MELCHOR CARO, petitioner, vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO, respondent.
Moreover, Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in his affidavit testified that what he sold
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503, affirming the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 15529 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, as well as the resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor's Lot No. 160 from Ruperto
Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale 2 dated October 21, 1953. The said lot was situated
in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of
17.9849 hectares. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro,
consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva
Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale 3 dated January 31, 1973 covering
Lot No. 4512.
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands,
District Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father.
The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional
Director rendered a Decision 4 canceling the said application, thusly:
This is a claim of Deogracias de la Cruz to Lot No. 4512, Pls-775 of
Calaya, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras, covered by the above-noted application of
Melchor Caro.
In the investigation, respondent claims preferential rights over the
land as he acquired it through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had
likewise bought the land from Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in 1953. On the other
hand, protestant De la Cruz testified that the land in controversy was bought
by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied, possessed
and improved the land by planting coconut trees; and that in 1968 he was
forcibly driven out by Gregorio Caro from the land in question.
Verification of the records disclosed that the land which was
actually sold to Gregorio Caro by Ruperto Gepellano (sic) is Assessor's Lot No.
160. The description and physical identity of Lot No. 160 is basically different
and distinct from Lot No. 4512, the land in question. This could be clearly seen
in the Certified True Copy of the Sketch Plan from the Assessor's Office of
Assessor's Lot No. 160 and the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit 9 of the
Respondent-Applicant. It has been established that Assessor's Lot No. 160
corresponds to Lot No. 4511 and not Lot No. 4512 claimed by the protestant.
to Gregorio Caro is a land distinct and different from the land in question.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, it is ordered that the F.P.A.
No. (VI-1)8548 of applicant-respondent Melchor Caro be, as hereby it is,
cancelled. Protestant Deogracias de la Cruz if qualified, is given one hundred
twenty (120) days from the finality of this decision to file an appropriate public
land application otherwise he shall lose his preferential right thereto.
SO ORDERED. 5
Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City, docketed as MNR
Case No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in an Order 6 dated June 29, 1982, on the ground
of failure to file an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period therefor.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application
for a Free Patent 7 covering the said lot, and was issued Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor.
Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession 8 before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted
in an Order 9 dated May 7, 1984.
Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint 10 against Sucaldito for
"Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with
Damages" before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an amended complaint, 11 alleging that he was
the owner of the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior
thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged
that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-
interest, and that the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor's Lot
No. 160 had actually been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had
actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two kilometers away. He
lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his ownership and possession of the said
property, the Bureau of Lands did not award it to him.
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor
of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as
a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner. The
complaint contained the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering the annulment and voiding of the decision of the
Bureau of Lands, the free patent and the Original Certificate of Title No. F-
27162 or in the alternative;
2. Ordering defendant to reconvey the ownership and in the event
she wrests possession from plaintiff then, also the possession of Lot 4512 PLS-
775 of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre, back to plaintiff;
3. Declaring plaintiff as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 4512
PLS-775 of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre and ordering the issuance of a
free patent or a torrens title in favor of plaintiff;
 4. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as expenses on litigation
plus exemplary damages in an amount at the discretion of this Court.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the
premises. 12
In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special affirmative defense, the
fact that she intervened in the proceedings on Caro's application for a free patent over Lot No. 4512
before the Bureau of Lands having bought the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover, contrary to the
allegations of the petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one and the same lot, as per the
findings of the Bureau of Lands.
The parties thereafter presented evidence to prove their respective claims. In a
Decision 13 dated December 7, 1993, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the
petitioner's complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff
is dismissed. The counterclaim of defendant which is merely the result of the
filing of the complaint, is likewise dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 14
Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz Br. III, 15 the trial court ruled
that Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent issued in favor of
Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held that "an applicant for a free
patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover the land, for
the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to
dispose lands of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the Public Land
Act," 16 or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy
of a rival-applicant for a free patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not
judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does
not thereby become the owner of the land in dispute. 17
The trial court also declared that contrary to Caro's claims, the evidence clearly showed that
Lot No. 4512, with an area of 70,677 square meters, was not included in Assessor's Lot No. 160, thus:
Assessor's Lot 160 is Cadastral Lot 4511, which has an original area
of around 17 hectares, more or less, later on, increased to 21 hectares. If we
add Lot 4512 to Lot 4511 following the contention of the plaintiff, then the
area would be more than 28 hectares. Thus, belying the claim of plaintiff that
Lot 4512 was formerly a part of Assessor's Lot 160.
The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is claiming Lot
989 which is owned by Felix Galabo and located at Brgy. Olacon, is not well
taken, because the identification of the lot as stated in the tax declaration is
not binding and conclusive. What is binding and conclusive is what is stated
in the title of the land and its technical description. In the technical description
as found in the title of the defendant [Sucaldito], it is clearly stated therein
that the lot is Lot 4512 and is located at Brgy. Calaya and not Brgy. Olacon,
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. 18
Aggrieved by the trial court's ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA on the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO PERSONALITY
TO BRING THE ACTION;
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE ACTION STILL HE CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT IN
QUESTION, CAD. LOT NO. 4512;
III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY THE
LAND IN QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF AND TO PAY DAMAGES. 19
The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision 20 dated July 31, 2002. The appellate court
agreed with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner had no personality to file the action under Section
101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free patent.
Citing several cases, 21 the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact made by administrative
agencies which are supported by substantial evidence must be respected, particularly where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge and
experience. 22
Caro filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court
denied in a Resolution 23 dated February 7, 2003.
Caro, now the petitioner, assails the ruling of the appellate court on the following grounds:
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THIS
ACTION;
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL
INTERPOSED BY PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL CAN FILE AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED
BY PATENT. 24
The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal personality to
bring and institute the present action against the respondent, considering that title issued on the basis
of a patent is annullable on the ground of fraud. Furthermore, the one-year period within which to file
an action to cancel a torrens title under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply
where the registered owner, or the successor-in-interest, knew that the property described in the title
actually belongs to another, as in this case. The petitioner cites Vital v. Anore, et al. 25 to bolster his
claim. The petitioner also cites Director of Lands v. Abanilla26 where the Court stressed that any false
statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title under Section 91
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, "shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or
permit granted."
In her comment, the respondent points out that the decision of the Bureau of Lands itself
would show that the petitioner is not the true and lawful owner of the subject lot; as such, the
argument that he has the legal personality to file the action for annulment of patent based on
constructive trust is untenable. The respondent further contends that the CA did not err in upholding
the ruling of the RTC.
The petitioner merely reiterated his previous arguments in his Reply dated December 30,
2003.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the petitioner has no
personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property. CSTEHI
The Court notes that the petitioner's complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of
the free patent issued in the respondent's favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the
respondent to "return" the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De
Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Court held that "[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of
the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right." 28 Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a private
individual, the property does not go back to the State. 29
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the
land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the
action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee. 30
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, 31 every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. 32
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case,
the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.
The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v. Cezar 33 as follows:
. . . Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the
patent was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for the
annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The
Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government,
to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs
of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere
homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action
for reconveyance. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, the Court stressed that " . . . [i]f the suit is not brought in
the name of or against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be
filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action [Travel Wide
v. CA, 199 SCRA 205, 209 (1991), per Cruz, J. See also Suguister v. Tamayo, 176
SCRA 579, August 21, 1989]. In fact, a final judgment may be invalidated if the
real parties-in-interest are not included. This was underscored by the Court
in Arcelona v. CA [280 SCRA 20, October 2, 1997], in which a final judgment
was nullified because indispensable parties were not impleaded.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for
reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land
but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the
judgment in such suit. 34
In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals, 35 the Court, in dismissing the petitioner's imputation of
fraud in securing a free patent and title over a parcel of land, declared that reconveyance is a remedy
granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. 36 The
Court further expounded:
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not
question the titles legally issued by the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771,
776 (1936)]. In such cases, the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the
Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after
appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed
vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with
the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a
grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance. 37
In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 38 where the private respondents
therein were mere lessees of the property in question, the Court ruled that as mere lessees, they had
"no present substantial and personal interest with respect to issues involving ownership of the
disputed property." The Court went on to declare:
. . . The only interest they have, in the event the petitioner's title
over the subject property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is
the hope that they become qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land.
Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere expectancy. Even the private
respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to the
State, they only have "pre-emptive rights" to buy the subject property; that
their real interest over the said property is contingent upon the government's
consideration of their application as buyers of the same. It is settled that a
suit filed by a person who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. 39
In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states —
 Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the
name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. THAECc
This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, et al., 40 a case on all fours with the present one, as follows:
Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion.
Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would
have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate
of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered
thereby will again form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is
another reason for withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does not
claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a free
patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part
of the public domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral
court that lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if the parcel were
declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not automatically
become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others who
may apply for the same.
To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that
would result in the reversion of the land to the government. 41 The petitioner has no personality to
"recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof. 42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503 and the Resolution dated February 7, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Caro v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. 157536, [May 16, 2005], 497 PHIL 879-891)
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), petitioner, vs. HON.
RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch
54); and the Heirs of the Deceased Spouses JUAN CUIZON AND FLORENTINA
RAPAYA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Demosthenes S. Tecson for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Lot No. 4673 of the Opon Cadastre situated in Lapu-lapu City, covered by OCT No. RO-2537,
was registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, Benito
Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybanez, Jesus Ybanez, Numeriano
Ybanez, Martino Ybanez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and Silvino
Patalinghug. On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Sorono, Frisca Booc, and Felix Cuizon executed an
Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered
owners of the said lot. On July 8, 1982, they were issued TCT No. 12467. That the said lot was among
the objects of expropriation proceedings pending before Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lapu-Lapu City. The court approved the Compromise Agreement entered into between the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered owners of Lot No. 4673. As a result, Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) acquired title over the said lot and the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu
City issued TCT No. 12788 on October 13, 1982. On July 29, 1996, the heirs of the deceased spouses
Juan Cuizon and Florentina Rapaya filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint for Nullity of
Documents, Redemption and Damages against PEZA and Jorgea-Igot Sorono, et al. wherein they
alleged that they were excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate in which they sought
the nullification of several documents including TCT No. 12788. PEZA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of prescription. But it was denied by the trial court. The Petition for Certiorari filed by the PEZA
before the Court of Appeals was also dismissed. Hence, this recourse.
The Court ruled that Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is not meant to be a statute of
limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being
merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof. Be that as
it may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction
may be known actually or constructively. In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have
been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation
in the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had
two (2) years or until July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate
settlement of the estate. The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title
remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property
or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. In this regard,
title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs,
but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value — the government. Moreover, the government
is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was
obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings.
The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or
persons who perpetrated the fraud.
Petition was granted.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED
PERSONS; LIABILITY OF DISTRIBUTEES AND ESTATE; TWO-YEAR PRESCRIPTION PERIOD; NOT
APPLICABLE TO THOSE WHO HAD NO PART IN OR HAD NO NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER,
BY ITS REGISTRATION, A TRANSACTION MAY BE KNOWN ACTUALLY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY. — Section 4,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a
settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and distribution
of the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no
notice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to be a statute of
limitations. Moreover, by no reason of logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being
merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof. Be that as
it may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction
may be known actually or constructively.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, private
respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason
of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time of
registration, private respondents had two (2) years or until July 8, 1984, within which to file their
objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — The only exception to the above-mentioned
prescription is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the
partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In this regard, title to the
property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already
in that of an innocent purchaser for value — the government. Moreover, the government is presumed
to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained
through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings. Even
assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs, private respondents may proceed
only against the defrauding heirs, not against petitioner which had no participation in or knowledge of
the alleged fraud. The fact that the co-heir's title to the property was fraudulently secured cannot
prejudice the rights of petitioner which, absent any showing that it had knowledge or participation in
the irregularity, is considered a purchaser in good faith and for value. The remedy of an owner alleged
to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or persons who perpetrated
the fraud.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF PRESCRIPTION OF AN ACTION TO CONTEST
AN EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; ELUCIDATED. — On the matter of constructive notice vis-à-
vis prescription of an action to consent an extrajudicial partition, a leading authority on land
registration elucidates as follows: "While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte
proceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens system and the annotation on the new
certificate of title of the contingent liability of the estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule
74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to all the
world, so that upon the expiration of said period all third persons should be barred [from going) after
the particular property, except where title thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who
executed the partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify as "innocent
purchasers for value."If the liability of the registered property should extend indefinitely beyond that
period, then such constructive notice which binds the whole world by virtue of registration would be
meaningless and illusory. . . . ."
6. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE; PRESCRIPTION; FOUR YEARS FROM
DISCOVERY OF FRAUD. — An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from
the discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken upon the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property.Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons
and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. Clearly then, private respondents' action
for reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed, considering that title to said property had
been issued way back on August 11, 1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted only on July 29,
1996.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEN YEARS IN CASE OF IMPLIED OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST;
IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY APPLIES ONLY WHEN THE PERSON ENFORCING THE TRUST IS IN POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY. — Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust would
have already prescribed just the same, because such action prescribes ten (10) years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The
imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only
when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action
for reconveyance in an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribed. Undisputedly,
private respondents are not in possession of the disputed property. In fact, they do not even claim to
be in possession of it, even if to do so would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUAN v. ZUÑIGA; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Accordingly, the
CA Decision's reliance on Juan vs. Zuñiga, as regards the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust, is utterly misplaced in the light of the foregoing rulings of the
Court declaring a ten-year period of prescription for such action. Moreover, the principle enunciated
therein has no application to the instant case, considering that the supposed "trustee" herein has
effectively repudiated the so-called "trust" by directly performing an act of ownership; that is, by
conveying the property to the government through expropriation. An action to compel, for the benefit
of the cestui que trust, the conveyance of property registered in the trustee's name does not
prescribe unless the trustee repudiates the trust. Thus, private respondents cannot invoke the
imprescriptibility of their action for reconveyance, irrespective of their basis for it.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE AVAILED OF ONCE THE PROPERTY HAS PASSED TO AN INNOCENT
PURCHASER FOR VALUE; CASE AT BAR. — Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a
remedy of those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another. Such recourse however, cannot be availed of once the property has passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Indubitably, we find that the property has already
been conveyed to the government in appropriate expropriation proceedings, the regularity or validity
of which has not been questioned. Petitioner should, therefore, enjoy the security afforded to innocent
third persons under our registration laws. Equally important, its title to the property must be rightfully
preserved. Hence, private respondents' action to recover the subject property from the government
cannot be maintained, not only because of the prescription of the action, but on account of the
protection given to innocent purchasers for value granted under our land registration laws. Indeed, the
inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of land registration must be upheld in order to give
stability to it and provide finality to land disputes.
10. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON; HEIRS
DEPRIVED OF THEIR SHARE MAY SUE FOR DAMAGES THEIR CO-HEIRS WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY
PERPETRATED FRAUD. — This ruling notwithstanding, private respondents are not without recourse.
They may sue for damages their co-heirs who have allegedly perpetrated fraud in Civil Case No. 4534-
L pending before the RTC. The right and the extent of damages to be awarded to private respondents
shall be determined by the trial court, subject to the evidence duly established during the proceedings.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
An action for reconveyance of land, an equitable remedy recognized under our land
registration laws, is subject to the applicable rules on prescription. Moreover, the right to pursue such
reivindicatory action may be defeated when the property sought to be recovered has been conveyed
to an innocent purchaser for value.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the June 8, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 47575.
In the said Decision, the CA sustained the January 12, 1998 2 and the March 31, 1998 3 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 4534-L, which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [there being] no abuse of discretion committed by
respondent court, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED."
The Facts
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon Cadastre situated in
Lapu-Lapu City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2537 (May 19, 1982) and
registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, Benito
Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybañez, Jesus Ybañez, Numeriaño
Ybañez, Martino Ybañez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and Silvino
Patalinghug. The lot has an area of 11,345 square meters, more or less.
On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial
Partition, in which they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the
aforesaid lot. Consequently, they were issued TCT No. 12467 on July 8, 1982.
Considering that the said lot was among the objects of expropriation proceedings docketed
as Civil Case No 510-L and pending before it, Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu
City rendered a partial Decision on August 11, 1982. In that Decision, the RTC approved the
Compromise Agreement entered into between the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the
new registered owners of Lot No. 4673; namely, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon. In
accordance with the approved Compromise Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation
for the expropriation of the subject property, which was to be used for an export processing zone to
be established in Lapu-Lapu City.
As a consequence of the RTC Decision, petitioner acquired title over Lot No. 4673 and the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12788 issued by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-
Lapu City on October 13, 1982.
On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a Complaint for
Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages against petitioner and Jorgea-Igot Soroño et al.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 4534-L, the Complaint alleged that herein private respondents had been
excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of several
documents, including TCT No. 12788 dated October 13, 1992, issued in the name of herein petitioner.
On February 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. This Motion was denied by respondent judge in the Order dated January 12, 1998. A
Motion for Reconsideration thereof was likewise denied in the Order dated March 31, 1998.
On April 30, 1998, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a Petition
for Certiorari. As earlier noted, the CA dismissed the Petition.
Hence, this recourse. 4
The CA Ruling
In denying the Petition, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
"Civil Case No. 4534-L although instituted in the guise of a
complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages is in effect an
action for reconveyance of the property to plaintiffs of a portion which
rightfully belong to them. It would be against good reason and conscience not
to hold that defendants, Francisca 'Frisca' Booc, heirs of deceased Jorg[e]a
Igot-Soronio and heirs of Felix Cuizon committed a breach of trust which
enabled them to execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition[,] Special Power of
Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EPZA to the prejudice of the
plaintiffs as their co-heirs. Therefore, in an action like this case, the private
respondents may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to the
person rightfully entitled to it. DcCASI
"It is undeniable that defendants defrauded plaintiffs by falsely
representing that they were the only heirs of deceased Juan Cuizon and
Florentina Rapaya, succeeded in having the original title cancelled and
enabling them to appropriate the land in favor of EPZA and a new one issued
in the name of the latter (EPZA). This way of acquiring title create[s] what is
called 'constructive trust' in favor of the defrauded party and grants the latter
the right to vindicate [itself] . . . regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, it has
been held that if a person obtain(s) a legal title to the property by fraud or
 concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so called 'trust' in
favor of the defrauded party. In fact, it has long been held that a co-heir who
through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to the
prejudice of his co-heirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter. The
excluded heir's action is imprescriptible.
"And if the action involve(s) the declaration of the nullity or
inexistence of a void or inexistent contract which became the basis for the
fraudulent registration of the subject property, then the action is
imprescriptible. This finds codal support in Article 1410 of the Civil Code,
which declares that the action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.
"As to the constructive notice rule alleged by the petitioner, (the)
Supreme Court in the case of Juan vs. Zuniga, citing Sevilla vs. Angeles, has
this to say:
'While this ruling is correct as applied to ordinary
actions by recovery of real property which is covered by a torrens
title upon the theory that its registration under our registration
system has the effect of constructive notice to the whole world,
the same cannot be applied . . . when the purpose of the action is
to compel a trustee to convey the property registered in his name
for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In other words, the defense
of prescription cannot be set up in an action whose purpose is to
recover property held by a person for the benefit of another.'
The Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
"I
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that
private respondents' claim against expropriated property had prescribed.
"II
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that
reconveyance does not lie against the expropriated property." 5
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Prescription
Petitioner avers that private respondents' claim against the subject property has already
prescribed, because the two-year period within which an unduly excluded heir may seek a new
settlement of the estate had already lapsed by the time private respondents filed their action with the
trial court. Petitioner further argues that private respondents received constructive notice in view of
the registration of the extrajudicial partition with the Registry of Deeds. According to petitioner, the
two-year period commenced from July 8, 1982, the date of inscription of the extrajudicial settlement
on OCT No. 2537.
The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, are reproduced for easy
references as follows:
"SECTION 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear
at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an
estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of
this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time
of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the
estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle
the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in
what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and
may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or
both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to
creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been
made." (Italics supplied)
A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly deprived of their lawful
participation in a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the
settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to
those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is
not meant to be a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic can one contend that an
extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons who had no
knowledge thereof. 6 Be that as it may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner
provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified
of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over
the subject lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or until July 8,
1984, within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
On the matter of constructive notice vis-a-vis prescription of an action to contest an
extrajudicial partition, a leading authority on land registration elucidates as follows:
"While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte
proceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens system and the
annotation on the new certificate of title of the contingent liability of the
estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of the
Rules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to
all the world, so that upon the expiration of said period all third persons should
be barred [from going] after the particular property, except where title
thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who executed the
 partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify as
'innocent purchasers for value'. If the liability of the registered property
should extend indefinitely beyond that period, then such constructive notice
which binds the whole world by virtue of registration would be meaningless
and illusory. . . ." 7 (Italics supplied)
The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title remains in the
hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or in those of
their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the
allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value — the government.
Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot,
considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in
proper expropriation proceedings.
Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs, private
respondents may proceed only against the defrauding heirs, not against petitioner which had no
participation in or knowledge of the alleged fraud. The fact that the co-heirs' title to the property was
fraudulently secured cannot prejudice the rights of petitioner which, absent any showing that it had
knowledge or participation in the irregularity, is considered a purchaser in good faith and for value. 8
The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of
property that was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages
against the person or persons who perpetrated the fraud. 9
Second Issue:
Limitations on Reconveyance
The law recognizes the right of a person who, by adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, is deprived of an estate or an interest therein. 10Although a review of the
decree of registration is no longer possible after the one-year period from its entry expires, still
available is an equitable remedy to compel the reconveyance of property to those who may have been
wrongfully deprived of it. 11 This equitable remedy afforded by law is not without limitations, however.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of
the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons and,
thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. 12 Clearly then, private respondents' action for
reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed, considering that title to said property had been
issued way back on August 11, 1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted only on July 29, 1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive trust would have
already prescribed just the same, because such action prescribes (10) years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. 13 The imprescriptibility of
an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or
the person enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is
an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. 14 Undisputedly, private respondents
are not in possession of the disputed property. In fact, they do not even claim to be in possession of it,
even if to do so would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action. EHaASD
Accordingly, the CA Decision's reliance on Juan v. Zuñiga, 15 as regards the
imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is utterly
misplaced in the light of the foregoing rulings of the Court declaring a ten-year period of prescription
for such action. Moreover, the principle enunciated therein has no application to the instant case,
considering that the supposed "trustee" herein has effectively repudiated the so-called "trust" by
directly performing an act of ownership; that is, by conveying the property to the government through
expropriation. An action to compel, for the benefit of the cestui que trust, the conveyance of property
registered in the trustee's name does not prescribe unless the trustee repudiates the trust. 16 Thus,
private respondents cannot invoke the imprescriptibility of their action for reconveyance, irrespective
of their basis for it.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of those whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be
availed of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an action for
reconveyance to prosper, the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 17
Indubitably, we find that the property has already been conveyed to the government in
appropriate expropriation proceedings, the regularity or validity of which has not been questioned.
Petitioner should, therefore, enjoy the security afforded to innocent third persons under our
registration laws. Equally important, its title to the property must be rightfully preserved.
Hence, private respondents' action to recover the subject property from the government
cannot be maintained, not only because of the prescription of the action, but on account of the
protection given to innocent purchasers for value granted under our land registration laws. Indeed, the
inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of land registration must be upheld in order to give
stability to it and provide finality to land disputes.
This ruling notwithstanding, private respondents are not without recourse. They may sue
for damages their co-heirs who have allegedly perpetrated fraud in Civil Case No. 4534-L pending
before the RTC. The right and the extent of damages to be awarded to private respondents shall be
determined by the trial court, subject to the evidence duly established during the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City (Branch 54) in Civil Case
No. 4534-L, dated January 12, 1998 and March 31, 1998, are SET ASIDE and the said Civil Case, as
against petitioner, is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
||| (Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, [June 6, 2001], 411 PHIL 107-
121)
 reneged on his commitment to pay DBP to: (1) revoke her right to repurchase the lots under the deed
of conditional sale and (2) subject the properties to another public auction where petitioner could bid.

Petitioner and his father denied the allegations saying that the deed of conditional sale
JESSIE GASATAYA, petitioner, vs. EDITHA MABASA, respondent.
assumed by the latter from respondent was rendered ineffective by DBP's refusal to accept payments
thereon.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent finding that the Gasatayas failed to controvert
DECISION her claim that they defrauded her just so petitioner could acquire the lots at public auction. 5 According
to the trial court, the Gasatayas failed to prove that DBP indeed rejected payments from Sabas
Gasataya. The trial court ruled:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

CORONA, J p: [respondent] and against [the Gasatayas] ordering [them] to wit:

Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure a. Ordering [petitioner] to reconvey to [respondent] TCT. No.[T-
assailing the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55055 which, in turn, affirmed 11720] and TCT No. T-11721, both of the Registry of
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 7. 2 Deeds for the Province of Lanao del Norte, upon tender
to and receipt by [petitioner] of the amount of
The facts follow. P37,200.00 Philippine money;
Respondent Editha Mabasa's father, Buenaventura Mabasa, was granted a homestead b. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds for the Province of Lanao del
patent on Lots 279, 272 and 972 located in Lala, Lanao del Norte. Buenaventura Mabasa mortgaged Norte to procure and cause the transfer and
these lots to secure a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Because of his failure registration of the aforesaid transfer certificates of title
to pay his indebtedness, DBP foreclosed on the lots and sold them at public auction where it emerged in favor and in the name of herein [respondent] Editha
as the highest bidder. DBP then obtained titles to the lots: Lot 279 under TCT No. T-2247 and S. Mabasa;
consolidated Lots 272 and 972 under TCT No. T-2448.
c. Ordering [the Gasatayas] to cede, transfer and reconvey to
When Buenaventura Mabasa died, respondent's siblings authorized her to negotiate with [respondent] the physical possession and occupancy of
DBP for the repurchase of the lots. DBP allowed respondent to reacquire the foreclosed properties Lot 279, 272 and Lot 972. . . as covered by the aforesaid
through a deed of conditional sale for P25,875. 3 certificates of title;
Subsequently, respondent entered into an agreement with petitioner's father, Sabas d. Ordering [the Gasatayas] to pay [respondent] the sum of
Gasataya, for the latter to assume payment of her obligation to DBP. They further agreed that Sabas P5,000.00 for attorney's fees; P5,000.00 as litigation
Gasataya would take possession of the lots for 20 years and develop them into a fishpond. As expenses;
consideration thereof, respondent received P10,000 cash, in addition to the P25,000 that Sabas
Gasataya had to pay DBP on her behalf. e. Ordering [the Gasatayas] to pay costs of this
proceeding[s]. CDAcIT
Upon representation by Sabas Gasataya that respondent's obligation to DBP had already
been settled, they entered into another agreement denominated as "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Lands SO ORDERED. 6
with Right to Repurchase."
Petitioner and his father appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC's decision and
Eight years after the execution of the above deed of sale with right to repurchase, dismissed their appeal for lack of merit. The CA declared:
respondent discovered that Sabas Gasataya had stopped paying DBP. As a result, DBP revoked her right
to repurchase the subject lots. aESHDA The contention of [respondent] that [the Gasatayas] deliberately
chose not to pay DBP as agreed, in order for them to acquire said properties
DBP later on held a public auction of the properties where petitioner participated and bid in a fraudulent and treacherous manner, was not fully controverted by
the highest price of P27,200. Eventually, he acquired titles to the lots for which he was issued TCT No. [them]. [The Gasatayas] failed to produce evidence to support their defenses.
T-11720 in lieu of TCT No. T-2447 (Lot 279) and TCT No. T-11721 for TCT No. T-2448 (Lots 272 and 972).
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent then filed a complaint in the RTC for reconveyance of titles of lands with
damages 4 against petitioner and Sabas Gasataya (Gasatayas). She claimed that the latter deliberately
 Moreover, [the Gasatayas] are in possession of said land[s] by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with a Right to Repurchase and not because the DBP
granted it to them. . . [T]o facilitate their acquisition of the land in question,
[they] deliberately defaulted in the payment of the assumed obligation to the
damage and prejudice of [respondent]. Consequently, the lands in question
were subjected to public bidding wherein [petitioner] participated and
eventually won. . . [the Gasatayas] committed a breach of trust amounting to
fraud which would warrant an action for reconveyance. 7
Petitioner alone came to us via this appeal by certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA
decision.
Before us, petitioner contests the CA decision affirming the trial court's order to reconvey
his titles on the disputed lots to respondent who, according to him, is not the owner thereof.
We affirm the CA.
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the
person with a better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously
registered. 8 While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than
petitioner to the contested lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale executed
by DBP vested on her the right to repurchase the lots and second, her right to repurchase them would
have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded her.
The trial court's findings, as affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and his father deceived
respondent to acquire the disputed lots bind us. Well-settled is the rule that factual conclusions of the
trial court deserve respect and become irrefutable especially when affirmed by the CA. 9 Absent any
evidence that the CA overlooked salient matters that could justify a reversal of the outcome of this
case, we decline to disturb such factual conclusions. TSEAaD
Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who has
knowledge of and participation in the employment of fraud. An innocent purchaser for value is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving
any notice of another person's claim. 13 Obviously, petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for
value. HECTaA
As a final point, the Court takes significant note of the fact that respondent's father
originally acquired the subject lots through homestead grant. Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act)
aims to confine and preserve to the homesteader and his kin the homestead lots. We, therefore, agree
with the CA's disquisition that courts should "lend a stout shoulder to help keep a homestead in the
homesteader's family" for the stern reality cannot be belied that "homesteaders and their families are
generally in the lower stratum of life" and most likely, when they alienate the homestead, it is "out of
dire necessity." 14 According to the CA, desperation does not allow much of a choice, hence
homesteaders and their kin should be given every opportunity to repurchase their homestead.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55055 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Gasataya v. Mabasa, G.R. No. 148147, [February 16, 2007], 545 PHIL 14-20)

Petitioner, however, insists that respondent had no right to the disputed lots since the
conditional sale agreement where such right was based had long been cancelled by DBP. According to
petitioner, a void and inexistent deed cannot override his right as registered owner of the lots.

We disagree.

Petitioner cannot discredit the deed of conditional sale just so he can to keep his titles to
the lots. Petitioner should be reminded that DBP revoked respondent's right to repurchase the lots
under said deed because of the deceitful maneuverings that he and his father employed. If we were to
sustain petitioner's argument, then we would, in effect, reward him for his misdeed.

Neither can this Court uphold petitioner's contention that his titles are unsullied on the
mere fact that he purchased the properties at public auction. Fraud overthrows the presumption that
the public sale was attended with regularity. The public sale did not vest petitioner with any valid title
to the properties since it was but the consequence of his and his father's fraudulent schemes.

The registration of the properties in petitioner's name did not obliterate the fact that fraud
preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of misrepresentation of material facts, 10 which in this case was the
conscious representation by petitioner's father (Sabas Gasataya) that respondent's obligation to DBP
had already been settled. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained,
to the prejudice of another. 11 Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance. 12
 TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.
GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON.
PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents.
Samson Montesa Villacorta & Associates for petitioner.
Atty. Antonio Z Magabo for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
After petitioner failed to pay her loan which was secured by a deed of real estate mortgage,
the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent del Mundo on May 23, 1997
and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the registry of deeds on June 23, 1997. Petitioner
failed to redeem the property within one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale. On June 25,
1998, however, she filed a complaint to annul the sheriff's certificate of sale with prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order due to alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings. The trial court enjoined private respondent and the sheriffs from causing the
issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the property in favor of de Guzman.
CA, however, annulled the asailed writ of preliminary injunction.
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision on appeal, ruling that petitioner has no more
proprietary right over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction; and
that their subsequent agreement entitled "Kasunduang Pagaayos" did not novate or extinguish the old
obligation because the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and
validity of the old one and the old and new contracts were not incompatible in all points.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; WHEN ISSUED. — Injunction is a
preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be
issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation
of such right.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF A CLEAR RIGHT VIOLATED IS A PREREQUISITE TO THE
GRANTING THEREOF. — Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an
injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either
the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of
injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has
endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the
court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to
only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard of compensation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, we agree with the respondent
Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle
her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public
auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from
the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or
before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the
foreclosed property.
4. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; NOVATION AS A MODE OF
EXTINGUISHING OBLIGATION. — Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution
or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or
principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third
person to the rights of the creditor.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES MUST EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT THEY ARE ABROGATING THE OLD
CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF A NEW ONE; CASE AT BAR. — Under the law, novation is never presumed. The
parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new
one. Accordingly, it was held that no novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement
entered into between the parties was intended to give life to the old one. A review of the "Kasunduang
Pag-aayos" which is quoted earlier does not support petitioner's contention that it novated the real
estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the
old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in
the Kasunduanthe existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long
overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for
a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon
failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one
year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the
continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, in other words, the parties expressly negated
the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita Idolor which seeks to
set aside the decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the Order 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City 3 granting Idolor's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 4
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, Teresita Idolor executed in favor of
private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. The object of said
mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvements located at 66 Ilocos Sur Street, Barangay
Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 25659.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of Gumersindo de
Guzman, filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" which
agreement is quoted in full 5 :
"Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa
usaping binabanggit sa itaas, ay nagkakasundo sa pamamagitan nito na ayusin
ang aming alitan gaya ng sumusunod:
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang
P520,000.00 noong September 20, 1994.
Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No.
25659) under Registry receipt 3420 dated July 15, 1996.
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace
period) to settle the said amount.
Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21,
1996, I agree to execute a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase
without interest within one year.
Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.
At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga
katakdaan ng pag-aayos na inilahad sa itaas."
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed
a motion for execution before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a
certification to file action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra-judicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage
dated March 21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent
Gumersindo, as the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,
a complaint for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondents, Deputy
Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among
others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the
real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private
respondents, the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance
of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman
spouses. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial court's order dated July 28, 1998 which granted the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the
assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration which was
denied in a resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V. Idolor. The issues
raised by petitioner are: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling (1) that
petitioner has no more proprietary right to the issuance of the writ of injunction, (2) that the
"Kasunduang Pag-aayos" did not ipso factoresult in novation of the real estate mortgage, (3) that the
"Kasunduang Pag-aayos" is merely a promissory note of petitioner to private respondent spouses; and
(4) that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erred in finding that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents
from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel
of land in favor of private respondents.
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land was not yet lost
since her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had neither lapsed nor run as the
sheriff's certificate of sale was null and void; that petitioner and the general public have not been validly
notified of the auction sale conducted by respondent sheriffs, that the newspaper utilized in the
publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and
interests. 6 Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:
1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the
injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. 7 Hence the existence of a right violated, is a
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future
rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially
protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to
commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient
ground for denying the injunction.8 The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to
issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. 9 It
is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. 10
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more
proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of
injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to private respondent
Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's
sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses
de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When
petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient
interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired
on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying
injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought — in other words, that she shows no equity. 11 The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. 12
Petitioner's allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriff's sale dwells on the merits of
the case; We cannot rule on the same considering that the matter should be resolved during the trial
on the merits. HCATEa
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" dated
September 21, 1996 between her and spouses de Guzman before the Office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa showed the express and unequivocal intention of the parties to novate or modify the
real estate mortgage; that a comparison of the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994 and the
"Kasunduang Pag-aayos" dated September 21, 1996 revealed the irreconcilable incompatibility
between them, i.e., that under the first agreement, the amount due was five hundred twenty thousand
(P520,000) pesos only payable by petitioner within six (6) months, after which it shall earn interest at
the legal rate per annum and non-payment; of which within the stipulated period, private respondents
have the right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage while under the second agreement,
the amount due was one million two hundred thirty three thousand two hundred eighty eight and
23/100 (P1,233,288.23) inclusive of interest, payable within 90 days and in case of non-payment of the
same on or before December 21, 1996, petitioner should execute a deed of sale with right to
repurchase within one year without interest; that the second agreement "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" was
a valid new contract as it was duly executed by the parties and it changed the principal conditions of
petitioner's original obligations. Petitioner insists that the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" was not a mere
promissory note contrary to respondent court's conclusion since it was entered by the parties before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the effect of a final judgment. 13
We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the
obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or principal
conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to
the rights of the creditor. 14 Under the law, novation is never presumed. The parties to a contract must
expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. 15 Accordingly, it was
held that no novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into between the
parties was intended to give life to the old one. 16
A review of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" which is quoted earlier does not support
petitioner's contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear
by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points.
In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old
obligation where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was
secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation
on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a
right to repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties
to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where,
in other words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no
novation. 17 We find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's pronouncement as
follows:
"In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the
original undertaking. The agreement adverted to (Annex 2 of Comment, p.
75 Rollo) executed by the parties on September 21, 1996 merely gave life to
the March 21, 1994 mortgage contract which was then more than two years
overdue. Respondent acknowledged therein her total indebtedness in the
sum of P1,233,288.23 including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage
loan which amount she promised to liquidate within ninety (90) days or until
December 21, 1996, failing which she also agreed to execute in favor of the
mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgaged property for the same amount
without interest. Evidently, it was executed to facilitate easy compliance by
respondent mortgagor with her mortgage obligation. It (the September 21,
1996 agreement) is not incompatible and can stand together with the
mortgage contract of March 21, 1994.
A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a
buyer with the view that he would find it easier to comply with his obligations
under the Contract to Sell does not novate said Contract to Sell (Rillo v. Court
of Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]).
Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has
the force and effect of a final judgment. That precisely is the reason why
petitioner resorted to the foreclosure of the mortgage on March 27, 1997,
after her failure to comply with her obligation, which expired on December
21, 1996.
Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local
Government Code of 1991, which requires the lapse of six (6) months before
the amicable settlement may be enforced, is misplaced. The instant case
deals with extra-judicial foreclosure governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended."
Notably, the provision in the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" regarding the execution of a deed of
sale with right to repurchase within one year would have the same effect as the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage wherein petitioner was given one year from the registration of
the sheriff's sale in the Registry of property to redeem the property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of
redemption would entitle the purchaser to possession of the property. It is not proper to consider an
obligation novated by unimportant modifications which do not alter its essence. 18 It bears stress that
the period to pay the total amount of petitioner's indebtedness inclusive of interest amounted to
P1,233,288.23 expired on December 21, 1996 and petitioner failed to execute a deed of sale with right
to repurchase on the said date up to the time private respondents filed their petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. The failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the
"kasunduan" to settle her obligation effectively delayed private respondents' right to extra-judicially
foreclose the real estate mortgage which right accrued as far back as 1994. Thus, petitioner has not
shown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 28, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Idolor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141853, [February 7, 2001], 404 PHIL 220-230) FEDERATED REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. Hon. COURT OF
APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through the Commanding
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines — Visayas Command (AFP-
VISCOM), respondents.

Belo Gozon Elma Parel Asuncion & Lucila for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; EMINENT

DOMAIN; NATURE. — Eminent domain is one of the fundamental powers inherent to the State as a
sovereign. It is the authority and right of the State to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. Any arm of the State that
exercises such power must wield the same with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural
requirements.

2.REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; WRIT OF INJUNCTION, WHEN

ISSUED. — In a long line of cases, this Court has held that injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and interests. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not
shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. Thus, to be
entitled to injunctive relief, the following must be shown: (1) the invasion of a right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

3.CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; SERVES AS EVIDENCE OF AN

INDEFEASIBLE AND INCONTROVERTIBLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. — Time and again, we have upheld
the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. One who deals with property
registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the same. Such
principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.

4.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION; TITLE TO

THE PROPERTY EXPROPRIATED SHALL PASS FROM THE OWNER TO THE EXPROPRIATOR ONLY UPON
FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION. — In Republic v. Lim, we reiterated the rule that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of just
compensation.

5.CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 (PROPERTY

REGISTRATION DECREE); REQUIRES THE REGISTRATION WITH THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF THE
REPUBLIC'S INTEREST ARISING FROM THE EXERCISE OF ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; CASE AT
BAR. — The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise
of its power of eminent domain is in consonance with Section 88 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration
Act (now Section 85 of P.D. 1529 also known as the Property Registration Decree) . . . . Furthermore,
Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time of the Commonwealth case
likewise provides for the recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of Deeds. . . . There
is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforestated registration requirement. Without such
compliance, it cannot be said that FRC had notice of the Republic's adverse claim sufficient to consider
the former in bad faith, for the law gives the public the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and
to dispense with the need of further inquiry, except only when one has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to inquire further into its integrity.
6.ID.; ID.; ACT NO. 496 (LAND REGISTRATION ACT); CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; SHALL NOT BE
SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK. — By law, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
In Leyson v. Bontuyan, we ruled, to wit: "While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack, the rule is that an action is an attack on a title if its object
is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The
attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul set aside such proceeding, or enjoin
its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof."
7.REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; NOT PROPER WHEN ITS PURPOSE
IS TO TAKE THE PROPERTY OUT OF THE POSSESSION OR CONTROL OF ONE PARTY AND TRANSFER THE
SAME TO THE HANDS OF ANOTHER WHO DID NOT HAVE SUCH CONTROL AT THE INCEPTION OF THE
CASE AND WHOSE LEGAL TITLE HAS NOT CLEARLY BEEN ESTABLISHED. — [I]njunction is not proper
when its purpose is to take the property out of the possession or control of one party and transfer the
same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case and whose
legal title has not clearly been established, for the reason that before the question of ownership is
determined, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in status quo so that no
advantage may be given to one party to the detriment of the other.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POSSIBILITY OF IRREPARABLE DAMAGE, WITHOUT PROOF OF VIOLATION
OF AN ACTUALLY EXISTING RIGHT, IS NOT A GROUND THEREFOR. — [U]ntil FRC's title is annulled in a
proper proceeding, the Republic has no enforceable right over the subject property. Neither military
operational integrity nor national defense vests title to property in favor of the government. Hence,
the CA was in error in enjoining enforcement of the lower court's order, as injunction does not protect
rights not in esse. The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actually
existing right, is not a ground for injunction.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Eminent domain is one of the fundamental powers inherent to the State as a sovereign. It
is the authority and right of the State to take private property for public use upon observance of due
process of law and payment of just compensation. 1 Any arm of the State that exercises such power
must wield the same with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. 2
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Federated Realty Corporation (FRC) against the Republic of the Philippines through the Armed Forces
of the Philippines-Visayas Command (AFP-VISCOMM) and several of its men. 3
The operative facts, together with a historical background of the property involved, follow.
Knowing the history of the property is essential to understanding the case.
Petitioner FRC is the registered owner of a 543-square meter lot in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 119929 of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. The lot
adjoins a military reservation, Camp Lapu-Lapu, where the Command Headquarters of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines-Visayas Command (AFP-VISCOMM) is situated.
The lot in question used to be a portion of Lot No. 933 containing an area of 37,126 square
meters and formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate. In 1932, Lot No. 933 was registered in the
names of Francisco Racaza, Pantaleon Cabrera and Josefina Martinez per TCT No. RT 2533 (T-13) issued
on 30 August 1932.
Sometime in 1938, Lot No. 933 was one of 18 lots subjected to expropriation proceedings
by the government before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu in the case entitled Commonwealth
of the Philippines v. Borromeo, et al. (Commonwealth case), docketed as Civil Case No. 781, for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation. 4 Pursuant to the CFI Order dated 19 October 1938, the
Republic deposited P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank as a precondition for entry to the lots
sought to be expropriated.
On 14 May 1940, the CFI rendered a Decision 5 condemning Lot No. 933 along with the 17
other adjacent lots of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the Republic. In 1947, the whole military
reservation was converted into a national airport by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation and, by virtue
thereof, turned over to the National Airports Corporation.
The Decision in the Commonwealth case notwithstanding, the legal ownership of the
expropriated lands was mired in controversy. This Court has had two occasions to rule on the question
of ownership involving two of the lots. Valdehueza v. Republic, 6 decided in 1966, concerned Lot Nos.
932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, while Lot No. 932 was likewise the subject of Republic v.
Lim, 7 decided earlier this year. In both cases, the Court found that by the very admission of the
government, there was no record of payment of compensation by the government to the landowners.
Thus, the Court ruled in both cases that there was no transfer of the lots involved in favor of the
government. The decisions, however, did not touch on the state of ownership of Lot No. 933 which
was not involved in the cases. cSTDIC
Beginning in 1940, Lot No. 933 had been subdivided. Part of it was segregated as Lot 933-B
under TCT No. 49999 in the name of Francisco Racaza who sold the same to the Cebu Agro
Development Corporation (Cebu Agro) on 11 March 1974. 8 Cebu Agro had Lot 933-B further
subdivided into three farm lots to expand its rabbit farm. TCT No. 108002 was issued for Lot 933-B-1
by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on 05 April 1989 while TCT No. 108001 was issued for Lot 933-B-
2. On 08 April 1992, TCT No. 119740 was issued for Lot 3, with an area of 543 square meters, which is
a portion of the consolidation of Lots 933-B-1 and 933-B-2. All three titles were registered in the names
of Arturo Mercader, the President-General Manger of Cebu Agro, and his wife Evangeline Mercader,
who religiously paid the real property taxes for the three lots. 9
On 27 April 1992, FRC bought Lot 3 from the Mercader spouses and was issued TCT No.
119929 therefor by the Register of Deeds. 10
FRC hired workers to fence the said lot in preparation for the construction of a commercial
building thereon. However, the fence construction was halted on 03 June 1992 when Captain Rogelio
Molina arrived with a jeepload of fully-armed men from the AFP-VISCOMM, and ordered FRC's workers
to stop building the structure per instructions of AFP-VISCOMM Commanding General Romeo Zulueta.
Intimidated, FRC's men stopped working. When they resumed work the following day, Captain Molina
returned with his armed men and again ordered them to stop the construction. A similar incident
occurred on 08 July 1992, with Captain Molina asserting that the lot in question formed part of the
military reservation. All three incidents were recorded in the blotter of Police Station 2, Mabolo, Cebu
City. 11
On 22 July 1992, FRC filed a Complaint 12 for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu against Captain Rogelio Molina and six John Does. The complaint was later
amended to implead the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) through the AFP-VISCOMM and its
Commanding General Romeo Zulueta. FRC sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to order the respondents to cease, desist and refrain from
threatening, intimidating and harassing the workers constructing its fence and to cease, desist and
refrain from committing acts of intrusion into and deprivation of subject land, and to cease, desist and
refrain from harassing, disturbing and interfering with its peaceful and lawful possession and
enjoyment thereof. FRC also prayed that after trial, (i) the injunction be made permanent, (ii)
respondents adjudged without any legal right to or interest whatsoever in the parcel of land in
litigation, (iii) respondents ordered to pay compensatory and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
On the same day, the trial court issued the TRO 13 prayed for with a duration of 20 days,
and set the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.
In their Answer, 14 respondents admitted that Captain Rogelio Molina ordered FRC's
workers to desist from fencing the land in dispute on the ground that said lot is government property.
However, they denied that he and his armed men threatened and/or harassed the said workers.
In an Omnibus Order 15 dated 26 August 1992, the trial court granted FRC's application for
preliminary injunction which writ it later made permanent in an Order16 dated 12 October 1995 "until
such time that the issue of ownership between the parties shall have been resolved by a competent
court." 17 The trial court found that the subject property is in the possession of FRC and its
predecessor-in-interest and ruled that FRC's assertion of ownership is supported by a TCT which must
be upheld until nullified by a competent court in a proper proceeding. In all probability, the Republic
would prevent the construction of FRC's fence, if not provisionally prevented by court order, thereby
making injunction a proper relief, the lower court noted.
Aggrieved, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) on 24 November 1995 a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with an urgent prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking to set
aside the 12 October 1995 Order of the trial court. 18 It justified its immediate recourse to the
appellate court on the basis of urgency and the perceived futility of filing a motion for reconsideration
with the lower court, thereby leaving it with no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except through the petition. 19
As per Resolution 20 dated 29 November 1995, the CA gave due course to the petition and
temporarily restrained the implementation of the trial court's questioned order pending full
consideration of the Republic's petition.
On 12 September 1996, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision 21 granting the Republic's
petition for certiorari, setting aside the trial court's 12 October 1995 Order, and making permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction it issued against the implementation of the trial court's decision. It further
ordered the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-12290.
The appellate court ratiocinated that FRC does not have a clear and unmistakable right over
the subject property on the ground that "the subject lot not only adjoins military structures, but the
main entrance thereof carries the arch of the AFP-VISCOMM identifying beyond peradventure of doubt
that one is entering the premises of the AFP, a government entity." 22 It likewise held that the damage
which FRC may suffer in enjoining it from undertaking any improvements on the subject property
"pales in comparison with what the [Republic] stands to suffer in the event of a permanent injunction
against it — the integrity of its military premises." 23 It concluded that not until FRC's title to the land
is upheld by final judgment may a writ of injunction properly issue to prevent the Republic from
disallowing FRC to fence the lot and introduce any improvement thereon. TaISEH
FRC then filed a motion for reconsideration 24 but the same was denied by the CA in
a Resolution 25 dated 31 January 1997. The appellate court found the trial court in grave abuse of
discretion when it disregarded the fact that the subject lot had been expropriated by the government
a long time ago in the Commonwealthcase.
Hence, this petition.
The core issue in this case is whether or not injunction lies in favor of FRC to prevent the
Republic from interfering in the exercise of its rights of ownership over the subject property.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and interests. 26 The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. 27 Where facts are
not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. 28
Thus, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the following must be shown: (1) the invasion of a
right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. 29
In reversing the trial court, the CA found FRC's case to be wanting in the second and third
requisites.
We disagree.
We first take up the second requisite. Without ruling on the question of ownership over the
subject property, we shall delve into the respective claims of ownership of the parties if only to
determine if FRC had sufficiently established the existence of a right to be protected by a writ of
injunction.
 Basically, FRC anchors its claim on the indefeasibility of its registered title to the subject lot
which cannot be collaterally attacked by the Republic in an injunction suit. It further alleges, and as
found by the trial court, that along with its predecessors-in-interest it has been in open, peaceful and
continuous possession thereof since time immemorial, tilling the same and paying all the taxes due
thereon.
On the other hand, the Republic has not presented any title over the subject lot but instead
relies heavily on the Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases in asserting ownership and possession over
the same, arguing that it was expropriated by the government for military purposes in 1940. It further
alleges that its possession of the subject lot is evidenced by the existence of military structures on the
adjoining lots and that of the Camp Lapu-Lapu arch on the main entrance of the property in question.
Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. 30 It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel
of land. 31 One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and
need not go beyond the same. 32 Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this
jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the
doctrine finds no application. 33
In the instant case, it is undisputed that FRC is a holder of a certificate of title over the lot in
question. Records show that each of FRC's predecessors-in-interest was likewise a holder of an
indefeasible title. Furthermore, no patent irregularity can be gleaned on the face of FRC's title. Yet, the
Republic challenges the validity of the same by maintaining that the subject lot had long been
expropriated in favor of the government. Although it does not present any title over the property, the
Republic invokes the expropriation proceedings which are the Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases.
However, the Republic's reliance on the proceedings does not in any way bolster its cause.
First, Valdehueza involves Lot Nos. 932 and 939. It does not in any way deal with the subject
property nor were FRC and its predecessors-in-interest made parties thereto. Hence, the ruling therein
cannot be applied to the instant case.
On the other hand, the property in question was indeed made subject of expropriation
proceedings in the Commonwealth case. However, the CFI in said case made no mention of the award
of the land subject thereof in favor of the government. The CFI merely fixed the valuation of the lots
involved for the purpose of payment of just compensation by the government. Until the government
has paid for the value of the lots, ownership shall remain with the respective landowners. 34 InRepublic
v. Lim, we reiterated the rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of just compensation.35
We note that the Republic claims possession over the subject lot based first on its alleged
deposit of P9,500 pursuant to the CFI Order dated 19 October 1938 in the Commonwealth case, and
second, on the existence of military structures on the adjoining lots of the subject property coupled
with the existence of a portion of the runway of the defunct Lahug airport on Lot No. 933 and the arch
of Camp Lapu-Lapu on the subject lot. However, the records are bereft of evidence on the alleged
deposit made by the Republic with the Philippine National Bank. The Republic merely relies on our
ruling in Valdehueza which the Republic claims to have reinforced theCommonwealth case. However,
although Valdehueza and even Lim do mention a disbursement of the said amount, there was no proof
presented by the Republic in both cases as to the receipt of the said deposit by the authorized
depositary. 36 Even then, said cases do not involve Lot No. 933. There is also nothing in
theCommonwealth case stating that the Republic had in fact made the required deposit as
precondition to possession of the subject lot. SAHIaD
There is also no evidence presented as to the existence of the camp's arch on subject lot. In
any case, the Republic cannot base its right to the subject lot solely on the alleged presence of a
government structure therein. The law provides for a strict procedure for expropriation which the State
must follow lest it violates the constitutionally enshrined principle that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." 37
Assuming that the Republic had indeed paid the deposit or made full payment of just
compensation, in regular order this should have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the
annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title covering the subject lot. The
registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of its power
of eminent domain is in consonance with Section 88 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act (now
Section 85 of P.D. 1529 also known as the Property Registration Decree), 38 to wit:
SEC. 88.Whenever any land of a registered owner, or any right or
interest therein, is taken by eminent domain, the Government or municipality
or corporation or other authority exercising such right shall file for registration
in the proper province a description of the registered land so taken, giving the
name of such owner thereof, referring by number and place of registration in
the registration book to each certificate of title, and stating what amount or
interest in the land is taken, and for what purpose. A memorandum of the
right or interest taken, shall be made on each certificate of title by the register
of deeds, and where the fee simple is taken a new certificate shall be entered
to the owner for the land remaining to him after such taking, and a new
certificate shall be entered to the Government, municipality, corporation, or
other authority exercising such right for the land so taken. All fees on account
of any memorandum of registration or entry of new certificate shall be paid
by the authority taking the land.
Furthermore, Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time of
the Commonwealth case likewise provides for the recording of the judgment of expropriation in the
Registry of Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit:
SEC. 251.Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. — The record of
the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes and bounds
and adequate description. the particular land or interest in land condemned
to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the
record of the judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of
deeds for the province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall be
to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land and estate so
described. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforestated registration
requirement. Without such compliance, it cannot be said that FRC had notice of the Republic's adverse
claim sufficient to consider the former in bad faith, for the law gives the public the right to rely on the
face of the Torrens title and to dispense with the need of further inquiry, except only when one has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to inquire
further into its integrity. 40 Such is the very essence of our Torrens system as ruled in Legarda v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, thus:
 The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the courts, or sitting in the 'mirador de su casa,' to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. . . . The certificate, in the absence of
fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all
security in registered titles would be lost. 41
In any event, if FRC or any of its predecessors-in-interest had fraudulently acquired title to
the subject lot, this issue should be properly ventilated in a direct proceeding for that purpose, and not
in an injunction suit. By law, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. 42 In Leyson v.
Bontuyan, 43 we ruled, to wit:
While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack, the rule is that an action is an attack
on a title if its object is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is considered direct when
the object of an action is to annul set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in
an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. caHCSD
Therefore, FRC's claim as a titleholder is given preference by law to any other claim of right
over said land. Until such title is nullified, the Republic can raise no more than a doubtful claim over
the property in question, which dubious claim militates against the issuance in its favor of a writ of
injunction. So, the appellate court erred in stating the rule in reverse and in granting injunctive relief
to the Republic when its claim of ownership as against FRC's is unclear. It must be stressed that
injunction is not proper when its purpose is to take the property out of the possession or control of
one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception
of the case and whose legal title has not clearly been established, 44 for the reason that before the
question of ownership is determined, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in
status quo so that no advantage may be given to one party to the detriment of the other. 45
All told, reversing the appellate court we rule that the second requisite for injunctive relief,
that FRC holds a clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot, has been sufficiently established.
Anent the third requisite, the appellate court ruled that in the event of a permanent
injunction the Republic stands to suffer greater injury compared to FRC, as a private commercial
building within a camp will pose serious danger and damage to military operations. Again, we disagree.
In seeking the affirmation of the writ of injunction issued by the CA to enjoin the
implementation of the permanent injunction ordered by the trial court against it, the Republic invokes
national security and the integrity of its military operations. It argues that civilians cannot be allowed
to lurk within military premises.
However, we cannot overemphasize that until FRC's title is annulled in a proper proceeding,
the Republic has no enforceable right over the subject property. Neither military operational integrity
nor national defense vests title to property in favor of the government. Hence, the CA was in error in
enjoining enforcement of the lower court's order, as injunction does not protect rights not
in esse. 46 The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actually existing right,
is not a ground for injunction. 47
Furthermore, the only so-called military structure allegedly found on Lot No. 933 is the arch
of Camp Lapu-Lapu. It is not even clear where exactly on Lot No. 933 this arch stands. Neither was it
shown when the same was constructed. Note that the lot in question is not the entire Lot No. 933, but
only a portion thereof. We cannot imagine how fencing a 543-square meter lot can lead to grave and
irreparable damage to the Republic. Our ruling in the Lim case is instructive, to wit:
The Republic's assertion that the defense of the State will be in
grave danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an
overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What
remains in the site is just the National Historical Institute's marking stating
that Lot 932 is the "former location of Lahug Airport." And second, there are
only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are
residence apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are
actually used as training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of
Lot 932 to respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will
not result to "irreparable damage" or "damage beyond pecuniary
estimation," as what the Republic vehemently claims. 48
Lot No. 932 adjoins the subject lot. Although, there existed on Lot No. 932 training centers
and housing for military personnel, we ruled that the reversion of Lot No. 932 to respondent therein,
a private party, will not cause irreparable injury to the Republic that gives rise to a ground for injunctive
relief. What more in this case when the only structures alleged to exist on subject lot are a portion of
an unused runway and an arch? Thus, the Republic's contention that it will suffer serious damage if
injunction is ordered against it is more imagined than real.
Meanwhile, the exercise by FRC of its rights of ownership over the subject lot is being unduly
restrained. At this point, its possession and ownership of the subject property must be respected.
Since the Republic has failed to prove its indubitable right over the lot in question we have
to rule that FRC possesses a clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot that necessitates the
issuance of a writ of injunction to prevent serious damage to its interests as titleholder thereto.
Meanwhile, FRC may institute a separate proceeding to quiet its title wherein the issue of ownership
over the subject property may finally be resolved.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 12
September 1996 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the Order dated 12 October 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. aSCHcA
SO ORDERED.
||| (Federated Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127967, [December 14, 2005], 514 PHIL 93-
112)

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, FELIX
ABANDULA, FAUSTO GABAISEN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO,
MARTIN ROLLON, EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS,
SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA
GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC, FLORENTINA
GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA,
ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO
HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA MATELA, DELFIN MATELA,
PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA
CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants, vs. TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES,
SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE COROMINAS, JESUSA
REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON
CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V. GARCES FALCON, JAIME
GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO RE. R. LUSPO, defendants-appellees.
[G.R. No. L-32065. February 23, 1990.]
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO
RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA,
FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS
REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and MAURO
RENOBLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of
First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al.,respondents.
[G.R. No. L-33677. February 23, 1990.]
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO
RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA,
FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS
REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and MAURO
RENOBLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of
First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province of Bohol, and
MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
Lord M. Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners.
Roque R. Luspo for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; EXCEPT QUESTIONS ON JURISDICTION, NO QUESTION
WILL BE ENTERTAINED THEREON UNLESS IT HAS BEEN RAISED IN COURT BELOW AND IS WITHIN
ISSUES MADE BY PARTIES IN THEIR PLEADINGS. — It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on
jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below
and it is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789,
July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532).
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; APPLIES TO ALL CASES AND PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING LAND
REGISTRATION AND CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS. — The principle of res judicata applies to all cases
and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES THEREOF, CITED. — It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on
the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is
conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in interest litigating
upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order, therefore, that there
may be res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil.
281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26, 1986, 146 SCRA 24).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF DOCTRINE; THERE SHOULD BE AN END TO
LITIGATION BY SAME PARTIES AND THEIR PRIVIES OVER A SUBJECT ONCE FULLY AND FAIRLY
ADJUDICATED; EFFECT OF IGNORING PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA. — The underlying philosophy of
the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28, 1984, 132
SCRA 302). The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by
age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be
an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly
adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L-41940, Nov.
21, 1984, 133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the door to endless
litigations by continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the
Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294-95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
5. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; WRIT OF POSSESSION; JUDGMENT CONFIRMING TITLE OF
APPLICANT AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION IN HIS NAME CARRIES WITH IT DELIVERY OF
POSSESSION; WRIT OF POSSESSION, TO WHOM ISSUED. — In a registration case, the judgment
confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily carried with
it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. The issuance of
the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the
generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests (Romasanta, et. al. vs.
Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion, et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554 [1956]). A writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case
but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during
the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs. Ibañez, et al., 97
Phil 2 [1955]).
6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CONTEMPT; WHEN MAY A PERSON BE CHARGED. — We
do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Under
Section 3 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of real
property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed
to deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that
the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession
thereof to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters
or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be entitled thereto,
then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine
National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS NOT HELD LIABLE WHERE FAILURE TO EXECUTE JUDGMENT WAS DUE TO
SHERIFF'S FAULT. — It is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates
of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the trial
judge who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. The
petitioners in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their
refusal to effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could
not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply
with his duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners,
that the judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have availed
himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat, 22
Phil. 183).
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases, considering that
they involve the same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660— this is an appeal from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court) 1 dated May 12, 1964
dismissing the cases of some of the plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying
the motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default; (2)
G.R. No.L32065 — this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol 2 dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding
petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. No. L-33677 — this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus
and prohibition of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the
demolition of the houses of the petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they are still
interested in prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these
cases moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same. On March 25, 1988, the
petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation that they are still very much interested in the just
prosecution of these cases.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels of
land allegedly inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No.
N-4251. On July 26, 1951, administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for
registration. After hearing, the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-
85, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminary
injunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record on Appeal; p. 7,Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-
appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that they are the lawful owners
of their respective parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by purchase or
inheritance and have been in possession publicly, continuously, peacefully and adversely under the
concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of their predecessors-
in-interest. However, those parcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for
registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving
them of their rights of ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of
1960 when the defendants-appellees, through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land
claiming that they now belong to the heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees
moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of
cause of action and (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment. LibLex
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss
(pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such order (pp.
31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the same court issued another order
reversing itself partially (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto
Cabaisan, Fabian Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc,
Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, Victoriano Haganas, Julia
Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio Cabañas and Vicente
Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with these
plaintiffs paying proportionately eighteenth-forty one (18/41) of the costs,
but the petition to dismiss the case of the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby
denied.
"SO ORDERED."
On May 28, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 57-58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants
whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default for
failure to file their answer with the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration
praying that the complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise dismissed (pp.
75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all motions.
The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-
Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit:
"I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
OF RES ADJUDICATA.
"II
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO DECLARE THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE THEIR
ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW."
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal as regards the second
issue because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not appealable (pp. 35-
38, Rollo).
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame,
Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon
filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that they are now the absolute owners and
possessors of their respective parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that they
(plaintiffs-appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for
registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court. Likewise, they contend
that res judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance. cdrep
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellants
were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they
given copies of the decision of the trial court are new issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except
questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
court below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R.
No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicable in an
action for reconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and
proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-
35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil.
303).
It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties
and their successors in interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous
it may be. In order, therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites must be
present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26, 1986,
146 SCRA 24).
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 302). The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom
of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to
the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their
privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis
litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L-41940, Nov. 21, 1984, 133 SCRA 344). To ignore the
principle of res judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous determination
of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 80294-95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he does not want to
participate and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title
has been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due course to the action is to nullify
registration proceedings and defeat the purpose of the law.
In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo meticulously discussed the
presence of all the elements of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):
"There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC Record No.
N-4251, Land Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance of the
province of Bohol had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that said court had
rendered a judgment on the merit that was terminated in the Court of
Appeals since December, 1958, and that decision is now final with a decree
of registration over the parcels of land described in the application issued to
the applicants.
"The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs in this
case at bar are the same, or at least part of the parcels already adjudicated
registration in that registration case to the persons, some of them are made
defendants in this case before us. The cause of action between the two
cases are the same, ownership of these parcels of land, though the forms of
action are different, one is an ordinary Land Registration and the other is
reconveyance.
'It is settled that notwithstanding the difference
in the form of two actions, the doctrine of res
adjudicata will apply where it appears that the parties in
effect were litigating for the same thing. A party can not, by
varying the form of action, escape the effects of res
adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30, 1958;
 Geronimo vs. Nava., No. L-12111, Jan. 31, 1959; Labarro vs.
Labateria, et al., 28 O.G. 4479).
'Well settled is the rule that a party can not by
varying the form of action, or adopting a different method
of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies.'
(Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz,
et al., No. L-12663, Aug. 21, 1959).
'Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary civil
action, determining the ownership of certain lands is res
adjudicata in a registration proceeding where the parties
and property are the same as in the former case (Paz vs.
Inandan, 75 Phil. 608; Peñaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).'
"xxx xxx xxx
"But are there identities of parties in this case before us and the former
registration proceedings? Identity of parties means that the parties in the
second case must be the same parties in the first case, or at least, must be
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
former action or proceeding, or when the parties in the subsequent case are
heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Phil.
487; Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et al. vs. Penida, No. L-3467,
July 30, 1951).
"xxx xxx xxx
"Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with in
mind the principles of res adjudicata above-quoted, we noticed that
many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the former registration
case, but many are children of the former oppositors. In such a case
we have to determine the case of every plaintiff, if the former
decision in the land registration case is conclusive and binding upon
him.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants of the
parcels of land object of registration proceeding had been notified when the
land was surveyed. These persons notified according to the surveyor's
certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, Fausto Baguisin,
Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio
Lofraco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura,
Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas Omosura, Simon
Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio Asolan,
Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel
Mondano, Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Felomino
Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape.
"The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office of the initial hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedings
enjoining them to appear on June 16, 1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Court of
First Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer of said application
should not be granted: the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the
Director of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, Manila; the Provincial
Governor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, Tagbilaran, Bohol;
the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan, Catalino
Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del
Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of
Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome
Omosora, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosora, Simon
Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirs of Catalino Polvos,
Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario Laroda,
Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona, Antequera, Bohol.
"And after the application had been filed and published in accordance with
law the following persons represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filed
opposition to that registration proceeding: Felipe Cubillo, Simon Lagrimas,
Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil, Anastacio
Orillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya, Pablo
Dumagdag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Cledonio Cabanas,
Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro Omosura, Daniel
Itaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omosura, Nicasio Omosora, Calixto Sevilla,
Teodora Omosora, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes
Sevilla, Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos Hagonos,
Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo Omosora, Fabian Villame, Teodoro Omosora,
Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela, Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosora,
and Gregorio Repelle (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V. Balmaseda in representation
of the Bureau of Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in
representation of the Municipality of Calape.
"Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiff
Alejandro Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro,
being the husband of Juliana Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff
Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the oppositors in the registration
proceedings, but he was notified of the initial hearing of that registration
case and by the surveyor that surveyed the land object of registration
(Exhibit J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land registration
proceeding is binding upon him and his case is dismissed on the ground
of res adjudicata with costs.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notified by the surveyor and that notice of the
initial hearing. And though he was not an oppositor, the former land
registration proceeding is binding on him. Therefore, this case is dismissed in
so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunato Ita-
oc are children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in the registration
proceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land was inherited by said
plaintiffs' mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record
(Exhibits J-3, J-4, J-5). However (sic), shows that the land is declared in the
name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration case. Hence,
these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are
bound by the decision in that registration case. Their case, therefore, is
dismissed, with costs.
"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas and Victoriano
Haganas are children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor in the
registration case. Marcos testified that his claim before was only two
hectares, while the claim of his children is seven hectares, which come from
his wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two parcels, one under Tax
Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It appears that Tax
Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of Marcos Haganas and
the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the
spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956
(Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor in the registration proceeding.
Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, and
Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-interest to properties in which the
decision in the registration case is conclusive and binding to their
predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with costs.
"Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositor
in the registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela Matela,
Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their children. She has no son by the
name of Pelagio. Julia testified that the land now claimed by her children
came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was claimed by Mauricio
Matela as oppositor was in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. This is
the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela
Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4). These plaintiffs are
successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision in
that land proceeding wherein he was the oppositor. Therefore, the case of
these plaintiffs are dismissed with costs.
"Plaintiff Procopia Cabañas was the wife of Andres Reambonancia, oppositor
in the land registration proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20 described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax Declaration No. R-8121. It appears
that this land is declared in the name of Andres Reambonancia (Exhibit N-3)
who, as oppositor in the land registration case, is bound by the decision of
that case. Therefore, the case of plaintiff Procopia Cabañas, as successor-in-
interest to Andres Reambonancia, is hereby dismissed, with costs.
"Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil,
both oppositors in the former registration case. The land claimed by plaintiff
Vicente Amosora is described as parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 of the
complaint under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of his father
Enerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the former land
registration of which this land was a part, the decision of that land
registration case is conclusive and binding not only to Enerio Amosora, but
also to his successor-in-interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case
therefore, is dismissed with costs."
G.R. No. L-32065
Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was
issued in the name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was issued in the
name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).
A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession dated January 6, 1961,
and a second alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court against the
petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seek tactics employed by the petitioners was
proved by the official report of the deputy sheriff dated January 21, 1960. Another evidence of
petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate was a certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriff's
return dated October 25, 1966.
On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one of the registered
owners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the petitioners
for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for refusing to sign the Sheriff's return.
On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
47, Rollo):
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record that Procopia
Reambonansa voluntarily left the land and dropped out from the case; the
charge of contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who died) is dismissed and
each of the remaining 22 respondents are hereby found guilty of contempt
under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of
One Hundred Pesos, authorizing the Constabulary Detachment at or near
Candungao, Calape, Bohol to collect the same and to transmit the money to
the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at
the rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day, the said
Constabulary Detachment to effect the commitment if any of them is unable
to pay the fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22 respondents shall also
be taken by the constabulary and filed with the record of this case.
"It is so ordered."
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated resolution
whereas Ogilve filed an opposition thereto.
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970, another
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for
reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the
court a quo ordered the proper officers to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969. cdphil
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less
THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF
POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLE
ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND
POSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF
POSSESSION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES
TO THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT DEFEATED
OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land
registration case, as their names do not appear in the amended application for registration; that they
have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before the
filing of the application for registration; and that after the hearing of the registration case, they
continued in possession of the said land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration
in his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the
right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in
this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests
(Romasanta, et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion, et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et al., 100 Phil. 554
[1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs.
Ibañez, et al., 97 Phil 2 [1955]). LLpr
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more than thirty
(30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration and continued in
possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked against them. It was a virtual admission
of their lack of defense. Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them.
However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
Under Section 3 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of
real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be
directed to deliver the possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This
means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the
possession thereof to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing
party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt
(Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this section, it is exclusively
incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in
fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who rendered that
judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing
to do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of
prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty. It was solely
due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners, that the judgment was not
duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have availed himself of the public force, had it
been necessary to resort thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183). prcd
G.R. No. L-33677
On March 22, 1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which was granted by the
trial court on April 5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of contempt. On
April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of said order. On June 2,
1971, the trial court issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):
"WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers with him
but also carpenters to effect the demolition, the carpenters being at the
expense of the Luspo.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use and
enjoyment of their right to which they are entitled when he (respondent judge) issued the order of
demolition on April 5, 1971 and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo).
On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo). LexLib
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The petitioners allege that the respondent judge cannot issue a writ of demolition pending the
resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of demolition.
It is significant to note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order dated
May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty
of contempt and not the writs of possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued
the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held:
"[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies
the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein
(Demorar vs. Ibañez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et
al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298), a writ of demolition
must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a
complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be
ineffective.
xxx xxx xxx
 "[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to do
justice to petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots in
question, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent . . . to remove his
house thereon and restore possession of the premises to petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of First Instance dated May
12, 1964 and August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some of the
plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;

2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court of First Instance dated
May 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and

3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of First Instance dated
June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Vencilao v. Vano, G.R. No. L-25660, L-32065, L-33677, [February 23, 1990], 261 PHIL 613-631)
 JETRI CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION/ANASTACIA CORPUZ RIGOR,
President, petitioner, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84788, dated 17 November 2005,
which dismissed petitioner's appeal for its failure to file its appellant's brief within the reglementary
period despite notice.
Sometime in 1994, petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation applied for a P20,000,000.00
Omnibus Line Credit Facility with Far East Bank and Trust Company, predecessor-in-interest of herein
respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Upon approval of said credit facility, petitioner Jetri
Construction Corporation was able to borrow from the bank a total of P20,000,000.00. As security for
the loans, petitioner mortgaged its land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213950 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila as well as the 4-storey building erected thereon located at No. 177 M. dela
Fuente St., Sampaloc, Manila. A Comprehensive Surety Agreement was also executed by Anastacia
Corpus Rigor, president of Jetri Construction Corporation, wherein she acted as surety of the
corporation's loans from Far East Bank and bound herself to pay jointly and severally with Jetri
Construction Corporation all obligations the latter may incur.
When Jetri Construction Corporation defaulted in paying the loan, it entered into a Loan
Restructuring Agreement with the bank wherein it acknowledged that its obligation under the
Discounting Line was for the total amount of P22,621,876.37.
For failure of Jetri Construction Corporation to pay the loan under the Loan Restructuring
Agreement upon maturity, the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property covered by
TCT No. 213950. On 22 November 1999, an auction sale was held wherein the mortgaged property was
sold to the bank, it being the lone and highest bidder. The Certificate of Sale was registered and
annotated at the back of TCT No. 213950 on 3 December 1999.
Upon expiration of the redemption period, with petitioner failing to redeem the property,
ownership over the mortgaged property was consolidated in favor of the bank and a new certificate of
title was issued in its name, particularly TCT No. 250654.
On 28 August 2001, BPI filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, Civil
Case No. 01-1336 against herein petitioner for alleged foreclosure deficiency in the amount of
P33,270,131.25.
Jetri Construction Corporation, on the other hand, simultaneously filed two complaints
against respondent BPI and its managing officers, respectively. The first is a complaint for (a) annulment
of mortgage foreclosure; (b) cancellation of respondent's derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No.
250654; (c) quieting of petitioner's ownership and restoration of title; and (d) indemnity for damages
before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-111298. The second is a
complaint for Estafa before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila against the managing officers of BPI
for the alleged misappropriation of the Three (3) Million Pesos paid by petitioner as amortization for
its loan. EIcTAD
Despite demands, petitioner refused to vacate the premises of the foreclosed property,
thus, on 15 August 2003, herein respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession of
Real Property 2 before the RTC of Manila.
On 28 February 2005, the RTC of Manila, Branch IV, issued the assailed Order 3 issuing the
writ of possession prayed for by respondent BPI. According to the courta quo:
As to the Oppositor's attack on the validity of the foreclosure sale,
the Highest Tribunal has already ruled in several cases that:
"The order for writ of possession issue as a matter of
course with no discretion being left to the court and any question
regarding the validity of the sale should be determined in a
subsequent proceeding and cannot be raised as a justification for
opposing the issuance of writ of possession." [De Gracia vs. San
Jose, et al., 94 Phil. 623].
". . . the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter
of course upon the filing of the proper motion and approval of the
corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the court. And any
question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the
subsequent cancellation of the writ) is to be determined in a
subsequent proceeding as outlined in Sec. 8. Such question is not
to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of
possession, since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex
parte." [Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA, citing Marcelo Steel Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 89]. EHSTDA
Moreover, in the case of Ong vs. CA, 333 SCRA 189, the High Court
fortified the foregoing obiter dicta by declaring that:
"As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not
there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession,
without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the said
case."
As to the prayer of the petitioner bank for the issuance of writ of
possession over the subject property, the court finds no cogent reason why
the same should not be issued, in the case of PDCP Bank vs. Vestil, 264 SCRA
467, the Supreme Court declared among others, that:
"In cases in which, an extra-judicial sale is made
pursuant to an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, redemption
 is governed by secs. 29 to 31 and sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court and sec. 35 provides among others, that, If no redemption is
made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser or
his assignee is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the
property. "The rule therefore is that: after the redemption period
has expired, the purchaser of the property has the right to be
placed in possession thereof. SCHATc
In Navarra vs. CA, 204 SCRA 850, The Highest Tribunal ruled:
The purchaser at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale has
the right to the possession of the property even during the one-
year period of redemption provided he files an indemnity bond.
After the lapse of the said period with no redemption having been
made, that right becomes absolute and may be demanded by the
buyer even without the posting of the bond. Possession may then
be obtained under a writ which, may be applied for ex
parte pursuant to sec. 7 of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118."
It having been established that the period of redemption of the
property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 213950 (now Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 250654) which was sold at public auction to Far East
Bank and Trust Company, (the herein petitioner's predecessor-in-interest) as
highest bidder in connection with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the
mortgage has already expired without said property having been redeemed
and a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654 issued in the name of
Far East Bank and Trust Company (now) Bank of the Philippine Islands and in
conformity with the provisions of Act 3135, as amended, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. ISCaDH
WHEREFORE, let the corresponding writ of possession be issued
directing the Sheriff of this Branch to place the herein petitioner bank in actual
physical possession of the foreclosed property situated in the district of
Sampaloc, City of Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
213950, now Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654, and to eject therefrom
mortgagor JETRI Construction Corporation, its agents and such other persons
claiming rights under it. 4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted Order, petitioner instituted an appeal before the Court of
Appeals which was dismissed by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 17 November 2005, which
reads:
For failure of the appellant to file its appellant's brief within the
reglementary period despite notice, the appeal is declared ABANDONED and
hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. 5
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the dismissal of its
appeal before the appellate court. In Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, it was averred that
counsel for petitioner did not receive any notice to file its brief from the Court of Appeals as well as a
copy of the letter of transmittal of the record from the clerk of the lower court to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner, thus, argued that this non-compliance by the clerk of the lower court in violation of Section
10 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court caused the unwarranted confusion which actually deprived the
petitioner of the means to know when the reglementary period to file its brief had commenced.
In a Resolution dated 1 March 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in this wise:
Finding no merit on oppositor-appellant's MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, dated December 5, 2005, considering that the Notice to
File Brief, dated July 21, 2005, was sent to and received by the oppositor-
appellant, through counsel, on August 1, 2005, as shown by the attached
Registry Return Receipt (Back of p. 6, Rollo), and taking into consideration the
Comment filed thereto by counsel for petitioner-appellee, We
hereby DENY the motion. 6
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the dismissal of its appeal by the Court of Appeals amounts to a
denial of due process. Petitioner now explains in its petition before this Court that its counsel failed to
receive the Notice to file appellant's brief by "honest mistake" or "unforeseen accident" as the same
was received and allegedly misplaced by one Angeline Diguinat, who was just a visiting relative of
petitioner's counsel seeking financial assistance for the victims of the calamities in the province of
Aurora. Moreover, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, in the interest of justice, equity and
fair play, could have simply directed petitioner's counsel to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt for failure to comply with the order to file appellant's brief.
Rule 44, Section 7 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that it shall be the duty of the
appellant to file his brief within 45 days from receipt of notice; and failure to comply with this mandate
is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal as provided under Rule 50, Section 1 (e) 8 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner failed to file its appellant's brief
despite notice which warranted the dismissal by the appellate court of its appeal as ordained in the
Rules of Court. However, petitioner maintains that such failure must be excused as it was occasioned
by an "unforeseen accident" or "honest mistake" that petitioner's counsel did not receive the notice
ordering it to file the appellant's brief. Thus, petitioner rationalizes, it is erroneous for the Court of
Appeals to summarily dismiss the appeal (thereby depriving petitioner of due process) on the ground
of failure to file appellant's brief within the reglementary period which could not have been possibly
computed since petitioner's counsel did not receive the notice due to "honest mistake" or "unforeseen
accident". Hence, petitioner was deprived of his due process right.
We find petitioner's postulations bereft of merit. As stated in the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 1 March 2006, the Registry Return Receipt shows that the Notice to File Brief, dated 21
July 2005, was sent to and received by petitioner, through counsel, on 1 August 2005. However, no
appellant's brief was filed by petitioner until the Resolution dated 17 November 2005, dismissing the
appeal was issued by the appellate court. Evidently, petitioner's counsel was negligent in failing to file
the required appellant's brief within 45 days from receipt of said notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court. Petitioner's counsel, nevertheless, would like to lay the blame at the door of one Angeline
Diguinat, who allegedly was only visiting to solicit financial aid for victims of the calamities in Aurora.
Petitioner's counsel explains that Angeline Diguinat, being unlearned and unaware of the significance
of the letter, unconsciously or accidentally misplaced or misfiled the notice. Still hurting, petitioner's
counsel explains in the Reply that he has no regular office assistant or secretary as he is alone in his
law office which also serves as his residence.
 Regrettably, such excuse of petitioner's counsel is unacceptable. It is the duty of a practicing
lawyer to so arrange matters that official or judicial communications sent by mail reach him
promptly. 9 For failure to do so, he and his clients must suffer the consequences of his
negligence. 10 Furthermore, a lawyer can adopt an efficient way of handling court mail matters even
if his residence also serves as his office. 11 Hence, if petitioner's counsel was not informed by his
visiting relative of the Notice to File Brief, petitioner's counsel cannot hide behind his relative's
negligence to excuse his own failure to adopt an efficient way of managing his court notices. That said,
this Court cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing the appeal which was done in faithful
compliance with the rules of procedure the Court has been mandated to observe.

Nevertheless, in our desire to put an end to the present controversy, we have carefully
perused the records of this case and have reached the conclusion that the order assailed is in perfect
harmony with law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation raises the validity of the foreclosure sale as a
ground to attack the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Possession. This is erroneous. This Court,
in numerous decisions, has enunciated that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. 12 Regardless of
whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the
purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of
the said case. 13 Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the
consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding. 14 In fact,
petitioner itself has already commenced Civil Case No. 04-111298 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50
for annulment of mortgage foreclosure. Therefore, the determination of the validity of said foreclosure
sale is best left to the discretion of the court wherein said complaint has been filed.

More succinctly, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a

ministerial act. 15 After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. 16 And its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. 17 It is undisputed that
herein petitioner failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and thereafter,
ownership was consolidated in favor of herein respondent and a new certificate of title was issued in
its name, particularly TCT No. 250654. Thus, it was purely ministerial for the trial court to issue a writ
of possession in favor of herein respondent upon the latter's filing of a petition. The issue of nullity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was of no moment. 18 Said issue cannot bar the issuance of a writ of
possession since, as stated above, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
is not a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84788 dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure of appellant to
file its appellant's brief within the reglementary period despite notice is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Jetri Construction Corp. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 171687, [June 8, 2007], 551
PHIL 962-972)

A.G. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORABLE IGNACIO CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY; and A.
FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc, & De los Angeles for petitioner.
Enrique Agana & Associates for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner A.G. Development Corporation (AGDC) and public respondent National Housing
Authority (NHA) entered into a memorandum of agreement, wherein the former agreed to construct
on its lot a dormitory-apartment-commercial building for the latter. AGDC executed in favor of NHA a
promissory note and a real estate mortgage over the land as security for the obligation. NHA, however,
rescinded the agreement on the ground that AGDC was not able to complete the project on time and
demanded the return of the initial amount paid. The demand was refused as a result of which, the real
estate mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to NHA as the highest bidder. The one-year
period to redeem having expired, a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of NHA,
thereafter, a writ of possession was applied for and granted by the RTC of Quezon City. AGDC filed a
complaint against NHA before the RTC of Makati for breach of contract, declaration of nullity of
promissory note and real estate mortgage, and annulment of foreclosure sale and reversion of
possession and title. NHA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia, which was denied
by the trial court. While the case was pending, private respondent A. Francisco Realty and Development
Corp. (AFRDC) filed a motion to intervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for value of the
subject property since it has already purchased the foreclosed property from NHA. AFRDC then filed a
motion to dismiss before the Makati RTC, reasoning that the said court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the complaint and annul the writ issued by the Quezon City RTC since both are co-equal or coordinate
jurisdiction. The Makati RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC and dismissed AGDC's complaint. Recourse to the
Court of Appeals proved futile. Hence, the present petition. The principal issue to be resolved is
whether the issuance of a writ of possession by the Quezon City RTC constitutesres judicata as to bar
the complaint filed by AGDC. aEIADT
The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the
merits. It is merely a ministerial function, as such; the court neither exercises its official discretion nor
judgment. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination. Cases
disposed of on technical grounds do not fall within the doctrine. The issuance of the writ of possession
was simply an incident in the transfer of title.
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA. — It is an oft-repeated
rule that for res judicata to apply, the following requisites must concur: a) the former judgment must
be final; b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) the
judgment must be on the merits; and d) there must be between the first and second actions identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. Although not explicitly stated, a basic requisite for res
judicata to apply is that there are two cases which have been decided on the merits.
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY WAS NOT A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS BUT AN INCIDENT IN THE TRANSFER OF
TITLE. — The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is
generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession
of a real or personal property, such as when a property is extra-judicially foreclosed. In this regard, the
issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely ministerial
function. As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. In other words, the
issuance of the writ of possession is summary in nature, hence the same cannot be considered a
judgment on the merits which is defined as one rendered after a determination of which party is right,
as distinguished from a judgment upon some preliminary or formal technical point. Furthermore, the
doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination. Accordingly, cases
disposed of on technical grounds do not fall within the doctrine of res judicata. Hence, the issuance of
the writ of possession by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was not a judgment on the merits but
simply an incident in the transfer of title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS NOT AN ACTION AS DEFINED BY THE RULES
OF COURT. — We also note that LRC Case No. 3067 (85) is not an action as defined by law. An action is
an act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention or redress of a wrong and such is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court.
However, in the procedure for the issuance of a writ of possession, no complaint is necessary, the filing
of ex-parte motion being enough. Indeed, the term "action" does not include non-judicial proceedings,
although they are before a court, as in cases where the court does not act in a judicial capacity. There
is also another consideration that supports this conclusion since an extra-judicial foreclosure only
requires the posting and publication of the notices to effect the same. It has been held that a
proceeding to foreclose a mortgage by advertisement is not an action. caSEAH
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. S.P. No. 30227 which upheld the order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 134, Makati, dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of the lack of
jurisdiction.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On November 4, 1981, petitioner A.G. Development (AGDC) and public respondent National
Housing Authority (NHA) entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement," 1 wherein the former agreed
to construct on its lot a dormitory-apartment-commercial building for the latter at a total cost of Eleven
Million Four Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos (P11,452,989.00). Pursuant
to the agreement, AGDC executed in favor of NHA a promissory note 2 and a real estate
mortgage 3 over the land as a security for the obligation. Thereafter, NHA made an initial payment of
three million three hundred eight thousand four hundred forty (P3,308,440.00) to AGDC to cover a
portion of the contract price.
On August 30, 1983, however, NHA rescinded the agreement and demanded the immediate
return of the initial amount paid on the ground that AGDC was not able to complete the project on
time. The demand was refused, as a result of which, the real estate mortgage was extra-judicially
foreclosed and the property sold to NHA as the highest bidder. The one-year period to redeem having
expired, a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of NHA; thereafter, a writ of
possession was applied for and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as LRC
Case No. 3067 (85).
On December 3, 1986, AGDC filed a complaint against NHA before the Makati RTC docketed
as Civil Case No. 15495 for breach of contract, declaration of nullity of the promissory note and real
estate mortgage, and annulment of foreclosure sale and reversion of possession and title. NHA filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground oflitis pendentia, which was denied by the trial court. While the case
was pending, private respondent A. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. (AFRDC) filed a Motion to
intervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property since it had already
bought the foreclosed property from NHA. 4
Consequently, AFRDC filed a motion to dismiss before the Makati RTC, reasoning that the
said court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and annul the writ issued by the Quezon City
RTC since both are co-equal or coordinate jurisdiction. The Makati RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC and
dismissed AGDC's complaint. 5Recourse to the Court of Appeals proved futile. Hence, this petition.
In resolving the instant petition, the principal issue to be addressed is whether the issuance
of a writ of possession by the Quezon City RTC constitutes res judicataas to bar the complaint filed by
AGDC. aisadc
It is an oft-repeated rule that for res judicata to apply, the following requisites must concur:
a) the former judgment must be final;
b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
c) the judgment must be on the merits; and
d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action. 6
Although not explicitly stated, a basic requisite for res judicata to apply is that there are two
cases which have been decided on the merits.
In affirming the Makati RTC's dismissal of AGDC's complaint, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the issuance of the writ of possession has the effect of confirming the title of NHA over the property in
question. 7 As such, the grant of said writ constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is final
as to the claim of nullity of the promissory note, real estate mortgage and the resultant extra-judicial
foreclosure sale. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the action to annul both the real
estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale is barred by res judicata.
The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is
generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession
of a real or personal property, 8 such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. 9 In this regard,
the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
function. 10 As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. 11In other words,
the issuance of the writ of possession is summary in nature, 12 hence the same cannot be considered
a judgment on the merits which is defined as one rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal technical point. 13

Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial
determination. 14 Accordingly, cases disposed of on technical grounds do not fall within the doctrine
of res judicata. 15 Hence, the issuance of the writ of possession by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City was not a judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title.

We also note that LRC Case No. 3067 (85) is not an action as defined by law. An action is an
act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection. of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong 16 and such is commenced by filing a complaint with the
Court. 17 However, in the procedure for the issuance of a writ of possession, no complaint is necessary,
the filing of an ex parte motion being enough. 18 Indeed, the term "action" does not include non-
judicial proceedings, although they are before a court, as in cases where the court does not act in a
judicial capacity. 19

There is also another consideration that supports this conclusion since an extra-judicial
foreclosure only requires the posting and publication of the notices to effect the same. 20 It has been URSULA MAGLENTE, CONSOLACION BERJA, MERCEDITA FERRER, THELMA
held that a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage by advertisement is not an action. 21 ABELLA and ANTONIO NGO, petitioners, vs. HON. PRISCILLA BALTAZAR-
PADILLA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Manila Branch
In the absence of the necessary elements, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied in 38, VISITACION GABELO, ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ, ERLINDA
the instant petition. cdtai TRAQUENA, BEN CARDINAL, EDUARDO TRAQUENA, LEOPOLDO
TRAQUENA, MARIFE TUBALAS, ULYSIS MATEO, JOCELYN FERNANDEZ,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby GRANTED. Civil ALFONSO PLACIDO, LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSAN RENDON and MATEO
Case No. 15495 is hereby REINSTATED. TRINIDAD, respondents.
SO ORDERED.

||| (A.G. Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111662, [October 23, 1997], 346 PHIL 136-
143) DECISION

CORONA, J p:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
order 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 20, 2001, denying petitioners'
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in their favor.

The antecedent facts follow.

On January 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a 687.80-square meter
parcel of land at 400 Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, entered into a contract of lease for three years
with one of the petitioners, Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was stated that, if PRC were to sell the
leased property, Maglente would be given the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Both parties
likewise agreed that the lessee was prohibited from subleasing any portion of the property without the
consent of the lessor. However, after the execution of the lease contract, petitioner Maglente
subleased portions of the property to respondents.
On March 9, 1987, when the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to
sell the leased property to Maglente. In response, the latter intimated that she would exercise her right
of first refusal to purchase the property with co-petitioners as her co-buyers. In February 1989, PRC
received a letter from respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same property. cHITCS
On February 23, 1989, PRC filed a complaint for interpleader 2 in the RTC against both
petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among themselves on who had the right to purchase
the property. 3 On March 11, 1991, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as
the rightful parties to purchase PRC's property. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. Declaring [petitioners] Ursula Maglente, Consolacion Berja,
Mercedita Ferrer, Thelma Abella and Antonio Ngo as the rightful [parties] to
purchase the land in controversy; and
2. Ordering. . . [PRC] to execute the corresponding contract of
sale/contract to sell in favor of [petitioners] aforementioned in accordance
with this Decision within 30 days from notice hereof. 4
Dissatisfied with the above decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Undaunted, respondents found their way to this Court, assigning as sole error the ruling of
the CA upholding the right of petitioners. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 111743.
On October 8, 1999, we affirmed the decision of the CA and denied respondents' petition
for lack of merit. 5 We declared:
In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was already
perfected — PRC offered the subject lot for sale to [petitioners] Maglente and
her group. . . Respondent Maglente and her group accepted such offer . . .
manifesting their intention to purchase the property as provided for under
the lease contract. Thus, there was already an offer and acceptance giving rise
to a valid contract. As a matter of fact, [petitioners] have already completed
payment of their downpayment of P100,000. Therefore, as borne by evidence
on record, the requisites under Article 1318 of the Civil Code for a perfected
contract have been met.
On April 11, 2000, 6 we ordered entry of judgment.
On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued by the RTC directing PRC to
execute the contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners.
As ordered, PRC executed a "deed of sale" in favor of petitioners. The latter then filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying the property)
objected on the ground that the trial court's decision on the interpleader case merely resolved
petitioners' right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to
possession. The trial court sustained respondents' argument and denied petitioners' motion. 7
Petitioners are now before us via this special civil action for certiorari raising this sole query:
whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader case)
as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a "deed of sale" has already been
executed in their favor. 8
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners assail the Manila RTC's denial of their
motion for the issuance of the writ of possession. However, they do not allege that the trial court was
without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction, or that it committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying said motion, as required in all Rule 65 petitions.
The remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial
functions without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.9 It must be based on
jurisdictional grounds like want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; otherwise, any error
committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be questioned only
on ordinary appeal. 10
Considering, however, that a question of law 11 is involved, that is, whether a writ of
possession should be granted to a party with the right of first refusal in an interpleader case, we give
due course to this petition.
Indeed, should petitioners be granted the writ of possession they seek? We rule in the
negative. CaESTA
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration
proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of
property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4)
execution sales. 12 Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial court's decision
ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such
a case.
Furthermore, the trial court's decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and
the SC) merely resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had the right to
purchase PRC's property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of
petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else. The trial court's writ of execution read:
NOW THEREFORE, [PRC] is hereby ordered to execute a contract
of sale/contract to sell in favor of [petitioners] within thirty (30) days from
the date of execution hereof. The Branch Sheriff shall return this Writ to the
Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt. . . until the judgment is
satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. The returns of periodic reports shall
set forth the whole of the proceedings taken and shall be filed with the Court
and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. . . 13 (emphasis supplied)
It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The
execution of the "deed of sale" in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the
property. 14 Likewise, although we stated in G.R. No. 111743 15 that the contract of sale between
petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained from declaring them the owners since,
pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to
them at that time. 16

Thus, petitioners' argument that the trial court's writ of execution 17 in the interpleader
case carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession
complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly
determined in a case directly relating to either. 18 The interpleader case obviously did not delve into
that issue.

Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor
of the judgment but must strictly conform to it. 19 It should be in harmony with the judgment that
gives it life and not exceed it. 20 We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of
possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the trial court's judgment in
the interpleader case.

Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must
file the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can
delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and
processes established for the orderly administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Maglente v. Baltazar-Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, [March 7, 2007], 546 PHIL 472-479)
 HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SR., represented by their Administrator
ELPIDIO VENCILAO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SABAS
and RUPERTA GEPALAGO, and DOMICIANO GEPALAGO, respondents.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A parcel of registered land located at Canduyao, Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol mortgaged by
Pedro Luspo to the PNB was foreclosed and a portion of which was later sold to the Gepalago Spouses.
It was donated by the spouses to their son in 1988. On February 12, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint
for recovery thereof claiming ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription in favor of their deceased
father who had declared the property for taxation purposes. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of petitioners holding that they had been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years and that
the Gepalagos knew that the land had long been possessed and enjoyed in the concept of owners by
petitioners. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reversed the trial court and held that the vendee for value
has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title and that a certificate of title is the best
evidence of ownership of registered land. aEACcS
The Supreme Court held that a title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession. Tax declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively prove
title to the land.
In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person who
claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but also
satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land
is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is under
no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the
face of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if
there is anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the real
property. In the instant case, there is nothing from the records showing that the title of PNB, the
vendor, was flawed.
Petitioners who failed to contest three (3) transactions involving the property are now
estopped from denying the title of the present owners. cSaATC
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; TITLE
ONCE REGISTERED CANNOT BE DEFEATED EVEN BY ADVERSE, OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION. —
The rule is well-settled that prescription does not run against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47
of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession." A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and
notorious possession. The certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of
ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and
conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS CANNOT PREVAIL AS
INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OVER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — Neither can the tax
declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners as evidence of ownership prevail over
respondents' certificate of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. It should
be stressed that tax declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively prove title to the land.
They only constitute positive and strong indication that the taxpayer concerned has made a claim either
to the title or to the possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. Stated differently, tax
declarations and tax receipts are only prima facie evidence of ownership or possession.
3. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF; A PERSON WHO CLAIMS BETTER RIGHT TO PROPERTY MUST
PROVE NOT ONLY HIS OWNERSHIP OF THE SAME BUT ALSO ITS IDENTITY. — But assuming ex gratia
argumenti that petitioners has indeed acquired the land they were claiming by prescription, there
likewise exists a serious doubt on the precise identity of the disputed property. What petitioners
claimed in their complaint was a parcel of land located in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area
of 3,625 square meters. This clearly differs from the piece of land registered in the name of Gepalagos,
which is Lot No. A-73 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-60558, LRC Rec. No. H-4251, and located in
Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 5,970 square meters. Even the commissioner's
report failed to clarify the difference in the area and location of the property claimed. In order that an
action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person who claims that he has a better
right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof. TSacAE
4. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; VENDEE
FOR VALUE HAS RIGHT TO RELY ON WHAT APPEARS ON THE FACE OF TITLE; EXCEPTION. — As a general
rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for
value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate.
By way of exception, the vendee is required to make necessary inquiries if there is anything in the
certificate of title which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. Otherwise, his
mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the
existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the
defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in alike situation.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, NOT AN EXCEPTION. — The exception contemplates a
situation wherein there exists a flaw in the title of the vendor and the vendee has knowledge or at least
ought to have known of such flaw at the time he acquired the property, in which case, he is not
considered as an innocent purchaser for value. In the instant case, we discern nothing from the records
showing that the title of PNB, the vendor, was flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their
claim of acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they also failed to allege, and much less
adduce, any evidence that there was a defect in the title of PNB. In the absence of such evidence, the
presumption leans towards the validity of the vendor's title. Therefore, inasmuch as there was no flaw
in the title of PNB, private respondents rightly believed that they could and did acquire likewise a
flawless title. Indeed, as a result of the deed of conveyance between PNB and private respondents,
there was transmission of ownership and the latter stepped into the shoes of the former hence entitled
to all the defenses available to PNB, including those arising from the acquisition of the property in good
faith and for value. HScDIC
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; UNUSUAL SILENCE OF PARTIES WHILE DISPUTED
PROPERTY TRANSFERRED TWICE TO DIFFERENT PERSONS. — Another consideration that militates
heavily against the present petition is the unusual silence of petitioners while the ownership of the
disputed land was transferred from one person to another. There were at least three (3) transactions
on record involving the property: first, the contract of mortgage between Luspo and PNB whereby the
property was used as security for the loan contracted by Luspo; second, the foreclosure of mortgage
upon the failure of Luspo to pay the loan and the subsequent sale of the property at public auction;
and, third, the sale of the property to fifty-six (56) vendees, among whom were the Gepalago spouses.
Each of these transactions was registered and a corresponding transfer certificate issued in favor of
the new owner. Yet in all these, petitioners never instituted any action contesting the same nor
registered any objection thereto; instead, they remained silent. Thus, they are now estopped from
denying the title of the present owner. Having failed to assert their rights, if any, over the property
warrants the presumption that they have either abandoned them or declined to assert them. Or, it
could likewise be inferred therefrom that petitioners themselves were not convinced in the validity of
their claim.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Between two (2) sets of claimants of real property — those claiming ownership by
acquisitive prescription, and those asserting ownership on the basis of a deed of sale recorded in the
certificate of title of the vendor as mortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale — who has a
better right? cdtai
On 12 February 1990 the heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., represented by their Administrator
Elpidio Vencilao, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol a complaint for quieting of title, recovery
of possession and/or ownership, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the spouses Sabas and Ruperta
Gepalago. 1 The complaint was subsequently amended to include an action for reconveyance and
cancellation of title and to implead defendant Domiciano Gepalago. 2
The heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. alleged that they were the absolute owners of a parcel
of land situated in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625 square meters having inherited
the same from their father, Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., who during his lifetime was in peaceful, open,
notorious and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property in the concept of owner,
declared the property for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 37C6-344 and religiously paid
the real estate taxes. He likewise had the property consistently declared as his own in other documents,
e.g., those relevant to the 1987 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). After his death, his
heirs continued to possess and enjoy the property.
The Gepalago spouses, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations in the
complaint and claimed that they were the registered owners of a 5,970-square meter property located
in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, and covered by TCT No. 16042, previously a portion of a
1,401,570 square-meter land originally owned by a certain Pedro Luspo. The entire parcel of land was
mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for a loan. Since Luspo
failed to pay the obligation upon maturity the mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter PNB, the highest
bidder in the foreclosure sale, conveyed the whole property to fifty-six (56) vendees among whom
were the spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago who acquired the 5,970 square-meter portion thereof.
Since then, they had been the owner and possessor of the land until they donated the same in 1988 to
their son Domiciano Gepalago.
The trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated property and determine
the areas claimed by both parties. The commissioner reported that the area claimed by the Vencilaos
was included in the titled property of the Gepalagos. On the basis of the commissioner's report and
the other pieces of evidence presented by the parties, the trial court found the following: (a) The
property claimed by the Gepalagos consisted of 5,970 square meters, while that of the Vencilaos
covered an area of 22,401.58 square meters as indicated in the survey plan submitted by Engr. Jesus
H. Sarmiento, the court appointed commissioner; (b) Insofar as the survey plan and report submitted
by Engr. Sarmiento were concerned, these indubitably established the fact that the Vencilaos owned
the excess area of 16,431.58 square meters which was clearly outside the area claimed by the
Gepalagos; (c) The lot in question had been titled to defendant Sabas Gepalago and subsequently titled
to his son, defendant Domiciano Gepalago, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18621 by virtue of a
deed of donation executed on 25 October 1988 by Sabas Gepalago in favor of Domiciano Gepalago;
and, (d) As stated in the commissioner's report, "If the titled lot of Domiciano Gepalago is plotted in
accordance with the technical description appearing in the title, it will be relocated to more than 219
kilometers eastward away from its supposed actual location. This amounts to its non-existence." 3
The trial court then ruled in favor of the Vencilaos holding that they had been in possession,
cultivation and enjoyment of the litigated property for more than thirty (30) years and that the
improvements therein were introduced by them long before any title was ever issued to the Gepalagos.
The lower court added that there was ample evidence showing that the Gepalagos knew when they
bought the property from PNB that the land had long been possessed and enjoyed in the concept of
owners by the Vencilaos. Thus, while under ordinary circumstances a certificate of title is indefeasible,
it is not so when a person with prior knowledge of the ownership and possession of the land by another
obtains title to it.
The Gepalagos appealed the decision of the trial court. After due consideration, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the Gepalagos owners of the disputed property —
Evidently, defendant-appellants spouses Gepalago were
purchasers in good faith and for value. They acquired their share in the
property from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) which was the registered
owner. Even assuming they had knowledge of the plaintiff-appellees'
possession of the said property at the time of the purchase, it was PNB which
was the registered owner of the property. The title was transferred to the
bank after the foreclosure sale of the property mortgaged by the previous
registered owner, Pedro Luspo. Thus where the certificate of title is in the
name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right
 to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. The rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate of Title are not required
to go beyond what appears on the face of the title is well-settled.
Granting that plaintiff-appellees were possessors of the property
for a long time, they never raised objections to the transactions affecting the
land. There was no action made or any protest recorded with the Register of
Deeds.
Defendant-appellants' claim of ownership was evidenced by
certificates of title issued in their names. A Torrens Certificate of Title is the
best evidence of ownership of a registered land. As against the allegations of
plaintiff-appellees, defendant-appellants are the ones entitled to the
property. Defendant-appellants' ownership of the property was evidenced by
a certificate of title while plaintiff-appellees relied merely on tax declaration.
Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein. Defendant-appellants acquired the land in a foreclosure
sale and there was no evidence to show that plaintiff-appellees were
defrauded when the property was mortgaged and then sold . . . 4
The motion for reconsideration by the Vencilaos having been denied 5 they filed the instant
petition for review.
In awarding the disputed land to petitioners, the trial court erroneously found that
petitioners had been in possession and enjoyment of the property for more than thirty (30) years. It
should be noted that the land in dispute is a registered land placed under the operation of the Torrens
system way back in 1959, or more than thirty (30) years before petitioners instituted the present action
in the court a quo, and for which Original Certificate of Title No. 400 was issued. 6 The rule is well-
settled that prescription does not run against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession." A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession. The certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the
whole world. 7 All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 8
Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners as evidence of
ownership prevail over respondents' certificate of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof
of ownership. It should be stressed that tax declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively
prove title to the land. 9 They only constitute positive and strong indication that the taxpayer
concerned has made a claim either to the title or to the possession of the property for which taxes
have been paid. 10 Stated differently, tax declarations and tax receipts are only prima facie evidence
of ownership or possession. cdtai
But assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioners had indeed acquired the land they were
claiming by prescription, there likewise exists a serious doubt on the precise identity of the disputed
property. What petitioners claimed in their complaint was a parcel of land located in Cambansag, San
Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625 square meters. 11 This clearly differs from the piece of land
registered in the name of the Gepalagos, which is Lot No. A-73 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-60558,
LRC Rec. No. H-4251, and located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 5,970 square
meters. 12 Even the commissioner's report failed to clarify the difference in the area and location of
the property claimed. In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the
person who claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but
also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. 13
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land
is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. 14 He is under
no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the
face of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if
there is anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property. 15 Otherwise, his mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent
purchaser for value if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he
had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. 16
Petitioners maintain that it is the exception, not the general rule, which should be applied
in this case. They argue that respondents had knowledge of prior possession and enjoyment by
petitioners when they purchased the property. Thus, they were not innocent purchasers for value and
could not invoke the indefeasibility of their title.
We do not agree. The exception contemplates a situation wherein there exists a flaw in the
title of the vendor and the vendee has knowledge or at least ought to have known of such flaw at the
time he acquired the property, in which case, he is not considered as an innocent purchaser for value.
In the instant case, we discern nothing from the records showing that the title of PNB, the vendor, was
flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their claim of acquisitive prescription as basis of
ownership but they also failed to allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that there was a defect
in the title of PNB. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption leans towards the validity of the
vendor's title.
Therefore, inasmuch as there was no flaw in the title of PNB, private respondents rightly
believed that they could and did acquire likewise a flawless title. Indeed, as a result of the deed of
conveyance between PNB and private respondents, there was transmission of ownership and the latter
stepped into the shoes of the former hence entitled to all the defenses available to PNB, including
those arising from the acquisition of the property in good faith and for value.
Finally, another consideration that militates heavily against the present petition is the
unusual silence of petitioners while the ownership of the disputed land transferred from one person
to another. There were at least three (3) transactions on record involving the property: first, the
contract of mortgage between Luspo and PNB whereby the property was used as security for the loan
contracted by Luspo; second, the foreclosure of mortgage upon the failure of Luspo to pay the loan and
the subsequent sale of the property at public auction; and third, the sale of the property to fifty-six (56)
vendees, among whom were the Gepalago spouses. Each of these transactions was registered and a
corresponding transfer certificate issued in favor of the new owner. Yet in all these, petitioners never
instituted any action contesting the same nor registered any objection thereto; instead, they remained
silent. Thus, they are now estopped from denying the title of the present owner. Having failed to assert
their rights, if any, over the property warrants the presumption that they have either abandoned them
or declined to assert them. Or, it could likewise be inferred therefrom that petitioners themselves were
not convinced in the validity of their claim.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 31 July 1995
as well as its Resolution of 14 December 1995 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. cdtai
||| (Heirs of Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123713, [April 1, 1998], 351 PHIL 815-826)
HEIRS OF ANASTACIO FABELA, namely; Teodula Fabela Paguidopon,
Ricardo Fabela, Irenita Fabela Zea(d), Carolina Fabela Arazo Donglas, and
Ampiloquio Fabela, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
ROQUE NERI, namely: Roque Neri, Jr. Filomeno, Sherlina, Emeterio,
Antonio, Nelcar and Claudia, all surnamed Neri, respondents.

Llego & Llego Law Office for petitioners.

Dysangco Neri-Dysangco & Fernandez Law Offices for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro, was entrusted with the possession of a parcel of land for
a period of fourteen (14) years from the date of the instrument. Upon the expiration of said period,
possession of the property was to be restored to Simeona Balhon and her children (heirs of Anastacio
Fabela) without need of "redemption." In 1977 or 1978, Barrio Abacan road was constructed across
the subject land, which divided it into two separate lots known as Lot 868 and 870. Roque Neri, Sr.
declared these two parcels of land in his name with the Bureau of Lands and the Assessor's office.
Sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans Industrial Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC), negotiated
with Roque Neri, Sr. for the purchase of Lot 870, however, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, protested. As
a consequence, Roque Neri, Sr. executed a waiver of rights stating that the 8,000 sq. meter portion of
Lot 870 was erroneously included in his name, thus plaintiff heirs of Anastacio Fabela eventually
received the proceeds of the sale. Thereafter, the late Roque Neri, Sr. continued to ignore plaintiffs'
demand for the return of Lot 868. The heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a complaint for reconveyance and
damages against the heirs of Roque Neri, Sr., involving said lot. The case was submitted for decision on
the basis of plaintiffs' evidence since all the defendants were declared in default. After trial and
hearing ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In finding that the property
belonged to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, the trial court concluded that in the "Escritura de
Transaccion," Carmelino Neri was obliged to restore the subject property in or about 1938 to the heirs
of Anastacio Fabela. Defendants heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. filed a motion to set aside orders of default
and judgment which the trial court denied. The Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. appealed to the respondent
Court of Appeals which rendered its assailed decision reversing the trial court's judgment by default
and dismissed the complaint. It sustained the trial court's declaration of default against appellants Heirs
of Roque Neri, Sr. but found that the judgment of default was contrary to the evidence or the law. It
concluded that petitioners had not successfully adduced the required preponderance of evidence on
their claim of absolute ownership over Lot 868. Appellees' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition filed by the heirs of Anastacio Fabela.

According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of default against defendants who have not
appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights, except their right to be heard
and to present evidence to support their allegations. Since the trial court rendered a judgment of
default against private respondents, the latter took the appropriate remedy, which is an ordinary
appeal. Thus, notwithstanding the respondent court's complete agreement with the trial court's
findings that all the respondents were properly declared in default, it found that the judgment by
default was contrary to the evidence or the law and thus reversed the trial court's decision. In civil
cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of evidence. If he
claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence and need not
rely upon the weakness of the evidence of his opponent. When the record did not show that the land,
which was the subject matter of the action for recovery of ownership, had been exactly determined,
such action could not prosper. Hence, petitioners' ownership rights in the land claimed were not
satisfactorily and conclusively proven during the trial. The petition was denied and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.
did not do so as a matter of course. When the dispute between the two courts are merely on probative
value, we limit our review of the evidence ascertaining if the findings of the Court of Appeals are
supported by the record. And, so long as the findings of the said court are consistent with, or not
palpably contrary to, the evidence on record, we decline to make a review on the probative value of
the evidence. In the instant case, We find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the
respondent court and its conclusion that petitioners failed to establish their case by preponderance of
evidence.

4. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP; CLAIMANT MUST PROVE NOT ONLY HIS
SYLLABUS
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BUT ALSO THE IDENTITY THEREOF; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action for recovery of
ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT; FAVORABLE RELIEF CAN
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof. We note, however, that nowhere in
ONLY BE GRANTED AFTER THE COURT HAS ASCERTAINED THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND THE
the trial court's narration of facts were the boundaries of the parcel of land indicated with particularity,
FACTS PROVEN WARRANT GRANT OF THE SAME. — Section 1, Rule 18 of the old Rules of Court which
nor the parcel of land referring to as lot 868. What really defines a piece of land is not the area
is the law applicable in the instant case provides: "Judgment by default — If the defendant fails to
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating
answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof
its limits. . . . In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance
of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to receive the
of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
opponent. When the record does not show that the land which is the subject matter of the action for
party complaint within the period provided in this rule." Favorable relief can be granted only after the
recovery of ownership has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the
court has ascertained that the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party,
petitioners' ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven
petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of the same. In this sense, the law gives the defaulting parties
at the trial.
some measure of protection because plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to
substantiate their allegations in the complaint. The judgment of default against defendants who have 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN CLAIMANT MAY USE TAX DECLARATION AS EVIDENCE OF THE NATURE
not appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights, except their right to be OF HIS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY CLAIMED; CASE AT BAR. — Although a tax declaration is not
heard and to present evidence to support their allegations. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to considered as conclusive proof of ownership the same is admissible in evidence to show the nature of
require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would the possession of the claimant of the property for which taxes have been paid. We accordingly find
automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of well-taken the respondent court's conclusion as follows: "Thus, where it was shown that plaintiff has
his prayer. EaICAD never paid the land tax, while the defendant has faithfully done so for many years, there being no
explanation offered, it was held that such payment of taxes should be taken into consideration in favor
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDINARY APPEAL, AS A REMEDY; PROPER; CASE AT BAR. — Since the trial
of defendant. Being the exclusive possessors of the subject property who have declared the same for
court rendered a judgment of default against private respondents, the latter took the appropriate
tax purposes through the years, defendants-appellants are entitled to such favorable presumption of
remedy which is an ordinary appeal under Section 2 Rule 41, par (3) of the Rules of Court providing in
ownership which so far had not been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees."
part as follow: "A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside
the order of default had been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38." Thus, notwithstanding
the respondent court's complete agreement with the trial court's findings that all the respondents were
properly declared in default, it found that the judgment by default was contrary to the evidence or the DECISION
law and thus reversed the trial court decision.

3. ID.; ID.; APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT; GENERALLY LIMITED ONLY TO QUESTIONS OF
LAW; DISAGREEMENT IN THE ACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
APPEALS, AS AN EXCEPTION; INDEPENDENT FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A
MATTER OF COURSE; RATIONALE. — These arguments essentially raise factual issues which normally
Petitioners, heirs of Anastacio Fabela, seek to annul the (1) decision of the respondent Court
are not reviewable by this Court in a petition under Rule 45 which is generally limited only to question
of law. While certain exceptions to this rule are recognized such as when the factual findings of the of Appeals dated June 17, 1999 1 which reversed and set aside the appealed judgment by default of
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan De Oro City 2 in Civil Case No. 10459
respondent Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the Regional Trial Court, the Court does not,
declaring petitioners as the rightful owners of subject lot 868 of the Pls. 293 of Balacanas, Nabacaan,
in all cases of disagreement of facts between these two courts, automatically delve into the record to
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, and (2) its resolution dated February 18, 3 2000 denying petitioners'
determine the facts for itself. Admittedly, there have been instances when this Court made
motion for reconsideration.
independent findings of fact on the points that the trial court and the appellate court disagreed but we
 Sometime in December 1985, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages against the heirs of Roque Neri, Sr., involving the subject lot 868, alleging
among others, that plaintiffs' late grandfather, Anastacio Fabela, left two parcels of land in Nabacaan,
Misamis Oriental which were later identified as lot 868 with an area of 48,121 sq. meters and lot 870
consisting of 15,658 sq. meters which originally formed part of their grandfather's big tract of land;
that earlier in 1924, the parcel of land became the subject of litigation (Civil Case No. 2891) in the then
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental between Carmelino Neri as plaintiff and Simeona Balhon
and children heirs of Anastacio Fabela as defendants and in connection therewith, the parties entered
into an agreement embodied in an "Escritura de transaccion", a notarized document in a Visayan
dialect, which provided that Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro had been entrusted with the possession
of a parcel of land for a period of fourteen (14) years from the date of the instrument which was May
10, 1924 and upon the expiration of said period, Carmelino Neri was to restore the possession of the
property to Simeona Balhon and her children-heirs of Anastacio Fabela, without need of "redemption";
that sometime in 1977 or 1978, the Bureau of Lands conducted a cadastral survey on this land when a
road (Barrio Abacan road) was constructed across the land dividing it into two separate lots which are
now known as lot 868 and 870; that Roque Neri Sr. declared these two parcels of land in his name with
the Bureau of Lands and the Assessor's Office; that sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans Industrial
Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC), a government entity buying substantially all real properties at
Nabacaan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, negotiated with Roque Neri Sr. for the purchase of lot 870,
however, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, protested and consequently, Roque Neri Sr. executed a waiver
of rights over a portion of lot 870 stating that the 8,000 sq. meter portion of lot 870 was erroneously
included in his name, thus plaintiff heirs of Anastacio Fabela eventually received the proceeds of the
sale; that with respect to lot 868, which was the lot in controversy, the late Roque Neri Sr. continued
to ignore plaintiffs' demand for the return of the said lot. Plaintiffs prayed for judgment declaring (1)
the plan of lot 868, Pls-293 and the tax declarations issued subsequent to and by virtue of aforesaid
plan as null and void, (2) the heirs of Anastacio Fabela as the lawful owners of lot 868, and (3) the estate
of Roque Neri Sr. liable for payment of damages. HEDCAS
Upon motion of plaintiffs heirs of Anastacio Fabela, defendants Sherlinda Neri Jamisolamin,
Emeterio Neri and Antonio Neri, were declared in default on April 14, 1986, Filomena Neri on
September 26, 1986 while Nelchar and Claudia Neri on February 9, 1989, for their failure to file answer
despite receipt of summons and copy of the complaint. On the other hand, defendant Roque B. Neri,
Jr. had filed his answer with Counterclaim, but was likewise declared in default for failure to appear at
pre-trial on August 12, 1988.
The case was submitted for decision on the basis of plaintiffs' evidence since all the
defendants were declared in default. After trial and hearing ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in
favor of the heirs of the late Anastacio Fabela including those named in the
Complaint as plaintiffs, as co-owners of lot 868, Pls-293 subject of the
complaint and as indicated in the plan (Exhibit D), as such entitled to the full
enjoyment and possession thereof. All other prayers or claims in the
complaint are denied for lack of merit."
In finding that the property belonged to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, the trial court
concluded that in the "Escritura de Transaccion," Carmelino Neri was obliged to restore the subject
property in or about 1938 to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela; thus the fulfillment of that prestation of
Carmelino Neri was presumed under Section 5, par (ii), Rule 131, Rules of Court which enumerates
among the disputable presumptions "that a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real
property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to
perfect the title of such person or his successor-in interest." It thus found that the Fabela heirs have
been in possession of lot 868 since 1938 up to the present and as such were entitled to the full
enjoyment and possession as owners thereof.
On July 24, 1989, defendants heirs of Roque Neri Sr. filed a motion to set aside orders of
default and judgment which the trial court denied in an Order dated August 22, 1989, on the grounds
that the motion had been filed out of time (after judgment) and that even if such motion would be
treated as a motion to set aside judgment/new trial under Section 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court,
defendants' negligence was not excusable, much less a mistake. 5
Heirs of Roque Neri Sr. appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals. Considering, however,
that the original records of the case from the trial court had been lost or misplaced, the respondent
court, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), set the case for
preliminary conference on December 17, 1998, which was reset to January 26, 1999, and the parties
were informed of the loss of the original records of the case. Counsel for defendants-appellants heirs
of Roque Neri Sr. manifested her clients' willingness to submit the case for decision, even without the
original records and asked for thirty days to file memorandum, to which manifestation counsel for
plaintiffs-appellees heirs of Fabela interposed no objection. The respondent court granted appellants'
prayer and gave plaintiffs-appellees twenty days to file their counter memorandum and appellants ten
(10) days to file reply memorandum, after which the case was submitted for decision. 6
On June 17, 1999, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision reversing
the trial court's judgment by default and dismissed the complaint. It sustained the trial court's
declaration of default against appellants heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. but found that the judgment of default
was contrary to the evidence or the law. It concluded that petitioners had not successfully adduced the
required preponderance of evidence on their claim of absolute ownership over lot 868, the court
stated: 7
"Art. 434 of the Civil Code states that "In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claims. The possessor of the
property has the presumption of title in his favor. Hence, any person who
claims that he has a better right to the property, as owner thereof, must prove
(1) that he has a better title than the defendant to the property, and (2) the
identity of the property. The identity of the land sought to be recovered may
be established through the survey plan of the property. Ownership may be
proved by any evidence admissible in law, such as titles and certificates, long
possession and tax declarations or receipts.
Appellees claimed that Lots 868 and 870 are owned by their
grandfather Anastacio Fabela. The records of the Bureau of Lands, as well as
the survey plan presented in court, however, indicate Roque Neri, Sr. as the
registered claimant of both lots. The original of the 'Escritura de Transaccion'
on which appellees relied heavily, was not presented in court. Its probative
value, however, remains doubtful since said document does not really prove
appellees' absolute ownership of the subject property, nor was Lot 868
explicitly referred to as the property being entrusted to the vendee-a-retro
(Carmelino Neri). aTIEcA
 On the other hand, the waiver of rights executed in 1980 by Roque
Neri, Sr. appears to refer only to a portion of Lot 870 (the parcel of land sold
to PHIVIDEC), and not to Lot 868. The old tax declaration presented by
appellees and which supposedly covered the two (2) lots did not specify the
lot number, nor was there any evidence presented that the original parcel of
land actually consisted of eighteen (18) hectares. Their allegation that both
lots have already been partitioned among the heirs of Anastacio Fabela was
not substantiated by any document or writing evidencing such extra-judicial
partition. The fourteen (14) years of the agreed temporary possession of the
land by the defendants-appellants had lapsed a long time ago, and this was
prior to the 1971 public survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It appears
appellees did not exert diligent efforts to regain possession or resume paying
taxes on the land thereafter, prior to the purchase of Lot 870 by PHIVIDEC.
The fact that appellees were the ones paid by PHIVIDEC for the portion of Lot
870 does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they also absolutely
own Lot 868. Most significant yet, is appellees' failure to adequately explain
why they had not at all registered their claim over the property with the
Bureau of Lands during and after the public survey in the municipality.
Roque Neri, Sr., appellants' predecessor-in-interest, meanwhile
registered his claim or interest on the land and declared it for taxation
purposes. Appellees' claim of possession was through the land's caretaker and
administrator, Delfin Sia, but at the same time admitting that appellants
similarly benefit from the fruits of the land. Regarding tax declarations, it has
been held that while tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, they are
strong evidence of ownership. Thus, where it was shown that plaintiff has
never paid the land tax, while the defendant has faithfully done so for many
years, there being no explanation offered, it was held that such payment of
taxes should be taken into consideration in favor of defendant. Being the
exclusive possessors of the subject property who have declared the same for
tax purposes through the years, defendants-appellants are entitled to such
favorable presumption of ownership which so far had not been overturned by
plaintiffs-appellees.
The foregoing considered, it is clear that plaintiffs had not
successfully proved by the required preponderance of evidence their claim of
absolute ownership of Lot 868. It is an invariable rule laid down in numerous
decisions, that a person who claims the ownership of property is in duty
bound to clearly identify the land claimed, in accordance with the titles on
which he founds (sic) his right to ownership, and he shall not be permitted to
rely upon the defects in defendant's title. Failure to prove his right of
ownership will bar an action to recover the property; his right to recover must
be founded on positive title or right, and not merely on negative ones, such
as the lack or insufficiency of title on the part of the defendant. The possessor
has a presumption of title, and unless the plaintiff proves he has a better right,
he cannot recover the property from the defendant."
Appellees' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated February 18, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the heirs of Anastacio Fabela alleging
that the respondent court (1) departed from the stringent jurisprudence on default and appeals filed
out of time and (2) erred in the appreciation of the findings of fact of the lower court.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners fault the respondent court for reversing the
decision of the trial court despite its complete agreement with the findings of the trial court that
respondents were properly declared in default. They contend that the reasons cited by private
respondents for their failure to file answer and to appear at the pre-trial were not meritorious and that
private respondents' affidavit attached to the motion for reconsideration did not declare how Roque
Neri Sr. acquired lot 868. ScaEIT
We are not persuaded.
Section 1, Rule 18 8 of the old Rules of Court which is the law applicable in the instant case
provides:
"Judgment by default — If the defendant fails to answer within the
time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and
proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon, the court
shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting
him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This
provision applies where no answer is made to a counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party complaint within the period provided in this rule."
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the evidence offered
and the facts proven by the presenting party, petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of the
same. 9 In this sense, the law gives the defaulting parties some measure of protection because
plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their allegations in
the complaint. The judgment of default against defendants who have not appeared or filed their
answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights, except their right to be heard and to present
evidence to support their allegations. 10 Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require
presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would
automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the
tenor of his prayer. 11 Since the trial court rendered a judgment of default against private
respondents, the latter took the appropriate remedy which is an ordinary appeal under Section
2 Rule 41, par (3) 12 , of the Rules of Court providing in part as follow:
"A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal
from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38."
Thus, notwithstanding the respondent court's complete agreement with the trial court's
findings that all the respondents were properly declared in default, it found that the judgment
by default was contrary to the evidence or the law and thus reversed the trial court decision.
Anent the second error, petitioners claim that the respondent court erred in concluding that
petitioners' predecessor Roque Neri, Sr. appeared as the registered claimant of lot 868 and 870 which
was contrary to the findings of the trial court that the "plan showing lot 868 (Exh. D-2) and lot 870 (Exh.
D-1) although appearing to have been approved by Jose F. Gatus, OIC, Regional Director, on July 17,
1986 does not on its face indicate for whom it had been approved"; that Neri Sr. failed to produce
evidence of ownership on how he acquired the subject Lot No. 868. They further claim that the
execution in their favor by Roque Neri Sr. of a waiver of right over lot 870 where the former
acknowledged the erroneous inclusion of the lot in his name was a strong admission against interest
on Neri's part. They also contend that the respondent court erred in doubting the probative value of
the "Escritura de Transaccion" only for the reason that the original was not presented in court.
These arguments essentially raise factual issues which normally are not reviewable by this
Court in a petition under Rule 45 which is generally limited only to question of law. 13 While certain
exceptions to this rule are recognized such as when the factual findings of the respondent Court of
Appeals are at variance with those of the Regional Trial Court, the Court does not, in all cases of
disagreement of facts between these two courts, automatically delve into the record to determine the
facts for itself. 14 Admittedly, there have been instances when this Court made independent findings
of fact on the points that the trial court and the appellate court disagreed but we did not do so as a
matter of course. When the dispute between the two courts are merely on probative value, we limit
our review of the evidence ascertaining if the findings of the Court of Appeals are supported by the
record. And, so long as the findings of the said court are consistent with, or not palpably contrary to,
the evidence on record, we decline to make a review on the probative value of the evidence. 15 In the
instant case, We find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the respondent court and its
conclusion that petitioners failed to establish their case by preponderance of evidence. STADIH
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action for recovery
of ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof. 16 The party who desires to recover
must fix the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. 17
In the instant case, petitioners based their claim of ownership on the "1924 Escritura de
Transaccion", the original copy of which was not presented in the trial court, while the photocopy was
also lost when the original records were elevated to the respondent court. This was the only piece of
evidence that would establish petitioners' ownership and the identity of subject lot 868. In ruling for
petitioners heirs of Anastacio Fabela as the absolute owners of lot 868, the trial court found that in the
Escritura, "it appears that the portion which is now identified as lot 868 had been entrusted to the
possession of Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a retro, for a period of 14 years from the date of the
instrument which was May 10, 1924 and upon the expiration of which said Carmelino Neri was to
restore the possession of the property to Simeona Balhon and her children heirs of Anastacio Fabela,
namely Petra Buenaventura, Julio and Pedro, all surnamed Fabela, without need of 'redemption'," and
"that fulfillment of Neri's obligation was presumed to have taken place." We note, however, that
nowhere in the trial court's narration of facts were the boundaries of the parcel of land indicated with
particularity, nor the parcel of land referring to as lot 868. What really defines a piece of land is not the
area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. 18
Moreover, the testimony of petitioner heir Teodula Fabela Paguidopon which was quoted
in part in petitioners' own memorandum 19 did not also clearly establish the relation of the said
"Escritura de Transaccion" to lot 868, to wit:
"Q: Now, that bigger lot has the cadastral lot number before?
A: No because that was not yet surveyed.
Q: Do you know who owns this lot?
A; Our grandfather Anastacio Fabela.
Q: Now while it was still in the hands of Anastacio Fabela while he was still
alive, do you know what was the total area of the mother lot?
A: Yes, it was estimated by our father and we estimated it to be 18 hectares.
Q: Do you have evidence to prove that it was indeed 18 hectares?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: I am showing to you an old document but only a xerox copy thereof
entitled escritura de transaccion notarized by Uldarico Akut in the
year 1924, kindly take a look and see where is the 18 hectares
which you have just mentioned?
A: This one.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LLEGO:
". . . We will have this marked as our Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3."
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN of 2/9/89 pages 16 to 18 (topmost)
COURT:
Plaintiff is ordered to prepare the English translation of that document.
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN of 2/9/89 page 18)
"ATTY. LLEGO: (continuing)
Q: You have pointed this portion as your basis for saying that the area is 18
hectares. Now kindly read this paragraph on the description of
the land for purposes of record. (witness is ready (sic)
Which, we pray that that portion being read into the record by
witness be marked as our Exhibit A-4. CcAITa
COURT:
Mark it. (page 18 bottom to page 19 middle portion of the page)."
Unfortunately, the description of the eighteen (18) hectare land which should had been read
and incorporated into the transcript for purposes of record, was omitted in the quoted portion,
to establish the exact location, area and boundary of the 18 hectare lot in relation to lot 868.
The omission has created serious doubts as to the specific identity of the lot which petitioners
 sought to recover. Moreover, even in the petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court,
there was no allegation of the metes and bounds of the subject lot, the complaint reads:
"3) a. That the grandfather of plaintiffs-the late Anastacio Fabela,
had left among others, the following property, to wit:
a) Lot 870
Area: 15,658 sq. m.
Location: Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
b) Lot 868
Area: 48,121 sq. m.
Location: Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
b. That the above described parcels of land are adjacent to each
other as shown by a photocopy of the sketch plan from the Bureau of Lands
hereto enclosed and marked as Annex "B";
c. That these two parcels since time immemorial used to be one
big parcel of land, until in 1977 or 1978, when a government cadastral survey
in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was undertaken by the Bureau of Lands,
wherein a road was provided and made to appear across the big parcel of
land, causing it to be divided physically and for which the government
surveyors assigned two lots numbers for what used to be one big parcel of
land, thus the appearance of Lot 870 and Lot 868; This once one big chunk of
land never had a cadastral number in the past;"
Notably, the total area of lots 868 and 870 would only be about 63,679 sq. meters or about six
(6) hectares which fails to correspond to the eighteen (18) hectare parcel of land allegedly
owned by the late Anastacio Fabela which was the subject of the "Escritura de Transaccion" and
testified to by Teodula Fabela Paguidopon. Petitioners failed to identify the land with that
degree of certainty required to support their affirmative allegation of ownership.
Moreover, the respondent court found, and we agree, that the waiver of rights executed in
1980 by Roque Neri Sr., in favor of petitioners referred only to a portion of lot 870 and not to lot 868.
Thus such waiver which petitioners capitalized on as an admission against Neri's interest did not in any
way support petitioners' claim of ownership of lot 868. Said waiver reads: 20
"ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ADJUDICATION AND QUITCLAIM
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, Roque Neri, Sr., of legal age, widower, Filipino, with
residence and postal address at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, Philippines, do
hereby ACKNOWLEDGE AND CONFIRM that the certain portion of a parcel of
land located at Balacanas, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental under Lot No. 870 of
Pls. 923 of Villanueva Public Land Subdivision containing a total area of
SIXTEEN THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (16,000 sq. m.) which portion is more
particularly described as follows:
North — Roque Neri, Sr.
East — Nabacaan Road
West — Tayum Creek
South — Lot 869
containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (8,000
sq. m.) is hereby adjudicated in favor of the Heirs of Anastacio Fabela.
That the above described portion of a parcel of land actually
belongs and owned by said Heirs of Anastacio Fabela. aSTcCE
That the above described portion of land was erroneously included
in the land survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands in my name.
That I hereby quitclaim and renounce whatever interest, rights and
participation I have over the described portion of real property of which the
Heirs of Anastacio Fabela were the lawful owners.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 18th day of
August 1980 in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, Philippines.
SGD. ILLEGIBLE
T/ROQUE NERI, SR."
A simple reading of the instrument would readily show that only 8,000 sq. meters of the
entire 16,000 sq. meters included in lot 870 was adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Anastacio Fabela
as belonging to them. In fact, petitioners in their memorandum admitted that only 8,000 sq. meters
was given to them and yet they did not take any positive action to assert their ownership of the entire
lot 870. Petitioners have accordingly no sound basis to claim lot 868 by virtue of such instrument. As
the appellate court succinctly stated, "the fact that appellees were the ones paid by PHIVIDEC for the
portion of lot 870 does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they also absolutely own lot 868.
Most significantly, is appellees failure to adequately explain why they had not at all registered their
claim over the property with the Bureau of Lands during and after the public survey in the
municipality." Finally, petitioners also failed to allege much less establish that they are in possession of
the subject lot.
On the other hand, the respondent court found, and this finding was not refuted, that
petitioners' own witness, Norberto Dumat-ol, a representative of the Bureau of Lands, testified that
when a cadastral survey was conducted in 1971, the registered claimant of lot 868 based on their
official record was Roque Neri Sr. Petitioners' allegation that Neri Sr., committed fraud in the
registration in his name of these two (2) parcels of lot was not substantiated. The survey plan for lot
868 was approved for Roque Neri Sr. and he had also declared lot 868 for taxation purposes which was
admitted by petitioners as their complaint prayed for the annulment of the plan and tax declaration.
Although a tax declaration is not considered as conclusive proof of ownership the same is admissible
in evidence to show the nature of the possession of the claimant of the property for which taxes have
been paid. We accordingly find well-taken the respondent court's conclusion as follows:
 "Thus, where it was shown that plaintiff has never paid the land
tax, while the defendant has faithfully done so for many years, there being no
explanation offered, it was held that such payment of taxes should be taken
into consideration in favor of defendant. Being the exclusive possessors of the
subject property who have declared the same for tax purposes through the
years, defendants-appellants are entitled to such favorable presumption of
ownership which so far had not been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees."
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance
of evidence. 21 If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent. 22 When the record does not show that the land which is the subject matter of the action
for recovery of ownership has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the
petitioners' ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven
at the trial. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. ITScHa
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heirs of Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, [August 9, 2001], 414 PHIL 838-857)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EFREN M.
CARRASCO, respondent.
GARCIA, J p:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated June 14, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59566, affirming in toto an earlier decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal, Branch 80, which ordered the registration in the name
of herein respondent Efren C. Carrasco of a parcel of land situated at Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc,
Tanay, Rizal.
The factual antecedents:
On October 1, 1996, in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, respondent Efren M. Carrasco filed
an application for registration of title over a 17,637-square meter land situated at Sitio Ulang
Tubig, Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay, Province of Rizal.
In his application, docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
215-T and raffled to Branch 80 of the court, respondent alleged that he is the
owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered; that said land is
alienable and disposable and not within any military or whatever kind of
reservation; that to the best of his knowledge, the land has never been
mortgaged or encumbered or that any person has any interest thereon, legal
or equitable; and that the subject land is declared for taxation purposes in his
name. Among the documents attached to the application were the individual
plan and technical description of the land; Diazo polyester film (SEPIA) of the
original survey subdivision plan SGS-No. 04-000518-D of which the subject
land is a part; respondent's Affidavit of Ownership dated August 22, 1996,
therein stating that he took possession of the land in 1990 from his
predecessor, Norberto Mingao, who has occupied the land for the last 25
years; the latter's Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991, thereunder
waiving his claim over the land in favor of the respondent; a Certification from
the Land Registration Authority as to the status of the land; Tax Declaration
No. 017-4224 for the year 1996 in respondent's name; and an official receipt
dated September 13, 1996 of realty tax payment. ADSIaT
Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
opposition to the application. There being no private oppositor, the trial court issued an order of
general default on November 10, 1997 and proceeded on the same day with the markings of the
respondent's documents and the reception ex parte of his evidence.
Thereafter, or on November 26, 1997, the respondent testified in support of his
application. He likewise adduced the testimony of one Teosito Avesado. Hereunder is the trial
court's summation of respondent's testimonial evidence:
Petitioner Efren Carrasco testified on November 26, 1997 that he
is single, 24 years of age, a farmer and residing at Tanay, Rizal, a Filipino; that
he owned a parcel of land located at Sitio Ulang Tubig, Barangay Tandang
Kutyo, Tanay, Rizal with an area of 17,637 sq. meters; that the said land has
not been the subject of Original Registration of Title as amended by PD 1529;
that he acquired the said land from Norberto Mingao as his compensation for
having worked with him and his acquisition as evidenced by a Waiver
executed by Norberto Mingao in favor of petitioner on December 16, 1991
which he caused to be marked Exhibit "E;" that he also produced and showed
to the Court as proof of his ownership to the land an original survey
subdivision plan No. SGS-04-000518-0, which he caused to be marked Exhibit
"F" and the particular Lot No. 16 on the map as Exhibit "F-1;" that he caused
the survey of the property by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer in the person
of Engineer Modesto Allado who prepared the technical descriptions of the
property now marked Exhibit "G" and issued a surveyors certificate which was
marked Exhibit "H;" that the land sought to be registered was declared for
taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 017-4224 in the name of
Efren Carrasco which was marked Exhibit "I;" that the taxes for the said
property was paid under Official Receipt No. 215109 dated September 13,
 1996 marked Exhibit "J;" that the boundary owners of his property sought to
be registered are: on the East, Miguel Taclas, on the North, Maximo
Mondragon, on the South, Allan Alcantara and on the West, Jesus Consulta;
that he has been in continuously, openly, adversely in possession of the said
property in the concept of an owner, while his predecessors-in-interest has
likewise been in possession of the same in the concept of an owner
continuously, openly, and adversely for more than 25 years; that there are no
other persons claiming possession over the property; that the same property
has not been mortgaged or encumbered to any other persons or entities; that
the property subject matter of the case is not within a military or naval
reservation.
On cross-examination, he testified and clarified that he was
employed in the land of Norberto Mingao, clearing and planting on the vast
property he owns; that his father also had worked for Norberto Mingao for a
very long time and for the services that he and his father rendered, he was
given by Mingao about 17,637 square meters of the more or less 600,000
square meters of land he owns; that in 1950 his father took over the
possession of the land, cultivated the same and planted fruit trees and
growing crops; the said land was given by Mr. Mingao to his father because
of the services he rendered to Mingao by clearing, planting and cultivating his
vast track of lands; that it was in 1990 that he occupied the possession of his
father by virtue of the Deed of Waiver executed by Mingao in his favor. AcISTE
The second witness of petitioner is Teosito Avesado, 69 years old,
a businessman and a resident of B.F. Homes Phase 3, Parañaque, Metro
Manila; that he personally knows the applicant in this case as he is one of the
workers of Norberto Mingao, that he knew the land sought to be registered
because he used to visit Mingao in that area as they happened to be the
President and Vice President of the Magellan Agricultural Corporation
respectively; that he is interested in the petition so that people working with
Mingao should be given the rightful ownership and title to the land they hold;
that Mr. Mingao had started to occupy a vast tract of land during the early
1940s and because of his appreciation to the services of his workers who
worked for him in the land for a very long time, he gave a portion of his land
to applicant. 3
In a decision 4 dated February 4, 1998, the trial court, upon a finding that the
respondent has sufficiently established his ownership of the land in question, ordered the
registration thereof in his name, thus:
Wherefore, it is hereby decreed that the property described as Lot
16, SGS-000518-D located at Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal with an
area of 17,637 square meters may now be registered and confirmed in the
name of Efren N. Carrasco pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, and the corresponding title to the property be issued in his name after
payment of the required fees.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Solicitor General, the
Land Registration Authority, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal and the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Insisting that (1) the land being applied for registration is not alienable public
agricultural land; and (2) respondent is not qualified to register the same under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, 5 the Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA whereat its
appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59566.
During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent filed a motion with the appellate
court praying for the admission of additional evidence, which additional evidence included an
Affidavit of Ownership dated June 1, 1998 of Norberto Mingao. In its resolution of February 9,
1999, however, the CA merely noted the motion. TcDaSI
Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated June 14, 2000, the CA dismissed the
Republic's appeal and affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
In its decision, the CA held that the subject land is alienable in view of the certification
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that the land was verified to
be within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain and outside of any civil or
military reservation. On the issue of whether the respondent was qualified to have the land
registered in his name, the CA ruled in the affirmative having found the evidence sufficient to
establish respondent's and Mingao's ownership and possession of the land in accordance with
the rule laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals 6 that occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years by an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of the public domain.
Unable to accept the judgment, the Republic is now with this Court via the present
petition on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS QUALIFIED TO APPLY FOR THE
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND UNDER P.D. NO.
1529.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT IS QUALIFIED TO APPLY FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE QUESTIONED LOT, STILL THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE, REPUBLIC V.
COURT OF APPEALS, 235 SCRA 567 (1994), RESPONDENT HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION THEREOF WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE
SAME TO BE ACQUIRED THROUGH JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE. 7
 In his Comment, 8 respondent maintains that he is entitled to apply for registration of
title over the subject property because his open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for
more than 30 years has ripened into ownership. In any event, respondent argues that the CA has
found his evidence sufficient to establish his and his predecessor-in-interest's ownership and
possession of the land, which factual finding is conclusive on this Court. cTECHI
The petition is impressed with merit.
While the rule is well-settled that findings of fact of appellate courts are conclusive
upon this Court, there are, however, recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the
findings of fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a
serious abuse of discretion. 9 Such exceptions obtain in this case.
Basically, the pivotal issue is whether the respondent was able to sufficiently prove his
possession, in the concept of an owner, of the land sought to be registered for the period required
by law so as to entitle him to the registration thereof in his name.
We resolve the issue in the negative.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: (1) he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier; and (2) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. 10
For sure, Section 14, paragraph (1), of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No.
1529) explicitly states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now the Regional Trial Court] an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. aEDCAH
We have no disagreement with the finding of the CA that the subject property is part
of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, having been classified as
such by the DENR, an appropriate government agency for the purpose. We part ways, however,
with the CA in its conclusion that the respondent has established his ownership of the land in
question for the period of possession required by law.
Respondent anchors his claim of ownership on his allegation of continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of an owner by himself and through his predecessor-in-
interest, Norberto Mingao, for more than 30 years. 11 Bearing in mind the rule that a person who
seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence, 12 we find respondent's evidence in this respect insufficient.
To begin with, the respondent failed to prove that Norberto Mingao from whom he
allegedly derived his title, was the owner of the subject land and hence can transmit rights over
the same in his favor.
In his Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991, Mingao merely claimed ownership of
the land and that he is waiving his right and interest thereon in favor of the respondent.
Significantly, the same Waiver did not even specifically state when his (Mingao's) possession
started. While, as rightly found by the CA, Mingao has been in possession of the land since 1950
based on Mingao's Affidavit of Ownership dated June 1, 1998 which was presented while the case
was pending appeal with the CA, nonetheless, without more, said affidavit is not adequate to
prove the fact of possession beginning that date. Indeed, it may not be amiss to point out that
Mingao did not even testify in this case.
The Court cannot give full credence to respondent's Affidavit of Ownership dated
August 22, 1996 for he simply alleged therein that Mingao had occupied the land for the last 25
years. Likewise, respondent's testimony regarding Mingao's possession and ownership, aside
from being self-serving, consists merely of general statements with no specifics even as to when
his predecessor began occupying the land. Indeed, such is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence required in cases of this nature. Respondent must present proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. AaEcHC
In the same vein, Teosito Avesado's testimony cannot be relied upon to corroborate
respondent's claim as to Mingao's possession as owner of the land, more so, when we are not
sufficiently convinced as to said witness' personal acquaintance with Mingao or knowledge
regarding the latter's intention to give the subject land to the respondent.
Furthermore, there is no proof that Mingao declared the land in his name for taxation
purposes or paid taxes due thereon. True, a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. 13 As we held
in Republic v. Alconaba: 14
While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to
contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Hence, since Mingao's possession and ownership of the subject land were not
sufficiently proven, Mingao himself cannot validly transmit his rights over the land in
respondent's favor. At any rate, the mode by which respondent alleged to have taken possession
and ownership of the land is not one of those provided for under Article 712 of the Civil Code. 15
To show how he acquired possession of the subject land from Mingao, respondent
presented his Affidavit of Ownership dated August 22, 1996 and Mingao's Deed of Waiverdated
December 16, 1991. But said documents cannot show that there was a valid transmission of
rights. As it were, respondent's Affidavit of Ownership merely stated that he has taken possession
of the subject land in 1990 from Mingao. On the other hand, Mingao's Deed of Waiver is not, as
aforestated, a mode of acquiring ownership.
 The waiver cannot even be considered a donation because it does not comply with
the formalities required in order for a donation of an immovable to be valid pursuant to Article
749 of the Civil Code 16 because respondent's acceptance thereof is lacking. HDCTAc
Also, prescription cannot be availed of to acquire ownership not only because the
respondent's possession was not in the concept of an owner, but also because he failed to comply
with the required period. Respondent cannot tack his possession to that of Mingao's since there
is no privity between them, the transmission of rights not having been proven. Thus, respondent's
possession must be reckoned only from the time of his actual possession which, as admitted by
him, commenced in 1990.
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent may validly derive his right
of possession from Mingao, still, he may not rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land
in question. For, as the CA correctly found, and which the respondent does not dispute, Mingao's
possession started only in 1950 which is 5 years later than the reckoning point of June 12, 1945
under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529). It is thus clear that respondent failed to
comply with the period of possession and occupation not only as required by Section 14(1), supra,
of the Property Registration Decree but also by the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 141, the pertinent provision of which is Section 48(b):
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of first Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. cCSHET
Clearly then, the reliance placed by the appellate court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals 17 where we ruled that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land, is erroneous. Said ruling has been effectively superseded by
subsequent legislations which amended Section 48(b) the Public Land Act. The case of Republic
v. Doldol, 18 cited in Igtiben v. Republic, 19 provides a summary of these amendments, to wit:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended
Section 48(b) now reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of first Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied.) EcTDCI
As presently phrased, the law requires that possession of lands of the public domain
must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier for the land to be acquired through judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title.
In sum, the respondent could not have acquired an imperfect title to the land in
question because he has not proved possession openly, continuously and adversely in the
concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. At best, he
can only prove possession since 1990, the date which he admitted to have taken possession of
the subject parcel of land from Mingao.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated June
14, 2000 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 59566 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and LRC No. 215-T of the
RTC of Morong, Rizal, Branch 80, is ordered DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, [December 6, 2006], 539 PHIL 205-220)
ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO, petitioner,vs.ROLANDO RAMOS, EUSEBIO I. RAMOS and
EVANGELISTO GARCIA, respondents.
D.L. Wagas Law Office for petitioner.
Julian B. Dela Rosa for respondents.
 SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; MODES OF ACQUIRING ALIENABLE LANDS; HOMESTEAD
PATENT; LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFECTION OF TITLE OVER THE LAND APPLIED FOR. — Under
the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the public domain
are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or
the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (1977), remains to be the general law
governing the classification and disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. It enumerates the
different modes of acquisition of these lands and prescribes the terms and conditions to enable private
persons to perfect their title to them. It is, therefore, the applicable law to the case before us. A
homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under thePublic Land Act, a homestead patent is one issued
to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner
of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show that he has
resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must have
cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PETITIONER HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISHED THAT A VALID
APPLICATION FOR HOMESTEAD PATENT WAS FILED BY HER PARENTS; PURPORTED SALE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND HER MOTHER CANNOT BE GIVEN EFFECT, NOR CAN IT BE THE SOURCE OF
PETITIONER'S RIGHT BECAUSE HER MOTHER DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SELL WHAT DID NOT
BELONG TO HER. — In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural
land that her parents Susana and Abundio had possessed since 1938. She claims that, for some time,
the cultivation of this land was left to her and her grandfather and that, following the death of her
father Abundio, the land was allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana. Zenaida's argument is flawed
because it assumes that her parents had perfected their title over the land and that they could validly
convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or by inheritance. However, a careful examination
of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid application for
homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed
Zenaida's family's right of preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation of the
land. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of an appropriate application for its
registration which indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed. The
purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect, nor can it be a
source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not belong to
her. The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property among Zenaida,
Alexander, and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of the land which
she did not own.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT LAND REMAINS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. — For the
same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of Susana. Their
claim evidently relies on the provision of the Public Land Act which states: Section 105. If at any time
the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or
during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the
Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with
respect to the land applied for or granted or leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be
entitled to have issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied
with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the
purposes of this Act. The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an applicant,
grantee, or lessee. Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime, despite her possession and cultivation
of the land, she failed to apply for a homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or
Rolando can inherit. As such, the land remains part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio and
Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of the land because the same cannot be
considered as adverse, open, public, peaceful and to the exclusion of all. Hence, the subject land
remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully belongs to the State. As held by the Court of
Appeals, none of the parties obtained a defensible title to the property which can be upheld by the
Court. Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different from the issue of its ownership. Petitioner
argues that her petition may be treated as an accion publiciana and not merely an action for recovery
of inheritance.
4. ID.;PROPERTY; POSSESSION; PETITIONER'S UNCONTESTED AND VERIFIED APPLICATION
FOR A HOMESTEAD PATENT COUPLED WITH HER OPEN AND NOTORIOUS OCCUPATION OF THE LAND
SUFFICIENTLY PROVES HER PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO POSSESS THE LAND CLAIMED, WHICH ENTITLES
HER TO BE PROTECTED BY LAW IN SUCH POSSESSION. — An accion publiciana is an action for the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently of title. In this case, the issue is whether Zenaida, as
an applicant for public land, may be considered as having any right to the land occupied, which may
entitle her to sue in courts for the return of the possession thereof. We find that Zenaida has proven
prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her share, which possession antedates the filing
of the homestead application. She produced evidence showing that she has filed a verified application
for the registration of the land with the Bureau of Lands on August 10, 1971, which is still pending. The
documents remain uncontested and the application has not been assailed by any of the parties to the
case. She alleged that during the lifetime of her mother, she and her maternal grandfather cultivated
and occupied the land. Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her
predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held
that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. All
told, petitioner Zenaida's uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent coupled with
her open and notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to possess the
land claimed, which entitles her to be protected by the law in such possession.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58644 reversing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, Branch
23, dated July 17, 1996, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 which ruled that herein petitioner Zenaida Ramos-
Balalio had a superior right to possess Lot No. 204, Pls-15, situated at Muñoz, Roxas, Isabela, as well as
its Resolution 3 dated June 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased)
are the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The spouses started occupying Lot No.
204 in 1938. Abundio died in 1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in
1946, with whom she had five children, one of whom is respondent Rolando.
In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo applied for a sales
patent over the subject parcel of land which she opposed. The Bureau of Lands resolved the dispute,
thus:
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is clear that Felimon B.
On July 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner was deprived
Domingo has not entered, possessed or cultivated the land in question and
of her right to cultivation and possession of her share of Lot No. 204 and thus ruled:
therefore he has not acquired any preference right thereto. Upon the other
hand contestant Susana Bueno Vda. de Ramos and her children have
sufficiently established their right of preference over the land except the one
hectare Cemetery site, on the basis of their continuous occupation and
cultivation and their valuable improvements introduced thereon.
Wherefore, it is ordered that the Sales Application No. 21992 of
Felimon B. Domingo be as hereby it is rejected, forfeiting in favor of the
Government whatever amount have been paid on account thereof. The land
in question shall be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one hectare
portion in the northwestern part of the land, which shall be reserved as barrio
cemetery site, while the remaining area is hereby allocated to SUSANA
BUENO VDA DE RAMOS who shall file an appropriate application therefore
within sixty (60) days after the survey thereof at her own expense, it not
appearing that this Office has received the homestead (new) application
allegedly filed by her for the same land.
SO ORDERED. 4
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier, wherever he was
assigned, Susana's father, George Bueno, and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation
and possession of the subject land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land to petitioner who, in turn,
partitioned it among herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent Rolando and his siblings. The
partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of Rolando and
Alexander. aDCIHE
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge that
respondents Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of possession
over the land. After settling the mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession
and damages with a petition for preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court had the land surveyed. Subdividing the land into Lots 204-A to 204-H 5 based
on the actual possessor or occupant, the survey plan revealed the following:
1. Plaintiff Zenaida Ramos Balalio has no possession, occupation, and
cultivation whatsoever of lot 204, Pls-15;
2. Rolando Ramos is in possession and cultivation of lot 204-F, lot 204-G and
lot 204-C, with a total area of 43,957 sq. m.,more or less;
3. Eusebio Ramos is occupying and cultivating lot 204-A with an area of 4,994
sq. m.,more or less;
4. Lot 204-B consisting of 17,685 sq. m.,more or less, is possessed and
cultivated by Evangelisto Garcia, another intervenor. His
occupation is very much less than the two (2) hectares sold to him
by Alexander Ramos. It is short by 2,311 sq. m.,more or less;
5. The total area of the land in question, after deducting one (1) hectare
occupied by the cemetery is 73,150 sq. m.,more or less. 6
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING,judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff, Zenaida Ramos and against Rolando Ramos,
defendant, and Eusebio Ramos, intervenor.
1. Ordering Eusebio Ramos to vacate lot 204-A and surrender it to
Evangelisto Garcia because he is not entitled to any portion of the lot in
question, it being the conjugal property of the first marriage of Susana Bueno
to Abundio Ramos;
2. Evangelisto Garcia is adjudicated the first two (2) hectares from
the North and East of the cemetery, as he validly bought the area from
Alexander Ramos. He is presently occupying only 17,689 sq. m.,more or less.
His possession now is increased to two (2) hectares which includes the area
being possessed by Eusebio Ramos;
3. The remaining portion of the share of Alexander Ramos is 4,410
sq. m.,more or less. This is adjudicated in favor of his heirs. This portion now
corresponds to the area immediately South of the area of Evangelisto Garcia,
the partition being from East to West;
4. The middle portion consisting of 24,410 sq. m.,more or less, and
immediately South of the cemetery, and also South of the portion adjudicated
to the heirs of Alexander is now given to Zenaida Ramos Balalio as her valid
share of lot 204, the partition being also East to West;
5. South of the share of Zenaida consisting also of 24,410 sq.
m.,more or less, is the valid share of Rolando Ramos and his full blooded
brother and sisters namely Robin, Corazon, Myrna and Mila, all surnamed
Ramos;
6. Rolando Ramos and Eusebio Ramos are ordered jointly and
severally to pay Zenaida Ramos:
a. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees;
 b. One thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos as appearance
fees of her lawyer;
c. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as incidental expenses
relative to the case;
d. One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred (P100,800.00) Pesos as
the reasonable owner's share of the produce of the
land of Zenaida Ramos from 1975 to the present, with
an interest of 6% per annum until fully paid;
7. The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff are ordered to repair to the
land in question and partition said land in accordance with the tenor of this
decision;
8. And to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with
the homestead application requirements in order to acquire superior vested right. As a consequence,
it reversed the decision of the trial court, to wit:
As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of
appellants as to the fourth error and finds that the contract supposedly
dividing that property among Zenaida, Rolando Ramos and Alexander Ramos
cannot be enforced because neither of the parties therein can claim any
vested right over the subject parcel land which is still part of the public
domain.
Also, prescinding from the above ruling, the intervention of
Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia should likewise be dismissed. As to
Eusebio, since Susana never filed an application for homestead, her right
never ripened to ownership which she could have transmitted to her heirs. As
to Evangelisto Garcia who supposedly purchased that share of Alexander (an
heir of Susana),since the vendor never inherited anything from Susana there
was nothing which he (Evangelisto) could have bought. In fine, neither of the
intervenors could claim any right which they can enforce in court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas,
Isabela, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 is REVERSED and the
"Complaint" filed by plaintiff-appellee as well as the respective "Answer in
Intervention" of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia are all hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
7.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S
COMPLAINT.
7.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND, AND
DECLARING THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO THE
DISPUTED LAND.
7.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE ISSUE OF
ACCION PUBLICIANA IN THE CASE AT BAR AND CONFINED ITSELF
TO THE CLAIM OF RECOVERY OF INHERITANCE. 9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. 10 Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. 11
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073 (1977), remains to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of
alienable lands of the public domain. It enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these lands
and prescribes the terms and conditions to enable private persons to perfect their title to them. It is,
therefore, the applicable law to the case before us.
A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire
title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, a homestead patent
is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is
not the owner of more than 24 12hectares of land in the country. 13 To be qualified, the applicant must
show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is
situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for. 14
In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural land that
her parents Susana and Abundio had possessed since 1938. She claims that, for some time, the
cultivation of this land was left to her and her grandfather and that, following the death of her father
Abundio, the land was allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana.
Zenaida's argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents had perfected their title
over the land and that they could validly convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or by
inheritance. However, a careful examination of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily
established that a valid application for homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the
Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaida's family's right of preference over the land, in view of
their possession and cultivation of the land. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of
an appropriate application for its registration which indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no
valid application filed. 15
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect,
nor can it be a source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did
not belong to her. The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property
among Zenaida, Alexander, and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of
the land which she did not own. SIAEHC
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs
of Susana. Their claim evidently relies on the provision of the Public Land Act which states:
 Section 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before
the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of
the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending
towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded
in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted
or leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued
to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied
with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights
and obligations for the purposes of this Act.(Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 16, 2005 is MODIFIED, insofar as to grant petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio preferential
possession of the portion of Lot 204, Pls-15, situated in Muñoz, Roxas, Isabela, as delineated in the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996. STIcEA
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ramos-Balalio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 168464, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL 506-518)

The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an applicant,

grantee,or lessee.Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime, despite her possession and cultivation
of the land, she failed to apply for a homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or
Rolando can inherit. As such, the land remains part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio and
Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of the land because the same cannot be
considered as adverse, open, public, peaceful and to the exclusion of all.

Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully belongs to
the State. As held by the Court of Appeals, none of the parties obtained a defensible title to the
property which can be upheld by the Court. Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different from
the issue of its ownership.Petitioner argues that her petition may be treated as an accion
publiciana and not merely an action for recovery of inheritance.

An accion publicianais an action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. 16 In this case, the issue is whether Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may
be considered as having any right to the land occupied, which may entitle her to sue in courts for the
return of the possession thereof.

We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her
share, which possession antedates the filing of the homestead application. She produced evidence
showing that she has filed a verified application for the registration of the land with the Bureau of
Lands on August 10, 1971, 17which is still pending. The documents remain uncontested and the
application has not been assailed by any of the parties to the case. She alleged that during the lifetime
of her mother, she and her maternal grandfather cultivated and occupied the land.

Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her
predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held
that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. 18 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. 19

All told, petitioner Zenaida's uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent
coupled with her open and notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to
possess the land claimed, which entitles her to be protected by the law in such possession.
 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

For resolution by the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed
by the Republic of the Philippines questioning the Decision 1 dated November 28, 2003 rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68973. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 39, granting the application for registration
of title of land filed by respondents.

Respondents filed their verified petition for confirmation and registration of title to two
parcels of land located in Gahonon, Daet, Camarines Norte on January 16, 1997. 2 One parcel, Lot 1711,
Pls-488-D, consists of 455 square meters. The other parcel (hereafter referred to as "Parcel 2"),
described in Psu-05-006497-D, contains 297 square meters.

Petitioner, through the Director of Lands, filed an Opposition on the grounds that
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest have not been in continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that respondents' evidence is not
competent or sufficient to establish their claim; and that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of
the public domain. 3

On September 28, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision with the following dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, title of the applicants to the 455-square meter parcel

of land described on Plan-051603-0022344 (Exh. "M") and the 297-square
meter parcel of land described on plan Psu-05-006497-D (Exh. "M-1") is
hereby confirmed and the same is ordered registered in the name of spouses
Ricardo B. Enriquez and Eliza M. Enriquez, both of legal age, Filipino citizens
and residents of Batobalani, Paracale, Camarines Norte.

Once this decision shall have become final, let an order for the
issuance of decree be issued. CIaASH

SO ORDERED. 4

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA on grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to respondents'
failure to present the original tracing cloth plan of the subject lots, and respondents' failure to prove
open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession for more than 30 years. Finding no error, the CA
denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision in the assailed Decision dated November 28, 2003. 5

Hence, herein petition based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL

COURT WHICH GRANTED THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RICARDO B. TO PROCEED WITH THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO PRESENT
ENRIQUEZ and ELIZA M. ENRIQUEZ, respondents. THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN OR THE DIAZO POLYESTER FILM.

II

DECISION
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO PROVE THAT THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSORS-
IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOTS IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNERS FOR AT
LEAST THIRTY YEARS. 6
These issues, notably, are questions of fact that petitioner had already previously raised in
its appeal before the CA. The general rule is that questions of fact are beyond the province of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. 7 Said rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact
is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record. 8(Emphasis supplied) HAISEa
After going over the evidence extant in the record of this case, the Court finds that the CA
failed to notice a relevant fact which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion, thus
necessitating a review of the case. Particularly, the Court is referring to the fact that there exists a
material discrepancy in the technical description of Parcel 2 applied for as will be discussed forthwith.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. 9
One of the mandatory requirements in applications of original registration of land is the
submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan or the "sepiacopy" (Diazo Polyester Film), duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands. This is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and
to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.
Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration. 10
Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court allowed substantial compliance with this rule.
In Recto v. Republic of the Philippines, 11 this Court held that blueprint copies of the original tracing
cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to
identify a piece of land for registration purposes, as the property was sufficiently identified by: 1) the
blueprint copy of the plan and technical description which were both approved by the Land
Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and 2) the
report of the Land Management Sector stating that the subject property is not a portion of, nor
identical to any previously approved isolated survey. The applicants in the Recto case also submitted a
certified true copy of the original tracing cloth plan to the CA as well as a certification from the Land
Registration Authority attesting that the original plan in diazo polyester film was on file.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla, 12 the Court also deemed as substantial compliance
the submission of the following in lieu of the original tracing cloth plan, to wit: 1) a blueprint copy of
the subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands; 2) a technical description approved by the Land
Management Bureau of the DENR; 3) a certification from the DENR Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) which states that the Property has not been forfeited for non-
payment of real estate taxes, is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as of December 31,
1925, has not been previously titled and is not covered by any previous public land application; and 4)
a report of the Land Management Bureau stating that the Property is not recorded in their lot and plan
index cards as being subject of a previous public land application. The applicants also filed a motion to
admit original tracing cloth plan with the Court of Appeals during the pendency of the appeal and
attached thereto the original plan, which the Court noted as the same as the blueprint subdivision plan
offered as evidence before the trial court. IDCcEa
In the present case, there is no question that respondents did not submit the original of the
tracing cloth plan of Lots 1711, Pls-488-D and Psu-05-006497-D. Applying the exception, the CA ruled
that the same may be dispensed with as there are on record the blueprint copies of the properties and
"other evidences," which sufficiently establish the nature, identity, location and extent of the subject
properties. The CA also ruled that the case of Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 13 cited by petitioner, does
not apply in this case since there is no discrepancy in the area of the land as stated in the application
and in the blue print.
Petitioner, however, insists that there exists a material discrepancy in the area of Parcel 2.
The Court went over the records of this case and indeed, as borne by respondents' own
evidence, there exists a significant discrepancy in the area of Lot Psu-05-006497-D creating a doubt as
to the actual area, such that the exception to the rule on the presentation of the original tracing cloth
plan cannot be applied.
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994 between Rosalinda Oloya and
respondents, Parcel 2 was described as follows:
Parcel 2 A parcel of land situated at Gahonon, Daet, Camarines Norte,
Philippines. Bounded on the north by irrigation canal;
 on the South lot owned by Mrs. of Tomas Cootauco;
on the West lot No. 1710 -____ and on the East lo [sic]
No. 1710 ____. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 018-
0991 containing an area of 250 Sq. m more or less. 14
This is confirmed in the Provincial Assessor's Property Field Appraisal & Assessment Sheet
for the years 1993 15 and 1994, 16 and the Declaration of Real Property in the names of Rosalinda
Oloya and Tomas Cootauco, although the boundaries set therein were as follows:
Northeast: Lot 1711
Northwest: Road lot
Southeast: Road lot
Southwest: National road
Meanwhile, in the 1996 blue print copy of the survey plan 17 and the technical description
issued by the Lands Management Services, 18 Parcel 2 already contained an area of 297 square meters,
and bounded as follows:
Southwest: National Road
Northwest: property of Samuel Magana
Northeast: Lot 1711, Pls 488-D
Southeast property of Emeteria Abodago
Moreover, the Court notes that in a Certification dated October 15, 1992, issued by the
Office of the CENRO, Daet, Camarines Norte, there already exists a previous survey plan over the same
property but which measures 250 square meters. It was stated therein: "THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per
records filed in this Office, shows that the parcel of land with an area of 250 square meters as surveyed
by Engr. Virgilio F. Jimenez for Tomas Cootauco, located at Gahonon, Daet, Camarines Norte . . . ." 19
Respondents failed to satisfactorily explain the reason for the difference in the area. What
respondent Ricardo Enriquez merely said on this score was: "When the relocation survey was conducted
and the exact boundaries were determined, it was found out that the area is actually 297 and not
250." 20 Such bare testimony does not suffice to clarify the difference in the area, as shown in the
pertinent documents on record. Respondent Enriquez did not conduct the survey, and it does not
appear that he has technical know-how in this regard. It could have been different had the original
tracing cloth plan been submitted in evidence, since it is the best evidence to identify a piece of land
for registration purposes, 21 or at the very least, the geodetic engineer who surveyed the property
should have testified with regard to the increase in the area. SITCEA
It should be stressed that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must
prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence, and is duty bound to identify sufficiently and
satisfactorily the property. Otherwise stated, all facts must indicate that no other person, including the
government, will be prejudiced by the adjudication of the land to the applicant. 22
Given respondents' failure to identify with certainty the area of Parcel 2 as described in Lot
Psu-05-006497-D, the RTC should have therefore denied the application for registration of title over
said property.
The foregoing conclusion, however, does not hold true with regard to Lot 1711, Pls-488-D.
All the evidence on record sufficiently identified the property as the one applied for by respondents,
and containing the corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Consequently, the original tracing
cloth plan need not be presented in evidence, applying the exception set forth in
the Hubilla 23 and Recto 24 cases.
On the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots,
the Court will settle the issue only vis-à-vis Lot 1711, Pls-488-D, since as earlier stated, the application
for the registration of title over Parcel 2 should be denied.
In Republic v. Jacob, 25 the Court explained the concept of possession and occupation
referred to in cases of registration of title, viz.:
Indeed, the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Possession
is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
Unless, therefore, the law adds the word "occupation," it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words "continuous," "exclusive" and "notorious," the word "occupation"
seems to highlight the facts that for an applicant to qualify, her possession of
the property must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over her own
property. A mere casual cultivation of portions of land by the claimant does
not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Such possession is not
exclusive and notorious as it gives rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land. The good faith of the person consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom she received the property
was the owner thereof and could transfer ownership.
Records bear out that Lot 1711, Pls-488-D was originally part of a 707-square meter
property owned by Concepcion Pabico. In an Escritura de Compra Venta dated April 23, 1941, the
property was sold to Tomas Cootauco. 26 After the death of Cootauco, his heirs sold the property,
which was already partitioned into to two portions, Parcel 1 consisting of 455 square meters and Parcel
2 consisting of 250 square meters, to Rosalinda Buñag Oloya by virtue of a "Deed of Absolute Sale"
dated October 22, 1992. 27 The sale was confirmed in an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with
Confirmation of Sale" executed on October 22, 1992. 28 Oloya, in turn, sold these two parcels of land
to respondents in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated December 2, 1994. 29
Records also show that as early as 1963, Cootauco has already declared Lot 1711, Pls-488-
D for taxation purposes, 30 and realty taxes have been paid thereon since 1964. 31 It has been ruled
that while tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are goodindicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 32

Given the sufficiency of proof of respondents' compliance with the legal requirements, in
that Lot 1711, Pls-488-D has been identified with certainty, and that respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same since 1963, or for 34 years, the application for the registration of title of Lot
1711, Pls-488-D was therefore correctly granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68973 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
September 28, 1998 is MODIFIED whereby the application for original registration of the 297-square
meter parcel of land described in plan Psu-05-006497-D is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Republic v. Spouses Enriquez, G.R. No. 160990, [September 11, 2006], 533 PHIL 87-100)

SPS. ALBERTO and JOCELYN AZANA, petitioners, vs. CRISTOPHER LUMBO

and ELIZABETH LUMBO-JIMENEZ, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J p:

In this appeal by certiorari, spouses Alberto and Jocelyn Azana assail the decision 1 dated
September 17, 2002 and resolution 2 dated March 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60973. After a re-evaluation of the evidence on record, the appellate court held that the trial
court's factual findings were contrary to the evidence presented and, on that basis, reversed the latter's
ruling.
 Originally, respondents filed an action for quieting of title 3 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kalibo, Aklan. The subject matter of the action was a piece of real property located in the island of
Boracay, a prime tourist destination. It was designated as Lot 64 during the national reservation survey
of Boracay on April 14, 1976.
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of Lot 64. They claimed that, in a deed of
absolute sale dated December 1, 1996, the spouses Emilio and Estela Gregorio sold Lot 64 to
petitioners. This cast a cloud over their title.
To support their claim of ownership, respondents stated that Lot 64 was originally part of
the 8.0488-hectare land bought in a public auction by their parents, which they inherited entirely; that
such sale in the public auction was evidenced by a final bill of sale dated September 18, 1939; that Lot
64 was separately designated during the national reservation survey only because it was also being
claimed by the spouses Gregorio; and that, if Lots 63 and 64 were combined, the boundaries of the
resulting lot coincided with the boundaries of the lot purchased under the final bill of sale.
For their part, petitioners claim that they purchased Lot 64 from the spouses Gregorio in
good faith; that the spouses Gregorio became the lawful owners of Lot 64 by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale dated March 25, 1976 executed by Ignacio Bandiola in favor of Estela Gregorio whereby
Bandiola transferred to Gregorio a parcel of land with an area of 3.4768 hectares; and that Lot 64 was
part of this 3.4768-hectare land.
According to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, respondents failed to establish the identity of the lot
sold under the final bill of sale. Consequently, their claim of title over Lot 64 also had to fail. In the
words of the court a quo:
Assaying the evidence presented by the parties in relation to their
respective submissions, the Court noted that the land acquired by
[respondents'] parents at the public auction is not solely bounded on the
North and East by [the] Visayan Sea, but also by Anunciacion Gelito and
Guillermo Sualog, respectively. Indeed, [respondents] own survey plan
discloses that Lots 63 and 64 [are] bounded by Lot 62 and seashore.
Hence, it is not clear that the land acquired by [respondents']
parents at an auction sale includes Lot 64. The Court could probably sustain
[respondents'] theory if the said land is solely bounded on the North and East
by [the] Visayan Sea or seashore. There would be no space for any intervening
lot. 4 (citations omitted)
Finding equiponderance of evidence, 5 the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and upheld
the validity of the sale of Lot 64 to them.
On review, the CA arrived at a different conclusion. It declared respondents as owners of
Lot 64 and nullified the sale by the spouses Gregorio to petitioners. The appellate court agreed with
respondents that Lot 64 was part of the 8.0488-hectare property described in the final bill of sale. As
opposed to the findings of the trial court, the appellate court was satisfied that the boundaries of the
lot resulting from the merger of Lots 63 and 64 coincided with the boundaries of the 8.0488 hectare
property. Moreover, the CA noted that the areas of Lots 63 and 64 were 7.0300 hectares and 1.2012
hectares respectively, meaning that the area resulting from the combination of the two lots was
equivalent to "8.0000 hectares, more or less, which [was] the total area being claimed by the
[respondents]". 6
Aggrieved, the spouses Gregorio and the spouses Azana filed in this Court separate petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitions were separately docketed as
G.R. No. 157617 7 and G.R. No. 157593, respectively. The Court instantly denied both petitions for
essentially raising questions of fact which are generally beyond our review.
Thereafter, both the Gregorios and petitioners filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The Court denied the MR 8 of the spouses Gregorio, in effect denying G.R. No. 157617
with finality.
Meanwhile, the MR of the spouses Azana was granted. As a general rule, it is not the
Supreme Court's function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented. 9 The factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on this Court
and are given great weight and respect. 10However, the rule is not absolute. In instances where there
is divergence in the findings and conclusions of the trial court, on one hand, and the appellate court,
on the other, the Court may give the petition due course and re-examine the evidence on
record. 11 Satisfied that the foregoing exception applies to this case, the Court ordered the
reinstatement of G.R. No. 157593 (this petition).
Respondents oppose the petition on the ground that it is already barred by prior judgment.
They argue that the dismissal of the Gregorios' petition (G.R. No. 157617) was a final judgment
constituting a bar to the institution of a similar petition.
Respondents' position is incorrect. Res judicata calls for the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) there is final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits and (4) there is, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 12 Here, the first requisite is absent. The
Court's resolution denying the spouses Gregorio's petition is not the final judgment contemplated by
the first requisite. Rather, "final judgment" entails a decision which perpetually settles the controversy
and lays to rest all questions raised. At that point, there was no final judgment because the spouses
Azana's appeal of the CA decision was still pending before us. Stated differently, there was yet no final
judgment which could be entered and executed.
We now proceed to consider the documents relied upon by the parties.
To prove their claim, petitioners submitted a deed of absolute sale of real property 13 dated
March 25, 1976 to show that Ignacio Bandiola sold to Estela Gregorio 3.4768 hectares of land located
in Manoc-Manoc, Malay, Aklan. The property was particularly described as follows:
THE PORTION SOLD CONSISTS of 3.4768 hectares, more or less,
located at the southern side of the whole parcel and with the following
pertinent boundaries: on the North by Visayan Sea and Ernesto Bandiola; on
the East by Visayan Sea; on the South by Felicitas Lumbo, D. Pelayo, and D.
Magapi; and on the West by Teodorica Bandiola. 14
They also presented the corresponding tax declaration 15 which reiterated the same property
boundaries.
Petitioners point out that a portion of this property was separately declared for realty tax
purposes under ARP/TD No. 93-011-1020/1021 as Lot 64 with an area of 1.48 hectares. 16 The tax
declaration indicated that the boundaries of Lot 64 were:
North: Visayan Sea South: Lot 63
 West: lot 99-pt East: Visayan Sea
In the hope of strengthening their case, petitioners narrated the supposed origin of the
disputed property. They claimed that the 3.4768-hectare property was taken from the consolidated
lots owned by Ignacio Bandiola, i.e., three contiguous parcels of land with individual areas of 8.7766
hectares, 6550 square-meters and 4994 square-meters. 17 From this land mass, Ignacio Bandiola
carved out 3.4768 hectares and sold the same to Estela Gregorio. Allegedly, this portion included Lot
64 which Estela Gregorio, in turn, sold to petitioners. cEDaTS
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners' preceding allegations are true, it follows
that Ignacio Bandiola's lots, if taken as one, must have extended to the Visayan Sea in the east to have
roped in Lot 64. It also follows that at least one of the lots should have the Visayan Sea as its eastern
boundary. However, this conclusion is belied by the tax declarations petitioners themselves presented.
Not one of the tax declarations stated that any of Bandiola's lots was bound in the east by the Visayan
Sea. On the contrary, all the tax declarations stated that each of the lots was bound in the east by a
particular land mass:
Tax Declaration No. 3066
Land Area: 8.7766 hectares
quite unlikely that Lot 64 would have the exact same boundaries as any or all of these [three]
parcels." 21
We find their explanation wanting. If, indeed, Lot 64 was part of Ignacio Bandiola's mass of
properties it would have been in its south-east corner, occupying part of its southern and eastern
perimeter. 22 Therefore, the parcels of land covered by the three tax declarations must reflect
southern and/or eastern boundaries similar to those of Lot 64. But, as explained earlier, none of the
lots was enclosed or partly enclosed in the east by the sea. It is highly unlikely that the corner portion
of the mother property would not have similar boundaries as those of the latter on at least two
sides. CDAcIT
The Court is not inclined to pronounce which of the documents presented by petitioners is
true and correct. It is enough to say that the evidence they presented cast doubt on the validity of their
claim. Petitioners failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, the exact perimeters of the land
which they claim as their own.
On the other hand, respondents anchor their claim over Lot 64 on a final bill of sale 23 dated
September 18, 1939. Apparently, the document was executed in favor of Lorenzo and Felicitas Lumbo
who bought an 8.0488-hectare property in a public auction. It stated:

Boundaries: North — Visayan Sea That on September 30, 1937, the real property under Tax
East — Lorenzo Lumbo, Declaration No. 6523 was forfeited to the Government in the manner and
form prescribed by Act 3995 known as the Assessment Law, for non-payment
Vanancio Maming of land taxes corresponding to the years 1931 to 1937, inclusive, the
West — Conchita Tirol, Visayan Sea description of which follows:
South — Moises Pelayo, Paula Gelito 18 A parcel of cocal land situated in the barrio of
Tax Declaration No. 3087 Manocmanoc, municipality of Buruanga, province of Capiz,
Philippines, having an area of 80, 488 square meters more or less.
Land Area: 0.6550 hectare
Bounded on the North by Visayan Sea; on the East by the property
Boundaries: North — Visayan Sea of Guillermo Sualog and Visayan Sea; on the South by the property
East — Felicitas Alag de Lumbo of Moises Pelayo; and on the West by the properties of Venancio
Maming and Lucino Gelito, and assessed at P1040.00. . . . . 24
West — Felicitas Alag de Lumbo
South — Quirica Lumbo 19 The trial court discredited the final bill of sale by highlighting the fact that the property
bought at the public auction was not solely bound on the north and east by the Visayan Sea but also
Tax Declaration No. 3068 by the properties of Anuncion Gelito and Guillermo Sualog, respectively. With this, the trial court
Land Area: 0.4994 hectare deduced that there was an intervening space which should not have been there if the lot referred to
in the document included Lot 64. Thus, the final bill of sale must pertain to a different parcel of land.
Boundaries: North — Ignacio Bandiola
East — Anunciacion Gelito and We find the trial court's conclusion inaccurate. The Gelito and Sualog properties were not
located between the Visayan Sea and the disputed property. Otherwise, the tax declarations and final
F.A. Lumbo
bill of sale would have indicated that the Lumbo property was solely bound in the north by the Gelito
West — Ignacio Bandiola property and in the east by the Sualog property. A cursory look at the survey map 25 reveals that the
South — Gertrudes Casimero & perimeter of the Lumbo property ran along the Visayan Sea and Gelito's property in the north, and the
Visayan Sea and Sualog's property in the east. Naturally, the tax declarations and final bill of sale
Salvador Magapi 20 included the two properties mentioned as part of the boundaries of the Lumbo property. AEIcSa

Petitioners underscore the seeming irregularities in the description of the property under
Petitioners strained to explain the discrepancy by pointing out that "Lot 64 was but a mere the final bill of sale, a deed of sale dated May 20, 1939 and the tax declarations for the years 1991 and
portion of the three parcels of land covered by the [three] tax declarations. . . . . It [was] therefore,
1993 in the names of respondents. They posit that these irregularities negate respondents' claim of
legal or equitable title and ultimately justify the resolution of the case in their favor.
A deed of absolute sale 26 was executed on May 20, 1939 between Pantaleon Maming and
the respondents' parents, stipulating the sale to the Lumbos of "an approximate area of [five hectares],
being a part of the land under Tax No. 6523 in the name of Pantaleon Maming. . . ". 27 Petitioners
emphasize the fact that the property sold under the final bill of sale was the same lot under Tax
Declaration No. 6523. This discrepancy supposedly blurred the identification of the property claimed
by respondents.
We disagree.
The CA sufficiently reconciled the difference in the land areas in the two deeds:
. . . . It may be asked why there were two deeds of sale covering
the same property. We find credence in [respondents'] explanation. The
public auction was held on 13 September 1938 and therefore Pantaleon
Maming had up to 13 September 1939 to redeem the property. Before the
expiration of the period of redemption, Lorenzo Lumbo bought [five] hectares
of the [eight]-hectare property in an attempt, as [respondents] put it, to
persuade Maming not to redeem the property. This can be inferred from the
price of P500.00 he paid for the [five] hectares while in the auction sale held,
he bought the entire 8.0488 hectares for only P56.78. . . . 28
petitioners, were null and void. Therefore, respondents, as the adjudged owners of Lot 64, are entitled
to have the aforementioned deeds of sale nullified to remove any doubt regarding their ownership of
the lot.
While the appellate court adequately explained its decision, it failed to categorically declare
the deeds of sale as null and void in its dispositive portion. Since it is the dispositive portion of the
decision which shall be carried out, it is important that the status of the deeds of sale be clearly stated
therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated September 17, 2002 and
resolution dated March 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976, in so far as it covers Lot 64, and the deed of absolute
sale dated December 1, 1996 are hereby declared null and void.
Costs against petitioners. ETDHaC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Azana v. Lumbo, G.R. No. 157593, [March 22, 2007], 547 PHIL 598-610)

Next, petitioners highlight the tax declarations filed by respondents for the years
1991 29 and 1993 30 covering Lot 63 only. In the absence of contrary evidence, tax declarations, being
official documents, enjoy a presumption of truth as to their contents. Petitioners contend that, unlike
them, respondents never actually declared Lot 64 as theirs and cannot therefore claim ownership of
the property.

Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership
of the properties stated therein. 31 A disclaimer is even printed on their face that they are "issued only
in connection with real property taxation [and] should not be considered as title to the property." At
best, tax declarations are an indiciaof possession in the concept of an owner. 32 However, non-
declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership. 33

From the foregoing, the fact that both tax declarations in the names of respondents covered
Lot 63 only did not necessarily mean they did not own Lot 64 as they were in fact able to present a
document evidencing ownership of both properties — he final bill of sale. TDAHCS

Clearly, respondents have been able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they
are the rightful owners of Lot 64.

When an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the property by
the unfounded claim of others, he may bring an action for quieting of title. The purpose of the action
is to remove the cloud on his title created by any instrument, record, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid and prejudicial to his title. 34

Here, the deeds of sale executed in favor of petitioners and the spouses Gregorio
were prima facie valid and enforceable. However, further scrutiny and investigation established that
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Ignacio Bandiola, could not have owned the disputed lot.
Consequently, the subsequent conveyances of Lot 64 to the spouses Gregorio and thereafter, to

REGALA, J p:
CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES E. ARAGON, petitioners, vs. EMILIA E. DE
LEGARE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Teehankee, Tañada & Carreon for petitioners.
Ignacio M. Orendain for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; SALE OF REGISTERED LAND; INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR
VALUE; PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH. — A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchaser, or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another (Cui and Joven vs.
Henson, 51 Phil. 606).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRODUCTION OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE DEEMED
CONCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO ENTER NEW CERTIFICATE. — Under Section 5, Act 496, the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title operates as a conclusive authority from
the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN FORGED DEED MAY CONVEY TITLE. — Although generally a
forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, however, there are instances when
such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the
certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and
while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then,
the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUYER NOT REQUIRED TO INQUIRE FARTHER THAN WHAT FACE OF
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE INDICATES. — Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate
any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule
were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens
system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory.
DECISION
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on November 16, 1960, in Civil Case No. 15728-R, entitled "Emilia E. Legare, plaintiff-
appellant, versus, Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon, defendants-appellants.
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision are as follows:
"This is an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale and
conveyance covering a parcel of land, together with the improvements
existing thereon, situated in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal,
and for damages.
"It appears in evidence that the plaintiff, Emilia E. de Legare, was
the owner of a parcel of land, together with a residential house erected
thereon, situated at No. 146 Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal,
her ownership being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253,
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. She was
living in that house together with defendant John W. Legare, her adopted son,
and a maid named Purita Tarrosa. On September 26, 1951, the plaintiff, thru
a public deed, constituted on the above mentioned house and lot a first class
mortgage in favor of defendant Tomas Q. Soriano to guarantee the payment
of a loan in the amount of P8,000.00. This deed of mortgage was on the same
date recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal
and annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances of transfer certificate
of title No. 21253. On account of certain partial payments made by the
plaintiff and the contracting by the latter of additional loans in small amounts
from Tomas Q. Soriano the debt guaranteed by the above mentioned
mortgage was reduced to the sum of P7,000.00 as of February 23, 1953. These
transactions, however, were not annotated on the memorandum of
encumbrances of the above mentioned certificate of title.
"At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953, while the
plaintiff, John W. Legare, and Purita Tarrosa were seated in the drawing room
of the house above referred to, an unknown man intruded into the room,
approached the plaintiff, covered her mouth, and, pressing a knife on her side,
demanded that she give him P10,000.00 if she did not like to be killed. The
plaintiff replied that she did not have that amount. Thereupon, the intruder
told the plaintiff to raise the necessary amount as he would come back the
following morning, and once more threatened to kill her if she would fail to
do so. After having made that threat, the intruder left the house. John W.
Legare did not call for help nor made any attempt to defend his mother, and
when Purita Tarrosa stood up to go down the house to call for a policeman,
he held the latter by the hand and slapped her on the face when she persisted
in going down, telling her that the man had companions waiting downstairs.
"After the intruder was gone John W. Legare approached the
plaintiff, and exhibiting to her a paper told her to sign it as with the same he
could secure from the U.S. Veterans Administration the amount which they
needed to deliver to that intruder. The plaintiff, who did not know how to
read nor write, altho she could sign her name, asked John W. Legare what that
paper was. The latter answered that it was an application for payment of
compensation. As plaintiff had confidence in John W. Legare and prior to that
occasion she had received from the U.S. Veterans Administration a letter
concerning some compensation she was to receive, she signed that paper.
After the paper was signed by the plaintiff, John W. Legare had Purita Tarrosa
sign it as a witness, without however, allowing the latter to read it.
"After that paper was thus signed, John W. Legare told the plaintiff
and Purita Tarrosa to pack up their things as they were leaving the house to
hide in a hotel, adding that the men who came earlier that evening were Huks.
Early the next morning John W. Legare took the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa to
the Windsor Hotel in the City of Manila, and after conducting them to a room
in the hotel, told them not to leave the room nor peep out of the window as
they might be seen by the men who came to their house in the previous
evening. This advice given John W. Legare left the hotel. The plaintiff and
Purita Tarrosa stayed in that hotel for about a month and a half. John W.
Legare occasionally visited them there. In one of said occasional visits the
plaintiff told John that she wanted to go home. The latter told her that it was
not yet safe for her to go home. On May 7, 1953, however, John W. Legare
came to the hotel, gave the plaintiff a five peso bill, and told her that she could
use the amount for transportation expenses if she wanted to leave the hotel.
On the following morning the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa left the hotel and
went direct to her house at Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension. When they arrived
at the house, however, they found that it was occupied by strangers, and that
all her furniture and personal belongings had disappeared. Inquiring from
those strangers how they happened to occupy the house, the latter told her
that John W. Legare had sold the house to them and that it was no longer
hers. The plaintiff thereupon sought the help of her attorney. It was then
discovered that the paper which John W. Legare had the plaintiff and Purita
Tarrosa sign in the evening of March 29, 1953 was a deed of sale of the lot
and house in question in favor of John W. Legare for the sum of P12,000.00,
and that it was supposed to have been executed on the 7th day of April 1953,
and acknowledged before a notary public on that date. Exhibit X.
"It further appears that sometime prior to May 9, 1953, John W.
Legare approached Elias B. Fermin, the real estate broker who intervened in
the securing of the loan contracted by the plaintiff from Tomas Q. Soriano,
and sought said broker's help to sell the lot and house in question. Elias B.
Fermin accepted the commission and offered the property in sale to
defendants spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon. Conrado C. Fule
read the title papers in the hand of John W. Legare and inspected the
premises, and satisfied with the result of his inspection, he agreed to purchase
the property for P12,000.00 on condition that the sum of P7,000, the unpaid
balance of plaintiff's indebtedness to Tomas Q. Soriano secured by a
mortgage thereon, would be deducted from the price, and that he would
assume said mortgage. The terms offered by Conrado C. Fule being
acceptable to John W. Legare and Tomas Soriano, the parties proceeded to
formalize the contract. Accordingly, on May 9, 1953, defendant Tomas Q.
Soriano executed a deed of absolute sale thereof, free of all liens and
encumbrances, in favor of defendant spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F.
Aragon, Exhibit X-2, and said spouses in turn executed in favor of Tomas Q.
Soriano a deed of mortgage covering the property for the sum of P7,000.00
Exhibit X-3. These three deeds, together with transfer certificate of Title No.
21253, issued in the name of the plaintiff, were on that same date presented
for registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal.
The latter, following the usual procedure, recorded, first, the deed of sale
executed by the plaintiff in favor of defendant John W. Legare (Exhibit 1) and
issued in the name of the latter transfer certificate of title No. 30126 which
cancelled transfer for certificate of title No. 21253 (Exhibit Y), then the deed
of sale executed by John W. Legare in favor of the spouses Conrado C. Fule
and Lourdes F. Aragon (Exhibit X-2) and issued in favor of the latter transfer
certificate of title No. 30127 (Exhibit Y-1), which cancelled transfer certificate
of title No. 30126, and then annotated on the memorandum of encumbrances
of transfer certificate of title No. 30127 the deed of mortgage (Exhibit X-1)
executed in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano by said spouses. Once these were
accomplished, Elias B. Fermin and John W. Legare went back to the house of
the spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon and gave the transfer
certificate of title No. 30127. Thereupon said spouses delivered to John W.
Legare the balance of the purchase price of the property after deducting
therefrom the amount of the mortgage constituted thereon in favor of Tomas
Q. Soriano, the brokerage fees and the expenses incident to the execution
and registration of said deeds and issuance of new certificates of title, which
amounted to a little over P4,000.00.
 "Upon the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby orders:
"1) the cancellation of Certificate of Title Nos. 30127 and 30126,
thereby leaving valid TCT no. 21253 in the name of Emilia E. de Legare
together with the encumbrance thereon in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano;
"2) the delivery of the possession of the premises to the plaintiff
and the monthly rental of P150.00 a month from May 9, 1953, up to and
including the date on which the delivery is to be made, this obligation being
understood to be joint and several insofar as the defendants Fule and Aragon
are concerned;"
3) the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the
plaintiff and enforceable against John W. Legare for the fraud perpetrated by
the latter on the former;
"4) the award of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees enforceable against
the defendants Fule and Aragon;
"And on the cross-claim the court orders —
"1) John W. Legare to refund to the spouses Fule and Aragon the
amount paid by the latter on account of the sale contained in Exhibit X-2 plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the cross-claim;
"2) the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the
spouses Fule and Aragon and enforceable against John W. Legare for the
misrepresentation made by him;
"3) the reimbursement to the spouses Fule and Aragon by John W.
Legare of all amounts which may be paid by the former to the plaintiff by way
of rentals for the premises involved herein, as well as attorney's fees in the
amount of P1,000.00.
"SO ORDERED."
The Court of Appeals, in deciding the appeal, entered a judgment the dispositive
portion of which follows:
"WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above, i.e., the transfer
certificate of title No. 21253 issued in the name of Emilia E. de Legare is
revived with the mortgage in favor of appellee Tomas Q. Soriano annotated
on its memorandum of encumbrances but reduced to the amount of
P7,000.00, and that the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00
to be paid by the spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon, in favor of
the plaintiff, is eliminated therefrom, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in
this instance.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
In elevating the judgment of the Court of Appeals to this Tribunal for review, herein
petitioners discussed 6 assignments of error. However, this Court, is of the view that, in effect
and substance, only one issue was raised. We have always refrained from reviewing factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the first two errors assigned were but attempts at disputing
the same. The other four were simply detailed aspects of the one, sole issue, to wit:
Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value
of the properties here contested?
Guided by the facts found by the Court of Appeals, We hold the herein petitioners
innocent purchasers for value of the house and lot here disputed. In consequence, they are here
adjudged the lawful owners thereof.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil., 606). We have
measured the conduct of the petitioner spouses by this yardstick.
These facts were uncontroverted. The negotiation and transaction which eventually
caused the certificate of title to be transferred from the herein respondent to the petitioner
spouses were conducted by a real estate broker licensed since 1938. Nothing in John W. Legare's
person or behaviour suggested anything suspicious. He was the adopted son of the herein
respondent, and, to the time that he was contracting with the petitioner spouses, he had not
been known to commit crime or dishonesty. On the contrary, John has had previous dealings with
the real estate broker during which he exhibited the expected degree of trustworthiness.
It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no one would
have questioned its authenticity since it was duly acknowledged before a notary public.
Moreover, even if the petitioners had the opportunity to compare the signature of the
respondent on the deed of conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the effort,
nonetheless, would have been in vain since the respondent's signature on the document was
admittedly hers. Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the respondent, during the whole period
of the negotiation, was nowhere available to confirm or deny the execution of the deed. She was
then in hiding, or, hidden, at the Windsor Hotel in Manila.
The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves could hardly
have been wanting. The records show that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed of sale
in favor of John W. Legare and the fact that John had then in his possession the corresponding
certificate of title of the registered owner. They demanded more. They insisted that the sale in
favor of John W. Legare be first registered and that the transfer in their favor be thereafter
likewise registered. It was only after all these were complied with that they paid the purchaser
price. In other words, the petitioner spouses relied not really on the documents exhibited to them
by John W. Legare, but, on the registerability of those documents. This in our view, satisfies the
measure of good faith contemplated by law.
It is true that at the time the herein petitioners purchased the properties from John
W. Legare, he was not yet the registered owner of the same. This fact alone, however, could not
have caused the herein petitioners to lose their status as innocent purchasers for value. It should
be recalled that although the title was in the name of the respondent Emilia E. de Legare, the
certificate of title was in the possession of her adopted son, John. Under Section 5 of Act 496, as
amended, John's possession of the certificate and his subsequent production of it to the herein
petitioners operated as a "conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds
to enter a new certificate."
"SEC. 55. . .
"The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any
voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive
authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new
certificate or to make a memorandum or registration in accordance with such
instrument, and the new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon
the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of
every purchaser for value and in good faith. . . ."
While it was true that the transfer in favor or John was still unregistered when he
sought to sell the property to the herein petitioners, it was not true that the latter observed no
precaution whatsoever from the complication of such non-registration. As already discussed
above, the petitioners required that the registration of the previous sale (from the respondent to
John W. Legare) be first attended to and completed. After that was done and the certificate of
title was issued to John by the Register of Deeds, they still withheld payment till the second sale
(from John to the petitioners) was in turn registered and the corresponding certificate of title
therefor was issued in their names. It was only after all these were followed that the entire
negotiation was terminated with the payment of the balance of the purchase price. All these, we
hold, were adequate safeguards against the objection interposed. A contrary conclusion would
operate to weaken the reliance of the general public on the indefeasibility of titles registered
under the Torrens System.
We have so far demonstrated the good faith of the petitioner spouses. By the very
facts established by the Court of Appeals, however, there is still another reason why the property
here in question should be adjudged to the petitioners.
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains
that he was able to secure a registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he
subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or
fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19).
However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent
document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title
was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained
that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the
right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28,
1960).
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the
Torrens system, "registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens
title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the
certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory.
(Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The
public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land
Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced
immeasurably.
Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of
John W. Legare, and thereafter registered the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were
concerned, acquired valid title to the house and lot here disputed. When, therefore, he
transferred this title to the herein petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the
purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The registration in John W. Legare's name effectively
operated to convey the properties to him.
"Art. 1434.When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto,
such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee."
This Court sympathizes with the respondent. It is aware of the treacherous, painful
fraud committed on her by her adopted son. But positive provisions of law and settled
jurisprudence cannot be subordinated to that feeling.
Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein respondent is herself not
entirely free from blame. We note that when John presented to her the document which turned
out to be a deed of conveyance in his favor, she readily affixed her signature thereto upon the
simple representation of John that it was a document pertaining to her claim with the U.S.
Veterans Administrations. She could have asked her maid to read the contents of the same for
her and yet she did not. These, We believe, amount to a lack of prudence and precaution on the
part of Mrs. Emilia de Legare.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed
and set aside. A new one is here entered dismissing the respondent's complaint and declaring the
petitioners herein the lawful owners of the properties here involved. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA RUMARATE; deceased
TEODULO RUMARATE is represented herein by his Heirs/Substitutes,
namely, ANASTACIA RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA RUMARATE,
ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE,
MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA RUMARATE,
SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA RUMARATE, petitioners, vs. HILARIO
HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN
HERNANDEZ, LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA HERNANDEZ-
MERCURIO, RODRIGO HERNANDEZ, BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES
HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO SALVATIERRA, ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO,
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053, which reversed and set aside the March 31, 1997 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, declaring
petitioners as owners of Lot No. 379 with an area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio
Catimo, 3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo Rumarate
(Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting
of title with damages against respondent heirs of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta. 4 Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his
godfather, Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate family
in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate family transferred
residence to avail of the land distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan, Quezon. From 1925 to 1928,
Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez,
Quezon in 1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and entrusted
to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April 21, 1925
recognizing his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379. 5 Since Teodulo was only 14 years old then, his
father helped him cultivate the land. 6 Their family thereafter cleared the land, built a
house 7 and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon. 8 In 1960, Santiago
executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)" 9 ratifying the transfer of his rights over Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo. Between 1960 and 1970, three conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of
coconut trees growing therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the
remaining portions of the land was almost entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts, coffee,
jackfruits, mangoes and vegetables. 10 From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children
possessed the land as owners and declared the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961. 11
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta,
respondents' predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not
immediately file a case against respondents because he was advised to just remain on the land
and pay the corresponding taxes thereon. 12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, 1964, Santiago sold
the questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for
P9,000.00. 13 Respondents alleged that on April 21, 1925, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a Decision
written in Spanish, declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant
thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was issued to Santiago because he failed
to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open Cadastral
Proceeding No. 12, alleging that though no title was issued in the name of Santiago, the same
decision is, nevertheless, proof that Santiago was in possession of Lot No. 379 since 1925 or for
more than 30 years. Having succeeded in the rights of Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral
Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened and that the corresponding title over Lot No. 379 be issued in
their name. On September 13, 1965, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No.
379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-11844 14 was
issued on the same date. 15 Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land through the
help of a certain Fredo 16 who was instituted as caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano
Hernandez that he will no longer stay on the land because there are people instructing him to
discontinue tilling the same. 17
After the death of the spouses, 18 respondents executed a deed of partition over the
subject lot and were issued TCT No. T-237330 on June 28, 1988 in lieu of OCT No. O-11844. 19
Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he accompanied his
father in inspecting the lot which was then planted with coconut trees. 20Thereafter, he visited
the land twice, once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he testified, his
family declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon. 21 Joaquin explained that
after the death of his father in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only when the
complaint was filed against them when he learned that petitioners are in actual possession of the
property. 22 He added that his siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for
cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations then of the New People's Army
between the years 1965-1970. 23
On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held
that since the latter possessed the land in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became the
owners thereof by acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of
Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to respondents' parents in 1964, the former no
longer had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said respondents.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, to wit:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the Cadastral
Survey of Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557),
situated in Brgy. Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently,
deceitfully and mistakenly registered in the names of the spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta;
2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta have no better rights than their
parents/predecessors-in-interest, they having stepped only on (sic) their
shoes;
3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and
substitute plaintiffs-[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate are the true,
real and legal owners/or the owners in fee simple absolute of the above
described parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-described parcel
of land to plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs
(heirs) of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate;
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province in Lucena
City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-237330 and to issue in lieu
thereof a new certificate of title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate
and the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff Teodulo
Rumarate, in accordance with law and settled jurisprudence; and HCEcAa
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.
 SO ORDERED. 24
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, 2005, reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that Teodulo did not acquire title over Lot No.
379, either by donation or acquisitive prescription; that Teodulo's bare allegation that Santiago
orally bequeathed to him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and
that even assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to Teodulo in 1929, or in the
1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not complying with the formalities of a valid donation
which require the donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to be embodied in a public
instrument. Both requirements, however, are absent in this case because in 1929, the alleged
donation was not reduced to writing while the purported 1960 donation was never accepted in a
public document by Teodulo. The appellate court thus surmised that since it was not established
that Santiago donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also failed to prove that
he possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the concept of an owner, a vital requisite
before one may acquire title by acquisitive prescription. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals ruled
that even assuming further that Teodulo had a right over the property, his cause of action is now
barred by laches because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding knowledge as early as
1970 of the issuance of title in the name of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. The
decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. The assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 25
Hence, the instant appeal.
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners
who possessed and cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate
of title over the property, or to respondents who have a certificate of title but are not in
possession of the controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective rights
of the parties so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever free from
any danger of hostile claim. 26 Under Article 476 27 of the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed
of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast
on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein. Article 477 of the
same Code states that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the suit. DIECTc
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 28
In Evangelista v. Santiago, 29 it was held that title to real property refers to that upon
which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest,
by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a right to exclusive possession and
enjoyment of the property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulo's open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years
vested him and his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable at the time Teodulo completed
his 30-year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec.
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942, effective June 22, 1957 30 which provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Property
Registration Decree), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant, without necessity of a
certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the public domain. The
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm
such conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of
Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulo's) possession of the land since 1929 was open,
continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as
well as in criminal cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial
courts are given great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court considering
that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed and
occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted
land, built his home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application
over Lot No. 379 but failed to pursue the same. 33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the
youngest being 28 years old, 34 continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never
challenged Teodulo's possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said
land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960,
he confirmed that he is no longer interested in asserting any right over the land by executing in
favor of Teodulo a quitclaim. EDcIAC
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as owner
thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No.
379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the formalities of donation, they nevertheless
explain Teodulo and his family's long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature
of their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete, 35 the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of land in the
name of the successors-in-interest of the donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation
inasmuch as said donee possessed the property in the concept of an owner. Thus —
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid
because it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made
in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in
connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter
nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of
acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken
possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulo's open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of an
owner, earned him title over the lot in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no
more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently,
the latter and herein respondents did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued
in their name are void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago acquired title over Lot
No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his
rights over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of possession since 1925 up to 1964 when
he sold same lot to their (respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an action for, and successfully
obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that Santiago's
alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature contemplated by the Public Land
Act which requires more than constructive possession and casual cultivation. As explained by the
Court in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and
occupation." Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be
mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
". . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid
down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See
also Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should
be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive
possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and this
court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is
'one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with
reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant.'
While, therefore, 'possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession', possession under
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession
cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense
tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership,
while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction . . . ." DHITcS
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:
". . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for
taxation purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was done
by him, does not constitute acts of possession."
In the instant case, Santiago's short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379
could not vest him title. While he tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the
same since 1928. He abandoned the property and allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of
ownership. His brief possession of Lot No. 379 could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus
juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to another than he
himself has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not
acquire any right over the questioned lot and the title issued in their names are void, because of
the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than the source. 37
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be considered as
purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. 38 The Court notes that Santiago was not
residing in Lot No. 379 at the time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate
and maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted the spouses to
further inquire who was actually tilling the land. Had they done so, they would have found that
Teodulo and his family are the ones possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or purchasers
in good faith and for value or those who buy the property and pay a full and fair price for the
same 39 because they merely inherited Lot No. 379 from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta.
 Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by virtue of the April 21,
1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and not on account of his alleged 30-year possession thereof,
we will still arrive at the same conclusion. This is so because the declaration of this Court that
petitioners are the rightful owners of the controverted lot is based on Teodulo's own possession
and occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, regardless of the
manner by which Santiago acquired ownership over same lot.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in possession of the
disputed property. A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his title. 40 Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since 1929
up to the present, their right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred
by the statute of limitations. DaTICE
Neither could petitioners' action be barred by laches because they continuously
enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested the fruits thereof up to the present to the
exclusion of and without any interference from respondents. They cannot therefore be said to
have slept on their rights as they in fact exercised the same by continuously possessing Lot No.
379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of laches.
Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can properly address the issue of laches based on
petitioners' allegation in the complaint that "[n]either spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta . . . nor [herein respondents] had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel
of land from the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to the present." 41 Such
averment is sufficient to impute abandonment of right on the part of respondents. At any rate,
laches need not be specifically pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider it in
determining the rights of the parties. 42
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is by express provision
of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. 43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows the
following number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of action without enforcing
his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47
years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years. 44
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the other party
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting one's rights, despite having had knowledge or notice of the
other party's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of a party that the person against whom laches is imputed would
assert the right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the event the suit is
allowed to prosper. 45
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners' continuous possession and
occupation of Lot No. 379 should have prompted the respondents to file an action against
petitioners, but they chose not to. Respondents cannot deny knowledge of said possession by
petitioners as they even asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant they
(respondents) instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing of petitioners' complaint in 1992,
or after 22 years, respondents never bothered to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent
Joaquin Hernandez testified that he and his siblings had a plan to convert the land into a grazing
land for cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations of the New People's
Army between the years 1965-1970. However, even after said years, respondents took no step
to implement their plan. Worse, among the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta who are all living in the Philippines, 46only Joaquin Hernandez visited the land and only
thrice, i.e., once in each years of 1964, 1966 and 1970. Thereafter, not one of them paid visit to
Lot No. 379, up to the time Joaquin Hernandez testified in 1996, 47 despite the fact that two of
them are living only in Calauag, Quezon; one in Agdangan, Quezon; 48 and two in Lucena
City. 49 Neither did they send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their right over
the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta as well
respondents, have neglected Lot No. 379. Were it not for this action instituted by petitioners in
1992, their conflicting claims over the property could not have been settled. It goes without
saying that to lose a property that has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77
years will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to petitioners, especially so if the
same ancestral land will be lost under most unfair circumstances in favor of respondents who
appear to have no real interest in cultivating the same.
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a positive
and categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners would rule out the
application of laches. It means taking the offensive by instituting legal means to wrest possession
of the property which, however, is absent in this case. Respondents' payment of taxes alone,
without possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of ownership. What stands out is
their overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy
the fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of petitioners.
One last point. Notwithstanding this Court's declaration that Lot No. 379 should be
awarded in favor of petitioners, their title over the same is imperfect and is still subject to the
filing of the proper application for confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, where the State and other oppositors may be given the chance to be heard. It was therefore
premature for the trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to issue a certificate
of title in the name of petitioners. HcaDIA
Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is enough to defeat
the certificate of title issued to respondents. 50
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 57053, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 31, 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No.
379 in favor petitioners and ordering the cancellation of respondents' Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-237330, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting the trial court's order directing
the Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the name of petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, [April 18, 2006], 521 PHIL 447-468)