STATCON

Module I: Construction and Interpretation

Caltex vs Palomar

FACTS:

 1960: Caltex conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme, entitled “Caltex Hood Pump Contest”
 In this contest, participants have to estimate the number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period
 This contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers
 No need to purchase of Caltex products nor a fee or consideration is required
 All you have to do is to fill out an entry form, write your guess, and place it inside a sealed can
 Foreseeing the extensive use of mails amongst the media and for the company’s communication purposes, Caltex
decided to send a letter to the postal authorities, praying that any mails relating to their contest will be cleared.
Caltex enclosed the contest’s rules as a justification that it doesn’t violate the anti-lottery provisions in Postal Law
 However, the Acting Postmaster General refused and denied request for clearance since for him, the scheme falls
within the purview of the anti-lottery provisions
 Caltex sought reconsideration to which the Postmaster once again, refused, saying that the contest involves
consideration and that if it does not, it is a “gift enterprise” that is also banned by law. The Postmaster threatened
Caltex that if the contest is conducted, then it will issue a fraud order against them.

ISSUE: W/N the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violates Postal Law

RULING: No. The "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by Caltex is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. The term in question is used in association with the word "lottery".

EXPLANATION:

 The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections
1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster
General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any
information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind”
 However, the term “lottery” extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing,
gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements
of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
 However, in the case at bar, there is no element of consideration.
 Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to
go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the
same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
 On the other hand, “gift enterprise” has yet to be spelled out explicitly, but generally, it’s applied to a sporting
artifice under which are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize. This doesn’t embrace the scheme at bar.
 The broad definition of “gift enterprise” cannot also be applied to the scheme at bar. Statutory provisions
prohibiting gift enterprises are not identical. Some use the terms “lottery” and “gift enterprise” interchangeably.
In others, it is different. Thus, due to the conflicting opinions, the court decided to resolve the case upon the
particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision
  In Postal Law, “gift enterprise” is used is association with the term, “lottery”. According to the principle of legal
hermeneutics, noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the term under construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
 Thus, if lottery is prohibited if it involves consideration, so must “gift enterprise” be construed.

Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:

 Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in the QC RTC, alleging that Garcia confronted her in her office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to her dignity and
personality.
 To support her claim, Ramirez produced a transcript of the event. The transcript was based on a tape recording of
the confrontation made by Ramirez.
 Garcia then filed a criminal case before the Pasay City RTC due to the Ramirez’s tape recording, alleging that the
said act was illegal and violated RA 4200.
 RTC ruled in favor of Ramirez while the CA ruled in favor of Garcia

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

 RA 4200 doesn’t apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation, but only
to those who are a part of or involve in the communication
 The substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not violate RA 4200
 RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a “private communication” not a “private conversation” and thus, making her act
of taping their conversation not illegal

ISSUE: W/N Ramirez’s act of taping the conversation violates RA 4200

RULING: YES

 First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice
 RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such. The law makes no distinction as to whether the violator be a party to the
conversation or not (where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish)
 The nature of the conversation is immaterial to the violation of RA 4200. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of
a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
 Ramirez’s distinction between communication and conversation narrows the former word to a point of absurdity.
In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."
 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office

URSA vs Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

FACTS:

 Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. He, and
others, were allegedly illegally cutting mahogany trees and hauling illegally-cut logs in the area
 On May 9, 1989, the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and the giving of unwarranted benefits by Ursua and
other officials of the DENR
 On Aug 1, 1989, Atty Palmones, Ursua’s counsel wrote a letter requesting for a copy of the complaint against
Urusa. The atty then asked Ursua to give this letter to the Office of the Ombudsman because his messenger, Oscar
Perez, had to attend to some personal matters
 Ursua then talked to Perez and told him he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of
those involved. Perez assured him and told him that he can just sign his (Perez) name in the receipt
 In the Office of Ombudsman in Davao City, he wrote Oscar Perez in the visitor’s logbook as well as in the receipt
issued by Loida Kahulugan after he got the copy of the complaint
 On the way out, he met his acquaintance, Josefa Amparo who worked in the same office as Kahulugan. Because
of this, Kahulugan learned that Oscar Perez was indeed Ursua and thus, reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended to charge Ursua on the grounds of violating CA 142, as amended by RA 6085
 RTC convicted Ursua. CA affirmed RTC’s decision

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

 Didn’t violate CA 142, as amended by RA 6085, as he never used any alias and neither is Oscar Perez his alias. For
him, alias is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims
he has never been known as Oscar Perez and he only used that name on 1 occasion and with the express consent
of Oscar Perez himself

ISSUE: W/N Ursua violated CA 142, as amended by RA 6085

RULING: NO. Petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under Commonwealth Act No. 142
and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name

 statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus
in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute,
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers
 the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese
of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such
a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be
successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register
 alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute
name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases.
 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without
any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day
forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended
  There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that
he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the
name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to
expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner
would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not
refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone
under the proper circumstances
 The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and is related statutes seek to prevent
are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in
enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended

The People of the Philippine Islands vs Venancio Concepcion

FACTS:

 Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), authorized an extension of credit in favor
of “Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.”, between April 10, 1919 and May 7, 1919. This special authorization is essential
in view of the MOA order of Pres. Concepcion, dated May 17, 1918 which limits the discretional power of the local
manager to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000 and in some cases, P10,000.
 Credit aggregating P300,000 was granted to the firm of “Puno y Conception, S. en C.,” and the only security
required consisted of 6 demand notes. The notes and interests were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919
 Puno y Conception was a co-partnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto Concepcion contributed P5,000; Clara
Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion, P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin,
"casada con. Gral. Venancio Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S. Conception was the administrator of the
company
 Venancio as Pres of PNB and member of the board of directors of this bank was charged for violating Sec 35 of Act
2747. He was found guilty by the trial court
 Sec 35 of Act 2747 prohibits the National Bank from granting loans, directly or indirectly, to any of the members
of the board of directors nor to agents of the branch banks. Sec 49 provides that violations will result in a payment
of a fine or by imprisonment or by both fine and imprisonment. Both of these provisions were in effect in 1919
when Venancio’s act took place, but were later repealed by Act 2938, approved on Jan 30, 1921

ISSUE: W/N Concepcion violated Act 2747, Sec 35

Issues raised by the defense counsel were as follows:

1. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venacio Concepcion,
President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?

DEFENSE: documents of record do not prove that the authority to make a loan was given, but only show the concession
of a credit.

The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed
by a lender that he will pay what he may promise while "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt
by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum of
money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest.
 The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the amount fixed in
the "credit
2. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Conception, S. en C.," by Venancio
Conception, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a "discount”
DEFENSE: The ruling of Acting Insular Auditor ruled that Act 2612 was to place no restrictions upon discount
transactions

 Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of an actual, live
transaction.
 However, to discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a
discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a
discount is always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.
 the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were mere
evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid
when the notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.
 In the Binalbagan Estate case, it was declared that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so
should we here lay down the same ruling.
3. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act
No. 2747?

DEFENSE: a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an "indirect loan." In this connection, it
should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held one-half of the capital of this partnership

 In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the Legislature
 In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a
director of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man
may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always
suffers.
 If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business
venture, a loan to a partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.
 A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to
such director.
4. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of a violation of section 35 of
Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by
Act No. 2938, prior to the filing of the information and the rendition of the judgment?

DEFENSE: section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation to section 35 of the same Act, provides a punishment for any person
who shall violate any of the provisions of the Act. It is contended, however, by the appellant, that the repeal of these
sections of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal prosecution

 it has been the holding, and it must again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes
an offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law
5. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine national Bank, in violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this
law?

DEFENSE: the prohibition in sec 35, Art 2747 provides a punishment for the bank and thus, would have no effect on
Concepcion

 When the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors and to
each director separately and individually
6. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in extending the
credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a legal defense?
DEFENSE: Concepcion acted in good faith and only committed such acts since he was misled by the rulings of the
Insular Auditor. Moreover, the loans made to the partnership have already been paid, so the PNB suffered no loss.

 Under the statute which was violated, criminal intent wasn’t necessary. The doing of the act constitutes the
crime.