Director of Land v Dano
J. Melencio-Herrera | February 21, 1980
DOCTRINE
• Time limitation for filing a judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title as stated in CA 141 must be raised in an
MTD or an answer at the first instance. It is not a jurisdictional
issue and is subject to waiver if not pleaded in an answer or
MTD.
• The intendment of the lawmaker to record as much leeway
as possible to applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles is evident from the statutory history of
section 47 of the Public Land Act.
FACTS: Ida Dano, representing the heirs of Francisco Dano,
filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land in
Misamis Occidental, praying “in case the land may not be
registered as private land, she requests that her imperfect or
incomplete title to the property may be confirmed in favor of
the heirs of Francisco Dano”. Petitioner opposed the application
because the land sought to be registered is foreshore land
which is part of the public domain and hence cannot be the
subject of private ownership. The lower court decided in favor
of Dano on the basis of open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and
notorious possession dating back to more than 30 years.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time
the issue that respondent filed her application for registration
beyond the time prescribed in Sec. 45 and 47 in of CA 141,
which said the application was “not to extend beyond
December 31, 1968” (she filed the application January 8, 1969).
The Misamis CFI denied the MR on the basis of Rule 9.2 of the
ROC (defenses and objections not pleaded either in a Motion to
Dismiss or the Answer are deemed waived) and the doctrine
in Vicente v. Lucas (where the defendants never pleaded the
statute of limitations they are deemed to have waived it and
it is error for the lower court to dismiss the proceeding on
that ground). Petitioner filed a second MR arguing the issue is
jurisdictional and can henceforth be raised at any stage in the
proceeding, though this 2nd MR was denied. The CFI held the
date prescribed in Secs. 45 and 47 of CA 141 is not
jurisdictional but a limitation to file an application. It upheld its
earlier decision.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal for registration of land past the deadline set in CA
141 (YES, because the period indicated in Sec. 47 is a time
limitation petitioner did not aver in his answer, and because
the intent of the law was to give as much leeway as possible to
applicants of judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title.)
1. The period fixed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act CA
141, as amended, is not jurisdictional but is more of a time
limitation. It is a defense or objection which should have been
set up either in a Motion to Dismiss or in an Answer. Since
petitioner had never pleaded the statue of limitations, he is
deemed to have waived the same.
2. The defense of prescription cannot be pleaded for the first
time at the trial or on appeal. Petitioner raised that issue for
the first time only in his MR.
3. Even bearing in mind that prescription does not run against
the State (Art 1108 (4), Civil Code) and the rights of the State
may not be waived by mistakes of officers entrusted with the
exercise of such rights, the intendment of the lawmaker to
record as much leeway as possible to applicants for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is evident from
the statutory history of section 47 of the Public Land Act.
a. In the original text, the time limitation was not to extend
beyond December 31, 1938.
 b. An amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act 292,
section 2, approved on June 9, 1938, extended the expiry date
to December 31, 1941.

c. Subsequently, section 1 of Republic Act No. 1011, approved

on June 2, 1947, further extended the time limit to December
31, 1957. Republic Act No. 2061, approved on June 13, 1958,
again prolonged the period to December 31, 1968

d. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6236, approved on June 19,

1971, the time prescribed was extended to December 31, 1967.

e. Again, on January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 lengthened the

cut-off date to December 31, 1987.

4. The Court cited Director of Lands v. Abarro where it held

that “Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the
lawmaker in extending the period for filing such applications
time and time again, to give full opportunity to those who are
qualified under the law to own disposable lands of the public
domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the
citizenry.”