribal candidates in ST constituencies. In 2008 assembly election, two
non-Meena candidates belonging to the Dhanka Adivasi group had
won. They were Anju Dhanka who won as an independent candidate
from Bassi and Surajbhan, a Samajwadi party candidate from Rajgarh.
These victories came as a shot in the arm of Gujjars, who decided to
support non-Meena candidates in Dausa, Banswara, and Udaipur
where they continued to be in sizeable numbers.
Candidate Selection and

Politics of Catchment Area
This is a major problem for any party. In choosing a candidate, it

has to ascertain and affirm that the law of proportionality is not
violated and every segment of public opinion is adjusted according
to its relative strength, be it caste, religious affiliation, or gender. But
above all, it is the win-ability factor that is taken into consideration.
Together with win-ability, sometimes a different yardstick is also
adopted. Every political party has some dissidents and to eliminate
them, they are put in a constituency where their defeat is certain. In
respect of Badmer constituency, which after delimitation became
heavily Jat dominated, the BJP’s dominant group led by ex-CM
Vasundhara Raje, fielded Manvendra Singh, a Rajput. The plan was
obvious. Manvendra Singh was the current BJP MP and being the
son of Jaswant Singh, the dissident leader, was the best bet for this
strategy of dealing with dissents. Vasundhara Raje wanted to kill
two birds in one shot. Being an ex-MP, Manvendra Singh was
accommodated and being a dissident, he was put in a constituency
acceptable to him, but where his defeat was certain. The BJP could have
put up a better fight by putting a Jat candidate in this constituency,
but this was not done. The idea was to eliminate a dissident and not
to win a seat.
The same strategy took place in the Congress. The Congress fielded
one Jyoti Mirdha, granddaughter of the late Nathuram Mirdha from
Nagaur constituency, which has traditionally been a Jat stronghold.
Here two rival Mirdhas, late Nathuram Mirdha and Ram Niwas
Mirdha, competed for electoral gains since 1952. After the death of
Nathu Ram Mirdha, Harendra Mirdha son of Ram Niwas Mirdha
staked his claims to the Chief Ministership on the plea of being a
peasant. He was a potential candidate for Chief Ministership but
he lost the Assembly seat and thereby lost his claim to the Chief
Ministership. Obviously, this paved the way for Gehlot’s ascendance
to this pre-eminent position. Gehlot’s other potential rivals were
Bhanwarlal Sharma, Narain Singh Jat, C.P. Joshi, B.D. Kalla, and
C.S. Vaid. All lost in the Assembly election.
By giving a ticket to Jyoti Mirdha, Gehlot tried to cut Harendra
Mirdha to size. It was an oblique hint to him that he was dispensable
in Nagaur being a political reject and Congress could bank upon the
rival Mirdha family to bolster the support of the Jat community. Jat
votes could be garnered through the help of another Mirdha clan.
Whereas Ram Niwas Mirdha chose to remain a Congress loyalist
throughout, Nathu Ram joined the opposition ranks in 1980 and
never rejoined Congress. By giving a ticket to his grand daughter,
Ashok Gehlot showed his dexterity at electoral management. It was a
subtle message to Harendra Mirdha that having been rejected by the
people in the Assembly election, he no longer wielded great clout and
his rival Jat family now was ungrudgingly supporting Congress.
Similarly, the Bhilwara seat was allotted to C.P. Joshi who lost the
Nathdwara Assembly seat by just one vote to BJP’s Kalyan Singh.
The game plan was that if Joshi won the Lok Sabha seat, he would
shift his politics to the center. A defeat in Lok Sabha poll would
marginalize him completely in state politics. He won the Lok Sabha
seat and is a minister at the center.
Splinter Explosion
Party split is not new to India; usually, the cause of split is defection
of people elected on one party symbol joining another party. The
anti-defection law stipulates party split, if one-third of the elected
members decide to form another group or merge in another formation.
On April 4, 2009, six legislators of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly

elected on BSP tickets of the Dalit czarina Mayawati, decided to en-
masse walk into the Congress fold, thereby giving a rude shock to her
prime ministerial ambitions. This step by six legislators proved how
tenuous was her hold on legislators outside UP. In states dominated
either by Congress or BJP, the BSP has always been a catchment
area for the two big formations that could successfully woo the BSP
legislators. They are the prized catches.
The six defecting members were Rajkumar Sharma, Giriraj Singh,
Ramesh Meena, Murari Lal Meena, Ramkesh Meena, and Rajendra
Singh Gudha. What made these samaritans change sides remains a
mystery. None of them were inducted into the ministry. Perhaps
they realized that it would pay in the long run to be with a leading
political formation like Congress, and since BJP being out of power
and faction-ridden looked like a sinking ship, they decided to throw
in their lot with the Congress, the ruling party. To be with the ruling
party was a better political option than to be with a waning opposition.
The Congress party came clean in this business. By denying them
ministerial positions, it can boast that it did not provide them with
any allurement to join it.
The Fateful 4.5 Percent Share of Rajasthan
In the House of the People consisting of 545 members, Rajasthan’s

share of just 4.5â•¯percent may seem woefully small. But since Rajasthan
is politically speaking a bipolar state where MPs have traditionally
belonged to only two parties—the Congress or the BJP—their number
becomes crucial in government formation at the center. When we look
at the electoral share of these parties in Rajasthan, their importance
becomes abundantly clear as shown in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1 affirms the importance of the party position in 2009 as
in previous elections. Once again the two major political formations
accessed nearly all the 25 seats with the Congress drubbing the BJP
by winning 20 seats. The BJP won 4 seats and an Independent,
Kirori Lal Meena, annexed the one seat of Dausa.
Table 10.1
Party Results 1991–2009
Year Name of party Number of seats won

1991 BJP 12
Congress 13
1996 BJP 12
Congress 12
Others 1
1998 BJP 5
Congress 18
Others 2
1999 BJP 16
Congress 9
2004 BJP 21
Congress 4
2009 Congress 20
BJP 4
Independent 1
Source: Times of India, New Delhi, April 8, 2009, p. 4.
The Die is Cast
Voting day came on May 7, 2009 for Rajasthan. It was a low turnout
largely because of voter apathy and/or fatigue. Scorching heat, an
absence of real political issues, and an auspicious day for weddings,
the 7th May, turnout was fairly disappointing. It was 16â•¯percent less3
than the turn out in the 2008 Assembly election. Results are shown
in Table 10.2:
The overall voteâ•¯percentage in the entire state for the 2008
Assembly election was 48.35.4 Table 10.2 has depressing participation
results. It shows that in 15 constituencies, the voting figure was less
than 50â•¯percent. Dausa recorded the highestâ•¯percentage of 64.07
and the lowest percentage was at Jalore which was 37.96. As stated
earlier, it could be either due to public apathy or the effect of mercury
hovering over 40°C in most parts of the state, which proved to be
a great dampener for a large number of voters to come and exercise
their franchise in this scorching heat.
Table 10.2
Comparative Voting Turnouts in 2008 Assembly and 2009 Parliamentary Elections
Voting percentage Voting percentage

in assembly in parliamentary
No. Name of district election 2008 election 2009
1. Ganganagar 60.95 39
2. Churu 52.53 40
3. Bikaner 41.16 40
4. Jodhpur 45.14 41
5. Badmer 54.42 42
6. Jalore 37.96 41
7. Pali 42.86 41
8. Nagaur 41.22 41
9. Rajsamand 39.67 39
10. Jaipur 48.26 39
11. Jaipur Rural 47.95 39
12. Jhunjhunu 42.62 39
13. Sikar 48.31 39
14. Ajmer 53.07 40
15. Bhilwara 50.54 42
16. Chittorgarh 49.59 41
17. Udaipur 46.37 39
18. Kota 45.45 42
19. Jhalawar Baran 60.26 41
20. Karoli-Dholpur 37.39 42
21. Bharatpur 39.00 39
22. Alwar 55.90 40
23. Banswara 52.67 42
24. Dausa 64.07 40
25. Tonk, Sawaimadhopur 52.99 42
Source: Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 8, 2009, p.1 and Dainik Bhaskar, (Jaipur),
April 9, 2009, p. 6.
Some cases of rigging were reported from Surajpura in Dausa

constituency where theâ•¯percentage of voting was 60+â•¯percent and the
miscreants wanted to raise it to 90 or 95â•¯percent.5 It was to be a noise
free, smooth, and silent operation so as to prevent another repoll.6
In villages dominated by either Meena or Gujjar communities,
this type of rigging was the order of the day. In Gujjar dominated
Bhandarej and Meena dominated Gothada, rigging was a planned
afair.7 In Shyamawal school polling booth, the presiding officer
was beaten black and blue by miscreants who were indulging in

fake voting, voter intimidation, and booth jamming. In Olwada,
a Meena dominated village, one person died owing to police firing
on stone pelting mob of Gujjars.8
Repoll was ordered in 60 polling booths which showed the extent
of rigging, fake voting, and acts of intimidation in which rival caste
groups indulged.
High Decibel Campaign

and Repoll Violence
During repoll, Gothada village in Dausa again became the epicenter of

poll violence. Polling was suspended again due to large scale rigging.
When poll observer Rajesh Kumar Misra, arrived at the scene, he was
aghast to see fake voting being indulged in due to the connivance of
polling party in favor of independent candidate Kirori Lal Meena.
He suspended four officials on the spot, which irked the Meena
community. He was attacked by the irate mob. The police resorted
to firing in which one 18 years old Jaikishan Meena was killed.9
Village Gothada had a third repoll on May 14, 2009. Only Meenas
numbering 234 exercised their franchise. The result was a resounding
win for Kirori Lal Meena the Independent candidate. He was the only
independent to win. For the rest, it was a complete rout of BJP which
was reduced to just four seats. Congress by wide margins annexed the
remaining 20 seats.
Post Mortem Analysis
The election results announced on May 16, 2009 showed a land-

slide in favor of Congress. The voteâ•¯percentage of various parties is
given in Table No. 10.3.
The election threw up 14 new faces. They are Sachin Pilot (Ajmer),
Devji Patel (Jalore–BJP), Jitendra Singh (Alwar), Harish Choudhary
Table 10.3
Party and Poll Percentage 2009
Name of party Poll percentage

Congress 36.82
BJP 34.27
BSP 7.60
Marxist 1.63
CPI 0.22
Independents and Others 14.97
Source: Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 17, 2009, p. 2.
(Badmer), Lal Chand Kataria (Jaipur Rural), Mahesh Joshi (Jaipur

City), Raghuveer Singh Meena (Udaipur), Mahadev Singh Khandela
(Sikar), Arjun Ram Meghwal (Bikaner–BJP), Khilari Lal Bairwa
(Karauli-Dholpur), Ileyraj Singh (Kota), Badri Ram Jhakhad (Pali),
Gopal Singh (Rajsamand), and Jyoti Mirdha (Nagore). All new faces,
barring two, belonged to Congress. The two BJP new faces were Devji
Patel from Jalore and Arjun Ram Meghwal from Bikaner.
The victory margin was over one lakh in the case of 11 candidates.10
The lowest victory margin of 317 votes was that of Namonarain Meena
of Congress, which was not only the lowest for Rajasthan, but for the
entire country.11 The lone Independent winner Kirorilal Meena was
also among those who won by over one lakh votes. BSP did not put
many competitive candidates, but in 14 seats it placed at number
three position.12 10 sitting BJP MPs lost their seats. They included
Manvendra Singh, V.P. Singh, Subhash Meharia, Nihal Chand, Pusp
Jain, Rasa Singh Rawat, Mahavir Bhagora, Srichand Kriplani, Jaswant
Bishnoi, and Kiran Maheshwari.
The Congress increased its vote share in 159 assembly segments in
20 Lok Sabha constituencies. They include Sriganganagar, Jhunjhunu,
Sikar, Jaipur city, Jaipur Rural, Alwar, Bharatpur, Karoli, Ajmer,
Tonk-Sawai Madhopur, Nagore, Pali, Jodhpur, Badmer, Udaipur,
Banswara, Chittorgarh, Rajsamand, Bhilwara, and Kota.13 The BJP
increased its vote share only in 18 assembly segments in the four Lok
Sabha constituencies of Bikaner, Churu, Jhalawar-Baran, and Jalore.14
BJP lost decisively in this election to the Congress party.
Education Index of Members
In terms of education, among the MPs elected, two are M.B.B.S.,

three M.A., four M.B.A., three Ph.D., two LL.B., one B.Sc., one
B.Com, one B.A., one B.E., one B.A., one undergraduate, and five did
not indicate their qualifications except stating that they were school
educated,15 which is a euphemism for school drop-outs.
Age Index
The age index of members elected is equally interesting. Only one

member, Sheesh Ram Ola was 82 years old. Among the rest, seven
were below 70, eight were below 60, three were below 50, and six
were either 40 or below.16 Perhaps this explains the appeal of Rahul
Gandhi and his youth brigade of the Congress party.
Representation of Erstwhile Royalty
India lives in an age of postcolonial egalitarianism, where the feudals

and bluebloods are officially denied the pompous and boastful prefixes
of Raja, Maharaja, and Nawab to mark them from the deglamorized
hoi polloi. Nonetheless, in practice traditional elitism continues and
references to their royal honorifics still persist and linger in public
memory and conversation. These lineages still have political utility
that sets then apart as nobles in the social hierarchy. Electoral value
remains attached to their royal backgrounds and hence both the
Congress and the BJP made liberal use of such bluebloods.
The BJP’s chief leader, ex-CM Vasundhara Raje is an ex-princess
of Gwalior state and the Maharani (queen) of Dholpur state. She had
put up the royal scion of Dholpur—her son Dushyant Singh—from
Jhalawar constituency on a BJP ticket. As a matching response, the
Congress gave tickets to three ex-royals—Princess Chandresh Kumari
of Jodhpur, Prince Bhanwar Jitendra Singh of Alwar, and Prince
Ileyaraj Singh of Kota. All four erstwhile royals won handsomely

with good margins. Four royals out of 25 winners is not a mean
achievement.
Caste Representation and

the Rahul Factor
Though officially denied, yet caste continues to be a winning factor

in constituencies dominated by some major castes. The Congress
made a selective use of caste groups and gave seven seats to Jats, four
to Rajputs, and three to Brahmins. The result of this caste arithmetic
was fantastic. It won 20 out of 25 parliamentary seats, which covered
159 assembly segments where it received the majority of votes in 159
out of 200 assembly segments. This is a big quantum jump from 2008,
when in the Assembly election Congress won 96 out of 200 seats.
The Congress Party ascribes this victory to better Congress rule
and the Rahul factor. Rahul Gandhi, the Congress general secretary
held rallies in eight constituencies and his party won in seven of them.
His magic worked in seven constituencies and failed only in one
constituency, Jhalawar. Other leaders like L.K. Advani and Narendra
Modi from the BJP, and Sonia Gandhi from the Congress, also made
selective appearances but they did not register a perceptible impact
on the electorate. Rahul being a youth icon made a big difference
to the electoral fortunes of the Congress party. Senior leaders from
both parties did not make a big impression with the electorate. They
appeared to be faded icons.
As against this, the caste wise representation given by the BJP
was Rajputs four, Jats four, Brahmins two, Vaishyas two, and others
like Rawat, Sindhi, Gujjar, and Jadav—one each.
Women Representation
Three women—Girija Vyas, Jyoti Mirdha, and Chandresh Kumari

won their electoral contests. They were all from Congress. The BJP
women failed in their effort to reach New Delhi. They lost both
Nagaur and Jalore seats. Women did not play a stellar role in Rajasthan
politics. Only one woman, Vasundhara Raje, became the CM for five
years ever since 1952. Some women were always given cabinet berths
but this seemed to be tokenism. By and large, women have not played
a very significant role in Rajasthan politics. This is largely owing to
the absence of charismatic women in this conservative and tradition
bound state. The sole exception was Vasundhara Raje—who got to
the top post—not because of her charisma and popularity, but because
she was the choice of BJP patriarch Bhairon Singh Shekhawat. He
wanted to edge out his political rivals in the BJP such as Lalit Kishore
Chaturvedi and Hari Shankar Bhabhara.
Elimination of Sitting Ducks
Political parties were not averse to fielding seasoned campaigners and

old warhorses in the election, but without much success. Three sitting
members of the Legislative Assembly—Ghanshyam Tiwari, Kiran
Maheshwari, and Rao Rajendra Singh—all from the BJP lost. The
lone CPM member Amra Ram also lost. But an independent, Kirori
Lal Meena, was victorious from Dausa. Previously, he served as the
MLA from Toda Bhim.
Reflection
This election indicates the sharp reversal of electoral fortunes. In 2004,

the BJP was victorious in 21 out of 25 Parliamentary segments. In
2009, the situation reversed as the BJP won only four seats as against
20 Congress wins. One Independent Kirori Lal Meena won from
Dausa. What accounts for this electoral somersault? Since Rajasthan
has a tradition of bi-party political alternation and domination at
different time intervals, one may look into the crucial causal factors of
BJP’s debacle and Congress’ landslide. These could be both national,
as well as local. One can first turn to broader national causes.
Varun Venom
However much the BJP talked about soft Hindutva, the atavistic
emotions raised by Varun Gandhi with his fire spitting communal
hate speech, “Chop off their hands/sterilise the Muslims,” was rabid
enough to torpedo the best laid plans of BJP. This was sufficient, not
only to scare Muslims but also a large section of Hindu secularists,
who found in Varun’s speech toxic products offloaded by the BJP.
It triggered the death knell of a shifting political matrix in which
BJP apparatchiks failed to salvage the damage done to the unity of
an amorphous NDA. The resulting slide in the electoral turf war was
toward the Congress.
It is important to note that following the communal carnage of
Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, the BJP was not inclined to accom-
modate Muslims in Rajasthan. It could bank upon the alienation of
Jats and state government employees from the Congress. The excesses
against Muslims in Gujarat did not impact the 2003 state election
in Rajasthan because of the Godhra episode involving the burning
of railway coaches of the Sabarmati Express. That in turn triggered
off revenge excesses against the Muslims. The alleged Muslim atro-
cities of Godhara were fresh in the minds of the Hindus in Rajasthan
in 2003.
BJP: A Party with a Difference Became a

Party of Differences
For long, BJP boasted of its ideological loftiness and commitment

to a cause. Little did it realize that it was soon to become a house
divided against itself, where its members would be jockeying for
leadership positions, more than showing a strong commitment to
ideology. It became a leaderless rump and a rudderless ship. The party
with a difference became a party of differences. For once, it was not
clear what Hindutva meant except perhaps, minority bashing. The
utterances of Varun became an albatross around its neck. It looked
like it was once again trying to revive the Hindu card, which neither
the vast majority of Hindus, nor the sadhus and saints of Ayodhya
were prepared to accept, given the track record of BJP in office during
their period of rule leading the NDA alliance. It steadfastly refused
to wreck the coalition for Ram Temple at Ayodhya’s disputed sight
and chose to remain ensconced in power on the alibi that it did not
have complete majority to up the ante in favor of constructing the
temple. The Hindu-based effort made a minor splash but failed to
jolt the masses into supporting the BJP.
With such an unenviable track record in office, and an ensuing
open war between Arun Jaitley and Rajnath Singh, Murli Manohar
Joshi and L.K. Advani at the center and Vasundhara Raje and Bhairon
Singh Shekhawat and his acolytes in Rajasthan, BJP was ill-equipped to
give a fight to a fully united and organizationally galvanized Congress
in Rajasthan. With Atal Behari Vajpayee taking a self exile, Pramod
Mahajan gunned down, and Bhairon Singh Shekhawat sidelined,
the theatre of the absurd was complete.
Their inherent dualism of playing to the Hindu gallery and trying
to mislead the Muslims in the name of nationalism backfired and
did not yield desired results. The people were fed up with BJP’s double
time. Imagine a victim of Jinnah’s communal politics of 1947, the
post partition Sindhi refugee from Pakistan, L.K. Advani giving a cer-
tificate of secularism to M.A. Jinnah 50 years after partition, thereby
indirectly admitting that BJP’s earlier stance toward the Muslim
League and its leaders was misplaced and incorrect. One may now
turn to local causes.
Deglamorized Queen Goes Berserk
Having been beaten and battered by Congress in Assembly election

2008, the BJP was badly mauled again in 2009 and its deglamorized
queen Vasundhara Raje had to eat humble pie. The impression she
gave during election campaigning was that she was resigned to the cruel
fate of an impending defeat and hence concentrated more on the one
seat of Jhalawar where from her son Dushyant Singh was contesting
than on the rest of Rajasthan. It was one seat versus the rest. The only
way she could defend her honor was by salvaging this one seat. The
result was a foregone conclusion. She could retrieve and retain this
one seat and bagged three more but lost the rest of the 21 seats in the
state. In her anxiety to help her son, she forgot Rajasthan. In the year
2004, she had won 21 out of 25 seats. This time the wheel had taken
a full circle, paving the way for the ascendance of Congress.
Sulking Saffron Brigade Paralyzed
The absence of a third front in Rajasthan resulted in a two-way

fight between the BJP and the Congress. There was no credible BSP
or LF. The fight was between two alternating parties in which the
winner took all. This time the winner was Congress. Success has
many patrons and followers but defeat has none. The BJP scurried
for cover, seeking scapegoats for the party’s most debilitating defeat.
Its leader Vasundhara Raje proved to be a drawing room strategist,
who compared the old guard to fossilized ruins, but she herself
failed to deliver.
She could walk on the ramp of fashion shows in Jaipur, but could
do no tight rope walking in the electoral arena and caved in meekly
before the determined onslaughts of a rejuvenated Congress, under
the leadership of an underestimated Ashok Gehlot. He led the party
to a splendid victory thereby proving once again within six months
his family credentials of being a magic performer. His father, the late
Laxman Singh Gehlot was a professional magician. His son decided
to forsake his family profession and join politics. Being down and out
for five years, his victory was no less phenomenal and magical. Verily,
he played political magic to resurrect his position.
The Endgame
The BJP was truly reduced to a heap of rubble. Said Prabhu Chawla,
the editor of India Today, “The BJP is now a party without slogan,
without a leader and without an ideology.”17 M.J. Akbar aptly
observed, “Votes go to those who sell the future, not to those who
rebrand the past.”18 As of today, the BJP has become a prisoner of the
past and its lost beatitudes. It is not a pilgrim of the future. It represents
a fibreless diet of past projections concerning old time Hindu glory
with nothing for the near future. It needs to invest some credible pro-
pulsion of political boosters to survive and progress. Instead of
projecting a new ideology, its leaders exhibit only ego-clashes clothed
in high sounding rhetoric. What is worse is that despite the bad
political drubbing it has received in the elections, its leaders are out
of sync with reality, without an honest post-mortem of its electoral
defeat. Its old and haggard leaders are still not willing to pass the baton
to the next generation and walk into the sunset.
To quote Umbreto Eco, “The earth is round, so if you go too
much to the left, you end up on the right and vice versa.”19 This is
the tragedy of BJP, which neither accepts the world as more equal
and accessible, nor does it realize that mild tectonic shifts in political
landscape can cause extraordinary upheavals. BJP has yet to learn fire
fighting mechanism and damage control devices. This is its tragedy
and predicament.
Notes
â•‡ 1. Outlook (Delhi) March 23, 2009, p. 32.

â•‡ 2. Times of India (New Delhi) March 21, 2009.
â•‡ 3. Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 8, 2009.
â•‡ 4. Dainik Bhaskar, May 9, 2009, p. 1.
â•‡ 5. Times of India (Jaipur) May 8, 2009, p. 1.
â•‡ 6. Ibid.
â•‡ 7. Ibid.
â•‡ 8. Ibid.
â•‡ 9. Times of India (Jaipur) May 11, 2009, p. 1.
10. Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 17, 2009, p. 10.
11. Times of India (Jaipur) May 18, 2009, p. 1.
12. Rajasthan Patrika, op. cit., p. 10.
13. Dainik Bhaskar (Jaipur) May 18, 2009, p. 7.
14. Ibid.
15. Rajasthan Patrika, p. 9.
16. Ibid.
17. India Today, June 29, 2009, p. 5.
18. Times of India (New Delhi) August 30, 2009, p. 12.
19. Ibid., p. 8.
Chapter 11
Kerala
The LDF’s Debacle:

Kerala Votes for National Stability
G. Gopa Kumar
The resounding victory of Congress-led United Democratic Front

(UDF) in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections did not surprise pollsters but
the mandate was significant in several respects. The INC following of
ruling India for decades had been on a decline since 1989. Congress
generally saw south Indian states as areas of consistent support.
Kerala’s national poll trends until 1996 showed, with few excep-
tions, a general trend for supporting Congress to produce stable
governments at the center. Between 1996 and 2004, this pattern from
the Kerala electorate lost its appeal and therefore it was crucial for the
Congress to revive the trend in the state.
Second, the electoral contest was an acid test for the ruling LDF
who gained 18 out of 20 Lok Sabha seats in 2004, 99 out of 140 seats
in the Assembly poll in 2006 and nearly 60â•¯percent of the seats in the
2005 Panchayat Raj Institution (PRI) elections. With the election
to the local bodies due in May 2010 and Assembly poll in May 2011,
the mandate became equally crucial for the LDF.
Another important factor that was tested in the contest was
the credibility of the CPI(M)-led LDF. It was in the limelight
for its allegedly big-brotherly attitude toward its allies and for the
controversial alliance it made with the PDP, led by Abdul Nasser
Maudani. Strategically, it sought to make inroads into the Muslim
The LDF’s Debacle 235
vote bank and thereby weaken the Muslim League, a middle sized
party in state politics.
In contrast, the Congress (I) in Kerala also had several issues and
policy positions to be tested before the electorate. Firstly, the return
of senior leader K. Karunakaran to the Congress fold after 28 months
had to be evaluated in terms of electoral dividends. Indeed, the NCP,
before the arrival of Karunakaran faction [called the Democratic
Indira Congress (Karunakaran){DIC(K)}], was not a major factor
in state politics. But with the merger of DIC(K) in 2007, the NCP
gained attention and a potential alliance with the LDF would have
made things difficult for the Congress (I). It did not happen because
of the resistance from the constituents of LDF, although a section of
the leadership in the CPI(M) was so inclined.
The NCP State President K. Muraleedharan, son of K. Karunakaran,
and his ranks refused to accept the decision of K. Karunakaran to join
the Congress (I) and the NCP stood independent of the two major
electoral fronts—the UDF and the LDF. Paradoxically, the NCP
State President K. Muraleedharan voluntarily resigned his President
ship on July 31, 2009 and sought membership in the Congress (I).
The immediate reaction of the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee
(KPCC) Executive Committee was negative.
Second, factionalism in the KPCC between three groups led by
Oommen Chandy, Ramesh Chennithala, and Vayalar Ravi demanded
a ceasefire so as to project a unified party before the electorate. The
KPCC had to bargain for more seats from her allies or at least contest
in 85â•¯percent of seats as it did in all the previous elections since 1984.
The demand of Muslim League for two seats and Kerala Congress
(Mani) [KC(M)] for one seat was understandable, but in the meantime
smaller parties in UDF also began demanding seats. Unless the UDF
consolidated itself, it could not compete with the strong LDF and
expose the latter for its political and administrative failures during
the last three years. Nonetheless, the UDF had several positions that
it could and did convert to its advantage.
1. Being a national election, the CPM/LDF chances of forming

a government were bleak.
236 G. Gopa Kumar
2. The Congress party and its allies had to be elected from Kerala
so as to resist the BJP’s rise to power, an especially attractive
issue in Kerala with a nearly 45â•¯percent minority population.
3. Highlight and expose the setbacks of an LDF government
already plague by intra and interparty disputes.
4. Intensify the anti-incumbency element in the minds of the
electorate as the LDF did in the 2004 election.
All these demanded a collective effort on the part of the Congress

and UDF to oil its machinery and provide morale and confidence to
the ranks of the party. Viewed from these angles, the contest became
crucial for the Congress (I), although the media in Kerala often focused
on the CPI(M) as its prestige contest. The contest was also crucial to
the Muslim League because in 2004 it lost its prestigious Manjeri seat.
With the CPM’s new appeal to the Muslim community, the League
was put into a defensive posture so regaining its support base became
very crucial and prestigious.
The relevance of the BJP and its front, the NDA, did not attract
much public attention. The situation had changed markedly from
2004. In 2004, the NDA polled 12.5â•¯percent votes and won the
Moovattupuzha seat by the Indian Federal Democratic Party (IFDP)
led by former Kerala Congress leader P.C. Thomas from the KC (M)
in a triangular contest. BJP also did well in Thiruvananthapuram,
Palghat, and Kasargode constituencies. The situation in 2009 had
completely changed. More over, unlike in 2004, the NDA faced
elections in 2009 sitting in Opposition and plunged into numerous
controversies. The hatred speech of Varun Gandhi against Muslims
during the campaign trail in UP brought a negative image for the BJP
and the Kerala scenario was not different. The stalwarts of the state
BJP leaders refused to contest, probably anticipating the negative
swing among the voters. The electoral result reflected this change as
the NDA declined in its vote share to 6.5â•¯percent in 2009 compared
to 12.5â•¯percent in the 2004 elections.
The landslide victory of the UDF in 2009 by winning 16 out of
20 seats was a remarkable achievement for the Congress and her
allies. At the national level, the share from Kerala, although not
a great number, was very important besides boosting the morale.
The Congress won 13 out of 17 seats contested, while the Muslim

League won its allotted two seats and the KC(M) one seat.
For both the Muslim League and the KC(M), the victory was
prestigious as both regained seats they lost in 2004 besides increasing
their respective vote shares. The Muslim League actively galvanized
its cadres since it faced two kinds of opposition. One was the CPM,
which since 2004 had been wooing the Muslim community by
attacking the extreme position of the BJP as well as attracting a section
of dissident Muslim League activists to its fold.
Second, the alliance within the LDF of the CPM and PDP led
by Maudani was raising potential challenges to the Muslim League.
Maudani attracted huge crowds in Malappuram and Calicut districts,
which are considered to be Muslim League strongholds. Moreover,
on the eve of the election, the CPM State Secretary Pinarai Vijayan
predicted that the Muslim League would not have any representation
in Parliament following the election. This message sent shock waves
to the leaders of the League.
For the KC(M), regaining the prestige it lost in 2004 became
very essential. The merger of IFDP with the rival Kerala Conress
(Joseph) [KC(J)] and its entry into the LDF made things somewhat
easier for the KC(M). The contest became bipolar and that too in
its heartland, Kottayam. Clearly, the anti-incumbency factor faced
by the LDF government significantly helped the KC(M). Therefore,
unlike the Muslim League, the KC(M) did not face severe obstacles
on its home turf.
The BSP, though not a force in Kerala, also tried to field candi-
dates in all the 20 constituencies. On the eve of election, some sections
of the media reported a possible understanding between LDF and
BSP but no progress actually was made in this direction. Especially
in the Thiruvananthapuram Lok Sabha seat, the BSP candidate
Neelalohitadasan Nadar was attracting some of the vote banks of UDF
and LDF candidates simultaneously. However, the BSP candidates was
not able to make a powerful presence, even in Thiruvananthapuram,
where it finished in a poor third position. Bi-polar politics has become
deeply entrenched in Kerala and other parties could not make their
presence easily felt (see Table 11.1).
238 G. Gopa Kumar
Table 11.1
A Framework of Alliances and Parties on the Eve of 2009 Elections
No. UDF LDF Other forces

1. Congress (I) CPI(M) BJP
2. Muslim League CPI JD(U)
3. Kerala Congress (M) RSP BSP
4. Kerala Congress ( Jacob) Kerala Congress (Joseph) NCP
5. Janadhpathya Samrakshana Congress (S) INL
Samiti
6. CMP JD(S) PDP
7. Kerala Congress (B) – SUCI
8. RSP (B) – CPI(ML)
9. – – DMK
10. – – AIADMK
11. – – SP
12. – – KDP
Source: Compiled from Mathubhumi (Trivandrum) and Malayala Manorama
(Trivandum).
The Thiruvananthapuram Lok Sabha seat attracted national and

international attention due to the presence of noted writer and former
Under Secretary General of UN Dr Shashi Tharoor, as the Congress
candidate. The seat was held by CPI in the LDF. Although, both the
Congress and CPI won the seat in the past elections, the contest in
2009 became prestigious. Local critics blamed Dr Tharoor for his lack
of political background or contacts in the constituency. But his impres-
sive victory by one lakh votes surprised his critics and friends alike.
Undoubtedly, the results indicate a clear trend in favor of bipolar
politics (see Table 11.2). The combined vote share of UDF and LDF
came to 89.6â•¯percent leaving little scope for three other national
parties—the BJP, the BSP, and NCP—who are deprived of any strong
constituent in their alliance to help them. Altogether, BJP, the BSP,
the NCP, and the rebel leftist candidates could not make any impact
in the electoral outcome. The NCP fielded five candidates and lost in
all the seats contested. Similarly, the BSP which fielded candidates
in all the 20 seats failed to make any impact. The BSP candidate,
A. Neelalohita Dasan Nadar polled 86,233 votes in Thiruvananthapuram
constituency, but his presence did not seem to affect the prospects of
UDF or LDF. Similarly, the NCP state president K. Muraleedharan
Table 11.2
Vote Share and Seats of Major Alliances
No. Alliance Seats won 2009 (%) Seats won 2004 (%) Difference (%)
1. UDF 16 47.7 1 38.4 +9.3
2. LDF 4 41.9 18 46.1 –4.2
3. BJP – 6.4 1 12.10 –5.6
Source: Available online at: http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPercentVotesPartyWiseChart.
aspx and http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPcWiseResult.aspx. (last date of access:
December 15, 2010).
polled 99,663 votes from Wayanad constituency, but did not in any
way affect the prospects of the Congress candidate.
Significantly, the share of the BJP votes fell by almost half in 2009.
It polled 6.2â•¯percent of the votes compared to its10.4â•¯percent and
12.10â•¯percent (including an ally) in 2004. Except in Kasaragod, where
it polled 1,25,482 votes, the performance of BJP was very poor in
2009. On the whole, before the Kerala electorate, the BJP had been
expected to strengthen the UPA government in Delhi or to extend
moral support to the LDF government in Kerala and thereby give
more strength to the Left Front–Third Front political leadership
at the national level. The results showed not only that the electorate
preferred the Congress-led UDF to win 16 out of 20 seats but also
inflicted a heavy loss to LDF in most of the constituencies. The LDF,
which won 18 out of 20 seats in 2004, was reduced to just four seats.
In terms of vote share, the UDF increased by 9.3â•¯percent while the
LDF lost 4.2â•¯percent in 2009 compared to 2004.
The biggest winner in the elections was the Congress (I) which
phenomenally increased its seats from zero in 2004 to 13 in 2009 and
an increase in vote share by 8â•¯percent (see Table 11.3). In terms of
vote share this was the highest for the party since 1977. The Congress
won the Alappuzha, Chalakudy, Ernakulam, Idukki, Kannur, Kollam,
Kozhikode, Mavelikara, Pathanamthitta, Thiruvananthapuram,
Thrissur, Vadakara, and Wayanad seats. The four seats it lost was
to its arch rival the CPI(M) who bagged these four seats only. The
victory of the Congress party was spectacular in Alappuzha, Vadakara,
Wayanad, Chalakudy, Kannur, Kollam, and Mavelikara—all CPM
constituencies previously.
240 G. Gopa Kumar
Table 11.3
Vote Share of Major Parties
Difference
No. Party Seats won 2009 (%) Seats won 2004 (%) (%)
1. Congress 13 40.10 – 32.10 +8.00
2. Muslim League 2 5.07 1 4.87 +1.20
3. KC(M) 1 2.53 – 1.39 +1.14
4. CPI(M) 4 30.50 13 31.50 –1.00
5. CPI – 7.44 4 7.89 –.45
6. KC(J) – 2.08 1 2.35 –.27
7. BJP – 6.20 1 10.40 –4.20
Source: Available online at: http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPercentVotesPartyWiseChart.aspx
and http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPcWiseResult.aspx. (last date of access: December
15, 2010).
From the CPI, it took Pathanamthitta, Thiruvananthapuram, and

Thrissur. It won Idukki from the KC(J). The victory of Dr Shashi
Tharoor in Thiruvananthapuram seat by a margin of 99,998 votes
attracted national attention. The Congress’ victory in Calicut was
by a small margin, but it was a prestigious contest against CPM.
Similarly, in Ernakulam, it wrested the seat from CPM by a margin
of 11,790 votes.
The UDF allies, the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and
Kerala Congress also made impressive victories. Much against the
attempt to marginalize IUML in Kerala politics through penetrating
into minority votes by CPM, besides the controversial alliance with
Abdul Nazir Maudani on the eve of elections, the League came back
successfully. It wrested the prestigious Ponnani seat from the CPM–
LDF backed an independent candidate Dr Hussain Randathani, while
retained the Malappuram seat by a big margin. It also increased its
vote share by 1.20â•¯percent and rebuked the CPI(M) claim that League
will have no representation in Parliament this time. On the whole,
the Muslim League candidates’ victory was impressive.
Similarly, the KC(M) candidate Jose K. Mani won his seat with a
huge margin and defeated the CPI(M) candidate Suresh Kurup who
won the seat in 2004. The vote share of KC(M) also increased by
1.14â•¯percent. Thus, unlike the setback, the KC(M) candidate received
in the prestigious Muvattupuzha seat in 2004, to its arch rival and
NDA-backed IFDP candidate, P.C. Thomas, the party could gain

the equally prestigious seat, Kottayam.
Thus, the electoral performance of the UDF candidates was
impressive except for the four seats it lost—Kasaragod, Alathur,
Attingal, and Palghat—although the loss in Palghat was by a small
margin of 1,820 votes. The victory in the Calicut seat was also by a
small margin of 838 votes. On the whole, all the three major consti-
tuents of UDF—the Congress (I), the Muslim League, and KC(M)—
had increased its vote share by a total of 10.34â•¯percent from its vote
share of 2004 which make the electoral trend very clear.
On the contrary, the three partners of the LDF lost the election by a
huge margin except in the Kozhikode seat. The CPI(M) lost Alappuzha,
Chalakudy, Ernakulam, Kannur, Kollam, Kozhikode, Pathanamthitta,
and Vadakara to the Congress candidates, Malappuram to Muslim
League, and Kottayam to the KC(M). Especially, the loss of Kannur
and Vadakara by big margins was a great set back. Similarly, by
snatching the sitting seat of JD(S), the CPI(M) fielded its candidate
in Calicut but eventually lost. The issue became very live on the cam-
paign phase resulting in the practical withdrawal of support by JD(S)
leadership. As events showed later, the JD(S) faction was accepted as a
new constituent of the UDF in the post-election phase. Nevertheless,
the CPM won the Kasargod and Alathur seats with huge margins,
besides Attingal and Palghat.
The CPI lost all the four seats it contested. It lost heavily in
Wayanad, Thiruvananthapuram, and Mavelikara, besides Thrissur.
None of its candidates raised any hope of victory during the campaign.
The war of statements between CPI(M) and CPI over seat sharing
on the eve of elections also affected the prospects of its party candi-
dates. The lone KC(J) candidate Francis George who earned good
reputation for nursing the Idukki constituency also lost the election
by a sizeable margin. The victory of the Congress candidate in Idukki
reflected the overall electoral trend of the state.1
Compared to 2004, the LDF lost 4.2â•¯percent of its vote share. In
terms of individual party strength, the loss of CPI(M) was huge. Unlike
in 2004, when it contested in 13 seats and polled 31.50â•¯percent votes,
the party contested 14 seats but polled only 30.50â•¯percent votes in
2009 (see Table 11.3). In 2004, it bagged all the 13 seats contested
242 G. Gopa Kumar
but this time it could win four seats only. Interestingly, loss of vote
share for CPI was less than 1â•¯percent (0.45â•¯percent) but it lost all the
four seats this time in contrast to winning four seats in 2004. Again,
the KC(J) lost the seat it held in 2004 and its vote share declined from
2.35â•¯percent to 2.08â•¯percent.
Explaining the Verdict:

Regional Issues or National Appeal?
It has been found in the state’s electoral politics that voters resort
to a kind of ticket splitting process. This means that voters clearly
distinguish between elections to State Legislature and Parliament
and redistribute their choices. While the UDF and LDF alternate in
coming to power in Kerala, the voting behavior has been different for
Parliament elections. A consensus seems to exist in favor of a stable
government, which often favored the Congress party. This trend
started declining particularly since 1996 and reached its peak in 2004.
But once the Congress-led UPA demonstrated its ability to provide a
secular and stable government, the Kerala electorate turned in favor
of the Congress-led UDF for the Lok Sabha election. Especially in
the backdrop of rising communalism and terrorism, there emerged a
consensus that Congress (I) is far more accountable than other party,
in addressing the grave challenges of contemporary India.
The post-poll survey conducted by CSDS in Kerala also supports
this observation. Moreover, the major national opposition party, the
BJP, did not make any worthwhile impact in Kerala politics. The
social demography and the history and impact of social movements
in Kerala together offer a major obstruction to the BJP for making
inroads in the electorate. Again, the CPI(M)-led LDF, though strong
in Kerala, did not assure any prospects for its Third Front alliance to
come to power in India. All these factors provided an early advantage
for the Congress party in this election.
But this provided only one side of the picture. The performance of
the LDF government which came to power exactly three years before
was certainly put to test in the election. Although, the leadership of
the LDF distanced itself from this argument, neither the UDF sitting
in the Opposition nor the powerful media spared the LDF from the
government performance issue.
Ever since the V.S. Achutanandan government came to power on
May 18, 2006, numerous problems haunted the government. These
included the issue of self-financing policy in the education sector,
failure of the government in providing adequate support in the health
sector, shortage of safe drinking water, ineffective role of Public Works
Department (PWD) in improving roads and bridges, rising prices of
essential commodities, corruption charges against ministers, depletion
of agricultural sector and crisis faced by farmers, disunity and lack of
coordination among ministers, war of statements by ministers and
party leaders against communal interest groups, etc. All these aspects
considerably damaged the prospects of the LDF. Added to this were the
three major issues that became highlighted on the eve of elections.
1. The SNC Lavalin controversy against the CPI(M) Party

Secretary, Pinarayi Vijayan.
2. The issue of aligning with the PDP led by Abdul Nazir
Maudani.
3. The disunity that emerged between the CPI(M) on one side
and its constituent allies, viz., the JD(S), the CPI, and RSP.
Needless to say, the print and electronic media highlighted these

problems before the electorate and discredited the government. Thus,
the anti-incumbency element reached its peak on the eve of elections.
At the same time, the performance of the government on the welfare
sector needed to be debated. The government was able to distribute
most of the welfare benefits to the poor people which partly explain
the LDF’s creditable vote share of nearly 42â•¯percent. Even at the peak
of the anti-incumbency element, the CPI(M) was able to win four
seats although none of its partners were able to secure any seat.
The electoral verdict clearly demonstrates the disenchantment of
the major social groups—the Christians, the Muslims, and the Nair
communities, although for different seasons. The CSDS survey results
show that the UDF gained significantly among Christians in com-
parison to 2004 (see Table 11.4); while the LDF lost substantially
244 G. Gopa Kumar
among Nairs as well as Christians. The study shows that LDF lost
support across almost all sections, though not in equal measure.
The LDF retained its traditional base among Ezhavas and Dalits.
However, its popularity among the Scheduled Tribes (STs) is declin-
ing compared to its appeal among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) (see
Table 11.4).
Probably one explanation for this new phenomenon is due to
the LDF’s controversial policy on the tribal land question. The land
struggles of the tribal community led by C.K. Janu and others in
Malabar and Chengara had led to the marginalization of LDF’s sup-
port base. The LDF’s attempt to garner fresh Muslim votes through
a controversial tie up with PDP led by Maudani boomeranged.2
A majority of the respondents in Kerala disapproved this tie up.3
Similar were the attitude of CPI, RSP, and a section of CPI(M) led
by the Chief Minister V.S. Achutanandan. As a matter of fact, the
PDP is considered as an extreme communal force compared to the
moderate role played by the Muslim League.
The CSDS study found that LDF is more popular among poor
(52â•¯percent), equally popular among lower middle income group
(45â•¯percent) but not among middle income (39â•¯percent) and high
income groups (32â•¯percent). The comparative figures of UDF are
38â•¯percent, 45â•¯percent, 41â•¯percent, and 53â•¯percent, respectively.4
Table 11.4
Caste–Religion Wise Preference of Parties
Party Voted for Lok Sabha 2009

No. Categories UDF (%) LDF (%) BJP (%) Others (%)
1. Nairs 32.9 27.1 28.6 11.4
2. Other Upper Caste 37.5 45.8 16.7 –
3. Ezhavas 26.8 57.0 7.4 8.7
4. Other OBC 22.0 46.3 12.2 19.5
5. SC 15.4 69.2 3.1 12.3
6. ST 60.0 40.0 – –
7. Muslim 68.2 26.4 – 5.4
8. Christian 68.2 31.8 – –
9. Others 55.6 44.4 – –
Total 44.8 41.8 6.5 69.6
Source: CSDS Post Poll Survey, 2009.
Significantly, 70â•¯percent of the sample mentioned V.S. Achutanandan

as their preferred CM.5 This result further substantiates the claim
of the media that the CM enjoyed popularity among the people for
his commitment to corrupt free administration and principled
politics at a time when the CPI(M) and its key leaders, including
few ministers, lost their credibility among the people. The CSDS
data highlights that V.S. Achutanandan should lead the LDF (with
a popular rating of 69â•¯percent; see Table 11.10). As events proved,
the factional tussle in CPI(M) reached its peak on the eve of elections
and damaged the party severely. The CM V.S. Achutanandan lost
his membership in the party’s highest-level body, the Politburo,
soon after the verdict.
The Lavalin controversy6 also damaged the CPI(M) at a time
when the CM resorted to distance himself from the allegation and
demanded judicial probe. The consistent position of the CPI(M)
Secretary Pinarayi Vijayan in denying the allegation and at the same
time refusing to cooperate for a judicial probe raised doubts in the
public mind. Significantly, three weeks after the verdict, on June 7,
2009, the Governor initiated legal steps for prosecuting the alleged
leaders and officials. Many of the constituent allies of the LDF also
demanded a judicial probe that added substance and credibility to
the allegation.
The position of CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat in defend-
ing his colleague was also not appealing. He argued that Pinarayi
Vijayan held the position of Electricity Minister when the controversy
arose in 1999 and he would have resigned for facing a probe had he
held a post in the current government. His position as Party Secretary
therefore does not warrant a resignation. This argument did not
convince the voters. Altogether, the Lavalin controversy dominated
the discourse in the campaign. The CSDS survey also supports this
argument. Only12â•¯percent believed that the charges are baseless,
while 32â•¯percent held that Pinarayi Vijayan’s role in the scam cannot
be denied (see Tables 11.5 and 11.6).
Similarly, the attempt of the CPI(M) to attract Muslim voters by
aligning with the PDP and its leader Abdul Nazir Maudani also reacted
negatively in the public mind. Maudani, who was imprisoned for
nine-and-a-half years allegedly for being involved in the Coimbatore
246 G. Gopa Kumar
Table 11.5
Voter’s Views on SNC Lavalin Case
No. Response Validâ•¯percent

1. Charges are baseless 11.9
2. Role in scam can not be denied 32.4
3. No opinion/Don’t Know 25.2
4. N.A 30.4
Total 100.0
Table 11.6
Have You Heard about the Corruption Charges against
Pinarayi Vijayan in the Lavlyn Scam?

1. Yes 69.6
2. No 30.4
Total 100.0
Bomb Blast in 1998, was released in 2008 when the prosecution failed
to prove the charges against him. The LDF seized the opportunity by
courting with his party, as they did in the 2006 Manjeri experiment
that paid dividends then. The Muslim League lost the prestigious
Manjeri seat in 2004, but since then the League effectively prevented
the CPI(M) inroads into their base.
Moreover, the constituents of the LDF, the CPI, RSP, and Janata
Dal, were opposed to the last minute tie up with the PDP, fearing
reactions from the civil society. The CSDS data also support this
assumption. According to their survey, 71â•¯percent have heard about
the LDF’s controversial alliance with Abdul Nazir Maudani. Only
7.5â•¯percent in the sample fully approve of this alliance in contrast to
34â•¯percent who fully disapproved (see Table 11.7). In reality, this had
occurred and, in turn, the League was able to stage a comeback. The
League leadership commented that the PDP–CPI(M) alliance had
put on risk peace and secularism but the people rejected the Ponnani
experiment.7
Another issue was the problem related to the government policy on
self-financing of the education sector. The Christian-run educational
Table 11.7
Approval Rating on LDF’s Alliance with Abdul Nassir Maudani

1. Fully approves 7.5
2. Somewhat approves 9.6
3. Somewhat disapproves 4.6
4. Fully disapproves 34.4
6. N.A 25.6
Total 100.0
agencies derived additional benefits in starting now professional

colleges in the previous UDF government but found itself locked up
with the LDF government. Eventually, this led to a war of statements
between various Christian groups on the one side and M.A. Baby,
the Minister for Education on the other side. In all the three years, the
controversy thrived and no rational policy choice was in sight. The
problem led to polarization pushing most of the Christian Church
groups to issue pastoral letters to defeat the LDF.
The media observed a Christian wave against the LDF. The high
margin of victory by the UDF candidates in Pathanamthitta, Idukki,
Kottayam, Chalakudy, Alappuzha, and Mavelikara further sub-
stantiates the effectiveness of Christian consolidation against the
LDF. The setback also affected KC(J) in Idukki. Although it was
expected to serve as a link between the Church and the LDF, nothing
productive was achieved.
The disunity among the partners of the LDF was another factor
that affected their prospects. Ever since 2006, the CPI was quick to
react against the big brotherly attitude of CPI(M). There were many
occasions when the CPI State Secretary Veliyam Bhargavan made open
statements against the domination of CPI(M) in the LDF. This also
led to a poor chemistry in the unity of ministers in the Cabinet.
Once the electoral scenario emerged, the non-CPI(M) parties of
LDF came out with complaints that the CPI(M) is entering into their
electoral space. For instance, the CPI was asked to leave its claim
on Ponnani seat and be content with three seats and support an
independent LDF candidate in Ponnani. After significant dispute,
248 G. Gopa Kumar
Table 11.8
Who Should Lead the UDF in Kerala?
No. Name Validâ•¯percent

1. Oommen Chandy 34.3
2. A.K. Anthony 35.7
3. K. Karunakaran 9.6
4. None of the Three 2.2
5. Others 1.5
Total 100.0
Table 11.9
A Non-coalition View on Voter’s Party Preferences
No. Party Valid percent

1. Congress 26.0
2. BJP 4.2
3. CPI 2.9
4. CPI(M) 25.3
5. BSP 0.5
6. NCP 0.5
7. SP 0.1
8. TDP 0.1
9. Praja Rajyam 0.1
10. CPI(ML) 0.1
11. IUML 5.7
12. JSS(UDF) 0.1
13. Any other small ally 0.1
14. Independent 1.1
15. Don’t Know 1.1
16. Blank/Refused 32.0
Total 100.0
CPI was allotted the unsafe seat in Wayanad and the rift temporarily
ended up there. Another complaint emerged from RSP who wanted to
regain its Kollam seat. The CPI(M) denied the seat but RSP did not
make any further claim [the Kollam seat was subsequently captured
by Congress (I) in a sharp electoral battle with the CPI(M)].
The major issue of disunity emerged in LDF when the JD(S)
was denied its sitting seat in Kozhikode. Earlier, the rift between
Table 11.10
Who Should Lead the LDF in Kerala: V.S. Achutanandan or Pinarayi Vijayan?
No. Name Validâ•¯percent

1. V.S. Achutanandan 69.1
2. Pinarayi Vijayan 8.8
3. None of the Two 5.1
4. Others 2.0
6. Total 100.0
the JD(S)’s President MP Veerendra Kumar and CPI(M) came into

the open in 2006. The popular newspaper, Mathrubhoomi, edited by
MP Veerendra Kumar came up with a clear anti-CPI(M) stand that
continued since 2006 and played a critical role in highlighting the
Lavalin Case. Once the Kozhikode seat was denied, the JD(S) declared
its intention to adopt an anti-CPI(M) position.
The JD(S) extended tactical support to the UDF candidates in
Kozhikode, Vadakara, Palghat, and Kannur constituencies. The
victory of UDF candidates in three out of these four seats also can be
attributed to the support extended by JD(S). Soon after the debacle,
the LDF dropped the JD(S) faction led by MP Veerendra Kumar from
LDF. Eventually, this faction joined the UDF in the post-electoral
scenario. A small section of JD(S), rival to the MP Veerendra Kumar
faction, continued in the LDF.
Conclusion
On the whole, the resounding victory of UDF in capturing 16 out of

20 seats compared to just one out of 20 seats in 2004 can be attributed
to two strong factors:
1. The preference to the Kerala electorate to vote for Congress in

Lok Sabha elections, especially charged with a situation of rising
communal tempo and terrorism, which could offer national
stability and governance, and,
250 G. Gopa Kumar
2. the strong wave of anti-incumbency element against the LDF

government in Kerala, which was marred with charges of
corruption, poor governance, and disunity in the alliance.
Both the fronts moved in opposite directions compared to the

2006 Assembly election. Strong unity developed in the Congress,
especially with the return of the Karunakaran faction to the party,
after a gap of more than three years. In fact, there was no conflict in
regard to the popularity of UDF’s leadership. According to the CSDS
survey, both Oommen Chandy and A.K. Antony enjoyed co-equal
preference among voters on the question of the leadership roll in
UDF (see Table 11.8). Other constituents displayed unity and waited
for the opportunity to cash in. The results also show the UDF gaining
back substantial minority votes compared with the 2004 and 2006
elections. The LDF and CPI(M) were marred with interparty and
intraparty quarrels, exactly the way UDF and Congress faced the Lok
Sabha elections in 2004 and Assembly elections in 2006.
Since, coalition politics has come of age in Kerala and bipolar
politics had strongly settled in, the individual strength of each party
has become difficult to measure except through empirical surveys.
Indeed, almost all governments in Kerala were coalition governments.
The Kerala model of coalition politics emerged out of expediency
produced by a variety of factors.8 In this context, it will be interesting
to compare the relative strength of political parties in the event they
contest independently, eschewing alliances of whatever kind.
A Non-coalition View on voter’s party preference, according to
a CSDS 2009 survey suggests the following data—the Congress
garnering 26â•¯percent, CPI(M) 25.3â•¯percent, IUML 5.7â•¯percent,
BJP 4.2â•¯percent, CPI 2.9â•¯percent, BSP and NCP 0.5percent (see
Table 11.8). However, the electoral performances of these parties
within their respective coalitions present a different picture. For
instance, Congress received 40.10â•¯percent, CPI(M) 30.50â•¯percent,
IUML 5.07â•¯percent, BJP 6.2â•¯percent, CPI 7.44â•¯percent, etc. Thus,
there exists a considerable difference in a party’s strength in two dif-
ferent situations.
With the civic polls coming closer in 2010 and Assembly election
due in 2011, it would be interesting to watch the changing dynamics
of state politics. Already, the CPI(M) had started internal cleansing

program in the party which would lead to further political develop-
ments. The morale of Congress and UDF is very high now with a
record number of representatives in the Union Ministry resulting
from the Lok Sabha poll. The entry of JD(S) faction led by MP
Veerendra Kumar also brings additional strength to the UDF in this
situation. However, it is always interesting to watch Kerala politics,
because one cannot anticipate what is in store in the next moment of
political development.
Notes
1. C. Gouridasan Nair, “Time for Introspection, Hard Decision,” The Hindu,

May 17, 2009, p. 4.
2. “The UDF’s Turn this Time, How India Voted: Verdict 2009,” The Hindu
(Supplement), May 26, 2009, p. 4.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. The `â•›300 crore SNC Lavalin scam raised a huge controversy in the 2009 elections
because of the alleged involvement of CPI(M) Secretary Pinarai Vijayan. He has
been charged by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) with conspiracy and
indulging in corruption. He was accused of wrongly awarding a contract to the
Canadian company SNC Lavalyn for renovation and modernization of hydel
power projects at Pallivasal, Shengulam, and Panniar in late 1990s, when he was
a Minister in the LDF government. According to the CPI(M), the LDF preferred
a deal with the Canadian company because it could help find funds for Malabar
Cancer Centre, a cancer research center and hospital at Tellicherry in Kannur
District. The deal was finalized after the SNC Lavalyn promised to arrange
USD40 million from Canadian funding agencies as grant. But the Canadian
government later informed the Kerala government that funds of that magnitude
would not be possible. The LDF accused the UDF and Congress-led government
(2001–06) responsible for this scam.
7. The Hindu, May 17, 2009, p. 5.
8. G. Gopa Kumar, “A Verdict Against Non-performance and Factionalism,” in
Sandeep Shastri, K.C. Suri and Yogendra Yadav (eds), Kerala: Electoral Politics
in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2009), p. 95.
Chapter 12
Maharashtra
Maharashtra: Still a Bipolar System,

but Turmoil Ahead
Congress and NCP did not have a pre-electoral alliance for the 1999
Lok Sabha or Assembly elections, resulting in their disappointing
performance. In 2004, they entered into a pre-electoral alliance, not
only between themselves, but also with JD(S)] and three factions of
the RPI. In terms of the share of votes and seats won, the honors were
almost even between the Congress–NCP alliance and the BJP and
Shiv Sena (SS) combine. On the eve of the 2009 elections, it was
difficult to hazard a guess. Almost everyone had written off Raj
Thackeray’s MNS. But the Congress–NCP alliance won five seats
more and about 4â•¯percent votes more than the rival combine. In
comparison with their performance in 2004, the Congress–NCP
alliance got three seats more in 2009. But their share of votes fell by
about 3â•¯percent. The BJP–SS alliance not only lost five seats, but also
their share of votes declined by about 7â•¯percent.
In 2009, both the alliances seethed with tremendous internal
tensions. The Congress–NCP alliance was rocked by the flip-flop
tactics of Sharad Pawar, the founder of the NCP and also described as
the “Maratha Strong Man,” who has been nursing Prime Ministerial
ambitions. The tensions in the BJP–SS alliance stemmed from the
SS being torn between its nativist regard for Pawar and its willingness
to even break the alliance in order to see Pawar as Prime Minister.
Still a Bipolar System, but Turmoil Ahead 253
Over the years the Congress has become weaker, and it is now being
compelled to share the same shrinking base with NCP. BJP–SS also
has been poaching on the same base. A brief historical perspective is
necessary to understand how various social forces developed and broke
into, and are breaking into the political arena.
Sociopolitical Forces in Maharashtra
The last quarter of the 19th century saw the beginning of a social
churning in Maharashtra. The emergence of enlightenment in the
Mumbai–Pune area produced many movements and stirrings for social
equality, and rejection of the social and ritualistic hegemony of the
Brahmins. Jotirao Phule established the Satya Shodhak Samaj (Truth
Seeking Society) in 1873 to liberate the Shudras and ati-Shudras
from the exploitation of the Brahmins. He not only campaigned
against prevailing evil social practices like child marriages, widows not
being encouraged to remarry, but also rejected the Vedas, idolatry,
etc. He fought against the Brahmin hegemony in education as well.
Shahu Maharaj of the Kolhapur Princely State and Ambedkar
carried on his legacy. While Shahu Maharaj’s leadership ultimately
generated mainly the Maratha consciousness and identity, that of
Ambedkar led to the formation of the Mahar, a major SC identity
and its assertion.
It is noteworthy that similar non-Brahmin movements emerged in
the Tamil areas of the Madras Presidency and Princely Mysore. Both
were led by non-Brahmin landed gentry castes. But the element of
social reform and upliftment of the Dalits was absent in south India.1
In Maharashtra, the movement for social reform gathered mom-
entum, but gradually petered out by the middle of the 20th century
and the contours of caste politics started emerging. In the 1930s and
1940s, the Marathas entered Congress and began to displace the
Brahmins. Also, the Shivaji cult, which the Maharashtrian Hindus
have been cultivating and celebrating with gusto, contains a strong
element of Hindutva.
While the unilingual states of Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam, and
Kannada speakers were formed in 1956, the bilingual state of Bombay
254 Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur
comprising Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking areas was also formed.

The formation of unilingual Maharashtra required an extraordinary
political movement. The struggle of the Maharashtrians, led by the
Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Committee),
which was waged between 1956 and 1960, was more protracted and
bitter than even the struggle for the formation of Andhra Pradesh,
the Telugu-speaking state. Nearly 105 persons were killed in the
agitation. The struggle received support from all parties and openly
from within the Congress. Finally, Maharashtra state was formed in
1960. The struggle contained the seeds of Maharashtrian ownership
of Mumbai and Marathi nativism.2
The creation in 1960 of the new state released the energies of the
Marathas. The first CM, Y.B. Chavan, who was above casteism and
a follower of M.N. Roy, energetically pushed through the Panchayati
Raj system. At the district levels, new power centers of the Marathas
emerged. Constituting about 40â•¯percent of the population, the
Marathas lorded it over the major social, political, and economic
resources. Sugar, other cooperative societies, and cooperative banks
became their resources of power, subsequently followed by edu-
cational institutions. They have been the major beneficiaries of
irrigation. Sugarcane is now grown on 2â•¯percent of the irrigated land,
but consumes about 60â•¯percent of the water.
A new cumulation of inequalities emerged. A highly integrated
and almost impregnable system of patronage, hierarchy, and clientel-
ism came to be established under Maratha dominance.3 But unlike
the dominant castes of Lingayats and Vokkaligas of Karnataka, the
Marathas did not want to get themselves included among the OBCs.
Probably, in the beginning this could have been due to the Maratha
amour propre. They have woken up 40 years later! The Maharashtra
OBC list was drawn along the strict constructionist interpretation
of the Constitutional phrase “socially and educationally backward.”
Ambedkar’s Dalit movement, actually Mahar, dates back to
the pre-independence days. He founded the All India Scheduled
Caste Federation in 1942, which failed to take off for several years.
His Mahar-based movement gathered momentum after 1950 and
culminated in 1956 when Ambedkar and thousands of other Mahars
converted to Buddhism. He had also mooted the idea of a RPI,
which was founded in 1956. But, the party is now fragmented into
many splinters. The other Dalit castes do not always join the Mahars.
In terms of numbers, the Dalits are about 13â•¯percent of the state’s
population, but they are always socially and politically divided.
The social reformers of Maharashtra tried to root out evil Hindu
practices. But, the reality at the ground level could not be altered. The
landowners are mostly Marathas and many Dalits work as laborers
on their land.
Founded by Bal Thackeray in 1966, SS received a good deal of
overt and covert support from the Congress leaders. Earlier, his
Marathi weekly, Marmik, used to make some noise about the merger
of Belgaum and Karwar with Maharashtra. After 1966, it developed
the following program:
1. the issue of Maharashtrians being deprived of jobs,

2. a stance against south Indians and other non-Maharashtrians,
3. a pro-Hindu attitude, and,
4. anti-communism.4
The SS entered trade union movements, women’s and students’

wings, and local committees to keep an eye on the recruitments of
jobs.5 In the process, it weakened or ousted the trade unions affiliated
not only to the communist parties, but to the erstwhile Praja Socialist
Party. In the beginning, it received enthusiastic support from the
lower and middle class Maharashtrian Hindus in the Mumbai-
Thane areas and across all castes including OBCs. Many Congress
leaders and CMs were sympathetic to SS, and took its help to weaken
the communists.
But the fortunes of the SS declined between 1977 and 1984. Then
SS sought to revive itself, and became a strong and strident supporter
of Hindutva. Around 1984, the party began to attract other linguistic
groups in Bombay, and started wooing back the Marathi speakers.6
In 1987, the Marmik gave itself a new and clearer motto: “The only
magazine which fights for the just rights of the Marathi speaking
people and for the protection of Hindutva.” In the 1985 elections to
the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, it won 74 seats out of the 139
it contested. Hebsur, etâ•¯al.7 have calculated the rank order correlations
between population percentages of the different linguistic groups in

11 zones of Mumbai and the percentages of the votes of different
political parties in 1985. The correlation values for BJP/SS are: for
Hindi, +0.74; Gujarati, +0.58; Marathi, +0.97; Urdu, –0.14; South
Indian languages, +0.10; other languages, +0.43 (see Table 12.1). The
Hindutva agenda of SS found support, in varying degrees, from almost
all the linguistic groups in Mumbai. In 1989, the party’s Marathi
daily, Saamna was launched.
During the aftermath of the 1977 Lok Sabha elections, Sharad
Pawar quit Congress and founded his own party, Congress (S). When
he returned after a gap of about eight years to Congress in 1986,
he left behind a Congress (S) party structure. This created political
space, which the SS then occupied.8 Pawar left Congress for the
second time in 1999, ostensibly on the issue of Sonia Gandhi’s
Italian origin, and founded the NCP. Hansen9 further argues that
industrialization and commercialization of Maharashtra’s rural
economy weakened the Maratha dominated clientele structure. Also,
Table 12.1
Rank Order Correlations between Party Votes and Size of Linguistic Groups:
Bombay Municipal Elections, 1985*
South
indian Other
Party Hindi Gujarati Marathi Urdu languages languages
Congress (I) and (S) +0.68 +0.58 +0.96 +0.03 +0.06 +0.56
BJP/SS +0.74 +0.58 +0.97 –0.14 +0.10 +0.43
Janata Party +0.93 +0.86 +0.68 +0.44 +0.75 +0.90
Muslim League +0.41 +0.68 –0.05 +0.71 +0.45 +0.89
Source: R.K. Hebsur, Jacob A. Aikara, Chandan Sengupta, S. Siva Raju, Factors
Contributing to the Bombay Riots and Violence, 1992–93. A Report submitted to
the (Justice B.N. Srikrishna) Commission of Inquiry (Mumbai: Tata Institute
of Social Sciences, 1995), p. 71.
Note: *After, and including the 1971 Census, the Census ward wise breakdowns of
linguistic and religious groups for Mumbai have not been reported. Hence,
Hebsur etâ•¯al. (1995) had to use projections of these groups for the 11 census
wards/zones on the basis of the 1961 figures for deriving the 1981 estimates. They
also tried to derive the correlations between the estimated sizes of the religious
groups and votes for the parties. But, the correlations did not give a correct fit.
Hence, only the correlations between the linguistic groups and party votes have
been presented.
SS’s employment of warrior idioms appealed to the younger Marathas

and even the OBCs. Hemmed in by the two Maratha-led Congress
parties and the two Hindutva parties, the OBCs of Maharashtra could
not emerge as an autonomous political force.
Between 2004 and 2009
Narayan Rane, who began his political career with SS, rose to become
the CM of Maharashtra in February 1999. He held the post for
about nine months. Driven by a burning ambition to lead the SS and
chafing at the rise of Uddhav Thackeray, a son of the SS supremo
Bal Thackeray, he left the party, joined Congress and was made a
minister. His outburst against Ashok Chavan being made the CM
in December 2008 led to his suspension from the Congress. He soon
learnt his lessons about the Congress culture, relented, was taken
back into the party and again made a minister. In 2009, he got his
son elected on a Congress ticket to the Lok Sabha. Rane’s leaving the
SS is one of the factors that have weakened the party in the coastal
strip of Konkan.
Resenting the senior Thackeray’s choice of Uddhav as his successor,
Raj Thackeray, a nephew of Bal Thackeray, left the SS in March
2006. But, most of the leaders of SS were comfortable with Uddhav’s
gentle posturing and collegial approach. Having toured Maharashtra,
Raj Thackeray announced the formation of MNS and revived the
nativist agenda of Marathi manoos (“the Marathi common man.”)
He announced the following program:
1. Raising the status of Maharashtrians and restoring the glory of

Maharashtra.
2. Striving for the cultural and material prosperity of the state.
3. Bringing the people of Maharashtra together regardless of caste,
religion10 or class under its flag.
4. Protecting the interest of Marathi manoos.
5. Engaging all centers of power in a constructive way, but not
shying away from conflict.
6. Making Marathi compulsory in schools.
He defined Marathi manoos as the person living in the state and

born to Marathi parents, or one, though of a different linguistic origin,
speaks Marathi and loves Maharashtra.11
Raj Thackeray’s followers have adopted what Palshikar12 has called
the SS strategy of oversimplifying reality and resorting now and then to
spontaneous direct action. Raj Thackeray’s virulent speeches provoked
MNS members to attack North Indians in Mumbai and Nashik in
February 2008. Actually, the SS had started such attacks earlier. The
party’s cadres in 2004 attacked north Indian candidates who came to
Mumbai for railway jobs. Raj Thackeray criticized the Hindi cinema
superstar Amitabh Bachchan for the latter’s alleged lack of loyalty to
Maharashtra. Bachchan is supposed to have said that he had lived in
Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, but he is recognized as a man from
the banks of the Ganga. Sudheendra Kulkarni, till recently a BJP
ideologue, wrote to Raj Thackeray an open letter, which contained,
among others, the following points: (a) Raj Thackeray is doing good
work of imparting technical training to the Maharashtrian youth.
(b) All persons should be proud of their regional culture without
being parochial. (c) If Raj opposes the Bihari festival of Chhaat
Pooja, what about Ganesh Chaturthi outside Maharashtra? (d) His
anti-North Indian campaign is ill advised and condemnable. And,
(e) Maharashtrian youth should be trained in entrepreneurship.
Raj Thackeray’s response was spontaneous and acerbic. He
responded: (a) The stir against north Indians is not unconstitutional.
Maharashtrians participate in Gujarati Garba and Bengali Navaratri.
(b) The Chhat Pooja is not a religious festival, but a show of strength
by the Bihari ruffians. (c) Every political party has indulged in polit-
ical violence at some time or the other. The political history learnt by
him tells him that breaking laws, braving lathis and getting arrested
are symbols of practical agitations.13 In the elections to the Mumbai
Municipal Corporation in 2007, the MNS had won only seven seats.
In the beginning, the SS leaders used to dismiss Raj’s speeches and
actions as “a fly buzzing about the tiger’s head.” Now, they realize
that MNS is a party to reckon with.
The Presidential elections of July 2007 constituted the first inci-
dent to jolt the alliance between SS and BJP. The BJP-led NDA
put up Bhairon Singh Shekhawat against the Congress-led UPA’s
Pratibha Patil, a domiciled Maharashtrian although the family is

Rajasthani Rajput. Despite BJP pleadings, SS directed its MLAs and
Lok Sabha members to vote for Mrs Patil.
Between November 2006 and March 2007, elections were held to
the Municipal Councils, Corporations, Zilla Parishads, and Panchayat
Samitis. SS and BJP had an alliance, but Congress and NCP contested
separately. Congress was the biggest winner of the total number of
seats.14 But, SS–BJP managed to retain control of Mumbai (a hat-trick),
Nagpur, and Thane Municipal Corporations with their rich resources.
In Pune, NCP and SS joined hands after the election and elected an
NCP mayor and SS deputy mayor! It was evident that Congress
and NCP were holding each other back for various reasons.
Mumbai is the financial and commercial heart of India. A sub-
stantial proportion of central government taxes is generated in
Mumbai. According to the city’s business and industrial leaders,
peace and security of Mumbai facilitates the growth of business
and investments, both domestic and foreign. When the communal
riots of 1992–93 did not subside, the city’s industrial and business
magnates called on the CM urging him to bring the situation under
control. The city has been a target of terrorist attacks since the
communal riots of 1992–93. Between 2004 and 2009, there were
two such major attacks. In July 2006, bombs went off in suburban
trains. On November 26, 2008, ten terrorists came by sea from
Pakistan, went to six select places in the city and killed people
indiscriminately. Congress feared that this attack would give BJP
an opportunity to raise the question of security of India and cost
the party many votes. Soon after, Vilasrao Deshmukh, the CM of
Maharashtra, was replaced.
Run-up to the Elections
When the Congress declared in March 2009 that incumbent

Manmohan Singh would be the PM designated for the coming
elections, the Maratha strong man Pawar shot back saying Manmohan
Singh was the candidate of the Congress, and not the UPA. Having lost
to Narasimha Rao in 1991, he obviously had not given up. He kept
channels open to almost all the non-Congress parties. His followers

too, kept on repeating the claim that Pawar was the right choice for
PM and SS had declared that the party would prefer Pawar to Advani.
But, to console the BJP, the SS would say that they would do so, only
if Advani was unable to get sufficient support.
BJP asserted that if Pawar could not handle the agriculture port-
folio well, how he could become the Prime Minister. Bal Thackeray
is reported to have said, “… [A] Marathi PM is my idea. At a Sena
conclave held years ago, which Pawar attended, we had said that he
should set his eyes on Delhi [Prime Ministership], while the Sena can
take care of Maharashtra.”15 Both Advani and Uddhav Thackeray
addressed a joint rally of SS and BJP in Mumbai on March 4, 2009.
Uddhav kept quiet on the issue of Advani as PM.
During March–April 2009, Pawar continued to run with the hare
and hunt with the hounds. He had planned to go to Bhubaneshwar
in early March 2009 to take part in the meetings and rallies organ-
ized by the Third Front. The ostensible reason was that his NCP had
put up a few candidates in Orissa. Only after a stern warning from
the Congress, he dropped the idea of the trip. But, he addressed the
gathering through his cell phone. He praised the earlier LF for
having solidly supported the UPA government and thus providing a
stable government for four-and-a-half years. He occasionally praised
Manmohan Singh also.
Maharashtra has adhered to a strict constructionist definition of
“socially, educationally backward classes” for the purpose of drawing
a list of the OBCs. Following the 73rd and 74th Amendments,
Maharashtra enacted laws to provide for reservations in the local
self government institutions. This began to erode the power base of
the Marathas. The community started demanding their inclusion
in the OBC list. This would enable them to have their share of the
reservation pie in the local self-government bodies. The government
then invented a backward caste of “Kunbi-Marathas.”16
Deshpande further 17 says, “The invented identity of a Kunbi-
Maratha caste can be seen as a desperate attempt on the part of the
Marathas to retain their political dominance.” The Maharashtra
Backward Classes Commission had not accepted in 2008 the inclusion
of the Marathas among the OBCs. But, Ashok Chavan, the most
recent CM said that the question will be examined afresh.18 Pawar

also joined the debate. He promised to extend the reservation quota to
beyond the existing 52â•¯percent to include the economically backward.
Though he specifically referred to the Dhanagars (shepherds) who
constitute a sizeable proportion of his new constituency, he hinted
that the Marathas might be covered as well. He gave the examples of
states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which have exceeded the Supreme
Court mandated ceiling of 50â•¯percent.19
But, classifying the Maratha as backward will further alienate the
already weak OBCs. Mayawati’s BSP had put up its candidates in
47 constituencies. She addressed a huge rally in Mumbai, and also
promised reservations for the economically backward classes. She
complained that her representation in this regard to the govern-
ment of India is still awaiting its consideration.20
After the elections, but before the results, the state Congress chief
complained that some partners of the Democratic Front had let the
party down, i.e., the ruling coalition of partners of Congress and
NCF, and independents/unrecognized parties. He cited the example
of a junior non-Congress minister fielding candidates from Latur
and Nanded, and also supporting the MNS candidate in Mumbai
South. Also, the Home Minister belonging to NCP made a surprise
visit to Raj Thackeray. In general, the troubles and tensions within
the two alliances made bolder headlines and were more talked
about than the issues of farmers’ suicides in Vidarbha, power cuts
and load shedding, deteriorating quality of life, Mumbai’s security,
inequalities of access to irrigation, and other problems. As Sainath
says,” The level of the campaign and the debate has not unduly taxed
the intellect.”21
Results
The elections were held on April 16, 23, and 30 of 2009. Compared
with the turnout of 54.37â•¯percent in the 2004 elections, the turnout
in 2009 was only 50.70â•¯percent (see Table 12.2).
Congress–NCP alliance improved its tally in 2004 by three seats;
but Congress gained four seats and NCP lost one. On the other hand,
Table 12.2
Seats Contested, Won, and Share Votes of Parties
2004 turnout 54.7% 2009 turnout 50.9%

% Share % Share
Parties Contested Won of votes Contested Won of votes
Congress 26 13 23.8 25 17 19.6
NCP 18 9 18.3 21 8 19.3
BJP 26 13 22.6 25 9 18.2
SS 22 12 20.1 22a 11 17.0
Others 320b 1c 15.2 602d 3e 25.9
Total 412 48 100.0 695 48 100.0
Source: Collated from: http:/www.indian-electionaffairs.com and other websites.
Notes: a.â•‡ BJP–SS alliance withdrew its candidate from Sangli;
b.â•‡ includes four candidates from JD(S), and three factions of RPI;
c.â•‡ RPI (Athavale);
d.â•‡ includes MNS, all other parties, and independents; and
e.â•‡includes two unrecognized state parties—Bahujan Vikas Aghadi, Swabhiman
Paksha, and an independent.
the vote share of the Congress declined by about 4â•¯percent and that
of NCP increased by 1â•¯percent. BJP–SS alliance lost five seats from
2004. The vote share of BJP came down by 4.4â•¯percent and that of
SS by about 3â•¯percent. The RPI candidates of both the factions lost.
On the contrary, candidates from two unrecognized state parties and
one independent won. NCP received a big jolt losing two seats in
the Kolhapur area.
The MNS administered a severe shock to the BJP–SS alliance
by contesting 11 seats and winning 4â•¯percent of the votes. In eight
out of nine constituencies (total 10), which MNS contested in the
extended Mumbai region,22 it polled more votes than the difference
between the votes of the Congress–NCP alliance and the BJP–
SS alliance. The only exception was Priya Dutt’s constituency of
Mumbai North-Central, where her lead was larger than the votes
polled by the MNS candidate. In Nashik and Pune also, the MNS
polled more constituencies than the difference between Congress–
NCP and BJP–SS. Actually in Mumbai South and Nashik, MNS
was the first runner-up. Dhawale argues, “The MNS helped the INC
(i.e., Congress)–NCP in two ways—firstly by eating into the BJP–SS
votes and, secondly by driving the beleaguered non-Maharashtrians

into the INC–NCP combine.”23
As seen from Table 12.3, BJP–SS suffered its most humiliating
defeat in the extended Mumbai area. The alliance won only one of the
10 seats. In western Maharashtra, supposed to be the citadel of NCP,
the Congress–NCP got two seats more than BJP–SS, but NCP was
jolted by the rebels. The tally was even in Vidarbha. As expected,
BJP–SS won two seats more than the Congress–NCP in Marathwada.
The gains of BJP–SS were more in Northern Maharashtra.
The BSP contested 47 out of 48 constituencies and did not win any
seats. It got about 5â•¯percent of the votes. But, in 13 constituencies it
was the second or third runner-up. Assuming BSP had not contested
and about 70â•¯percent of its votes would have gone to Congress–NCP
combine, the party spoiled the chances of victory of the alliance
in about eight constituencies. In a couple of constituencies, the
Congress–NCP combine became jittery due to BSP. Competition
turned out to be very close when considering Assembly segments of
the Lok Sabha votes. Congress–NCP alliance won 130 segments,
BJP–SS alliance 130, and others 28. If this pattern is repeated, the
Assembly elections are going to be keenly contested.
Table 12.4 reveals that that the BJP–SS alliance obtained substan-
tially more votes from the Marathas, Kunbis, and the OBCs. This
generally shows that the alliance has done well in the rural areas. Also,
the OBCs who were among the earliest groups to support SS continue
to stand by the party. It is likely that the Congress’ toying with the
idea of reservations for the Marathas might have consolidated many
OBCs behind the BJP–SS. As expected, the Congress–NCP continues
to get the support of the Dalits and Muslims. The rich and the poor
are equally divided between the alliances. At the grassroots level, the
BJP–SS alliance receives substantial support from the overlapping
categories of Marathas and Kunbis, and rich and poor (but not very
poor), which constitutes a solid power base. But, the Congress–NCP
base of the overlapping categories of Dalits, very poor, and Muslims
is equally sound. Congress, more than NCP, is likely to have won more
support from the Dalits, Muslims, and the “very poor.” Therefore,
the Congress’ share of the joint base is probably much larger than
that of NCP.
264
Table 12.3
Seats Contested and Won by Regions
BJP SS NCP Congress Others

Contested Won Contested Won Contested Won Contested Won Won only Total seats
Extended Mumbai 5 – 5 1 3 2 7 6 1 10
Western Maharashtra 5 1 6 3 8 3 3 3 2 12
Konkan – – 2 1 – – 2 1 – 2
Northern Mahrashtra 5 4 1 – 4 1 2 1 – 6
Marathawada 4 2 4 3 4 1 4 2 – 8
Vidarbha 6 2 4 3 2 1 7 4 – 10
Total 25 9 22 11 21 8 25 17 3 48
Source: Collated from: http://www.indian-electionaffairs.com and other websites.
Table 12.4
Share Votes of Parties by Social Background
Social background Congress–NCP (%) BJP–SS (%)

Marathas and Kunbis 35 49
OBCs 36 45
Dalits 55 28
Rich 37 37
Poor 39 39
Very poor 47 26
Muslims 69 9
Alliance Average 39.9a 35.2
Source: The Hindu, May 26, 2009.
Note: aThe share of votes of Congress–NCP alliance as reported in The Hindu is higher
by 1â•¯percentage point than the one calculated by the author.
Conclusions
The Maratha corporatist identity received a big boost after the

formation of the unilingual Maharashtra in 1960. Their leaders in
the countryside converted their traditional social power and the new
political—Congress party and government—resources into modern
economic resources. They wove a fine tuned network of clientelism
and patronage. But, beginning in 1990s, their base began to erode
under the impact of diversification of the rural economy, entry into
politics of new groups and younger contenders, and the spread of
Hindutva through BJP and SS.
The Congress–NCP alliance won three seats more in 2009 than
in 2004. But, their share of votes declined by about 3â•¯percent. The
Congress contested one seat less, and NCP three seats more. But,
the share of the Congress votes declined by about 4â•¯percent, and that
of the NCP increased by 1â•¯percent. This could be due to the phenom-
enon of winning or losing narrowly, or winning or losing by huge
margins, as well as the number of seats contested. On the whole, the
Congress–NCP alliance won five seats more in 2009 and got about
4â•¯percent votes more than the BJP–SS alliance. But the NCP winning
only three out of the eight seats it contested in western Maharashtra—
particularly its losing two seats in the Kolhapur area—reveals that the
Maratha dominance is getting weaker. A leader of the sugar factory
workers won one of the Kolhapur seats.
Compared to 2004, the BJP–SS alliance got five seats fewer, and
their share of votes declined by about 7â•¯percent. This is largely due to
the MNS factor. The alliance suffered its worst defeats in the extended
Mumbai region, winning only one of the 10 seats it contested. It has
significantly recouped its losses in the Mumbai area by holding on to
its bases in the non-Mumbai areas. The alliance continues to occupy
the political space vacated by Pawar’s homecoming to Congress in
1986. The spirit of Maratha valor still gets translated into Hindutva,
but, it appears in retrospect that SS has not been able to blend
smoothly its original nativist stance post the 1985 Hindutva ideology.
In the recent years, the SS supremo’s nativism came to the fore only
when Pawar’s ambitions for Prime Ministership and Mrs Patibha
Patil’s candidature for the Presidentship were publicly debated. This
may have created scope for Raj Thackeray and his MNS to penetrate
the urban areas.
Despite the Herculean efforts of Ambedkar, the Maharashtrian
Dalits have emerged into politics divided and their leadership remains
divided. Although more than half of the Dalits have voted for the
Congress–NCP alliance, no candidate of any faction of the Republican
Party has won. On the contrary, Mayawati’s BSP has done rather
well in Maharashtra, although it did not win a single seat. But, she
is unlikely to repeat in Maharashtra her success in Uttar Pradesh as
there are no big names among her followers in Maharashtra.
The 2009 Lok Sabha elections in Maharashtra are noteworthy for
one peculiar development. The internal tensions within either alliance
were organically linked. The moment Pawar hinted at keeping all
options open, the SS egged him on, much to the consternation of BJP.
Both BJP and Congress were literally pleading with their respective
partners to continue their alliances. As the Assembly elections of
October 2009 approach, the tensions within either alliance are likely
to be rekindled. Already, there is a talk of a secret understanding
between NCP and SS.
Dismissed as a disgruntled cousin and ignored as having only a
nuisance value, Raj Thackeray and his MNS dealt a stunning blow
to BJP and SS in the extended Mumbai area, and Pune and Nashik
constituencies. The MNS divided the Marathi voters. A close exam-
ination of Raj Thackeray’s agenda reveals that he defines Marathi
manoos rather inclusively. He includes all those who are proud of
Maharashtra, regardless of religion or community, but they must speak

Marathi. This is a clear departure from the stand of Bal Thackeray.
In plain words, abandoning Hindutva, Raj Thackeray seeks to
appeal to the Muslims as well. Probably, he wants to shape MNS like
TDP of Andhra Pradesh and the two Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu.
A feeling of wounded Telugu pride was the basis for the formation of
TDP. The development of intense Tamil cultural sub-nationalism is
at the root of the emergence of the Dravidian parties. But, none of
these factors are present in Maharashtra. Nativism in Maharashtra is
confined to the major cities. Inheriting the thoughts and ideologies
of Phule, Gokhale, Tilak, Shahu Maharaj, Ambedkar, and others,
Maharashtra has not produced a Marathi cultural sub-nationalism.
One wonders whether the MNS ideology will help the party to enter
the countryside. Also with its new inclusive ideology, MNS may look
like a pale imitation of Congress–NCP.
An analysis of voting for the alliances by castes, religion, and eco-
nomic classes reveals a faint fault line of economic classes along the
lines of party alliances. An overwhelming majority of the Muslims
and Dalits are likely to be poor. Congress–NCP alliance gets the sup-
port of sizeable sections of these groups and also of the “very poor.”
Historically, BJP has been considered as a Brahmin–Bania (merchants)
party. During the last couple of decades, it has been trying to grow
beyond this image and enlist the support of the backward classes.
To some extent it has succeeded, depending on the regions of India,
but it still has an upper class image. But, SS started in Maharashtra
as the voice of the urban lower middle classes and those in the
unorganized sector. Some of the backward castes were its earliest
supporters. It now seems that the party is acquiring an upper class
and forward caste hue.
Neither the gains of the Congress–NCP nor the losses of the
BJP–SS combine in the Lok Sabha Elections of 2009 was spectacular
or sweeping. These were listless elections, and probably because of
the listlessness, they were normal elections. The bipolar alliance
system still holds good. But the internal feuds at the national level
of BJP may weaken the state party’s power to bargain with SS. Also,
owing to the troubled relations between Congress and NCP and the
emergence of MNS, the party system in Maharashtra may face an
uncertain phase.
Notes
â•‡ 1. R.K. Hebsur, Reactions to the Reservations for Other Backward Classes:
A Comparative Study of Four States, Vol. 4, A Report submitted to the
(Mr B.P. Mandal) Backward Classes Commission, (Government of India,
Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1980).
â•‡ 2. Thomas Blom Hansen, “The Vernacularisation of Hindutva: The BJP and Shiv
Sena in Rural Maharashtra,” Contribution to Indian Sociology, Vol. 30, No. 2
(July–December, 1996), pp, 177–214.
â•‡ 3. Anthony T. Carter, Elite Politics in Rural India: Political Stratification and
Political Alliance in Rural Maharashtra (Delhi: Vikas, 1974). See also, Jayant Lele,
Elite Pluralism and Class Rule: Political Development in Maharashtra. (Bombay:
Popular, 1982).
â•‡ 4. Dipankar Gupta, Nativism in a Metropolis: Shiv Sena in Bombay (Delhi: Manohar,
1982).
â•‡ 5. Suhas Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 39, Nos. 14–15 (April, 3–10 and 11–16, 2004), pp. 1497–1507.
â•‡ 6. C., I. “Unlearnt Lessons of 1970,” EPW, 9, Nos 21 and 22 (May 19–26, 1984),
pp. 826–30.
â•‡ 7. R.K. Hebsur, Jacob A. Aikara, Chandan Sengupta, S. Siva Raju, Factors
Contributing to the Bombay Riots and Violence, 1992–93, A Report submitted to
the (Justice B.N. Srikrishna) Commission of Inquiry (Mumbai: Tata Institute
of Social Sciences, 1995).
â•‡ 8. Hansen, “Vernacularisation of Hindutva;” Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with
Many Faces,” p. 1499.
â•‡ 9. Hansen, Ibid.
10. Available online at: www.manase.com. (last date of access: July 10, 2009)The
inclusion of the phrase “regardless of religion” is significant (author’s emphasis).
11. Available online at: www.manase.com (last date of access: July 10, 2009).
12. Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces.”
13. Available online at: www.indianexpress.com/news (last date of access:
February 24, 2008).
14. Ashok Dhawale, “Maharashtra Local Bodies Elections,” People’s Democracy,
Vol. 31, No. 14, April 8, 2007, pp 1–4. Available online at: “pd.cpim.org/2007”)
(last date of access: August 4, 2009).
15. The Times of India, April 8, 2009.
16. Rajeshwari Deshpande, “Kunbi-Maratha as OBC: Backward Journey of a Caste,”
EPW, Vol. 39, No. 4 (April 3–10, 2004).
17. Ibid., pp. 1448–49.
18. The Hindu, February12, 2009.
19. DNA, April 5, 2009.
20. When it comes to the question of OBC reservations, generally no party would
like to lag behind. The Supreme Court has never upheld reservations based solely
on economic criteria, i.e., poverty or income. But, it has said that income can be
one of the criteria for social backwardness. Similarly, no OBC reservation can
be made only on the basis of caste. If some states have exceeded the ceiling, it is
because their acts have been pushed into the 9th Schedule of the Constitution.
Both Pawar and Mayawati know this.
21. P. Sainath, “Maharashtra: the Last Lap”. Available online at: www.india-together
(last date of access: July 14, 2009).
22. The author, in view of the delimitation, has included the following constituencies
in the “Extended Mumbai” area: (a) Mumbai South, (b) Mumbai South Central,
(c) Mumbai North Central, (d ) Mumbai North, (e) Mumbai North East, (f )
Mumbai North West, (g) Thane, (h) Kalyan, (i) Bhiwandi, and (j) Palghar.
23. Ashok Dhawale, “Maharashtra: What Lok Sabha Results Show,” People’s
Democracy (May 10, 2009), pp 1–16. Available online at: “pd.cpim.org/2009”
(last date of access: July 1, 2009).
Chapter 13
Karnataka
The Surge of Saffron:

Some Genuine and Some Imitation?
BJP’s impressive performance in Karnataka in the 2009 Lok Sabha

elections was a foregone conclusion. It won 19 out of 28 Lok Sabha
seats in Karnataka, two-thirds of the total seats. BJP’s victory is almost
a replication of its Lok Sabha performance in 2004. The victory also
provided a ray of good news to the BJP national leaders, distressed by
BJP’s electoral performance in the rest of the country.
In the 2004 Assembly elections, Karnataka voters had given a
fractured mandate. Although BJP had emerged as the largest party
with 79 seats, it was way short of a simple majority of 113. Its posi-
tion improved markedly in 2008. The electorate gave the party a
near majority of 110 seats in the mid-term general elections to the
Assembly in May 2008. The BJP wave was there, and between 2004
and 2009, and especially between October 2007 and April 2009, it
became considerably strengthened.
Sociopolitical Forces
After the formation of Karnataka state in 1956, the duumvirate of

the Lingayats and Vokkaligas emerged with the former as senior
partners. They constitute about 16 and 13â•¯percent of the population,
The Surge of Saffron 271
respectively (The Karnataka Third Backward Classes Commission,

1990, Vol. II: 5).1 The statewide proportions do not give an accurate
picture. The Lingayats are concentrated in the northern districts
and the Vokkaligas in the major parts of the southern districts. In
the central districts, their proportions are fairly balanced. Before the
reorganization of the state, the Lingayats in the old Mysore area had
accepted the dominance of the Vokkaligas. Those in the Mumbai–
Karnataka area, formerly a part of the trilingual Bombay state, chafed
at the dominance of Gujaratis and Maharashtrians. They were more
vocal about a unified Karnataka state.2
The first four CMs of the reorganized Karnataka were Lingayats.
The backward classes did not have a major role or representation.
Land reforms—ostensibly making the tiller of the soil the owner and
lowering the land ceiling—were diluted. Every effort was made to
declare the Lingayats as a backward caste. Both the dominant castes,
more so the Lingayats, arrogated to themselves modern resources
like Agriculture Produce Marketing Committees, aided or unaided
educational institutions, and sugar cooperatives.3
The Congress split in 1969 helped the OBCs to burst into the
corridors of power very forcefully under the able leadership of
Devaraj Urs in 1972. With shrewdness and persistence, he assembled
a coalition of peasant, artisan, and similar OBCs, minorities, and
sections of Lingayats and Vokkaligas. He introduced land reforms—
though it was a bit too late—and announced a new list of OBCs
for the purposes of reservations in jobs and educational seats, which
kept out a large section of the Lingayats. The OBC list was amended
many times later on, but the basics have not changed in the subse-
quent years. He overthrew the prevailing paradigm of politics based
on the dominant castes and replaced it by his own.
Although S.M. Krishna, a Vokkaliga, was made the CM between
1999 and 2004, the Congress still continues to rely on the coalition
that Urs built. The party calculated that making a backward caste
person or a Brahmin as CM was necessary to secure power. It installed
CMs like Gundu Rao (a Brahmin), Bangarappa, Moily, and Dharam
Singh (all OBCs). After the elections of 2009, the party has selected
Siddaramaiah, an OBC, as the leader of the Congress Assembly
legislature party.
The Urs strategies alienated both dominant castes: Lingayats, and

Vokkaligas. Capitalizing on this and the failures of the Gundu Rao
administration, and cultivating Lingayats, and some other sections,
Ramakrishna Hegde led the Janata Party (JP) to a near majority victory
in 1983 and an absolute majority in 1985.4 As the CM, he reclassi-
fied the state OBC list to include all the sub-castes of Lingayats. He
did not accept the report of the Second Karnataka (Venkataswamy)
Backward Classes Commission, 1987, because it did not recognize
all the Lingayat sects as OBCs.
More importantly, with the assistance of his rural development
minister, Abdul Nazir Sab, Hegde introduced a three-tier Panchayati
Raj system, along with a good deal of devolution of power. The
Panchayati Raj system of Hegde helped him to nurture loyal JP
leaders (later Janata Dal–JD) at the village, taluka, and district levels.
Between them, the Congress and JD left hardly any scope for the
BJP to expand.5 But his feud with Deve Gowda, an erstwhile junior
colleague and a bitter rival, festered and Hegde was thrown out of
the party in 1996. His Lok Shakti and later JD(U) did not take off.6
The BJP started dictating terms to JD(U). After the formal split
in the JD, Deve Gowda’s faction called itself JD(S).
The alienation of most of the Lingayats dates back to the humil-
iation of Nijalingappa, a Lingayat, the first CM of Karnataka, at
the hands of Indira Gandhi during the Congress split of 1969. The
alienation deepened during the Urs and Gundu Rao administrations.
Again, the arbitrary dismissal of the JD government of Bommai, a
Lingayat, in April 1989 and removal of the Congress CM Veerendra
Patil, a Lingayat, in October 1990 further aggravated the alienation.
Most Lingayats did not take to Deve Gowda. The BJP had made a
small beginning in 1983 with 18 Assembly seats, nine seats in the
coastal districts alone. In fact, the party lent support from outside
to the first Hegde government in 1983. The split in the JD in 1999
gave the BJP a fine opportunity. Most of the Lingayats continued to
be in disarray since the marginalisation of Hegde in 1996. They were
disinclined to support Deve Gowda, nor were they willing to risk
joining Hegde’s JD(U). Hegde passed away in 2004. The Lingayats
flocked to Yeddyurappa, himself a Lingayat, and began supporting
the steadily growing BJP. The BJP may have considered Karnataka
as a gateway to south India. But its Karnataka victories in the 2008

mid-term Assembly elections and 2009 Lok Sabha elections pose an
enigma. The party has found it difficult to enter the states that have:
1. Witnessed strong regional movements and parties: Andhra

Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.7
2. Maintain strong communist movements and parties: Kerala
and West Bengal.
3. Strong backward class and non-Brahmin movements: Tamil
Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala.
Basaveshwara, the 12th century founder of the Lingayat sect,

rebelled against Sanskrit, Brahmanical rituals, Sanskaras, varna, and
the caste system. In fact, till 1961, some Lingayats used to claim that
they are not Hindus, and that Census of India should classify them
as a separate religion like Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs. Karnataka has
witnessed a two-stage backward class movement—from the early
1910s, a non-Brahmin movement began in both the princely Mysore
state and in the Bombay–Karnataka areas, and from the early 1970s,
a movement of OBCs began.8 Thus, it is a very peculiar phenomenon
that the BJP could emerge in a big way on the Karnataka political
scene in 2004. The following are the possible alternative or overlapping
tentative explanations:
1. The Lingayats are a powerful community.9 With most of the

space in Congress being occupied by OBCs, and in JD(S) by
Vokkaligas, particularly Deve Gowda and his sons, BJP proved
to be the only shelter.
2. The Lingayats and sections of other castes find some kind of
Hindutva appealing.
Between 2004 and 2009
The Karnataka assembly elections of 2004 produced a fractured

mandate—BJP 79, Congress 65, JD(U) 5, and JD(S) 58. The simul-
taneously held Lok Sabha elections gave BJP 18, Congress 8 and JD(S)
2 seats. To keep the “communal” BJP at bay, Congress allied with

JD(S) and formed a coalition government with Dharam Singh—an
OBC Congress member—as the CM and Siddaramaiah—also an
OBC member of JD(S)—as the Deputy CM. But, as Balram analyzes,
“… [F]or 20 months Deve Gowda virtually ran the government.”10
A hemmed-in Congress tried to break the JD(S). Quite a few of
Hegde’s disciples had stayed with the JD(S), and Congress targeted
them. Siddaramaiah resented the continual interference of Deve
Gowda in his administration.
Meanwhile, some of the Congress OBC leaders had started an
outfit called AHIND in June 2005. It is a Kannada acronym for
“minorities, backwards and Dalits.” During June–October 2005,
the rallies of AHIND were held in various cities, and attracted huge
crowds. Siddaramaiah inaugurated one such rally and attended a
couple of others. While the Congress leaders criticized the style of
Deve Gowda’s functioning at these rallies, Siddaramaiah studiously
avoided mentioning him.
In August 2005, CM Dharam Singh received a letter from the
state JD(S) chief—obviously at the instance of Deve Gowda—that
Siddaramaiah and two other ministers should be dropped, and MP
Prakash, a senior JD(S) leader and a Lingayat, should be inducted
as the Deputy CM. In order to save his government, Dharam Singh
obliged. AHIND condemned the dismissal and went on a rampage.
Meanwhile, Siddaramaiah floated his own outfit, the All India
Progressive Janata Dal. He openly supported Congress in the local
body elections. Congress won 14 Zilla Parishads out of 29, and JD(S)
two. The rest had no clear majority.
Siddaramaiah bided his time, met Congress leaders in Delhi, resigned
his Assembly seat and joined Congress. According to his supporters,
he had become a stumbling block in the way of Kumaraswamy, son
of Deve Gowda. Siddaramaiah contested again in December 2006
from his constituency and defeated his JD(S) opponent, supported
by BJP, by a slender margin of 257 votes. The margin was slender
because JD(U) had put up a candidate belonging to the same caste
as the JD(S)’s, with the intention of defeating the JD(S) candidate.
That was also the end of any pretence of an alliance between BJP
and JD(U). Siddaramaiah’s contribution to the realignment of social
bases is quite significant.
Soon after, Deve Gowda upped the ante and met Sonia Gandhi in
January 2006. As a price for his continued support for the Dharam
Singh government, he is reported to have asked for Chief Minister-
ship of Karnataka for his son Kumaraswamy, Vice-Presidentship
for himself, and a Union cabinet berth for Revanna, his other son.
Obviously, these extraordinary demands were rejected. He also met
Vajpayee. Soon after, he withdrew JD(S) support from the Dharam
Singh government.
In February 2006, a coalition government of JD(S)–BJP was
sworn in with Kumaraswamy as the CM and Yeddyurappa as the
Deputy CM. The main agreement between the two parties was that
Kumaraswamy would hold the Chief Ministership for 20 months,
i.e., till October 2007 and then Yeddyurappa would take over. As
CM, Kumaraswamy was popular and pro-active. But when October
2007 approached, Deve Gowda was reluctant to hand over the Chief
Ministership to Yeddyurappa. Finally, he agreed and Yeddyurappa
was sworn in as CM in November 2007. But, when Deve Gowda
reneged on his promise, Yeddyurappa resigned. His first Chief
Ministership lasted barely eight days.
This act of Deve Gowda evoked dismay and revulsion in the entire
state and generated a huge wave of sympathy for the BJP, which
still lingers on. In the mid-term general elections to the Assembly
in May 2008, BJP achieved a near majority of 110 and with the
help of five independents formed the government. Vasavi11 suggests
BJP drew support also from the Lingayat mutts, “which run parallel
governments in terms of education, health and judicial service.” But
BJP and Yeddyurappa still did not feel secure. They started “Operation
Lotus.” It focused on poaching the MLAs of Congress and JD(S),
which continued till the Lok Sabha elections of 2009. Yeddyurappa
persuaded three Congress and two JD(S) MLAs to resign their
seats, join BJP, and contest again on the BJP ticket. They won and
were rewarded with ministerships. The BJP government became stable.
These MLAs were political heavyweights and could have won on the
ticket of any party. But, they also realized how the wind was blowing.
The electoral delimitation order was promulgated in March 2008.
The SC Lok Sabha seats increased from four to five, and two new
seats were reserved for the STs for the first time. The boundaries of
some Lok Sabha constituencies were redrawn. BJP gloated over the
additional Bangalore Central seat. The Congress thought that, on
the basis of caste calculus, redrawing of the coastal and upghat (i.e.,
literally, across a pass in hills) constituencies would work in its favor.
Religious Turmoil
in the Coastal Districts
In September 2008, the members of a couple of Hindu fringe groups

attacked churches in the coastal district of Dakshina Kannada. These
groups alleged that a few Christian priests had made derogatory
references about Hinduism. Close on the heels of these incidents
came attacks on women going to pubs, organized mainly by these
extremist fringe elements. A Hindu convention in March 2009
led to communal clashes in the coastal districts of Uttara Kannada,
Dakshina Kannada, and Udipi. This intensified the communal
polarization and competitive communal mobilization in Dakshina
Kannada, which went on till the Lok Sabha elections. The constituency
recorded a turnout of 73â•¯percent in the Lok Sabha elections. The
opposition non-BJP parties, and some magazines, sought to capitalize
on these incidents. One lady Union Minister called these attacks
“Talibanisation under BJP.”
Run-up to the Elections 2009
BJP closed its ranks. The infighting between Ananth Kumar, an MP

from Bangalore, and Yeddyurappa was placed on hold and the party
started campaigning. Operation Lotus was intensified and entered
its second stage. Yeddyurappa enticed into BJP, not only Lingayat
heavyweights like Nagamarpally (lost Bidar in 2009) and his son (also
lost the Assembly by-election, 2009), but also prominent Vokkaliga
leaders like Shivrame Gowda (lost Mandya) and Chandre Gowda12
(won Bangalore North). He poached both Congress and JD(S)
politicians. Some leaders who had been in Congress for nearly
40 years switched to BJP. Congress and JD(S) also resorted to

poaching, but they attracted only small fry or those discredited
by the BJP for defying the party whip. Congress welcomed back
Bangarappa. This attests to the fact that many hard-headed leaders
sensed the BJP wave. Also, the party hopping shows the hollowness
of the labels “secular” and “communal.”
The Third Front
Smarting under the discomfiture of defeat in the Lok Sabha on the

Indo–US nuclear treaty issue, the LF sought to forge a Third Front
at the national level. Due to the local compulsions and calculations of
electoral alliances, BJD of Orissa, AIADMK of Tamil Nadu, and the
TDP of Andhra Pradesh spurned BJP and were sympathetic to the idea
of a Third Front. Deve Gowda, probably recollecting his elevation as
Prime Minister in 1996, thinking that the opportunity might knock
again, and hoping at least to equal the performance of the undivided
JD in 1996, promptly hosted a convention of the Third Front on
March 12, 2009, at a place 40 miles from Bangalore. Prakash Karat,
A.P. Bardhan, and Chandrababu Naidu attended. BSP and AIADMK
sent delegates. Deve Gowda literally held the center stage.
Ticket Distribution
Following the Urs paradigm, Congress gave tickets to five Lingayats,

five Vokkaliga/Bunts, six OBCs, five minorities, five SCs, and
two STs. BJP’s ticket allocation was as follows: nine Lingayats, six
Vokkaliga/Bunts, three Brahmins, three OBCs, five SCs, and two
STs. The JD(S) contested only 20 seats, the ticket distribution being:
five Vokkaliga/Bunts, three Lingayats, two Brahmins, two OBCs,
five SCs, one ST, and two Muslims. It did not contest three seats.13
The party left two seats to their Third Front allies, CPI and CPM.
Its candidates withdrew from three constituencies, allegedly without
consulting Deve Gowda, but actually to help Congress.
Very clearly, JD(S) did not contest Shimoga, where Yeddyurappa’s

son Raghavendra was pitted against the stalwart Bangarappa, who
had the reputation of having won Shimoga regardless of his party
affiliation. The JD(S) leaders openly accompanied Bangarappa when
the latter went to file his nomination papers. In Bellary also, the
party workers openly supported the Congress candidate. The mining
magnates of Bellary, who are with BJP, have been on Deve Gowda’s
hit list. The state CPI, CPM, and FB leaders complained to him
that the JD(S) workers were not cooperating in Udipi and Dakshina
Kannada. Deve Gowda obviously kept the door ajar for adjustments
with the Congress in the post-poll scenario. The JD(U) gave tickets
to eight candidates, who could fight on the strength of their own local
prestige, following, and financial resources.
Election Issues
The elections were held on April 23 and 30, 2009. Many of the
expected issues included BJP being “communal,” “Talibanization
under BJP,” moral policing, attack on the churches, the assertions
that Manmohan Singh was a weak Prime Minister, country’s security,
Karnataka’s perennial power crisis, inflation, raising the poverty line,
terrorists attack on Mumbai—but, none of these became election
issues. Deve Gowda, not keeping his word in 2007 of handing over
power to BJP, and letting down BJP and Yeddyurappa, were upper-
most in the minds of the electorate. Also, by the time of the 2009
elections, Yeddyurappa had completed only 11 months in office.
Hence, the honeymoon continued. And, ultimately caste became
the major issue. There were grumblings among the Panchamsali
sect—traditionally agriculturists—of Lingayats that Yeddyurappa
was favoring the dominant Banajigas, traditionally merchants. For
this reason, many Panchamsali Lingayats were not inclined to vote
for BJP. But it is reported that the sect leaders and the swamijis of
some Lingayat mutts persuaded the Panchamsalis not to divide the
Lingayat votes.14 The leading Congress leaders Moily, Kharge, Dharam
Singh were busy in their constituencies. Others like S.M. Krishna
and Siddaramaiah were mostly in Bangalore.
Results
The voting turnout was 63.3â•¯percent, not much lower than the
64.9â•¯percent recorded in 2004. BJP increased its tally of seats by one to
19. The Congress tally went down by two to six seats. The JD(S) won
three, an increase of one seat (see Table 13.1). A further analysis might
show that BJP also did well in constituencies where the Lingayats
and Vokkaligas are present in approximately equal proportions.
As seen from Table 13.1, the share of votes of BJP went up by about
7â•¯percent. JD(U) put up eight candidates. Most of these candidates
were relegated to the last, or almost the last positions. A detailed
analysis should show whether the rise in BJP’s share of votes is due to
its losing some constituencies by a narrow margin, or winning some
by a huge margin, or both. The share of votes of the Congress went
up by 1â•¯percent, although its tally of seats came down by two. JD(S)
share of votes came down by 7â•¯percent.
As Table 13.2 reveals, BJP won about half the seats (eight out of
15) in old Mysore. It won all the six seats in Mumbai Karnataka, and
two out of four in Hyderabad Karnataka. It won all the three seats in
the coastal Karnataka. (After the delimitation, Udipi-Chikmagalur
constituency has jutted quite further into the old Mysore areas.)
Table 13.1
Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections (2004 and 2009):
Seats Won and Share of Votes by Parties
2004 turnout 64.92 2009 turnout 63.3

% share % share
Party Contested Won of votes Contested Won of votes
BJP 24a 18 34.77 28 19 41.63
Congress 28 8 36.82 28 6 37.65
JD(S) 28 2 20.45 20b 3 13.57
Others 92 – 7.96 351 – 7.15
Total 172 28 100.00 427 28 100.00
Source: Various websites like “Indian-electionaffairs.com”.
Notes: a In alliance with BJP, JD(U) contested four seats.
b
JD(S) did not contest three constituencies—Chikodi, Bellary, and Shimoga;
its candidates withdrew in Dharwad, Bagalkot, and Davangere; one each was
left for CPI (Udipi–Chikmagalur) and CPM (Dakshina Kannada).
Table 13.2
Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections 2009:
Seats Won Contested and Won by Administrative/Political Regions
Regions of Congress BJP JDS Total

Karnataka Contested Won Contested Won Contested Won seats won
Old Mysore 15 4 15 8 12 3 15
Mumbai 6 – 6 6 3 – 6
Karnataka
Hyderabad 4 2 4 2 4 – 4
Karnataka
Coastal 3 – 3 3 1 – 3
Total 28 6 28 19 19 3 28
Note: The results of the coastal constituencies need to be interpreted with caution.
Before the delimitation of 2008, the erstwhile Mangalore Lok Sabha constituency
included two upghat assembly segments in Kodagu. Now, renamed as Dakshina
Kannada, it does not. The Uttara Kannada constituency remains the same,
with two assembly segments from the neighboring Belgaum district, which are
culturally and commercially different from those in Uttara Kannada district
proper. The redrawn Udipi–Chikmagalur constituency includes segments in
upghat Chikmagalur district.
Table 13.3
Votes of the Political Parties by Social Background of the Voters
Social background BJP (%) Congress (%) JD(S) (%)

Upper castes 55 23 16
Lingayats 74 17 5
Vokkligas 38 28 30
OBCs 44 40 9
Scheduled Castes 38 56 4
Scheduled Tribes 42 45 10
Muslims 11 65 14
Source: The Hindu, May 26, 2009.
Table 13.3 shows the share of votes of the parties by the social
background of the voters. As expected, three-fourths of Lingayats
have voted for BJP, followed by more than half of the upper castes.
OBC votes have been shared mostly by Congress and BJP, while
only 9â•¯percent voted for JD(S). This could be due to the exit of
Siddaramaiah from JD(S).
Without the support of an overwhelming majority of the aggrieved
Lingayat community, the BJP could not have done so well. Some of the
reasons or tentative explanations were raised earlier. The charismatic

personality of Yeddyurappa who espoused many popular and peasant
causes is one of the explanations. U.R. Ananthamurthy, a Kannada
litterateur and Gyanpeeth Award winner, wrote about the BJP victory
in the 2008 Assembly elections, “It is Mr Yeddyurappa’s personal
victory and not an ideological victory of Hindutva of the kind one finds
in Gujarat.” He adds, “Mr Deve Gowda’s crooked politics alienated
them [the Lingayats].”15
The above explanation can be extended and modified. Congress,
since Devaraj Urs, has been mainly dominated by the OBCs. JD(S)
is dominated by Deve Gowda, his family, and other Vokkaligas.
Hegde’s JD(U) is moribund and almost defunct. Hence, the only
political shelter most Lingayats could find is BJP. A few journalists
and politicians the author met add another powerful argument in
support of the Lingayats’ new shelter. Between 1984 and 1988,
Hegde had built around his Panchayati Raj system, a new structure
of a three-tier leadership—village, taluka, and district. The structure
struck roots and he groomed the leaders. BJP has latched on to this
free-floating JD structure.
One veteran politician went on to add that but for Deve Gowda,
even the JD(S) seats would have gone to BJP. He added, “The real
Hindutva BJP—i.e., the Ananth Kumar BJP—is confined to 40 to
45 Assembly and 5 to 6 Lok Sabha seats. The rest is the legacy of
Hegde.” He further said that if Congress groomed a Lingayat leader,
like M.P. Prakash,16 the party would win back the Lingayat com-
munity votes. But, sometimes people come to like their temporary
shelter. Similarly, now that the non- or anti-Brahmin days have all but
disappeared, the Lingayats and other communities also may be getting
attracted to “soft” Hindutva. Also, it will take quite some time for
Congress to groom Lingayat leaders acceptable all over Karnataka.
Conclusions
By imaginatively mobilizing a string of OBCs, dalits, minorities, and

poorer sections among the dominant castes, and by adopting bold
policy innovations like land reforms, and reservations in government
jobs and educational seats, Devaraj Urs, the 5th CM of Karnataka

(1972–80) redefined the state’s politics. Even till today, the main fea-
tures of his coalition have continued. Ramakrishna Hegde, another
visionary politician and the 7th CM of Karnataka (1983–1988)
emerged as the leader of the Lingayats and also of sections of other
castes. He restored the Lingayat primacy. Through his Panchayati Raj
system, his party, JD, entrenched itself in the countryside. Hegde’s
coalition has also continued till today, in some form or the other.
But, within the JD, the rivalry between Hegde and his junior
colleague, Deve Gowda, worsened, which was the beginning of the
downfall of both; Hegde’s in the short run and Deve Gowda’s in
the long run. After he became the Prime Minister in 1996, Deve
Gowda had Hegde thrown out of the party; a costly and self destruct-
ive revenge. Little did Deve Gowda realize at that time that he was
decimating the base of the JD.
The BJP made a quiet entry into the Karnataka party system in
1983. At that time, no one anticipated that the party would emerge,
after a quarter of a century or so, as the ruling party of the state and
elect two-thirds of the state’s members of the Lok Sabha. In the
beginning, its number of MLAs and MPs grew incrementally, and
also erratically. But after 1999, the increase has been exponential.
The Karnataka Assembly elections of 2004 did not throw up a clear
winner. During the post election scenario, Congress and JD(S)
formed a coalition government. Deve Gowda sidelined Congress
CM, Dharam Singh and his own party’s Deputy CM, Siddaramaiah.
The latter joined Congress and bounced back. Then the JD(S) pulled
down the Dharam Sigh government and struck a deal with BJP that
the chief ministership would be transferred to Yeddyurappa after
20 months. But in October 2007, Deve Gowda did not, on some
pretext or another, hand over the chief ministership to Yeddyurappa.
This was a disastrous, but a decisive moment in the history of
Karnataka politics, and Indian democracy. Through the epics of the
Ramayana and the Mahabharata and other sources, the Indian people
have imbibed many beliefs, including, “One should keep one’s word.”
Yeddyurappa emerged as the martyr and Deve Gowda as the villain.
The net result was the pro-BJP and a pro-Yeddyurappa wave.
Historically, the Lingayats have been in the forefront of the anti-
Brahmin movement. Eliminating the Brahmins from the public sphere
had become one of their goals. It is a paradox that such a community

should take shelter in a party with distinct Brahmanical hue and close
association with the RSS. The powerful community had no option.
They did not have much room in Congress. Their distrust of Deve
Gowda had deepened by October 2007. The days of anti-Brahmanism
are almost over. Hence, they turned to BJP. Yeddyurappa is not a run
of the mill RSS worker. He has led many pro-poor and pro-peasant
movements. This also helped.
The 2009 Lok Sabha elections can be described as reinforcing
elections. An analysis of votes for the parties by the social background
of the voters reveals that almost three-fourths of the Lingayats have
voted for BJP, followed by more than half of the forward castes
(mainly Brahmins). More Vokkaligas and OBCs have also voted for
the party. Yeddyurappa’s poaching the legislators and politicians
[including Vokkaligas of the Congress and JD(S)] through Operation
Lotus helped. It is very probable that even the Vokkaliga voters
are deserting Deve Gowda. BJP has succeeded in constituting a
broadbased coalition. The BJP’s victory could be attributed to the
overwhelming support of the Lingayats, substantial support of others,
and also the attraction of Hindutva. This looks like a new version of
Hegde’s coalition, except for the lack of support of the Muslims. Also,
the support of only one-third of the SCs is noteworthy.
Congress has maintained its share of 38â•¯percent of the votes. Also,
its support base comprises sizeable sections of the OBCs and STs, and a
bulk of the SCs and Muslims. About one-third of the Vokkaligas have
voted for the JD(S). The bases of Congress and JD(S) are generally
consistent with their images.
It is not very surprising that BJP in Karnataka has bucked the
national trend of the party’s nation-wide decline. The voters of
Karnataka were not much concerned with the national issues like,
Advani as a strong man, security of the country, money in Swiss
banks, and the like. The 2009 elections were held within one year
of the State Assembly elections of 2008. The popular honeymoon
with the Yeddyurappa government had continued. Deve Gowda
was seen as a person who wrecked a smooth sailing coalition gov-
ernment. The sympathy wave for Yeddyurappa had become strong.
The Operation Lotus itself added to the strong BJP wave. Also the
swamijis of the Lingayat mutts played a major role.
The current feud in the highest echelons of the party is not likely to
affect the short term prospects of the party in the state. Yeddyurappa’s
former rival and critic, Ananth Kumar (a Brahmin, and MP from
Bangalore South) is a member of the BJP inner circle, but not a
powerful one. The top BJP leaders—the elderly or the young—know
very well that Ananth Kumar cannot sway many voters outside
Bangalore or the coastal constituencies. In fact, not many people in
Karnataka have heard his name. His capability to play mischief
in Karnataka is very limited. And, no faction of BJP can dare it.
Opposition to Yeddyurappa, if any, is more likely to come from the
mine owing Reddy brothers of Bellary, or Jagdish Shettar (a Lingayat
of North Karnataka), who has reluctantly accepted the Speakership of
the Assembly.
The predicament of the JD(S), i.e., Deve Gowda, is unenviable. The
party’s shrunken base in the Vokkaliga heartland of old Mysore area is
still good. In the five by-elections to the state Assembly held in August
2009 (four in the old Mysore and one in Hyderabad Karnataka),
the JD(S) won two—both in old Mysore; BJP two, and Congress
one. Only on the basis of the victory in the Vokkaliga heartland, the
party cannot aspire to regain the glory of the JD of 1994–96. The
Congress andJD (S) need each other. An alliance between them will
be, to some extent, complementary. But, Siddaramiah, a bête noire of
Deve Gowda, has already been appointed as the leader of the Congress
legislature party, i.e., the future CM, if Congress wins a majority. Also,
Deve Gowda may have to accept unpalatable conditions, if he wants
to ally himself with Congress. Then, there is the AHIND17 group,
now a silent volcano. But, in politics, situations change. For some
time to come, it will be a competition between the two paradigms of
mobilization and coalition: Hegde’s (i.e., BJP’s) and Urs’.
Notes
1. Government of Karnataka, Report of the (Mr Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy)

Karnataka Third Backward Classes Commission, Vol. II, 1990.
2. For the purposes of this article, the Lingayats and Vokkaligas are referred to as
the dominant castes. Whether both of them were, or have been recognized, as
OBCs, or only some sub-castes have been, is not taken into account.
â•‡ 3. R.K. Hebsur, “Karnataka,” Seminar, No. 224, (April, 1978), pp. 21–28; Also see,
R.K. Hebsur, Reactions to Reservations for Other Backward Classes: A Comparative
Study of Four States, Vol. IV, Backward Classes (Mr B.P. Mandal) Commission
Report, (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1980).
â•‡ 4. A shaivite Brahmin, Hedge, along with Veerendra Patil, a Lingayat, was the
general secretary of the state (undivided) Congress party at a fairly young age.
Both of them were instrumental in the reinstatement of Nijalingappa as CM.
Although he emerged as the leader of the Lingayats, Hegde had supporters in
other castes, too. Moreover, his flair for Kannada literature made him acceptable
to all the parts of Karnataka.
â•‡ 5. K.S. Dakshina Murthy, “Hegde and Gowda Paved the Way,” Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 24 (July 14–20, 2008), pp. 11–12.
â•‡ 6. Sandeep Shastri, “Lok Shakti in Karnataka: Regional Party in a Bipolar Alliance
System,” EPW, Vol. 39, Nos 14–15, (2004), pp. 1491–96.
â•‡ 7. Assam (AGP), Punjab (Akali Dal), Maharashtra (SS), Orissa (BJD) have regional
parties. SS has an ideological affinity with BJP. In Punjab, historically both
Akali Dal and BJP are the adversaries of Congress. In Assam and Orissa, the
alliances with BJP were based purely on electoral arithmetic.
â•‡ 8. Hebsur, “Karnataka.”
â•‡ 9. The Karnatak Lingayat Education Society runs more than 200 colleges, including
engineering. Their Belgaum Medical College has been recognized as a Deemed
University. There are other Lingayat managed schools and colleges. In central
and north Karnataka, they dominate not only agriculture, but also commerce.
Their mutts (headquarters of the swamijis) provide free boarding and lodging
facilities for the poor students. This has helped generations of Lingayats to rise
in life.
10. H.S. Balram, “Southern Surprise: Gowda Stirs up Poll Potpourri,” Times of
India, March 16, 2009.
11. A.R. Vasavi, “Caste, Capital, and Captaincy in Karnataka,” EPW, Vol. 43,
No. 24 (June 14–20, 2008), pp. 10–11.
12. Chandre Gowda had vacated in 1978 his Chikmaglur Lok Sabha seat for
Indira Gandhi.
13. Adapted from Deccan Herald, 8 April 2009.
14. Interview with Mr Sarjoo Katkar, Senior Correspondent, The New Indian Express,
in Belgaum, May 29, 2009.
15. U.R. Ananthamuthy’s blog, Rujuvatu, June 3, 2008.
16. A Lingayat, who left JD(S) during the critical period of Deve Gowda’s October
2007 coup and joined Congress.
17. AHIND is an acronym constructed from a Kannada phrase: Alpasankhyakaru,
(the minorities, i.e., Muslims), HINdulidavru (the backward castes), and Dalitaru
(the Scheduled Castes).
Chapter 14
Andhra Pradesh
Political Mobilization, Competitive

Populism, and Changing Party Dynamics
in Andhra Pradesh
Karli Srinivasulu
The performance of the Congress in the 2009 elections in AP, held

simultaneously to the state assembly and national parliament, has
proved that the Congress still retains its vitality. This, despite the
fact that these elections were keenly fought between three principal
political contestants—the Congress, the TDP and its allies (the CPI,
CPM, the TRS), and the newly formed Praja Rajyam Party (PRP)
led by a popular film actor, Chiranjeevi. All of them attracted huge
public responses to their election meetings. This made predictions
about election results very difficult indeed.
In Indian politics since the 1980s, many states have seen a routine
rejection of the incumbents. The re-election of the Congress stands
out as an almost unique achievement. The newly formed PRP was
expected to do what the TDP, founded by NTR—a cine actor of
an earlier generation—had done in 1983. NTR was voted to power
in 1983 altering the configuration of social forces in the state. The
TDP’s rise posed a challenge to the Reddy caste dominance and sig-
naled the political rise of the economically prosperous Kammas. The
emergence of the PRP is seen as a challenge to both the Congress
and the TDP identified with the Reddys and Kammas, respectively.
Alternatively, the PRP is identified with the political ambition of the
Political Mobilization and Competitive Populism 287
Kapu peasant caste, thereby challenging the dominance of both the

Congress and TDP.
As the election results show, this did not occur in 2009. What then
accounts for the retaining of political power by the Congress? What
social forces, policy framework, or electoral strategy made this possible?
What does the Congress victory signify in terms of national–regional
party dynamics? What does the electoral outcome in the state signify
in terms of caste dynamics and identity politics? Further, how is it that
the TDP, with its strong organizational structure and allies, on the one
hand, and the PRP, in spite of it evoking huge popular response, on
the other, could not unseat the Congress?
This chapter attempts to examine the changing dynamics of party
politics, the character of political contestation, social bases, elec-
toral campaign, and performance through an analysis of the 2009
elections. The analysis here is presented in four sections. The first
section maps the nature of political contestation in the state by
examining the configuration of political forces and electoral alliances
in the 2009 elections. The second section discusses the nature of
electoral campaigns and strategies. The third section analyzes the
electoral performance of political parties and shifting social forces.
The fourth section, examines their implications for the party system
in the state.
Electoral Contestation:
Issues and Alliances
The discourse in this election was centered on the following three

issues:
1. The issue of separate statehood to Telangana championed by

the TRS;
2. Congress’ emphasis on development as a solution to the
problems facing the state including that of the Telangana
demand and CPI(ML) issue; and,
3. The question of samajika nyayam (social justice) emphasized
in the elections by the PRP.
288 Karli Srinivasulu
The Telangana issue has dominated the political discourse in

the state since the formation of the TRS in 2001. It was one of the
principal issues, along with focus on rural economic crisis and farmers’
distress that facilitated the Congress’ return to power in the 2004
elections. The Congress alliance, with the TRS on the one hand and
with the Left on the other, was based on the promises of forming a
Telangana state and addressing the crisis in the agrarian and rural
sectors, respectively.1
The non-fulfillment by the Congress party of the promise made
to the TRS about Telangana led to the latter’s withdrawal of sup-
port to Congress governments both at the state and the center. The
Telangana issue dominated the political debate and activity in the
state so much so that it affected the entire party system. The TRS
succeeded in causing a sense of insecurity among the leaders coming
from Telangana region across political parties. They were pressed to
take a clear stand on it.
The Congress party too experienced an intense factional activity
during this period. What further intensified factional fights was
the absence of approval from and YSR’s successful persuasion of the
High Command to dither in deciding the issue of Telangana state.
The Telangana demand involves a set of complex issues—the status
of Hyderabad city being one of them: should Hyderabad be declared
a union territory, if Telangana state occurs as it involves substantial
interests of migrants from Andhra and Rayalaseema regions? Another
crucial issue is the apprehension of the Muslims of Telangana that a
separate state would lead to their further marginalization and increase
the communal tensions because of the historical fact of this region
being part of the erstwhile Muslim princely state of Hyderabad. As
such, the Congress leadership vacillated in its stand on Telangana,
insisting on the need for evolving a consensus. This could prove to
be detrimental to the Congress in the long run.
The TDP also saw the rallying of influential leaders from the
Telangana region pressuring the party to favor the Telangana
demand. This is a major development as the TDP’s basic ideological
position is that the Telugus constitute one linguistic community that
cannot be safeguarded by a Congress party dominated by north
Indian leadership. Despite the pro-Andhra dispensation and Kamma
dominance, the TDP leadership—given the electoral compulsions —

had to take a stand in favor of the Telangana demand.
The BJP also wavered. In spite of its stand in favour of Telangana
state demand, the BJP could not decide on the matter when it created
the three states of Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh. This
was attributed to the compulsions of coalition politics. The CPI, a
minor party in the state, also took a stand in favor of the demand.
The CPI(M) unwaveringly adhered to its stand on linguistic states.
The most important move in this election is the success of the TDP
in forging a mahakutami, a grand alliance with the TRS, CPI, and
CPM. It constituted an alliance of parties that were united rather by
their common opposition to the ruling Congress than by any common
program. The TRS, CPI, and CPM were part of the Congress alliance
in the 2004 elections. They fell out with the Congress for their own
reasons—the TRS because of Congress’ indecision on the Telangana
demand and the Left because of the Indo–US nuclear agreement issue.
The pro-Telangana stand taken by the TDP opened the way for the
TRS to join the TDP-led alliance. The Left had no great reasons to
ally with the TDP except its opposition to the Congress.
The Congress thus, was left to contest on its own. It is indicative
of the close electoral contest in the state since the emergence of the
TDP that compels the main political parties to enter into alliances.
While the TDP since the mid-1980s had an electoral alliance with the
Left, in the 1990s there is a greater realization of this on the part of
the Congress, both at the center and in the state. The TDP’s support
to the BJP after 1999 and their alliance in 2004 elections provided
scope for an alliance of the Congress with the Left in the state.
The Congress in alliance with the TRS and Left came to power
in 2004 against the TDP–BJP alliance by focusing on the issues
of agriculture and rural development which were neglected during
the decade long TDP rule, 1995–2004. The TDP regime with its
excessive focus on urban concerns and Information Technology (IT)
industry neglected the rural sector. Large scale suicides among the
weavers and farmers were symptomatic of the gravity of the situation.
The Congress succeeded in highlighting this crisis through YSR’s
famous padayatra through the state before the 2004 elections, and
articulated it in its election campaign.2
Accordingly, the state Congress government implemented an

elaborate agrarian and welfare policy regime. A loan waver scheme
for distressed farmers, free electricity and input subsidies for agricul-
ture, and construction of major irrigation projects being important
components of the policy package for the farming sector. It extended
loan facility to the Self Help Groups (SHGs) at an interest rate of
25 paisa.
In addition, it implemented an elaborate welfare package consist-
ing of the `â•›2 kilo rice for the Below Poverty Line (BPL) families, Old
Age Pension Scheme, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS), and Indiramma, housing for the poor. A medical scheme
included an ambulance service, providing emergency mobile medical
attention, for both urban and rural areas3 and the Rajiv Arogyasree
scheme for private corporate hospital treatment to the poor. Further,
fee reimbursement for socially and economically backward class
students in the professional colleges since 2008 gained huge popu-
larity. The PDS rice, pension, and housing schemes were not new, but
the latter two involving medical care and fee reimbursement were the
creation of the Congress regime. They are provided at a time when
health care and professional education have become unaffordable to
the poor. These provisions gave an image to the Congress of being
caring and pro-poor.
What marks a major change in 2009 is the entry of the PRP. Led
by one of the most popular actors in the Telugu film industry, it
attracted unparalleled attention from the media as well as the public.
It aroused great interest among the Kapus, the peasant caste to which
Chiranjeevi belongs. In comparison to the other dominant castes, i.e.,
Reddys and Kammas, Kapus are not only more numerous, but also
have a wider geographical presence. Moreover, PRP’s leadership is
not restricted to Kapus alone.
With an ideological plank of social justice defined in the tradition
of Mahatma Phule and B.R. Ambedkar, the PRP sought to inject
freshness into the political scene. It sought to highlight the mar-
ginalization of the backward and Dalit castes in the state politics.
This ideological stance evoked a good response from those associated
with these movements. AP had seen a vibrant Dalit movement in
the 1980s and early 1990s,4 which gradually transformed into caste
specific movements—the Madiga Dandora and the Mala Mahanadu—

focusing almost exclusively on reservations. These developments have
rendered the leaders of the earlier phase of the Dalit movement that
treated social justice as a central principle as redundant. These leaders
along with some ideologically oriented backward caste leaders found
the echoes of their politics in the PRP. Thus, the PRP with a new
ideological thrust posed a challenge to the Congress and the TDP.
Populist Promises and

Mobilization Strategies
The 2009 election was fiercely fought with the campaign rhetoric
reaching to a level verging on mutual slander. It also featured cinema
stars on a scale hitherto unheard, lending their glamor to the campaign,
largely due to Chiranjeevi’s entry into politics. The first to respond
his challenge was TDP president Chandrababu Naidu. He brought
in the actor members of his father-in-law, NTR’s family, a couple of
whom have significant fan followings. YSR did not lag behind in his
efforts though, unfortunately for him the film field has never been the
Congress’ forte, but some stars did show up for the Congress.
The predominant means of campaign consisted of road shows
and door-to-door contacts. Restrictions on election campaigns and
expenditures forced political parties to tone down their efforts. Despite
the restrictions, the expenditure in this election surpassed all earlier
limits with an abundance of liquor and distribution of money.5 This
time, there was a conspicuous absence of carnival-type grandeur as
in earlier elections.6 Television provided partial compensation. TV
networks in the state have greatly expanded during the last decade.
At present, five exclusive news channels, 11 channels providing enter-
tainment, and two bakthi channels dedicated to devotional themes
are in existence.
The core of the electoral campaign centered on three planks—first,
development and welfarism vs. separatism; second, corruption vs. good
governance; third, social justice vs. social and economic dominance.
The Congress campaign, projecting its five years in power as one for
development, focused on it as the key issue as described previously. It
is also argued that it is possible to resolve the Telangana issue, on the

one hand and to address extremism, on the other through develop-
ment. It further highlighted its achievements on the welfare front
related to increases in revenue resulting from economic expansion.7
The Congress government in AP stands out as an important case of
an expanded welfare regime. Popular schemes of the earlier period
were expanded to cover all eligible persons, while new ones brought
new benefits.
The campaign of the TDP and its allies’ was quite predictable.
They banked on the anti-corruption plank. The Congress government
led by YSR is alleged to be one of the most corrupt regimes in the
country. There have been serious allegations of corruption in almost
every program and scheme. The most maligned are the irrigation
projects, but even the Arogyasree scheme is said to involve bribes in
dealings with corporate hospitals. Corruption has long been a major
electoral campaign issue. Even Congress made it a major issue against
the TDP government in the 2004 elections. Corruption charges
against the TDP regime in 2004, added to other issues, contributed
to its defeat.
The TDP’s strategy in the 2009 election presented a sense of
déjà vu. The TDP tried to repeat what the Congress had done to it in
2004. The TDP basically banked on a strategy of bringing together
the opposition so that the non-Congress vote would not split. By and
large the TDP alliance took to a negative campaign, emphasizing
corruption and misrule. In the middle of the electoral campaign,
it conjured up the Cash Transfer Scheme, according to which a fixed
amount depending on the economic status of the family would be
transferred into its account every month. The poorest of the poor
would get `â•›2,000, the poor `â•›1,500 and the lower middle classes
`â•›1,000. It also promised to supply color TVs to the poor “TV-less”
families free of cost and a comprehensive health scheme for the poor.
These promises largely failed to impress the electorate due to the anti-
populist image of the earlier Naidu government. In fact, the TDP
failed to offer any credible alternative political agenda.
The PRP’s performance was not commensurate with the popular
response it received. Massive turnouts at public meetings, the migration
of fairly senior people from other parties into the PRP and the immense
interest of the youth in the party were not properly channelized. It did
not however lag behind other parties in terms of populist promises.

Besides a monthly grocery plank of `â•›100 for poor families, the PRP
promised Old Age and Widow Pensions, an unemployment dole,
and free and compulsory education up to standard X for all.
The main weakness of the PRP was manifest on the organizational
front. Chiranjeevi is undoubtedly a cine star with a large and com-
mitted fan following with a wide network of fan associations.8 They
had campaigned for more than a year for his entry into politics.
When the PRP was founded, they actively participated in its activ-
ities. Thus, he had a huge popular response and the political plank
of social justice to differentiate his party from others. The failure of
the actor is conspicuous in his inability to transform this enthusiasm
and channelize these energies into a proper political organizational
structure.
All the major parties went in for detailed pre-election surveys by
well known organizations at different stages.9 The campaign issues and
candidate selection did not follow conventional methods, but used
detailed information gathered from these surveys. Congress and the
TDP used this massive information resource base in their selection
of candidates. Apart from the popularity of candidates, another
major consideration was their financial capacity. The 2009 election is
without exaggeration, the most expensive one in the electoral history
of the state. The conservative estimate is that a MLA candidate had
to minimally spend two crores and the MP candidate five crores.10
The upper limit varied, depending on factors like the intensity of
competition, party strength, the perception of the candidate about his
vulnerability, popularity and spending capacity of the rival candidates,
etc. What is also noteworthy about this election—cutting across party
lines—there had been a general preference for wealthy candidates.
As a result, among the contestants, the proportion of those from the
class of contractors, real estate brokers, and other classes of neo-rich
has seen a significant rise.
While the Congress and TDP exercised some judicious balance
between the political background and financial capacity of their
candidates, the PRP came in for large scale criticism on this count. There
was an open talk, not only about the PRP leadership allocating tickets
on the basis of the candidates’ financial strength, but also collecting
extensive funding for the party from the aspirants. The ruling
Congress banked on huge resources at its disposal, while the TDP as
usual, displayed its well known organizational strength, despite losing
some of its leaders to the PRP. The PRP with the charisma of its
leader and initial popularity nonetheless displayed a major weakness
in organizational terms. Added to this, a series of allegations of finan-
cial misappropriation and allocation of tickets to undeserved aspirants
damaged its electoral prospects.
In ideological terms, the PRP’s slogan of social justice was a novel
electoral issue. It made sense in view of the strong Dalit movement
and political awareness among the backward castes. Further, it was
in tune with the fact that the mass fan following of Chiranjeevi has
been among the lower castes and classes. This slogan also assumed a
certain degree of practical significance in view of YSR regime’s blatant
Reddy bias in the selection of MLAs, formation of cabinet, and other
political appointments. Perhaps, no other Congress government in
the state was perceived to be so blatantly casteist.11 Public criticism
on this count did not bring about any change. In correspondence
with its social justice slogan, the PRP allotted 100 seats to Backward
Classes (BC) candidates, thus distinguishing itself from other parties.
Despite this, it failed on the organizational and political fronts. As a
Dalit activist in coastal Andhra noted, the PRP “began with a bright
promise but lost even before it could made its mark.”12
Social Configuration
and Electoral Outcome
Winning 157 seats in an assembly of 294, the Congress clearly

demonstrated its victory in the 2009 elections. The performance
of the Congress has been spectacular in the parliamentary elections
in terms of seats and votes. By bagging 33 out of 42 seats, four seats more
than that in 2004 with a 38.95â•¯percent vote, the Congress proved to
be far more secure. In the assembly, the Congress’ popular vote
of 37.42â•¯percent was far ahead of the TDP poll of 29.66â•¯percent.
Thus, the Congress could largely retain its vote base despite a keen
three-cornered contest. The regional break up (see Table 14.2) does
reveal that the Congress performance in Telangana compared to the
other two regions was not impressive because of the impact of the
Telangana issue.13
The TDP won 92 assembly and six parliamentary seats and came
second. The PRP’s performance with just 18 seats in the assembly
and none in the parliamentary elections was disappointing. The
major losers in this election are the allies of the TDP. The CPI could
win four seats and the CPM just one seat in the assembly. While
they won two seats each in the last parliamentary election, their
dismal performance in 2009 is symptomatic of their declining
base. In contrast, the performance of the Hyderabad based Majlis
Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (MIM), which had a tacit understanding
with the Congress, with seven MLAs and one MP to its credit was
spectacular.
PRP made a greater dent into the vote base of the TDP than that
of the Congress. It got 17.71â•¯percent of the popular vote but failed
to translate it into seats with only 18 seats in the assembly. In terms
of votes and seats, the PRP is relatively stronger in coastal Andhra,
wining 13 seats and 22â•¯percent of the popular vote (see Table 14.2).
A spoiler to the TDP’s election prospects is the Lok Satta (LS), a
NGO)-turned-political party. In as many as 22 assembly constitu-
encies, the Congress margins over the TDP alliance were smaller
than the votes polled by the LS. LS split the votes of the TDP rather
than that of the Congress. Further, in as many as 44 assembly con-
stituencies, there was a close contest as the winning margin was less
than 2,000 votes. In these seats, the Congress with 25 seats, topped
the list followed by the TDP with 11, the PRP with four, and the
TRS with two.14 Thus the PRP and the LS harmed the TDP alliance
more than the Congress.15
There is a significant difference in the performance of parties in the
assembly and parliamentary elections in terms of seats and popular
vote. The TDP polled 4.73â•¯percent less than what it received in
the assembly elections. The other major contender, the PRP as well
polled 2â•¯percent less vote in the parliamentary election than in the
assembly election.
The differential performance of the parties in the assembly and
parliamentary elections and the decisive edge the Congress demon-
strated over regional parties like the TDP, PRP, and the TRS points
to the fact that the electorate showed a greater preference for a
national party in the parliamentary elections. The continuous threat of
instability of the coalition governments at the center, and the tendency

of the smaller coalitional partners to threaten to pull out at their own
convenience may have contributed to a shift in the perception of the
place of regional parties in national politics. The significant difference
in the voteâ•¯percentages between the parliamentary and assembly
elections points to this trend.
Further, the pro-poor performance of UPA government, in com-
parison to the NDA, acted as a significant factor influencing the
popular preference for the Congress. The withdrawal of the Left’s
support to the UPA on the nuclear issue in fact had an adverse
impact on the image of the Left in the state. Further the Left’s
alliance with the TDP was seen in a poor light. The Left’s trenchant
criticism of the TDP during its second tenure in power (1999–2004)
and its volte face just prior to the recent election did not make a
convincing case in the popular perception.16 In fact, one could see the
opportunistic alliance with the TDP contributing to the decline in
the Left’s credibility as reflected in its electoral performance (see
Table 14.1 and 14.2).
Table 14.1
Parliamentary Electoral Profile of Parties in AP: 1984–2009
Congress TDP Left BJP Others

Year S V S V S V S V S V
1984 6 41.8 30 44.8 1 1.9 NA NA 5 11.5
1989 39 51.0 2 34.5 – 4.4 – 2.0 1 8.1
1991 25 45.6 13 32.3 2 4.3 1 9.5 1 8.3
1996 22 39.7 16 32.6 3 5.3 – 5.7 1 16.7
1998 22 38.5 12 32.0 2 5.5 4 18.3 2 5.7
1999 5 42.8 29 40.7 – 2.8 7 9.1 1 4.6
2004 29 41.54 5 33.11 2 2.38 0 8.40 5 6.83 (TRS)
1 7.73 (others)
2009 33 38.95 6 24.93 0 2.85 0 3.75 2 6.14 (TRS)
0 15.76 (PRP)
1 7.62 (others)
Sources: Adapted from K. Srinivasulu and P.C. Sarangi, “Political Realignments in Post-
NTR Andhra Pradesh,” Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Vol. XXXIV,
Nos. 34 and 35, (August 21–28, 1999), Table 1 and 3; CSDS Team, “A Triumph
of Alliance Arithmetic,” Frontline, (November 6–11, 1999); NES 2009. “How
India Voted,” The Hindu, May 26, 2009.
Note: Total Number of Seats: 42.
Table 14.2
2009 Assembly Elections: Regional Break-up
Cong TDP TRS Left PRP BJP Others

Telangana 51 39 10 5 2 2 10
(119) (33.06%) (20.65%) (9.43%) 4.93 % (12.32%) (5.3%) (14.31%)
Coastal 74 36 – 0 13 0 0
Andhra (36.94%) (30.84%) (1.41%) (21.91%) (1.21%) (7.69%)
(123)
Rayalaseema 32 17 – 0 3 0 0
(52) (42.72) (36.32%) (0.81%) (14.7%) (1.2%) (4.25%)
State (294) 157 92 10 5 18 2 10
(37.42%) (29.66%) (2.36%) (2.14%) (17.71%) (2.23%) (8.48%)
Source: Andhra Jyothi (Telugu daily, Hyderabad) May 17, 2009 and May 18, 2009;
Sakshi (Telugu daily, Hyderabad), May 17, 2009.
Shifting Support Bases
Given the shifts in the political alliances and emergence of new parties,
a comparison of the shifting social support base of parties needs to be
done cautiously. There have been a number of assumptions about the
social bases of parties. One of them is that the TDP continues to enjoy
strong support among women. In the 1980s, when NTR founded
the TDP, he voiced the rhetoric of empowerment of adapaduchulu
(sisters). Policy measures like share to the daughters in the patrimony
and women reservations in the local bodies, apart from the rhetoric in
favor of the enhancement of women’s status were instrumental in the
consolidation of the support base of the TDP among women.
Chandrababu Naidu who seized power in the mid-1990s tried to
consolidate women’s support through the Development of Women
and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) groups. These groups, which
were dormant earlier, were activated and large funds were allocated
to them. The DWCRA program was highlighted as one of the flagship
programs of the Naidu government. 50.3â•¯percent of the female
respondents in the 1996 NES17 as against only 40.6â•¯percent of the
male respondents favored the TDP alliance clearly show the support
of women. In contrast, the Congress enjoyed major support from
the men voters with 49â•¯percent, while women comprised around
43â•¯percent. This clearly began shifting from 2004 onwards. As the
2004 NES data shows, women’s support to the TDP came down to
41â•¯percent, with the Congress alliance support among women reaching

55â•¯percent. Male supports remained at 48â•¯percent. The articulation of
the crisis in rural economy, which affected men and women in equal
measure, through a policy package discussed earlier and promises
like low interest loans to DWCRA groups, seem to have influenced
women’s electoral preference for the Congress. In the 2009 elec-
tions, according to the NES 2009, there is a significant decline of
the support among men and women to both the Congress and TDP
alliance. This is because Chiranjeevis’s PRP gained 13.5â•¯percent and
11.5â•¯percent among women and men respectively (see Table 14.3).
Table 14.3
Who Voted for Whom in Andhra Pradesh
1996 2004 2009

INC and Allies (%)
TDP + BJP (%)
TDP + Left +
Others (%)
TDPLP +
INC (%)
INC (%)
TDPN +
TRS (%)
PRP (%)
Left (%)
JD (%)
Gender
Male 49.0 40.6 5.7 4.7 48 42 44.9 33.3 11.5
Female 42.9 50.3 2.6 4.2 55 41 41.3 37.2 13.5
Economic class
Very poor 34.4 59.7 3.8 2.2 48 42 45.5 41.2 8.6
Poor 49.0 40.7 8.3 2.1 56 38 42.9 39.6 12.6
Lower – – – – – – 43.6 38.1 12.3
Middle 50.0 41.3 2.5 6.3 50 46 42.2 33.2 14.0
Upper 53.1 37.0 – 9.9 49 46 43.0 27.8 10.9
Caste–community
Upper castes 34 48 38.2 33.7 4.5
OBCs 44.5 46.5 4.3 4.7 47 47 38.3 37.7 15.5
Malas – – – – – – 51.0 28.8 13.5
Madigas – – – – – – 47.7 46.1 4.7
SCs 55.8 40.3 1.3 2.6 67 25 49.35 37.45 9.1
Scheduled 32.3 57.3 9.4 1.0 59 36 54.3 33.3 7.2
Tribes
Muslims 56.7 36.7 1.7 5.0 63 35 50.7 24.8 6.9
Source: NES 1996, Post-poll survey, CSDS Data Unit, EPW, August 21–28, 1999; NES
2004, CSDS Data Unit, EPW, December 18, 2004; NES 2009, ‘How India
Voted’, The Hindu, May 26, 2009.
Since its emergence in the 1980s, the TDP had carved out a strong
base among the poor through welfare schemes like `â•›2 a kilo rice,
housing for the poor, janata dhoti, and sarees. Earlier, Indira Gandhi
through her populist garibi hatao and anti-poverty programs created
a niche for herself among the lower classes. This was turned upside
down by the TDP during its first term in power, which coincided
with the post-Indira phase in Indian politics. Congress came back to
power in 1989 on populist promises, but soon in tune with the liberal-
ization process initiated by the Congress government at the center
in the early 1990s; it introduced economic reforms and reduced
welfare programs. This made the Congress unpopular, paving the
way for the TDP’s come back in the 1994 elections. Once in power,
the TDP again put an elaborate populist agenda in place. Naidu
continued some of these schemes till the 1999 elections though with
some modifications. It is this which made the TDP popular among
the lower classes as evident in the 1996 survey.
By 2004 this has changed significantly. Naidu regime’s neoliberal
development dispensation and move away from welfares policies
led to its unpopularity from the subaltern caste classes. Despite its
populist promises and alliance with the Left, as NES 2009 shows, the
TDP could not regain support among the lower classes and support
from the upper sections declined significantly. Its pro-Telangana
stand and alliance with the TRS is seen as an obstacle to speculative
enterprises like the real estate business which have risen since the
1990s and increased further during Congress rule. The beneficiaries
of the speculative boom, upper classes, and sections of the middle class
were not in favor of the changed TDP stand.
One of the crucial questions in this election is the role of caste
and religious identities. It has been suggested that there is “a shift in
political fundamentals”18 from caste-based identity politics to good
governance and development. Contrarily, polarization along caste
lines has become quite explicit with the entry of the PRP. The three
dominant peasant castes of Reddy, Kamma, and Kapu have been
identified with the Congress, TDP, and PRP respectively. The PRP’s
entry has further sharpened this polarization. Caste remained, as the
NES 2009 indicates, a major consideration in the candidate selec-
tion, electoral appeal, and voters’ preference.
According to the NES 2009, 65.9â•¯percent Reddys and 63.7â•¯percent

Kammas had preferred the Congress and TDP, respectively. Their
preference for the TDP and Congress in contrast was around just
20â•¯percent. Despite its organizational weaknesses and failure to infuse
confidence, the identity of the Kapus with the PRP was quite high at
53â•¯percent.19 This is not to deny the fact that issues like governance
and development did gain some prominence.
Historically, the TDP’s consolidation is identified with the polit-
ical rise of the Kammas and backward classes in the state. The policy
of reservations to the backward classes in local bodies, educational
institutions and employment, and preference to the BCs in the
allocation of party positions and selection of candidates for elected
bodies has been an important factor in consolidating BC support.
This pattern can be seen changing from the 2004 election with the
TDP advantage changing in favor of the Congress.
Dalits have historically shown a preference for the Congress all
through the country and AP is no exception. The TDP identified with
Kammas and OBCs could not make any dent into the Dalit vote bank.
In fact, the rise of the TDP in the 1980s stimulated a series of attacks
on the Dalits in the Kamma dominant villages. This only widened
the gap between them.20 In the 1990s, with the rise of the Madiga
reservation movement, a political division along the Madiga–Mala
caste lines developed. With the TDP supporting the Madiga Dandora
movement, spearheaded by the Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi
(MRPS), the Madigas moved toward the TDP. This helped TDP
to gain electorally from Madigas, but further cemented the Malas’
relation to Congress. The Madigas’ support to the TDP as quid pro
quo to the latter’s support to the reservation issue has been up and
down. However Mala’s support to Congress has been stable.21
Muslim electoral behavior has also seen an interesting trajectory,
especially since the early 1990s. The Babri Masjid demolition is a
major event that made the Muslims move away from the Congress
and break the tacit understanding the party had with the Hyderabad
based MIM. Muslim support to the TDP has never been very signifi-
cant. In the post-Babri period, the community disenchanted with the
Congress moved closer to the TDP. This turned out to be a short lived
relation. As the TDP moved closer to the BJP, entered into an alliance
with it and supported the NDA government at the center, since the
late 1990s, the Muslim swung away from it. As the survey data also
clearly shows, Congress in both the 2004 and 2009 elections received
overwhelming support from Muslims. In terms of popular support,
Congress and the TDP have remained the main contenders, and the
PRP’s challenge is only limited to spoiling the chances of either of
them, but not adequate enough to displace them.
Changing Party Dynamics in AP
At one level, the electoral outcome is a reflection of the shifting sup-

port base and at another of the changing party structure in the state.
The two major parties, the Congress and the TDP, between whom
power has circulated since the 1980s, have undergone changes in
terms of organizational structure and ideological character and policy
orientation. The electoral outcome also reflects the people’s verdict
on new parties which have emerged in the recent past.
The Congress party in AP, dominated as it is by the Reddy com-
munity, has evolved a strategy based on what is called “politics of
accommodation”22 by facilitating representation to different castes and
communities. This principle had been blatantly violated by the YSR
regime in concentrating power in one community. Concentration of
power in the hands of YSR and his caste coterie and highhandedness in
dealing with matters related to both party and government did attract
a certain degree of dissidence, but this was quickly controlled.23
YSR’s concentration of power relates to the changed role of the
central Congress Party. The Congress under Sonia Gandhi contrasts
with the centralization of decision-making under Indira Gandhi as
well as Rajiv Gandhi. They frequently intervened in the functioning
of provincial parties and governments including frequent changes
of CMs leading to factionalism. Under Sonia Gandhi’s leadership,
the provincial Congress committees have been allowed to function
more on their own, under the guidance of a general secretary in
change of the state party. The absence of blatant intervention and the
discouragement to dissidents has considerably restrained factional-
ism in the states. A significant fallout of this strategy is concentration of
power in one center in the provincial party and reduction of access to
multiple channels of information, which may prove to be detrimental
to the party in the long run.
Using this to his advantage, YSR could easily marginalize and sup-
press the opposition to his leadership from caste and region-based
dissidence. The provincial Congress, freed from the strict regulation
of the High Command in fact has increasingly functioned like a
“regional” party with a fair degree of autonomy in decision-making.24
It is no exaggeration to suggest that YSR had emerged as the most
powerful Congress CM of Andhra after K. Brahmanada Reddy, who
was the CM during the 1960s.25
The Congress regime has banked on a two pronged strategy that
combined development with mass welfare populism. The develop-
mentalist thrust of the regime is seen to be evident in the massive
investments in irrigation projects, roads, bridges, flyovers in the urban
centers, and SEZs. Networks involving contractors, builders, real estate
developers, corporate operators, and racketeers of various hues are
part of the regime’s support structure. The nexus with these groups
is seen by its critics as institutionalizing corruption. This has been the
standard allegation made against the YSR regime by the TDP, TRS,
the Left, PRP, and a section of the media.
If the developmental works created networks of support among
the rich and powerful, then, the welfare programs strengthened the
Congress social base among the poor, and marginalized. The clue to
the Congress’ electoral success in the 2009 elections lies in its effort at
keeping its promises and establishing an elaborate welfare mechanism.
The popular schemes include subsidized rice, free power to agricul-
ture, a pension scheme, Arogyasree, and fee reimbursement. Their
undisrupted continuity added to the credibility of the regime. In
contrast to the TDP, no dramatic shift took place in Congress
policies in its five year rule. It acquired an image of being pro-poor,
pro-farmer, and pro-backward classes, while at the same time catering
to the interests of the rich. The continuity in the Congress’ strategy
combined development with welfare.
In its two and half decades of history, the TDP could be seen passing
through three major phases. In the first phase which was during the
tenure of NTR, the emphasis was on Telugu self-respect and populist
schemes. There was a major policy shift toward liberalization of
the state economy in the TDP regime during the mid-1990s with
its leader N. Chandrababu Naidu. One of the significant aspects of
this change was the move away from agriculture to an emphasis on the
new economy. As a result, the agrarian sector and related economic
activity suffered neglect leading to a rural crisis. But this period saw
a perceptible growth of the IT sector leading to an expansion of
employment opportunities to urban youth. The regime evoked con-
trasting images. On the one hand, it acquired the image of being an
IT savvy regime, while on the other as notoriously nonresponsive to
the suicides of farmers and weavers.
In the 2009 assembly election, the unfolding of the third phase in
the history of the TDP is reminiscent of its first phase of populism.
In this election, the TDP made promises like free color TV to poor
families, Cash Transfer Scheme, etc. This was a major departure from
the image the TDP under Naidu leadership has acquired and this volte
face was not convincing to the electorate as is clear from the electoral
outcome. The major weakness of the TDP in this election was its
failure to formulate a political agenda that could weave the populist
promises into a convincing alternative to the Congress.
In its eight years of existence, the TRS carved out a space for
itself as the only party that has consistently advocated the Telangana
demand for a separate state. It has displayed three limitations: first
strategic, second spatial, and third sociological. Strategically, the
party has largely confined itself to elections and lobbying in the corri-
dors of power for the realization of the Telangana demand without
much effort at building a mass movement. In spatial terms, its growth
has been limited to the northern Telangana districts and could not
expand in the southern Telangana districts. In sociological terms
though its social base includes different sections of society like youth,
students, middle classes, and peasantry, the leadership has been
identified with the dominant peasant castes of Velama and Reddy.
The TRS had an alliance with the Congress in the 2004 elections
and won five MP and 26 MLA seats with 16.9â•¯percent popular vote
in Telangana. The resignation of Kalwakunta Chandrasekhar Rao
(KCR) to his MP position in 2006 and his re-election with a majority of
two lakh votes was shown as a demonstration of the popular aspiration
for the Telangana State and the TRS as its organizational expression.
The TRS sought to repeat it in 2008 by making the entire contingent
of TRS MPs and MLAs to resign and recontest. This was designed as
a prelude to the 2009 general election. But it boomeranged. In the
by-election, in the place of 16 MLAs and four MPs,26 the TRS could
retain only seven MLA and two MP seats as the Congress and TDP
won five and four MLA seats and one MP seat each respectively.
A major shock to the TRS in this election was the reduction of the
party president KCR victory margin to a mere 15,000 vote.
In electoral terms, the TRS’ performance in 2009 is poor compared
to its performance in 2004.27 This time it won only 10 assembly seats
out of 45 it contested and won only 9.43â•¯percent of the popular vote.
In 2004, the TRS had its electoral presence in almost all the northern
Telangana district; Adilabad (3), Karimnagar (5), Nizamabad (3),
Medak (4), Warangal (6), and Hyderabad (2). In the 2009 assembly
election, it won from Adilabad and Karimnagar, three and four seats,
respectively and one each from Nizamabad, Medak, and Warangal
districts. The reduction in the electoral importance of the TRS is seen
as the achievement of the YSR regime in marginalizing the Telangana
demand in state politics.28
The PRP’s position in the state politics provides an opportunity
to reflect on the dynamics of caste politics dominated by the Reddys
and Kammas, on the one hand, and the relationship between politics
and cinema on the other. Earlier NTR, emerging from the Telugu
cinema field founded the TDP with the Kammas as the core social base
and came to power. Apparently inspired by the NTR phenomenon,
Chiranjeevi drew up a political agenda which was to forge an alliance
of social forces consisting of the Kapus as the core constituency
and including the numerous BCs. The political slogan of samajika
nyayam (social justice) is seen as the ideological plank that would
bring together all these communities who have been subjected to the
domination of the Reddy and Kamma communities on a common
political platform.
The PRP’s failure to make a decisive impact on the electoral process
is seen more as the failure of the party on the organization front
than its ideological failure.29 The principal obstacle the PRP faced is
related to the polarization of the political space between the Congress
and TDP. This is in sharp contrast to the scene in the 1980s when
NTR founded the TDP. Then, the Congress was in bad shape due to
factionalism and low morale. In 2009, the Congress led by YSR was
not only in a secure position but quite high in terms of popularity.
The TDP retained its organizational strength and its enthusiastic cadre
was hopeful of a come-back. In contrast, the PRP displayed all the

weaknesses of a novice and absence of acumen to translate the goodwill
and fan-following into organizational and electoral strength.
The Left in its two decades of alliance politics with the TDP and
later with the Congress has become an appendage of either of them
alternatively or so it is popularly perceived. The Left after the state
formation gradually declined in organizational and electoral terms
but continued as a credible politico-ideological force. Its alliance
with the TDP marked a decisive shift. Moving away from any serious
political mobilization on social and economic issues and absorbed
comprehensively in the electoral politics, the Left has lost its politico-
ideological identity.
Conclusion
In a larger sense, the 2009 elections in AP point to a major inade-

quacy revolving around an ideological vacuity. The most visible
characteristic is the reduction of the political process into a purely
electoral numbers game. As a result of this obsession with elections, the
core principles that could provide a meaningful political focus were not
adequately recognized. In the absence of a viable alternative political
agenda, the TDP’s electoral promises looked like a pale shadow of the
Congress and therefore failed to evince popular acceptance. In spite
of its social justice plank, civil society response and overwhelming
popular reception, the PRP failed to evolve as a major player in
state politics mainly due to its organizational inadequacies and ideo-
logical articulation. To cover it up it also resorted to populist appeals
which only exposed its desperateness. The competitive populism
engaged by the major contestants, the Congress, TDP, and PRP
clearly demonstrate the political vacuity of these promises as well as
desperateness emanating from a sense of electoral insecurity.30
An unfortunate development seen in this election is the margin-
alization of civil society initiatives. AP has a strong presence of civil
society. Since the 1980s, civil society organizations have shown a
concern and also played a visible role in the electoral process.31 In the
2004 elections, they played a key role in bringing the agrarian crisis
onto the electoral agenda, building a critique of the TDP regime’s
liberalization policies, and thus influencing the electoral outcome.

The 2009 elections in this respect represent a disturbing deviation.
Moreover, all those voices identified as authentic civil society ones
have been co-opted and subsumed by political parties, the most visible
dimension being the joining of the Dalit and backward caste activists
in the PRP.
Further, the media, print and electronic, with their widespread
network and powerful presence, were so sharply divided along party
lines that the sense of objectivity they were supposed to display was
absent, and the allegations of financial and political links deprived
the media of their credibility. The reconfiguration of the civil society,
media, and political party relationship has led to the weakening of
democratic checks. They made the Election Commission, which is
a branch of the government, look like the exclusive and all pervasive
guardian of the democratic electoral process.
It is suggested that the 2009 elections are marked by a shift from
identity politics to development and good governance. But the
experience of AP clearly shows that to counter-pose development to
identity as the driving force of politics in AP is misplaced. The 2009
election, partly due to the contextual change brought about by the
PRP, has seen an active and competitive mobilization on the basis
of caste identity. Caste identity along with enhanced expenditure on
development and welfare, thanks to the increased state revenue, played
a key role in the Congress strategy. An important change observed
in this election pertains to the changing party dynamics. While the
TDP and PRP are regional parties, even a national party like Congress
projected a “regionalist” character with YSR acting as its supremo.
This factor undoubtedly played a key role in the party’s electoral
performance. Thus the increased autonomy of the state Congress,
which allowed it to evolve a regionally distinct mode of articulation
of politics of identity, focusing on development and populist
mobilization, facilitated the electoral victory of the Congress.
Notes
1. For an analysis of the discourses in the 2004 election, see K. Srinivasulu, “Political
Articulation and Policy Discourse in Elections, Andhra Pradesh, 2004,” Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 34, August 21, 2004.
â•‡ 2. Ibid.
â•‡ 3. This is managed by the Emergency Management Research Institute (EMRI),
launched at the initiative of Ramalinga Raju of Satyam Computers on the
model of public–private partnership, with 95â•¯percent of the cost met by the
state government. The immense popularity of this project is evident from the
fact the EMRI now runs 108 ambulance services in nine states. With the fall of
Satyam Computers, it has been taken over by GVK group.
â•‡ 4. K. Srinivasulu, Caste, Class, and Social Articulation in Andhra Pradesh, India:
Mapping Differential Regional Trajectories (London: Overseas Development
Institute, 2002).
â•‡ 5. All newspapers reported this phenomenon of unrestrained electoral spending.
It is also an election when candidates who have made big money in speculative
enterprises have entered into elections. See, for instance a front page report that
in the first phase of polling there was “an expenditure of `â•›10 crores in some
constituencies and `â•›5 crores in 50 constituencies,” in “Dabbu to the power of
dabbu” (Money to the power of Money), Andhra Jyothi (Hyderabad), (Telugu
daily), April 18, 2009.
â•‡ 6. Walter Hauser, and Wendy Singer, “The Democratic Rite: Celebration and Par-
ticipation in the Indian Elections,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 9, September
1986.
â•‡ 7. According to the AP Human Development Report 2007, AP’s tax revenue
asâ•¯percentage of GSDP has increased from 5.2â•¯percent in 1995–96 to
10.1â•¯percent in 2007–08 (Revised Estimate or RE). AP’s total revenue (including
central transfers) has increased from 12 to 14â•¯percent of GSDP during 1995–96
to 2004–05 to 18â•¯percent of GSDP in 2007–1998 (RE). See, Andhra Pradesh
Human Development Report 2007, (Hyderabad: CESS, 2008) p. 43.
â•‡ 8. S.V. Srinivas, Megastar: Chiranjeevi and Telugu Cinema after NT Rama Rao
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
â•‡ 9. Interview with Tankasala Ashok, editor, Telugu daily Vaartha and with journalists
in various places. It is said that even some candidates sponsored surveys in their
constituencies to know the pulse of the people and program their campaign on
the basis of the survey findings (Field notes).
10. Various news reports in Andhra Jyothi, Eenadu, and Vaartha (Hyderabad
editions).
11. The preponderance of the members of this community in the ministry and
nominated positions is emphasized in “Agrakulala Guppitlo Adhikaram” (Power
in Grip of the Upper Castes), Bahujana Keratalu (A Telugu monthly magazine),
April, 2009. Also, interviews with K. Kondal Rao, B.C. Mitrulu, June 14, 2009
at Hyderabad.
12. Field notes, Ponnur, Guntur, May, 2009.
13. Andhra Jyothi (Telugu daily, Hyderabad) May 17, 2009.
14. Indian Express (Hyderabad) May 18, 2009.
15. Andhra Jyothi (Telugu Daily, Hyderabad) May 17 and 18, 2009.
16. Interviews with CPI(M) activists, Field notes, June, 2009.
17. CSDS, Delhi, as part of its NES has been conducting election surveys at the
national and state levels since 1996.
18. The Hindu. “How India Voted,” The Hindu (Hyderabad) May 26, 2009, p. 2.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. For analysis of this phenomenon, refer to, K. Srinivasulu, Note 4.
21. K. Srinivasulu, 2007. “SC Reservation, Dalit Movement and the Policy
Questions;” Presented at the National Seminar on Future of Reservation
Policy in India in Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi,
July 13–14.
22. Writing about the Congress rule in the state, G. Ram Reddy thus characterized
the Congress strategy; see Ram Reddy. “The Politics of Accommodation: Class,
Class and Dominance in Andhra Pradesh,” in Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A.
Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Vol. I (Delhi: Oxford
23. There is an overwhelming consensus on this interpretation of the regime.
Interviews with BC, SC activists, and journalists. Field notes, May–June, 2009.
24. Similar patterns of regionalized behavior could be observed in other national
parties as well. For an interesting case of the regionalization of the Hindutva
agenda in the context of Rajasthan, see Rob Jenkins, “Rajput Hindutva, Caste
Politics, Regional identity and Hindu Nationalism in Contemporary Rajasthan,”
in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christopher Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the
Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
25. This may, however, change because of the possibility of intensification of
factionalism in the aftermath of the untimely death of YSR in a helicopter crash
in September 2009.
26. Out of the 26 MLAs and five MPs who won on TRS tickets, 10 MLAs and one
MP became rebels and therefore they did not resign.
27. The only challenge that the TRS could have faced was from the Nava Telangana
party, which like TRS earlier was formed by a break away group from the TDP
at the time of the 2009 election, but just before the 2009 elections merged in
the PRP.
28. The dominant tendency to interpret popular support to the Telangana movement
in terms of the electoral performance of the TRS is erroneous. There are a wide
variety of civil society associations and cultural organizations also articulating
the issue, some of which differ with and are in fact positioned against the TRS.
It is instructive to maintain a distinction between the politics of movement and
electoral politics. Therefore, the electoral decline of the TRS in the 2009 elections
should not be described as the marginalization of the Telangana issue.
29. This is the view of the Dalit bahujan activists and intellectuals. Field notes,
Hyderabad, Ponnur, and Vijayawada, May–July, 2009.
30. Even committed TDP activists admit that their populist promises were seen
to be desperate attempts to woo the electorate but were not driven by genuine
public motives. The popular apprehension of the TDP is grounded in its earlier
track record.
31. The most well-known case is their role in setting the pro-prohibition agenda in
the 1994 assembly elections.
C.â•‡ Multi-party States

Chapter 15
Bihar
Identity Politics Recycled:

2009 Lok Sabha Election in Bihar
Binoy Shanker Prasad
The 2009 Lok Sabha election in Bihar turned out to be a referendum

on the four-year old ruling coalition government. Voters were gener-
ally not enthusiastic about the alliance forged on election eve between
Lalu Yadav of the RJD and Ram Vilas Paswan of the LJP. Thus Nitish
Kumar, the provincial CM, skillfully steered the NDA of the JD(U)
and the BJP to a resounding electoral success.
A combination of speedy developmental effort, social engineering,
and a strategic positioning of candidates in redrawn parliamentary
constituencies of Bihar were responsible for the landslide NDA
victory.1 The election results of 2009 indicated a remarkable trend
in the politics of Bihar: the voters could not always be couched into
voting along caste lines. It could also not be asserted with certainty
that the state was hopelessly ungovernable. Essential elements of the
socioeconomic structure remained intact in Bihar, as well as signs of
change on the horizon.
312 Binoy Shanker Prasad
Realignment of Political Forces

and Personalities
The JD(U)–BJP Alliance and Placement of Candidates

The political partnership in Bihar between the JD(U) and the BJP
held steady in its fourth year and reflected well on the stability of
the state government. By tradition, nominations of candidates for
elections are decided by party leaders in the capital cities and not by
members of the parties in the parliamentary constituencies. Near
absence of inner-party democracy was a given fact and party operatives
managed any dissension very skillfully, mostly in favor of their party
bosses. There were, thus, relatively fewer resignations, defections,
and realignments after the battle lines were drawn. On the NDA
side, the JD(U) contested 24 seats and the BJP ran in the remaining
16 constituencies.
Skirmishes within the RJD and the JD(U) Ranks

The caste composition of the OBCs, the support base of the two main
rival parties, the RJD and the JD(U), has been the same. However,
within the OBCs, the two parties were identified with the castes of
their respective leaders: the Yadavs (Lalu Yadav) and the Kurmis
(Nitish Kumar). Criss-crossing of ranks and file between the two
parties was, therefore, very convenient.
George Fernandes, one-time patriarch of the earlier versions of
the JD(U) and a former convener of the NDA and Digvijay Singh,
a former union minister and MP were not given JD(U) tickets
from Muzaffarpur and Banka, respectively. Fernandes was denied
a ticket because the party leaders decided he was too sick to be a
viable candidate and Digvijay was not given a ticket from Banka
because he was a sitting JD(U) member of the Rajya Sabha from
Jharkhand. According to Sharad Yadav, the party president, the
caste profile of Banka had also changed.2 George Fernandes and
Digvijay Singh, however, went against their party’s decision and
contested as independent candidates. Kailash Baitha, whose Bagaha
Identity Politics Recycled 313
reserved seat had been declared as an open category seat, also lost his
own nomination bid.
Lalan Paswan, a JD(U) MLA quit his party and that of the Assembly
to accept nomination from the RJD. Lalu fielded him against the
Congress nominee in Sasaram, Meira Kumar. Paswan, resigned from
the JD(U) along with two ministers from Nitish Kumar’s cabinet:
Nitish Mishra and Nagmani. They protested the manner in which
party tickets were distributed. Nagmani, who belonged to the CM’s
twin caste, Kushwaha (Koeri) wanted a party ticket from Ujiarpur,
a newly created constituency dominated by his own caste.3
Ram Badan Roy was another leader of the JD(U) who quit the
party before the nomination and joined the RJD. The RJD rewarded
him by nominating him as its candidate in Munger. There were
defections from the RJD to JD(U) as well. Jai Narayan Nishad, a
former union minister, quit the RJD to become a JD(U) candidate
from Muzaffarpur. Mangani Lal Mandal, another RJD member of
the Rajya Sabha quit the party and joined the JD(U) because he was
not given a Lok Sabha ticket. These cases of defection represented
the superficiality of political parties and their “top-down system”
of recruitment. In the absence of inner-party democracy, both the
candidates and the leaders were not accountable to their consti-
tuents. This malady, however, is not limited to identity-based regional
parties alone.
Rift in the UPA: The RJD–LJP Alliance and

Placement of Candidates
Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan, the founder leaders of the RJD
and the LJP were members of the UPA headed by the Congress party
president Sonia Gandhi. Both Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan were
ministers in the UPA cabinet headed by Manmohan Singh. At the
center, the two leaders from Bihar were always at logger-heads. But,
following the announcement of elections, the two leaders entered
into a quick adjustment of seats without taking the Congress into
confidence. They set aside only three seats for the Congress. The
Congress was obviously displeased with what its rank and file viewed
as a backroom manipulation to marginalize the Congress.
Congress, at the initiative of Rahul and Sonia Gandhi, eventually

decided to do it alone in Bihar and fielded its candidates in almost
all constituencies. Without breaking the UPA formally, the three
parties became rivals in Bihar. The RJD fielded its candidates in 28
constituencies and left 12 for the LJP. The RJD–LJP alliance decided
to put up candidates in all the three seats held by the Congress in the
previous Lok Sabha. In 2004, the RJD had contested 22 seats and left
eight seats to the LJP and four to the Congress. One seat was allotted
each to the NCP of Sharad Pawar and the CPI(M).
The three Congress MPs who represented Bihar in 2004 were
Meira Kumar, Sasaram (SC), Shakeel Ahmed, Madhubani, and Nikhil
Kumar, Aurangabad. Against them, Lalu fielded Lalan Paswan, Abdul
Bari Siddiqui, and Shakeel Ahmed Khan.4
Constituencies Shared between the RJD

and the LJP
After the RJD and the LJP had placed their nominees, their candi-
dates in the field looked as follows:5 In Siwan, Hena Shahab, wife of
the former RJD MP, Mohammed Shahabuddin, represented the RJD.
In Munger, Ram Badan Roy replaced Jay Prakash Narayan Yadav.
Patna Sahib, a new constituency, earlier represented by Ram Kripal
Yadav (RJD) went to RJD’s Vijay Kumar. He had to contest against
a BJP VIP Shatrughan Sinha, a former movie-star, a union minister
and a Rajya Sabha member. Madhepura, where Lalu himself was a
candidate in 2004 and lost to JD(U)’s Sharad Yadav, was given to
Professor Ravindra Charan Yadav. In Maharajganj, the RJD replaced
its 2004 candidate with a Rajput, Uma Shankar Singh to take on
Prabhunath Singh of the JD(U).
RJD’s list also included loyalists who had been given ministerial
positions in Manmohan Singh’s cabinet. They were: Taslimuddin
(Kishanganj), Raghuvansh Prasad Singh (Vaishali), Akhilesh Prasad
Singh (Purvi Champaran), Kanti Singh (Karakat), Raghunath Jha
(Valmikinagar), and M.A.A. Fatmi (Darbhanga). Jai Prakash Narayan
Yadav, a 2004 winner from Munger was moved to Banka. The incum-
bent Lok Sabha members of the RJD re-nominated were Sitaram
Singh (Sheohar), Sitaram Yadav (Sitamarhi), Devendra Prasad Yadav
(Jhanjharpur), Alok Kumar Mehta (Ujiarpur), R.K. Rana (Khagaria),

and Ramjee Manjhi (Gaya, SC).
Lalu himself chose Saran as one of the two constituencies (including
Patliputra) to contest from. According to caste-wise analysis, out of
28 seats Lalu apportioned to his party, two were reserved (Gaya and
Sasaram) for SCs. From the remaining 26 open seats, Lalu retained as
many as a dozen for his own caste men, five were given to Muslims,
and three to Rajputs. A mix of others (Brahmin, Bhumihar, and
EBC) claimed the rest. Allocation of almost 65â•¯percent seats to Yadavs
and Muslims qualified the RJD once again to be the guarantor of
the Muslim–Yadav interest in Bihar.
In Ram Vilas Paswan’s share of 12 seats fell two reserved consti-
tuencies for SCs. He took Hajipur himself and his brother, Ram
Chandra Paswan had Samastipur. The rest went to a mix of castes
including Brahmin (Paschim Champaran and Purnea), Muslim
(Araria and Katihar), Yadav (Supaul), and EBC (Muzaffarpur). Arrah,
Begusarai, Nalanda, and Nawada were the other four constituencies
where the LJP fielded its candidates. A movie personality, Prakash
Jha was fielded from Paschim Champaran. Prakash Jha had made
outstanding movies exposing the crimes and the mafia connections
of Lalu’s administration. By a coincidence, he ended up on the side of
the political coalition co-headed by Lalu. In 2009, the NCP and the
Communist Parties were not partners of either Lalu Yadav or Ram
Vilas Paswan.
There were two women, Hena Shahab in Siwan and Kanti Singh
in Karakat, and one Veena Devi in Nawada in the lists of Lalu and
Ram Vilas Paswan. Similarly, there were two women Meena Singh
in Arrah and Ashwamedh Devi in Ujiarpur, and one Rama Devi in
Sheohar in the lists of the JD(U) and BJP, respectively. Women were
not adequately represented in any political party.
The Outcome
The caste-wise and Muslim result of the winners was as follows:6
Upper Caste: Rajput (9), Bhumihar (4), Brahman (1), and

Kayastha (1)
Backward Caste: Yadav (7), Bania (2), Kurmi (1), Koeri (1)
EBC (5)
Muslims (3)
SC (6)
The Parties’ Performance in Bihar
Against the UPA National Momentum:

A Land Slide Mandate for the NDA
Nationally, the Congress party, under the joint leadership of Sonia
Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, and PM Manmohan Singh scored its best
performance in 25 years. The contribution to its tally from Bihar,
however, was only two—Kishanganj and Sasaram (SC)—one short
of what it had in 2004. However, its share of votes increased from
4â•¯percent to 11â•¯percent. By comparison, in UP, the Congress seats
went from 8 to 21. Whereas the Congress rejoiced at the decision
of not having any adjustments with the RJD in Bihar, Lalu admitted
that it was “a mistake.” Even after the election, the UPA was not
formally dissolved and Lalu and Ram Vilas, in principle, retained
their alliance with the Congress.
The other coalition, the NDA, with a total of 162 seats in the
last Lok Sabha, did not do well nationally. However, two of its
constituents the BJP and the JD(U) won 32 out of 40 seats in Bihar.
The JD(U) won in 20 out of 24 constituencies and the BJP won in
12 out of 16 seats they contested. They registered a success rate of
83 and 75â•¯percent, respectively. Two seats, Banka and Siwan, went
to the rebel independents. Bihar had no contribution to the Third
Front, mainly the Left parties, and the Fourth Front of local parties.
In the 2004 elections in Bihar, the NDA had won only 11 seats, five
by the BJP and six by the JD(U). The RJD had contested 26 seats
and won 22. Its UPA partners, LJP and the Congress, as mentioned,
contested eight and four seats, respectively, and bagged four and
three. In 2009, the RJD almost met the fate of the CPI(M) in West
Bengal whereas Nitish Kumar rivaled Orissa’s Naveen Patnaik in
terms of transforming the nature of state politics.
A Contingent of State Legislators Win

for the JD(U) and the BJP
Fifteen members of the 243 seat Bihar Legislative Assembly became

elected to the Lok Sabha. That accounted for 37.5â•¯percent of the total
Lok Sabha seats from Bihar, a record believed to be unprecedented.
The JD(U) sent 14 of its state legislators to contest the election out
of which 11 made it to the Lok Sabha. Also, all the three MLAs
fielded by the BJP came out victorious. The RJD put up eight MLAs
in the race but only one, Jagadanand Singh (Buxar), could win. The
Congress fielded two MLAs and the LJP one, but all of them lost.
In all 29 sitting legislators (including one member of the Legislative
Council, the upper chamber) were in the race.
Constituencies Where Nitish Kumar and JD(U)

had to Face a Show Down
Brishen Patel and Damodar Raut were the two ministers of Nitish
Kumar who were fielded from Siwan and Banka, but they could
not make it. Also, among the unsuccessful was Vijay Kumar Shukla
alias Munna Shukla, a JD(U) MLA from Vaishali. Shukla had
the image of being a criminal politician, but not convicted, under
the patronage of Nitish. In Siwan and Banka, the JD(U)’s official
candidates faced challenge from two rebels, Om Prakash Yadav
and Digvijay Singh. Both of them won. Maharajganj had been a
formidable fortress of Prabhunath Singh, a tough JD(U) candidate
with criminal antecedents. A fraternal Rajput candidate put up by
Lalu trounced him.
The Ignominious Defeat of

the RJD–LJP Alliance
A Verdict on the Incumbent UPA Ministers from Bihar

Except for Lalu Yadav and Raghuvansh Prasad Singh, the voters
rejected every minister from Bihar in the out-going cabinet of
Manmohan Singh. Lalu lost from one of the two constituencies he

contested, Raghuvansh Singh scraped through by a little over 20, 000
votes. Kanti Singh and M.A.A. Fatmi could not win from Karakat
and Darbhanga, respectively. In Valmiki Nagar, the RJD minister
Raghunath Jha secured a humiliating fourth position. Ram Sundar
Das, a former CM, defeated Ram Vilas Paswan of the LJP. Ram Vilas
once was in the Guinness book of world records for his margin of
victory. The Congress Party minister from Madhubani, Dr Shakeel
Ahmad, was also routed. Meira Kumar from Sasaram was the only
Congress candidate who was helped by the national momentum in
favor of the UPA. A former member of parliament from a Delhi
constituency and a daughter of the Congress leader, Jagjivan Ram,
Meira Kumar became Speaker in the new Lok Sabha.
The Waning Stardom of Lalu among the Yadavs:

Patliputra
The waning political stardom of Lalu Yadav was evident from many
angles. In 2004, he had won from the two constituencies of Chapra
and Madhepura. This time around, on April 17, 2009, a day after
the first round of elections in which Lalu had contested from Saran,
he filed his nomination election papers in Patliputra. For his next
choice, he did not go back to Madhepura where he might have
had to face his bête noire, Sharad Yadav, the chief of the JD(U). In
2004, Lalu had convincingly defeated Sharad Yadav in Madhepura
by 70,000 votes. A contrary situation in 2009 presented itself, i.e.
the Yadavs would enthusiastically vote for a candidate of their own
caste, if available, against Lalu’s nominees. Lalu could no longer claim
monopoly over the Yadav votes.
In Patliputra, the JD(U) fielded a former RJD MP, Ranjan Prasad
Yadav, who trounced his old friend Lalu by over 23,000 votes. The
race for Patliputra turned somewhat bizarre when the Congress, in a
late move, opposed Lalu with his friend and former RJD MP, Vijay
Singh Yadav. Earlier, he ironically was the first to announce that
Lalu would be the RJD candidate from Patliputra and had begun
campaigning for him.
RJD Turns into “Rajput Janata Dal”:

Buxar and Maharajganj
It also turned out that, except for Lalu himself, all the other three
winners from the RJD were Rajputs. It was an unintended outcome
of the RJD’s electioneering. The party which stood for the backwards,
especially the Yadavs and the Muslims, had mostly upper caste Rajputs
as its MPs. Of the four seats the RJD secured, Vaishali and Saran
were retained by the RJD. The other two, Buxur and Maharajganj,
were taken away from the BJP and JD(U), respectively. In Buxur,
the sitting BJP MP, Lal Muni Choubey lost by a narrow margin
of 2,238 votes. The spoilers were two other candidates, one from the
BSP and the other an independent. Buxur was a unique case where
all the top four candidates, with votes in six figures, were within
the margin of 9,639 votes.
In Maharajganj, the RJD was able to humble a very strong JD(U)
incumbent, Prabhu Nath Singh, by a margin of only 2,797 votes,
despite the fact that the Congress candidate sliced off more than
80,000 votes. In a triangular contest, all the three candidates were
Rajputs by caste. The RJD had the advantage of getting a faction of
the Rajput votes and the rest.
Split in the UPA Proved Costly: Sitamarhi

and Madhubani
In Sitamarhi, Sitaram Yadav, the RJD winner of 2004, was relegated

to the third place just as in Madhubani, Dr Shakeel Ahmad, the
2004 Congress winner was pushed to third position. In Sitamarhi,
a relatively less known Congress candidate, Samir Kumar Mahaseth
scored the second position and in Madhubani, the RJD nominee and
the state party chief, Abdulbari Siddiqi, came second. If the RJD
and the Congress had closed their ranks and maintained the UPA
intact, they might have done better. In Sitamarhi, it appeared that
the Yadavs had deserted a Yadav candidate sponsored by Lalu and
preferred a Yadav fielded by the JD(U). In Madhubani, on the other
hand, Muslim votes seemed to have been shared by the two Muslim
candidates fielded by the RJD and the Congress.
Left Politics
For the first time, three major Communist parties in Bihar—CPI,

CPI(M) and CPI(ML)(L)—formed a joint front called United Left
Bloc (ULB) and contested 32 constituencies. In the past, the CPI had
allied with the Congress and RJD. The result under the new “left
unity” was very discouraging. Out of 31 constituencies where they
put up a joint candidate, they could gather votes in six figures only
in Arrah and Begusarai. In Arrah, Arun Singh, a CPI(ML)(L) candi-
date came third with 115,966 votes and Shatrughan Prasad Singh, a
former CPI MP, was the runner up in Begusarai with 164,843 votes.
In Patliputra and Siwan also, the CPI(ML)(L) ranked third but with
far less votes. It registered fourth in Jahanabad, Karakat, Katihar, and
Patna Sahib. The CPI stood fourth in Madhepura and Madhubani.
The CPI(M) was at the fourth position in Paschim Champaran.
The CPI(ML)(L), a former radical party with Maoist (Naxalite)
leanings, recently renounced its policy of boycotting elections and
was relatively new to electoral politics. Impressively, this party per-
formed better than its two partners, the CPI and the CPI(M). The
CPI and the CPI(M) have been older communist parties and did not
share the violent methods of the Maoists. CPI(M)’s leadership, in its
post-election assessment, admitted that the voters did not perceive
the Third Front as a “credible and viable alternative.”7 The CPI(M),
earlier a part of the UPA, was instrumental in getting certain pro-
gressive legislation passed by the central government. But, it suffered
a serious setback in its core territory, West Bengal, at the hands of
the regional TMC led by Mamata Banerjee who campaigned on the
“issue of violence” and exposing the “Marxist goondas.”8
The image of the Left parties had apparently changed from being
reform oriented progressive parties to power seeking status quo
parties. Even the Naxalite parties, which had educated and ideo-
logically committed cadre in the 1960s, now had the reputation of
being kidnappers and extortionists.9 The CPI(M), entrenched in
power in West Bengal since 1977 did not have much of an impact
in Bihar, but the Maoists enjoyed some following in pockets of Bihar
and Jharkhand.
The CPI(ML)(L) broke ranks with its more radical Naxalite

partners which boycotted elections and operated violently in many
parts of India. As a consequence, the CPI(ML)(L) has been a target of
attacks and periodically lost its cadres in the bloody fight for influence.
In 2008, the Maoist communist party in Nepal temporarily rode to
power through the ballot. It is important to note that Maoists on the
two sides of their joint border influenced the politics of each other
and aimed at creating a “red corridor” extending to Andhra Pradesh
in south India.10
The BSP as an Emerging Player
The BSP, led by Mayawati Devi the CM of UP has its main support-
base among Dalits. But it also extends its influence among other
castes through a share in ticket distribution. Mayawati, Lalu Yadav,
and Ram Vilas Paswan in the preceding years looked upon them-
selves as potential prime ministerial candidates. Their ambition
was based on their regional strength coming from identity politics.
Mayawati and Ram Vilas vied with each other to claim the leader-
ship of the Dalits.
In 2009, Mayawati fielded candidates in almost all constituencies of
Bihar. Tickets were given to all sections—Dalits, backwards, Muslims,
women, and to upper castes as she had done in Uttar Pradesh.
However, her party could not win a single seat. In one constituency,
Sheohar, its Muslim candidate Anwarul Haque secured the second
position but had less than half the votes of the winner. In six places,
the BSP candidates came third. In as many as eight constituencies, it
finished fourth. Among six reserved constituencies for the SCs,
the BSP finished third at one place (Gopalganj) and fourth at two.
Biharis who voted for the BSP did so because they felt connected to
local candidates and not because they considered Mayawati as their
national leader. As a rival of Ram Vilas and Lalu, Mayawati was an
outsider who could not rally much support with the local voters. In
future, however, the BSP seems to have considerable potential as a
significant player in alliance politics in Bihar. As its numbers suggest,
it did much better than the established Left parties.
Territories of Politicians with

Criminal Records
The Saga of Criminals’ Integration in

Electoral Politics of Bihar
In electoral politics, Bihar would have a unique record where many
criminal elements first got into politics, participated successfully in
races for a period, and then were tossed off by the voters. The rise
and decline of the criminal gangsters in Bihar politics has been a
subject of independent research and analysis. Awareness among
voters, persistent exposure of the criminal elements by the media and
the willingness of the state organs, especially the judiciary and the
election commission, to play by the book had a tremendous impact
on the 2009 election results.
Generally, the total number of tainted MPs increased from 128 in
the 14th Lok Sabha to 150 in 2009. In 2004, there were 55 legislators
with serious criminal records; in 2009, the number jumped to 72.11
UP topped the list of states sending MPs with criminal history,
followed by Maharashtra, and Bihar being the third. Among political
parties, the BJP had the maximum number of representatives with
criminal records. Out of 116 BJP members elected, 42 were booked
at one time under criminal charges. The party next to the BJP in
carrying this distinction was the Congress. Out of 205 of its MPs,
41 carried some kind of criminal history. The JD(U) came 5th with
seven tainted MPs.
In Bihar, reputed criminals had joined the ranks of politicians.12
They could run for political positions because they were not convicted
by a court of law. They first intimidated voters and engaged in crim-
inal activities. Later on, they threatened the elites of Bihar including
high administrative officials, some of whom were even murdered by
the political mafia. The increasing lawlessness of the 15-year period
of Lalu–Rabri regime came to be known as the Jungle Raj. When the
“criminalization of politics” got out of hand, the Election Commission
became pro-active and began close scrutiny of candidates. It referred
suspected criminal candidates to judicial courts to get clearance.
The government of Nitish Kumar also confronted the challenge of
criminals’ participation in politics while tackling the law and order

situation in the province. It put cases against criminal politicians on
a faster track and obtained timely results. About a dozen politicians,
including MPs and legislators, who had been convicted and sentenced
by the designated “fast track” courts in Bihar after 2005, were rendered
ineligible. According to election laws, anyone convicted of a crime
and sentenced to more than a two-year-long jail term was barred from
contesting elections for six years after completion of the sentence.
JD(U)-sponsored Tainted Candidates

In spite of this, many candidates with criminal records, not clearly
convicted, still continued to contest. Even Nitish’s party allegedly
gave tickets to tainted characters. Prabhunath Singh (Maharajganj),
Vijay Kumar also known as Munna Shukla (Vaishali), and Jagdish
Sharma (Jahanabad) were the leading names in the JD(U) list with
criminal records.
In Vaishali, Munna Shukla, a JD(U) legislator who unsuccessfully
challenged Raghuvansh Prasad Singh, was accused of murdering a
former Gopalganj district magistrate, G. Krishnaiah. He also was
an alleged complicit in the murder of a former minister, Brij Bihari
Prasad. However, Munna Shukla could not match the resources of the
RJD candidate who happened to be an incumbent MP and a minister
in the UPA government. Munna won an impressive 262,049 votes as
against 283,454, a difference of only 21,405.
Jagdish Sharma, another JD(U) legislator from Jehanabad was
said to be involved in a multi-million-rupee fodder scam and several
criminal cases. But compared to his RJD rival, he seems to be a junior
player in his alleged criminal activities. He was locked in a fight with
Surendra Prasad Yadav, an RJD legislator who had more than a dozen
criminal cases against him. He was reputed as the Magadh Samrat
(emperor) for his terror in the Maoist-affected Magadh division.
Nonetheless, his loss to Jagdish Sharma (213,442 to 234,769) had only
a tiny 21,327 votes separating them. Here, the presence of a Congress
candidate walking away with 48,487 votes did make a difference for
the RJD. If there had been an alliance between the RJD and the
Congress, Surendra Yadav might have closed the gap. The candidate
fielded by the CPI(ML)(L) came fourth with 35,496 votes.
Convicted Politicians Sponsor their Wives

as Proxy Candidates
Mohammad Shahabuddin, Anand Mohan, Surajbhan Singh, and

Rajiv Ranjan also known as Pappu Yadav, following their conviction
and sentence to life imprisonment moved the court for permission
to contest elections, but were disallowed. All four of them managed to
field their wives as candidates from different parties. That all the four
women lost is a testimony to the awareness of the Bihari voters.13
Let us survey the four constituencies briefly:
 Siwan: Mohammad Shahabuddin was reported to have super-

vised the campaign of his wife, Hena Shahab, from prison. In
a special show of support, Lalu Yadav escorted Hena to the
office where she filed her nomination papers. Despite having
an astounding tally of 172,764 votes, Hena was defeated by a
JD(U) rebel candidate.
 Sheohar: Lovely Anand, wife of a former JD(U) MP, Anand
Mohan, ran as a nominee of the Congress party. Voters of

Sheohar relegated her to the 4th position with 81,479 only. A
BJP candidate, Rama Devi, defeated her.
 Nawada: Veena Devi, wife of Surajbhan Singh, a convicted
MP of the LJP, was a candidate from Nawada where she came

second with 95,691 votes. The BJP’s Bhola Singh who had
130,608 votes trounced her.
 Supaul: Pappu Yadav, another criminal-politician and a former
RJD MP from Purnia put up his wife Ranjeeta Ranjan, an LJP

MP in the last Lok Sabha. On the eve of election, she quit the
LJP and joined the Congress. She came second with 147,602
votes, far ahead of her LJP competitor. The JD(U) winner,
Vishwa Mohan Kumar got more than twice the votes secured
by Ranjeeta. Pappu Yadav also fielded his mother Shanti Priya
from his own former constituency, Purnia. She came second
with 176,725 votes as a Congress party-supported independ-
ent candidate. It is important to note that the vast number of
votes secured by candidates sponsored by criminals confirmed
the level of influence they had in the constituencies.
Under the leadership of Sonia and Rahul Gandhi, the Congress

party expected to be revived in Bihar. But the party apparatus appar-
ently took short-cuts and extended support to tainted elements. To
add to the list, the Congress nomination for Paschim Champaran went
to Anirudh Prasad also known as Sadhu Yadav, the brother-in-law
of Lalu Yadav. Sadhu Yadav, it may be recalled, was one of the chief
beneficiaries of the Lalu–Rabri regime and although not convicted,
he was alleged to be involved in many criminal cases. He was also
an accused in the Bihar flood scam. Other Congress candidates with
criminal backgrounds were Tarkeshwar Singh (Maharajganj) and
Shamim Akhtar (Valmikinagar).
Among the RJD candidates, M.A.A. Fatmi (Darbhanga) and
Mohammad Taslimuddin (Kishanganj), the two central ministers in
the outgoing government faced serious criminal charges. The LJP, on
its part, fielded Rama Singh from Arrah who had criminal charges
against him. Zakir Anwar, the LJP candidate from Araria, was also
alleged to have been involved in criminal cases. Even the CPI(ML)
was not free from criminal elements. In Katihar, it put up its former
legislator Mahboob Alam, an ex-fugitive.
The Strategies at Play
Nitish Kumar’s Strategy

Over the four years of his administration in Bihar, Nitish Kumar came
to acquire the image of a relatively mild-mannered, result-oriented
CM. People contrasted him with the image and rhetoric of Lalu
Yadav. He was rightly credited with the victory of the NDA in Bihar.
Unlike Naveen Patnaik of Orissa, he did not renounce his party’s
alliance with the BJP. However, Nitish maintained a safe distance
from the communal nationalistic platform of the BJP, criticized the
anti-Muslim rhetoric of Varun Gandhi, and did not invite Narendra
Modi, the CM of Gujarat, to campaign in Bihar.14 Nitish also did not
endorse the BJP’s agenda of resurrecting the Ram Mandir issue. The
strategy worked for the alliance. The Muslim population amounting
to 16.5â•¯percent in Bihar accepted the JD(U)’s credential as a secular

party. The BJP played a subservient role. The BJP leaders kept a low
profile and did not use anti-Muslim rhetoric.
Developmental Strategies Combined

with Social Engineering
Ever since the formation of the NDA government in 2005, voters had
noticed changes in Bihar. The image of politics and administration
had improved. Within a short period, Nitish launched elaborate
development cum reform programs. As a result, attendance in gov-
ernment offices increased, educational institutions resumed their
functions, and law and order appeared to be improving. The election
results of 2009, therefore, could be interpreted as an endorsement of
Nitish’s administration even though members of parliament were
elected to make laws at the center. By the end of 2010 when provincial
elections were due, voters would have a chance to give their verdict
on the performance of the state government.
One key aspect of Nitish’s strategy was to maintain the message
of development, and also secure the divisive caste or communal
polarization in his favor. In the 15 years of the Lalu–Rabri regime,
Lalu had given the impression that slogan shouting for develop-
ments or even developmental works as such did not get votes. In fact,
in Lalu’s estimation, any discourse on development had the potential
of giving rise to a “revolution of rising expectations,” that could prove
electorally counter-productive. Therefore, Lalu always harped on the
restoration of izzat (prestige) and perpetuated alliance-based identity
politics he had so successfully built up over the years.15
When the RJD was defeated in the Vidhan Sabha election of 2005,
the media characterized the result as a verdict against the anarchic
Lalu–Rabri regime and a vote for developmental aspirations. Nitish
strategically stayed on that message and worked hard to live up to
the media image.16 Although development remained the major plank
of his administration, he was nonetheless aware that development
alone would not sustain his power base. He began to refashion new
social alliances. Lalu and Ram Vilas had relied essentially on elite
castes among the backwards and the Dalits. Also, by pushing aside
the Congress party, the Lalu–Ram Vilas team had further distanced
themselves from upper caste voters.
In sharp contrast to their strategies, Nitish, by nurturing the alliance
with the BJP, courted urban and upper caste voters. Nitish Kumar,
a former associate of Lalu, must have concluded that Lalu lost in
Bihar, not just because of bad governance, but also for under-valuing
the importance of wider caste alliances. Lalu’s excessive reliance on the
Muslim–Yadav alliance and his uninterrupted success at the power
game had made him somewhat smug and complacent. In the process,
he seemed to have abandoned “the policy of accommodation of
the less assertive and less privileged caste groups.”17 Having gauged the
political space, Nitish diligently embarked on his social engineering
at three levels.
Level I: Reinventing EBCs as a Sub-category

Nitish Kumar devised an electoral strategy to beat Lalu at his own
game of identity politics. He had the support base of his own caste,
the Kurmis, a relatively prosperous backward cultivator caste group
like the Yadavs. But, that was not enough. The Kurmis were not as
dominant in number as Yadavs. Even upper caste support from the
BJP was not sufficient to counter Lalu in Bihar politics. Nitish adopted
a formula devised in the 1960s and 1970s by Karpoori Thakur, a
former CM and mentor of both Lalu and Nitish, calling for special
privileges for EBCs. The EBCs, according to an estimate, consisted of
about 100 small and scattered castes and together with the Mahadalits
(the lowest of the former untouchables) constituted 28–29â•¯percent of
the total vote. Except for token representation, the EBCs were largely
ignored in the Lalu–Rabri scheme of power sharing.
Nitish mobilized EBCs by assuring them of 20â•¯percent reserva-
tions in jobs and panchayat bodies. Out of 25 seats contested by the
JD(U), the party allocated tickets to four EBCs. The EBC’s enthu-
siasm, lying dormant after Karpoori’s death, was energized in NDA’s
favor. Once accused of being anti-EBC by his opponents, Nitish had
now emerged as their champion. Nitish also increased reservation for
women in the panchayat bodies from 33 to 50â•¯percent. This policy
package broke the Yadav stranglehold in rural areas.
Level II: Creation of Mahadalit as a Sub-category

Just as he brought about a division within the backward castes by
propping up the EBCs, Nitish’s politics also sought to split the
Dalits as a vote bank. He set up a Mahadalit Commission, so as
to identify and extend special benefits to the most underprivileged
among the Dalits. Chamars—who once owed allegiance to Jagjivan
Ram and now arguably claimed by his daughter Meira Kumar, and
the Paswans, another Dalit caste—owing allegiance to Ram Vilas
Paswan were excluded from the Mahadalit community. There was a
sense of disaffection among a large section of the Dalit community
against Chamars and Paswans because these two influential castes
allegedly appropriated all political patronage. Nitish cashed in on
that discontent. He got 18 Dalit sub-castes grouped under the
Mahadalit category and transferred resources and opportunities to
them. Earlier, in a state mid-term election (Fatuha reserved seat),
Nitish gave his party nomination to a Mahadalit in preference to a
Paswan. Thus, the hitherto marginalized and neglected Mahadalit
group felt empowered.
Level III: Creation of Fault Lines between Muslims

Nitish’s even bigger masterstroke was to split Muslims along “forward
and backward” lines. He realized that given the large number of
Muslims in almost every Lok Sabha constituency, he needed to split
the Muslim vote bank.18 Nitish successfully exploited their differ-
ences. Pashmanda Muslims had been carrying on a campaign for
recognition as a backward caste insisting that upper caste Muslims
usurped all the spoils coming out of the Muslims’ association with
the ruling RJD party. Backward Muslims had unsuccessfully been
lobbying Lalu to improve their lot by accommodating them in the
power structure. But Lalu operated on the calculation that if he could
keep the powerful “forward” Muslims happy, he could continue to
count on unquestioned support from Muslims in general.
Nitish seized on this chasm and extended open support to the cause
of the backward caste Muslims. He sent Ali Anwar and Dr Izaj Ali,
leaders of the Pashmanda Muslim forum to the Rajya Sabha. In the
process, Nitish incurred the displeasure of some of his upper caste

Muslim supporters who were nursing their own political ambition.
But, targeting a larger constituency, Nitish clearly weaned the
backward Muslims away from Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan.
Additionally, among many other policies the Nitish government
pursued to win over the hearts and minds of the Muslims was to
provide compensation to the victims of the 1989 Bhagalpur riots.
The sweeping success Nitish registered in the 2009 Lok Sabha
elections, therefore, owed a great deal to the combination of devel-
opmental effort and identity politics. Nitish’s development plank
alone would have secured him a respectable number, but his landslide
victory had much to do with his skilful intervention in the caste
politics as well.
Conclusion
Toward the end of the uninterrupted Lalu–Rabri regime from

1990–2005, Bihar had notoriously slipped into “the dark ages.”
Because of scarcity and maladministration, people felt suffocated
and depressed. Many Biharis migrated to other states. There was
an aura of hopelessness. The situation did not improve even after a
large contingent of RJD MPs led by Lalu had joined the central
government in 2004. In fact, the RJD component of the UPA gov-
ernment was looked upon as a pressure group bent on extracting
political concessions from the government. Lalu’s credibility suffered.
His jester-like speeches did evoke laughter but people attended his
rallies for entertainment and he could not energize the voters on his
side. His claim to be a representative of the common man had begun
to fade. In general, the public also had the impression that as a Central
Minister Lalu had milked the Indian railways, the largest government
sector. Aided by a section of the media, Lalu, however, projected himself
to be a very profitable and efficient minister. Close to election time,
Lalu and his colleagues did try to bring some developmental works
in their constituencies.19 With the federal resources, the RJD looked
forward to winning over a majority of the Lok Sabha seats in 2009
and dislodging the Nitish state government in 2010.
The welcome change in the state administration after 2005 had

breathed new life into Bihar politics. Although the vice of corruption
in public life and financial pilferage did not show any sign of abate-
ment, the law and order situation had drastically improved. The police
had been relatively insulated from political influence, hospitals slowly
resumed their function, teachers reported to the schools, roads were
constructed, and developmental projects restarted. Above all, the CM
worked his office hours and restored accountability to bureaucracy.
All these elements were almost absent during the Lalu–Rabri period.
Therefore, the 2009 Lok Sabha election in Bihar turned out to be a
referendum on the performance of the government headed by Nitish.
The confidence the voters had posed in the NDA government did not
waver in four years, i.e., the anti-incumbency was not a factor.
A very important contributory factor was that the majority of voters
seemed to fear the prospect of a return of Lalu–Rabri’s dominance
and, therefore, lowered their expectations of the state government. A
case in point was the politics of the Mithila region in the aftermath
of the Kosi river flood of August 2008. As many as eight Lok Sabha
constituencies were badly affected by the flood. However, the flood
victims as usual did not take out their anger against the state govern-
ment. Contrasted with the Lalu–Rabri administration, the response
of the NDA government to the calamity, people acknowledged, were
satisfactory. Since the Nitish government was perceived as serious
about developmental efforts in general, people seemed to be ready to
give them an endorsement at the Lok Sabha election. NDA swept the
Kosi region and the RJD–LJP alliance did not have any success.20
Did Opportunistic Defection Pay?

All Depended on Who Had the Momentum
Surveying the 2009 election results, it may be noticed that voters did
not always punish the defectors. They spared the ones who were on the
side of the winning coalition. For example, Ram Badan Rai, a Yadav
and a JD(U) member of the state legislative council quit the party just
before the elections to join and be rewarded with the RJD nomina-
tion from Munger. But the voters rejected him. Ramai Ram, who left
RJD and joined the Congress, lost in Gopalganj and Dr Ashok Kumar
of the same party was defeated in Samastipur. LJP’s Rama Singh lost
from Arrah. But, on the other hand, Mangani Lal Mandal, an RJD
Rajya Sabha member, quit the party and crossed over to the JD(U).
Mangani won handily. The parties with an electoral wave in their
favor could sweep unpopular candidates to victory.
Based on past history, however, it can be prophesied that the politics
of Bihar could easily take a sudden and unexpected turn. The familiar
caste factor can very well shake the foundation of any social alliance
and developmental effort. The 2009 Lok Sabha result was in contrast
to what happened in 2004 when Lalu led the alliance with the LJP and
the Congress and secured 29 out of 40 seats without accomplishing
much development. In that round of elections, even the NDA’s star
campaigner Nitish Kumar lost from Barh, a Lok Sabha constituency
so well nurtured by him. The alliance of Lalu and Ram Vilas, with
the aid of other social groups, could potentially stage a comeback
in the future. A few subsequent bye-elections pointed the trend in
that direction.
Fair System of Election

In the end, an examination of the election process must help us
understand their legitimacy. Massive election machinery is pressed
into service to complete the process. The introduction of Electronic
Voting Machines has reduced malpractices. The voters’ participation,
even if it hovers below 50â•¯percent, is huge. However, by following
the “First Past the Post” election method, the citizens of Bihar, like the
rest of India, end up returning representatives who do not have
the mandate of an absolute majority. The veracity of the represent-
ative system, therefore, comes into question. In the 12th Lok Sabha,
as many as 41 of 54 candidates who won the Lok Sabha seats from
Bihar had less than the combined votes of their next two opponents—
the “B + C > A” factor.21
In 2009, the B + C > A factor was present in 23 out of a total
of 40 seats. In 10 other cases, the combined votes of the next three
candidates were greater than the winner’s, i.e., B + C + D > A. Only
seven candidates had the distinction of securing votes more than the
combined votes of the next three contestants, i.e., A > B + C + D.
Seven winners fall into this category. A few examples underscore

the unrepresentative nature of the winners. In Buxur, Jagadanand
Singh of the RJD secured about 22â•¯percent of the total votes polled
and won the election. In a multi-cornered contest, there were about
448,424 votes polled against Jagadanand Singh, a disapproval rate
of 78â•¯percent. In Arrah, Meena Singh of the JD(U) had 212,726
(40â•¯percent) votes leaving the LJP and the CPI(ML)(L) to the second
and third places with a combined vote of 253, 972. Likewise in Banka,
Digvijay Singh with 185,762 votes registered a lead of 28,716 votes
over his closest rival. But he secured only 29â•¯percent of the total votes
polled and 451,520 votes against him were divided among nine of
his opponents.
In a different category, the number of votes polled by Sushil
Kumar Singh, the winner (A) from Aurangabad, was greater than
the combined votes of the next two candidates (B + C). However,
if the votes of the third candidate (D) were added, the winner would
drop far behind. Moreover, Sushil Kumar Singh had only 47â•¯percent
of the votes polled as against 53â•¯percent polled by all his opponents
combined.
In a participatory majoritarian democracy, it can be argued that the
winner must have 50â•¯percent and more of the total votes polled.22
The 2009 election results show that in more than 80â•¯percent of
the constituencies in Bihar, the elected candidates did not have the
endorsement of a vast majority of the voters. This is a problem endemic
to many democracies around the world. In Canada, all such voters
who are part of the majority and yet not the ones who voted for the
winner are called “orphan voters”.23 The best course suggested is to
have a run off between the two leading candidates following an open
election. Election legitimacy would thereby be enhanced.
Notes
1. Constituencies in Bihar had a partial delimitation along the lines of redistricting

in western democracies. Motihari constituency split into Purvi (East) Champaran
and Paschim (West) Champaran, Patna into Patliputra and Patna Saheb. New con-
stituencies are Valimikinagar, Saran, Ujiyarpur, Karakat, Supaul, and Jamui (SC).
Besides Motihari and Patna, therefore, the constituencies that ceased to exist
were Bagaha (SC), Balia, Barh, Bikramganj, Chapra, Rosera (SC), and Saharsa.
Bihar has a total of 40 Lok Sabha seats including six reserved for the SCs. After
the bifurcation of Bihar in 2000, the largely tribal south went to the state of
Jharkhand.
2. Bihartimes.com, March 21, 2009.
3. Nitish Mishra, son of Jagannath Mishra, a former CM, and Nagmani, a leader
belonging to the Koeri caste were reportedly relieved from their ministerial
positions because of their incompetence. Bihartimes.com, March 22, 2009.
4. Bihartimes.com, March 25, 2009.
5. In the past, Lalu and Ram Vilas had benefited in state elections when they
joined hands. They suffered in 2005 when they did not. See “How Bihar Voted:
Assembly Elections 2005,” The Hindu, March 10, 2006.
6. Soroor Ahmed, “RJD and LJP Losing Stranglehold over Old Social Constituency,”
Bihartimes.com, May 18, 2009. The Election Commission of India website,
www.eci.gov.in has been the source of the numerical data used in this essay.
7. “Third Front Implodes,” Statesman Weekly (Kolkata), May 23, 2009.
8. “Left Ouster is Mamata Priority,” Statesman Weekly, May 23, 2009.
9. Sudip Mazumdar, “Captors of the Liberated Zone,” Newsweek (New York),
May 11–18, pp. 42–43. Also see Sumanta Banerjee, “On the Naxalite Movement:
A Report with a Difference,” Economic and Political Weekly, (May 24, 2008),
pp. 10–12. Sumanta Banerjee’s In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite
Movement in India (1980) is a seminal work on the Naxalite movement.
10. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Binoy Shanker Prasad, “Caste,
Regionalism, and Political Violence: Maoist Violence in Nepal and Bihar.”
Available online at: http://cpsa-acsp.ca/papers2005/Prasad.pdf
11. “More Tainted Legislators Make It to House,” Statesman Weekly, May 23, 2009.
12. N.R. Mohanty, “Lalu-Paswan-Nitish and Their Nexus with Criminals,” Available
online at: http://sangharshindia.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/lalu-paswan-nitish-
and-their-nexus with criminals/ (last date of access: April 25, 2009).
13. “Wives of Criminal-turned-politicians Lose in Bihar,” Bihartimes.com, May 16,
2009.
14. BJP’s popularity suffered in most states. Jharkhand and Karnataka are exceptions.
It did not do better in states where it was in power although the performance
of its government was as good as Nitish’s. For example, in Gujarat the BJP vote
percentage declined by 0.9â•¯percent. In Jharkhand, the BJP barely managed to
hold on because it did not face a serious and concerted challenge from main-
stream secularist parties like the Congress or the regional tribal parties. See
Bihartimes.com, May 19, 2009.
15. “The Bihari Enlightenment,” The Economist (London), January 30, 2010, p. 12.
16. The story of economic recovery under Nitish’s government found its way to the
international media as well. See “On the Move,” The Economist, January 30,
2010, pp 47–48.
17. N.R. Mohanty, “Nitish Owes His Success to Developmental Plank as Well
as Identity Politics.” Available online at: http://sangharshindia.wordpress.
com/2009/04/24/ (last date of access: April 24, 2009).
18. For the strategy of bloc voting of Muslims in particular constituencies so as to
change the outcome of Lok Sabha elections, see Binoy Shanker Prasad, “Split
the Votes and Win the Election: An Analysis of the 12th Lok Sabha Election in
Bihar,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), Indian Politics and the 1998
Election: Regionalism, Hindutva, and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
1999) pp. 129–58.
19. During my visit to Bihar, December 2–16, 2008, I noticed a series of inaugu-
rations of new Railway projects in that region by Lalu Yadav. Lalu got a railway
engine construction plant approved for Madhepura.
20. Soroor Ahmad, “Why Lalu, Ram Vilas cast(e) away by Bihar voters?” Bihartimes.
com, May 16, 2009.
21. See Prasad, “Split the Votes, and Win the Elections.” Other reforms often
talked about such as changing into the presidential system of government, pro-
portional system of representation or the introduction of compulsory voting
probably would not work in the specific context of Indian democracy. See
G. Bingham Powell Jr., “Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal,
and Socio-economic Influences,” in Richard Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation:
A Comparative Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980).
22. Enlightened and educated voters agreed. Dialog with a “focus group” at Laheria
Sarai (Darbhanga, Bihar) on July 11, 2009.
23. “5 Reasons to Reject FPTP.” Available online at: www.electoralreformcanada.ca/
(last date of access: May 15, 2009). “Are you an Orphan Voter?” Available online
at: www.orphanvoters.ca/ (last date of access: May16, 2009). The demand for
electoral reforms in both Canada and India was subdued but necessary. See
Binoy Shanker Prasad, “Crying for Election Reform: A Theme of Political
Discourse in Canada and India.” Available online at http://www.cpsa-acsp.
ca/papers-2009/Prasad.pdf
Chapter 16
Jammu and Kashmir
Ethnic–Religious Crisis and Electoral

Democracy: Jammu and Kashmir
Elections, 2008 and 2009
Praveen Krishna Swami
Islamist political flags fluttered from atop the clock tower in Srinagar’s
historic Lal Chowk tower on August 15, 2008, the anniversary of
India’s independence.
Even during the worst days of the long jihad in J&K, Indian
forces in Srinagar had ensured that the national flag flew from the
Lal Chowk tower. As usual, security force personnel had hoisted
India’s flag at Lal Chowk that morning. But later that afternoon,
Islamist protestors marched on Lal Chowk. With strict orders not to
use force on the unarmed protestors, police stationed at Lal Chowk
brought down the flag and withdrew.1 Elsewhere in Srinagar, mobs
destroyed police and CRPF posts, attacked police stations, and burned
down the offices of pro-India politicians.2
What a two-decade jihad in J&K had not achieved, six weeks of
protests had succeeded in bringing about. The Indian state appeared
to be in retreat—and this, just weeks before elections to the J&K
Legislative Assembly were scheduled to be held.
Late in 2008, few believed that an election in J&K was even
possible. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, Chairman of the secessionist All
Parties Hurriyat Conference, had insisted that “we are sure there will
be 100â•¯percent poll boycott.”3 In an October 31 article, commentator
336 Praveen Krishna Swami
Hassan Zainagiri reported in Greater Kashmir that Kashmir’s

“people are quite jubilantly supporting the boycott schedule of the
Coordination Committee.”4 The eminent scholar, journalist, and
author Prem Shankar Jha even prophesied that “the Government
will be lucky if they get more than 10â•¯percent of people to come
out and vote.”5 Most major political parties were less than enthused
at the prospect of facing the electorate; India’s Election Commission
was also concerned.6
Then, the apparently inexplicable happened: J&K saw record num-
bers of voters participating in a peaceful election (see Figure 16.1).
Figure 16.1
Voter Participation in Jammu and Kashmir Assembly Elections by District: 1996–2008
Source: Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu and Kashmir. Available online at
http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/pdf/Winning-Candidates-08.pdf
Note: This figure shows inâ•¯percentage the total votes polled.
Ethnic-religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy 337
Later, in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the two parties which rode to
power in the 2008 Assembly elections—the NC and the Congress—
consolidated their position.7 In the Kashmir valley, the NC won all
three Lok Sabha seats, brushing aside challenges from the PDP and
north Kashmir secessionist politician Sajjad Gani Lone. For its part,
the Congress won the Jammu and Udhampur seats, brushing off
competition from the BJP. Ladakh alone saw an independent, Ghulam
Hassan Khan, defeat the official NC–Congress alliance candidate,
P. Namgyal—but the victor was, in fact, an old NC hand who remains
affiliated to the party. In essence, the alliance between the NC and
Congress had allowed both parties to emerge as dominant forces in
their principal regions of influence, respectively, Kashmir and Jammu.
Far from yielding an embittered, fissured polity, the dramatic mass
mobilizations of 2008 seemed to have had the paradoxical outcome
of driving the emergence of a new democratic political alliance.
How did the NC and Congress, proclaimed to be rendered
marginalized and irrelevant by ethnic and religious-chauvinist com-
petitors, so suddenly rise to a position of apparently, unchallengeable
dominance in the Legislative Assembly elections of 2008, and the
Lok Sabha elections of 2009? And how did what appeared to be mass
uprising against Indian rule yield so quickly to competitive democratic
politics? In this chapter, I shall argue that the summer’s Shrine War
was driven by ethnic-religious anxieties which remain unresolved. All
parties attempted to profit from these anxieties; none, however, were
able to leverage them in order to become the sole spokesperson of
the state’s warring ethnic-religious communities.
The Shrine War and Kashmir Politics
Back in the summer of 2004, J&K’s Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad

Saeed, and the state’s union government-appointed governor,
S.K. Sinha, had locked horns over the management of the Amarnath
Yatra—an annual pilgrimage to a cave-temple in the mountains above
Pahalgam. Saeed shot down Sinha’s decision to extend the pilgrimage
to eight weeks from four. Five cabinet ministers from the Jammu
region—all members of Saeed’s coalition partners, the Congress, and
all Hindus—submitted their resignations in protest.8 It was an early

round in a series of skirmishes that would lead to the eventual collapse
of the Congress–PDP alliance.
Amidst this feud, the J&K High Court ordered the government
to give the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), which manages
the pilgrimage, the right to use forest land to provide shelter and
sanitation for pilgrims. It took another two years of legal wrangling,
though, before the SASB was given permission to raise “pre-fabricated
structures only for camping purposes of pilgrims without going in
for construction of permanent structures.” The government order
granting permission made clear that that the “proprietary status of
[the] forest land shall remain unchanged.”9
Kashmir’s Islamist patriarch, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, saw political
opportunity in the decision. He claimed the order stated it was part
of a conspiracy to settle Hindus in the region so as to increase the
Hindu percentage of the population. At one press conference, he
warned that Sinha had been working “on an agenda of changing
the demography of the state.”10 “I caution my nation,” he warned
“that if we don’t wake up in time, India and it stooges will succeed
and we will be displaced.” Later, he asserted that the land-use rights
granted to the SASB were part of a covert enterprise code-named
Operation Yatra, which was “devised on the lines of Israel’s strategy of
settlement in Palestine.”11 The SASB, he went on, was “pursuing the
similar method to settle Hindus here.” He was later to hold out dark
hints that genocide of Kashmiri Muslims, modeled on the Partition
of India pogroms, was being planned.12
Geelani’s position stemmed from his long-standing belief that
Islam and Hinduism were locked in an irreducible civilizational
opposition. At an October 26 rally in Srinagar, Geelani had made clear
this position, saying that “the people of state should, as their religious
duty, raise voice against India’s aggression [my emphasis].”13 This duty,
he argued, stemmed from the fact that to “practice Islam completely
under the subjugation of India is impossible because human beings
in practice worship those whose rules they abide by.”14 Geelani had
long located the legitimacy of the secessionist movement in J&K
in the supposed oppositional dualities of Hindus and Muslims. In
matters of faith, belief, and customs, he argued in his prison diaries,
Hindus and Muslims are set irrevocably apart, as they are divided by
such matters as food, clothing, and lifestyles. He described it as being
as difficult for Muslims to live in a Hindu milieu as “for a fish to stay
alive in a desert.” Muslims, he argued:
… cannot live harmoniously with a Hindu majority without their own

religion and traditions coming under a grave threat, one major factor
being Hinduism’s capacity to assimilate other religions. For Islam to be
preserved and promoted in Kashmir, it is necessary for it to be separated
from India.15
Matters came to a head when Saeed’s PDP, whose ministers had

supported the land-use orders in the state cabinet, reversed their
position so as follow Islamist calls for them to be revoked. PDP leaders
were driven by the fact that a significant part of their constituency
was affiliated with Kashmir’s religious right. However, their Congress
coalition partners were unable to meet their demand, afraid it would
undermine their position amongst their core constituency of Jammu
Hindus. Sinha’s successor as governor, N.N. Vohra, in his capacity
as head of the shrine board, attempted to resolve the stalemate. He
offered to surrender the land-use rights if the state government itself
would provide all facilities to pilgrims, as it had been doing since
1979. Hoping to avert a showdown with the PDP, CM Ghulam Nabi
Azad agreed. Later, under pressure from the party’s central leader-
ship in New Delhi to save the Congress’ alliance with the PDP, Azad
revoked the land-use order altogether. However, the PDP pulled out of
government days before a deadline it had set to resolve the crisis.16
Now, a second phase of the crisis began. Hindu-chauvinist groups
in Jammu now began an agitation demanding the land back. Elements
among them threatened to blockade traffic to Kashmir. It is unclear
that there was, in fact, a significant blockade.17 But the threat itself
provided leverage to Geelani, and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a Srinagar-
based cleric who chairs a rival secessionist formation, the All Parties
Hurriyat Conference.
Acting on a call from the Pakistan-based United Jihad Council,
both groups organized a march across the Line of Control, which
divides Indian-adminsitered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir,
saying the economic blockade necessitated the opening of traffic

from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad.18 India had, in fact, been calling for
free trade along the route, a demand Pakistan had rejected. However,
the defiance of the Line of Control was an act the state simply could
not countenance. To no-one’s surprise, force was used to stop the
marchers: three people were killed, including a mid-ranking All
Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader. Over 20 other people died
in subsequent clashes between police or soldiers and the protestors,
often a consequence of attacks on the bunkers of police and army
personnel by enraged mobs.19
Ever since 2002, when levels of jihadist violence in Jammu and
Kashmir began to decline, Indian policy makers had assumed that
the anti-India movement in the region would also slowly disappear.
It was a seismic error of judgment. Faith and xenophobia became the
twin poles of a long-running and powerful effective Islamist campaign
that began in 2005, after it became evident to Islamists that the jihad
on which their political position had been predicated was in terminal
decline. Economic change and the social dislocation it had brought
about provided the firmament for their revival. Islamists began to
make the wider case that the secularization of culture in Kashmir—in
turn the consequence of economic growth—constituted a civiliza-
tional threat. In an article published in May, 2006, Islamist leader
Asiya Andrabi wondered what would happen if “Muhammad (S.A.W.)
will come to know that the Muslim youth of Kashmir are busy in
vulgarity, obscenity, waywardness?” She attacked “young Muslim girls
who have lost their identity of Islam and are presenting the look of
a Bollywood actress but not Fatima and Aisha (R.A.) [respectively,
Muhammad’s sister and wife].”
Later, Islamists leveraged the uncovering of a prostitution racket
in Srinagar to argue that secularism and modernity were responsible
for and an Indian conspiracy to undermine J&K’s Islamic character.
Pro-Islamist scholar Hameeda Nayeem even claimed the scandal
pointed “unequivocally toward a policy-based state patronage
[of prostitution].”20 Significantly, the prostitution protests saw the first
large scale Islamist mob violence that went unchecked by the state.
Geelani’s supporters were allowed to gather at the home of alleged
Srinagar prostitution-ring madam Sabina Bulla, and raze it to the
ground. Mobs also attacked the homes of politicians charged with

having used her services.21
In the summer the summer of 2007, the rape-murder of a north
Kashmiri teenager Tabinda Gani was used to initiate a xenophobic
campaign against the presence of migrant workers in the state.
Addressing a June 24, 2007, rally at the town of Langate, Geelani said
that “hundreds of thousands of non-state subjects had been pushed
into Kashmir under a long-term plan to crush the Kashmiris.”22 He
claims that “the majority of these non-state subjects are professional
criminals and should be driven out of Kashmir in a civilised way [sic.].”
Geelani’s political ally, Hilal War, claimed that migrant workers’
slums were “centres of all kinds of illegal business.”23 Language like
this inspired a series of terrorist attacks on migrants, the last of which
was the bombing of a bus carrying workers from Srinagar just as the
shrine board protests began.24
From these events, Islamists learned that the objective conditions
existed for xenophobic politics to succeed. Even on the eve of the
shrine board protests, Islamists mobilized against a career counsellor
who, they claimed, had been despatched to Srinagar schools to seduce
students into a career of vice. An Anantnag school teacher also came
under attack, after a video surfaced showing that a group of his students
had danced to pop film music on a holiday in Anantnag.25
Part of the reason for Geelani’s success was the absence of secular
voices—either in political life or amongst public intellectuals—
challenging his contentions. No political grouping condemned his
actions. Indeed, elements in the Congress made opportunistic use
of his mobilization. PDP politicians, too, sought to appropriate
Geelani’s rhetoric, in an effort to draw the electoral endorsement of
his supporters. So, too, did the NC.
Across the Pir Panjal mountains in Jammu, a near-identical chau-
vinist mobilization was underway—one that was even more invisible
to analysts and the government than its Islamist counterpart. In the
build-up to the 2002 elections, the BJP found itself discredited by
its failure to contain terrorism. Much of the Hindutva movement’s
cadre turned to a new grouping, the Jammu State Morcha (JSM).
JSM leaders wanted a new, Hindu-majority state carved out of J&K.
In the event, both the JSM and the BJP were wiped out in the elections,
winning just one seat each.
A new generation of Hindutva leaders then took control of Hindu

neo-conservative politics in Jammu. Soon after the Congress–PDP
government came to power, this new Hindutva leadership unleashed
its first mass mobilizations. PDP leader and former CM Mufti
Mohammad Saeed’s calls for demilitarization and self-rule, Hindutva
leaders argued, pointing to the expulsion of Pandits from Kashmir
at the outset of the jihad. Hindutva leaders claimed that Saeed
was now preparing the ground for the expulsion of Hindus—and
Hinduism—from Jammu.
From 2003, Hindutva groups sought to forge these anxieties into
a concrete political mobilization around the issue of cattle-slaughter.
Hindutva cadre would interdict trucks carrying cattle, and then use
their capture to stage protests. It was not as if the anti-cow-slaughter
movement had stumbled on a great secret. For decades, cow-owning
farmers—in the main Hindus—had sold old livestock, which no
longer earned them an income, to traders from Punjab and Rajasthan.
In turn, the traders sold their herds to cattle traffickers on India’s
eastern border, who fed the demand for meat among the poor of
Bangladesh. But Hindutva groups understood that the cow was a
potent—and politically profitable—metaphor. In December 2007, for
example, VHP and Bajrang Dal cadre organized large-scale protests
against the reported sacrificial slaughter of cows at the villages of
Bali Charna, in the Satwari area of Jammu, and Chilog, near Kathua
District’s Bani town.26 Riots had also taken place in the villages around
Jammu’s Pargwal area in March 2005, after Hindutva activists made
bizarre claims that a cow had been raped.27
It should be noted, however, that these mobilizations, though built
around religious themes, were led by politicians—not clerics. For
example, south Kashmir-based Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis neo-fundamentalist
activist Maqbool Akhrani mobilized against migrant workers in 2006.
They were part of a campaign by India’s intelligence services to “divert
attention from real issues and that is why new things like country made
liquor are pushed into the valley.”28 As I have noted earlier, similar
xenophobic claims informed the shrine war. However, Akhrani and
the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis, although they participated in the anti-shrine
land mobilization, were at best marginal to the course of subsequent
events. Indeed, senior Ahl-e-Hadith leaders continued to engage
with the J&K government to build a denominational university,

and refused to condemn governor S.K. Sinha.29 Kashmir’s quasi-
official Grand Mufti, Maulvi Mohammad Bashir-ud-Din, also made
interventions in the course of the shrine war.30 However, it bears note
that—like the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis leadership—Bashir-ud-Din did
not address a single rally of consequence. That task was left to leaders
of the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat and APHC, none of whom bar Mirwaiz
Farooq was a religious leader—and even in this one case, a religious
leader with influence only in a small part of Srinagar.
Hindu religious leaders like Swami Dinesh Bharati, who played
roles in the Hindu-chauvinist agitation there, were also leaders of
obscure denominations and temples, with no real clerical authority.31
No figure associated with major temples, like the priests of the Mata
Vaishno Devi or Raghunath Mandir, appear to have participated in
the protests.
Despite the centrality of religion to the Shrine War, therefore,
two points are relevant: First, conventional political actors—whether
Islamists like Geelani, opposed to India, or Unionist political parties
like the PDP, NC, Congress, and the BJP—both initiated its crisis
and shaped its course. Neither religious institutions nor clerics had
any significant role in the movement. As such, the Shrine War did
not mark a breakdown of competitive democratic politics, as some
believed, but rather led to its intensification to dangerous levels,
but not levels which could not be contained by the political system.
Second, a welter of democratic parties played no small role in the
grassroots mobilization of what was marketed as a purely Islamist-
led or Hindutva-led movement. These twin facts are of great sig-
nificance in understanding why the Shrine War did not derail the
democratic system.
Unexpected Outcomes: The 2008 Results
Most conventional mappings of J&K’s political map holds that its

political geography consists of three major ethnic-religious blocks—
Hindu majority in Jammu, Buddhist majority in Ladakh, and Muslim
majority in Kashmir. Ethnic-religious competition within and between
these regions, it is argued, has shaped the course of its political life
and electoral engagements. There is more than a small element of
truth in this conventional wisdom. However, the 2008 elections
to the J&K Legislative Assembly appear to have broken the mould.
The chauvinist mobilizations that provided the overall context to the
elections ought to have manifested themselves in results polarized
along ethnic-religious fault lines—but did not.
Instead, the two major political parties of the Kashmir valley—the
NC and the PDP—each demonstrated primacy in particular sub-
regional zones. The Congress and the BJP, in turn, showed that they
have particular subregional constituencies in Jammu.
In north Kashmir, the NC won seven seats to the PDP’s five, with
an independent linked to the secessionist People’s Conference and
the Congress each picking up one seat.32 In central Kashmir—the
agglomeration of 15 seats between Kangan and Ganderbal on
the one side, to Khansahib and Chrar-e-Sharif on the other, with
urban Srinagar at its core—the NC has reigned supreme. Here, the
PDP could take just three seats, those of Chadoora, Khasahib, and
Beerwah. NC leaders succeeded in beating off competition in the
region’s rural constituencies—competition which had cost now-CM
Omar Abdullah the Ganderbal assembly seat in 2002.33 But in start
contrast, the PDP has dominated southern Kashmir, losing just four
of the region’s 16 seats—two to the Congress and one each to the
NC and CPI(M).34
South of the Pir Panjal mountains, voters in the Hindu majority
Jammu region also demonstrated that no one party could claim to
speak for the entire region or its religious communities.
Of the 11 seats in the Doda-Udhampur belt, the NC and Panthers
Party took two seats each, while the BJP won one.35 However, the
Congress has profited from former CM Ghulam Nabi Azad’s devel-
opmental record in the area, picking up seven seats. In the 19-seat
cluster from Bani to Naushera, with urban Jammu at its center, the
BJP has picked up 10 seats.36 However, its opponents have also done
well, with the Congress taking four seats, the NC and independent
candidates two each, and the Panthers Party one. Finally, the six seats
of the Rajouri-Poonch belt—often the site of tense Hindu–Muslim
relations—the PDP, Congress, and the NC have each won two seats.37
What lessons ought politicians be learning from these results?

Perhaps the most important is that competitive ethnic and religious
chauvinism, of the kind that threatened to rip J&K apart this summer,
does not pay.
The case of the PDP is instructive. Ever since its birth in 1999,
the party had worked hard to win over Islamists in its south Kashmir
heartlands. By 2002, the party had achieved some success in building
bridges with the Jamaat-e-Islami and the jihadist group it helped give
birth to, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Even though it was evident that
the electoral gains were limited, the party increasingly used religious
themes and motifs to appeal to Islamist voters.38 In 2008, this kind
of rhetoric succeeded in securing the PDP the undisguised support of
the Jamaat-e-Islami’s cadre, even though the Islamist party formally
called on them to boycott the elections.39 Despite securing the backing
of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s rank-and file, the PDP failed to emerge as the
principal voice of the Kashmir valley. The party has succeeded, it is
true, in winning 21 seats, up from 16 in 2002. However, this increase
is less remarkable than it might at first seem. In the 2004 Lok Sabha
elections, after all, the PDP registered wins in 25 Kashmir valley
assembly segments, compared to the 21 that were won by the NC.40
Despite the apparently dramatic improvement in the BJP’s
fortunes—which have taken it from just one seat in 2002 to 11 in
2008—Hindu chauvinism did not pay off. Claims that the BJP has
ridden a communal tide in Jammu are empirically unsustainable.
First, the ultra-right JSM had broken from the BJP on the eve of
the 2002 elections. Had this division of votes not taken place, simple
arithmetic shows that the BJP would have won eight seats then.41
More important, most of the BJP’s victories came in areas where
the Amarnath Shrine movement remained at a low ebb. The BJP’s
efforts to capitalize on the movement have, for the most part, ended
in failure. Kirti Verma—the wife of a protestor who dramatically
committed suicide—has been defeated in Vijaypur; the BJP’s chief,
Nirmal Singh also suffered defeat in Samba, which saw some of the
most intense violence in Jammu during the summer.42 Most of
the BJP’s victories came in areas which saw relatively little violence
in the summer, but where voters were dissatisfied with the devel-
opmental record of incumbents rather than their commitment to
religious causes—a lesson the party would do well to comprehend if

it wishes to expand its state-wide reach in the future.
What lessons do the election results hold out? First, the age of
coalition governments, which arrived seven years ago in J&K, seems
set for an extended stay.
Back in 2002, contrary to popular perception, the NC was not
decisively defeated. The party remained the largest in both the Kashmir
valley and in the state as a whole, polling 28.18â•¯percent of the vote
in all of the state’s 87 seats together.43 By contrast, the PDP took
14.64â•¯percent of the vote in the seats it contested, and just 9.28â•¯percent
state-wide. For its part, the Congress won 24.24â•¯percent of the votes in
the seats where it contested, and 24.24â•¯percent state-wide. It took the
combined forces of the PDP and the Congress to dethrone the NC.
Most of the new government’s Jammu region seats were won by the
Congress, as they had been in 1987. In the Kashmir valley, however,
the PDP rose as the principal challengers to the NC hegemony.44
As such, these elections marked a coming together of different
oppositional forces from the two regions—a forced cooperation across
ethnic-religious lines, in the common interests of power. The same
happened again in 2008.
For a state with a long history of the use of religion for political
profit, the outcome of the 2008 elections—and the alliances it has
compelled—are likely good news. They are also a break with history.
Back in March 1977, Indira Gandhi withdrew the Emergency and
called General Elections. She was defeated. The coming to power of
the Janata Party, a coalition spanning socialists, centrists, and Hindu
chauvinists, provoked a crisis within the J&K Assembly, and elections
had to be called early.
Having emerged more or less unscathed from the Emergency, and
wearing, moreover, the halo of political martyrdom, the Jamaat-e-
Islami sought to capitalize on the new situation. It allied itself with the
Janata Party both at the national level, and in J&K. Sheikh Abdullah
responded to the threat with unconcealed appeals to communal
sentiment. A vote for the Jamaat-e-Islami, Sheikh Abdullah claimed,
was a vote for the Jana Sangh, a Hindu-chauvinist constituent of the
Janata Party whose “hands were still red with the blood of Muslims.”45
Islam, NC leaders insisted, would be in danger if the Jamaat-Janata
alliance took power.
Mirza Afzal Beg, Abdullah’s key lieutenant, went one step further.
At rally after rally, he would produce a green handkerchief with
Pakistani rock-salt—as opposed to Indian sea-salt—contained in
it, signalling support for that country to his audience.46 NC cadre
administered oaths on the Quran to potential voters, through
which they pledged their commitment to the party. Clerics were
imported from UP and Bihar to campaign in Muslim majority areas
of Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah, wary of the consequences of pushing
New Delhi too hard, was carefully to assert that “Kashmir was a part
of India and Kashmiris were Indians,” but added that “if we are not
assured of a place of honour and dignity in India, we shall not hesi-
tate to secede.”47
Sheikh Abdullah’s incendiary campaign paid off—the NC won 47
of 75 seats in the J&K Assembly, a decisive majority. Moreover, the
NC secured over 46â•¯percent of the popular votes, an exceptionally
high proportion in Indian elections. By contrast, the Jamaat-e-Islami
could secure just one of the 19 seats it contested, and received only
3.59â•¯percent of the state-wide vote.48
Religion was also the central axis along with the Muslim United
Front (MUF)—a coalition on which the PDP modelled itself, and
from which it drew its electoral emblem—was formed. From the
outset, the MUF campaign focused on Islamic issues—the prolif-
eration of bars in Srinagar was, for example, a major target, on the
grounds that this was part of a larger onslaught on Muslim religious
practices and culture. For MUF’s major constituents, the acquisition
of state power was a precursor to these ends. At a March 4, 1987,
rally in Srinagar, MUF candidates, clad in the white robes of the
Muslim pious, declared variously that Islam could not survive under
the authority of a secular state and that Farooq Abdullah was an agent
of Hindu imperialism.49
For the Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, this platform was not new. The
organization had long argued that faith made imperative the Nizam-
e-Mustafa, the state as the Prophet Mohammad had envisaged it. In
a broader sense, the Jamaat-e-Islami saw its politics as emerging from
the ideological belief that “Kashmiri Muslims need to be converted
afresh for accommodating Islamic beliefs in the local framework.” As
the scholar Mohammad Ishaq Khan has noted, this also was not new;
popular religious identity and culture had long been challenged “by the
Shariat-oriented culture as generally represented by the Ahl-e-Hadith
and the Jamaat.”50 MUF succeeded in harvesting enough votes to panic
the NC and Congress into rigging the 1987 elections, one factor which
contributed to the rise of jihadist violence a year later.
Now, though, efforts to build political fortunes on piety have
failed—neither the PDP nor the BJP profited from the shrine board
war they initiated. Where might J&K politics now head?
Some signs, of course, are evident from the results of the 2009
Lok Sabha elections. Although full statistical analysis of the results
is yet to be made available by the Election Commission of India, it
seems apparent that the NC–Congress alliance is, for the present,
an almost unbeatable political force. The Anantnag Lok Sabha seat,
made up of the Assembly segments of southern Kashmir, has long
been considered a stronghold of the PDP. Even in the December 2008
Assembly elections, the PDP won 12 of 16 seats in the region. This
time, however, the combined forces of the NC and Congress allowed
the NC candidate Mirza Mehbooba Baig to defeat the PDP’s Peer
Mohammad Hussain by more than 5,000 votes.
The Baramulla seat of northern Kashmir, similarly, saw the NC’s
Sharif-ud-Din Shariq win 203,022 votes to the 138,208 polled by
the PDP’s Mohammad Dilawar Mir, and the 65,403 pulled in by
Sajjad Gani Lone. The latter is the son of a prominent secessionist
leader, Abdul Gani Lone, who was assassinated by jihadists in 2001
for his pursuit of dialogue with the Government of India. It should
be emphasized that the Congress–NC alliance polled more votes than
the two most prominent rivals, combined. Finally, NC patron and
former CM Farooq Abdullah won the Srinagar Lok Sabha seat by a
margin of over 32,000 votes, underlining the PDP’s failure to develop
a significant constituency in the city by eating into the base of Islamist-
led secessionists, as it had succeeded in doing in southern Kashmir.
The BJP fared even worse than the PDP. In Jammu, the Congress’
Madan Lal Sharma defeated Leela Karan Sharma, leader of the Shrine
war. Sharma’s victory is a clear sign that the apparent religious frenzy
unleashed during the summer of 2008 had less-than-durable political
foundations. The BJP also failed to wrest the Udhampur seat from
the Congress. In both areas, the support gained by the Congress
from the NC supporters in Muslim majority segments of Jammu

appears to have been important in beating back the BJP challenge.
For the time being, then, J&K politics appears to have reconfigured
itself much like pan India politics—no one party can credibly lay
claim to power. For now, the NC–Congress alliance is unbeatable.
Its defeat will only come about if the alliance partners fall apart—as
the PDP and Congress did—or if an alternate system of trans-regional
alliances develops. In the long term, one may even see a realization of
the inconceivable—the alliance of one of the Kashmir valley-based
parties with the Hindu nationalist BJP. The prospect is not as bizarre
as it may first seem. After all, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the MUF had
a none-too-discreet alliance with the Hindu right-wing in 1987, in
their common purpose of beating back the NC–Congress alliance of
Farooq Abdullah and former PM Rajiv Gandhi.
Democracy and the “Kashmir Problem”:

Some Conclusions
Elements of Kashmir’s civil society have long been concerned about

their future in a Hindu-majority India. During a visit to New Delhi
soon after Independence, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah candidly
underlined the relationship between politics in Kashmir and Indian
communalism. “There isn’t a single Muslim in Kapurthala, Alwar
or Bharatpur,” Abdullah said, noting that “some of these had been
Muslim-majority states.” Kashmiri Muslims, he concluded, “are afraid
that the same fate lies ahead for them as well.” In Jammu, religious
chauvinists have long raised fears of the subjugation of the region’s
Hindus by Kashmir’s Muslims.
Fears like these underpinned the summer’s violence, on either side
of the Pir Panjal Mountains. They were not, outside of the principal
urban bases of the secessionist movement, separatist in their content
or intent.
On the ground, a bewildering array of parties participated in the Shrine
movement. Jamaat-e-Islami activist Nisar Ahmad Ganai, for example,
led a 600 strong peasant gathering at Watergam on June 27. Two days
later, Jamaat-linked activists Mushtaq Ahmad Wani and Fayaz Ahmad
led the protests in Baramulla’s Khanpora area. Elsewhere in Baramulla,

though, pro-India parties drove the protests. A 5,000-strong gathering
at Sheeri-Baramulla on June 30, for example, was led by local NC
activist Abdul Qayoom and PDP dissident Ghulam Mohideen.
Hasan Rather, another PDP dissident, also played an important role
in organizing protests. Similarly, in Anantnag, both the APHC and
Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s Tehreek-i-Hurriyat played an important role
in organizing protests. Tehreek leader Hafizullah Mir, for example,
organized an 800 strong rally at Anantnag’s Lal Chowk on June 25,
while APHC-linked Fayyaz Ahmad Sodagar and Zahid Hakim led
a similar crowd at the same venue the next day. Local Congress
leaders burned effigies of PDP patron Mufti Mohammed Sayeed at
Wandi-Valgam on June 30, while NC activists were the principal
leaders of protests in Paibugh. Of the 20 protests in the district of
Ganderbal—the scene of a dramatic NC–PDP confrontation that saw
former Union Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah
lose his seat last year—half were led by National Conference cadre.
In the village of Chatterhama, NC activists even helped build a
shrine to two Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists killed in the course
of the protests.51
Similar patterns of mobilization have been seen in several post-
election mobilizations characterized as secessionist, notably the protests
against the alleged rape and murder of two women in the south
Kashmir town of Shopian. Power struggles between NC and PDP
played a key role in giving momentum to what later transformed into
an Islamist-led agitation.52
Part of the reason for the incomprehension of the elections of
2008 is a discourse that a priori casts Kashmiri secessionism as the
authentic sentiment of the people of the state. The high turnout
in the 1996 and 2002 elections was widely attributed to coercive
pressure from Indian troops, rather than the political influence of
the candidates. Without dispute, the Army did ask rural residents
to vote in both 1996 and 2002—actions which must be read in the
context of jihadi groups threatening them with death if they chose
to do so, and killing dozens of political activists to demonstrate their
seriousness of purpose. However, a careful study of voting patterns
demonstrates that there was no demonstrable relationship between
this persuasive activity and turnout. Zero voting took place in some
areas where the troops were reported to have pushed voters; some areas
which saw no coercion at all, conversely, reported a high turnout.53
Kashmir secessionists, it is rarely understood, represent specific
social classes—not a generalized, free-floating “sentiment.” Most major
secessionist leaders were members of the MUF, a political coalition that
represented an alliance between the urban petty bourgeoisie and the
rural orchard-owning elite.54 Both classes saw their pre-independence
influence decline through years of the National Conference rule—a
rule founded on an alliance between the small peasant, on the one
hand, and a new elite of contractors and capitalists, on the other.
Islam, for the classes which backed the MUF, was an instrument to
legitimize the protest of a threatened social order against a modernity
which threatened to obliterate it. In Srinagar and other urban centers,
this coalition succeeded in securing the support of disenfranchized
youth—the children of the city’s traditional bourgeoisie, who are
witnessing the inevitable death of the artisanal and trading occupations
of their parents but have neither the skills nor resources to compete
in the new world emerging around them. Kashmir’s Islamists-led
secessionist movement became a medium for their rage at being
denied entry through the gates of the earthly paradise before them—a
phenomenon which formed the most visible part of the street protests
during the Shrine Board movement.
Democracy in J&K has shown it can survive the strains imposed
on it by the state’s volatile ethnic-religious politics. Can it find the
resources needed to draw those now disenfranchized by the modernity?
Electoral democracy is merely a system; it guarantees no particular
outcomes. For their survival and growth, however, politicians will
have to find answers to this problem.
Notes
1. Avijit Ghosh, “Tricolour at 8 a.m., Flags of Separatists at 4.00 p.m.,” The

Times of India (Mumbai), August 16, 2008. Also available online at: http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/JK_Tricolour_at_8am_separatist_flags_at_4pm/
articleshow/3369371.cms
â•‡ 2. Hakeem Irfan, “Angry Mobs Storm CRPF Bunkers, Police Stations,” Rising Kashmir
(Srinagar), August 14, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.risingkashmir.
com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5879&Itemid=1
â•‡ 3. “We’ll Carry on Anti-poll Campaign: Mirwaiz Umar,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar),
November 22, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/
full_story.asp?Date=22_11_2008&ItemID=72&cat=1
â•‡ 4. Hassan Zainagiri, “Engineering Elections,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar),
October 31, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/
â•‡ 5. “Voting Begins in Indian Kashmir,” Alwahy News (Online), November 17, 2008.
Available online at: http://alwahy.com/news/article/asiapacific/5661/1/print/
â•‡ 6. Muzamil Jaleel, “Kashmir ’02 Kashmir ’08,” The Indian Express (New Delhi),
November 16, 2009. Also available Online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/
story-print/386152/
â•‡ 7. “NC–Cong Sweep J&K; Lone Loses,” Rediff.com (Online), May 16, 2009.
Available online at: http://election.rediff.com/report/2009/may/16/loksabhapoll-
nc-cong-sweep-jk-lone-loses.htm
â•‡ 8. Luv Puri, “Amarnath Yatra: Court Vests Authority with Shrine Board,” The
Hindu (Chennai), April 17, 2005. Also available Online at: http://www.hindu.
com/2005/04/17/stories/2005041706750700.htm
â•‡ 9. Praveen Swami, “Anatomy of the Shrine Board Crisis,” The Hindu (Chennai),
June 30, 2008. Also available Online at: http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/30/
stories/2008063059891300.htm
10. Zulfikar Majid, “I Caution My Nation: Wake up Geelani,” Greater Kashmir
(Srinagar), June 24, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.
com/full_story.asp?Date=24_6_2008&ItemID=61&cat=1
11. Hakeem Irfan, “Operation Yatra Devised on Israeli Lines: Geelani,” Rising Kashmir
(Srinagar), June 13, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.risingkashmir.
com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=4330
12. Ahmad Ali Fayyaz, “Stronger Geelani’s New Slogan: Ham Pakistani hain,” Daily
Excelsior (Jammu), August 19, 2008, p. 1.
13. A.M. Dar, “Geelani Slams Mainstream Politicians,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar),
October 27, 2007. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/
14. Ibid.
15. Yoginder Sikand, “For Islam and Kashmir: The Prison Diaries of Sayyed Ali
Gilani of the Jama’at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” in The Journal of Muslim
Minority Affairs (New Delhi), Vol. 18, No. 2, (1998), p. 243.
16. Chander Suta Dogra, “Echoes In Hell,” Outlook (New Delhi), August 18, 2008.
Also available online at: http://www.outlookindia.com/fullprint.asp?choice=1&
fodname=20080818&fname=Jammu+Main+%28F%29&sid=1
17. “Centre: No Economic Blockade of Valley, Pak Cashing In on Turmoil,” The
Indian Express (New Delhi), August 17, 2008. Also available online at: http://
www.indianexpress.com/printerFriendly/349694.html. Also see Harmeet Singh,
“Army Controls Highway, Traffic Restored,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), August

4, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story.
asp?Date=4_8_2008&ItemID=45&cat=1
18. “March Towards Muzaffarabad: UJC,” Rising Kashmir (Srinagar), August 7, 2008.
19. Ahmad Ali Fayyaz, “Toll Reaches 21 as One More Killed in CRPF Firing,” The
Daily Excelsior (Jammu), August 15, 2008, p. 1.
20. Hameeda Nayeem, “Unite, in Humanity,” The Indian Express (New Delhi),
May 11, 2006, p. 6.
21. For a full account, see Praveen Swami, “Righteousness, Religion and Right-
wing Politics,” The Hindu (Chennai), May 15, 2008. http://www.hindu.
com/2006/05/15/stories/2006051504021000.htm
22. “Non-Kashmiris Should Be Seen Off: Geelani,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar),
July 25, 2007, p. 3.
23. “Construction Works to Be Hit by Labourers Exodus,” Daily Excelsior (Jammu),
August 4, 2007, p. 1.
24. Praveen Swami, “Bombing in Srinagar: A Response to Islamist Calls,” The
Hindu (Chennai), July 25, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.hindu.
com/2008/07/25/stories/2008072556861500.htm
25. Praveen Swami, “Kashmir: The War for Hearts and Minds,” The Hindu (Chennai),
June 4, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/04/
stories/2008060455311000.htm
26. “Tension over Cow Sacrifice,” The Daily Telegraph (Kolkata), December 23,
2008. Also available Online at: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1071223/jsp/
nation/story_8700385.jsp
27. “‘Unnatural Act’ with Cow Leads to Protests in Akhnoor,” Expressindia.com
(Online), March 28, 2005. Available online at: http://www.expressindia.com/
news/fullstory.php?newsid=44002
28. Hilal Bhat, “Bihari Labourers Producing Desi Liquor in South Kashmir,” Greater
Kashmir (Srinagar), June 29, 2006, p. 3.
29. Praveen Swami, “Islamic University Falls Victim to Kashmir’s Shrine War,” The
Hindu (Chennai), August 21, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.hindu.
com/2008/08/21/stories/2008082155121100.htm
30. “Lift Blockade Or We Lift Durbar,” Rising Kashmir (Srinagar), August 3, 2008.
Also available online at: http://www.risingkashmir.com/?option=com_content
&task=view&id=5616
31. “Dinesh Bharti’s Detention under PSA Ordered,” The Daily Excelsior (Jammu),
August 26, 2008, p. 1.
32. Derived from Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu and Kashmir,
Available online at: http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/pdf/Winning-Candidates-
08.pdf. North Kashmir consists of constituencies 1–14.
33. Ibid., constituencies 15–30.
36. Ibid., p. 63–81.
37. Ibid., constituencies 82–871–61.

38. Praveen Swami, “A Bend in the Road,” Frontline (Chennai), May 16, 2006.
Also Available Online at: http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2309/stories/20
060519004912600.htm
39. Muzammil Jaleel, “Despite Boycott Call, Jamaat Cadres Come Out in Support
of PDP,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), December 23, 2009. Also Available
Online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/despite-boycott-call-jamaat-
cadres-come-out-in-support-of-pdp/401699/0
40. Praveen Swami, “Democracy without Freedom,” South Asia Intelligence Review,
Available Online at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_44.htm
(last date of access: on May 17, 2004).
41. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 2002, to the
Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Election Commission
of India, 2002).
42. Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu and Kashmir, Available Online at:
http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/pdf/Winning-Candidates-08.pdf.
43. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 2002, to the
of India, 2002), p. 8.
44. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
45. Navnita Chadha Behera, State, Identity, and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir, and
Ladakh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000), p. 143.
46. Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unending War
(London: IB Tauris, 2003), p. 125.
47. Cited in Behera, State, Identity, and Violence p. 140.
48. Election Commission of India, Key Highlights of General Election, 1977, to the
of India, undated), p. 8.
49. P.S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroad (New Delhi: Vikas,
1994), p. 159.
50. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “Six Centuries of Islamisation in Kashmir: Retrospect
and Prospects,” in Balraj Puri (ed.), 5000 Years of Kashmir (New Delhi: Ajanta,
1997).
51. Praveen Swami, “Hubris and downfall,” Frontline (Chennai), August 1, 2008.
Also Available Online at: http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2515/stories/
20080801251502800.htm
52. Praveen Swami, “Politicians Preying on Shopian Tragedy,” The Hindu (Chennai),
June 14, 2009. Also available Online at: http://www.hindu.com/2009/06/14/
stories/2009061459700800.htm
53. Praveen Swami, “A Surprise in Kashmir: The Myth of Coercion at Large,”
Frontline (Chennai) June 14, 1996. Also see Aarti Dhar, “A Vote for Peace,”
The Hindu (Chennai) June 9, 1996.
54. P.S. Verma, “Muslim United Front,” in S. Bhatnagar and Pradeep Kumar (eds),
Regional Political Parties in India (New Delhi: Ess Publications, 1988), p. 191.
Chapter 17
Northeast India
Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization,

and Competitive Politics: The Case
of States in Northeast India
Rajesh Dev
The Region and its Politics
If South Asia is the largest “democratic region”1 of the world, India’s

contribution to that estimation is indeed significant. This is because,
in comparison to her South Asian neighbors, India’s “democratic
adventure” has not only demonstrated an adaptable resilience,2 but
through its own peculiar modes, affected a deepening of democratic
norms3 and procedures. While it may be true that such deepening
of democratic norms and procedures must be manifested in more
substantive essentials than in the periodic ritual of elections, an election
is commonly seen as the “ultimate” democratic device that validates
the democratic personality of this nation.
In this minimalist procedural sense of democracy, elections are said
to constitute the “crucial sites for the production and reproduction
of the political.”4 It is not simply the stable regularity and sanctity of
elections that are critical to Indian democracy. Elections have come to
form the obligatory conduit for intragroup political contestation and
competition and an effective means through which social pluralism is
politically articulated and expressed. The wide profusion of political
parties in every part of India manifesting the interests and claims of
356 Rajesh Dev
the newly empowered social groups is not only a sign of the deepening
of the democratic experience,5 but is also seen as the institutionalized
expression of entrenched social pluralism.
India’s “democratic adventure” has also been deeply affected by
the “shift in [the nature and pattern of] democratic politics.”6 This
shift is apparently discernible in the “rise of state politics as an autono-
mous domain” that transformed Indian states into “principal” sites
of political contestation where effective political choices are made.
Though some see this as “progressive ruralization”7 or “fragmentation
and regionalization of political power,”8 others have argued that it
only indicates a shift in the “locale of politics.”9
This “ruralization” has also produced a popular anxiety about the
content of democratic politics in India. There is a despondent general-
ization that democratic norms are being compromised by excessive
localism and fluid political coalitions, attributed to the gratuitous rise
of regional parties and their gaining control of the political “center.”
Political theorists have termed this shift in the “locale,” and possibly
also the content of the democratic game, as an attribute of the “third
electoral system”10 in the Indian democratic passage.
A growing mood among analysts is, therefore, to examine the
political impact of the provincial, state level actors, forces, and issues11
on the construction of the “national” political agenda, which is now
considered a “derivative”12 of the former. This reversal of the cus-
tomary perspective of understanding Indian politics through the
prism of “national” politics, possibly allows us to integrate the “micro
foundations” and “lived experiences” with our collective democratic
adventure. Such an understanding of the “local,” social, and political
realities is significant as it essentially provides a more substantive
transparency to the Indian democratic experience by appreciating how
the “sub-national” diversities constitutes, what Ashis Nandy states as “a
culturally viable national political style.”13 It is in following this mood
that we attempt to unravel the nature of political competition and the
pattern of expression of political choices made in states constituting
the “northeast” region of India.
The “northeast” of India, traditionally constituted by seven states,
till the recent times occupied a “peripheral” fringe in the Indian political
imagination. The institutional and political exclusions initiated during
â•…â•…â•… Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Competitive Politics 357
colonialism as a political strategy have been rationalized as political

recognition of cultural difference in the post-independent period.
The region apparently manifests a “notional” integration with a
“national” consciousness and continues to express a collective unease
with the “idea of India.” It is this limited depth of national integra-
tion that continues to polarize political theorizing and practice on
and in the region.
The discourse on political integration in the region is, therefore,
being articulated through a genre of contentious politics that mani-
fests a widely held social posture that people from the region are part
of India but are not Indians. Such a political sensibility often has its
enervated counter, in assertions that “the future of Northeast [India]
lies in its political integration with India and economic integration
with southeast Asia.”14 What is important is that this unusual sentiment
on political integration perhaps expresses an inchoate desire to be a
part of the political community without sharing the standardized
political sameness or even consciousness.
A growing dissonance, over the terms of political relationship with
India, expressed by ethnic communities of the region, not only reflects
a substantively frail political bond, but also establishes a contingent,
plagiaristic level of identification and loyalty with India. The region
shares, what Kymlicka states as a “provisional form of togetherness”15
which coexists with a corresponding and perpetual interrogation of
the nature and rules of the [political] relationship, with India. The
political negotiations underway between the Nagas and the Indian
state is only one such example that attempts to redefine the federal
architecture and redefine political relations between the centre and
the constituents.
This frame may however, give us two false impressions. One, that
the region by itself shares an internal social and political coherence
and thus is a collective regional solidarity. And second, that as a con-
sequence, the “region” is positioned in a polarizing dichotomy with
the “nation.” However we must admit that the perceived internal
regional coherence is often an inference of essentialist designs and
the ostensible external regional antipathy an outcome of unproblem-
atized conceptualization of the relations between a “center” and its
constituent “federal” units.
358 Rajesh Dev
Indeed, if we care to analyze the persuasion of competitive

democratic politics on the nature of social change in India, the
“northeast” cannot consider itself an exile—even if in provincial dis-
courses, competitive democratic politics is considered circuitous
alleyways for legitimating “Indian rule” that causes “Indianization.”
Introduction of competitive democratic politics has transformed
the “traditional” structures of power, redefined political practices,
and crafted novel political traditions. Though subliminal feelings of
cynicism about electoral democracy and its “corrupting influence” on
the tribal ethos and forms of governance are expressed by “traditional
elites,” many of these actors consider elections to state assemblies and
parliament as a higher-level of politics to be generally aspired for.
These actors though vocal about the transgressions of competitive
politics oddly regard elections as a tool for integrating into a wider
and privileged network of social and political patronage. Therefore,
even if participation in competitive politics manifests a coarse form
of political integration of the region with the “idea of India,” it has
nonetheless, assisted in the formalization of an institutional political
culture that the region shares with India.
There is also a broad popular political reading that the region’s
share in political power is restricted by its negligible representation in
parliament. With only 10 representatives in a house of 542, six of the
seven states constituting the region command an ineffectual political
authority in the parliament. Except Assam, none of the states have
more than two representatives to parliament. This lack of political
weight in the federal legislature apparently reduces their legitimacy
among the electorate as effective political actors who could articulate
regional and local interests and needs. Sometimes, such perceptions
of inadequate representation often make it obligatory for groups
and states to arrive at a provisional intra-regional and inter-ethnic
consensus during parliamentary elections. It contrasts the political
agenda and arithmetic at the local levels, which otherwise usually
manifests an intrepid form of ethnic fission and contest.
While attempting to understand the context of competitive politics
in the region, it may also be indicative to preface that the “capacity
and opportunities” accorded by competitive democratic politics in
the region is restrained by a violent social grid. This violence, though
an outcome of the varied forms of layered exclusions has, to a large

extent depoliticized the political space limiting the capacity of the
electorate. Yet, it is ironically a pervading violent culture that possibly
offers the requisite political opening for increased participation in
democratic politics and expression of political preferences through
competitive elections. Even if transformation of rebels into demo-
cratic stakeholders stimulated an expansion in federal institutional
linkages, it has resulted in the diffusion of political conflict and
only provisionally neutralized the proclivity for violent expression of
dissent and difference. In almost all the six states under review in
this chapter, “violent application of opinions”16 continue to form the
distinctive backdrop to institutionalized political competition and
efforts at political control.
Electoral competitions in the region seem like a “second-order” pre-
ference in the selection of strategies for claims-making and negotiating
differences. Violent contention, naively blanketed as insurgencies, is
often the “first-order” preference for groups, as the dominant tool
in the repertoire of convincing strategies for mobilizing social and
political resentment as well as reformulating redistributive claims for
power and resources. Efforts intended to democratize ethnic group
claims and relations resulted in altering political structures that assured
greater political autonomy to ethnic groups. Yet, in a social site of pol-
iticized ethnic identities and claims which are yet to be channelized
through more formal politics, it has only exacerbated ethnic-security
dilemmas resulting in armed resistance.
Ironically therefore, it is the degree of political violence generated
by a large array of non-state actors who seem more effective in aggre-
gating public preferences in the region. A popular version of this
discourse is apparent in the view among a large number of indigen-
ous intellectuals that it is only after the Assam agitation or the rise of
the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam or similar
assertions by other groups, that the “center” began changing its
“security-model” of dealing with the region. The non-state actors, they
argue, play a more important role in defining the political discourse
than political representatives. Thus, violence has become an accepted
strategy for expressing political discontent and securing access to and
control of institutions. Besides, the linkages between insurgencies,
360 Rajesh Dev
political parties,17 and the political processes provide a typical regional

variation of institutionalized democratic politics and an influential
assortment of armed non-state actors.
The typicality lies in the fact that a large number of these demo-
cratic actors18 provide patronage to non-state and armed actors as
imbursement for abetting political efforts at mobilization and realign-
ment of inter-ethnic relations. In almost all the states of the region such
insurgent groups—surrendered, active or under temporary secession of
armed hostilities—have come to increasingly play intermediary roles
between the state and society. Though there may not be a direct fit
between the increasing nexus of elected representatives and insurgent
outfits at the local level with electoral outcomes to parliament, the
relationship does reflect the nature and pattern of political mobilization
and competition at all levels.
The “infrastructural powers” of the state in large parts of the region,
therefore, seem like “juridical artefacts,” fragile in its capacity to pene-
trate and manage the society. The formal voting equality granted
to citizens does not seem to bridge the inequities released by the
structure of society–state relations in the region. The federalizing
strategies of ethnic autonomy seem to have only assisted in the insti-
tutionalization of ethnic clientelist networks. This inhibits attempts
to embed liberal democratic political culture and consciousness on
a group of people, more deeply rooted in political dispositions of
ethnic nepotism. Moreover, in some states, cessations of political
autonomy by central impositions inhibit an adequate entrenching of
democratic continuity.
These democratic aberrations have also assisted in augmenting a
political consciousness and culture that stresses the mutual suspicion
between these regional units and the “center” and introduces what
Yadav calls a disconnect between “what people vote for and what they
get.”19 The parallel existence of a high degree of political violence
along with a respectable degree of electoral participation, probably
reveals the complex personality of the democratic matrix in the region.
It manifests the inadequacy of the available democratic resources as
adequate tools for negotiating social and political incompatibilities.
The winner takes all; first-past-the-post system allows political
mobilization along group differences. But popular claims for post-

election group-consensus emasculate the unique group claims. It
is also argued that the broad rules of democratic politics does not
permit alternative proposals for structuring the demos as it needs
to be operated, principally by the limits defined by the dominant
consensual idea of nation-state. A democratic structure that makes
attempts at democratic inclusion through the legitimization of
group mobilization fails to adequately accommodate complex ethnic
claims in a deeply plural social context.
It is clear that the societies of the region are formatted along
cleavages, primarily related to ethnic identity and the politicization
of those cleavages forms an important focus for understanding the
nature of political competition in the region. The differences between
ethnic groups that control institutions20 and groups that do not
have such institutional control, and also indigenous versus outsiders
differences pattern the structure of competition. Political equality
attempted voting seldom produces results, where popular control
of democratic politics is diluted by the strong majoritarian predis-
position of the institutions. The terms of the sociopolitical discourse
are being crafted in the “arena[s] located in the interstices of state and
society”21 by primary groups whose political relevance and power is
derived essentially from a sense of shared ethnic allegiance, exclusive
collective goals, and need for political control. The consultative
patterns of democratic politics are, therefore, largely defined by “local
subjectivities” that essentially privilege dominant, gendered, mono-
ethnic voices.
Such a priming of ethnic identity also moulds the degree of relative
regionalist posturing and often distorts the ideological distinction
between “national” and “regional” parties. The politics of ethnic dif-
ferentiation and fission being expressed essentially through armed
resistance, often gives way to ephemeral regional political formations
that craft strategic political alliances and coalitions with “national”
parties. The result, however, has mostly been fluid political conditions
and increasing political disenchantment. The play of ideological
alternatives—so essential for the effective expression of democratic
choices—is fairly negligible in the six states of the region reviewed
in this chapter.
362 Rajesh Dev
That the region pursues a political trajectory of its own is suggested,

not only in its brand of contentious politics and social exceptions, but
also in the apparently unique features of its political history that defies
“national” trends and waves.22 Such an indigenous political trajectory
of the region that emphasizes the rhetorical force of “difference”
is also exhibited recurrently in the political imagery of the region.
These are expressed in narratives of a “failed partition”23 noticeable
in the politics regarding “immigrants” and “foreign nationals.” They
include persistent ethno-political violence that seriously challenge
the “democratic norms, and the character of state power,”24 issues of
territorial homelands and gladiatorial positioning of ethnic groups
and issues of state-repression through counter insurgency meas-
ures and operation of laws like Armed Forces Special Powers Act
(AFSPA). These issues influence the structure of political discourse,
but rarely define the ideological distance between political parties or
become unguarded issues of inter-party debates.
This shared imagery may not adequately reveal the intra-regional
diversity and plurality of political claims or, in some cases, even the
differences in the “grammar of claims-making.” A broad regional desire
for expressing “politics in the vernacular”25 is punctuated by similar
intra-regional expressions that question this standardized regional
imagery. Therefore the suggestion that “the starting point of making
sense of politics in the northeast is to recognise its internal diversity”26
provides a novel opening through which we may appreciate the distinct
social and political realities of the states and social groups.
Yet, attempts at understanding the intensity of political com-
petition must appreciate the caution that “political and electoral
mobilisation has never been crystallized along party political line.”27
Political competition in many states of the region operates within
what Yadav terms as “systemless competition” where politicization
of ethnic and sub-ethnic antagonisms forms the bases for political
mobilization and contestations. This politicization of ethnic differ-
ences is reconfiguring “ethnic demography” and realignment of ethnic
forces and often evokes explanations about the development of clumsy
democratic culture in the region. The politicization of ethnic identities
has nevertheless allowed a loosening of the political space, hitherto
controlled by broader ethnic categories, but has territorialized fluid
ethnic spaces making it more contested. Such politicization has not yet
coalesced into entrenched party bases and boundaries. Party loyalties
are effectively fluid and tenuous.
The presence of a large number of candidates and parties, in most
of the states and constituencies does not reflect a highly competitive
political space. In most cases, competition is often restricted between
two or three individuals and parties. Besides, the dominance of the
social discourse and political agenda by social majorities sets the mar-
gins of democratic politics in all states. Yet these do not necessarily
suggest a “fixed regional culture” that is normally evoked by many
governing narratives on the region.
In the general elections to parliament in 2009, the Congress had
an edge over the regional and other national parties. In the six states
under consideration, the Congress party secured six of the total
10 seats. The CPI won two and the remaining two went to the NCP
and the Nagaland People’s Front (NPF), respectively. Though this
may seem as a reflection of the national trend favoring the Congress,
in this region it is more significantly the result of the continuation of
the politics of shifting political loyalties and the wholesale merger
of regional political parties with the Congress. This merger at the state
level limited the space for political competition and made political
opposition a virtually fictional encounter.
For the Congress, it is only a refinement of the policies adopted
in the early 1970s to encroach into hitherto “regional” spaces, where
the Congress is often perceived largely as an outsider and a party
of the “plains.”28 The paradox, however, is that while the Congress in
most of the hill regions is perceived as a party that passively pursues
an integrative agenda, it still is able to expand its social base. The
BJP has also been making some inroads in the hill states, especially
since the 1990s, parallel to its phenomenal rise in national politics.
Nonetheless, it is the Congress that has attained a substantial presence
in these hill states and has consolidated this presence in recent years.
A continuing trend for the Congress has been provided through
“induced defections” from regional parties. Chaube stated that the
trends of politics and the nature of political competition in the region
were largely established by the diversities in political culture and
behavior between the hills and the plains. It is this difference
364 Rajesh Dev
between the hills and the plains that often shapes the support bases
of the regional and national parties, and as a logical manifestation,
it is perceived as a difference between the “indigenous/local” and
“outsiders/migrants” political preferences.
Before the 2009 elections, the splintered and ideologically brittle
anti-Congress regional forces attempted to resist the Congress through
the formation of a political forum, both at the regional level and in
some individual states. The established forum was largely an outcome
of the efforts by P.A. Sangma, the inexorable former speaker of the
Lok Sabha. It comprised the AGP, Asom United Democratic Front
(AUDF), the Bodoland People’s Progressive Front (BPPF), the NPF,
the Manipur People’s Party (MPP), and the CPI, besides the BJP.
This suggests that the nature of political competition manifests, what
Yadav suggests is a “Congress vs. Opposition Scenario.” It is essentially
a bi-polar contest between the Congress and a regional party, despite
the presence of a wide array of political forces.
The composition of the forum suggests that ideological connect-
edness along a policy dimension had not been one of its criterions. It
was rather a provisional and strategic antipathy to the Congress. In fact
the support extended by the AUDF (now called the All India United
Democratic Forum) and the NPF, including the so called “Sangma
faction” of the NCP, to the Congress-led UPA government at the
center establishes character of the forum. Such a candid illustration
of what is oddly termed as “ideological convergence”29 and perceived
as an attribute of the “third electoral system” in large parts of the
country, has always been a defining feature of competitive politics in
northeast India.
The States and its Politics
Meghalaya
Elections for the two parliamentary seats in the state of Meghalaya
were held in the backdrop of political instability30 and President’s
rule in the state. Though it had been the first time that the state had
parliamentary elections under President’s rule, it did not have any
direct impact on the outcome of the elections, despite perceptions

that the governor being a political appointee was biased,31 in favor
of the Congress. Indeed, political instability has been a recurrently
stable political experience in the state since its elevation to full state-
hood on January 21, 1972. The 91st Amendment Act to the consti-
tution that restricts the total number of cabinet members has made
political instability and shifting of political loyalties more acute in the
state. The CMs are on record requesting the central government to
introduce exceptions to the Act for some of the northeastern states
with small legislatures, reflecting the instrumental need for political
maneuverability and political stability through disbursement of
political bursaries.
The appreciation of this backdrop of political instability that flows
from chronic political realignments of forces is important in order to be
able to understand the pattern of political competition in Meghalaya,
where politics is largely a short-term measure for access to resources,
political coalitions, and loyalties that are extremely fluid and transitory.
“Power politics” of alliances and provisional coalitions have usurped
the value of legitimate ideologically coherent politics. In Meghalaya,
political ideologies are often irreconcilable with personal aspiration
and provincial loyalties. To a large extent, this influences political
outcomes at the state-level assembly elections and also structures
political alignments and preferences for parliamentary seats. The
diversity of the social structure is patterned along perceived power
differentials between the three dominant tribes, intra-ethnic cleav-
ages contoured along religious differences between indigenous
faith and Christianity, clan-loyalties, denominational devotions
characterized through Catholic or Presbyterian loyalties, and insider/
outsider images. These cleavages define and influence political
preferences and mobilizations.
The social base of the Congress reflects its centrist political
positioning with a rather “coded ethnic card,”32 defining the finer
nuances of the electoral arithmetic. The relative positioning of the
Congress and the regional parties with regard to regional aspirations
and claims, forms an elemental feature of inter-party competition
in the states. Regional parties seek to aggregate and articulate the
typically regional and “indigenous” interests and political claims.
366 Rajesh Dev
Thus, while the Congress expressed the need for “peace, development,
and education,”33 the regional parties expressed their mandate for
protecting the rights of tribals.34 This apparent difference in their
political positions did not dissuade the Congress candidate from
stating that votes from minority “non-tribals” are not “so important”
for any Congress victory. This endorsed a coded message for the
dominant tribes, obliquely disavowing the censure of being a party for
the “plains people,” yet retaining its base among the non tribes.
Regional leaders accommodated into national politics often become
strong advocates35 of national parties and many of them perceive the
Congress as an important political stepladder for upward mobility
into a domain larger than that accorded by the regional parties. Such
transient political loyalties and ideological depth does not allow for
political cohesion among regional forces. The durable factionalism
within the regional parties and the local organizational depth of the
Congress thus assisted the Congress to make inroads into the social
bases of regional parties.
Vincent Pala, elected to represent the Shillong parliamentary
constituency on a Congress ticket, was considered to be a political
greenhorn in electoral politics. He was, however, never far away
from politics even when he had been an engineer in a Public Works
Department. His influence on political outcomes36 at the state level,
even while being a government functionary is seen as a reason for his
being offered the party nomination, instead of P.R. Kyndiah who had
been a veteran and a minister in the Union Cabinet.
Though delimitation had affected the social composition of the
constituencies, the impact of any realignment of social forces during
these elections was negligible as the broader boundaries of parlia-
mentary constituencies remained unaltered in the state with only two
seats. Congress secured a majority in 29 of the 36 assembly consti-
tuencies under the Shillong parliamentary seat, while the UDP
and the Hill State People’s Democratic Party (HSPDP) candidates
secured a majority in the remaining seven. Pala, a Jaintia, won all
the seven constituencies in the Jaintia Hills districts and 22 in the
Khasi hills districts. His immediate rival won in two constituencies,
while the HSPDP candidate won in five constituencies of west Khasi
hills district, considered to be the traditional political stronghold of
the regional party. A cursory analysis of the assembly constituencies
reveals that the Congress has made inroads into traditional regional
party constituencies, especially in the Khasi Hills districts. It does not
reveal the fact that the contest between a composite regional bloc and
the Congress was much keener than what such a cursory glance of the
election results suggests.
Though the Congress received 44.84â•¯percent of the votes polled,
there has been a decline of 0.71â•¯percent in its vote share in the state,
especially in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills districts. Yet the Congress
candidate won by a margin of 1,07,868 votes over his nearest UDP
rival, while the regional parties along with the two independent
candidates together polled 9,037 votes more than the Congress candi-
date. To give the Congress its due, it may be stressed that the Congress
candidate still received 1,309 votes more than the combined votes
polled by three regional party candidates from the UDP, the HSPDP,
and the splinter group of the UDP, the Meghalaya Democratic Party.
Yet, this small margin indicates the possible potential strength of a
common regional candidate and a combined regional bloc.
Though the regional parties were in an existing political coalition
called the Meghalaya Progressive Alliance (MPA) along with the NCP
running the state government before the imposition of President’s
rule, the regional parties failed to agree on support for a common
candidate. The NCP, an important political force in the state preferred
to support the UDP candidate for the Shillong constituency as a
reciprocal measure for its support to the NCP candidate for the Tura
constituency, because of its limited social base in the Khasi and Jaintia
Hills districts. It is also important that in these districts the NCP
is viewed as a “Garo” party, while the Khasi and Jaintia Hill-based
regional parties do not have enough political grounding in the Garo
Hills districts.
Tura constituency is considered as the political fief of Purno
Agitok Sangma, who had been a representative from this constituency
eight times. In fact, the Congress nominee stated that the contest is
essentially between her37 and Sangma, implying that Agatha Sangma
was merely a political surrogate for her father. Personalities rather
than parties became the major feature of the election.
Though there were three candidates, the contest had been between
Agatha Sangma and Deborah Marak, with the former winning by a
368 Rajesh Dev
margin of 17, 945 votes. These elections in Tura have been significant
for Congress as it increased its pre-eminence to eight assembly consti-
tuencies compared to only three during the 2004 elections, while in
15 other constituencies it came a close second. Therefore, the win of
the NCP is not seen as politically significant for the expansion of the
Congress bases. The vote share of the NCP was merely 18.78â•¯percent
of the total votes polled, and signals the erosion of Sangma’s political
base. The NCP could consolidate its vote base in east and south Garo
Hills, while Congress manifested its dominance in its traditional
base of west Garo hills.38 This waning political influence of Sangma
is attributed to his recent political eccentricities in aligning with the
BJP in the center and supporting the regional parties in the state, and
then seeking to form a government in the state with the Congress.39
The nature and direction of political competition is perceived to be
determined by these processes of perpetual political realignments of
state politics.
The Congress’ pre-eminence is visible in largely “religious minority”
dominated areas of Garo Hills, where Purno Sangma’s pro-BJP bias
is viewed with skepticism. In the Rajabala and Phulbari unreserved
constituencies, with a large religious minority population, the
Congress candidate defeated the NCP candidate by a large margin.
A significant difference is that, while at least for the parliamentary
elections, the party seems relatively more important for the electorate
in the Khasi and the Jaintia Hills, in the Garo hills, it is the person
who is accorded qualified primacy. An assessment of the broader
political history of Meghalaya will make it manifest that the contests
between the regional parties themselves, and sometimes regional party
dissidents, have made the task of the Congress easier and made its
win more likely, especially in the Khasi–Jaintia dominated districts.
Ever since the splintering of the regional forces in 1976, regional
parties have engaged in a tug of war for political space and political
identity among themselves.
Yet, due to the convergence of their ideological moorings and policy
orientations, parties have often engaged in what can be referred to as
“political collusion”40 or cartelization for governance. In Meghalaya,
such collusion is revealed in state-level coalitions provisionally formed
between regional political formations—and also between regional
formations and the Congress—while concurrently contesting for

analogous social base and political space during elections. This
incestuous competition introduces political cynicism amongst the
electorate and emasculates substantive democratic engagement by
the people curtailing effective political competition. In such a con-
dition, political choices and competition largely are determined by
strategic political aims and other forms of patronage linkages obtained
in embedded social relations and not by party loyalties or policy
choices. Democratic competition in the state is also hemmed in by
“traditional institutions” that often control local boroughs through
customary methods like social exclusion for voting against collective
directives. In a number of constituencies, especially in rural areas,
such instances were reported during these elections.
Such a system of patronage and fostering of political capital has been
mastered by the Congress and is generated through a well lubricated
tiered system. The arrest of Congress supporters with prohibited
amounts of cash41 and the defrayment of election expenditures for
20 candidates during elections to the Jaintia Hills District Council,42
by the Congress sponsor, are apparent indications. In Meghalaya,
the emergence of a small but immensely rich class constituted by the
coal lobby as also an urban neo-rich class who largely derive their
economic clout from a systematic pilferage of public resources, increas-
ingly define the state’s political agenda. The “briefcase politics”43
that Kochanek referred to also exists where the “money bags” of
this amorphous class often gets converted into political influence.44
Meghalaya today is no stranger to the allegations of “selling” of pat-
ronage by elected representatives to their cronies and “buying” of votes
during elections. This is seen essentially as a forte of the Congress,
only because the regional parties often fail to match the selling and
buying capacity of the Congress. Such mercenary aims often take
away the political innocence attributed to the politics and political
actors of hill-tribal states.
Manipur
Manipur is currently being referred to as a “failed state” attributed to
the pervading crisis of governance. Elected governments are unable
370 Rajesh Dev
to secure citizens their democratic rights because of their increasing

powerlessness to counter the growing influence of non-state actors in
defining and structuring the social and political lives of the citizens.
The estheticization of violence is most acutely manifested in the society
and political culture of the state where an elected government and
40 insurgent groups45 compete for political legitimacy and social
control. Insurgent groups like the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
(KYKL) challenge the institutions and legitimacy of the state through
effective control of some of the basic services lawfully accorded to
the government.
In this contest, democratic institutions and structures decline,
resulting in the “loss of party base, rise of money, muscle power and
‘gun culture’.”46 There is a consequent rise in a personality cult girded
by corrupt networks of patronage. The ephemeral optimism engend-
ered by electoral democracy nurtured in a politics of provisional coal-
itions and political ambiguity has alienated the people along with the
debasement of all political values significant for democratic politics.
Manipur thus confronts what an author describes, as many prob-
lems “that could possibly appear in the discourse of [any] collective
conflict.”47 Yet, Manipur had been one of the princely states to have had
a constitutional monarchy obtained through universal adult franchise
after the British withdrawal from India.48 But contemporarily, it is not
the lessons derived from such a distinctive democratic experiment,
but rather the negative specter of identity politics and its splintering
effects on the idea of a cohesive political community that is challenging
a coherent democratic intent. With more than 32 ethnic groups and
subgroups maneuvering for self-rule or secession, electoral politics
are largely perceived as a tool for legitimizing the political control49
by a cohort of elites drawn from the diverse society. Yet this perception
about the depth of popular engagement in the democratic processes
may be challenged by a 77.16â•¯percent turnout in the recently con-
cluded parliamentary elections.
The two seats to the parliament are defined as Inner Manipur
constituency and Outer Manipur constituency. The former with
91â•¯percent of the state’s land area is predominantly inhabited by the
Naga and Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, while the valley with 65â•¯percent
of the total population of the state is inhabited predominantly by
the Meiteis, though a few valley constituencies are also included

in the Outer Manipur constituency.
At a macro level, it would seem that the broad divisions between
the hills and the valley primarily shape the political agenda and
discourse in the state. However, the internal fractures between the
tribes and the triangular contest for political space between the tribes
and the foremost ethnic group in the state, the Meiteis, define the
configuration of the political choices. The demand for a “greater
Nagalim” has also configured interethnic equations in the state, and
has also influenced the nature of electoral politics.
During the 2009 elections there was no “grand electoral theme
or issue.”50 The foremost issues that emerged included the repeal
of AFSPA, protecting the territorial integrity51 of Manipur, and
preventing vivisection of “Naga-dominated” districts in the hills. Yet,
the hollowness of the campaign issues is revealed by a commentator
while stating that when all candidates speak of repeal of AFSPA,
they conveniently forget that the Act is related to the Army, though
the maximum number of rights violations in counterinsurgency
operations is being committed by the state commandos.52 The vacuity
of the political discourse also becomes apparent in the absence of
any debate over substantive issues of livelihood and socioeconomic
development. Law and order and peace, debased governance and
corruption, substituted as the other cautious exploratory agendas for
the elections.
The defeat of the sitting Outer Manipur constituency MP Mani
Charenamai by the Congress nominee Thangso Baite is attributed
to the changing political dynamics influenced partially by a recon-
figuration in interethnic relations. Baite, polledâ•¯3,44,517 votes to
defeat the sitting MP, Mani Charenamei byâ•¯1,19,798 votes in this
Outer Manipur constituency. Outer Manipur constituency consists
of the Nagas, the Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, the Meiteis in the Valley
segment of the constituency, and some other minor tribes. Indeed,
the 32 tribes in the hill districts and their clan and tribe lineages often
form a significant source of political groupings, claims, and social
base of parties in this constituency. As one author states, in the hill
districts a “tight-rope-walk pleasing the civil societies and insurgent
organisations are of utmost importance”53 for candidates.
372 Rajesh Dev
It is in the interstices of these social fissures and intertribal

divides that voting patterns and political choices are defined, as what
happened during the 2009 elections. The changing ethnic equations
and kin linkages politicized by competition over development and
distribution of the resource pie became factors that defined voting
patterns, more than party loyalties. Every political party derived
benefits relative to their degree of divergence or convergence with
the dominant ethnic configurations and the voting pattern reflects a
sort of ethnic veto over issues and individuals who are suspected to
harm ethnic equations.
The unyielding competition among Naga groups for control of
the “Naga cause” has polarized the tribes constituting the Nagas and
has also deepened the suspicion and anxiety among the other tribes
in this constituency. As a consequence of this competition, there has
also been a split among the Naga insurgent groups. Therefore, the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM),
the Naga National Council (NNC), National Socialist Council
of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN-K), and other splinter groups
extended their political support to different candidates and their
version of support for the “Naga cause.” Despite an open campaign
for Charenamai by groups54 supporting the integration of the Naga
inhabited areas of Manipur, Charenamai failed to receive the back-
ing of NSCN-IM as he did in 2004. The split between the Naga
tribes was politically consolidated by sections of Naga intellectuals55
who canvassed against the Congress and provided support to the
BJP candidate.
There was also the alienation of a large section of cross-ethnic
voters who may have voted for Charenamai during the 2004 elections.
This alienation was buttressed in favor of the Congress candidate
significantly by the ceasefire agreement between Kuki insurgents
and the government. Charenamai and the People’s Democratic
Alliance (PDA) also proposed tribal land reforms in the hill districts
that produced a strong insecurity among the large number of tribal
groups initiating a polarization among the hill tribes. The Congress
candidate had the support of the Meiteis from the valley segment of
this constituency, as he is a member of a smaller tribe of the Kuki-chin
family and thus strategically more acceptable.
The Inner Manipur seat composed of 32 assembly segments is a

cosmopolitan and urban middle class constituency. Though ethnic
and kin loyalties have marginal influence on political outcomes
in this constituency, the issue of integration of Naga-contiguous
areas received its urban-based political opposition articulately from
this constituency. Thokchom Meinya, the sitting MP of the Congress
secured 230,876 votes to defeat his rival M. Nara of the CPI by a
margin of 30,960 votes in this constituency.
Therefore, it is the centrist ideological posturing and middle
class centric politics that led voters in this constituency toward the
Congress. Congress and its allies in the SPF government are also
politically dominant in most of the assembly segments in this consti-
tuency. Appeals for repeal of the AFSPA were made along with an
emphasis on the need to provide security for peace and development.
The promise to implement the 6th Pay Commission recommendations
is another contributory factor for Congress support from this middle
class constituency. Indeed, the enduring political fortitude of Congress
in Manipur may be attributed to its patronage by the middle class.
Regional parties like the MPP openly expressed their inability
to communicate with the people as a reason for their defeat, which
affirms the loss of social base by the oldest regional party among
the electorate. This lack of communication can be attributed to the
organizational weakness of the regional parties, as well as their inability
to cultivate patronage networks that the Congress so effectively has
in every state of the region. One of the most secular forms of such
patronage is revealingly apparent in the corrupt public life 56 and
culture of Manipur.
The domination of the Congress in the state and parliamentary
elections thus reflects the emasculated condition of the regional
parties. Like others states of the region, regional parties in the state are
struggling to retain their social bases. It seems that in a condition of
social and political chaos, patronage linkages forms the most affective
form of social and political survival. The shrinking social base and
political clout of the MPP that had formed the first government in
the state after the granting of statehood is one such clear example. The
MPP, the oldest regional party in the state, received only 7.6â•¯percent
of the votes polled with the PDA, receiving 16.78â•¯percent of the
374 Rajesh Dev
votes polled in the hill districts. By contrast, the Congress polled

42.96â•¯percent of the total votes polled in the state. Like all small
states, the relentless shifting of political loyalties by members of the
regional parties to the Congress, the splintering of the Congress into
“factional” regional parties and the violent social grid to a large extent
affects the quality of democracy in the state.
Mizoram
Peace is the dominant social and political idiom in the state that has
traversed from being the Lushai (Mizo) Hills District of Assam, to
a union territory, and then elevated to full statehood in 1987. As
violence delivers its spinoff advantages for states like Manipur, peace
too ensures its dividends. Thus, Mizoram was granted a peace pack-
age for being able to sustain its peace in a region girded by turmoil. In
the extreme corner of India’s map, Mizoram is bordered by Myanmar
on the east and the south, and by Bangladesh on the west.
An insight into the political history of Mizoram reveals that oppo-
sition to the institution of “feudal-chieftainships” resulted in the
mobilization of a nascent educated middle class into the “Mizo Union”
that asserted their pro-integrationist inclinations.57 The Chieftainships
were subsequently abolished in 1953.58 The Mizo Union is the political
platform that demanded the establishment of a District Council and
undertook political strategies to compel the government of Assam to
introduce it at the earliest. It subsequently splintered with one group
supporting the newly formed regional party—the Mizo National
Front (MNF)—in 1961 and the other splinter group “merged” with
the Congress in 1974.59
Conventional narratives view the Mizo insurgency largely as
the product of the Mautam,60 yet a closer attention to the political
dynamics of the time reveal that it essentially resulted from the com-
petition between the regional forces to embed their social base
and secure political dividends. It was certainly precipitated by the
famine. And as Chaube states, the “gains of the Mizo crisis went to
the Congress while the Mizo Union was the loser.”61 The “political
settlement” of the Mizo crisis also modified the nature of competition
in Mizoram and craftily expanded the political base of the Congress
and assisted it in utilizing “the ethnic and cultural differences among

the people for partisan purposes.”62
The Mizos are a part of the Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups and are com-
prised of several tribes like the Raltes, Lakhers, Paites, Luseis, Thado,
and others. There are other ethnic groups like the Kukis, Chakmas, and
Brus or Reangs in Mizoram. The dominant religion of the state is
Christianity with minority groups like Chakmas following Buddhism
and the Brus or Reang, Hinduism. The church has always played a
dominant role63 in influencing the political dynamics of the state.
Indeed, in the political tussle between the Mizo Union and the MNF
during mid-1960s, the church had sided with the Mizo Union64 and
declared opposition to the armed rebellion by the MNF.
The Mizo Presbyterian Church influences Mizoram’s social and
political life, routinely issuing strictures and implementation of the
“moral code of conduct” to be adhered to by candidates and electors.
There is an expression of disdain for the “Bihar, UP-type goondagiri”65
politics by members of NGOs supported by the church. The church
and members of the Young Mizo Association (YMA) enforce pol-
itical discipline among political parties and moderate political
debates through common political platforms. Restrictions on
political enthusiasm are so impressive that a former Chief Election
Commissioner of India quipped that this was the easiest state to
conduct elections.66 The extent and role of the church in influencing
actual “public policy-making” remains a grey area of conjecture.
The 2009 parliamentary election was held in the backdrop of the
political conditions created by the sweep of the Congress in the 2008
state assembly elections. The MNF which ran the state since 1998, lost
the state elections. Key issues that sealed the fate of the MNF were the
increasing corruption and misappropriation of central funds.67 The
strong anti-incumbency factor along with the popular perceptions of
misgovernance assisted the Congress. The shift in political allegiance
between parties in Mizoram, like other small states in the region, also
depends on the changes in the party-in-power at the center. Because
of their dependence on central assistance and patronage, many of
the small states that lack adequate resources of their own prefer to
be in a political alliance, however unsteady, with the party in power
at the center.
376 Rajesh Dev
Congress veteran C.L. Ruala won the elections securing 65.58â•¯per-

cent of the total votes polled. The main opposition party, the MNF,
candidate H. Lallungmuana was also supported by the Mizoram
People’s Conference (MPC). The other two candidates were from
the NCP, Lalawmpuia Chhangte and Rualpawla of a hardly known
state party called Israel National Front. The political opening provided
by the assembly elections and buttressed by the necessity for party
convergence at the state and the center is seen as factors favoring the
Congress. In Mizoram, a politically conscious but sedate electorate
appears to pursue a decadal cycle of political change whereby
political alternation is effected, especially in the state legislature. Also,
a change in party configuration of the state does influence the out-
come of the parliamentary elections.
Nagaland
The Naga people began their political tryst with institutional politics
through the boycott of the first general elections held in 1952. It was,
however, Phizo’s “election” to the presidency of the NNC by one vote68
that changed the direction of the Naga claim for self-determination.
An attempt to formally induct the Nagas into electoral politics was
made in 1957, but it was only with the inauguration of the state
of Nagaland in 1963 and the first elections to the Assembly that
democratic politics was institutionalized.
Some scholars argue that it was with the first successful elections in
Nagaland in 196469 that a gradual marginalization of forces opposed
to political integration with India became manifest. Yet, a complete
separation between the armed groups and the democratic actors has
been difficult to obtain. Therefore, it is the relationship between the
“legally constituted” political representatives elected by the people and
the “ideologically constituted” nonstate representatives of the armed
groups that sets the boundaries and norms for electoral engagement
and defines the nature of democratic politics in Nagaland.
It is this intimate association between apparent competitors that
has resulted in a caution about the democratic intentions of political
parties in the state. Thus, the then governor of Nagaland insisted
that Vizol of the UDF pledge his allegiance to the constitution of
India and his constitutional duty to uphold its territorial integrity.70

This suspicion is essentially acute for the state’s regional parties even
now. National parties like the Congress, playing by the same rules,
does not ironically evoke any such political suspicion. The political
ambiguity of political parties concerning the “Naga issue” is evidenced
in the fact that while some parties publicly pledge the “integration
of all contiguous Naga areas” others like the Congress innocuously
call for “Naga integration.”71 The political project of Nagalim72 in its
many avatars is thus a common guarantee by political parties seeking
to influence political choices in Nagaland.
Ironically while the Congress in Nagaland pledges itself to inte-
grating Nagas in the neighboring state, it concurrently pledges to
“safeguard the territorial integrity of Manipur.” Such efforts of the
Congress to maintain its “all-India” personality along with manifest-
ing the regional aspirations of constituent states weakens its political
credibility. It, however seems to offset this weakness through lever-
aging its control of the central government and local disbursement
of patronage.
It is the subtle, yet politically significant claim of “integration”
that has immense influence in defining the political choices of the
Nagas and political position of the parties. Surprisingly, in 2000,
the Congress party under S.C. Jamir attempted to question this in
a pamphlet, “Bedrock of Naga Society”73 and suffered consequences
in the 2003 Assembly elections. It succeeded in augmenting the
fractures among the Nagas further along tribal allegiances, thereby
“domesticating” the secessionist sting of insurgent groups. The
political price of such an attempt was paid by Congress during the
elections, when the electorate favored an incongruent set of political
formations to dominate the state assembly.
The shared space between the “armed” and “democratic” groups in
Naga politics allow both sets of actors to draw upon the resources of
each other. The “elected” representatives derive ideological legitimacy
from the underground elements by asserting that the present state and
its institutions are a stop-gap arrangement,74 pending a “final solution.”
The armed groups utilize their “lethal power” to influence political
outcomes by providing subtle assistance to their chosen political
formations as well as the structures of the state to embellish their
378 Rajesh Dev
moral and political legitimacy over the “Naga cause.” This apparent
fraternal bond, however, masks the nuanced competition that takes
place between the armed groups to expand their popular base and
control over the “Naga cause” and often reflected in the ambiguities
of Naga politics. Traditionally, the NSCN-K led by a Nemi Naga
and supported by the Aos and the Angamis, is perceived as having
influenced the prospects of “Jamir’s INC;”75 while the NSCN-IM
led by a Thankul and a Sema Naga from Manipur is opposed to
the Congress. The NPF76 is popularly perceived as being close to the
NSCN-IM, while the NSCN-K is seen as a political instrument of
“Jamir’s congress.”77
In Nagaland, the agenda for political discourse is thus broadly
patterned by the decades-old Naga claim for self-determination.
But the micro-foundations of this agenda are constituted by the
intertribal animosity and hostilities between the fluidly fused Naga
tribes.78 In Nagaland, like some other states constituting the region,
parties hardly ever serve as ideological “carriers” and often play a
marginal role in defining electoral outcomes and competing actors.
Tribal affiliations, tribal elders, and affiliation to armed groups play
crucial roles in deciding “who gets what, when, and how.” However,
in a modern Nagaland, it is also the three “Ms”—Money, Muscle,
and Madhu79 that are acquiring decisive influence in determining
political choices.
The social relevance and politicization of tribal affiliations is
demonstrable in the fact that both nonstate and state actors draw
upon these divisions for legitimacy and political sustenance. In a
sense, the formation of the NSCN-IM, NSCM-K or even the NNC
are all organized reflections of the entrenched intertribal splits and
contestations. Its political institutionalization has been achieved in
the structures of the state and democratic processes. The Ao tribe
are perceived to have dominance over the state bureaucracy, with the
Angamis, Semas, Chakhesangs, and Lothas being the other major
players in the political theatre of the state. A Naga commentator
observes that these divisions are so entrenched and influential that
government policies and political decisions are implemented only
by paying due consideration to the interests of the different Naga
tribes and effectively recognizing the different tribes as formal
political units.80
An assessment of the social profile of the candidates for state-level

elections to the assembly will establish the perception that the Semas
have a respectable edge over other tribes in the overall result tally
followed by the Aos, Angamis, Chakhesangs, and the others tribes.81
Open proclamation of support by tribes for their own candidates82
illustrates how tribal loyalties determine political choices. This neat
pattern, however, does not follow for the parliamentary elections where
intertribal coalition and party loyalties does influence voters’ choices,
primarily because the space for political maneuvers is restricted by
the number of seats in the parliament. Indeed the degree of empathy
shown by parties to the “Naga cause” also shapes the scale of their
support base. The NPF which had suggested that “statehood was not
the final solution to the Naga Problem”83 continued to politically
assert the distinctiveness of the “Naga cause” and act as a poised envoy
of the Nagas.
The election of C.M.Chang of the NPF in 2009, reflects the vary-
ing bases that motivate political choices to the state assembly and
the parliament. He defeated two-time Congress MP, K. Asungba
Sangtam by over 4 lakh votes, receiving 69.96â•¯percent share of the
votes polled; the Congress receiving only 29.36â•¯percent. The NPF
candidate won comprehensively in 53 assembly segments of the state.
NPF also won by-elections in four assembly constituencies along with
the parliamentary seat. Congress attempted to use the various forms of
available cleavages84 to influence voters’ choices, but it failed to obtain
any advantage due to other factors including its own organizational
weaknesses.
Observers85 attribute the NPF candidate’s win to a number of causes,
particularly the leadership vacuum within the Congress after the exit
of veteran S.C. Jamir from state politics. The disunity in the Congress
revived the competition for control by “factional leaders,” fragment-
ing its organization and alienating its traditional electoral base. The
NPF under Rio has been able to rework the power arrangements in
the state and cultivate a new politics of ethnic attrition and political
action by building a new coalition of ethnic forces under the nomen-
clature of “Eastern Nagas.”86 They comprise the Chang, Konyak,
Sangtam, Phom, Yimchinger, Khiamnuigan, and other tribes who are
spread way beyond the territorial limits of present Nagaland. It is this
380 Rajesh Dev
ethnic coalition that forms the new social base of the NPF and has
generously assisted the recent political outcomes of the NPF. They
constitute the political counter to the Ao, Angami, Lotha dominated
Congress support base, which is evidenced in the continuous election
of candidates87 from eastern Nagaland to parliament, since the forma-
tion of the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) government.
The presence of these tribes beyond Nagaland also allows the NPF
to provide a wider political base to the claim for the integration of
the Naga contiguous areas into a single Nagalim. The recent trans-
formation of the “Nagaland” Peoples Front (NPF) into the “Naga”
People’s Front and its interest to contest the state assembly elections
in Arunachal Pradesh with substantial Naga tribes bordering Nagaland
is evidence of the astute political move.
The areas comprising “Eastern Nagaland” have 20 representatives
to the Nagaland Assembly and form a substantial social base for the
state’s regional alliance. The emergence of Neiphiu Rio, the CM and
the chief architect of the NPF, as an unfeigned voice for the regional
forces in the state has eroded the two-decades of Congress dominance
in Nagaland. Rio bolstered by his dominance in the assembly since
2003, followed it with some progressive policies in education and other
social sectors ostensibly by sublimating the polarizing principles in
Naga politics. His nuanced ethnic approach to political action through
the creation of a Department of Underdeveloped Areas (DUDA)
for the “development” of the underdeveloped tribes and regions, not
only reinforces his “regional” loyalties, but also reconfigures ethnic
demography and its consequent politics in the state.
The policies and performance of the DAN government led by the
NPF has been perceived as improving the fortunes of all sections of
the people. Importantly, the NPF and the DAN are seen as being
more “pro-Naga” than its forerunners. The issue of the “integration
of Naga-dominated areas” of the region into a single territorial unit
has been the aspiration of Naga insurgents, which is provided political
legitimacy by the NPF. This has assisted in the growth of a social
coalition that provisionally integrates diverse Naga tribes especially
in the case of parliamentary elections. The collective consensus
resulting from such a coalition is reflected in the ability of the NPF to
obtain the confidence88 of the dominant Naga voices and Naga “civil
society” groups like the various tribal Naga Hohos (tribal councils),
the student groups, the church, and importantly the educated youth.
Yet, the impasse toward a “comprehensive solution” may have stressed
the extent of political choices available, thereby also limiting the space
for competitive politics.
Tripura
Tripura is what Yadav describes as the “Two-Plus”89 competitive format,
where the two main political formations—in this case the Congress
or the Left Front (CPM, CPI, and Forward Bloc)—had to align with
a third formation. Political competition in the state has often been
between the CPM-led Left front and the Congress which had pro-
visional alignments with regional parties like the Tripura Upajati Juba
Samity (TUJS), the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT)
or the Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT).90
The polarization of the society is reflected in the democratic and
also armed confrontation between social forces and political formations
representing the interests and claims of the tribes and non tribes. Ethnic
polarization in Tripura structures the dynamics of democratic politics
like elsewhere in the region. Its institutionalized form began in 1967
with the formation of the TUJS, which many would like to regard as
the tribal “wing”91 of the Congress. The Congress, organizationally
weak in the tribal belts of the region, had a traditional alignment with
tribal political formations like the TUJS or the INPT. Moreover, the
Congress like in other states of the region was earlier not “patronised
by the hill people.”92 Initially, Congress had been the preferred party
of “refugees,”93 while communists with rural bases94 were dominant
mostly among the tribes and Muslim minorities.95
In attempting to explain the political dependency of Congress
on tribal political formations, observers state that it may have been
difficult for Congress to retain its nontribal base and simultaneously
nurture a tribal constituency. Thus, it provided support for the
formation of a tribal front. Such a political relationship with a tribal
formation allowed it to also provisionally attempt the crafting of an
imperfect coalition of social forces in its favor. The later formation of
indigenous parties in Tripura manifested the inability of “national”
382 Rajesh Dev
parties like the Congress and the left parties to adequately articulate
the issues96 of the indigenous tribals. Yet none of these tribal political
formations like the TUJS, IPFT, and the INPT could affect any sig-
nificant polarization of tribal votes. Congress, in recent years, seems
to have expanded its base among the indigenous tribals of Tripura97
and closely trails the left parties.
Left parties drawing its political legacy from the Janamangal-
Janasiksha Samiti98 were supposed to traditionally have had a strong
organizational base in the tribal and rural areas. In a recent survey,99
the CPM is seen as having regained support among the tribal groups
that it had lost in the 1990s. This period also coincided with emer-
gence tribal insurgency often backed100 politically by the Congress
and the indigenous tribal parties. The link between armed nonstate
groups and democratic actors was institutionalized in 2000 when a
tribal insurgent group like the National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT) intimidated101 electors against the CPM during elections to
the Tribal Autonomous Councils.
Tribal political parties could not consolidate their political
power and entrench their support base due to a number of factors.
The decrease102 in their support was inversely proportionate to the
increase in support for armed ethnic insurgents since 1990s. Later
the intense rivalry between leaders after their democratic control of
the Autonomous Councils meant for tribal self-governance produced
a politics of attrition. The competition for control of the party and
the resource disbursing Councils, between over-ground political
actors and surrendered militant leaders, eroded any ideological
cohesion and political principles, and curtailed their political existence.
On the contrary tribal organizations of the CPM like the Tripura
Upajati Gana Mukti Parishad had greater organizational depth and
political control.
The ethnic geography of the state and the social bases of the
parties underwent continuous modifications since the mid-1960s
when armed tribal groups were allegedly used by the Congress103
to erode the CPM bases in tribal dominated areas. The increasing
politicization and militarization of indigenous claims and their
subsequent transformation into an armed insurgency apparently repre-
senting autochthons’ interests continue to format the social bases of
parties. This along with other social and political developments has
since altered the political dynamics and consequently reordered the
traditional bases of parties in the state. Congress has had a steady
political relationship with the indigenous parties despite the apparent
contesting political loyalties of their respective social bases. Moreover,
unlike other states of the region, in Tripura we can perceive a high
degree of party identification among the electorate and as such political
polarization is embedded.
CPM candidates won both parliamentary seats in 2009. Its candi-
dates, Khagen Das for Tripura west general constituency and Baju
Ban Riyan from the Tripura Scheduled Tribes (STs) reserved consti-
tuency, were re-elected securing almost two-third of the polled vote.
The former was elected for the third consecutive time. The latter won
it for the 7th term. Of the 15 times elections for the parliamentary
seats were held in the state the communists won the west Tripura
(unreserved) constituency eight times while it won the east Tripura
(tribal reserved) constituency 11 times.
The voting pattern of the constituencies reveals widespread support
for the CPM among a cross-section of the electorate along with an
increase in the support from tribal areas. The Congress comes a poor
second in all the areas despite being buoyed from the tribal parties
and its apparent support among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and
Other Backward Castes (OBCs).104 Even in the SC constituencies, the
CPM candidates secured a substantially higher share105 of the votes
cast despite a fall in its overall vote-share. The result does not indicate
any significant split in the votes despite the presence of a number
of other candidates. The contest remained a bipolar one between
the Congress and the CPM. In some constituencies the CPM was
ahead of its Congress rival by 10,000 votes. The BJP came third in
a number of constituencies and trailed the Congress in a number of
tribal dominated constituencies.
CPM controls 46 of the total 60 assembly constituencies con-
solidating its political dominance in the state through the 2009
parliamentary elections. This consolidation can be attributed to a
number of positive socioeconomic developments as also the broad
dominance of sub-state level institutions like the panchayats and the
Autonomous Councils by the CPM and its allies. The disenchantment
384 Rajesh Dev
with armed violent groups and its political hosts has widened the space
for democratic consensus.
The ability of the CPM to expand its dominance can be largely
credited to the unconcealed manifestation of factionalism in the state
Congress that undermined its role to become an effective opposition.
Indeed the Congress in Tripura had been pervasively confronted
with factional competition that limited its ability to obtain and retain
political power ever since the creation of the state. The formation
of the Krishak Samaj, or the Tripura Congress, or Tripura Rajya
Congress was all the product of inter-factional competition resulting
in an unreliable and wavering social base.
Arunachal Pradesh
There is a suggestion that the emergence of political parties is linked
to the level of political modernization. Such connect is demonstrated
in the fact that the Bardoloi subcommittee106 suggested the denial
of franchize to people in the area allegedly due to a lack of political
consciousness.107 Party politics was introduced in the state in an
oblique manner when two members were appointed to the Governor’s
Advisory Council in 1972. The people were represented in the Lok
Sabha and later the Rajya Sabha through a nominated representative
until 1977.108
The state has come a long way since its transition from a frontier
agency to a union territory and finally a state. Yet the lack of a dis-
ciplined party system, as in other states of the region, has affected the
degree of political contestation and effective expression of political
choices. The Congress has remained the dominant party often
contesting with its own factional splinters that make failed attempts
to develop into parties. The fracture, merger, and revival of parties in
the state have thus followed the rise and fall of political personalities.
It is these actors, rather than ideologies, that structures political
choices in the state. Political competition is made inadequate by the
role of these “personalities’” whose charisma, augmented through
patronage linkages, forms the political capital that determines
choices. Besides the perception that the electoral dynamics are deeply
influenced by the ruling administration and its role in electoral

outcomes, restricts the expansion of political competition.
The tenuous dimensions of political contestations in the state
during elections to the parliament in 2009 have been centered around
claims of autonomy109 by tribes in the Mon region and the Naga tribe
dominated Tirap and Changlang (patkai) region; politics over claims
by China over these regions and the “disputed” status of Arunachal
Pradesh. The growing divide between followers of Christianity and
indigenous religions along with issues of “development” like better
roads and communications also are important. Emerging social
polarization can be glimpsed from the emergence of the BJP as a pol-
itical force during the last few years. This possibly follows the grow-
ing divide between followers of indigenous religions and converts to
Christianity. Indeed the overwhelming support for the BJP among
the Adi tribe110 and also the Nyishi tribes is an indicative possibility
of such a polarization along which political contestation may be more
effectively structured in the future.
Identity claims by a number of tribal groups in the state is being
effectively politicized through democratic politics and the political
contestation of such claims could make democratic politics more
discordant. One such contestation is visible in the Changlang and
Tirap districts which are Naga-inhabited areas and are being claimed as
a part of “greater Nagalim.”111 Though primarily claimed by the armed
Naga groups, recent attempts by the NPF to represent these areas in
the Arunachal Assembly are an indication of its mainstreaming as a
broader electoral agenda. The issue of proper political recognition and
rehabilitation for the Chakma and Hajong refugees112 also continues as
a festering wound in the body politic. Yet as we have stated for other
states, such social fractures are inchoately manifested in the outcome
of parliamentary results where more macro-level issues assisted by
micro-level networks determine political choices.
In 2009 there were eight candidates for two seats to parliament,
although the contest was mainly restricted between the BJP, which was
attempting to retain the two seats, and the Congress. The endeavor by
minor political forces113 to constitute a broad non-Congress, non-BJP
coalition called the Arunachal Democratic Alliance (ADA) did not
provide much political depth as a potential alternative.
386 Rajesh Dev
For the western parliamentary constituency, the sitting BJP Mem-

ber, Kiren Rijiju, who had received the best parliamentarian award
during his last tenure, contested against the erstwhile student leader
and former minister, Takam Sanjay. Perceived by keen observers as a
“clear winner,” Rijiju lost the elections to Sanjay by only 1, 314 votes
receiving 48.6â•¯percent of the popular vote. A political leader this writer
spoke to revealed under conditions of anonymity that Rijiju is morally
still considered a winner as the elections were strongly influenced by
the “ruling administration.” Ironically, shifting loyalties influenced
by political opportunities is not only a habit among the electorate
but also party loyalists like Rijiju, who joined the Congress soon after
losing the elections.
The eastern Arunachal constituency that also comprises Tirap and
Changlang districts returned the Congress nominee Ninong Ering who
defeated the sitting BJP member Tapir Gao. The Arunachal Congress
(AC) candidate, supported by the ADA, Lowangcha Wanglat, was
essentially a Congress rebel who was nominated after being denied
the Congress ticket. His strong presence among the Naga tribes in the
Tirap and Changlang was established in the fact that he received
overwhelming support among them. In this constituency the biggest
factor was the role of the dominant Naga tribes and their political
contest with the Adis who identify strongly with the vision of a united
Arunachal Pradesh and oppose any vivisection of the state to fulfil
the demands of a greater Nagalim. The split in the Adi votes aided
the Congress as a substantial share of votes from the Naga tribes
went to Wanglat.
In Conclusion
We may conclude by stating that dominant democratic theories

view political competition as an ideal principle so very essential to
the consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, a perfect competitive
system—especially in sociopolitical contexts as those prevailing in
the northeast India—may not only be difficult to obtain but in the
short run seems counter-productive to democratic engagements.
The presence of various forms of embedded networks in the region

restricts the aggregation of individual political choices that are neces-
sary for democratic political outcomes in an ideal competitive political
milieu. In all the states, personalities, and their kin-affiliations are
politically more significant than ideologies and substantive issues.
Therefore, elections are increasingly being perceived as “entry-
points” to a lucrative patronage network rather than as instruments
to enhance political accountability through competitive engagement.
As substantiated in the case of Meghalaya, modern politics opens up
a new realm of power for actors of traditional institutions that assist
in their attempts to consolidate traditional power bases and broaden
clientelist networks.
Therefore the institutional architecture related to the politicized
embedded networks and loyalties results in a variety of ethnic
politics that manifest a messy democratic moment in the region.
Apparently such architecture has provided marginalized ethnic
groups an indigenous political voice and control over redistribution
of resources hitherto controlled by dominant ethnocultural groups.
But the institutional logic of such architecture has empowered only
specific groups and a very limited dispersal of resources. It has only
allowed some actors to capture state resources that allow them to
embed clientelist networks and construct political outcomes that
eventually favor their rent-seeking abilities. Such architecture thus
increased the political relevance of ethnic identity and introduced
political opportunities that make ethnic identity the basis for pol-
itical participation and making political choices in all the states we
have discussed in this chapter. It is apparent that ethnic nepotism and
patronage forms the core base of political support in the region.
Such patronage networks has paradoxically also assisted in the
incorporation of radical militant members and groups into the demo-
cratic political system by manifesting its political “opportunities.”
Democratic conciliation may thus seem to be moderately triumphing
over violent armed rebellions, because it accords “separatist” leaders
a new space for articulation and aggregation of their distinct political
interests. Yet the simultaneous presence and equally convincing
apology for armed groups and appreciation of institutionalized politics
388 Rajesh Dev
imperils effective party-competition and an institutionalized expres-

sion of political preferences and choices in the region. The antinomies
of these dual loyalties reflect the tenuous quality of democratic values
and processes in the region. This is visible in the politics of armed
movements and their sublimation through democratic engagement
in Mizoram and may soon be seen in Nagaland.
Moreover the democratic empowering of specific groups institution-
ally and politically fragments ethnic groups and limit the possibilities
for interethnic coalition building and political consensus. It has
provided an institutional means for the consolidation of political
power by recognized ethnic groups who attempt to politically mar-
ginalize other minor ethnic groups, thereby intensifying intra and
interethnic contestation that necessarily does not converse with
democratic norms. The recurrent instances of resistance by newer
ethnic groups suggest that there are limits to political access and par-
ticipation placed on minor ethnic groups. The pervading culture of
violence and attempts to redesign the contours of the body politic of
the region, which also results from a lack of confidence in democratic
institutions and governance, frustrates all possibilities of interethnic
negotiation through institutionalized democratic engagement.
Indeed the characteristic duality that some scholars observe in
working of Indian democracy where competitive mobilization of
insular identities precedes political coalitions by such social groups
are manifested in its unique ways in the region. For, on the one hand,
there is the lack of a procedural consensus for the resolution of inter-
ethnic disagreements through the political medium of competition
in the region. On the other hand, political competition seems to
have at least provisionally incorporated groups into a democratic
political process. Besides, a violent social grid is tempered by occa-
sional democratic diffusion and armed groups coexist with legitimate
democratic actors.
In all the states of the region, party politics also often plays second-
fiddle to various forms of “movement politics” that largely define the
structure and content of politics. Though it is currently being argued
that parties necessarily have no determining role in the consolidation
of democracy, a stable party system still remains an important process
through which a customary pattern of political interactions could be
institutionalized in enhancing the quality of democracy.
Notes
â•‡ 1. Christian Wagner, “Democracy and State in South Asia: Between Fragmentation
and Consolidation?” Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 6 (November–December 1999),
pp. 908–25.
â•‡ 2. Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 1.
â•‡ 3. See Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Ten Theses on State Politics in India,”
Seminar, Vol. 591 (November 2008), pp. 14–22.
â•‡ 4. Jonathan Spencer, Anthropology, Politics, and the State: Democracy and Violence
in South Asia (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 78.
â•‡ 5. Hasan, Parties and Party Politics in India, p. 1.
â•‡ 6. Sandeep Shastri, K.C. Suri, and Yogendra Yadav (eds), Electoral Politics in Indian
States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2009), p. 401.
â•‡ 7. Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu
Nationalism, and Popular Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. xxvi.
â•‡ 8. Such a view is expressed in the book by Andrew Wyatt and John Zavos (eds),
Decentring the Indian Nation (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass/ISBS,
2003), p. 2.
â•‡ 9. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in
the Indian States, 1952–2002: From Hegemony to Convergence,” in Peter
Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan (eds), India’s Political Parties (New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 2006).
10. Yadav and Palshikar, “Ten Theses on State Politics in India.”
11. Tejbir Singh, “The Problem,” Seminar, Vol. 591 (November 2008), pp. 12–13.
12. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in India,” p. 401.
13. Ashis Nandy, “The Culture of Indian Politics: A Stock Taking,” The Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (November 1970), pp. 57–79.
14. Jairam Ramesh, “Northeast India in a New Asia,” Seminar, Vol. 550, (June 2005).
15. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and
Citizenship (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 94.
16. Ramesh C. Thakur, “The Fate of India’s Parliamentary Democracy,” Pacific
Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), pp. 263–93.
17. “ULFA to Support Congress-I,” The Hindu (Chennai), September 11, 1999.
18. “Mohilary Paid us `â•›50 Lakh: NDFB,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), July 7, 2009.
Available online at: http://telegraphindia.com/1090707/jsp/northeast/story_
11202721.jsp
19. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States,”
p. 407.
20. See Rajesh Dev, “Institutional Designs and Ethnopolitical Conflict Transfor-
mation: Assessing Peace-building Initiatives in North-East India,” in Prasenjit
Biswas and C. Joshua Thomas (eds), Peace in India’s North-East: Meaning,
Metaphor, and Method (New Delhi: Regency Publications, 2006), pp. 189–207.
390 Rajesh Dev
21. Patrick Heller, “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India,”
World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2000), pp. 484–519.
22. The 1977 “Janata Wave”, for instance, had no impact on electoral outcomes
in the region. Similarly despite the above-average voter turnout in democratic,
the political integration of the region is being challenged by a large number of
armed groups.
23. Sanjib Baruah, “Assam: Confronting a failed partition,” Seminar, Vol. 591,
(November 2008), pp. 33–37.
24. Shastri, Suri, and Yadav, Electoral Politics in Indian States, p. 61.
25. The term is from Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, op. cit.
26. Yogendra Yadav, “Northeasts of India,” Indian Express, Available Online at:
www.indianexpress.com/news/northeasts-of-india/280367/ (last date of access:
March 5, 2008).
27. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States,
1952–2002”, p. 84.
28. See S.K. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India (Madras: Universities Press,
1985), p. 7.
29. Shastri, Suri, and Yadav, Electoral Politics in Indian States, p. 400.
30. Rajesh Dev, “Political Morality, Alliances, & Governance,” The Statesman
(Kolkata), March 10, 2008.
31. Patricia Mukhim, “Web of Runaway Politics,” The Telegraph (Kolkata),
April 6, 2009.
32. Kanchan Chandra, “The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The Decline
of Congress and the Rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur,” in The
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 26–61.
33. “Businessman-turned Politician Spells Out Priorities,” Shillong Times, April 1,
2009.
34. “Rev Basaiawmoit to Fight for Tribal Rights,” The Shillong Times, April 2, 2009.
35. For an indication of this trend see Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India.
36. Patricia Mukhim, “The Winner Takes it All,” The Shillong Times, May 22, 2009.
37. “Fight is between me and Purno: Deborah,” The Shillong Times, April 2, 2009.
38. Andrew W. Lyngdoh, “So, the Best Man and Woman are…,” The Shillong
Times, May 21, 2009.
39. Rajesh Dev, “D-Day for ‘DD’,” The Shillong Times, May 14, 2009.
40. Ian Marsh (ed.), Political Parties in Transition? (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006),
p. 116.
41. “Police Arrest Two Cong Supporters,” The Shillong Times, April 17, 2009.
42. “Business Man-turned Politician Spells Out Priorities,” The Shillong Times,
April 1, 2009.
43. Stanley A. Kochanek, “Briefcase Politics in India: The Congress Party and
the Business Elite,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 12 (December 1987),
pp. 1278–1301.
44. See “Another Probe into Shillong Jailbreak,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), July 24,
2009.
45. For information on terrorist insurgent groups in Manipur, see http://www.satp.

org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/index.html
46. Oinam Bhagat, “Electoral Politics in Manipur: A Study,” in Apurba Baruah and
Rajesh Dev (eds), Ethnic Identities and Democracy: Electoral Politics in Northeast
India (New Delhi: Regency Publications, 2006), p. 104.
47. Oinam Bhagat, “Patterns of Ethnic Conflict in the North-East: A Study on
Manipur,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 21 (May 24–30, 2003),
pp. 2031–37.
48. Bimol Akoijam, “How History Repeats Itself,” Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol. 36, No. 30 (July 28–August 3, 2001), pp. 2807–12.
49. This idea of elections as a “means of ensuring political control” is drawn from
B. Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982).
50. “AFSPA and the Elections,” Editorial, Imphal Free Press (Imphal) April 6, 2009.
51. “Integrity Icing in Brief Speech,” The Telegraph (Kolkata) April 3, 2009.
52. Chitra Ahanthem, “Sounds of Silence,” Imphal Free Press (Imphal) April 11,
2009.
53. Bhagat, “Electoral Politics in Manipur,” p. 125.
54. “Delhi Students Team Campaign for PDA Candidate at Tamenglong,” Imphal
Free Press (Imphal) April 11, 2009.
55. “Congress Creating Problems Everywhere, says Prof. Gangmumei,” Imphal Free
Press (Imphal) April 12, 2009.
56. See Noorul Hooda, “Rampant Insurgency in Manipur,” in People’s Democracy,
Vol. 33, No. 12 (March 29, 2009).
57. S.K. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India (Hyderabad: Orient Longman,
1999 reprint), pp. 176–77.
58. Chaube, “Electoral Politics in Northeast India,” p. 195.
59. Ibid., p. 197.
60. See Sajal Nag, Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Sub-nationalism
in North-East India (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), pp. 217–18.
61. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 182.
62. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 194.
63. “Pastor Politics,” Tehelka Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 46 (November 22, 2008).
65. “Why Mizoram is Lyngdoh’s Favourite State,” Available Online at: http://in.rediff.
com/election/2003/nov/14spec.htm (last date of access: November 14, 2003).
66. Ibid.
67. “Sonia Promises Corruption-free Government,” Available Online at: http://www.
morungexpress.com/regional/8738.html (last date of access: November 29, 2008).
69. Udayon Misra, The Periphery Strikes Back: Challenges to the Nation-State in Assam
and Nagaland (Shimla: IIAS, 2000), p. 46.
70. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 165.
71. Cited in Rajesh Dev, “Ethnic Self-determination and Electoral Politics in
Nagaland,” in Apurba K. Baruah and Rajesh Dev (eds), Ethnic Identities
392 Rajesh Dev
and Democracy: Electoral Politics in North East India (New Delhi: Regency
Publication, 2006), p. 77. Also see “Cong Chants Unity Mantra,” The Telegraph
(Kolkata), April 15, 2009.
72. Nagalim is an “imagined” state of Nagaland where Nagas settled in different
states and countries would settle in their own lebensraum.
73. Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee, “Bedrock of Naga Society,” (Kohima:
NPCC-I, 2000).
74. See “NPF Leaders Upbeat on Polls,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), February 5, 2003.
75. See “Legislators Warned to Keep Off,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), March 4, 2003.
76. It has since changed its name to Naga People’s Front, as a part of its political
strategy to extend its social base to neighboring states where Nagas reside. This
exacerbated the interethnic, inter-state conflicts in the region.
77. See Rajesh Dev, “Ethnic Self-determination and Electoral Politics in Nagaland,”
in A.K. Baruah and Rajesh Dev (eds), Ethnic Identities and Democracy: Electoral
Politics in North East India (New Delhi: Regency Publications, 2006), p. 88.
78. There are varied estimates about the number of tribes constituting the “Naga,”
though there is a standard consensus about 16 tribes.
79. Unlike the Mandir, Mandal, and Market, the three “Ms” have a different
significance in Nagaland. Madhu being Nagamese (a pidgin of Assamese and
Hindi) for liquor. See Samir K. Purkayastha, “Naga Candidates Dial M for
Votes,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), March 3, 2009.
80. Aselie Pusa, “Politics in Naga Society-The Inter-tribal Relations,” unpublished
Ph. D. thesis, Northeastern Hills University, 1996, p. 123.
81. See Dev, “Ethnic Self-determination and Electoral Politics in Nagaland,” p. 85.
82. “Chakhesang Community Declares Support,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima),
February 15, 2003.
83. See “NPF Leaders’ Upbeat On Polls,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), February 5, 2003.
84. For instance, Congress sought to influence voters in this Christian-dominated
state by terming the NPF as “anti-Christian” for aligning with the BJP as also
the anti-Christian conduct of the NPF candidate for being “polygamous.”
The Telegraph, April 15, 2009.
85. A large number of social commentators the author spoke to made almost similar
observations. The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of Apam Muivah
in facilitating these interactions.
86. “DUDA Created for Development: Rio,” The Nagaland Post (Kohima), June 8,
2009.
87. Also see Amongla N. Jamir, “Nagaland: Behind the Curtain,” Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 170.
88. For information on terrorist insurgent groups in Manipur, see http://www.satp.
org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/index.html
89. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States,”
p. 86.
90. N.C. Debbarma, a retired government official, recently revived the IPFT. He is
considered to be the influence behind all the political fronts of the indigenous
people.
â•‡ 91. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 181.

â•‡ 92. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 208.
â•‡ 94. Ibid.
â•‡ 95. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 173.
â•‡ 97. Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) Post Poll Data, 2009.
â•‡ 98. Ranjit Kumar De, Socio-political Movements in India (New Delhi: Mittal
Publications, 1998), p. 153.
â•‡ 99. CSDS Post Poll Data, 2009.
100. See Kalyan Chaudhuri, “A Verdict against Insurgency,” in Frontline, Vol. 19,
No. 6, (March 16–29), 2002.
101. Ibid. Also see “Militants Step Up Violence on Poll Eve in Tripura,” Available
Online at: www.nenanews.com, April 22–May 6, 2000.
102. Manas Paul and Rajesh, “Ethnic Groups, Electoral Politics, and Democratic
Consensus in Tripura,” in Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 15,
April 12, 2003.
103. See “A Verdict against Insurgency,” Chaudhuri.
104. CSDS Post Poll Data, 2009.
105. Preliminary detailed data released by the Tripura Election Department.
106. The Bardoloi Sub-committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly to
consider the administrative patterns for areas termed as North-East Frontier
Agency, comprising the Balipara and Tirap Frontier Tracts, the Abor and
Mishmi Hills Districts, together with the Naga Tribal Area. See. Chaube, Hill
Politics in Northeast India p. 188.
107. Ibid., p. 193.
108. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India p. 192.
109. See Special Correspondent, “Arunachal Districts Bordering China Press for
Autonomy,” The Hindu (Chennai), October 20, 2008.
110. There is a growing effort by religious organizations to provide an indigenous
religious identity, Doni Polo (the sun and the moon) an institutionalized
religious structure along the lines of the Hindu pantheon. The Adis are also
the most dominant tribe in the state.
111. The NSCN claims Tirap and Changlang districts as part of their greater Nagalim
project. For details, see http://www.angelfire.com/mo/Nagaland/Background.
html
112. Chakmas and Hajongs are denied their rightful place in Arunachal Pradesh.
For more details, see http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF42.htm
113. These marginal political players included the NCP, the People’s Party of
Arunachal Pradesh, the Arunachal Congress, the Janata Dal (U), the Lok Bharati
Party and the Lok Janashakti Party.
About the Editors and Contributors
Editors
Paul Wallace is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the

University of Missouri, Columbia. He has been a consultant on South
Asia to members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
US Attorney General’s Office, defense lawyers, and other agencies in
North America and has received five Smithsonian funded awards for
national election studies in India. In September 2003, Prof. Wallace
served as the expert witness on Sikh violence at the Air India trial
in Vancouver, Canada. He lectures throughout India, almost on an
annual basis. In January 2009, he served as a major participant in
celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Institute of Development
and Communications in Chandigarh, India. His research in India
also includes a Senior Fulbright Research Award, and funding from
the Ford Foundation, the American institute of Indian Studies, and
various government and non-government groups in India. Professor
Wallace is the author or editor of seven books and more than 40
book chapters and articles. His last book, with Ramashray Roy, was
India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives (2007). His
most notable chapter publication is “Counterterrorism in India:
Khalistan & Kashmir” in the 2007 book titled Democracy and
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. A forthcoming publication is
“Sikh Militancy and Non-violence,” in Pashaura Singh’s edited book
Sikhism in Global Context.
Ramashray Roy is a founding member and former director (1976–82)

of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi.
He has recently served as a visiting Fellow at the G.B. Pant Institute
of Social Sciences, Allahabad. During a long and distinguished career,
Professor Roy has taught at several prestigious universities including
the University of Texas, Austin; the University of California at both
Los Angeles and Berkeley; and the University of Missouri, Columbia.

A recipient of Woodrow Wilson and Ford Foundation Fellowships,
Professor Roy has also been a National Professor of the University
Grants Commission (UGC) in 1987 and a National Fellow of the
Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) from 1994 to
1996. His areas of interest include political parties, bureaucracy,
electoral behavior, Indian politics, development, Gandhian thought,
and political philosophy. His most recent of over 20 books is
Democracy in India: Form and Substance (2005).
Contributors
Amiya K. Chaudhuri taught political science in Calcutta and

Vidyasagar before his present position as a Fellow in Maulana Azad
Institute of Asian Studies, Ministry of Culture, Government of India,
Kolkata. His latest publication is Contemporary Politics and Changing
Economy of Bihar (2010). In addition, he has authored several books,
book chapters, and more than two-dozen journal articles. He continues
to add to his total of more than 200 newspaper articles.
Rainuka Dagar is Director (Research), Gender Studies Unit, at the

Institute for Development and Communication (IDC). Her work
focuses on two separate research fields—gender and justice, and demo-
cratic governance. In the domain of gender, her engagement is with the
study of the politics of gender constructs, gender positioning in multi-
cultural societies, and gender in conflict dynamics with an application
of culturally sensitive methodologies. Her recent publications include
Rethinking Female Foeticide: Perspective and Issues (2007) and Mapping
Criminal Justice Delivery in India (2009), which is co-authored.
Jyotirindra Dasgupta is Professor Emeritus of Political Science

at the University of California, Berkeley. His work has focused
on development politics, language planning, ethnic mobilization,
and socioeconomic development in India and in comparative
perspective. His publications include Language Conflict and National
Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India

(1968) and Authority, Priority, and Human Development (1981).
Recent publications deal with different aspects of multicultural
democratization and federal development processes.
Rajesh Dev is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Delhi University.

Prior to this, he was a faculty member in the Department of Political
Science at Women’s College, Shillong, and visiting faculty in Political
Science in the Department of Law, North Eastern Hill University,
Shillong. His research interests are in areas of political ethnography,
identity politics and democratic discourse, and human rights. His
co-edited books include Ethnonarratives, Identity and Experience in
Northeast India and Ethnic Identities and Democracy (2006). He has also
authored numerous articles and chapters. He serves as Executive
Secretary of argueIndia, a research group based in Shillong.
Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur is former Professor of Social

Sciences and a Deputy Director of Tata Institute of Social Sciences
(TISS), Mumbai. His work includes Reactions to the Reservations for
Other Backward Classes: A Comparative Study of Four States, Vol. 4
(1980). He has co-authored with three colleagues, Factors Contributing
to the Bombay Riots and Violence, 1992–93, published in 1995.
Christophe Jaffrelot has been Director of CERI (Centre d’Etudes et

de Recherches Internationales) at Sciences Po (Paris) between 2000
and 2008. He is Research Director at the CNRS (Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique) and teaches South Asian politics and
history at Sciences Po. His most significant publications are The Hindu
Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s (1996),
India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India
(2003), and Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting
Caste (2005). He has also edited Pakistan: Nationalism Without a
Nation? (2002) and co-edited with P. Van der Veer, Patterns of Middle
Class Consumption in China and India (2008); with S. Kumar, Rise
of the Plebeians? The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies
(2009), and with L. Gayer, Militias of South Asia (2010).
G. Gopa Kumar is Head of the Department of Political Science and

Dean of Social Sciences, University of Kerala, and Director General
of the Institute of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Kerala. He
served as the Kerala State Coordinator for the CSDS election studies
during 1996–2008. He has authored seven books and over 120 research
articles. His awards include a Fulbright, Indo-Shastri, Indo-French
Cultural Exchange, and Australia–India Council. He also served as
Visiting Professor in the USA and Canada. His major publications
include Congress Party and State Politics (1984), Regional Parties
and State Politics (1986), and Future of Parliamentary Democracy in
India (2007).
Pramod Kumar is Director, Institute for Development and Com-

munication (IDC), Chandigarh and Chair, Punjab Governance
Reforms Commission (PGRC). His work focuses on three interrelated
themes of politics of development, violence, and governance; politics
of conflict management; and resolution and practice of democracy
through empirical methodologies and analysis of public policy
and peoples movements. He is a recipient of the prestigious Homi
Bhabha Award for the year 1988–90 for his work on ‘Causation and
Forms of Ethnic Conflicts and Interâ•‚ethnic Coâ•‚operation in India’.
His publications are Polluting Sacred Faith; Punjab Crisis: Context
and Trends; Victims of Militancy in Punjab (co-authored); Towards
Understanding Communalism (edited); and Mapping Criminal Justice
Delivery in India (co-authored).
Binoy Shanker Prasad holds a PhD in political science from the

University of Missouri-Columbia, USA. A former Fulbright scholar,
his teaching and research career extends from Delhi University,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Mithila University in India to
Centennial College and Ryerson University in Canada. He has been
an analyst of the politics of Bihar, his native state, for 30 years. His
recent book is Violence Against Minorities: Riots and the State in the
United States and India (2010).
Maneesha Roy is a faculty member in the Department of Political

Science at Sri Guru Nanak Dev Khalsa College, Delhi University.
She has completed her PhD, MPhil, and MA degrees from Delhi
University. She is a recipient of the ICSSR Doctoral Fellowship in
2002 and UGC’s Junior Research Fellowship in 1999. Her research
interests include Indian politics, particularly religious and caste
mobilization and electoral politics in India. She has authored several
articles and a number of chapters.
Ghanshyam Shah, retired professor from JNU, is at present

National Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. He
has authored more than 12 books in the field of political science and
sociology, that includes Social Movements in India (2004), Caste and
Democratic Politics in India (2004), and Dalit Identity and Politics
(2001). At present, he is working on “Globalisation, Civil Society
and Governance.”
Bhawani Singh retired as Professor and Head of the Department of

Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. He has written ten
books including Confessional Terror: The Dateline to Death (2007),
co-authored with Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat, Mizoram: The Politics
of Tribal Homeland (2009), and Nagaland: The Politics of Alternate
Discourse (2009). In addition to this, he has also edited 10 books.
Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat is Associate Professor at Humanities

and Social Sciences Department in Malaviya National Institute of
Technology Jaipur. He is MA, MPhil, and PhD (Political Science),
MA (Sociology), and also holds a MBA degree. He has contributed
a dozen articles and has written seven books including: Supreme
Court and Judicial Independence (1996), Confessional Terror: The
Dateline to Death (2007), and Shri Lanka: The Politics of Tamil Eelam,
co-authored with Bhawani Singh (2009).
Karli Srinivasulu is Professor of Political Science at Osmania

University, Hyderabad, India. He has been Visiting Fellow at
University of Oxford and Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of
Social Science Research (ICSSR). His interests include political theory,
agrarian and Dalit movements, and public policy. He is presently
doing a research on the Politics of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
and State and Business relations in India. His forthcoming book

is Karamchedu, Chunduru and Beyond Dalit Movement in Andhra
Pradesh. He authored the chapters on Andhra Pradesh for the
Wallace–Roy volumes on the 1999 and 2004 elections.
Praveen Krishna Swami is Associate Editor of The Hindu, and is

based in New Delhi. He reports on security and intelligence issues.
Index
Advani, L. K., 14, 34, 123, 167, 169, All India Forward Bloc, 4–5, 7
174, 182–187, 228, 231, 260, 283 All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen,
AHIND, 274, 284 4–5
Ahmad, Dr Shakeel, 318, 319 All India Trinamool Congress, 4–5
Akali Dal, 11, 33, 48, 51, 61n 19, Ambani, Anil, 169
83–84, 99–100, 124 Anand, Lovely, 324
Akhrani, Maqbool, 342 Andhra Pradesh
Akhtar, Shamim, 325 2009 assembly elections, regional
alliance formation break-up, 297
background, 23–26 BJP status, 289
birth of UPA, 35–36 caste identity, 306
Chandrashekhar-led government, changing party structure in,
31 301–305
compulsions of, 29 civil society organizations, 305
Congress prominence, 30 Congress government, 290
considerations and prospects, 29 Congress performance in 2009
Deve Gowda-led government, 31 elections, 286
difficulty, complexity, uncertainty, Congress-TSR alliance, 288, 303
and unpredictability factors, CPI(M) status, 289
27–28 Development of Women and
Gujral-led government, 31 Children in Rural Areas
and multiple bipolarities, 27 (DWCRA) program, 297
NDA-led, 32–33 election promises and mobilization
and process of economic development, strategies, 291–294
30 electoral alliances, 287–290, 298
reasons, 21–22, 26 Kamma community, 300, 304–305
state-based political parties, role of, Madiga–Mala caste lines, 300
28–29 Muslim electoral behavior, 300
Third Front, 38 Naidu regime’s, 297–298, 299, 303
Vajpayee-led government, 31–32 PRP’s leadership, 290, 291,
V.P. Singh-led National Front, 293–295, 304
30–31 Reddy community, 304
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra shifting of social support base of
Kazhagam, 4–5 parties, 297–301
All India Congress Committee (AICC), social configuration and electoral
36 outcome, 294–297
All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam status of Hyderabad city, 288
(AIDMK), 11, 32 TDP-led alliance, 289, 297
Index 401
TDP regime, 289, 305 in Punjab, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh,

TDP’s election strategy, 291, 294, and Maharashtra, 143
295, 299, 300 reason for setback, 150–153
Telangana issue, 288, 292, 295 by State in 2009/2004, 144
welfare schemes implemented by strategy initiated by Kanshi Ram,
Congress government, 290, 144–152
292, 302, 303 transferable vote bank and this “plus
YSR’s padayatra, 289 vote,” 145
YSR’s regime, 301, 302, 304, 306 in UP, 142
Ansari, Vice President Mohammad and upper caste conventions, 147
Hamid, 10 in Uttarakhand and Haryana, 143
anti-Congressism, 43 in Vidarbha and Marathwada, 143
Armed Forces Special Powers Act vote percentage in seven general
(AFSPA), 362, 371 elections, 143
Arunachal Democratic Alliance (ADA), votes polled by the candidates,
385 141–142
Arunachal Pradesh, 384–386 voting Pattern by class, 158
Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), 4–5, 34 voting Pattern by locality, 157
Assam United Democratic Front voting Pattern of UP castes and
(AUDF), 4–5, 364 communities, 145, 149–150,
Azad, Ghulam Nabi, 339 157
Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi, 4, 6
Babri Masjid demolition, 300 Bairwa, Khilari Lal, 226
Bachchan, Amitabh, 258 Baitha, Kailash, 312
Backward and Minority Communities Bandyapadhyay, D., 195
Employees’ Federation (BAMCEF), Banerjee, Mamata, 17, 116, 194–195,
144 208, 209, 218, 320
Badal, Parkash Singh, 51, 115, 124 Bantala incident, 195
Badal, Sukhbir Singh, 115 Bardhan, A.P., 277
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 4–5, 11 Basaveshwara, 272
and anti-incumbency factor in UP, Bashir-ud-Din, Maulvi Mohammad,
151 343
in Bihar, 321 Basu, Biman, 205
as a Dalit party, 152–156 Basu, Jyoti, 196
introduction of reservations on an Batla House encounter, 149
economic basis, 146–147 Bhagora, Mahavir, 226
Kerala, 237 Bharati, Swami Dinesh, 343
2009 Lok Sabha elections, 140–144 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 4–5,
and Mayawati’s strategy, 145–148 10, 31
and Muslim community, 148–149 Akali-BJP government, 51
national campaign, 148 Andhra Pradesh, 289
performance, 151 BJP’ recommendations, 2009
progress in elections, 141 elections, 50
BJP-SS alliance, Maharashtra, 252, seat sharing, 314–315

258–259, 263–264 UPA momentum, 316
decline of, reasons, 33–34 UPA split in Sitamarhi and
federal structure, of Indian politics, Madhubani, 319
107 waning political stardom of Lalu
Gujarat Assembly Elections (1990– Yadav, 318
2007), 168 wives as proxy candidates, 324–325
Gujarat Lok Sabha Elections (1991– Yadavs community, 312
2009), 167, 169 Biju Janata Dal, 4–5
JD(S)-BJP, Karnataka, 275 Biju Janata Dal (BJD), 11
JD(U)-BJP alliance, Bihar, 312–313, Bishnoi, Jaswant, 226
317 BJD, 33
Karnataka, 274, 276 Bodoland Peoples Front, 4, 6
Kerala, 236, 239 Bodoland People’s Progressive Front
Rajasthan, 218, 230–233 (BPPF), 364
vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 Bulla, Sabina, 340
vs Congress, 2009 election, 34–35
vs Congress Party, 2009 election, Chand, Nihal, 226
34–35 Chandy, Oommen, 235
Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU), 153 Chang, C.M., 379
Bihar politics Chaudhary, Shruti, 132
BSP, 321 Chaudhry, Shruti, 115
caste-wise, 315–316 Chavan, Ashok, 257, 260
Communist parties, 320–321 Chennithala, Ramesh, 235
criminal history, 322–323 Choubey, Lal Muni, 319
Dalits vs Chamars, 328 Choudhary, Harish, 225
election process, 331–332 Communist Party Marxist (CPM), 4–5,
JD(U)–BJP alliance, 312–313, 317 10. See also LF government, of West
JD(U)–sponsored tainted characters, Bengal
323 Andhra Pradesh, 288
Kurmis community, 312 CPI-CPI (M) rift, Kerala, 247–248
Lalu–Rabri regime, 322, 325–326 Kerala, 241–244
Mahadalit Commission, 328 losses in elections, 17
Maoists (Naxalite), 320–321 PDP-CPI(M) alliance, Kerala, 243,
mobilization of EBCs, 327 245–246
Muslim vote bank, 328–329 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14
NDA victory, 316 Communist Party of India (CPI), 4–5.
Nitish Kumar’s strategy, 325–329 See also LF government, of West
people’s perception and voting Bengal
behaviour, 330–331 in Northeast, 363–364
Rajputs, 319 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14
RJD–LJP alliance, 313–315, Community Development Programme
317–318 (CDP), 46
RJD’s electioneering, 319 Congress Party, 3
Index 403
Andhra Pradesh, 286, 290 differentiated relationship between

Congress-NCP alliance, Maharashtra constituents and representative,
politics, 252, 261–264 73–78
Congress-PDP alliance, Jammu and gifts of, 78–80
Kashmir, 338 importance of a plurality of voices,
Congress-TSR alliance, Andhra 74–75
Pradesh, 288, 303 inter-regional collaboration, 69
election manifesto, 44–46, 49, 56 literary projects promoting regional
federal structure, of Indian politics, language, 68
107 patterns of regional identification,
Gujarat Assembly Elections 67–68
(1990–2007), 168 pre-independence legacy of contested
Gujarat Lok Sabha Elections public space, 72
(1991–2009), 167 regional associations of Indian
Kerala politics, 235, 239 National Congress, 69–70
Manipur, 373–374 regional chauvinism, 70
in Meghalaya, 365–366, 368–369 regional cultural communities,
in Nagaland, 377 66–67
NC-Congress alliance, Jammu and regional histories, 68
Kashmir, 337 regional norm of national unity, 73
in Northeast, 363–364 regions in South Asian history, 68
prominence in alliance formation, relational view of a region, 71–73
30 Sikh religious identity, 83–84
Rajasthan, 220–221, 226, 232 Devi, Ashwamedh, 315
vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 Devi, Veena, 315, 324
vs Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 2009 Dirks, Nicholas, 59
election, 34–35 Domestic Violence Act, 119, 123
vs Modi, Narendra, 183 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 4–5
welfare schemes in Andhra Pradesh, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK),
290, 292, 302–303 11
Duverger, Maurice, 21–22
Dagar, Rainuka, 12 Duverger-Riker hypothesis, 100–101
Dakshina Kazhagam (DK), 82
Das, Khagen, 383 Farooq, Mirwaiz Umer, 335, 339
Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, 12 Fatmi, M.A.A., 314, 318, 325
Democratic Alliance of Nagaland federalism, 11–12
(DAN), 380 federal structure, of Indian politics
democratic public space, political architecture, 97–98
processing in background, 95–97
case of Andhra state, 75–80 BJP vs Congress, 107
case of Kannada area, 67–68 and coalition government, 100–107
centripetal sentiments, 80–85 Duverger-Riker hypothesis,
cultural affinity, 71 100–101
first two decades, post-independence, elected candidates, 1957–2009,

98–99 112–113
J.P. movement, 102 elite women leadership, 129
judicial behavior, 106 emerging issues, 124–125
multiple bipolarity, 103 female leadership’s as a leverage in
one-party dominant system, 101 identity politics, 127–129
political cleavages, 103 incidence of maligning of female
principle of collective responsibility, character, 116–117
105 leadership potential of women, 114
Rajiv Gandhi government, 102–103 media role, 117
Rajya Sabha, 105–106 at the micro level, 130–133
regional demands, 99–100 perceptions of women issues raised
in relation to non-Congress states, by political parties, 123–124
102–103 in political decision-making,
and state electoral processes, 129–133
103–104 and political lineage, 115
trend of, 107 Scindia royalty of Gwalior, 115
UPA-II, 2009 elections, 105 selection of women candidature,
Fernandes, George, 312 115
Forward Bloc (FB), 194 wifehood qualification, 1927, 114
Fourth Front, 5 win-ability of women candidates,
127
Gandhi, Gopal Krishna, 208 women as candidates, 1996 elections,
Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira, 47, 114
102 women as candidates, state-wise,
Gandhi, Rahul, 9–10, 314, 316 114–115
Gandhi, Rajiv, 3, 102 women as potential leaders and
Gandhi, Sanjay, 149 candidates, 2009, 114
Gandhi, Sonia, 3, 10, 22, 132, 314, women candidates’ and avenue of
316 selection, 116
Gandhi, Varun, 149, 325 women’s electoral performance,
Gao, Tapir, 386 110–111
Garibi Hatao slogan, 46 women’s empowerment as an
Geelani, Syed Ali Shah, 338 imperative for inclusive
Gehlot, Ashok, 17, 217, 232 development, 117–123
gender discourse, in Indian electoral women’s reservation in Parliament,
politics 128–129
access and inclusion of women in George, Francis, 241
executive and legislative office, Godhra carnage, 34, 184, 230
125–127 Godhra carnage, 2002, 33
breakdown of voters, 1957–2009, Gowda, Chandre, 276
112–113 Gowda, Deve, 31, 272–275, 277–78,
contesting candidates, 1957–2009, 281–84
112–113 Gowda, Shivrame, 276
Index 405
Gudha, Rajendra Singh, 222 Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura

Gujarat and 2009 Lok Sabha election (INPT), 381
BJP and Congress votes in Assembly Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura
Elections (1990–2007), 168 (IPFT), 381
BJP and Congress votes in Lok Sabha Indo-American Nuclear Treaty, 36
Elections (1991–2009), 167 institutional leadership, 2009 elections,
BJP voters, 169 10
development and governance,
178–181 Jain, Pusp, 226
election strategies, 181–184 Jaitley, Arun, 218, 231
Gujarat civil society, 171–174 Jamir, S.C., 379
Gujarati asmita, 174–176 Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008
Modi, Narendra, 167, 169–171 and 2009
people’s perception of Modi’s All Party Hurriyat Conference
regime, 184–187 (APHC), 340, 343, 350
people’s perception of UPA’s Congress–PDP alliance, 338
performance, 186–188 Geelani’s position, 338–339, 341
preference of 2009 Voters for Prime Hilal War, 341
Minister, 187 Hindu-chauvinist groups, 339
Rath Yatra, 167 Hindutva movement, 341–342
social engineering formula, 176–177 Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis, 342
vote by class, 188 and jihadist violence, 340
Gujarat Export Corporation Ltd, 178 J&K’s Islamic character, 340–341
Gujaratna Gauravvanta, 185 Kashmiri secessionism, 349–351
Gupta, Akhilesh Das, 116 Kashmir secularization culture, 340
2008 Legislative Assembly,
Hargovind Pant vs. Raghukul Tilak & 343–349
Others, 106 NC–Congress alliance, 337
Haryana Janahit Party, 5 oppositional dualities of Hindus and
Haryana Janhit Congress (BL), 4 Muslims, 338–339
Hill State People’s Democratic Party Pakistan-administered Kashmir,
(HSPDP), 366 339–340
Hindutva, 34 Saeed’s coalition partners, 337–338
Hola Mohalla festival, 51 Saeed’s PDP, 339
Shopian incident, 350
Independent, 4, 6 Shrine war, 337–343
Index of Opposition Unity (IOU), Tabinda Gani incident, 341
201 Tehreek-i-Hurriyat, 343, 350
Indian National Congress, 4–5 voter participation, 336
Indian National Lok Dal, 5 Jammu & Kashmir National Conference,
Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), 33 4–5
“India Shining,” 32 Janata Dal (Secular), 4–5
India Today, 10 Janata Dal (United), 4–5
Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), 11 Kaur, Harsimrat, 115

Janhit Congress Party, 6 Kerala Congress (M), 4–5
Jat, Narain Singh, 221 Kerala politics
Jayalalitha, 32, 115 alliances and parties on the eve of
Jayalalitha, 11 2009 elections, 238
Jha, Raghunath, 314, 318 anti-incumbency element, 243
Jhakhad, Badri Ram, 226 bi-polar politics, 237
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), BSP, 237
4–5, 33 Christian wave against LDF,
Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik), 246–247
4, 6 Congress (I), issues with, 235
Jiban O Jibika Raksha Committee, Congress (I), victory in 2009
209 elections, 239
Joshi, C.P., 221 CPI, 241–242
Joshi, Mahesh, 226 CPI–CPI (M) rift, 247–248
Joshi, Murli Manohar, 231 CPI(M), 241
Jungle Raj, 322 CPI(M)-led LDF, 242–244
issue of disunity in LDF, 248–249
JD(S), 248–249
Kalla, B. D., 221
KC(J), 241, 247
Kandhamal riot, 33
Kerala Congress (Mani), 235, 237,
Karat, CPI(M) General Secretary
240–241
Prakash, 245, 277
Manjeri seat, 236, 246
Karnataka politics
Muslim League, 235–237
assembly by-election, 2009,
national poll trends, 234
276–277
NDA’s Moovattupuzha seat, 236
assembly elections of 2004,
non coalition view on voter’s party
273–274
preferences, 248
BJP government, 275
PDP–CPI(M) alliance, 243,
BJP’s ticket allocation, 277 245–246
coalition government of JD(S)– performance of BJP, 236, 239
BJP, 2006, 275 Ponnani seat, 247
dominance of Vokkaligas, 271 problem related to policy on self-
2009 election issues, 278 financing of education sector,
Lingayat community, 272, 246–247
280–282 seat bargaining, 235
Lok Sabha Elections (2004 and SNC Lavalin controversy, 243, 245,
2009), 279 251n6
regional turmoil in coastal districts, ticket splitting process, 242
276 UDF advantages, 235–236
socio-political forces, 270–273 UDF allies in 2009 elections, 240
Third Front, 277 vote share of major parties, 240
Urs, Devaraj, 271 V.S. Achutanandan government,
Kataria, Lal Chand, 226 243–245
Index 407
Wayanad constituency, 238–239 panchayat elections, 2008, 202–203

Keshvananda Bharti vs. Union of India, panchayat system, 195, 201
107 2009 parliamentary election,
Khandela, Mahadev Singh, 226 198–200, 203–204, 206–209
Kharge, 278 Singur (Hooghly) land acquisition
Khasi and Jaintia Hill-based regional incident, 196
parties, 367 supremacy of, 193
Kriplani, Srichand, 226 and UPA coalition government,
Krishi Bachao, 209 193
Krishna, S. M., 271, 278 vs TMC, 201–202, 205, 209
Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups, 375 Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), 5, 37
Ku Klux Klan, 219 Lok Sabha Party results, 2009, 4
Kulkarni, Sudheendra, 258
Kumar, Ananth, 276 Madhubani, 314
Kumar, Meira, 10, 313–314, 318 Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS),
Kumar, MP Veerendra, 249 57
Kumar, Nikhil, 314 Maharashtra politics
Kumar, Nitish, 11, 316 backward caste politics, 260–261
Kumar, Pramod, 12 BJP–SS alliance, 252, 258–259,
Kumaraswamy, 274–275 263–264
Kumari, Chandresh, 228 Congress–NCP alliance, 252,
Kurup, Suresh, 240 261–264
Kyndiah, P. R., 366 2009 election results, 261–264
formation of MNS, 257–258
at micro level, 259
Laakso-Taagepera Index (N), 43
MNS victory in 2009 election, 262
Lallungmuana, H., 376
Mumbai, growth of, 259
LF government, of West Bengal,
Pawar politics, 259–260
192–197
seats contested and won by regions
atrocities during, 194–195
in 2009 election, 263
attacks on Ms Banerjee, 195
socio-political forces in, 253–257
behavior of police officers, 196
stir against north Indians, 258
in 2010 by-elections, 192
Third Front, 260
caste and communal distinctions,
Mahaseth, Samir Kumar, 319
193–194 Maheshwari, Kiran, 226, 229
challenges with civil society groups, Majlis Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (MIM),
203, 209 295
dual strategy of, 192–193 Mandal Commission, 31, 56
2004 election, 197 Mani, Jose K., 240
2009 election, 206–209 Manipur, 369–374
electoral challenges, 197–206 Baite, Thangso, 371
“genocide”at Nandigram, 208 Charenamei, Mani, 371–372
human development, 202 domination of the Congress,
land grabbing frauds, 196, 205–206 373–374
Inner Manipur seat, 373 conquering of civil society,

Jaintia Hills District Council, 369 171–174
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), construction of Narmada Dam,
370 179–180
Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, 371 election strategy, 181–184
Meinya, Thokchom, 373 on Gaurva Day, 174
Meiteis, 371 growth strategy, 178
Naga and Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, Gujarat Export Corporation Ltd,
370–371 178
Naga insurgent groups, 372 Gujarat Gaurva (honor) yatra, 174
People’s Democratic Alliance (PDA), Gujarati asmita, 174–176
372 on Gujarati society, 176
Manipur People’s Party (MPP), 364 Gujarat State Petrochemical (GSPC),
Manjhi, Ramjee, 315 180
Manumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Gujarat under, 180–181
Kazhagam (MDMK), 4–5, 33, 36 as Hindu Hriday Samrat, 172
Marak, Deborah, 367 on Islam and Christianity, 172
Maudani, Abdul Nasser, 234, 237, 240, Jyotigram Scheme, 179
244–247 mission, 169–171
Mayawati, 10, 56, 117, 222, 321 “no-nonsense” attitude, 173
Meena, Kirori Lal, 222, 225, 229 people’s perception of Modi’s
Meena, Murari Lal, 222 regime, 184–187
Meena, Raghuveer Singh, 226 post Godhara carnage, 184
Meena, Ramesh, 222 preference for, 169
Meena, Ramkesh, 222 as a protégé of Advani, 167, 169
Meghalaya, 364–369 regularization of power supply, 179
Meghalaya Progressive Alliance (MPA), RSS Shakha culture, 170
367 slogans, 174–175
Meghwal, Arjun Ram, 226 social engineering formula,
Meharia, Subhash, 226 176–177
Mehta, Alok Kumar, 315 in state Assembly elections, 182
Minerva Mills vs. Union of India, 107 vs Congress, 183
Mirdha, Harendra, 221 Modi, S. K., 175
Mirdha, Jyoti, 220, 226, 228 Mohan, Anand, 324
Mirdha, Nathuram, 220–221 Moily, 278
Mishra, Nitish, 313 Mukerji, Nirmal, 196
Mishra, Satish Chandra, 147 Mukherjee, Dilip, 196
Mittal, Sunil, 169 Muniyappa, Marasandra, 147
Mizo Presbyterian Church, 375 Muraleedharan, K., 235, 238
Mizoram, 374–376 Muslim League Kerala State Committee,
Mizo Union, 374 4–5
Modi, Narendra, 325
anti-Muslim posture, 183 Nadar, A. Neelalohita Dasan, 238
collection of poems, 173–174 Naga, Nemi, 378
Index 409
Naga, Sema, 378 voters turnover, 54–55

Naga, Thankul, 378 women representatives, 58
Nagaland, 376–381 National Security Act, 149
Nagaland People’s Front (NPF), 4–5, National Socialist Council of Nagaland
363, 380 (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM), 372
Naga National Council (NNC), 372 National Socialist Council of Nagaland
Nagmani, 313 (Khaplang) (NSCN-K), 372
Naidu, Chandrababu, 33, 79, 277 Nayeem, Hameeda, 340
National Congress Party (NCP), 4–5, Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3
11, 368 Nehru, Motilal, 3
Congress–NCP alliance, Nishad, Jai Narayan, 313
Maharashtra, 252, 261–264 Northeast India
vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 Arunachal Pradesh, 384–386
National Democratic Alliance, 2009 Manipur, 369–374
elections, 5 Meghalaya, 364–369
Mizoram, 374–376
National Development Council, 50
Nagaland, 376–381
National Liberation Front of Tripura
region and parties, 355–364
(NLFT), 382
Tripura, 381–384
national–regional political parties, in
NPF, 364
coalition politics
Akali-BJP government, 51
one-party dominance, 44
BJP’ recommendations, 2009
elections, 50
caste-wise candidature, 55 Pakistan-based United Jihad Council,
339
citizen-centric governance, 58–59
Pala, Vincent, 366
as coalition of interests, 49
Paswan, Lalan, 313
and economics of market, 56
Paswan, Ram Vilas, 311, 313, 315,
election sops, 48–49, 56
318
filing of affidavits, 59
Patel, Brishen, 317
interactive relationships, 42
Patel, Devji, 225–226
issue of autonomy, 51–52 Patil, President Pratibha, 10
mandate of governance, 42–43 Patnaik, Biju, 33–34
multi-party characteristics, 44 Patnaik, Navin, 218, 325
paradox between electoral promises Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), 6, 33
and government mandate, 48 Pawar, Sharad, 11, 115
patronage politics, 50, 54 Phule, Jotirao, 253
performance of, 45 Pilot, Sachin, 225
populist politics, 43, 46–47, 56–57 populist politics, 43
slogans and manifesto, 46–47 Praja Rajyam Party, 5
and “sons of the soil” parochialism, Prasad, Brij Bihari, 323
57 Priya, Shanti, 324
statutory transfer of funds, 52–53 Progressive Democratic Socialist (PDS),
trends in expenditure to GDP ratio, 208
54 Punjab Repealing Act of 2004, 50
Rajasthan politics Rao, N. T. Rama (NTR), 78

age index of members elected, 227 Rao, Narasimha, 31
Badmer constituency, 220 Rashtriya Janata Dal, 4–5
Bhilwara seat, 221 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14
BJP’s dualism, 231 Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), 11
BJP’s growth, 218, 230–231 Rashtriya Lok Dal, 4–5
candidate selection, 220–221 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
Congress Lok Sabha constituencies, 170
226 Raut, Damodar, 317
Congress strategy, 220–221 Ravi, Vayalar, 235
Congress under Ghelot, 232 Rawat, Rasa Singh, 226
Dausa constituency, 222–223 Reddy, Y. Rajasekhar (YSR), 79
decline of BJP, 232–233 Report of the States Reorganization
education index of members elected, Commission, 77
227 Republican Party of India (Athvale), 5
election result of 2009 elections, Revolutionary Socialist Party, 4–5
225–226 Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP),
Gehlot’s strategy, 220–221 194
Jats vs Rajputs, 219 Rijiju, Kiren, 386
Meenas vs Gujjars, 219–220 Roy, Maneesha, 12
Muslims, role of, 230 Roy, Ram Badan, 313–314
Nagaur constituency, 220–221 Ruala, C.L., 376
party position in 2009 election,
223 Sachar Commission Report, 58
party split and game plan, 221–222 SAD manifesto, 48
4.5 percent share, 222 Sain Brothers murder, 194
poll violence, 225 Samajwadi Party, 4–5
Rahul factor, 228 Samajwadi Party (SP), 11
Raje, Vasundhara, 231–232 Sangma, Agatha, 368
representation of royal backgrounds, Sangtam, K. Asungb, 379
227–228 Sarkaria Commission, 50–51
Varun factor, 230 Sasaram (SC), 314
voters turnout in 2009 elections, Satluj Yamuna Link (SYL), 50
223–225 SC/Scheduled Tribes (STs) (Prevention
women candidature, 228–229 of Atrocities) Act, 153
Raje, Vasundhara, 217–218, 231 Sen, Nirupam, 204
Raje, Yoshadhra, 115 separatism, 69, 81–82, 84, 291
Rana, R.K., 315 Shah, Dr Gunvant, 173
Rane, Narayan, 257 Shahab, Hena, 315, 324
Ranjan, Rajiv (Pappu Yadav), 324 Shahabuddin, Mohammad, 324
Ranjan, Ranjeeta, 324 Shah Bano Case, 128
Rao, G.V.L. Narasimha, 218 Sharma, Bhanwarlal, 221
Index 411
Sharma, Rajkumar, 222 Sinha, S.K., 337

Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 102 Socialist Unity Center (SUC), 195, 202,
Shekhawat, Bhairon Singh, 231 206, 208
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), 4–5, 33 Sodagar, Fayyaz Ahmad, 350
Shiv Sena, 5, 11, 34, 218 Sodhi, Nafisa Ali, 116
Shivsena, 4 S.R. Bommai & Others vs. Union of India
Shourie, Arun, 169, 219 & Others, 106
Shukla, Munna, 323 91st Amendment Act, 365
Shukla, Vijay Kumar, 317 state results, lok sabha election 2009,
Siddaramaiah, 273 15
Siddiqi, Abdulbari, 319 Sule, Supriya, 115
Sikkim Democratic Front, 4, 6 Swabhimani Paksha, 4, 6
Singh, Akhilesh Prasad, 314 Syed, Mufti Mohammad, 36
Singh, Arun, 320 symbols, of national and state recognized
Singh, Dharam, 278 political parties, 6–9
Singh, Digvijay, 312
Singh, Dushyant, 231 Taslimuddin, 314
Singh, Giriraj, 222 Tata, Ratan, 169
Singh, Gopal, 226
Telangana Rashtra Samithi, 4–5
Singh, Ileyraj, 226
Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), 35
Singh, Jagadanand, 317
Telugu Desam, 4
Singh, Jaswant, 219
Thackeray, Bal, 257
Singh, Jitendra, 225
Thackeray, Raj, 57, 257–258, 261
Singh, Kanti, 314–315
Thackeray, Uddhav, 257
Singh, Manvendra, 220, 226
Thakur, Karpoori, 327
Singh, Meena, 315
Tharoor, Shashi, 238
Singh, Mulayam, 11
Singh, Prabhu Nath, 319 Third Front, 5, 260
Singh, Prabhunath, 317 Thomas, P.C., 236
Singh, President Rajnath, 218 three-phase evolution, of Indian
Singh, Prime Minister Manmohan, 3, politics, 94
10, 277 Tiwari, Ghanshyam, 229
Singh, Raghuvansh Prasad, 314, 317, Tripura, 381–384
323 Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS),
Singh, Rajnath, 231 381
Singh, Rao Rajendra, 229
Singh, Sitaram, 314 United Liberation Front of Asom
Singh, Surajbhan, 324 (ULFA), 359
Singh, Tarkeshwar, 325 United Nation’s Children’s Fund
Singh, Uma Shankar, 314 (UNICEF), 126
Singh, V.P., 28, 30–31, 226 United Progressive Alliance, 2009
Singur (Hooghly) land acquisition elections, 5, 13
incident, 196 United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
Sinha, Shatrughan, 314 coalition, 3
UPA, birth of, 107 Westminster system, 104–105

Mayawati of BSP, 37
resolution of Congress Working Yadav, Devendra Prasad, 314
Committee, 36 Yadav, Jai Prakash Narayan, 314
seat-sharing arrangement, 37–38 Yadav, Lalu Prasad, 11, 37, 311, 313,
317
Vaid, C. S., 221 Yadav, Ravindra Charan, 314
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 31, 231, 275 Yadav, Sadhu, 325
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch, 4, 6 Yadav, Sharad, 312, 318
Vienna episode, 84 Yadav, Sitaram, 314
Vijayan, CPM State Secretary Pinarai, Yeddyurappa, 274–275, 277
237
Vohra, N.N., 339
Vyas, Girija, 228

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