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14-Aug-19

BUSINESS ECONOMICS

BUSINESS ECONOMICS
Main textbook:
Trefor, J., Business Economics and
Managerial Decision Making
Optional reading:
Griffths, A. and Wall S., Economics for
Business and Management
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 Dr. Hoàng Ngọc Thuận (UNSW LAW)*


Director of High Quality Program in
International Business Economics
School of Economics and International Business
(SEIB), Foreign Trade University (FTU)
Tel: 0912 869 981
Email: hoangthuan@ftu.edu.vn

• University of New South Wales (UNSW) ranks #45 in the world QS


university ranking 2018
• Faculty of Law, UNSW (UNSW Law) ranks #14 in the world QS ranking
2019 for subject: LAW

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Tentative schedule of classes


 •Lecture 1-2: General Introduction to the course and
business structure
 •Lecture 3-4: Business objectives and theories of firm
•Lecture 5-6-7: Demand analysis and estimation of
demand function
 •Lecture 8-9-10: Cost analysis and Cost management
•Lecture 11-12-13: Market structure and Pricing strategies
•Lecture 14: Risks and Uncertainty
 •Lecture 15: Investment Appraisal

Grading
 •Participation 10%: students can be absent no more than
two times
 •Mid-term 30%
 •Final 60%

Chapter 1:
INTRODUCTION TO
BUSINESS ECONOMICS

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 Required: Business Economics and


Managerial Decision Making, C. 1
 Recommend: Economics for
Business and Management, C. 4

? Economics applied
for business
→ Economics +
Managerial perspectives
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Managerial economics
→ Application of
microeconomic theories &
quantitative methods
to find optimal solutions to
managerial decision-making
problems.
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Regarding:
- Customers
- Suppliers
- Competitors
- The internal workings of the
organization
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STRUCTURE
1. Objectives and methodology
2. Overview of a company
3. Ownership vs. managerial control
4. Outsider and Insider system of
corporate control
5. External and Internal constrains for
managerial discretion
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1. Objectives and methodology


1.1 Objectives:
→ Optimal solutions for decisions
1.2 Methodology:
→ Fundamental theories
→ Economic models

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2. Overview of a company
2.1 Types
2.2 Common characteristics
2.3 Ownership structure

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2.1 Types of companies


Unincorporated vs. Incorporated
+ Legal identity: separate?
+ Liability: limited?
+ Formalities: complex?
(UK: Sole trader & Partnership vs.
Limited company & Holding company
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2.2 Common characteristics


- Owners
- Managers
- Objectives
- Resources
- Organization structures
- Performance assessment
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2.3 Ownership structure


- Monistic: a single interest group
(shareholders → UK and USA)
- Dualistic: two interest groups
(shareholders & employees →
Germany and France)
- Pluralistic: stakeholders (→ Japan)

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3. Ownership vs. Managerial


control
3.1 Definition
Spieler, A. C. and Murray, A. S. (2008),
Management Controlled Firms vs. Owner
Controlled Firms: A Historical Perspective of
Ownership Concentration in the US, East
Asia and the EU, Journal of International
Business and Law, Vol. 7, Issue 1.
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3.1 Definition
- Owner control occurs where the
equity holders of a firm maintain
sufficient control over the board of
directors to have a measureable influence
on policy either by direct control of votes
on the board of directors, or indirectly
through a sufficiently large share of the
voting stock

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3.1 Definition
- Manager control exists in a firm
where the shareholders fail to achieve
sufficient board representation or
voting stock control allowing
managers to exercise more judgment
than would be possible under OC
regime.

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→ Advantages
- Owner Control:
+ More productive & accountable to the
owner’s wishes
+ Align the interests of the owner and
the manager
+ Help retain the ability of the owner to
control the future direction
+ Avoid the problem of agency
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→ Advantages
- Manager Control:
+ Suitable for the complexity, scale, and
scope of a company’s operation
expansion
+ Protect minority shareholders
+ Possess specific knowledge that
effective management

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3.2 Criteria for classification


- ? A threshold/ a cut-off point
Berle and Means (1932): 20%
Radice (1971): 15% for the
largest shareholding

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3.2 Criteria for classification


- ? Control = f (X)
Cubbin and Leech (1983):
A probabilistic voting model:
+ Degree of control (probability of the
controlling shareholders securing
majority support in a contest vote)
+ Control (95% chance of winning a
vote)
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X:
- Size of largest holding
- Size and distribution of the remaining
shares
- Willingness of other shareholders to form
a voting block
- Willingness of other shareholders to be
active and to vote against the controlling
group
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4. Insider vs. Outsider system of


Corporate control
Corporate governance
Griffiths and Wall: “Corporate governance
refers to the various arrangements within
companies which provide both authority and
accountability in its operations. In other
words, the various rules and procedures
which are in place to direct and control the
running of the company”
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Corporate control
- Insider systems:
+ Ownership: concentrated
+ Trading shares: large blocks
+ Relationship between management and
shareholders: close & stable
+ Board of directors or other senior managerial
positions: shareholders
+ Priority to stakeholders
→ More active owner participation
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Corporate control
- Outsider systems:
+ Ownership: dispersed
+ Trading shares: easy (for investment)
+ Relationship between management and
shareholders: not close
+ Board of directors or other senior managerial
positions: owners and stakeholders
+ Priority to market regulations
→ More active market for corporate control
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5. External & Internal constrains


→ Constrains for objective-setting
- External constraints: Arises from the active
market in company shares (i.e. holder of large
blocks of shares, acquirer of blocks of shares…)
- Internal constraints: Arises from the role of non
– executive board members and stakeholders (i.e.
Owners/shareholders, stakeholders, non-
executive directors)
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