Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Executive Department
Executive Power
It is the legal and political functions of the
President involving the exercise of discretion. It
is vested in the President of the Philippines. It is
the power to enforce and administer laws.
Executive Power
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines. (Section 1, Article VII) In National Electrification
Administration vs. CA, G.R. No. 143481, February 15,
2002, the President is vested with the power to execute,
administer, and carry out laws into practical operation. Executive
power, then, is the power of carrying out the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
The President may not veto a law enacted thirty-five (35) years
before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside
or reverse a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court
through the exercise of veto power. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208
SCRA 133, April 15, 1992)
President Vice President
QUALIFICATIONS
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. Registered voter;
3. Able to read and write;
4. At least 40 years of age on the day of election; and
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately
preceding the election.
TERM OF OFFICE
PRIVILEGES PRIVILEGES
1. Official residence; 1. Salary shall not be decreased
2. Salary is determined by law and during his tenure;
not to be decreased during his 2. No need for Commission on
tenure (Section 6, Article VII); Appointment confirmation for
3. Immunity from suit for official Cabinet post (Section 3, Article
acts. VII)
President Vice President
CANVASSING BOARD
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
REMOVAL
Impeachment only
Election
(Section 4, Article VII) Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of
May.
Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to
perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-
presidential election results without need of any call for special session by
the President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened
by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass
the votes for and proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice-President
has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has
completed its functions it is rendered functus officio. (Pimentel, Jr. vs.
Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for
President and VP, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004)
Election
There is no constitutional or statutory basis for COMELEC to
undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results,
whether manually or electronically. By conducting such “unofficial”
tabulation, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private
organization, spending public funds for the purpose. This not only
violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an
“unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes
containing the election returns and the election returns themselves.
Thus, if the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official
canvass of the votes cast for the President and VP, the COMELEC is,
with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of
said votes. (Brillantes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June
15, 2004)
Immunity from Suit
After his tenure, the President cannot invoke
immunity from suit for civil damages arising out
of acts done by him while he was President
which were not performed in the exercise of his
official duties. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R.
Nos. 146710-15, March 2001)
Rules on Succession
a. Vacancy at the beginning of the term
i. Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: VP-elect shall become President
ii. President-elect fails to qualify: VP-elect shall act as President until the President-elect
shall have qualified
iii. President shall not have been chosen: VP-elect shall act as President until a President
shall have been chosen and qualified.
iv. No President and VP chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall died or become
permanently disabled: The President of the Senate, or in case of his disability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a VP shall have been chosen
and qualified. In the event of inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide
for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or VP
shall have qualified.
At 10 o’clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs, Congress shall convene without
need of a call, and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a
VP to be held not earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. The bill shall
be deemed
certified and shall become a law upon its approval on 3rd reading by Congress. The convening of the
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be
called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election.
Rules on Succession
b. Vacancy during the term
i. Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President: VP shall become the President
Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001, the SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada
could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement,
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did
not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon
as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain—
refers to military officers alone
Manalo vs. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239—a law was enacted creating the PNP, RA 6795. It
provides that the Director, Deputy Director General, and other top officials of the
PNP shall be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The SC declared it
as unconstitutional.
In the above two cases, Congress cannot add/remove anything from the list of
officers to be appointed by the President that require confirmation of the CA. The
list is exclusive. The Congress cannot add or remove anything by a mere legislative
act.
Officials subject to the Appointment of the
President:
A. With the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments—
1. Heads of the executive department
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
3. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution
4. Ad Interim—( 2 n d paragraph of Section 16, Article VII)—Appointment by the President when Congress
is not in session. It takes effect immediately but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the CA or upon the
next adjournment of Congress. It is deemed by-passed through inaction. It is intended to prevent
interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from the prolonged vacancies in
government offices.
It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the CA or
until the next adjournment of Congress.
a. Recess—one made while the Congress is not in session, before confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment; immediately effective; and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by CA upon the
next adjournment of Congress;
b. Midnight—made by the President before his term expires, whether or not it is confirmed by the CA
Ad Interim Appointments
Ad interim appointment disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments—can no longer be extended a new appointment.
The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing power of the President. The disapproval is a decision
on the merits, being a refusal by the CA to give its consent after
deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision,
the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on
the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no
longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional
prohibition on appointment, but because of a final decision by the
CA to withhold its consent to the appointment.
Ad Interim Appointments
In the case of Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, ad interim means “in the
meantime” or “for the time being”. An ad interim appointment means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that
Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can
be withdrawn or revoked at any time. An ad interim appointee who has
qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government
employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional
protection that he cannot be suspended or removed except for causes
provided by law. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim
appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before
the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he
acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but
also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and
hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
Ad Interim Regular
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do
not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed
appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewal of appointments will also not breach the 7-
year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not extend
the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of
the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be
exorcised by the twin prohibition of the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim
appointment of these three respondents for so long as their term of office expires on February 2, 2008
does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Four (4) Situations where Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C will apply:
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides: The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members
for five years, and the last Member for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
1. Where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the CA, serves
his full 7-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as
a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than 7
years.
2. Where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns
before his 7-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed. Whether as
a member or as a chairman, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a
reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
Four (4) Situations where Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C will apply:
3. Where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of
someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as member
or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment
will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
4. Where the appointee has previously served a term less than seven years,
and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in
his serving more than 7 years, a reappointment of such person to serve an
unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to
those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution. This provision refers to the 1st appointees under the
Constitution, whose terms of office are less than 7 years, but are barred
from ever being reappointed under any situation.
Appointment in an Acting
Ad Interim Appointment
Capacity
• Made if congress is not in • Made any time there is
session vacancy, i.e., whether Congress
• Requires confirmation of CA is in session or not
• Permanent in nature • Does not require confirmation
• Appointee enjoys security of of CA
tenure • Temporary in nature
• The appointee does not enjoy
security of tenure
Limitations of Appointing Power
1. Prohibition against nepotism—(Section 13, par. 2, Article VII) The spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
2. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected
President within 90 days from his assumption of office. (section 14, Article VII)
3. The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to
prescribe qualifications for public office.
4. The judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or
has not been validly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
5. Section 15, Article VII—2 types of appointment: Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
In Re: Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta, 298 SCRA 409
Section 15, Article VII is directed against two (2) types of appointment:
However, in the case of Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15,
2000, the SC held that even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President,
he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him,
inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President.
The power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts not over
the actor (Angangco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619)
POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Section 4, Article X)
The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he
finds that the latter acted contrary to law. The President or any of his alter
egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned LGU acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive,
therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the
wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a LGU is a patent
nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the
doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations. (Judge Dadole vs. COA,
G.R. No. 125350,
December 3, 2002)
The Congress may revoke or extend, on request of the President, the effectivity of
proclamation by a majority vote of all its Members, voting jointly.
The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three (3) days, otherwise he
shall be released.
Military Powers
3. Proclamation of Martial Law—
Constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the power of the President to proclaim martial law
a. There must be actual invasion or rebellion;
c. Within 48 hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. If Congress is not in session, it must convene
within 24 hours;
d. Congress may, by majority vote of all its members voting jointly, revoke the proclamation, and the President cannot
set aside the revocation;
e. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon initiative of the President, Congress may extend the proclamation if
the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires it;
f. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing;
g. It does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the confinement of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Military Powers – Proclamation of Martial
Law
Olaguer doctrine—aka OPEN COURT DOCTRINE—
civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil
courts are open and functioning (Olaguer vs. Military
Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54448, May 22, 1987)
Section 19, Article VII is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. This provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after the finality. In truth, an accused
that has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For
instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction
cannot be executed while in the state of insanity. (See Article 79 of the
Revised Penal Code)
Pardoning Power
Article 81 of the Revised Penal code, as amended, which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times. For instance, the President
cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a
sentence to a day certain in the absence of a precise date to
reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this
time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and
defeat the purpose of the Constitution, and the applicable
statute as when the date of execution set by the President
would be earlier than that designated by court. (Echegaray
vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96)
Pardoning Power
1. Pardon—an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from punishment which
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
a. Plenary or partial
b. Absolute or conditional
Conditional pardon—is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive
and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition
that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one.
4. Parole—release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as parolee is in custody of
the law although not in confinement
5. Amnesty—act of grace, concurred in by the Legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who
committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.
Pardoning Power: Limitations
a. Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
b. Cannot be granted in violations of election laws
without favorable recommendations of the
COMELEC;
c. Can be granted only after conviction by final
judgment (except amnesty);
d. Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt
or civil contempt;
e. Cannot absolve convict of civil liability;
f. Cannot restore public offices forfeited.
Pardoning Power: Amnesty vs. Pardon
In Llamas vs. Orbos, pardon is available also to
one found guilty of administrative offense.
Limitations:
1. There must be prior concurrence of the Monetary Board
2. It is subject to such other limitations
Diplomatic / Treaty-Making Power
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000)
This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and
applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties or
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate
to be valid and effective.
But see Section 25 of Article XVIII. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is
only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and
to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.
Budgetary Power
Within 30 days from opening of every regular
session, President shall submit to Congress a
budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of the
authority of the President.
1. authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress
2. the executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief
3. Faithful Execution Clause
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President
desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An
example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project,
substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President
to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235
SCRA 506)