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Sec. 11.

Parliamentary Freedom of Speech

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang


17 SCRA 876
GR.NO. L-15905
August 3, 1966

Point of the Case:

Facts:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous,
and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. At the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication;

Ruling:

No. Under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution, "speech or debate
therein" only refers to the utterances made by Congress members in the performance of their
official duties, such as delivering speeches, making statements, or casting votes in the
Congressional hall while the same is in session. It could also refer to the introduction of bills in
Congress, whether it is session or not, and other acts performed by Congress members in their
official capacity whether there was a session or not, whether inside or outside the premises of one's
office.

In the case at bar, the Court ruled that Cabangbang's letter cannot be classified as a
privileged form of communication because it was published during a time when the Congress was
not in session. Moreover, the defendant was not performing his official duty as either a member of
Congress when he intended the letter to be published. Therefore, the open letter was not
privileged. Because of these reasons, Cabangbang's open letter cannot be classified as a
privileged form of communication.

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