AMENDMENTS AND REVISION

I. Definitions
A. Amendment v Revision

1987 Constitution, Bernas

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that
are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have overall implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall
impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.

○ Raul Lambino, Eric Aumentado, et al v Commission on Elections

FACTS
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b)
and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due
course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to
Santiago v. Comelec ruling.

ISSUES
Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision
Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct
proposal by the people

RULING
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people.
Sec.2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of
the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the
framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must
sign a petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements of
initiative must be present:
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full
text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must stated the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before –
not after – signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people
approve of a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before
they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be” directly proposed by the people x x
x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.

The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode
is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative. Section 1 of Article
XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
“amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment
of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?

Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition
of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering
the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision.
For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and
not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to
60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis
of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on
how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a
deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do
not have fixed & identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
& not revisions.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative
test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize
the traditional form of government & the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision &
NOT merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles
- Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great
co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the
President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision
of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks
and balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the
deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through
an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make
an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express
intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory.
Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts
do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.

II. Proposal Stage

Constituent Power (Art. XVII, Secs. 1 and 2)
The constituent power, or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different
from the law-making power of Congress

(1) That Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives — propose amendments or call a convention
therefore — but may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendments and call a convention — at
the same time;
(2) That the election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local
governments shall be chosen;
(3) That the spirit of the Constitution demands that the election must be held under such conditions —
which, allegedly, did not exist — as to give the people reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the
nature and implications of the amendments being proposed

A. Article 17, Section 1-3 (1987 Constitution)

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A constitutional convention

Section 2. Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.

Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its members, call a constitutional convention,
or by a majority vote of all its members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

B. Constituent Assembly

1987 Constitution, Bernas

The two Houses of Congress had to come together in joint session in order to propose
amendments. The first step in the process was a resolution calling for a joint session. The second step
was the actual joint session where a decision was made either to call a constitutional convention or
directly to propose amendments. In either case the two Houses voted separately and each House

C. Constitutional Convention
1987 Constitution, Bernas
If proposal is to be made by a constitutional convention, the convention, once organized, is free to
decide the vote required to carry a proposal. Whether the amendatory process will be done through
Congress or through a constitutional convention is a matter normally for Congress to decide. However,
should Congress wish, it may submit the matter of calling a constitutional convention to the vote of the
"electorate." But the use of the word "electorate" does not connote that a plebiscite to determine the
subject must be held only concurrently with an election. A plebiscite can be held independently of an
election.

○ Manuel Imbong v Jaime Ferrer, COMELEC Chairman

RELATED LAWS
1. Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from
each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
2. RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
3. Resolution 4 (1969) -amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of
320 delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population.
Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.
4. RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
5. Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
6. Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
7. Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from
assuming any appointive office/position until the final adjournment of the ConCon.
8. Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a
delegate to the convention.

FACTS:
Two separate but related petitioners for declaratory relief were filed pursuant RA 6132, sect 19, by
Imbong and Gonzalez, both members of the bar, taxpayers, and interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention (ConCon).
On 16 March 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution 2 which
called for a ConCon to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of 2 delegates from each district
who shall have the same qualifications as those of congressmen. They will be elected on Nov 1979.
Before November elections that year, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacting enacted
RA 4914, implementing Resolution 2.
On 17 June 1969, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution 4 which amends
Resolution by providing that the convention will be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the
existing rep districts according to the number of their inhabitants. Provided that each district shall be entitled
to at least 2 delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House
of Reps.
On Aug 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted RA 6132, implementing
Resolutions 2 and 4, and expressly repealing RA 4914.

ISSUE:
Petitioner Gonzalez assails the validity of RA 6132 (ConCon act of 1970) as well as the particular provisions
in sections 2, 4, 5 and par 1 of 8. Petitioner Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par 1 of sec 8 of
RA 6132.

RULING:
RA 6132 is constitutional.

EXPLANATION:
1. Pursuant to Art 15, Congress, when acting as a constituent assembly has full and plenary
authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for that purpose, by a ¾
vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions 2 and 4
calling for a ConCon were passed by the required ¾ vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention, includes by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers
essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted. This includes the power to fix
the qualifications, number, apportionment, compensation of the delegates, appropriation of funds
to meet the expenses for the election and for the operation of the ConCon, and other
implementing details. Resolutions 2 and 4 embody the above-mentioned details, except for
the appropriation of funds.

3. The authority to call a ConCon is vested in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. The
power to enact the implementing details is held by Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly
and Congress acting as a legislative body. These implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its legislative power.

4. When Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide implementing details,

Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing details to fill in the
gaps

5. Congress can override Presidential vetoes as well as reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and
adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.

○ Alejo Mabanag, et al v Jose Lopez Vito, et al

FACTS:
Three of the Plaintiff Senators and eight of the Plaintiff Representatives had been proclaimed by a
majority vote of the Comm on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the
elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening
of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election.
The eight representatives since their election has not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take
part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended.
A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
As a consequence, these three Senators and eight Representatives did not take part in the passage
of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Thus, the petitioners filed for the
prohibition of the said resolution amending the Constitution.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
Respondents deny that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of
an enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case;
2. Whether the questioned resolution was duly enacted by Congress

RULING:
The court ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case. Political Questions are not within the
jurisdiction of the Judiciary department except to the extent that power to deal with such questions had
been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (Principle of Separation of
Powers).

EXPLANATION:
If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a
duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill rule” born of that respect. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. These two steps complement each other.
Amendatory process as provided in Sec 1 of Art 17 of the Ph Constitution: consists of only 2 distinct
parts: proposal and ratification.
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial
inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

○ Ramon A. Gonzales v Commission on Elections, et al

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions
which aim to:
(1) Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members (First
Resolution).
(2) Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
(3) Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention without
forfeiting their seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA
4913 is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution proposed
by the Congress in the First and Third Resolutions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit
of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC
from implementing Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the
constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.

ISSUES/HELD:
(1) Whether or not RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.
(2) Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violates the spirit of the
Constitution – NO.

EXPLANATION:
1. RA 4913 is constitutional.
The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments are
sufficient under the Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission of proposals for
amendment to the people except under certain conditions.

2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do not violate the spirit of
the Constitution.
People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among the
provinces of the Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to know the full details may
enlighten themselves by reading copies of the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the
matter of Third Resolution, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that it permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run
for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were unconstitutional but they were unable
to reach the number of votes needed to invalidate these congressional acts under the 1935 Constitution,
which is two-thirds of the Supreme Court.

D. People’s Initiative

1987 Constitution, Bernas

Another way of proposing amendments to the Constitution is through "initiative." This is provided
for in Section 2 which is introduced for the first time in the 1987 Constitution. The bulk of the discussion of
the amendatory process in the 1986 Constitutional Commission in fact was devoted to this innovation. It
is a method whereby the people themselves can directly propose amendments to the Constitution. It
should be pointed out that while Congress and a Constitutional Convention may propose both
amendments and revisions, the electorate can propose through initiative only amendments.
First, an effective proposal must carry the support of "at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered votes therein." The percentage of the total number of votes required is higher
than that for passing a statute by initiative and referendum. The higher percentage is in recognition of the
fact that the process involves a constituent and not an ordinary legislative act. Second, this method of
proposing amendments may not be used "within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter." This is not to imply that the people acting as a constituent
body is inferior to Congress or to a constitutional convention, both of which may propose amendments as
often as desired. This is merely to recognize that initiative is both an extraordinary and cumbersome
process and to abuse it by too frequent use can unduly hamper government operations.

○ Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al v Jesus Delfin, Commission on Elections, et al

FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution, to lift term
limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said
people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of
lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at
least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco, et al,
moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC. On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — led this special civil action for prohibition raising
the following arguments:

a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of
people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
d. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
e. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
f. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to
the Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such initiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution
has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution via
People’s Initiative, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.

FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of
a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.

THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended RA 6735 to fully provide implementation of the initiative on constitutional
amendments, then it would have provided the proper subtitle, considering that this is a matter of great
importance. The argument that, the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is to be subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope, is not accepted . SC
interprets the classification between Subtitle II and III, as one not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character.
● National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass.
● Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution
which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass.

SC concluded that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
● cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act
● Potestas delegata non delegari potest (no delegated powers can be further delegated)

What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation
of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to
the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.

COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law:
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.

DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or
that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction
over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.The only participation of the COMELEC before the
filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each district; (3) to assist in the establishment of signature stations; and (4)
to verify the signatures.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted
its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.

○ Raul Lambino, Eric Aumentado, et al v Commission on Elections

FACTS:
Raul Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On Aug. 25, 2006, Lambino Group filed
a petition under Sec 5 (b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered
voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures.
The petition contains changes in the 1987 Constitution, if approved, it will modify Sections 1-7 of
Art 6 (Legislative Dept), Sections 1-4 of Art 7 (Executive Dept) and by adding Art 18 of the Transitory
Provisions. The petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential System to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
Form.
On Aug. 23, 2006, Lambino Group filed an amended petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Art 18 of their initiative.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution. COMELEC cited Santiago v. COMELEC in declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
 Lambino Group prays for the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
COMELEC resolution and compel them to give due course to their initiative petition. They contended that
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since the Santiago
case is binding only to the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of
the “will of the sovereign people”.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Sec 2, Art 17 of the Ph Constitution on
amendments on the Constitution through people’s initiatives;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution;
3. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition.

RULING:
There is no merit to the petition. Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

EXPLANATION:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Sec 2, Art 17 of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People.
“Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein.” (Sec. 2 Art 17)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The
framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature”

Amendments through “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” must
include the following elements:
● The People must author and sign the entire proposal.
● The proposal must be embodied in a petition.

a. Lambino group did not attached a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. They only submitted a copy after the oral arguments when they filed their
Memorandum.

2. A revisit to Santiago v. COMELEC is unnecessary. Since the petition failed to comply with the
requirements of the constitution, there is no reason to revisit the Santiago v. COMELEC case.
Moreover, changes in the outcome of Santiago case will not change the result of the petition.

III. Ratification Stage

 A. Article 17, Section 4 (1987 Constitution)

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification of the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.

B. Doctrine of Fair and Proper Submission

Plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular election (Gonzales v. COMELEC Nov. 1967),
provided the people are sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously
deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner. Submission of piece-meal amendments is
unconstitutional. All amendments must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. The people
have to be given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision. They have no idea yet of what
the rest of the amended constitution would be. (Tolentino v. Comelec Oct. 16 1971)

○ Pablo Sanidad, et al, v Commission on Elections

FACTS
● September 2, 1976: President Marcos issued PD 991 (calling national referendum on Oct 16,
1976 for the Citizens Assemblies to resolve the issues of martial law, among other things.
● September 22, 1976: Marcos issues PD 1031 amending 991 by declaring provisions of PD 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvas of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16. (PD 1031 repeals Sec 4, PD 991)
● September 22, 1976: PD 1033 stating the questions Marcos submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16 - people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evidences their desire to have such body abolished and replaced through a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body (submitted on Oct 16)
● Proposed amendment: to establish an interim Batasang Pambansa instead of the National
Assembly
● COMELEC vested with exclusive supervision and control of Oct 1976 National Ref-Plebiscite.
● September 27, 1976: Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to:
a. Enjoin COMELEC from holding/conducting Referendum Plebiscite
b. Declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 (insofar as they propose amendments to
the constitution), 1031 (insofar as it directs COMELEC to hold Ref-Plebiscite)
● SANIDAD: 1935 + 1973 Constitutions do not grant incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new constitution; Oct 16 Ref-Plebiscite has no
constitutional or legal basis.
● September 30, 1976: Vicente M. Guzman, 1971 ConCon delegate, files action for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction (L-44684) asserting that the power to propose amendments/revisions to the
Constitution is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly (Sec 16, Art 17 of Consti)
● October 5, 1976: Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction (L-44714) by Raul M. Gonzales, his son
Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan to restrain PD implementations relative to Oct 16 Ref-Plebiscite.

ISSUE:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution - NO
RULING:
Section 1, Article XVI (1973 Constitution on Amendments):
(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election.

Section 2: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision."

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The
interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all
its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified
in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period
of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly.
In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v.
COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion
as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the
fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene
the interim National Assembly. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the
proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed
upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the
1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.
In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character
and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the
President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

○ Alex Almario, et al v Hon. Manuel Alba, Commission on Elections

FACTS:
 As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January
27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in
four (4) separate questions to be answered by a simple YES or NO answer. Petitioners herein seek to
enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of acquiring
lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program
and a social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or
rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down
in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask
for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until
the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.
RULING:
The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of
the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are
unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which
only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a
member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public
land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his
or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to
express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed
amendments, their desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the
voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to
make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban
land reform."

○ Arturo M. Tolentino v Commission on Elections, et al

FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution. After the election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the
Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971.
On the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18."
On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that
it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial
elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and
that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and
proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violates the
Constitution

RULING:
The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution
No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be
submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient
time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not
separately but together.

In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of
the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to
form a harmonious whole.
In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal
or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.

○ Ramon A. Gonzales v Commission on Elections, et al

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and
3 i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of
1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become delegates themselves to
the Convention. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval by the people, at the general elections
which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He
claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, tax payers, and voters
similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of
which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend itsConstitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution?
2. Whether or not Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

RULING:
The issue on whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates
the Constitution essentially justifiable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review .In the cases at
bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, said resolutions are null
and void because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the
resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are at best,