ADMIN LAW | Atty.

Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

GARCHITORENA V CRESCINI in fact defeat the true expression of the opinion of the voters of said precinct
Election, defined. or municipality.
- The presumption is that an election is honestly conducted, and the burden of
One-liner: Elections are means of which the people choose their officials for proof to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return. But when the
definite and fixed periods, and to whom they entrust, for the time being, as their return is clearly shown to be wilfully, and corruptly false, the whole of it
representatives, the exercise of the powers of government.” becomes worthless as proof. When the election has been conducted so
irregularly and fraudulently that the true result cannot be ascertained, the
FACTS: whole return must be rejected.
1. On June 6, 1916, an election was held in said province for governor, and - “In democracies the people, combined, represent the sovereign power of the
other provincial and municipal officers. State. Their sovereign authority is exercise through the ballot, of the qualified
2. At said election, Andres Garchitorena, Manuel Crescini, Engracio Imperial, voters, in duly appointed ELECTIONS held from time to time, by means of
and Francisco Botor were candidates for the office of governor. which they choose their officials for definite and fixed periods, and to
3. After an examination of the returns, it was found that the candidates whom they entrust, for the time being, as their representatives, the
obtained the following: exercise of the powers of government.”
a. Andres Garchitorena 2,468 votes;
b. Manuel Crescini 3,198 votes;
c. Engracio Imperial 1,954 votes; and
d. Francisco Botor 692 votes.
4. The provincial board of inspectors decided that Manuel Crescini had
received a plurality of all votes cast, made a proclamation declaring that
he had been elected Governor, and issued to him a certificate to that effect.
Andres Garchitorena presented a protest against said election, alleging
that many frauds and irregularities had been committed in various
municipalities of said province, and that he had, in fact, received a majority
of all legal votes cast. A trial occurred and Hon. Maximino Mina declared
that Andres Garchitorena received a majority of the legal votes cast,
and ordered the provincial board of inspectors to correct its report. Later, a
new trial was ordered where Hon. Isidro Paredes, reached exactly the
conclusion as Judge Mina and issued the same order. Manuel Crescini and
Engracio Imperial appealed that decision.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the election returns were corrupted by fraud;
2. W/N Crescini actually obtained a plurality of all votes cast

RULING:
- The record of the frauds and irregularities committed in the said
municipalities in which Judges Mina and Paredes annulled the entire vote,
not only shows that legal voters were prevented from voting, but in some
instances, legal ballots were tampered with and destroyed after they had
been cast, to such an extent that no confidence can be placed in the return.
The return in no sense discloses the expressed will of the voters.
- Courts, of course, should be slow in nullifying and setting aside the election
in particular municipalities or precincts, and they should not nullify the vote
until it is shown that the irregularities and frauds are so numerous as to show
an unmistakable intention or design to defraud, and which does actually and

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LINO LUNAv. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ
Election, purpose.
The purpose of elections in a democratic society is to give the voters a direct
participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be
their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that
purpose all the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to
cast their ballot
FACTS:
1. 6 June 1916, an election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal
2. Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were
candidates for said office
3. Eulogio Rodriguez wa proclaimed winner, having received a plurality of said
votes, was duly elected governor of said province (4,321 votes).
4. Jose Lino Luna protested against the proclamation
5. CFI Judge found:
a. ballots cast for the various candidates were as indicated in the
returns of the inspectors of the various municipalities except those
in the municipality of Taytay and Binangonan.
b. In Taytay, 50 ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have
been counted for him.
c. In Binangonan, inspectors did not close the polls at 6 o'clock pm.,
and that a large number of persons voted after that time; judge
directed that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced
by the number of such votes, without ascertaining how many had
been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.
ISSUE: WON the votes of the municipality should be nullified.
RULING: NO.
- The law provides that "at all the elections held under the provisions of this
Act the polls shall be open from seven o'clock in the morning until six
o'clock in the afternoon, during which period not more than one member of
the board of inspectors shall be absent at one time, and then for not to
exceed twenty minutes at one time."
- In this case, the board of inspectors failed to have the list of voters properly
prepared at 7 am., thus only a few of the voters were able to vote before
eleven or eleven-thirty in the morning – thereby causing the delay.
- Thus, a large number of voters had not yet been able to vote at 6PM and for
that reason an agreement was made between some of the candidates for
office who were present and the board of inspectors, to the effect that the
polls should be kept open in order that such electors might vote. No
objection whatever to that agreement was made by any person at that time.
- The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in
the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their
public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for
that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered
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and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds
have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election
should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of
their participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on
the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A
different rule would make the manner and method of performing a public
duty of greater importance than the duty itself.
- The errors and irregularities which warrant the rejection of ballots and the
annullment of an election and thus deprive lawful voters of heir legal right to
vote, should be such as to fully justify that result. It has been held that even
great irregularities on the part of election officers will not of necessity vitiate
an election, where no fraud is committed or attempted, or no illegal vote was
polled and no legal voter was deprived of his vote.
- For the special reasons given, the board of inspectors was justified in
keeping the polls open after the hour for closing. But this conclusion must
not be interpreted to mean that under other circumstances and other
conditions, where the polls are kept open after the hour for fraudulent
purposes, that such act on the part of the inspectors might not nullify the
entire election.
NON-TOPIC QUESTIONS INCASE GUJI ASKS:
What is the effect of assistance rendered by the inspectors of the election to
incapacitated persons, without first requiring of such persons an oath to the
effect that they are incapacitated to prepare their own ballots?
- It is irregular for the board of inspectors to permit incapacitated voters to
vote without taking the oath and for one inspector only to assist such voters,
yet the ballots of the innocent voters should not be nullified on that account;
that the ballots of such persons only should be annulled when identified;
- In the absence of fraud, all of the ballots of the precinct should not be
invalidated by the mere fact that the inspectors did not comply with their
duty.
- Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in an election for
a violation of the law for which they were in no way responsible and which
they could not prevent.
What is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper
voting booths?
- The voter not being responsible, his ballot should not be nullifiied on that
account.
- Inasmuch as the voting booths in the municipality of Antipolo were prepared
in a manner and form which permitted the voter to prepare his ballot in
absolute secrecy, the vote of that municipality should not be nullified; and
- Filling the different columns of the polling list is a duty imposed upon the
election officers. If they fail to perform their duty they are responsible, the
ballots of innocent voters should not be nullified for a failure on the part of
election officers to perform their duty.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
RULLODA V. COMELEC
Election laws, purpose.
One-liner: Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination
of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
FACTS:
1. Barangay elections of July 15, 2002: Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L.
Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
2. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
3. His widow, petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the
Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as
candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband.
o Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition
containing several signatures of people purporting to be members
of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.
4. Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and
Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas to add the
words “NOT COUNTED” beside the name of Petronila Betty Rulloda.
5. Based on the tally of petitioners’ watchers who were allowed to witness the
canvass of votes during the July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516
votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes. Despite this,
the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas.
6. The Commission resolved to deny the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
widower Rulloda citing Section 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 that
“There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials.”
7. Petitioner filed to annul Section 9 of such resolution thru an instant petition
for certiorari, to nullify the the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim
her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan.
8. Respondent filed his comment stating that no substitution is allowed and
such, petitioner did not file a Certificate of Candidacy.
o Resolution No. 4801 was issued not pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions but as an incident of its inherent administrative functions
over the conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore, the same
may not be the subject of review in a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON there was grave abuse of discretion when COMELEC denied
petitioner’s request that she be allowed to run for elections.
RULING: YES.
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- The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in
barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution.
- Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same
is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved than when political
considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been
subsumed by law.
- It was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be
made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.
Side note:
“Election” means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined
through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular
will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the
election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all
republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
On other contentions:
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioners favor cannot be
counted because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he
was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the
Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed
Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioner’s letter-
request to be allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her
late husband was treated as a certificate of candidacy.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
Election laws, construction.
One-liner: In case of doubt, electoral laws should be liberally and equitably construed
to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. //
Legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
FACTS:
1. March 20, 1995, Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office
of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
2. March 23, 1995, Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the
Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled.
3. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the May 8,1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for
during the elections held on said date.
4. Lee won. Frivaldo filed for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of
Lee and for his own proclamation.
a. alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."
b. As such, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant
to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee
should occupy said position of governor.
ISSUES:
1. Is Frivaldo qualified to be proclaimed Governor?
2. When may his repatriation be reckoned?
RULING on ISSUE 1: YES. Citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION FAVORS FRIVALDO
- Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."
- It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist
of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least 23 years of age on election day).
- The purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
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and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or
to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995 the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
- This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law
was enacted.
LITERAL CONSTRUCTION FAVORS FRIVALDO
- So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should
be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates.
- If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election
consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not
have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy.
It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being
a citizen first.
RULING on ISSUE 2: Repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing
of his application on August 17,1994.
- GR: NCC: "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided."
o EXC: When the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when
it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
- P.D. 725 creates a new right and a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in
our laws.
- While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became
an America citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to
be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. It was the intent of the legislative authority
that the law should apply to past events.
SUMMATION, TOPIC:
- Tthe citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed
by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of the term of office to which he has been elected.
- This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way
of the sovereign will: "x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections”
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

PARAS v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS NATURE OF A RECALL

Regular election.
One-liner: SK election not a regular election.
FACTS:
1. Petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed against Danilo E. Paras
(incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City, who won in 1994).
2. It was approved by COMELEC and the date of recall set on November 13,
1995. But was set to December 16, 1995 due to petitioner’s (Paras)
opposition.
3. The trial court issued a TRO which was later on lifted for petitioner’s
misrepresentation that the recall election was without COMELEC approval.
4. COMELEC rescheduled the recall on January 13, 1996.
5. PARAS’ ARGUMENT: as the SK election is a regular local election, no
recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election
from the recall election. The Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject
of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
- Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding
the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The
electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a
recall election.
- It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision
of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the
same having been scheduled on May 1997.
The case was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not SK election is a regular election

RULING: NO. (Murag Jollibee workers lang, dili regular. L)

- The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
- Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office.
- Interpreting the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will
unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the
people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by
R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be
deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.

IN LINE WITH CONSTITUTION

- Furthermore, interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code,
specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact
a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LUCERO vs. COMELECTITLE
Special election, after failure of election.
One liner: There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections
under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of
election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election.
FACTS:
1. Lucero and Ong were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative
District of Northern Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held
on May 11 1992.
2. The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar
credited Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068
votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did not include the
results of the following:
a. Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the submitted
election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible;
b. Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were
snatched and no election was held; and
c. Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election
returns were missing.
3. Lucero then moved for the COMELEC to suspend the proclamation of Ong and
to hold a special election for Precinct No. 13. COMELEC ordered PBC to desist
from reconvening until further order. Ong moved to lift the suspension in which
Lucero opposed.
4. COMELEC en banc issued a resolution ordering the Provincial Election
Supervision (PES) to bring the ballot boxes from Princinct Nos. 7 and 16 to the
Commission and the keys shall be turned over to the PES who shall in turn give
the keys to the authorized representative of Lucero and Ong.
5. SC issued a TRO on the implementation of the above resolution and ordered the
COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the same.
6. COMELEC ordered a re-tabulation of the votes including the results of Precinct
No. 16 and the ‘Comelec-copy’ of the results of Precinct No. 7, a special election
for Precinct No. 13, and a recount of Precinct No. 7 conditioned upon the results
of Precinct No. 13.
7. LUCERO CONTENTIONS: (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid;
and (2) his chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos
would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos before determining the necessity of holding a special election in Precinct
No. 13 of Silvino Lobos;
2. Whether or not the requirements for a special election have been met
3. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a
special election in Precinct No. 13 after almost 2 years.
RULING on ISSUE 1: YES
- Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7,
the COMELEC would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election
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returns thereof, which it describes as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly,
direct the PBC to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos
the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero — 29, 30, or 31. The
recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall
have been held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.
- Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a
special election may be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the
election therein "would affect the result of the election." This "result of the
election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a
given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his
closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the
precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly
affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special election must be held.
Consequently, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 can only be
determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been included in the
canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
RULING on ISSUE 2: YES
- Please see Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, on Failure of election.
- 2 requisites for the holding of special elections, viz:
o (1) that there is a failure of election, and
o (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election.
- HERE, the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box
snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity
and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the
result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of
its election returns.
- The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code have indeed been met.
RULING on ISSUE 3: NO
- In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that:
o (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause
of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect,
and
o (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect.
- The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of
the peculiar circumstances of a case.
- In the instant case, the delay was primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or
maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. Considering then that
the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into
account the fact that since the term of the office of the contested position is only
three years, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next
few months may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the
election not held."
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

ORDILLO vs. COMELEC INTERPRETING ARTICLE III, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF RA 6766

One-liner: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region because (1) the Constitution requires a region to have more
than one province and (2) the provisions of the CAR Organic Act cannot be
complied with or will lead to absurd results.
FACTS:
1. On January 30, 1990, a plebiscite was held asking the people of the
provinces of Ifugao, Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao, and Baguio City whether or not they approved of the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomaous Region (CAR), pursuant to RA No. 6766 entitled An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
2. The creation of the CAR was overwhelmingly rejected by voters from all the
provinces except voters from the Ifugao province.
3. This prompted the COMELEC to issue a resolution stating that the province
of Ifugao alone legally and validly constitutes the CAR.
4. Congress enacted a law setting the elections in CAR. The Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly also wound up it
affairs. Finally, the President issued an order declaring all offices created
under Executive Order No. 220 be abolished due to the ratification of the
CAR Organic Act.
5. ORDILLO ARGUMENT: (CAR Regional Assembly Member) COMELEC
resolution should be declared null and void, as there is no valid CAR
composed of only the Ifugao province as this violates the constitutional
requirement of a region having more than one constituent unit.
- Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of RA 6766 states that: The Regional
Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay within the Autonomous Region . . ."
- From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a
single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would
be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
INTERPRETING ARTICLE V, SECTIONS 1 AND 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6766
- Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in
the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional
assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing
the Autonomous Region.
- If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera
Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an
awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies serving only a few
people. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of
the CAR and has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the
provinces and city above mentioned.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting the Region.

ISSUE: WON the sole province of Ifugao can legally constitute the CAR THE PETITION IS GRANTED.

RULING: NO. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.

INTERPRETING ARTICLE X, SECTION 15 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

- Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution states that: There shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
- The language of the Constitution should, as much as possible, be
understood in its common sense and given ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. The term "region" used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas. The Constitutional requirements are not present in
this case.

AY 2018-2019
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
PORMENTO vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA, COMELEC
Presidential term limit.
One-liner: The phrase "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection” is
premised on the person’s second election as President.
FACTS:
1. Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
general elections of May 11, 1998.
2. He sought the presidency again in the general elections on May 10, 2010.
3. Pormiento opposed this candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.
4. COMELEC (2nd Division) and (En Banc): Denied.
5. Pormiento filed petition for certiorari; but the filing of such petition would not
stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed, absent the issuance of a TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction, which Pormiento did not secure.
6. Estrada was then able to run as President where he garnered the second
highest number of votes.
ISSUE: Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in
view of the prohibition in the Constitution which states that: "[t]he President shall
not be eligible for any reelection”?
RULING: YES
- Erap was not elected President the second time he ran.
- Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will
be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.
- Judicial review chararat: No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in
this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific
relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will
benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case
or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
ISSUE IS ALREADY MOOT.
- An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties.
- Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose.
DISMISSED.
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TECSON v. COMELEC; FORNIER v. COMELEC
Natural-born Filipino.
FACTS:
1. There is a COMELEC Resolution which dismissed an SPA praying for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ, from running for the position of President in
the May 2004 national elections
2. SPA contends that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by presenting himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
3. It was alleged that his mother Blessie Poe, was an American and his father, Allan
Poe was a Spaniard, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject.
4. And supposing that Allan was Filipino, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to FPJ being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Allan had a prior
marriage to Paulita Gomez and even if no such first marriage existed, Allan
married Blessie only a year after the birth of FPJ.
5. Further, judical acknowledgement could only be had if done during lifetime of
putative parent while voluntary could only be had in a record of birth (must be
signed and sworn to by father), a will, or public document.
6. In FPJs birth certificate, there was no signature of Allan Poe.
ISSUE: Whether or not, FPJ (Ronald Allan Kelly Poe) is a natural-born citizen?
RULING: YES
- Natural born citizens are those who are Filipino citizens from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
- FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, under the 1935 Consti, Jus sanguinis was
the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Determination depends on whether the
father of respondent, Allan Poe would have been a Filipino citizen. If so, it has to
be determined also, if the illegitimacy of the respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
- Lorenzo Po’s Filipino citizenship is presumed. Having died in 1954 at 84
years old, he would have been born sometime in 1870, when Philippines was
under Spanish rule. His place of residence upon his death was in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and thus he would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. (Treaty of Paris: it was provided that
the subjects of Spain may retain their allegiance by making before a court of
record, a declaration to preserve such allegiance within a year from the date of
exchange of ratifications of the treaty)
- Thus, the term “citizens of the Philippine islands” first appeared in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States of the Philippines. All inhabitants who continue to reside, who were
Spanish subjects as of 11th of April 1891.
- If Lorenzo acquired such citizenship, it would extend to his son, Allan, father of
FPJ. Latter was born under the 1935 Constitution which confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens, regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
- Preponderance of evidence points that FPJ could not have committed material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC
TWO TOPICS: Foundling as Not Natural Born; Period of Residence
FACTS:
1. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was a foundling in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar. Care was passed to the latter’s
relatives. Three days after, she was registered a foundling.
2. When she was five, celebrity spouses FPJ and Susan Roces filed a petition for
her adoption.
3. She married Teodoro Llamanzares a Filipino and US citizen. They lived in the
US. She subsequently became a naturalized American citizen in 2001 and
obtained a US passport.
4. In 2004 she returned to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy and
then to be with the family with his eventual death. The couple decided to
permanently settle in the Philippines.
5. In 2006, she took her Oath of Alelgiance to the Philippines pursuant to RA 9225
“Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. She registered as a voter
in San Juan City and secured a new Philippine Passport.
6. She was appointed Chairperson of the Movie and Televeion Review
Classificaiton Board (MTRCB), but before assuming post, executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American
Citizenship before a notary public, in satisfaction of RA 9225.
7. In 2011, the US Vice Consul issued petitioner a Certificate of Loss Nationality of
the USA effective October 2010.
8. In 2015, she filed her CoC for Presidency and declared herself a natural-born
citizen.
9. A petition was filed to cancel her COC:
a. she committed material misrepresentation as international law does not
confer natural born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Thus,
she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition under RA 9225, for she is
not natural-born. But even assuming that she is, she became
naturalized American which is contrary to a natural-born citizenship that
must be continuous from birth.
b. she did not comply with the residencey requirement; she acquired her
domicile in Quezon only from the time she renounced her American
citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. Petitioner’s own
admission in her CoC for Senator that she had only been a resident for
at least 6 years and 6 months prior to May 2013 operated against her.
c. Otherwise, the reckoning period for residency should be from July 18
2006, the date her petition to reacquire citizenship was approved by the
BOI. It was asserted that her presence in the country prior to 2006
could not be valid as she was then living as an American citizen, hence
governed by immigration laws.
10. POE DEFENSES:
a. CIL dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Hence, a
natural born.
b. Further contends that domicile, need not renounce her American
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile
are present. There is no requirement of renunciation to establish a
domicile of choice.
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RULING:
ON THE ISSUE OF FOUNDLING AS NATURAL BORN
- Petitioner’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden of proof to
her. The respondents should have shown that both of petitioners parents were
aliens. Her status as a foundling did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case, there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos. The factual issue is not who the parents
of petitioner are, but whether such parents are Filipinos.
- Circumstantial evidence of the Petitioner’s parents are the fact that she was
abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church; has the typical features of Filipinos:
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond eyes, oval face. A person
with typical Filipino features, abandoned in a Catholic Church, in a municipality
where the population is overwhelmingly Filipino, such that there would be more
than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s
parents are Filipinos.
- As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. No restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings. There are also two
conventions, while yet ungratified are GAPIL, the first is ART 14 of the Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
which states that a foundling is presumed to have “the nationality of the country
of birth,” and ART 2 of the UN Convention on the Reduction of Sstatelessness
which provides that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where
he is found.
- Further, repatriation is: the recovery of the orginal citizenship. A naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen; on the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural-born Filipino.
ON ISSUE OF PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
- Poe indicated 10 years 11 months as her residencey prior to 9 May 2016, which
corresponds to a date of 25 May 2005, when she returned for good from the US.
- Requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1) residence or bodily presence in a new
locality 2) intention to remain there, 3) intention to abandon the old domicile. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. There must be animus manendi and animus non
revertendi. Purpose to remain must be for an indefinite period, change of
residence voluntary, and residence and place chosen for new domicile must be
actual.
- Clear than when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good. Evidence is
overwhelming that she decided to permanently abandon her US residence:
selling the house, taking the children from US schools; abandonment of their US
address, husband resigning from US employment). In Romualdez Marcos v.
COMELEC, we held that “it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.”
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC
Residence defined.
FACTS:
1. According to the Constitution, an aspirant for election to the House of Reps
must be “a registered vote in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the election.”
a. RATIONALE: to prevent the possibility of a stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community...to
serve it...”
2. Imelda Marcos filed her COC for the position of representative of the first
district of Leyte.
3. Private respondent, incumbent rep of said district, also candidate for the
same position filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with
COMELEC alleging that former did not meet the residency requirement.
4. IMELDA DEFENSES:
a. entry of the word “seven months” in her CoC was the result of an
honest misinterpretation (ROLL-EYES!) which she sought to rectify
by adding the words “since childhood.”
b. That she has always maintained Tacloban as her domicile or
residence. She thought that what was asked of her was her actual
and physical presence in Tolosa and not her domicile. She stated
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned.
ISSUE: Has petitioner Marcos, satisfied the residency requirement?
RULING: YES. Petitioner possesses the residence qualifications for a seat in the
House of Representatives.
- Ong v. Republic: domicile mean an individual’s permanent home, a place to
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.
- Domicile includes the twin elements of:
o 1) fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place,” and
o 2) animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
- Residence, in ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community, or country.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE
- Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it
becomes domicile. If his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established, it is residence. Thus, it is normal for a person to have different
residences, but a person can only have a single domicile.
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- Uytengsu v. Republic: Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
RESIDENCE, FOR ELECTION PURPOSES
- But, for election purposes, residence is synonymous with domicile.
- Nuval v. Guray: the term residence, is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
- Faypon v. Quirino: absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a vote other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence. Mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not
result in a loss or change of domicile.
- Deliberations of the 1987 COnsti on residence qualifications have placed
beyond doubt that when the CONSTI speaks of RESIDENCE, IN ELECTION
LAW, IT ACTUALLY MEANS ONLY DOMICILE.
- It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether an individual has satisfied the
constituion’s residency qualification. This statement becomes material only
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to misled, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Rationale: It
would be ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a CoC which would lead to his disqualification.
AS TO THE MISTAKE IN THE COC
- When petitioner announced she would resiget in Tacloban to make eligible
to run for the First District, respondent opposed it claiming that petitioner
was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban. Petitioner then registered in her
place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, which she
noted in her CoC. It appears petitioner jotted down her period of stay in her
actual residence, in a space which required her period of stay in her legal
residence or domicle. This honest mistake, should not be allowed to negate
the fact of residence established by means more convincing.
- According to COMELEC: She served as a member of Batasang Pambansa
and Gov of Manila. She could not have served these positions, if she had
not been a resident of Metro Manila.
- Individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences. Residence, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes.
- Larena v. Teves: A person, notwithstanding having registered as an elector
in the other municipality, having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municiapility, has his residence in the municipality wherein he lives with his
family without ever having the intention of abandoning it.
- Faypon v Quirino: Despite registration, the animus revertendi to his home,
has not forsaken him. The strong feeling of attachment to the place of one’s
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
- Even during her husband’s presidency, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for their benefit, and establishing a political
power base with her siblings always with her influence or cnsent. The
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always
knew: the fact of petitioner’s domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
- Further, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired, is retained until a new one is gained. Second, domicile is not easily
lost. Must demonstrate:
o 1) actual removal or an actual change of domicile,
o 2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one,
o 3) acts which correspond with the purpose.
- Even assuming, that she gained a new domicle after her marriage, her acts
indicate that she expressly chose her domicile of origin as her domicile:
when she sought the PCGG’s permission to rehabilitate her ancestral house
in Tacloban to make them livable for the Marcos family, obtained her
residence certificate in Tacloban.
AY 2018-2019
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DOMINO v. COMELEC
Residence, evidence of.
FACTS:
1. There is a COMELEC Resolution, decalring petitioner Juan Domino
disqualified as candidate for representative of Sarangani in the May 1998
election.
2. A petition to cancel CoC was filed against him alleging that he was not a
resident, much less a registered voter of the province where he seeks
election.
RULING:
- Petitioner was not notoriously known as ineligible, even if the Resolution
declaring him as such was rendered before the election, the same was not
yet final and executory. Thus, votes cast for Domino are presumed to have
been cast in sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate without any
intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, votes cannot be treated as stray,
void, or meaningless. Reliance in Labo Jr. case is misplaced that: if the
electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate disqualification,
would nevertheless cast their votes in favour of such, electorate may be said
to have waived the validity of their votes, in which case, the eligible
candidate, obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected.
- Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was in Ilocos, and that he
acquired domicile of choice in Quezon City as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative. He contends his lease of a
house and lot in Sarangani in Jan 1997 and the affidavits by residents that
they have seen petitioner and his family is evidence of his new domicile.
- Actual and physical presence is NOT sufficient to show that from said
date he had transferred his residence in that place. Personal presence
must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While residence
simply requires bodily presence, domicile requires not only such bodily
presence, but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and
permanent place of abode.
- ELEMENTS: 1) physical presence, 2) intent to adopt it as domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements are absent.
- Lease contract in Janurary 1997 does not support change of domicile.
Merely indicative of intent to reside in Sarangani but does not
engender permanency. Mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence no matter how long, without the intent to abandon it, does not
result in a loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of contract of lease
cannot be used, absent other circumstances, as the reckoning of the
one year residence requirement.
- Lack of intent to abandon Quezon was shown when he registered as a voter
therein. While not conclusive, gives rise to a strong presumption of
residence. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public
assertion of the fact of residence.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
TORAYNO v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Residence requirement, rationale.
One-liner: Residence requirement is to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to
evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.
FACTS:
1. Vicente Y. Emano was the provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. His
residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. After his third
term as governor, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city
on March 25, 1998, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two
years and five months was at Cagayan de Oro City.
2. PETITIONERS filed a Petition before the Comelec in which they sought the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had
allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement.
3. PETITIONERS ARGUE: Emano maintains his domicile in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the
following facts:
a. he had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the
1998 elections;
b. in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest
against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was
a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental;
c. he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor
until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25,
1998. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification. Thus
he could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City
while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Private respondent: avers he actually and physically resided in CDO and that
one's choice of domicile is a matter of intention evidenced by him having a house
in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor
(the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a residence
certificate and registering as voter therein.
But prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private
respondent as the duly elected city mayor.
COMELEC held: "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is an actual
resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time necessary to qualify
him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the respondent
having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where
his family has been living since then."
ISSUE: whether or not? Why not? Jk. Whether private respondent had duly
established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the
May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof.
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RULING:
Law applicable: "SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
Private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City
while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house
in the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998
community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of
the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible
to run for mayor thereof.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of
districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their
constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves -- their
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all
matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would give
candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies,
and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and
fitness for the offices they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private
respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to
fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the
mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the
residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense
rationale for the residence requirement.
There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the
people of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that
the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given
fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate. Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
MAQUERA vs. BORRA
Property qualification.
FACTS:
1. RA 4421 requires that “all candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices” to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be
forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government
concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at
least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his COC, there
being not more than 4 candidates for the same office.
2. In compliance with such law COMELEC had, on July 20, 1965, decided to
require all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of
good reputation, acceptable to COMELEC in the sums of P60k and P40k for
Pres and Vice Pres, respectively, and P32k for Senator and House Reps.
3. The consequence of said RA 4421 and the aforementioned action of
COMELEC, every candidate has to pay the premium charged by bonding
companies, and, to offer thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least,
the amount of the surety bond, or properties of the same worth, belonging to
other persons willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor
of said bonding companies
ISSUE: Is RA 4421 constitutional?
RULING: NO.
- RA 4421 prevents or disqualifies from running those persons who, although
having qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, are unable to pay the
premiums charged by the bonding companies or those who lack the property
necessary for the counterbond.
- Such property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is
premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies
necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that,
accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to
be elected to public office.
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TOPACIO v. PAREDES
President-elect and President, distinguished.
One Liner: A President-elect is one who is chosen to an office, but not yet
actually inducted into it while a President is one who has already assumed office.
FACTS:
1. Topacio alleges that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in the
course of that election contest in that he declared that no one had been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election
held in that town and prayed that:
a. the judgment rendered be declared null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
2. A general election was held in Imus, Cavite to fill in the office of the
municipal president (mayor?)votes
a. Topacio and Abad were opposing candidates for the said position
b. Topacio received 430 votes and Abad received 281
c. Abad contested the election on the ground that Topacio was
ineligible in that he was re-elected the second time to the said
office, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.
3. There is no question about the correctness of the method of casting and
counting the votes.
4. Judge Paredes declared that no one had been legally elected president of
the municipality of Imus
a. Paredes claimed that if the CFI do not have the powers upon the
eligibility of candidates for public office, the result will be very
serious—possible daw that an enemy of the government will take
possession lol
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to determine the eligibility of the
candidates?
RULING: NO.
CFI HAS NO JURISDICTION IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY OF
CANDIDATES
1. Section 27 of Act No. 1582 was the prevailing law regarding Election
Contests, which was amended by Act No. 2170.
2. However, it must be noted that the only changes made in the section as
amended are:
a. the admonition to the courts to decide the election contests as soon
as possible, and
b. that the jurisdiction of CFI is not now final and conclusive in such
contests as to provincial governors.
c. In all other essential respects, the section remains the same.
3. Consequently, if the courts did not have jurisdiction under the original
section to determine, in election contests, the question of the eligibility
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

or legal qualifications of candidates, the amendment does not confer
upon them that jurisdictional power.
4. The construction placed upon the original section by this court is perfectly
applicable to the new.
SEC. 27 ONLY PROVIDES FOR A SUMMARY PROCEEDING IN CASES
OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND IS TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
5. The jurisdiction of such tribunals, although courts of general jurisdiction in all
other matters, is strictly confined within the provisions of the statute creating
them for this purpose.
6. The proceedings authorized by those provisions were intended by the
legislature to be summary' in the highest degree cannot be doubted—it
does not include the authority to declare candidate ineligible for office
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE THE OFFICE
OF PROVINCIAL MEMBER OR THIRD MEMBER VACANT ON ACCOUNT OF
INELIGIBILITY OF THE “GOVERNOR-ELECT” OR “THIRD MEMBER ELECT”
7. Par. 8, Sec. 12 of Act No. 1582 (as amended) authorizes and empowers the
Governor-General, after an investigation as therein provided, to declare the
office of provincial governor or third member vacant on account of the
ineligibility of the "governor-elect" or "third member elect"
14. That the power to declare the office vacant has been granted cannot be
doubted. There is an express grant. It is unrestricted. The paragraph is not
ambiguous. Plain, ordinary language is used.
INELIGIBLE—DEFINITION
15. Legally or otherwise disqualified for office. Not eligible. (Standard, Edition
1910.)
16. "Disqualified to be elected to an office; also disqualified to hold an office, if
elected or appointed to it." (28 Wis., 99; Black's Law Dict.)
CONCLUSION
17. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings
that no one was elect municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the
last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision
is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be
entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs.

“ELECT”—DEFINITION
8. Lexicographers define is as:
a. "Chosen to an office, but not yet actually inducted into it; as, bishop
elect, governor or mayor elect.” (Webster, Edition of 1910.)
b. "Elected to office but not yet in charge of its functions; as, the
president elect; the bishop elect."

GOVERNOR-GENERAL CAN ONLY EXERCISE THE POWER TO DECLARE

VACANCY IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN ELECTION AND INDUCTION
9. The Governor-General can only exercise the power conferred upon him by
this paragraph in the interval between the election and the induction into
office of such person.
10. This is clear from the mere reading of the paragraph. Had it been otherwise,
the legislature would not have used the words "governor-elect" and "third
member elect."
11. But it is said that under the rule of strict construction as above set forth, the
word "ineligible" as used in the paragraph under consideration, does not
include those disqualifications which are not derived from the personal
character of the individual, such as the one mentioned in section 2 of Act No.
2045.
12. This is clear from the mere reading of the paragraph. Had it been otherwise,
the legislature would not have used the words "governor-elect" and "third
member elect."
13. That the authority here conferred is special and statutory and that its extent
depends upon the terms of the grant, there can be no question.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO; ESTRADA vs. MACAPACAL-ARROYO
THREE TOPICS: Inability of the President; Resignation of the President;
Vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President, How Filled.
THE DRAMA
1. May 1998 elections— Estrada was elected President; Gloria Arroyo was
elected VP
2. October 2000— "Chavit" Singson accused Estrada of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords
a. Next day, members of Senate and House of Reps (HR) delivered
privileged speeches accusing Estrada of further crimes
b. investigations were thereafter ordered; some moved for Estrada’s
impeachment
c. within a number of days: Some bishops, Ex-pres Cory, Ex-pres
Ramos, VP Arroyo all asked for resignation
3. November 2000— mass resignations of economic advisers; mass defection
of House representatives from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
a. Same month, Impeachment trial was opened
4. Impeachment highlights—
a. Ocampo testified witnessing Estrada sign “Jose Velarde” a P500
million investment agreement
b. Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources
Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider
trading
c. Ohmygosh dramatic: January 16, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."
The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the
ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.
5. Jan 16 midnight— Consequent to the ruling, thousands assembled at the
EDSA Shrine.
6. Jan 17— Public prosecutors mass resignation; impeachment was
postponed due to resignations
7. Jan 18— a 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a
human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati
City to the EDSA Shrine; Sec. of Defense/Generals/armed services later
joined in Jan 19, announcing the AFP’s withdrawal of their support of the
government.
8. Jan 19— Estrada agreed to the holding of a snap election for President
where he would not be a candidate
9. Jan 20— 12nn, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to Arroyo
as President;
a. 2:30pm, Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacañang
Palace.
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b. Estrada then issued a statement (see Annex A); and sent a
letter to then-Senate president and then-House speaker (see
Annex B);
10. Following days: Arroyo started discharging powers and duties; SC issued
resolution unanimously confirming her authority; Congress issued resolution
of full support; US-Pres Bush phoned Arroyo recognizing her government;
etc.
11. Feb 6— Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President
a. Feb 7— Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming
Guingona’s nomination (some Yes-votes with reservations
due to pending challenge on legitimacy of Arroyo’s
presidency)
b. Feb 9— Guingona, Jr. took oath as VP
THE CASE
12. Several Ombudsman cases previously filed against Estrada were set in
motion (eg bribery, plunder, graft, etc)
13. Estrada filed (both were later consolidated)—
a. petition for prohibition before SC to enjoin Ombudsman from
proceeding with the case until after his “term as President is over
and only if legally warranted"
b. Quo Warranto, to confirm Estrada as incumbent president
“temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,” and
declare Arroyo as only holding Presidency in acting capacity
14. SC enjoined Ombudsman from proceeding with criminal cases pending
instant case
15. Estrada arguments before the SC:
a. Under ISSUE 1
i. he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only
an Acting President.
ii. Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution
to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions; not VP Arroyo.
b. Under ISSUE 2
i. denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of
the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo
took her oath as President.
ii. he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of
law; he relies on SEC 12 of RA No. 3019, which allegedly
prohibits his resignation.
ISSUE 1: WON SC has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of Congress recognizing Arroyo as
new president
ISSUE 2: WON Estrada effectively resigned before Arroyo took her oath
ISSUE 3: WON Guingona’s assumption of the Vice Presidency was proper
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SYLLABUS TOPIC: INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
WON SC has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of Congress recognizing Arroyo as new president
ISSUE 1: NO
- See SEC 11, ART VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
THE OPERATIVE FACTS:
- Estrada sent the letter (see Annex B) in January 20 claiming inability;
Arroyo unaware of the letter took her oath.
- The HR, despite the letter, adopted 2 RESOLUTIONS: (1) expressing
support to Arroyo as president; (2) confirming Arroyo’s nomination of Sen.
Guingona as VP.
- Senate, despite the letter, adopted 3 RESOLUTIONS: (1) confirming
Arroyo’s nomination of Sen. Guingona as VP; (2) terminating the
impeachment trial; (3) certifying the vacancy in the Senate (due to
Guingonas ascension to VP).
- Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
Estrada is no longer temporary.
- Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
CONGRESS RULING ON PRESIDENT INABILITY, FULLY DISCRETIONARY
- Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative… branch of the government."
- There is a "textually demonstrable lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it."
- In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest
by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
- SC cannot pass upon Estrada’s claim of inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency.
The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this
Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
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SYLLABUS TOPIC: RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT
WON Estrada effectively resigned before Arroyo took her oath
ISSUE 2: YES
- See SEC 8, ART VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
RESIGNATION, ELEMENTS AND FORM
- Elements: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment.
- No form required: The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
TOTALITY TEST
- Estrada didn’t write a formal resignation letter; he merely left the Palace
after Arroyo’s oath-taking
- When no written resignation, facts of resignation has to be determined
from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001
or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
IN THIS CASE
- Authoritative window on the state of mind of Estrada: the "Final Days of
Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. (see Annex C for details)
- SC SUMMARY OF FACTUAL BASES: Estrada’s resignation was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he
has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
ON THE LETTER TO CONGRESS
- It is, however, urged that Estrada did not resign but only took a temporary
leave of absence due to his inability to govern (see Annex B for letter)
- Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate his
resignation. If it was prepared before the press release of Estrada clearly
showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release,
still, it commands scant legal significance. Estrada's resignation from the
presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
repudiation by the people.
ON RA 3019 PROHIBITION FROM RESIGNATION
- Estrada’s reliance is misplaced. The intent of the law ought to be obvious. It
is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public
official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal
or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution. To be
sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a
violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve
if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or
retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of
the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his
resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
- PLUS, there was actually no pending criminal investigation against him
before resignation because he was still immune from suit, thus RA 3019 is
inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
- Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
SYLLABUS TOPIC: VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VP, HOW FILLED
WON Guingona’s assumption of the Vice Presidency was proper
ISSUE 3: YES (NOTE: no ISSUE on this one IN THE CASE, it was just
illustrated in passing in the facts)
SEC 9, ART VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
- Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the
term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-
President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority
vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
IN THIS CASE: NOMINATION FROM AMONG CONGRESS
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- Feb 6— Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President
IN THIS CASE: CONFIRMATION BY HOUSES SEPARATELY
- Feb 7— HR and Senatae adopted respective resolutions:
o House of Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
§ Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of
Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
o Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 82: "RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
§ Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate
confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
o NOTE: Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
and John Osmeña voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason
therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent
Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
- Constitutional process was followed. Guingona’s assumption was proper.
ANNEX A
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any
future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. o Arroyo was installed under the provisions of 1987 Consti, she
MABUHAY ! took oath to defend the 1987 Consti = reviewable
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" - EDSA I v EDSA II
o EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of
ANNEX B revolution which overthrew the whole government.
"Sir: o EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President President.
shall be the Acting President. o EDSA I is extra-constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review.
ANNEX C o EDSA II is intra-constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
The Angara Diary reveals that: President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
- Estrada statements on snap election (see Jan 19 in Facts) President as President are subject to judicial review.
o indicium that Estrada had intended to give up the presidency o EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
even at that time questions.
- Angara and Sen. Pimental advised Estrada on a "dignified exit or
resignation" which Estrada expressed “no objection to the
suggestion…but said he would never leave the country.”
- Estrada: “I would have five days to a week in the palace.”
o proof that Estrada had reconciled himself to the reality that he
had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-
day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of
time.
- Estrada: “Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng peaceful and
orderly transfer of power.”
o at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was
implied.
- Estrada: “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to clear my
name, then I will go.”
o this is high grade evidence that Estrada has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear.
- There ensured 2 rounds of negotiations premised on Estrada’s
resignation, where the details negotiated were merely on the measures
to be taken during and after the transition (Estrada’s security mostly);
there was already a draft for the transition deal, but it was aborted due
to Arroyo’s oath-taking; after Arroyo’s oath-taking the provisions on
resignation were deleted as it was already moot and academic.
- Estrada intimates that he needs to release a final statement before
leaving Malacañang (See Annex A)

ANNEX D
- Arroyo’s installment not same as Cory’s
o Cory was installed through a revolution = non reviewable
because act was OUTSIDE any constitution

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
One-liner: Although the Comelec failed to call and give notice, the special
election is still valid as the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the
statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law
charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election (statutory
notice).
FACTS:
1. Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr
as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona
who took his oath as Vice-President on Feb. 9, 2001.
2. Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate passed Resolution
No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate.
3. Reso No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy thru a special election
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
4. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on
30 June 2004.
5. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13
candidates as the elected Senators. Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio
Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively.
6. On 20 June 2001, petitioners as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition.
a. Petitioners contend that COMELEC’s provisional proclamation is
without jurisdiction because it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as required under Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645 and it failed to specify in the Voters Information
Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections.
ISSUE: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat
was validly held on 14 May 2001.
RULING: YES!
SPECIAL ELECTION, BASIS AND NATURE OF
- Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be
called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives
"in the manner prescribed by law”.
- The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of
its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with
the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's validity. In a
general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is
valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
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- In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general
elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and
operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the
time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.
This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the
statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law
thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
- IN THIS CASE: Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of
vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the
special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be
held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the
voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC's failure
to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
NO PROOF THAT COMELEC’S FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE MISLED VOTERS
- The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the
failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has
resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of the special election.
- Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's failure to give
this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change
the result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there
was no such special election.
- More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan. We simply
cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of
proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their
right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election.
- Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and
methods to conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No.
6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's proposal, as embodied in
Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed
COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its
mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the
limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute
grave abuse of discretion.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
PIMENTEL VS. COMELECTITLE
One Liner: Qualifications for election under the Constitution are exclusive and cannot
be expanded by ordinary legislation.
FACTS:
1. Congress passed Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, making it
mandatory for candidates for public office to undergo a drug test.
2. Pursuant to this law, the COMELEC issued a resolution prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
3. A candidate for senator sought to nullify Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
COMELEC resolution invoking Section 3 Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that:
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of
age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
• According to the candidate, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five
(5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of
the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC created an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing
the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
ISSUES:
1. Can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution? (No. It enlarges the exclusive
qualifications enshrined in the Constitution.)
2. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? (Yes. It is an unauthorized
expansion of the Constitutional requirements.)
RULING on ISSUE 1: NO.
• Congress' inherent legislative powers are subject to certain limitations. As early
as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the
limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of
the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under
delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
• The qualifications enshrined in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators are exclusive. Thus, legislative power
remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
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limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.
• In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes.
• If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of
a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
RULING on ISSUE 2: YES
• Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a
pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator; a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect.
• The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate.
• While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the
May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to
review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS:
COMELEC RESOLUTION:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing: x x x x
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under
Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
VETERANS FEDERATION VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the
Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four
inviolable parameters. These are:
a. First, the twenty percent (20%) allocation - the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
b. Second, the two percent (2%) threshold - only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
c. Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats.
d. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their
total number of votes.”
2. Comelec en banc proclaimed 13 party-list representatives from twelve 12
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5% of votes.
3. The Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.
Calderon, was proclaimed as the 14th party-list representative.
4. Subsequently, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and
Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement)
filed with the Comelec a Petition asserting that:
a. the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under
the Constitution, was mandatory.
b. the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional
provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House. Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their
respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that
sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. (TAKE
NOTE HA!)
5. Comelec grants PAG-ASA's Petition. It ordered the proclamation of herein
38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52
party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In
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allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
6. The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been
proclaimed winners objected to the proclamation and filed separate Motions
for Reconsideration. They contended that
a. under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or
coalitions garnering at least 2% of the votes for the party-list system
were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and
b. additional seats should be allocated to those which had garnered
the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast
for the winning parties.
7. Comelec En Banc ruled - follow the 20% allocation of party-list
representatives in order to comply with the constitutional mandate. Strict
application of the 2% threshold would limit the concentration of party
representatives.
ISSUES
1. WON the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory. (in other
words: WON the 20% allocation for party-list representative be filled up
completely and all the time)
2. WON the two percent (2%) threshold requirement and the three-seat
limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional. And If YES,
how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
RULING on ISSUE 1: NO! 20% ALLOCATION IS MERELY A CEILING!
- The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the composition of the House
of Representatives reads as follows:
“Article VI, Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.”
DETERMINATION OF TOTAL NO. OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES:
- Party-list representatives comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives. The mathematical formula, as follows:
o (No. of district reps. / 80% District Reps.) x 20% party-list
representatives = No. of seats for party-list
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
- This formulation means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
o To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections,
the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
§ (208 / .80) x .20 = 52
- The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to
comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the
Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time
and under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.” Twenty
Percent (20%) Allocation a Mere Ceiling - not to the filled up completely at
all times:
- The 20% allocation is a ceiling, not mandatory; the mechanics by which it is
to be filled up has been left to Congress.
o In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted
RA 7941. Congress declared therein a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning
party, The Two Percent Threshold
RULING on ISSUE 2: YES! CONSTITUTIONAL SYA BOGO
- In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
- The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
THE THREE-SEAT-PER-PARTY LIMIT
- An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote
and encourage a multiparty system of representation.
- Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress
set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent (2%) vote
threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how
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large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the
entire House.
METHOD OF ALLOCATING ADDITIONAL SEATS
1. The first step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-
list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two
percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in
the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than
two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes."
2. The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally,"
bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
FORMULA IN DISTRIBUTING ADDITIONAL SEATS PROPORTIONALLY
Step One.
1. The initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they each received.
2. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the
total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.
3. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed
one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two.
1. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties.
Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the
number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining
the most number of votes. The second and subsequent parties should
be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
2. The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats
than the first party for two reasons:
a. (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always
be less than 1:1, and
b. (2) an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the
20% allocation and there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. A fractional membership cannot be converted into a
whole membership because that would deprive another party's
fractional membership.
FORMULA IN DETERMINING ADDITIONAL SEATS FOR THE FIRST PARTY:
1. The formula for computing the number of seats to which the first party is
entitled is as follows:
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

Number of votes of the 1st party / Total votes for total party-list system =
Proportion of votes of first party relative to votes for party-list system
2. If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it
off is equal to:
a. at least 6% of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to 2 additional
seats or a total of 3 seats.
b. equal to or greater than 4%, but less than six percent, then the
first party shall have 1 additional or a total of 2 seats.
c. less than 4% then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
3. Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total
votes cast, is entitled to 1 additional seat or a total of 2 seats.
4. Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining
the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot
be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties because the use of the same formula for all would
contravene the proportional representation parameter. The proper
solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats;
and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion
to those of the first party.
4. Incidentally, the above formula does not give an exact mathematical
representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in
order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation
is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of
two additional seats.
5. The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional
seats happily coincides with the present number of incumbents;
namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve
other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the
incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a
different formula and methodology.
CONCLUSION --- Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are
each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.

FORMULA FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS OF OTHER QUALIFIED PARTIES:

Step Three.
1. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
Number of votes of
concerned party
Additional seats for a concerned party = ---------------------------------- x No. of
additional seats allocated to 1st party
No. of votes of 1st party

2. Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would

be entitled to is computed as follows:

No. of votes of the Concerned party (ABA)

---------------------------------------------------------- x 1= No. of additional seats allocated
to the concerned party
No. of votes of first party (APEC)

3. Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

321,646 (ABA)
------------------------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since rounding off is
not to be applied
503,487 (APEC)

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BANAT v. COMELEC
One Liner: The 2% threshold shall only be used in the first round allocation of
guaranteed seats to the party-lists.
FACTS:
1. BANAT (party-list) petitioned before the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by
the Constitution. However, the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s NBC
recommended to declare the petition moot and academic, and this was
approved by the COMELEC en banc.
2. BANAT questioned the proclamations of the COMELEC including the
formula used in computing the number of congressional seats for the party-
lists.
3. They questioned Sec. 11 of RA 7941 for being void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2%
of the total votes casted in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution.
4. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to fill the total
number of congressional seats allotted for the party-list representatives or
the 20% party-list seat as prescribed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the 2% threshold is unconstitutional
- The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the
guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including
those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-
list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second
round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
- The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the
Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There
is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not
require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule
is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is
not violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the
Constitutional provision that party-list representatives shall comprise twenty
percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time,
these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking
down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not be reconciled
anymore with the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: YES, but only insofar as it is used in the second round allocation
of additional seats.
1. Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast
guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat
allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the
Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise
of legislative power.
2. The Court ruled that the 2% threshold in the second round allocation
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec. 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.

APPLICATION:
In this case, the Supreme Court had summarized four parameters in a Philippine-
style party-list election system. The four parameters are:
- Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of
Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list
organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every
four existing legislative districts.
- Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be
distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two
percent of the total party-list votes

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BAYAN MUNA VS. COMELEC - The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties,
Note: Consolidated case with BANAT organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This
FACTS: clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. (Then those who garnered
1. Petitioners Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment at least 2% kay naa silay isa ka seat)
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms
(A Teacher) assails (National Board of Canvassers) NBC Resolution No. 07- EXAMPLE:
60 which made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions Votes Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party- Guaranteed
Rank Party
that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List Garnered List, in % Seat
System. 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2. The COMELEC announced that it would determine the total number of seats 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
Federation Party v. COMELEC.
3. Petitioner’s contention criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total 6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. They reject the
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
three-seat cap (I think tungod dagha silag votes), but accept the 2%
threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all 9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, 14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
ISSUES: 17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
1. WON the 20% allocation for party list rep. in Sec. 5(2) of Art VI of the Total 17
Consti is mandatory. NO
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
2. WON the formula used violates RA 7941. (Partially violates)
3. WON the 3-seat limit is constitutional. 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
4. WON major political parties are allowed to participate in party-list 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
elections.
- From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at
RULING on ISSUE 1: 1. NO. 20% allocation is not mandatory.
least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17
- The filling up of all available seats is merely a ceiling such that partylist
qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this
Rep.
first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. (So mao
nana ang first round. SC said this is constitutional. Nothing wrong with this.)
RULING on ISSUE 2: Partially NO/YES. Only the rule on additional seat was
- The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those
struck down by the Court.
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
- Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is
parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula
garnered during the elections. (So first buhaton kay e rank sila)
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total

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number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
- We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-
list representatives.
TO ILLUSTRATE:
- There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let
us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if
we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties
get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
- We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
RULING on ISSUE 3: YES. The 3-seat limit is constitutional.
- Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any
party from dominating the party-list elections.
RULING on ISSUE 4: NO. Major Political parties are disallowed from
participating in the partylist elections.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings. In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral
party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to
allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia. (Court is highest law of the land after all.)

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section

11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

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CAYETANO VS. MONSOD
Comelec, practice of law.
One Liner: Practice of law means any activity, in and out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
FACTS:
This petition revolves around what is meant by “members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years”. This is in
relation to the majority composition of COMELEC.
1. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
2. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
3. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18
4. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUES: WON Monsod has indeed practiced law
RULING: YES
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROVIDES IN SECTION 1 (1), ARTICLE IX-C:
- "There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty- ive years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
PRACTICE OF LAW, DEFINITIONS:
1) BLACK – The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
2) LAND TITLE ABSTRACT AND TRUST CO V DWORKEN – one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
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either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law."
3) PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V AGRAVA – The practice of law
is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions."
Embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill.
PRACTICE OF LAW, SUMMARIZED BY SC
- Means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."
LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM “PRACTICE OF LAW” IS
SHOWN BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION:
- Mr Foz said that: “To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.”
MONSOD MEETS THE QUALIFICATION, “10 YEARS PRACTICE OF LAW”
Bio of Monsod:
- Is a member of the Bar. He worked in the
- law office of his father, but later on worked in the
- World Bank Group from 1963 to 1970 as an operations officer for
o 2 years in Costa Rica and Panama. Upon his return to the Phil, he
worked with the
- Meralco Group as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and had since rendered services
to various companies as a
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
- legal and economic consultant or CEO.
- National Chairman of NAMFREL, which involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He likewise was a member of the
- Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings.
SC SAID:
- Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
CHIKA ON APPOINTMENT:
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
of icer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the quali ications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
quali ied who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide." (italics supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is quali ied, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satis ied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
- The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more quali ied for a particular position.
- It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority.
- An appointment is essentially within the iscretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law." (Italics supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists
of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) con irmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission
by the Commission on Appointments of its certi icate of con irmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc.... (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
BRILLANTES v. YORAC
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FACTS:
1. In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a
fact-finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide.
2. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship of the COMELEC.
3. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute (by the president).
4. Brillantes then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the
Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
5. TN: The qualifications of Yorac are conceded by Brillantes and are not in issue.
6. BRILLANTES CONTENTION: the choice of the acting chairman should not be
appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of
the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
7. COMMENT OF THE SOLGEN: (1) As compared to the SC (kay diba ang
president mo appoint sa SC justices, gi emphasize ni SolGen nga lahi ang
appointment sa SC og sa nahitabo nga appointment sa COMELEC) : no such
designation is necessary in the case of the Supreme Court because the
temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of
1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals.
(2) There is no such arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on
Elections. The designation made by the President of the Philippines should
therefore be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON the designation of Yorac violates the independence of COMELEC
RULING: YES!
- although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they
are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions.
- Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable
laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.
- Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this
Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IXA, Section 7.
- The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman
comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with
its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
- Designation made by president has dubious justification as it was merely on the
“administrative expediency” to present the functions of the COMELEC.
- Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. In the
choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves
would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were
for them and not the President to make.
- THUS: The designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent
Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is unconstitutional.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
FILIPINAS ENG’G MACHINE SHOP v FERRER, ACME
FACTS:
1. COMELEC issued an Invitation to Bid call for the manufacture and delivery
of 11,000 units of voting booths for the coming election, to which Filipinas
and ACME participated, submitting therein their respective bids.
2. It was ACME who offered a lower bid of P78 per unit then Filipinas’ P128
sample 1 or P123 sample 2 bid. The bidding committee of the COMELEC
RECOMMENDED the acceptance of Filipinas’ bid because it stated that
ACME’s materials were not rust proof and was too heavy.
3. COMELEC issued a purchase order in favor of ACME.
4. With this, Filipinas filed an injunction suit at CFI Manila.
5. COMELEC sought to dismiss such complaint arguing that CFI has no
jurisdiction over such suit and that the complaint states no cause of action.
The judge then dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: WON CFI has jurisdiction over an order of COMELEC dealing with an
award of contract arising from its invitation to bid.
HELD: Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction.
By constitutional mandate —
"The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number of location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials . . . The
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court." (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine
Constitution, which was then in force)
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180, approved June
21, 1947, the election law then enforced) provided that, "(a) any controversy
submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it
within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to
said controversy is filed," and that, "any violation of any final and executory
decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of court."
Likewise, the same section provided that, "any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court."
Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), as
amended, provides that, "final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the
Commission on Elections . . ." fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by way of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
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prescribed the manner of appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court from a
final order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Elections, among ther
administrative bodies. Hence it has been consistently held that it is the Supreme
Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review
on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the
conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.
We are however, far from convince that an order of the COMELEC awarding
a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various
proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the
purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to
this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders,
rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said
body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the
law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those
pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are
inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.
Thus in the case of Masangcay vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-13827,
September 28, 1962 (6 SCRA 27, 2829), We held that —
". . . (W)e had the occasion to stress in the case of Guevarra vs.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958) that under
the law and theconstitution, the Commission on Elections has not only
the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy
that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this
sense, We said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a
court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Sec. 30, Article
VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may, however, exercise
quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision
of law come under its jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting
the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it
wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after
which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission
was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election
purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor
of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely
as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
BAYTAN v. COMELEC
NOTE: Petitioners ako gi address sa ilahang Baytan kay daghan kaayo ni sila.
Imagina nalang taga makabasa kag word nga petitioners kay silang Baytan and
Company na. mga voters ni sila nga nagpa register.
FACTS:
1. Baytan et.al were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio
2. Ignacio led Baytan et. al to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18.
They registered in this precinct
3. When they returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this
precinct looked unfamiliar to them.
4. This fact prompted Baytan et. al to return to the registration center to study
the precinct map of Barangay 18.
5. They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of
Barangay 28.
6. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and
registered anew on June 22, 1997
7. Petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997 to former COMELEC
Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson Petitioners requested for
advice on how to cancel their previous registration. They also explained
the reason and circumstances of their second registration and expressed
their intention to redress the error.
8. The Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners’ Voters
Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V.
Ravanzo (Ravanzo for brevity), for evaluation
9. Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration
(criminal case) against petitioners.
10. Comelec affirmed Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC en
banc denied the motion
11. Petitioners assailed the COMELEC resolutions alleging GADALEJ
ISSUE:
1. WON the COMELEC acted in GADALEJ in Recommending the
prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear and
convincing evidence on record that they had no intention of committing
said election offense;
2. WON COMELEC en bancs assumption of original jurisdiction over the
case violated the Constitution.
RULING on ISSUE 1: NO!
POWERS OF THE COMELEC: (PURPOSE OF THE POWER)
- The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to
assure the people of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
- This grant is an adjunct to the COMELECs constitutional duty to enforce
and administer all election laws.
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- Failure by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make an idle ceremony of the
sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote
IN THIS CASE… (ANG UBANG FACTS SA RULING NA NANGGAWAS ☹)
- Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued
in the preliminary investigation stage A preliminary investigation is
essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be
charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine probable cause.
- There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and
in different precincts without canceling their previous registration.
- The COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by petitioners
contained glaring inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio led
them to the wrong precinct to register.
- However, Ignacios affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting
precinct of Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not knowing that
petitioners registered in the wrong barangay.
- Contrary to petitioners sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of
petitioners, had another version. She claimed in her affidavit that on June
15, 1997, Ignacio went to their house to inform them about the redefinition of
their barangays territorial jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought
her sons to Barangay 18 to register Neither did the COMELEC consider
petitioners letter dated August 22, 1997 as an application to cancel their
previous registration.
- The COMELEC explained that this letter was sent after their second
registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City
had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official.
- Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial
compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous
registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather
than at the preliminary investigation It is also well-settled that the finding
of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the
COMELECs sound discretion.
- The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices (TOPIC).
- Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC
absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates
from the COMELECs exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided
by law.
(SIDE NOTE: SC: lack of intent: immaterial, malum prohibitum ang election
offenses! Mga bogo!)
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

RULING on ISSUE 2: NO! In this case, the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on
- Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a second time in a different
exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELECs precinct without canceling their previous registration. At this point, the period of
administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), prescription for the alleged offense started to run.
and (9) of Article IX-C.[21] The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the Ineluctably, the prescriptive period of the offense was interrupted upon
COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in the COMELECs initiation of proceedings against petitioners and remains tolled
division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative pending the termination of the case
powers in the Commission on Elections, while providing that the COMELEC
may sit en banc or in two divisions. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has
been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
- Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
- Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
- The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3
of Article IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division,
and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa,[23] that the
COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon
motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC
exercises its quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC is empowered in
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to prosecute cases of
violations of election laws. The prosecution of election law violators involves
the exercise of the COMELECs administrative powers. Thus, the
COMELEC en banc can directly approve the recommendation of its
Law Department to file the criminal information for double registration
against petitioners in the instant case. There is no constitutional
requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided
by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.

OTHER TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION. (WAY LABOT SA TOPIC)

We also cannot accept petitioners plea for a liberal construction of the
laws on the ground of prescription. Prescription of the crime or offense is the
forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse
of a certain time Election Code provides that election offenses shall prescribe
after five years from the date of their commission.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SANDOVAL v. COMELEC, CANUTO SENEN ORETA
FACTS:
1. This petition questions the order of COMELEC en banc which nullified the
proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as congressman-elect for
Malabon-Navotas legislative district.
2. Petitioner Sandoval and Private respondent Oreta vied for the congressional
seat for the Malabon-Navotas.
3. May 17, 1998, Malabon municipal board of canvassers (MMBC) declared
that Oreta obtained the highest number of votes, while Sandoval came
second in MALABON ONLY
4. May 23, 1998, Oreta filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Correct Manifest
Error in Tabulation of Election Returns by MMBC”. It alleged only 790
election returns were actually canvassed and not 804.
a. District board of canvassers convened; found that they canvassed
804 election returns.
5. District board of canvassers continued with canvassing of Malabon and
Navotas; it found Sandoval was winner; he he thereafter took oath of office
6. Following day, Oreta filed an Urgent Appeal with Prayer for the
Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as
Congressman."
a. It alleged that there was a verbal order from the COMELEC
Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning
candidate and that the non-inclusion of the 19 election returns in
the canvass would result in an incomplete canvass of the election
returns.
7. COMELEC en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of
petitioner. The COMELEC ruled that the proclamation by the district board
of canvassers was void because: (1) it defied verbal order by the COMELEC
Chairman (2) it was based on an incomplete canvass.
8. Petitioner’s contention:
a. COMELEC's annulment of petitioner Sandoval's proclamation as
winner in the election for congressman of Malabon-Navotas,
without the benefit of prior hearing violates his right to due
process of law.
b. Respondent COMELEC's action on respondent Oreta's petitions
violates RA 7166 which bars pre-proclamation cases in the HREP.
9. Respondent’s contention:
a. COMELEC committed no jurisdictional error in declaring void ab
initio the proclamation of petitioner Sandoval and that respondent
COMELEC substantially complied with the requirements of due
process.
b. COMELEC properly took cognizance of respondent petition to
correct manifest error in the certificate of canvass.
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10. Solicitor General Silvestre Bello III: (gives me labor feels lol) found the
assailed order of the COMELEC null and void because COMELEC's motu
proprio and ex parte annulment of petitioner's proclamation is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and violated petitioner's right to due process;
and 2. Respondent COMELEC had no jurisdiction.
11. The COMELEC’s comment: invoked its power of direct control and
supervision over the board of canvassers, allowing it to review, revise and
reverse the board's actions. It said that it rendered the questioned order
upon finding that petitioner's proclamation was illegal for it was made in
disregard of the Chairman's verbal order and it was based on incomplete
canvass.
ISSUE/S
1. WON COMELEC has the power to take cognizance over petitions filed
by private resp., both alleging the existence 'of manifest error in the
certificate of canvass and seeking to reconvene the board of
canvassers to allow it to correct the alleged error; YES
2. WON COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was
valid. NO.
RULING on ISSUE 1: YES, COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION.
- GR: candidates and political parties involved in an election are allowed to file
pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC. (Pre-proclamation cases
refer to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers). The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all
pre-proclamation controversies.
- EXCPTN: prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential,
senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation
cases. (Sec. 15 RA 7166)
o PURPOSE: AVOID DELAY in the proclamation of the winner.
- EXCPTN TO THE EXCPTN: The second sentence of Sec. 15 allows the
filing of petitions for correction of MANIFEST ERRORS even in elections for
president, vice- president and HREP for the
a. SIMPLE REASON that the correction of manifest error will not
prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation
of the winner in the election.
b. This rule is consistent with the authority of the COMELEC
under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an, election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections."
Applying the foregoing rule, we hold that the Commission has
jurisdiction over the petitions filed by private respondent seeking to
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

correct the alleged manifest error in the certificate of canvass issued by

the MMBC.
These petitions essentially allege that there exists a manifest error in
said certificate of canvass as the board failed to include several election
returns in the canvassing. Section 15 of RA 7166 vests the
COMELEC with jurisdiction over cases of this nature.
Now private respondents assert that the hearing held on June 9, 1998
substantially satisfies the due process requirement. YOU ARE WRONG
AGAIN! The law requires that the hearing be held before the
COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, COMELEC FIRST ISSUED AN
ORDER ANNULLING THE PROCLAMATION OF PETITIONER AND
THEN SET THE DATE OF THE HEARING.

We reiterate the long-standing rule that jurisdiction is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations in the petition regardless
of whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought
THE AUTHORITY TO RULE ON PETITIONS FOR CORRECTION OF
MANIFEST ERROR IS VESTED IN THE COMELEC EN BANC. Section 7 of
Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu proprio, or
upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of
political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
RULING on ISSUE 2: NO.
- Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the exercise of its jurisdiction is tainted with illegality for having been
rendered without due process of law.
- Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the
hearing, the tribunal must show substantial evidence to support its ruling.
IN THIS CASE
- The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner,
without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the
questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be
observed because it was merely exercising its administrative power to
review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers.
WRONG!!
SC: COMELEC WAS NOT MERELY PERFORMING AN ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTION.
- The resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and
petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the
questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to ACT AS
AN ARBITER.
- It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a
manifest error.
- Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the
COMELEC of ITS QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER.
CONCLUSION: Orders of COMELEC are annulled. Case is remanded to
COMELEC and ordered to hold a hearing of the issues of the petitions.

Case of Bince Jr. V. Comelec: "Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office

without due process of law. Although public office is not property and one cannot
acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due
process in proceedings before the COMELEC, requires due notice and hearing,
among others xxx”
Private respondent is wrong in Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus
Election Code and said that COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal
proclamation even without notice and hearing because the law states that it
may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate-elect. YOU ARE WRONG!

"Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation

controversies.-- The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-
proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition,
and AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING, order the partial or total suspension
of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any
proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance
with the succeeding sections." (Klaro kaayo ang gi underline)

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LOONG v COMELEC
One Liner: In unforeseen circumstances, Comelec has to make snap judgments
in order not to frustrate the will of the voters.
FACTS:
1. In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436
prescribing the adoption of an automated election system.
2. The new system was used in the 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the
Province of Sulu.
3. During the election, some election inspectors and watchers observed
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the
mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata.
4. As a result, automated counting of ballots in Pata was suspended. Then,
they found that the error was in the printing of the local ballots, thus, the
automated machines failed to read them correctly.
5. Atty. Tolentino (head of the COMELEC Task Force) called for an emergency
meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing
the Sulu elections.
6. The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of
the misaligned ovals. Those who attended were the various candidates for
governor including petitioner Loong and private respondent Tan.
7. However, there was lack of agreement. Some recommended a manual
count while other insisted on an automated count.
8. Consequently, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution ordering a manual
count but only in the municipality of Pata.
9. While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security to our
Comelec officials and other deputies, the political tensions and imminent
violence and bloodshed may not be prevented, as per report received, the
MNLF forces are readying their forces to surround the venue for automated
counting and canvassing in Sulu in order that the automation process will
continue.
10. A new resolution was passed ordering the transfer of all counting machines
from Sulu to Manila for purposes of both automated and manual operations;
authorizing the official travel of board of canvassers for the counting of votes
at the PICC supervised by COMELEC en banc.
11. PETITIONER LOONG’S CONTENTION: Resolution violates the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8436 providing for an automated counting of the ballots
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The automated counting is
mandatory and could not be substituted by a manual counting. Where the
machines are allegedly defective, the only remedy provided for by law is to
replace the machine. Manual counting is prohibited by law;
12. Nonetheless, COMELEC started the manual count.
13. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
contending that manual counting gave opportunity for election cheatings
namely:
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A. The counting by human hands of the tampered, fake and
counterfeit ballots which the counting machines have been
programmed to reject;
B. The opportunity to substitute the ballots all stored at the PICC.
C. With the creation by the COMELEC of only 22 Boards of Election
Inspectors to manually count the 1,194 precincts, the manipulators
are given sufficient time to change and tamper the ballots to be
manually counted.
D. There is the opportunity of delaying the proclamation of the winning
candidates through the usually dilatory moves in a pre-proclamation
controversy because the returns and certificates of canvass are
already human (sic) made; compared to a machine where
immediate proclamation is ordained thereafter.
14. Sometime later, Tan was proclaimed governor-elect of Sulu on the basis of
the manual count.
MAIN ISSUE: WON the Comelec had the authority to order manual count.
(Topic: COMELEC’s power to administer and enforce laws)
RULING: YES
• In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy
where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not
all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
COMELEC from levitating above the problem.
• Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the
broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to have
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
• The cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to
R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count
does not work.
• Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-
evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count
the result of an election.
• Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the
parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections. Our
elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for
public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too
often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen
circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. (Wala gi
explain unsa ang Emily post haha)
• In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed,
may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair
criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
PS: An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a
wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate. Its aftermath could
have been a bloodbath. COMELEC avoided this imminent probability by ordering
a manual count of the votes. It would be the height of irony if the Court condemns
COMELEC for aborting violence in the Sulu elections.
SIDE DISHES haha:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed
COMELEC resolutions.
2. WON petitioners were denied of due process.
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable,
whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of
governor of Sulu.
First. We hold that certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Section
7, Article IX (A) of the 1987 Constitution states that "unless provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof." We have interpreted this provision to mean
final orders, rulings and decisions of the powers. Contrariwise, administrative
orders of the COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit subjects of a petition for
certiorari. The main issue in the case at bar is whether the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered a manual count of the 1998 Sulu local
elections. A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436
on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under
Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . . .." The issue is not only
legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the
entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private
respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are
enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court.
Second. Petitioner Loong, among others, were not denied due process. The
facts clearly show that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual
count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted
written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots
and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the
manual count from beginning to end. Moreover, the evidence is clear that the
integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were transferred from
Sulu to Manila and when they were manually counted. The ballot boxes were
consistently under the watchful eyes of the parties' representatives. They were
placed in an open space at the PICC. The watchers stationed themselves some
five (5) meters away from the ballot boxes. They watched 24 hours a day and
slept at the PICC.
From beginning to end, the manual counting was done with the
watchers of the parties concerned in attendance. Thereafter, the certificates of
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canvass were prepared and signed by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers
composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Secretary. They were also
signed by the parties' watchers.
The correctness of the manual count cannot therefore be doubted.
There was no need for an expert to count the votes. The naked eye could see
the check marks opposite the big ovals. Indeed, nobody complained that the
votes could not be read and counted. The COMELEC representatives had no
difficulty counting the votes.
Third. We cannot order a special election unless demanded by exceptional
circumstances. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
"Sec. 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect."
To begin with, the plea for a special election must be addressed to the
COMELEC and not to this Court. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should
be read in relation to Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166 which provides:
"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. —
The postponement, declaration of failure of elections and the calling of special
elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall
be decided by the Commission en banc by a majority vote of its members. The
causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after
casting of votes or on the day of the election."
The grounds for failure of election — force majeure, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes — clearly involve questions of fact. It is for this reason
that they can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice and
hearing to the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner never asked the COMELEC
en banc to call for a special election in Sulu. Even in his original petition with this
Court, petitioner did not pray for a special election. His plea for a special election
is a mere afterthought.
--end---
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only 2 methods of proposing
amendments to the Constitution were recognized:
a. By Congress upon ¾ votes of all its members (Constitutional
Assembly)
b. Constitutional Convention (2/3 of Congress; if majority, ask people)
3. However, the 1987 Constitution provides for another means through
people’s initiative
4. Private Respondent Atty. Delfin claims to be a founding member of the
Movement for People’s Initiative (PI), a group of citizens desirous to avail of
the system intended to institutionalize people power and to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Sec. 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution
a. He then filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution,
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative” (Delfin
Petition) and asked for an Order:
i. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over
the country and publication of such
ii. Instructing Municial Registrars to assist Petitioners in
establishing signing stations
b. Alleged that the exercise of that power (PI) shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC
5. COMELEC issued an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the
Delfin Petition and the Notice of Hearing and a hearing was subsequently
conducted
6. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago et. al. then filed this special civil action
for prohibition on the ff. grounds, among others:
a. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress—no law has been passed
b. It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative,
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle initiative on
the Constitution.
c. TOPIC: COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted to govern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
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7. DELFIN’S CONTENTIONS:
a. Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No.
6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution
b. TOPIC: The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra
vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act.
8. COMELEC’S CONTENTIONS:
a. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section
20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code.
b. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has the power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution
RULING: NO.
SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION—NOT SELF-
EXECTUTING
- BERNAS: Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.
- The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution is not self-executory.
- Thus, The Congress shall by law provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
R.A. 6735 HOWEVER IS NOT A FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE POWER
AND DUTY OF CONGRESS TO "PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT”
- We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
o This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
- Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of
the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
o “SEC. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.”
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
- The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section,
which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws
and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions
- While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), NO
SUBTITLE IS PROVIDED FOR INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION.
o This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws.
INITIATIVE—DEFINITION; TYPES
- Initiative on the Constitution - refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution;
- It is "national initiative," refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation
o if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a
law which only Congress can pass.
- It is "local initiative" refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
o if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of
the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass
INITIATIVE ON CONSTITUTION ON AMENDMENTS UNDER RA 6735
- Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty three sections, merely
o mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2;
o defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;
o speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people;
o reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters
who should sign the petition; and
o provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
- The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
- Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act
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THUS, COMELEC CANNOT VE EMPOWERED TO PROMULGATE SUCH
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT AN INITIATIVE
- Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative to administrative bodies.
- However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing
that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law:
o is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
o fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
- Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation.
- The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES
AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
- It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
- Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are
those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and
which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. 2006 - Lambino and Aumentado with other groups and individuals (Lambino
Group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative Petition to change
the 1987 Constitution; then they filed a Petition with COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
2. They also claimed that they had the support of at least 12% of all registered
voters with each legislative district represented by 3% of its registered voters
3. Their proposed changes aims to shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
a. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
b. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members
of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own
term of office;
c. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.
4. COMELEC denied due course to the Lambino Group for lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution in the ruling of
Santiago vs. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution
5. LAMBINO GROUP CONTENTIONS:
a. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
b. Alternatively, they claim that Santiago binds only the parties to that
case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of
the "will of the sovereign people."
6. OSG joined causes with the Lambino Group and urges the Court to grant the
Petition despite the Santiago ruling
a. Proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules
"as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."
ISSUES: WON Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Sec. 2, Art. XVII
of the Consti. on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative
RULING: NO. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative.
THE INITIATIVE PETITION DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SECTION 2, ARTICLE
XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION ON DIRECT PROPOSAL BY THE PEOPLE
- The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people.
- This means two essential elements must be present:
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o The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
representative or agent can sign on their behalf.
o The proposal must be embodied in a Petition
- These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition.
o Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
RATIONALE OF THE REQT TO ATTACH FULL TEXT OF THE PETITION
- A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing
- The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient
information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether
to sign the initiative petition."
- Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the
nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void
- In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly
reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containing such full text
- Also, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum
Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must
sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
IN THE CASE AT BAR—COPY OF A SIGNATURE SHEET NOT SUFFICIENT
- The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition.
- The Lambino Group merely submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet
- There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached
to it.
- The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government.
- The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
- Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

THERE IS DOUBT WHETHER LAMBINO GROUP TO CIRCULATE THEIR
DRAFT PETITION SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC
- Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-
gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's
draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC.
- When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition
filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied
that they circulated both.
- However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group
circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the
draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
- It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,
circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering
period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they iled later with the
COMELEC.
- The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated
claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition.
- Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the
amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino
Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
(Only 100,000 copies lol)
- The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the
6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
AS TO THE ULAP RESOLUTION
- ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino
Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature
sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC.
- On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the
Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets.
- ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition
or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
- Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the
people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
REVISION VS. AMENDMENT
- Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system
of checks-and-balances
- On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
- Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
- IN THE CASE AT BAR—a change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.
o This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution.
- A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government thus the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution
A REVISIT OF SANTIAGO V. COMELEC IS NOT NECESSARY
- The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct
and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution
- Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the
constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution

THE INITIATIVE VIOLATES SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII OF THE

CONSTITUTION DISALLOWING REVISION THROUGH INITIATIVES
- A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
- In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
- The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution.
- The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
GARCIA V. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan.
2. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC, guys idk what the C actually stands
for, tried to search pero wa jud, wa sd gibutang sa case but SC kept using
PRAC) to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia L. They then passed
Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Garcia on the ground of “loss of
confidence”.
3. Petitioners filed with COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said
Resolution No. 1 but COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the
recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan.
4. Petitioner’s contention: PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and
procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 AKA Local
Government Code of 1991. They urged that sec. 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing
recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate
proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials
belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also
argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing
Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal was
the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65)
members of the assembly.
5. Petitioners then filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ
of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution.
6. After the hearing, We granted the petition on ground that the sending of
selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process
protection of the Constitution.
ISSUES: WON sec. 70 of LGC of 1991 allowing a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the recall of local elective officials, is constitutional.
RULING: YES. Sec. 70 allowing the PRAC is constitutional.
Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the
respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative.
RECALL is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of
his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an
incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint,
the power is implied in all governmental operations. It is frequently described as
a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: The right to recall necessarily includes the sole
and exclusive right of the people to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceedings or not."
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- SC: We do not agree. There is nothing in the Constitution that will suggest
that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether
to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode
of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple
modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article
X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code
which shall provide for… effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given
the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment
dictates. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement
the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. (Ana ang court
nga if gusto mo e change, e amend ninyo ang constitution)
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: "The initiation of a recall through the
PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local officials. In
their Extremely Urgent Clarificatory Manifestation, petitioners stated that a "PRA
resolution of recall is the re call itself."
- SC: Not correct. Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory
process of recall by the PRAC. They think that initiation by the PRAC is not
initiation by the people. This is a misimpression, for initiation by the PRAC is
also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. More far out is petitioners' belief that a PRA resolution of
recall is the recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution
of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the
whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall
that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject
official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in
the election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: The disputed law violates the equal protection
clause of the Consti because according to them, local officials daw who
constitutes the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the
recall of a duly elected official belong to the minority party.
- SC: It does not violate equal protection. Petitioners' argument does not really
assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC. They fear
that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision. A
careful reading of the law, however, will show that it does not give an
asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political
minority. First to be considered is the politically neutral composition of the
preparatory recall assembly.
Under the Sec. 70 (b) of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang
members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Firstly, Its membership is not
apportioned to political parties. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the
provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned.
Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 (hehe) of the Code provides that the only
ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people.
By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere
differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-
party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth
and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be
faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.

CONCLUSION: Petition is dismissed.

Note: In case he asks for the history of recall. Here’s the summary:
1. 1973 Constitution- It was mandated in sec. 2 of Article XI entitled Local
Government “The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government
code xxx defining a more responsive and accountable local government
structure with an effective system of recall xxx”
2. The Batasang Pambansa- enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local
Government Code of 1983." Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only
one mode of initiating the recall elections of local elective officials, i.e.,
by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned
3. Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall
as provided by BP 337 was exercised by our people.
4. February 1986 - people more than exercised their right of recall for they
resorted to revolution and they booted off office the highest elective
officials of the land.
5. 1987 Constitution- The successful use of people power to remove
public officials who have forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm
institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations.
6. In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160 aka
Local Government Code of 1991, In this Code, Congress provided for a
second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall
assembly.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
PARAS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. A petition for recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
Brgy. Pula of Cabanatuan City against petitioner Danilo E. Paras, the
incumbent Punong Barangay.
2. Acting on the petition for recall, COMELEC scheduled the petition signing
and set the recall election. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
3. The COMELEC deferred the recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition.
4. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before
the RTC of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction with the trial court
issuing a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC
approval.
5. Comelec issued a resolution, for the third time, re-scheduling the recall
election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction.
6. Petitioner’s contention: Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
AKA the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take
place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists
that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the SK
election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,
and every three years thereafter. Petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular
local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate
the SK election from the recall election.
ISSUE: WON the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of
Section 74b of the Local Government Code.
RULING: NO mga dzae.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
1. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole.
2. A statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
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3. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction.
- Intent of Sec. 74: to subject an elective local official to recall election once
during his term of office. Par. (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall.
- Subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will circumvent the novel provision of the
LGC on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No.
7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase regular local election, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision.
- A statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the
interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically
paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional
mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum x x x.
- In a case, the Court admonished against a too-literal reading of the law as
this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of
its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in
the spirit that vivifieth x x x
- Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding
the regular local election. The electorate could choose the officials
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office
than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be
more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested
and be filled by the electorate.
BUT! SC said: recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the
same having been scheduled on May 1997.
CONCLUSION: Petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
RODULFO SARMIENTO vs. COMELEC
One Liner: Power to decide all questions affecting elections; Juridical powers:
Jurisdiction of en banc or division
FACTS:
1. NINE special civil actions for certiorari are consolidated
a) Involve Comelec en banc deciding appeals directly from board of
canvassers re: pre-promulgation petitions
b) Prayer: nullify on grounds of grave abuse of discretion
2. As of the instant action, the officers involved already assumed office at
12noon of June 30, 1992
ISSUE 1: WON Comelec has jurisdiction over pre-proclamation petitions – YES
ISSUE 2: WON En banc has jurisdiction to entertain cases appealed directly
from Board of Canvassers – NO
ISSUE 3: WON the instant actions may still continue notwithstanding subject
officials’ assumption into office
HELD: ISSUE 1: YES
COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER ALL QUESTIONS, INCL. PRE-PROC
CASES
- SEC 3, Subdivision C, ART IX: The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
divisions, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
- Specifically provided in the Constitution
HELD: ISSUE 2: NO
MUST BE: COMELEC DIVISION FIRST, BEFORE EN BANC
- SEC 3, Subdivision C, Article IX, 1987 Constitution
o See bold-underlined above
- OLD RULE: SEC 3, Subdivision C, ART XII, 1973 Constitution
o SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions, except contests involving Members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. . . . "
- SEC 9, Rule 27, COMELEC Rules of Procedure–
o SEC. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. — xxx
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately
set the case for hearing." xxx xxx xxx
o NOTE: pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Case
(which under the Rules, are cognizable by divisions
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- THUS: The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear
and decide the same at the first instance.
IN THIS CASE
- En Banc took cognizance directly from Board of Canvassers
CONCLUSION
- It acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases
without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
- Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside.
HELD: ISSUE 3: NO
PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES TERMINATE WHEN TERMS COMMENCE
- Consequent to the null En Banc decisions, the appeals would logically be
deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division (as
per SEC 8, Rule 3, HOWEVER…
- SEC 16 RA 7166—
o SEC 16. All pre-proclamation cases pending before
the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of
the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of
canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice
to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party.
However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the
petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the
proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been
issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.
IN THIS CASE
- The terms of the offices involved commenced at noon of 30 June 1992.
CONCLUSION
- These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would
only be an exercise in futility
- Instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners
of regular election protests.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
ONG V MARTINEZ
FACTS:
1. Herrera, was one of the Liberal Party candidates duly elected as Councilor
for Manila's Third District. He performed his duties as such councilor until his
death, thus leaving the position open for the appointment of a qualified
replacement from the same political party where the deceased councilor
belonged.
2. Ong, who was a defeated candidate of the Liberal Party in the Third District
of Manila, on the strength of an indorsement by the Treasurer of the said
party in the district which was allegedly supported by 80% of the ward
leaders of the party of the same district as embodied in their resolution, was
appointed as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) by the
Secretary of Local Government to fill the vacancy created by the late
Councilor Herrera.
3. On the same date, Ong took his oath of office as such councilor. In the
regular session of the City Council there was a motion to exclude Ong and
the other appointees from the session hall. In the subsequent session of the
Council, Ong and his co-appointees were formally excluded from the session
hall with sixteen (16) councilors voting for such exclusion and none against
it, with the rest of the Council members abstaining.
4. The records show that Martinez (daughter of Herrera) went through the legal
formalities or standard procedure prior to her appointment to the vacated
position subject of this controversy.
Appointment process of Martinez: (you may skip sa recits)
1. November 4, 1988: Nine out of the eleven incumbent LP Councilors in the City
Council endorsed the appointment of respondent per their resolution. This resolution
was forwarded to the Office of the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter.
2. March 1, 1989: Aforesaid Chairman, in turn, nominated respondent for
appointment per his letter-nomination to President Corazon Aquino thru the Secretary
of Local Government.
3. March 8, 1989: Senate President Jovito Salonga as National Head of the Liberal
Party was furnished with a copy of this letter-nomination.
4. March 13, 1989: Congressman Leonardo Fuguso as President of the LP Third
District Chapter also nominated respondent to National President Salonga of the
Party. President Salonga, in turn, nominated respondent to Secretary Luis Santos of
the Department of Local Government pursuant to Section 50 of the Local Government
Code.
5. March 17, 1989: Secretary Santos, acting for the President, issued an
appointment to respondent.
6. March 21, 1989: The first session day after respondent's appointment, the
City Council, by a vote of twenty-four members in favor with no member
opposing recognized her as member of said Council.Finally, the Presiding
Officer of the City Council directed its Secretariat to include the name of
respondent in the payroll of the City Council.
7. This petition now seeks to annul the appointment of respondent Martinez
and to declare Ong to be the holder of the position of Councilor in place of
deceased Saturnino Herrera.
8. PETITIONER CONTENTIONS:
a. The Secretary of the Department of Local Government, in
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appointing respondent Martinez on March 17, 1989, violated the
election ban on appointments under Res. No. 2054 of the
Comelec since her appointment was not cleared for exemption
from the election ban and, therefore, the same was made beyond
and in excess of the Secretary's authority and by reason of which,
the appointment is null and void.
b. Martinez is not a member of the Liberal Party and cannot be
appointed to the position of Councilor, a vacancy created by the
death of a member of said Party.
c. Ong's appointment is valid, complete and beyond recall.
9. RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION:
a. Petitioner misled the Court in claiming that he has a right to the
contested position. His appointment was indorsed only by the
Treasurer of the LP Chapter, 3rd District of Manila. The
Treasurer's indorsement was not known nor authorized by the head
of the LP in said district. Neither was the nomination brought to the
attention of the Chairman of the LP, Manila Chapter. The proper
procedure was not observed by petitioner. The unauthorized action
of petitioner cannot be cured or ratified by an alleged resolution of
80% of ward leaders and which resolution was adopted long after
the appointment of petitioner. Hence, petitioner's appointment was
void from the very beginning for lack of authority of the Treasurer
who nominated him.
b. Respondent has not assumed office; neither has he exercised or
performed the functions of the position because he was prevented
from doing so by the outright refusal of the City Council to
recognize his appointment.
c. Petitioner has no right to the position and for which reason, he
lacks the legal personality to institute the present petition for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition.
d. While petitioner claims that he took his oath on February 9, 1989
which was a calculated move to avoid the election ban on
appointments, he used a Residence Certificate issued on February
22, 1989 only. This means that he could not have taken his alleged
oath before the issuance of the residence certificate.
e. The appointment of Martinez possesses all the requisites of a valid
appointment according to legal and regular procedures. She avers
that her appointment was indorsed by nine out of eleven LP
incumbent councilors and that her nomination was favorably
indorsed by the Liberal Party hierarchy from the Chairman of the
Third District, thru the Chairman of the Manila Chapter up to the
National President of the LP; and, that she was duly appointed on
the basis of the series of nominations of the LP hierarchy.
f. The appointment of respondent is not covered by the election ban
contemplated under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Petitioner Ong should be councilor. –NO
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

2. Whether or not Sec. 261(g) of the OEC applies in this case. –NO • For having satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for appointment as
Councilor, which is an official position outside the contemplation of the
Ruling: election ban, respondent Martinez appointment is declared valid. The issue
• The case for respondent appears meritorious. Respondent had gone on the alleged discrepancy between the dates of petitioner's oath and his
through the regular and standard nomination process which had been residence certificate need not be tackled now because it will not anymore
officially acknowledged by the Secretary of Local Government. affect the recalled appointment of petitioner. If ever, the matter casts a doubt
• Sec. 50 of the Local Government Code provides that since deceased on petitioner's credibility and honesty.
Councilor Herrera who had caused the contested vacancy comes from the • WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Liberal Party, it follows that his mode of replacement should be
governed by the standing rules of the aforenamed Party.
• Notably, respondent Martinez appointment was accepted or recognized by
the City Council in its session of March 21, 1989. The minutes of said
session reveal that twenty-four (24) councilors voted to accept the
appointment of respondent and not a single member objected to or opposed
the acceptance. Right then and there, the Presiding Officer announced the
acceptance of respondent's appointment and the Chair directed the
Secretariat to include her name as a new member of the City Council.
• Both petitioner and respondent have invoked the election ban imposed
under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The election ban
covered the period from February 11 to March 27, 1989 by reason of the
Barangay election held on March 28, 1989. Both parties have capitalized on
the prohibitive provision for the purpose of having their respective
appointments declared illegal or null and void.

• Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus:

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving

salary increases. During the period of forty- five days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing
officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national
or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee whether provisional, temporary or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of
the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it
is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the
office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner
that may influence the election.

• As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be

appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the
appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the
date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this
provision shall be null and void.
• The aforequoted provision does not apply to both assailed appointments
because of the following reason: The permanent vacancy for councilor
exists and its filling up is governed by the Local Government Code
while the appointment referred to in the election ban provision is
covered by the Civil Service Law.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
PEOPLE VS. REYES
One Liner: Even if the employee was transferred during the election period,
when the resolution on how to secure approval of the Commission has not yet
taken effect on the day of transfer, the penal provision cannot be enforced as the
rules on the subject were yet inexistent.
FACTS:
1. Buenaventura Maniego, from Bureau of Customs (BOC), Manila issued a
personnel order assigning Jovencio Ebio as Special Assistant to the Office
of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations. The actual transfer was
completed. The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992.
2. Later, Ebio filed with Comelec to protest his transfer. He claimed that his
new assignment violated the Comelec Resolution and OEC, which prohibit
the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11,
1992 synchronized national and local elections.
ISSUE: Whether Maniego is liable for the election offense?
HELD: NO
- SEC 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, which read as: (h) Transfer of officers and
employees in the civil service. — Any public official who makes or causes
any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service
including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior
approval of the Commission.
- Two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261
(h) of B.P. Blg. 881:
o (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee
within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC
o AND (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of
the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and
regulations.
- The transfer or detail of government officer or employee will NOT be
penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to promote efficiency in
the government service.
- Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a
government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure, the
transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the
appointing authority. Maniego transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992.
On January 2, 1992, the COMELEC also passed Resolution No. 2333 which
promulgated the necessary rules to enforce Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881. We
quote its pertinent portions:
"RESOLUTION NO 2333
WHEREAS, the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides:
SECTION 261. Prohibited acts. — The following shall be guilty
of an election offense:
xxx xxx xxx
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(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. — Any public official
who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee
in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2. Request for authority of the Commission. — Any request
for authority to make or cause any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in
the civil service, including public school teachers, shall be submitted in writing to
the Commission indicating therein the office and place to which the officer or
employee is proposed to be transferred or detailed, and stating the reason
therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. Effectivity. — This resolution shall take effect on the
seventh day after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
- Resolution No. 2333 was published in the January 8, 1992 issues of
Malaya and the Manila Standard. Hence, it took effect on January 15,
1992, the seventh day after its publication.
- It was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect on January 15, 1992
that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its approval
on the transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the election
period. Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that Section
261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable.
- Respondent Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the
approval of the COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14,
1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were yet
in existent
GUJI: 2 requisites – 1. During election, 2. Without prior written
approval/exemption. In this case, since NO WAY TO ACQUIRE #2, you
cannot fault the person because it would be violation of right to due
process (in a way, you HAVE NO WAY TO AVAIL OF THE #2
REQUIREMENT AT AL; SO NO CHANCE OF VALIDLY DOING IT WHEN
SUPPOSEDLY ITS ALLOWED BY LAW)
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
ORCEO V COMELEC
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for certiorari questioning the validity of Resolution No.
8714 insofar as it provides that the term firearm includes airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations during the gun ban in the elections.
2. Res. No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the: (1) Bearing,
Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2)
Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of Security
Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. This was promulgated by COMELEC.
3. Res. No. 8714 contains the IRR of Sec. 32 (Who May Bear Firearms) and
Section 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of RA 7166, entitled An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
4. Section 1 of Res.No. 8714 prohibits an unauthorized person from bearing,
carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places,
even if licensed to possess or carry the same, during the election period.
5. Under Section 2 (b), the term firearm includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their
replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to
believe that they are real. Hence, airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations
are included in the gun ban during the election period.
6. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
a. Real party in interest since he has been playing airsoft since 2000.
b. The resolution will put him in danger of sustaining direct injury or make
him liable for an election offense if caught in possession.
c. Contends that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the definition of
since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations.
d. That there is no law that covers airsoft guns. By including airsoft guns in
the definition of firearm, Res. No. 8714, in effect, criminalizes the sport.
7. COMELEC’S COMMENT:
a. In its Comment, the COMELEC, represented by the OSC, states that
the COMELECs intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term firearm
is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear,
intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may
not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is
fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a
real gun or a recreational gun, which is sought to be averted.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
RULING: NO!
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R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections
and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes) provides:
§ SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. − During the election period, no person
shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in
public places, including any building, street, park xxx. The issuance of
firearms licenses shall be suspended during the election period.
Only regular members or officers of the PNP, the AFP and other law
enforcement agencies of the Gov. who are duly deputized in writing by the
Commission for election duty may be authorized to carry and possess
firearms during the election period xxx
§ SEC. 35. Rules and Regulations. The Commission shall issue rules and
regulations to implement this Act xxx
Pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 8714 which provides in Sec. 1 and 2:
SEC. 1. General Guiding Principles. During the election period:
(a) no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons in public places, including all public buildings,
streets, parks, and private vehicles or public conveyances, even if
licensed to possess or carry the same xxx
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Resolution:
Firearm shall refer to the "firearm" as defined in existing laws,
rules and regulations. The term also includes airguns, airsoft
guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause
an ordinary person to believe that they are real;
APPLICATION TO CASE:
1. As held in the case of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
§ Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. xxx All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
2. COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the
implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No.
7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the
details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly
weapons, as well as the definition of firearms, among others. These details
are left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that
possesses special knowledge and expertise on election matters, with the
objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
3. Contrary to petitioners allegation, there is a regulation that governs the
possession and carriage of airsoft rifles/pistols, namely PNP Circular No. 11
(Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Importation,
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
Exportation, Sale, Possession, Carrying of Airsoft Rifles/Pistols and
Operation of Airsoft Game Sites and Airsoft Teams). The Circular defines an
airsoft gun as follows: Airsoft Rifle/Pistol x x x includes battery operated,
spring and gas type powered rifles/pistols which discharge plastic or rubber
pellets only as bullets or ammunition. This differs from replica as the latter
does not fire plastic or rubber pellet.
a. PNP Circular No. 11 classifies the airsoft rifle/pistol as a special
type of air gun, which is restricted in its use only to sporting
activities, such as war game simulation. Any person who desires to
possess an airsoft rifle/pistol needs a license from the PNP, and he
shall file his application in accordance with PNP Standard
Operating Procedure No. 13, which prescribes the procedure to be
followed in the licensing of firearms.
THERE IS NO VIOLATION TO THE CONSTITUTION
Petitioner further contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the
State policies in these constitutional provisions:
o Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. x x x
o Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development.
o Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to x x x sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.
RIGHT TO POSSESS OR CARRY AN AIRSOFT GUN IS NOT ABSOLUTE
- As a long-time player of the airsoft sport, it is presumed that petitioner has a
license to possess an airsoft gun. As a lawyer, petitioner is aware that
a licensee of an airsoft gun is subject to the restrictions imposed upon him
by PNP Circular No. 11 and other valid restrictions, such as Resolution No.
8714. These restrictions exist in spite of the aforementioned State policies,
which do not directly uphold a licensees absolute right to possess or carry
an airsoft gun under any circumstance.
COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GADALEJ
§ The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
including airsoft guns and airguns in the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714
for purposes of the gun ban during the election period, with the apparent
objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible elections this year.
CONCLUSION: RES. NO. 8714 IS VALID AND COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT
GADALEJ
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GALLARDO v. COMELEC
Note: ang himua nga 1-liner kay about sa prohibition against disbursement of
public funds, kay maoy topic sa syllabus
Background:
- Petitioner Gallardo – incumbent Governor of Province of Camiguin, along
with other provincial officers
- Private Respondent Romualdo – incumbent Congressman, candidate for
Governor.
FACTS:
1. Romualdo filed a Special Civil Action against Gallardo et.al. to restrain the
latter from pursuing certain public works projects; from releasing, disbursing
and/or spending any public funds for such projects; and from issuing, using
or availing of treasury warrants or any device for the future delivery of
money, goods and other things of value chargeable against public funds in
connection with the said projects (concreting of roads, construction of
Capitol building, other waterworks system, acquisition of laboratory, hospital,
and office equipment, rehab of Katibawasan Falls)
a. said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on
public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code because
although they were initiated a few days before 27 March 1992, the
date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed
engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are
preconditions for the commencement of any public works project;
hence, they could not have been lawfully and validly undertaken;
b. the hiring of hundreds of laborers in the different projects continues
unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w),
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code;
c. the illegal prosecution of these public work projects requiring
massive outlay of public funds during this election period has been
and is being done maliciously and intentionally for the purpose of
corrupting the voters and inducing them to support the candidacy of
Respondent Gallardo and his candidates in the coming May 11,
1992 election.
2. RTC judge issued TRO.
3. Gallardo et al, filed Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the SC
a. RTC has no jurisdiction kay such suit intended to enjoin an alleged
violation of OEC. – ingon sila limited ra daw ang jurisdiction sa RTC
sa Criminal Actions for Violation of OEC
b. RTC no jurisdiction to take cognizance on election offenses prior to
the conduct of Prelim. Investigation by the COMELEC
c. Authority to prosecute election offenses belongs to the COMELEC
d. (TOPIC) – projects being undertaken are exempted from ban,
commenced only after approval of detailed eng. Plan and spec.;
duly passed and supported by the SP.
ISSUE: MAIN ISSUE JUD IS WON naay jurisdiction si RTC. (NO)
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
Discuss sa ta sa prohibited acts under OEC kay mao may topic.
"SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
- (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement expenditure of public
funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials
and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, releases,
disburses or expends any public funds for:
o Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
XXXXX
- Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of
materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices. — During the period of forty-five days preceding a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works,
except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph,
or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds."
Clearly, the issue is on the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of
elections, thus COMELEC has jurisdiction.
- considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the
Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by
the trial court over a cases involving the enforcement of the Election
Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing
statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of
authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions (Zaldivar doctrine)
- Under the present law, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or
hiring of new employees or the creation or filling up of new positions in any
government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, is banned during the
period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days
before a special election if made without the prior authority of the
Commission on Elections.
- A violation thereof constitutes an election offense.
- the Commission may "[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order or decision."
- Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the
power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices."
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OTHER ISSUES:
It is not true that, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election
laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code.
- The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests
involving elective municipal officials.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has
no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of theOmnibus
Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing
the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection
therewith.
- On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of
complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the
Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate
or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any
of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission.
o However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law
Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election
Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election
Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal."
o As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously
concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He
merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of
their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may
have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing,
he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong
authority.
CONCLUSION
- We have, therefore, no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis of
Our resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly
emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, We are not to be understood
as approving of the acts complained of by the private respondent.
- If his charges for the violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261
of the Omnibus Election Codeare true, then no one should be spared from
the full force of the law. No government official should flout laws designed to
ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections or
make a mockery of our electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past
have shown that only elections of that nature or character can guarantee a
peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to respect, preserve and
enhance an institution which is vital in any democratic society.
SO WAY JURISDICTION ANG RTC, WITHOUT PREJUDICE ON THE PART
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE APPROPRIATE COMPLAINT
FOR AN ELECTION OFFENSE PURSUANT TO THE COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Prohibited acts during voting.
FACTS:
1. RA 8436, as amended, aka the Automated Election System Law (authored
by Richard Gordon), provides for the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
(“VVPAT”) security feature as a Minimum safeguard:
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. — The automated election
system must at least have the following functional capabilities:
xxxx
(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for
verifying the correctness of reported election results;
xxxx
(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not
the machine has registered his choice; and
2. The Minimum Technical Specifications of the Optical Mark Reader or Optical
Scan System (machines to be used for 2016 elections) was capable of
issuing these receipts (i.e. Component 1 (B), subparagraphs (19) states
“The system shall have a vote verification feature which shall display and
print the voter's choices…”)
3. February 2016, COMELEC En Banc voted 7-0 NOT to implement VVPAT
for 2016 elections, for some reasons:
a. Politicians might use the receipts in vote buying
b. A receipt takes 13 secs to print to vote-counting process extended
for 6 to 7 hours
c. Losing candidates might instruct supporters to use the printouts to
question the results even though it’s correct, etc etc etc
4. Former Senator Gordon (was a candidate for Senate that time) and
Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc.
(Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.; of which the Chairperson was Gordon) filed a
petition for mandamus to compel COMELEC to implement the VVPAT;
GROUNDS invoked:
a. They had previously written letters demanding VVPAT to be
implemented, COMELEC ignored
b. VVPAT is a mandatory under the law
i. Law describes it as MINIMUM, and uses the word
“MUST”
c. Refusal to use VVPAT is felonious as it constitutes “impeding of the
use of computer devices” sanctioned by SEC 28 of RA 8436, as
amended.
d. Through VVPAT, the voter can verify if the choices on the paper
record match the choices that he or she actually made in the ballot
(thus, ensure transparency)
e. COMELEC’s "baseless fear of vote buying" is no excuse to violate
the law.
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f. they submitted a position paper by an alleged automated election
expert where with the VVPAT setup daw: after voters verify the
receipts, they will place the receipts in the old yellow ballot boxes if
no discrepancy; if naa, they will have it duly recorded by poll
watchers for analyses
5. COMELEC defense – instead of submitting their comment, they asked for
additional time because they have “yet to receive the petition and relevant
COMELEC documents”
a. SC: motion for extension DENIED; involved in this case is the right
of the sovereign to vote; the case should not be delayed.
6. NOTE: 3 days after being required to Comment, COMELEC in a press
conference manifested that theyd allow voters to have a 15-sec on-screen
verification through the counting machine (still, no receipt to be issued)
ISSUE: WON COMELEC may choose not to implement VVPAT
RULING: NO
PRELIMINARILY: MANDAMUS NATURE
- Through a writ of mandamus, the courts "compel the performance of a clear
legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or
respondent" by operation of his or her office, trust, or station. The petitioner
must show the legal basis for the duty, and that the defendant or respondent
failed to perform the duty.
LAW IS CLEAR, MINIMUM FEATURES ARE MANDATORY AND ARE PAID
FOR BY TAXPAYERS
- By setting the minimum system capabilities of our automated election
system, the law intends to achieve the purposes set out in this declaration.
A mechanism that allows the voter to verify his or her choice of candidates
will ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed election.
The voter is not left to wonder if the machine correctly appreciated his ballot.
- The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under SEC 6 (above)
are mandatory.
- The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the following:
(a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to
count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be
paper based.
- There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a "voter verified
paper audit trail." The paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical
ballot, because there may be instances where the machine may translate
the ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently spoils his or her ballot.
- If minimum system capabilities are met but not utilized, these will be a
waste of resources and an affront to the citizens who paid for these
capabilities.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
COMELEC ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY DOES NOT WARRANT NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
- SEC 2, ART XI (C), CONSTI empoweres COMELEC to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."
- It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to
administer the elections, but certainly, its constitutional duty is to "enforce
the law." The Commission is not given the constitutional competence to
amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold.
- COMELEC cannot assuage its by violating the law. It can just place proper
procedures instead.
SIDE KEMBOT by COMELEC
- Maliksi v Comelec – case where ballots were tampered to invalidate
several votes (by double shading) – SC: Maliksi could have been avoided if
the COMELEC utilized the paper audit trail feature.
ON-SCREEN VERIFICATION NOT ENOUGH (in relation to NOTE above)
- Inaction of the COMELEC in utilizing the VVPAT feature is a failure to fulfill
the duty required under the law.
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COMELEC V ESPANYOL
One Liner: In the exercise of its exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses, the Comelec may deputize the prosecutors but subject to revocation if such
is necessary to protect the integrity of the process. (wala ko sure bai, katulgon
nako…)
FACTS:
1. During the elections, (Bautista) the official candidate of the Lakas for the position
of Municipal Mayor charged the incumbent Municipal Mayor, et al. of violation of
Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the COMELEC.
2. Comelec conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, after which it
submitted its comments and recommendations to the COMELEC En Banc.
3. Comelec en banc resolved to file the necessary information against the
respondents before the RTC-Cavite and to authorize the Director IV of the Law
Department to designate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle the prosecution of
the case until termination thereof, with the duty to submit periodic report after
every hearing of the case; and (b) to file a Motion before the Court for the
preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days of respondents while the
case is pending pursuant Local Government Code of 1991 specifically on the
ground of commission of an offense involving moral turpitude.
4. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Violation of Section 261 (a)(2) of the Omnibus
Election Code is an election offense under Article XXII of the same code. Under
Section 265 of the Code, it is this Honorable Commission which has the
exclusive power to conduct (the) preliminary investigation thereof, and to
prosecute the same. As such, it is also this Honorable Commission which has
the exclusive power to review, motu proprio or through an appeal, the
recommendation or resolution of investigating officers in the preliminary
investigation.
5. Meanwhile, COMELECs Law Department, Investigation and Prosecution Division
recommended that the petitioner nullify the Resolution (finding the existence of
probable cause) of the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor for the reason
that the respondents-appellants are exempt, under Section 28(4) of Republic Act
No. 6646, from prosecution for violation of Section 261(a)(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code.
6. The Commission RESOLVED to approve the recommendation of the Law
Department as follows nullifying the resolution of the provincial prosecutor.
7. The Public Prosecutor opposed the petitioners motion to dismiss on the following
grounds: (a) the exemption under the last paragraph of Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 6646 applies only to the offense of vote-buying, as their sworn
statements was for vote-buying; this exemption will not apply to the charge for
vote-selling which was the crime charged (b) Resolution of the Comelec had
become final and executory; hence, it is no longer subject to review; and (c) the
review of the Provincial Prosecutors resolution made by the petitioner was a re-
investigation of the case, and was done without prior authority of the Court.
8. Ruling of the trial court: that the petitioner Comelec had no absolute power to
grant exemptions under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648. The trial court also
held that the issue of whether or not the accused are exempt from prosecution
and consequent conviction for vote-buying is a matter addressed to the Court
and not to the petitioner.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
ISSUE: Whether or not the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution by
COMELEC and the subsequent request for its nullification was proper.
RULING: YES, IT WAS PROPER.
• UNDER ARTICLE IX, SECTION 2(B) OF THE CONSTITUTION, the petitioner
is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election
offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to
assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election.
• UNDER SECTION 265 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, the petitioner,
through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus
Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the
assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government.
• IN SECTION 2, RULE 34 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, all
Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or their respective assistants are given
continuing authority as its deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under election laws and to prosecute the
same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them
by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives.
• The respondents assertion that Section 2, Rule 34, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is a violation of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code has been
laid to rest by this Court in Margarejo vs. Escoses, wherein this Court ruled that
until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays.
The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need for
prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of
the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled
by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the petitioner does not have a
sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such
cases. The prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject to its authority,
control and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such
deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated
authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the petitioner itself. Such authority
may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the petitioner, either expressly or
impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to
protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it
believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the petitioner.
Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the petitioner, provincial or
city prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are expected to act in accord with
and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the
petitioner in relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to
investigate and prosecute. Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city
prosecutor is to seek relief from the petitioner as its deputy.
THE WITHDRAWAL BY THE PETITIONER OF ITS DEPUTATION OF THE
PROVINCIAL OR CITY PROSECUTORS MAY NOT BE INTERFERED WITH OR
OVERRULED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
• In this case, the petitioner had resolved to approve the recommendation of its
Law Department and nullified the Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, and
directed its Law Department, not the Provincial Prosecutor, to implement
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the said resolution and file the necessary motion to dismiss Criminal Cases
pending with the respondent judge. The Law Department did file before the
respondent a Motion to Dismiss the said cases and a motion for the respondent
to, in the meantime, suspend the proceedings.
• The Provincial Prosecutor was thereby relieved of his deputation to represent the
petitioner in connection with the said motion. However, the Provincial Prosecutor
refused to give way to the Legal Officer of the petitioner and even opposed the
said motion. The act of the Provincial Prosecutor constituted a defiance of the
resolution of the petitioner and should have been ignored by the respondent
judge.
• It bears stressing that when the Provincial Prosecutor conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the Information, he did so because he had been duly
deputized by the petitioner. He did not do so under the sole authority of his
office. The resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor was subject to appeal by the
aggrieved party to the petitioner and may be reversed by the petitioner in the
exercise of its supervision and control of its deputies/subordinates.
CONCLUSION:
The conduct of a preliminary investigation of election offenses for the purpose of
determining whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, should be subjected to trial is the
function of the petitioner.The Court will not even interfere with the finding of the
petitioner absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle
emanates from the COMELECs exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses and to prosecute the same except as may otherwise be
provided by law. While it is the duty of the petitioner to prosecute those committing
election offenses, it is equally its duty not to prosecute those offenses where no
probable cause exists. The exclusion and inclusion of persons in the Information for
election offenses is a prerogative granted by the law and the Constitution to the
petitioner.
ISSUE: whether or not the exemption applies to both vote-buying and vote selling.
RULING:
Under the last paragraph of the said provision, any person guilty of vote-buying and
vote-selling who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on violations of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be exempt
from prosecution and punishment for the offense with reference to which their
information and testimony were given, without prejudice to their liability for perjury
and false testimony.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

PEOPLE vs. CORNELIO BAYONA TITLE - The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the
Election offenses as mala prohibita election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an
NOTE: THE FACTS ARE IN SPANISH MGA BESHIES HAHAHAHHAHAHAHA offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if
so infer2 nalang ko ani sa chika sa ruling not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.

FACTS: IN THIS CASE

1. According to record: Bayona was within the fence surrounding the polling - Bayona may not have intended to intimidate any elector or to violate the law
place when he was caught by a PH Constable (hahaha karaan na kayo in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his
besh) carrying a revolver; he was arrested. revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the
2. BAYONA DEFENSE: act complained of, and he committed it willfully.
a. he was just called by a friend and merely approached him to find - If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that Bayona should be acquitted
out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; because it was not proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence
b. there were many people in the public road in front of the polling the mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a
place, and he could not leave his revolver in his automobile, which cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.
he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and
thereby incurring in a violation of the law CONCLUSION
c. thus, he is not guilty of a violation of the Election Law - Lower court decision AFFIRMED
3. OSG (weirdly, mura he’s on the side of Bayona):
a. Literal application of the law is absurd because police force would
be included in the prohibition and could not use the roads if they
carry arms;
b. Object of congress was merely to prohibit the display of firearms
with intention to influence in any way the free and voluntary
exercise of suffrage;
c. prohibition should only be applied when the carrying of the firearms
was intended for the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to
influence the free choice of the electors
4. Bayona was found guilty by lower court for violation of SEC 416 of the
Election Law (imprisonment for 30days; fine: P50, with subsidiary
imprisonment; pay the costs)

ISSUE: WON Bayona is guilty

RULING: YES

MALA IN SE v MALA PROHIBITA

- acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent
- mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done
- “True, in abstract justice men should not be held criminally responsible for
acts committed by them without criminal intent, but the courts have always
recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and
compelled by necessity, to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer.”

IN ELECTION LAW OFFENSES, INTENT IS IMMATERIAL

- The law violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he
violated it is immaterial.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

DR. DOMALANTA and DR. FRANCISCO vs. COMELEC e. (THIS IS THE ONLY PART MENTIONING ABOUT MALA IN SE)
Election offenses as mala in se “NEITHER is their assertion that the offense is not mala
prohibita but mala in se a valid argument at all… Based on the
FACTS: facts, there appears a malice taking into account the pattern of
1. Domalanta and Francisco were part of the Staff of the Provincial Board of the distribution of the increase… This illegal act will jibe with the
Canvassers (PBC) of Isabela for 1995 elections position that violation of Section 27 (b) of RA 6646 is mala in
2. Senatorial Candidate Aquilino Pimental Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit against se. Besides, what we are proving here is the existence of a prima
the Provincial Election Supervisor and PBC and their Staff (petitioners facie case only, and not a proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
included) for violation of SEC 27(b) of RA 6646 (Guingona Electoral Reform 5. CLD recommended:
of 1987) which provides – SEC 27(b): Any member of the board of election a. an information be filed against the above people
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers with, increases or b. an administrative complaint against them for grave misconduct etc
decreases votes received by a candidate in any election or any member c. cases of 2 people (the petitioners) should be DISMISSED for
of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the lack of proof of conspiracy
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.” 6. COMELEC En Banc RESOLVED
a. Pimentel alleged that votes were padded by the PBC a. To file an Information against ALL above people (THIS IS WHY ni
b. The unauthorized additional number of votes were included in the petition and duha)
total votes for senatorial candidates Enrile (+27,755), Mitra (+7K) b. File an admin complaint for frave misconduct, etc,
and Honasan (+10K) in 9 municipalities and 1 city as reflected in c. Preventively suspend them for 90 days
the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (PCC) 7. Domalanta and Francisco
c. Pimentel submitted as proof Certificate of Canvass supported by
Statement of Votes per precinct (of subject cities and municipalities ISSUE: WON En Banc properly found probable cause for filing criminal charges
of Isabela) where is showed a consistent increase in the against Domalanta and Franciso
thousands. EXAMPLE: (this is not the issue of the case, in relation to the topic nalang… for actual case
Cert. of Canvass Prepared by PBC Discrepancy issue, see Annex B)
Santiago City
Enrile 15,454 16,454 +1,000
Angadanan
RULING: YES
Enrile 5,996 7,996 +2,000 - WALA JUD CHIKA ABOUT MALA IN SE IN THE RULING. Anyway…
Mitra 3,888 4,888 +1,000
Cauayan NATURE OF DISCREPANCIES BELIE CLAIM OF “ERROR”
Enrile 13,710 19,710 +6,000 - It can be clearly seen from the list above that the discrepancies are too
Honasan 11,205 21,205 +10,000
And so on……. (LIKE OHMYGOSH KAHUGAW RAJUD UGHHHHH)
substantial and rounded off to be categorized as a mere 'computation error'
or a result of fatigue.
3. DEFENSE (daghan lain2 defenses because ofcourse they had different - There is a limit to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight
in the performance of official duty.
roles played on that day):
- Magnitude of the error renders unacceptable the defense of 'computer error'
a. COMMON: The PBC etc all DENIED allegations; and said that if
or honest mistake.
there are discrepancies, theyre caused by human fatigue
4. Pimentel’s case was referred to COMELEC Law Department (CLD) for - The facts hardly paint a picture of manifest human error or fatigue in the
tabulation; instead, it discloses a pernicious scheme which would not have
evaluation and report, CLD FOUND:
a. glaring discrepancy is unquestionable been successfully perpetrated without the indispensable cooperation of all
b. Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting members of the PBC and their support staff which included herein
statements of votes by municipality and city, are sensitive election petitioners.
- The anomalies or the tampering of the results of the senatorial canvass
documents where the entries therein shall be highly scrutinized.
could only have been done by the staff. If they were “faithfully and regularly
c. Defined Mistake, Negligence and Gross negligence (See Annex
performing their assigned tasks,” it’s indeed highly unlikely that the padded
below)
d. Defense that erroneous crediting of additional votes to senatorial vote totals were entered without their knowledge.
- A reasonably prudent man on the other hand would readily come to the
candidates was an honest mistake due to human fatigue is
patently not tenable. conclusion that there exists a probable cause.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
RECOMMENDATION IF MERELY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
- It bears stressing in this regard that all that is required in the preliminary
investigation is the determination of probable cause so as to justify the
holding of petitioners for trial.
- Probable cause is defined — ….as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
PETITIONERS’ DEFENSES BETTER VENTILATED IN TRIAL
- Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and
whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can
only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony.
- . . . the merit of defenses such as honest mistake, simple error, good faith,
and the mere performance of ministerial duties, as interposed by persons
charged with the election offense of tampering, increasing or decreasing
votes received by a candidate in any election, are best ventilated in the
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.
ANNEX A: For your reading pleasure:
- Mistake, concededly committed by public officers are not actionable without any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those
consideration[s] which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do or the
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
- Gross negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is [a] duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
ANNEX B: THE ISSUE JUD IN THE CASE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in directing the filing of criminal and administrative complaints against the
petitioners.
- NO.
- In invoking the defenses of honest mistake, oversight due to fatigue and performance
of ministerial duties virtually admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the
total number of votes, which discrepancies by no stretch of imagination could
be dismissed as negligible or inconsequential, there is not merely a strong
suspicion that they actually committed the election offense which they are
charged. The burden of proof appears to have shifted to them to prove that the said
discrepancies cannot be considered illegal and criminal. Since based on the facts
THERE IS CLEARLY probable cause, then there could not have been grave abuse of
discretion at al.
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GO v SANDIGANBAYAN TITLE
One Liner: The Sandiganbayan can acquire jurisdiction over a private individual
charged with conspiracy with a public officer, either as co-principal, accomplice
or accessory.
FACTS:
1. The government awarded in favor of the Philippine International Air Terminal
Co. (PIATCO) the project for the development of NAIA passenger terminal.
2. In view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo
Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award was declared
null and void.
3. Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman charging several persons in connection with the
NAIA project.
4. After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan the Information charging Rivera,
as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of
PIATCO, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (entering,
on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby).
5. Petitioner Go contended that he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is he capacitated to
enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. At least one
of the important elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not
allegedly present in his case. As a private person, he could not allegedly
enter into a contract "on behalf of the government," there being no showing
of any agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of
the government.
ISSUE: WON Go can be charged with the Sandiganbayan despite being a
private person
RULING: YES.
• Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a
public officer does not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section 3(g)
of RA 3019. Petitioner Go’s simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer
ergo he cannot be charged with the violation goes against the letter and
spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine
Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
• Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s
application extends to both public officers and private persons. The said
provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor
more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.
• The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the
accused is a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to
private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring
with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder.
• Several cases were cited: Luciano, Singian, Domingo which are applicable
to the present case. Ruling: Private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for
the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h)
thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
• Petitioner Go’s reliance on the Marcos case is misplaced. The element that
the accused is a public officer, was totally wanting in the former First Lady’s
case because the public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in
committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted.
Obviously, the former First Lady could not be convicted, on her own as
a private person, of the said offense.
• In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first
element in his case because he is not being charged alone but in conspiracy
with Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the
DOTC Secretary. The case against both of them is still pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Go’s case are, therefore,
not exactly on all fours as those of the former First Lady’s case as to warrant
the application of the Marcos ruling in his case.
NB: specific acts and details of the alleged conspiracy need not be contained in
the Information because these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be
shown and proved during the trial on the merits. To establish conspiracy, direct
proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to
commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,
would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.
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AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Exception, Private person as public officer
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owns and operates an earth-moving business.
2. He was contracted by Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP).
3. As a resulted, he sub-contracted the services of Jaime Ancla, who has trucks.
4. But then it was found that Jaime Ancla was a delinquent taxpayer.
5. Thus, BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint over the personal property of Jaime
Ancla and commanded Azarcon to transfer, surrender, transmit, and/or remit to
BIR the property of Ancla in his possession (the trucks nga iya gi gamit sa
business)
6. Azarcon signed the Receipt of Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under
Authority of the National Internal Revenue, and assumed the undertaking as
depositary of the seized property.
Then the unfortunate turn of events:
1. Jaime Ancla decided to cease operations with Azarcon (kay sub-contractor man
to sya)
2. He surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from Azarcon’s custody.
3. Thus, Azarcon wrote a letter to the BIR Regional Director seeking to be
relinquished from whatever responsibility he has as depositary.
4. But then, si Uncle Regional Director wala ni sugot. He replied in a letter stating,
that by voluntarily assuming the liabilities as depositary in behalf of BIR, the
failure to observe such duties, does not relieve him of responsibility.
Thus, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation
of public funds or property under ART 217 in relation to ART 222 of the RPC, along
with co-accused Jaime Ancla.
1. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan does
not have jurisdiction because he was not a public officer.
2. Sandiganbayan denied the Motion, and subsequently CONVICTED him of the
crime.
SOLICITOR GENERAL:
3. The BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by
Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in
possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated
petitioner a depositary. (The SolGEn relied on the case of US v. Rastrollo which
states: “The power to designate a private person who has actual possession of
distrained property as a depositary of distrained property is necessarily implied in
the BIRs power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer in distraint as
provided for under Sec. 206, 207, and 308 of the NIRC..”)
PROSECUTION:
4. ART 222 of the RPC defines the individual covered by the term officers under
ART 217 of the RPC. And since Azarcon became a depositary of the truck
seized by the BIR, he also became a public officer who can be prosecuted under
ART 217.
ISSUE/S:
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
1) Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by
private individuals?
2) Whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being
designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a depositary of
distrained property?
RULING on ISSUE 1: NO. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
- To ascertain jurisdiction, the statute or law must clearly stipulate it. It cannot be
presumed or implied. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.
- In this case, the action was instituted when the applicable statutory provisions
are those of PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but
prior to their amendment by RA No. 7975. At that time, Section 4 of PD No. 1606
provides that:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of RA 3019, as amended, (“The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice
Act, RA 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII of the RPC
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in GOCCs whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correctional or imprisonment for 6 years, or a fine of Php 6,000.00:
PROVIDED HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correctional or
imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of Php 6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
RTC, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court
XxX
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices, or
accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in GOCCs, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees.
- These provisions specify that the only instance when the Sandiganbayan will
have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the
private individual wither as co-principal, accomplice, or accessory of a public
officer/employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
- Here, the Information does NOT charge Azarcon of being a co-principal,
accomplive, or accessory to a public officer. Thus, unless petitioner can be
proven to be a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction.
RULING on ISSUE 2: NO
ANENT THE ARGUMENTS OF THE SOLGEN:
- US v. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts
therein are not identical to those obtaining here. The cited case involved a
judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of
the debtor. Thus, clearly it was within the scope of the courts jurisdiction to
constitue the judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to
that of a public official.
- But this case deals with the BIRs administrative act of effecting constructive
distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes,
property which was received by petitioner Azarcon. While BIR had authority to
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require petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did
NOT grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
Sec. 206 of NIRC provides: The constructive distraint of personal property shall
be effected by requiring the taxpayer of any person having possession or control
of such property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate
himself to preserve the same intake and unaltered and not to dispose of the
same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the
Commissioner.
- However, this does NOT mean that the BIR’s authority over a private individual to
act as depositary included the power to appoint him as public officer.
ANENT THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PROSECUTOR:
- ART 222 of the RPC states: Officers included in the preceding provisions. The
provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity
whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial, or municipal funds, revenues, or
property and to any administrator or depositary of funds or property attached, seized,
or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.
- The only provides that a private individual who has in his charge any of the public
funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined...shall
be penalized with the same penalty meted out to erring public officers. Nowhere
is it expressed or implied that he is deemed a public officer. (In other words,
same penalty lang as a public officer besh, but NOT NECESSARILY na himo
kang public officer.)
Other Issues: Did the fact that the Sandiganbayan took cognizance of the case
and convicted them, cure the defect?
- NO! The Sandiganbayan taking cognizance of the case is of no moment since
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by erroneous belief of the Court that it had
jurisdiction. Petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he acted as
depositary. Thus, when the Information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the
Sandiganbayan, the Prosecution in fact, charged two PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
without any public officer similarly charged as co-conspirator.
RATIONALE of the DECISION:
- The Power Exercised by Administrative Agencies: Express and Implied
- Administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as defined
either in the Constitution, in legislation, or both. Thus, an administrative officer
only has such powers as are expressly granted to him. Corollarily, implied
powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser
degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced
therein, nor are not incidental thereto.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Wherefore, the Resolution and Decision of the
SANDIGANBAYAN are hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL AND VOID for LACK
OF JURISDICTION.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SAMPAYAN v. DAZA
De facto officer, Entitlement to Salary
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar
2. They filed this instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent
Raul Daza
3. PETITIONERS: Daza, then the incumbent Congressman, is a greencard holder
and lawful permanent resident of the United States since, October 16, 1974, and
should therefore, be disqualified from continuing the exercise of the functions of
his office. They allege that Daza, did not, by any act or declaration, renounced
his status as permanent resident, thus violating Sec. 68 of BP 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), and Sec. 18, ART XI of the 1987 Constitution.
a) they filed a petition before COMELEC to disqualify Daza from running
in the May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Sec. 68 of the OEC. (The
instant petition on the other hand, concerns his unlawful assumption of
office from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992).
4. DAZA ANSWERED BOTH COMPLAINTS:
a) He filed his comment to the petition for prohibition denying the fact that
he is a permanent resident of the United States, that although he was
accorded a permanent residency status, on October 8, 1980 as
evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration, he had long waived
his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985
b) He reacted also to the petition before COMELEC hypothesizing that the
case before COMELEC would become moot should this Court (the SC)
find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a
US non-immigrant visa.
ISSUES: Is respondent entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered?
RULING: YES (This is a very short case and two sentences ra ang ruling sa court ani
na issue na related sa ato topic):
As a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds
disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a
de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.
Other issue (which is actually the main issue but is not part of the topic):
Whether respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?
The case is already moot and academic. It is evident from the manifestation filed by
petitioners that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for
the duration of his term of office commencing from June 30, 1986 and ending June
30, 1992. Jurisdiction of this case belongs to the House Electoral Tribunal which is the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, return, and qualifications of its members
(Sec. 17, ART VI, 1987 Consti). Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to
cancel his certificate of candidacy before election or a quo warranto case with the
House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Daza’s proclamation.
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ZOSIMO M. DIMAANDAL v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
1. On November 23, 1992, petitioner Zosimo M. Dimaandal, then holding the
position of Supply Officer III, was designated Acting Assistant Provincial
Treasurer for Administration by then Governor Vicente Mayo of Batangas.
2. Pursuant to the designation, petitioner filed a claim for the difference in
salary and Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of
Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply Officer III for the whole year of
1993 in the total amount of P61,308.00.
3. However, the Provincial Auditor disallowed in audit P52,908.00 of the claim.
What was allowed was only the amount of P8,400.00 which corresponds to
the difference in the allowances attached to the designation and the position
occupied by the appellant.
4. The Provincial Auditor, however, denied the request for reconsideration.
Appellant was required to refund the amount of P52,908.00 which was
disallowed.
5. Thus, the respondent Commission not only affirmed the disallowance of the
amount of P52,908.00 but likewise disallowed the claim for the RATA
differential in the amount of P8,400.00, for being devoid of any legal basis.
Petitioner was, therefore, directed to refund the salary and RATA differential
in the amount of P61,308.00.
6. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Commission’s decision is “probably not in
accordance with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.” He cites the
cases of Cui vs. Ortiz; and, Menzon vs. Petilla, which laid down the rule that
de facto officers are entitled to salary for services actually rendered.
Petitioner contends that he may be considered as a de facto officer by
reason of services rendered in favor of the Province of Batangas.
a. He then posits the view that to disallow his compensation and in the
process allow the Province of Batangas to keep and enjoy the
benefits derived from his services actually rendered would be
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law,
and impairment of obligation of contracts duly enshrined in the
Constitution.
ISSUE: WON an he is entitled to the difference in salary between his regular
position and the higher position to which he is designated.
RULING: NO. The designation being defective, no right has been conferred
upon the petitioner to claim difference in the salaries and allowances
attached to the position occupied by him
We are not persuaded by petitioner’s insistence that he could still claim the
salary and RATA differential because he actually performed the functions
pertaining to the office of Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer and, therefore,
entitled to the salary and benefits attached to it despite the fact that the Governor
of Batangas had no authority to designate him to the said position.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
The law applicable is Section 471(a) of RA 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code which mandates that:
“Sec. 471. Assistant Treasurers. - (a) An assistant treasurer may be appointed
by the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible
recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
In fact, the appointing officer is authorized by law to order the payment of
compensation to any government officer or employee designated or appointed to
ill such vacant position, as provided under Section 2077 of the Revised
Administrative Code which states that:
"Section 2077. Compensation for person appointed to temporary service.
xxx xxx xxx
“In case of the temporary absence or disability of a provincial officer or in case of
a vacancy in a provincial office, the President of the Philippines or officer
having the power to fill such position may, in his discretion, order the payment of
compensation, or additional compensation, to any Government officer or
employee designated or appointed temporarily to fill the place, but the total
compensation paid shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position
filled.”
Undoubtedly, the aforecited laws do not authorize the Provincial Governor
to appoint nor even designate one temporarily in cases of temporary
absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office. That power resides
in the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance.
Necessarily, petitioner’s designation as Assistant Provincial Treasurer for
Administration by Governor Mayo being defective, confers no right on the
part of petitioner to claim the difference in the salaries and allowances
attached to the position occupied by him.
DESIGNATION VS. APPOINTMENT
- Moreover, what was extended to petitioner by Governor Mayo was merely a
designation not an appointment. The respondent Commission clearly
pointed out the difference between an appointment and designation, thus:
- “There is a great difference between an appointment and designation. While
an appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who
is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office, designation merely
connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
- “Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or additional duties on
the officer or employee to be performed by him in a special manner. It does
not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position (COA
Decision No. 95-087 dated February 2, 1995). As such, there being no
appointment issued, designation does not entitle the officer designated to
receive the salary of the position. For the legal basis of an employee’s right
to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved
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appointment to the position (Opinion dated January 25, 1994 of the Of ice for
Legal Affairs, Civil Service Commission, Re: Evora, Carlos, A. Jr.,
Designation).”
RIGHT TO SALARY PRESUPPOSES VALID APPOINTMENT/DESIGNATION
- The right to the salary of an Assistant Provincial Treasurer is based on
the assumption that the appointment or designation thereof was made
in accordance with law. Considering that petitioner’s designation was
without color of authority, the right to the salary or an allowance due from
said office never existed. Stated differently, in the absence of such right,
there can be no violation of any constitutional right nor an impairment of the
obligation of contracts clause under the Constitution.
- The nature of petitioner’s designation and the absence of authority of the
Governor to authorize the payment of the additional salary and RATA
without the appropriate resolution from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does
not make him a de facto officer.
DE FACTO OFFICER DEFINED
- A de facto officer is defined as one who derives his appointment from one
having colorable authority to appoint, if the of ice is an appointive of ice, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. It is likewise de ined as one who is in
possession of an of ice, and is discharging its duties under color of authority,
by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer.Then a de facto
officer is one who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its
functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though such
election or appointment may be irregular.
- Petitioner invokes in his favor the ruling in Menzon vs. Petilla, that a de facto
officer is entitled to receive the salary for services actually rendered.
However, his reliance on the Menzon case is misplaced. In Menzon, what
was extended was an appointment to the vacant position of Vice-Governor,
in petitioner’s case, he was designated.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
GENERAL MANAGER OF PPA VS MONSERATE
FACTS:
1. Monserate started her government service as a Bookkeeper II Iloilo
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Barely a year later, she was promoted to
Cashier II, then Finance Officer.
(worked at PPA. Book Keeper, Cashier II, then Finance Officer. Applied for
manager II but demoted to Administrative Officer)
2. In 1988, PPA underwent reorganization and respondent applied for Manager
II of the Resource Management Division. There were six aspirants and were
ranked accordingly in a Comparative Data Sheet. The General Manager
appointed her to the position and hence she assumed the position and
discharged functions. The Civil Service Commission approved her
appointment. (Applied for manager II. She was appointed and she assumed
position dayun)
3. Meanwhile, petitioner Anino, who ranked second in the Comparative Data
Sheet, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board protesting
against respondent’s appointment.
a. The Board sustained the protest based on appointment based on
certain Memorandum Circulars of CSC and Eligibility Law. These
grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution and the
respondent’s(monserte’s) appointment was rendered ineffective.
4. Of course, after receiving the order implementing such resolution, she
complained since she did not receive any notice of hearing, copy of the
complaint and was not included in such proceedings.
5. Later, Respondent received an order from the General Manager (GM) that
she was reassigned to Anino’s former position (Administrative Officer) with a
salary grade of 15 (a position which was lower than her previous position
before applying [salary grade 16])(na demote si monserate kay na invalidate
iyang appointment).
6. She later learned of the issuance of the GM’s order appointing petitioner to
the contested position. Hence, she filed an appeal of protest with the CSC,
but such appeal remained pending for 6 damn years.
7. Eventually, CSC dismissed it. CSC reasoned that “Although Monserate had
already assumed the position of RMD Manager II, the appointing authority
may still withdraw the same if a protest is seasonably filed.” Motion for recon
was also denied.
8. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in Monserate’s favour. CA said that
such demotion was in violation of her constitutional right to security of
tenure, and hence directed her reinstatement to the position as Division
Manager II.
9. Later, petitioner Anino filed this present petition and then months after filing,
he retired from government service.
10. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Respondent was never demoted because
“demotion” presupposed a conviction of a charge. Moreover, she was merely
displaced due to a timely protest filed. Lastly, the head of the agency is in
the best position to know who can best perform the functions of the office.
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ISSUE: WON there was due process when respondent was replaced by
petitioner Anino from her position as Manager II, Resource Management
Division, and demoted as Administrative Officer.
RULING: Monserate’s right to security of tenure was violated.
- The Court ruled that respondent was irregularly replaced by petitioner
Anino in her position as Division Manager and illegally demoted to the
position of Administrative Officer. She was not notified and was not able
to participate in the proceedings, hence such was tainted with irregularities.
- Moreover, in Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, this Court emphasized
that "once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes
a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not
only by statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from
him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for
cause, and with previous notice and hearing."
- Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the
selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil
service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is
exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the
position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the
appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for
cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the
revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondent's
security of tenure should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of
the appointing power.
- Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals reinstated respondent to her
legitimate post as Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it
merely restored her appointment to the said position to which her right to
security of tenure had already attached. To be sure, her position as
Manager II NEVER became vacant since her demotion was void. In this
jurisdiction, "an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is
null and void ab initio."
RULING ON DE FACTO OFFICER
- In this respect, while petitioner Anino's appointment to the contested position
is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a DE FACTO
officer during the period of his incumbency. A de facto officer is one who is
in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color
of an appointment or election, even though such appointment or election
may be irregular.
- In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals,26 this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent
of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by
the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto
officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto
officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must,
therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received
during the period of his wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, this Court allowed a de facto
officer to receive emoluments for actual services rendered but only
when there is no de jure officer.
- In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer,
during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments
attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith. This
rule, however, CANNOT be applied squarely on the present case in view
of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the
position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which
position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the
emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such office. While
her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the
corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of her
claim to her rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full
backwages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof.
- She is entitled only to backpay differentials for the period starting from
her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual
reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such
backpay differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates
for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same
must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he
wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the time of his
retirement on November 30, 1997.
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RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
One-liner: The acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as
those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.
FACTS:
5. The PNP, through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied
with the RTC of Manila for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the
alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao
Death Squad" may be found.
6. In support of the application, a certain Avasola was presented to the RTC
and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons
in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
7. [Timan-e nga ang authority ni Judge Peralta ang relevant ani nga case
for admin] Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant was found,
and thus, a search warrant was later issued by Judge Peralta and
enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the Crime
Operatives on July 15, 2009.
8. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the
presence of human remains.
9. Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the following grounds:
a) Judge had no authority to act on the application for a search
warrant since he had been automatically divested of his
position as Vice Executive Judge when several administrative
penalties were imposed against him by the Court; [Mao ni ang
issue nga gi raise ni Laud ng relevant for admin]
b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue which was to be
enforced in Davao City; ETC ETC ETC
10. LAUD CONTENTION: Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-
Executive Judge and accordingly issue Search Warrant citing Sec 5,
Chapter III of A.M. no. 03-8-02-SC which provides that the imposition upon
the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge on an administrative penalty of
at least a reprimand shall automatically divest him of the position as such.
ISSUE: WON the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated
the Search Warrant issued.
RULING: NO
SC agrees that the imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to
divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, HOWEVER, it
must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and
of itself, result in the invalidity of the search warrant considering that
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto
officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
FUNA V. AGRA [Gi-define ani nga case unsa na ang de facto officer]-
- A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging his duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal,
so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of
the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.
ELEMENTS
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must
concur [and ngano applicable siya ani nga case]:
- (a) there must be a de jure office - There is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-
Executive Judge.
- (b) there must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public -
Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office as he was duly
appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue of a
supervening legal technicality. It may be said that there was general
acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was
regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive
Judge.
- (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith
- Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of the said office is presumed
to be in good faith, as the contrary was not established.
REASON FOR THE RULE
- The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that third
persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold
an important office and, as such, have a right to assume that officials
apparently qualified and in office are legally such. Public interest demands
that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid
statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public – as distinguished
from the officer in question – is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of
the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful
officers.
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BENITO CODILLA, ET AL vs. JOSE L. MARTINEZ
One-liner: An officer de facto is one who has the reputation or appearance of being
the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the
office he assumes to hold.
FACTS: [Mura ni siyag chicken-pox epidemic sa USC LAW kay nangasakit tanan nya
pinasahay nas recits].
11. Hermenegildo C. Baloyo, mayor of Tagum, Davao, left for Negros Occidental to
attend to a sick brother. Thereupon, he designated the vice-mayor to act in his
place effective until further advice on his part. The vice-mayor in turn fell sick of
certain lung trouble in view of which he designated ranking councilor Macario
Bermudez as acting mayor until notice to the contrary. Councilor Bermudez was
not also in good health so he designated the third ranking councilor Jose
Martinez to act as mayor effective on the same date.
12. Martinez accepted the designation and assumed the office. His first official act
being to separate from the service the petitioners as policemen of the
municipality.
13. Petitioners immediately filed their protest invoking the right to continue in office
under the provisions of Republic Act 557, but far from heeding their protest,
Acting Mayor Martinez appointed Eduardo M. Duaso municipal policemen in lieu
of Benito Codilla who immediately qualified by taking his oath of office. The
appointment was approved by the President of the Philippines and the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
14. Benito Codilla and his companions filed a petition for mandamus before the
Court of First Instance of Davao against Acting Mayor Martinez and incumbent
Mayor Baloyo alleging that their separation from the service of municipal
policemen was illegal because being civil service employees their employment
cannot be terminated except for cause, and so they prayed that respondents be
ordered to restore them to their former positions with payment of their
back salaries.
15. Respondents set up the defense that the appointments of petitioners having
been made under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code in a temporary
capacity, because they are not civil service eligibles, the same were valid only for
three months and so their continuance in office after the expiration of that period
was illegal.
16. Respondents also set up the defense that even assuming that Acting Mayor
Martinez had no authority to terminate their employment, his action was
validated when incumbent Mayor Baloyo endorsed and ratified the same by
his subsequent official actuation; and that, not being civil service eligibles,
petitioners may be separated from them service under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 557 upon the expiration of the term of three months given to them in their
appointments.
ISSUE: [wala ni siya gihatag sa facts sa taas pero gi question sad daw ni sa
petitioners sa trial court]: WON separation was illegal because the designation of
Martinez as acting mayor was not made in accordance with the provisions of Section
2195 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 21 (a) of the Revised Election
Code under which such designation should be made by the provincial governor with
the consent of the provincial board.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
RULING: NOT ENTIRELY
- Trial court is correct in saying that the designation of Martinez as acting mayor
not entirely void, or one that would make him a usurper, but at most a de facto
officer whose acts maybe given validity in the eye of the law.
DISTINGUISH DE FACT OFFICER FROM DE JURE OFFICER
- An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who
has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who,
in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold.
DISTINGUISH DE FACTO OFFICER FROM USURPER
- He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former
holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and
assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to
such office.
ELEMENTS OF A DE FACTO OFFICER:
- (1) there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least one
recognized by law, and
- (2) the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of title or
authority.
IN THIS CASE
- Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of
authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor
color of right of an office." The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts
of a de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by
the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are
here present.
- Acts were ratified by incumbent mayor - Another factor that may be invoked in
favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting Mayor Martinez is the fact
that all his official acts done under his designation were subsequently endorsed
and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification
served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have
suffered because of his irregular designation.
Other Issues [Issue ni siya about sa termination]:
15. WON the termination of employment of petitioners as municipal policemen was
made contrary to the law which safeguards the rights of an employee to his office in
the government service. – Even there is a stain of politics in the separation, it cannot
be denied that whether the termination of employment of petitioners as municipal
policemen was made contrary to the law which safeguards the rights of an employee
to his office in the government service. A temporary appointment is similar to one
made in acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its
terminability at the pleasure of the appointment power. The replacement of non-
eligibles is lawful under and pursuant to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Petitioners cannot, therefore invoke in their favor the provisions of Republic Act
No. 557 because this Act only guarantees the tenure of office of police who are
eligibles. Non-eligibles do not come under its protection.
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MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN
Effect of Pardon
One Liner: pardon involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
FACTS:
1. March 25, 1983 - Petitioner Monsanto was the assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City, together with three other accused for estafa thru
falsification of public documents was convicted by the Sandiganbayan
(SB) and:
a. Sentenced to imprisonment of 4 years, 2 mos and 1 day to 10
years and 1 day
b. Ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government for
P4,892.50
2. Monsanto appealed her conviction to the SC, but the SC affirmed the
decision of SB.
a. She filed an MR
3. However, while her MR was pending, she was extended on December 17,
1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on
December 21, 1984.
4. By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant.
5. Her letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for
Resolution
a. Since power of appointment of treasurers from the city
governments is under the MOF
6. MOF Ruling - Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended
the absolute pardon
a. Directed the city treasurer to satisfy the indemnity in favor of the
government
7. Monsanto sought for reconsideration stating that:
a. the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted so the date of her reinstatement should correspond to
the date of her preventive suspension
b. she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension;
c. she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50 (ika’y baga’g nawng sizt?)
8. MOF referred the letter to the Office of the President (OP) and the OP held:
a. Disagreed with both MOF and Petitioner
b. “In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty
in public service, the OP adpops, as a juridical guide that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only
ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement
to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite.”
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
c. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure
a reappointment before he can reassume his former position
d. She is not exempt from the payment of civil liability because the
RPC provides that “a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit
from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.”
MONSANTO’S CONTENTIONS:
9. general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that
she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in the SC
10. thus, since no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as
assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited.
11. without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture
of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained
"suspended."
12. when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal
because there was no offense to speak of
ISSUE: WON a public officer, who has been granted absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of
a new appointment
RULING: NO.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
PARDON—DEFINED
v “An act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”
Ø TN: A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and
delivery is not complete without acceptance.
PARDON UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION—PREVAILING AT THAT TIME
v The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant, reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty."
v The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
extended only upon final conviction, implying that cIemency could be given
even before conviction.
Ø Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal
was pending in the High Court.
v BUT UNDER THE 1987 CONSTI: It is worth mentioning that under the 1987
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored.
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IN THIS CASE—ACCEPTANCE OF THE PARDON MEANS ABANDONMENT
OF APPEAL THUS RESULTED TO THE FINALITY OF THE CONVICTION BY
SB
v However, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before
or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
v Having accepted the pardon, Monsanto is deemed to have abandoned her
appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality.
DIFFERENT VIEWS IN PARDON
v BROAD VIEW IN THE DOCTRINAL CASE OF GARLAND (Garland Case)
Ø “A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offendor; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense.
v HOWEVER, the modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad
language of the Garland case. While a pardon has generally been regarded
as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes.
TOPIC!—EFFECTS OF FULL AND ABSOLUTE PARDON
v PARDON IMPLIES GUILT.
Ø The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain.
Ø IT INVOLVES FORGIVENESS AND NOT FORGETFULNESS
v PARDON RELIEVES THE PARTY FROM THE PUNITIVE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRIMINAL ACT.
Ø "To say, however, that the offender is a 'new men', and 'as innocent as
if he had never `committed the offense;’ is to ignore the difference
between the crime and the criminal.
Ø A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though
pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished;
and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one
never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him
following his conviction
v PARDON IS PROSPECTIVE.
Ø A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends
for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

IN THIS CASE—THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND MONSANTO FINAL NOTE BY THE SC TO MONSANTO
IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME v The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of
v "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to
been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this
required. particular disability was likewise removed.
Ø This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be v Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the Office which
entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
v The very act forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
has been established by the most complete method known to modern offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
civilization. determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds.
PARDON DOES NOT MAKE YOU INNOCENT v Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
v The Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal cannot go beyond that.
indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being presidential v To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he AS TO THE PAYMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
were innocent. v Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
v Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence
legal disabilities and restores him all his civil rights. But unless expressly is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost v Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due,remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
THUS—ALTHOUGH PARDON RESTORES HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, compensation and novation
IT DOES NOT IPSO FACTO RESTORE A CONVICTED FELON TO PUBLIC
OFFICE
v Thus, notwithstanding the expensive and effusive language of the Garland
case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon
does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
v REASON:
Ø Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety
and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests.
Ø To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that
the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable.
Ø A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power
from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.

AY 2018-2019
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
GARCIA VS. CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Effects of Pardon
One Liner: when a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the
offense, the pardon relieves the party from ALL punitive consequences of his
criminal act and is therefore restored of his innocence.
FACTS:
1. Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region 4 Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City
2. ADMIN CASE: He was summarily dismissed thru an in an administrative
case from the service on the ground of dishonesty by the Ministry of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications (MPWTC) for the loss of
several telegraph poles
a. Garcia did not appeal from the Decision of such admin proceeding
3. CRIMINAL CASE: Based on the admin case, a criminal case for qualified
theft
a. CFI of Quezon Decision: acquitted Garcia
4. Garcia then sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his
acquittal in the criminal case
a. MPWTC denied his request for reinstatement
5. Hence, Garcia pleaded to the President for executive clemency
6. Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus Jr., by authority of
the President, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency to Garcia
7. Garcia then filed with COA a claim for payment of back salaries from the
date of his dismissal from service
a. Denied by COA on the ground that the executive clemency granted
to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he
has not been reinstated in the service.
8. Garcia was recalled to service but the records to not show that he was
reinstated to the same position as Supervising Linemen
9. Garcia then appealed the COA Decision to the Office of the President
a. Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority
of the President, denied the appeal "due to legal and
constitutional constraint," holding that the Court is the proper
forum to take cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from the
decision of the COA, citing Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2, of the 1973
Constitution
ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled for payment of back wages after he was
reinstated to service pursuant to an executive clemency
RULING: YES.
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO EXTEND EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
v Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive
prerogative to extend executive clemency under the following
circumstances:
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Ø "Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit ines and forfeitures, after conviction by inal
judgment.
Ø "He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress."
THE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY GRANTED TO PETITIONER IS IN THE
NATURE OF AN EXECUTIVE PARDON
v A reading of Resolution granting the EC states:
Ø 'while it is a rule that an administrative case is separate and distinct from
a criminal case and an acquittal in the latter case does not ipso facto
result in the exoneration in the former case, yet an exception could
arise if the basis for the acquittal was the innocence of the
accused as in the case of petitioner Garcia.
Ø Civil Service Commission recommends the grant of executive clemency
to petitioner in view of the findings that:
§ “instead of coming forward to the defense of the accused who
actually was authorized to uproot or recover the poles in question
and of commending the latter for his high sense of responsibility in
preventing losses to the government, said high officials had even
the temerity to disown and deny the authority they gave to the
accused resulting in his separation from the service and having him
all alone in defending himself against the accusation of the very
government he tried to protect.”
Ø After a careful study, this Office is inclined to grant executive clemency
to petitioner in the light of the decision of the court acquitting him of the
crime of qualified theft which was based on the same acts obtaining in
Administrative Case No. 975 against him, coupled with the favorable
recommendation of the Minister of Transportation and Communications
and the Civil Service Commission.
EFFECTS OF PARDON
v GENERAL RULE: while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting
out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for
all purposes.
v The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and
the conviction thereof.
v Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores to him all his civil rights.
v Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring
back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
v The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office
which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

Ø But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement
because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled
to back wages.
v EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE: However, if the pardon is based on
the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a
new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense
charged.
Ø When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the
offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of
his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
IN THE CASE AT BAR—THE TRIAL COURT’S ACQUITTAL WAS FOUNDED
NOT ON LACK OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BUT ON THE
FACT THAT GARCIA DID NOT COMMIT THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO HIM
v In the case at bar, Garcia was found administratively liable for dishonesty
and consequently dismissed from the service.
v HOWEVER, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of
qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed.
v The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of
proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not
commit the offense imputed to him.
v Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant.
v Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of
executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations
for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
and the Civil Service Commission.
Ø There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
THE POWER OF CONTROL BY THE PRESIDENT OVER THE BRANCHES OF
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
v It is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any
criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public
office, but is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a
branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as its
head, has the power of control.
v The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for the latter.”
v In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive
exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications.
v The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved him
from administrative liability. The separation of the petitioner from the
service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.
v Consequently, this Court inds it fair and just to award petitioner full back
wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984
when he was reinstated. The payment shall be without deduction or
qualification.

THE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY EXCULPATED GARCIA FROM THE

ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE
v Thus, the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely
obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found
him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service.
v This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner
from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement,
which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
Ø This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated
to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.
v Thus, Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service
entitles him to back wages.
Ø This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start
and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service.
v Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those who have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them.

AY 2018-2019
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMELEC
Short background: about ni sa amnesty nga gi grant kang Trillanes et al. First,
ni commit silang trillanes og coup de etat kato hostage hostage sa Ayala, Makati
ba. So natural, naa criminal case gi file against sa ilaha before the RTC. While
case was still pending in RTC, nagpa register sila as political party and as a
party-list group (Magdalo). Gi deny sa COMELEC kay using violence to achieve
goals lagi daw (kato disqualification of a political party and party list ba), so
nisaka jud ni sa SC. Magdalo alleged grave abuse on the part of COMELEC.
NOTE: while pending ang case against COMELEC sa SC, gi grantan og
amnesty ang mga animal nga Magdalo. So, SC said nga there was no grave
abuse on the part of COMELEC kay atong time ni decide si COMELEC wa pa
byay amnesty, SC noted tho about the Effect of Subsequent grant of Amnesty.
FACTS:
1. July 2009 - Magdalo (represented by chairman Trillanes, et. al)filed its
Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for participation
in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
2. Oct. 2009 - COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in
accordance with the Constitution.
a. It is common knowledge that the party’s Chairman, and some
members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala, Makati on 2003, wherein several innocent
civilian personnel were held hostage. The fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their
goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
3. MAGDALO filed MR, also manifestation of intent to participate in the party-
list system (stated that its members include former AFP members, anti-
corruption advocates, etc.) – DENIED BY COMELEC.
4. MAGDALO arguments before SC:
a. Findings of COMELEC based on pure speculation and jumped into
conclusion that Magdalo committed mutiny even when the RTC
trying the case has not yet decided against them (presumption of
innocence! And due process!)
b. it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a)
no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members
immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not
a single shot was fired during the incident.
5. COMELEC: Naa mi power to ascertain eligibility of magdalo! And
determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates
the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be
reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.
6. MAGDALO last hirit:
a. Naa lagi mo authority to assess! Pero grave abuse pd mo mga
animal kay wa mo ni base sa evidence on record, pure conjectures
inyong galawan hap. Last nalang mo ha!
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ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed GADALEJ (grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction) you’re welcome. (mao jud ni
issue pero necessary ni sya para ma explain nimo ang about sa amnesty)
RULING: NO! kay ato nga time ni decide si COMELEC, wa pamay amnesty ato
mga animal, so no GADALEJ, kay ni base raman silag substantial evidence
about atong nahitabo nga mutiny, di man kelangan naay decision ang RTC kay
admin man ang case before sa COMELEC so substantial ra. EZ!
1. Consti provision regarding sa mga di pwede I register or I accredit ni
COMELEC nga pol. Party
a. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration (note --- same pod ni sa Party-list Law)
2. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.
a. Rules of Court - judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration
– common knowledge jd tong mutiny, so yeah.
3. Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the
accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical
force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed
against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.
a. IN THIS CASE…. As publicly announced by the leaders of
MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their
dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo,
and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the
supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state.
b. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied
by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with
ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash
methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of
its members and withdraw its support from the government
constituted clear acts of violence
4. COMELEC based its decision on substantial evidence! (THUS, NO
GADALEJ!) no prejudgment on crim case.
a. This is no way connected to the pending criminal case kay ang
concern rajud sa COMELEC kay WON pwede ba sila I register
under the law. Way labot ang criminal case sa RTC kay lahi ang
quantum of proof sa crim case og admin case. Nya admin case
ramani ang about sa registration! EZ !
b. Naay substantial evidence to prove nga MAGDALO used violent
means. So sakto ang COMELEC
c. And the finding of COMELEC did not operate as a prejudgment on
the Crim case, kay lahi lagi sila.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
(TOPIC) BUT WAIT! THERE’S MORE! --- IN 2010 (while this case was
pending in SC, Aquino granted Amnesty in favor sa mga animal) thus….
1. the foregoing discussion finding the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC is based on the facts available to it at the time it
issued the assailed Oct. 2009 and Jan. 2010 Resolutions.
2. The assessment of the COMELEC could have changed, had these incidents
taken place before the opportunity to deny the Petition arose. In the same
manner that this Court takes cognizance of the facts surrounding the
Oakwood incident, it also takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty in
favor of the soldiers who figured in this standoff.
3. People v. Patriarca explained the concept of amnesty:
a. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which
one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
4. People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty:
a. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private
act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned,
because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice
5. Nov. 24, 2010 – Aquino issued Proclamation No. 75 – granting amnesty to
people behind Oakwood Mutiny, the Marines Stand-off and the Peninsula
Manila Hotel incident. (BASICALLY APIL ANG MAGDALO GROUP SA GI
GRANTAN) --- Concurred by the Congress
CONCLUSION
- Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the
COMELEC as regards the use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide
to file another Petition for Registration, its officers must individually execute
affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to achieve
the objectives of their organization. Further, it must also be underscored that
the membership of MAGDALO cannot include military officers and/or
enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run counter to the
express provisions of the Constitution
- This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO.
However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood
incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the
disqualifications from party registration.
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CENTRAL BANK OF THE PH, JORDAN vs. CSC, BORJA
FACTS:
1. Position for Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of PH (CB) was
vacant
a. Promotions Board of CB (with participation of CSC representative)
certified the next-in-rank employee, Dr. JORDAN for promotion as
Asst. Bank Physician – his promotion was approved
2. Later, Dr. BORJA (he was hired for position ‘Physician’ only few months
back) contested JORDAN’s appointment – claimed he (BORJA) was more
qualified (huwow daring, new hire pa gani hahahaha)
3. NOTE: JORDAN promotion October 3; BORJA hiring October 9.
4. Protest went up all the way to CSC—
a. BORJA contention before CSC: choosing JORDAN is contrary to
the merit and fitness principles enshrined in the Civil Service Law
and the Constitution
5. CSC RULING: Set aside JORDAN appointment; directed appointment of
BORJA instead.
6. CSC dismissed CB’s MR on technical grounds.
7. CB arguments before SC:
a. CSC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, it revoked
JORDAN’s appointment when all the while his qualifications were
certified by the Promotions Board (with participation of CSC
representative)
b. power of CSC is limited to determining whether or not the
appointee has the appropriate eligibility and qualification and
that once such qualification was certified, the CSC is duty
bound to attest to the appointment.
8. OSG: seeks dismissal ky F&E na daw, technical chuchu
9. BORJA: CB lacks legal personality as it does not stand to be adversely
affected or personally aggrieved by the decision of the CSC; and power to
appoint not absolute
10. CSC: JORDAN did not hold a special medical position prior to her
appointment (was Coordinating Asst.), unlike BORJA (was Physician)
ISSUE: May the Commission revoke an appointment and direct the issuance of
the appointment to somebody else whom it believes is more qualified for the
position?
RULING: NO
OLD LAW
- Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has
the final authority on appointments.
NEW LAW
- PD No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) – The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority.
- The authority of the Commission is limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the law governing the Civil
Service.
APPOINTMENT A MGT PREROGATIVE AND POLITICAL QUESTION
- Appointment is a management prerogative which is generally unhampered
by judicial intervention.
- Reyes vs. Abeleda – at least sufficient discretion, if not plenary, should be
granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the offices
concerned, primarily the department heads. They are in the position to
determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office thus vacated. Unless
the law speaks in mandatory and peremptory tone, there should be full
recognition of the wide scope of such discretionary authority. The power of
appointment is essentially a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
o HOWEVER, under the pertinent rules on promotion obtaining in the
Central Bank, educational attainment and training experience are
just among the factors to be considered in the promotion of its
employees. The other factors to be considered are performance
rating, experience and outstanding accomplishments, physical
characteristics and personality traits and potential.
- JORDAN’s CV: JORDAN holds the degree of Doctor of Medicine and is a
graduate of UP; has been with CB since September 6, 1976; during this
span of time, she had displayed a high degree of efficiency, dedication and
initiative in discharging the duties and responsibilities of her position;
attending various seminars, conferences, symposia and other special
training courses that enriched her knowledge in the field of medicine.
CONCLUSION
- On the basis of the foregoing, the appointing authority found that Dr. Jordan
satisfied all the requirements set by the Central Bank on promotion the
wisdom of which cannot be questioned. CSC exceeded its authority.

POWER OF APPOINTMENT NOT ABSOLUTE; BUT CSC CANNOT ITSELF
APPOINT
- As noted earlier, the appointment is subject to verification by the
Commission as to whether or not the appointing authority complied
with the requirements of the law, otherwise, it may revoke the
appointment.
- The Commission has the authority to check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment must be approved; if not it
should be disapproved. No other criterion may be employed by the
Commission when it acts on an appointment.
OTHER ISSUES:
- As to CSC argument before SC (see above) – The position of coordinating
assistant which was held by Dr. Jordan prior to her promotion in the Medical
and Dental Unit where she belongs is filled up only by qualified and
competent physicians.
- As to standing of CB – CB, as the appointing authority is the one which can
defend its appointment since it knows the reasons for the same. Any final
determination of the issue can only be enforced through it. Moreover, it is the
act of the appointing authority that is being questioned.

JORDAN IS QUALIFIED
- JORDAN’s qualifications were never disputed, infact attested by Promotions
Board with participation of CSC rep.
- When the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

BORJA NOT NEXT IN RANK

- CSC should have dismissed the protest outright; as per CSC Rules, “a next-
in-rank employee who is competent and qualified and who feels aggrieved
by the promotion of another may file a protest to the ministry or agency
head…” – here, clearly, BORJA is not next-in-rank.

BG: JORDAN v BORJA

- BORJA’s edge: post-graduate degree in Medicine from a foreign educational
institution; experience and training in reputable institutions here and abroad.

AY 2018-2019
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LACSON VS. ROMERO
FACTS:
1. This case is a quo warranto proceeding which seeks to resolve who has
better right for the position of Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental:
§ petitioner Antonio Lacson or,
§ respondent Honorio Romero
2. Petitioner Lacson was first appointed by the President then performed duties
as provincial fiscal (PF -ako rani nga acronym for brevity) of Negros Oriental.
3. Later on, the President nominated Lacson as PF of Tarlac while he also
nominated Romero as PF of Negros Oriental, on the same day.
4. Romero took his oath of office while Lacson neither accepted nor assumed
office as PF of Tarlac.
5. Romero then notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office but
Lacson objected. In two cases, Lacson questioned the appearance of
Romero as PF, hence why judges are also made respondents as they ruled
against Lacson.
6. Lacson demanded payment of his salary but was denied after Secretary of
Justice replied that Romero is PF. Hence, payment was made to Romero.
(auditors also made as respondents)
7. As background as to why Lacson prefers Negros Oriental is because
although originally, the salary of Tarlac was higher 5,700 while Negros was
5,100 pesos per annum. However, later on, the President raised the salary
of Negros to First Class A province, while Tarlac was raised to First Class B,
the effect was that the salary was tied at 6,000.
ISSUES:
1) WON the COA alone, without acceptance of Lacson to Tarlac and its
confirmation thereof create a vacancy in the post of PF of Negros
Oriental. NO
2) WON the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the
COA serve as and is equivalent to a removal of Lacson as fiscal of
Negros Oriental? If yes, was it lawful? YES
3) WON the Pres. who appointed Lacson as provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental can remove him at will and without cause. NO
RULING: on 1ST issue: NO. Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as
PF of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so.
STEPS IN THE APPOINTMENT to a government post like that of provincial fiscal
to be complete:
a. Nomination by the President.
b. COA must confirm to make that nomination valid and permanent.
c. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his
assumption of office.
NOTE: The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer
of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and
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effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept
the appointment or nomination.
Jurisprudence: Borromeo vs. Mariano: "there is no Power in this country which
can compel a man to accept an office."
CONCLUSION: Since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as
provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues
as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created,
unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental.
RULING on 2nd issue: YES. The intended transfer of Lacson to Tarlac because
of nomination and if carried would mean removal from his office in Negros
Oriental.
TO BE FISCAL FOR TARLAC MUST MEAN HIS REMOVAL FROM NEGROS
ORIENTAL.
§ The reason is that a fiscal is appointed for each province (see. 1673, Rev.
Adm. Code), and Lacson could not well and legally hold and occupy the two
posts of fiscal of Tarlac and Negros Oriental simultaneously.
§ Jurisprudence: Nicolas vs. Alberto- “a transfer of a Justice of the Peace
outside of the municipality of which he is appointed is in legal effect a
combined removal and appointment."
OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL FISCAL IS INCLUDED IN CIVIL SERVICE
Applicable laws:
- Article XII, section 1. 1987 Consti:
o "a Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law."
- Sec 668 Administrative Code as amended by Com. Act No. 177, sec. 6:
o "the Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches and
subdivisions of the Government;"
- Section 670 of the same Code
o "person in the Philippine Civil Service pertain either to the classified
or unclassified service." Section 671 of the same code as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 8 in part provides as
follows:
- Sec. 671. Person embraced in unclassified. — The following officers and
employees constitute the unclassified service:
o (b) Officers, other than the provincial treasurers and Assistant
Directors of Bureaus or Offices, appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the
Philippines alone.
IN THIS CASE: We find that the post of provincial fiscal in the Philippines is
included in subsection (b) above-quoted . The law regarding appointment to the
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

post of provincial fiscal is contained in section 66 of the Administrative Code
which provides that "the President shall appoint among other
officials,xxx Provincial Fiscals, Register of Deeds, etc." And, Article VII, section
10(3) of the Constitution provides that the President shall nominate and with the
consent of the COA.
CONCLUSION: It is therefore clear that a provincial fiscal who is nominated and
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as was petitioner Lacson, is, under section 671 (b) above-quoted,
included in the unclassified service of the Civil Service.
RULING on 3rd Issue: NO. The Consti denies the President even with
concurrence of COA.
- Applicable law: Article XII, section 4
o "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law." Reproduced word for
word in the paragraph of sec. 694 of the Rev. Adm. Code, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 177, section 22.3
officers, lending money at exhorbitant rates of interest, willful failure to pay just
debts, contracting loans of money or other property from merchants or other
persons with whom the bureau of the borrower is in business relations, pecuniary
embarrassment arising from reprehensible conduct, the pursuits of private
business, vocation, or profession without permission in writing from the chief of
the bureau or office in which employed and of the Governor-General (now the
President)or proper head of Department, disreputable or dishonest conduct
committed prior to entering the service, insubordination, pernicious political
activity, offensive political partisanship or conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, or the willful violation by any person in the Philippine civil service
of any of the provisions of the Revised Civil Service Act or rules, may be
considered reasons demanding proceedings to remove for cause, to reduce in
class or grade, or to inflict other punishment as provided by law in the discretion
of the Governor-General (now the President) or proper head of Department. No
chief of a bureau or office shall knowingly continue in the public service any
subordinate officer or employee who is inefficient or who is guilty of any of the
above-named derelictions, without submitting the facts through the Director to the
Governor-General (now the President) or proper head of Department.

THE MERIT SYSTEM In this case, it is inevitable that before a civil service official or employee can be
o In order to appreciate the meaning of the constitutional provision as well removed, there must first be an investigation at which he must be given a fair
as the purpose behind it, it is necessary to delve into the framing of the hearing and an opportunity to defend himself. In the case of petitioner Lacson,
instrument. the record fails to show, neither is there any claim that he has been charged with
o It eliminates the political factor in the selection of civil employees which any violation of law or civil service regulation, much less investigated and
is the first essential to an efficient personnel system. It insures equality thereafter found guilty so as to authorize or warrant removal from office.
of opportunity to all deserving applicants desirous of a career in the
public service. It advocates a new concept of the public office as a Therefore, petitioner is the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, and the
career open to all and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction respondent not being entitled to said post, is hereby ordered to surrender to the
to be doled out as a reward for party service. (Arnego's Framing of the petitioner all the records or papers appertaining to said office.
Constitution, Vol. II, p. 886.)
o The Committee's report requires that removals shall be made only for
"causes and in the manner provided by law." This means that there
should be bona fide reasons and action may be taken only after the
employee shall have been given a fair hearing. This affords to public
employees reasonable security of tenure. (Ibid. p. 890.)
o The report also provides for security of tenure.

Respondent says that there is no provision which enumerates the just causes for
removal, but he is wrong. A like provision for removal and prosecution is found in
section 687, as amended by Commonwealth Act 177, section 19 then we have
Rule XIII, section 6 of the Civil Service Rules providing thus: (guys ako nalang gi
butang ang whole provision kay naa dri ang just causes in case ipa enumerate)

6. Discourtesy to private individuals or to Government officers or employees,

drunkenness, gambling, dishonesty, repeated or flagrant violation or neglect of
duty, notoriously disgraceful or immoral conduct, physical incapacity due to
immoral or vicious habits, incompetency, inefficiency, borrowing money by
superior officers from subordinates or lending money by subordinate to superior

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
GENEROSO SEVILLA vs CA, SANTOS
FACTS:
1. SEVILLA was Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City until he was designated
Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President Marcos.
2. After people power, OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan City appointed Santos as City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City (August 1986).
a. A memo was sent to Sevilla to this effect, but since he was on leave at
time of sending, someone else received it
3. Later in same year, Sevilla was designated by MPWH minister as Acting District
Engineer of Pasay City
a. Sevilla served in that capacity until his removal in following year
4. Sevilla returned to Cabanatuan City, and filed a quo warranto against Santos
a. He was a presidential appointee and cant be removed by mere OIC
Mayor;
b. even supposing that the OIC mayor had such authority, his (Sevilla's)
separation from office was illegal because none of the grounds for the
separation/replacement of public officials and employees set forth in
SEC 3 of EO 17 (see ANNEX below).
5. RTC RULING: favor of Sevilla, ordered reinstatement plus vacation and sick
leaves for the duration of his absence.
6. CA RULING: favor of Santos, by accepting another office, Sevilla in effect
voluntarily surrendered his former office, and was thereby precluded from
maintaining a quo warranto action against Santos; that when he accepted the
position in Pasay City, he lost his right to the position in Cabanatuan City.
7. SEVILLA ARGUMENT BEFORE SC:
a. He did not voluntarily surrender his office when he went to Pasay upon
assignment, he was just complying
b. CA wrong in not considering his appointment as acting city engineer of
Cabanatuan City as a specie of permanent appointment covered by
civil service security of tenure
8. SANTOS (RELEVANT TO TOPIC) ARGUMENT BEFORE SC:
a. Sevilla has no legal standing to bring an action for quo warranto,
because his designation to be disputed position was in an acting
capacity only
ISSUE: May an officer who was appointed to an office in an "acting" capacity, bring a
quo warranto action against the permanent appointee to the position?
RULING: NO
ACTING = TEMPORARY
- Austria vs. Amante – An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is
good only until another appointment is made to take its place
- Sevilla’s right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City" was
merely temporary. It lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as the
permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City on August 18, 1986.
APPOINTMENT v DESIGNATION
- Appointment – selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of an office.
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o Appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
- Designation – connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election
(Santiago vs. COA).
o Although loosely defined as appointment, a mere "designation" does
not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the position or office
which he occupies in an "acting" capacity only;
o Implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority
- Appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
SEVILLA WAS ONLY DESIGNATED WITH ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS
- Sevilla was the incumbent city engineer of Palayan City when he designated as
Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City.
- The designation of petitioner as Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City merely
imposed upon him the additional functions of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan
City on top of his regular duties as City Engineer of Palayan City but he may not
lay such a claim to the position of City Engineer of Cabanatuan City for he holds
no appointment to the latter office.
- The appointment of Santos by OIC City Mayor Vergara was valid and binding for
it was confirmed by the Minister of Public Works and Highways, and approved by
the Civil Service Commission.
APPOINTMENT IS A POLITICAL QUESTION
- The power of appointment is essentially discretionary. Its exercise may not be
controlled by the courts. The choice of an appointee from among qualified
candidates or applicants is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service
which can best be made by the head of office concerned for he is familiar with
the organizational structure and environmental circumstances within which the
appointee must function. (Lusterio vs. IAC)
APPOINTMENT OF SANTOS WITHOUT TERMINATING SEVILLA NOT ILLEGAL
- Sevilla’s ouster upon, and by virtue of, Santos' appointment as City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City, was not illegal for the Sevilla's right to discharge the functions
of Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a permanent
appointment to the same office was made in favor of Santos.
ANNEX:
SEC 3 of EO 17: SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for
separation/replacement of personnel:
1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil
Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the
service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service."
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SANTIAGO v COA
One Liner: In case of doubt, retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in
favor of the retiree because the intent is to provide for his sustenance and
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.
1. Santiago was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV with
a salary of P7219. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the
DOTC and detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority.
2. The chairman of the MIAA board of directors issued an office order formally
designating Santiago as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration, effective August 16, 1988.
3. Subsequently, the BOD of the MIAA passed a resolution stating that:
a. he will retain his plantilla position in COA;
b. his compensation for MIAA, shall be the difference between the
salary of Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration (MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV (COA); and
c. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.
4. Santiago served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of
P5849 plus his salary of P7219 as a State auditor for a total compensation
of P13, 068. He received this compensation until he was transferred to the
Presidential Management Staff under COA Office.
5. The petitioner retired after working in the government for 44 years.
6. In computing his retirement benefits, the GSIS used as basis the amount of
P13, 068, considering this the highest basic salary rate received by the
petitioner in the course of his employment. The COA disagreed, however,
and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of
P7, 219 as State Auditor IV.
7. The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot
invoke Section 9 because he was not appointed to the second position
in the MIAA but only designated thereto. It is stressed that under the said
provision, "the compensation of salary or pay which may be used in
computing the retirement benefits shall be received by an official employee
as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment." The
petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved appointment
but only in a designation.
8. Belittling this argument, Santiago maintains that there is no substantial
distinction between appointment and designation. He cites Mechem,
who defines appointment as "the act of designation by the executive officer,
board or body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual,
who is to exercise the functions of a given office."
ISSUE: WON Santiago is entitled to make the designated position as the basis
for computing his retirement pay.
RULING: YES. The law that sets the highest basic salary rate as basis for
computation did not intend to distinguish between appointment and
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designation because it includes the highest salary rate compensation for
substitutionary services or in an acting capacity.
• The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation of
Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows:
Sec 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. — The compensation of salary or
pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be limited to
the highest salary rate actually received by an official/employee as fixed by law
and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment. This shall include salary
adjustments duly authorized and implemented by the presidential issuance(s)
and budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary indicated in an
appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or
double compensation, merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary
services or in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all other compensation
and/or fringe benefits such as per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay,
honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in
correcting and/or releasing examination papers shall not be considered in the
computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.
• Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment
and designation. While appointment is the selection by the proper authority
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office,
designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional
duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue
of an earlier appointment (or election).
• Cited case: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on
the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on
an incumbent official. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.
• Nevertheless, the court agrees with Santiago that in the law in question, the
term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term
"designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between the two
terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966. The court considers this as
the more reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision
includes in the highest salary rate "compensation for substitutionary services
or in an acting capacity." A contrary reading would militate against the letter
of the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to
extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated
recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient service in the
government.
• As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers Santiago, who was designated
Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. The
position was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent
appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second
position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in
the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his
position in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he rendered
for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which, following the
letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary
rate.
• It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a
few days or weeks but for more than three months. His designation as
Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration was not a
mere accommodation by the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to Chairman
Domingo requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General Manager
Macatulad said, "Considering his qualifications and work experience, we
believe that a finance man of his stature and caliber can be of great help in
the efficient and effective performance of the Airport's functions."
• Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully
even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning
his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service,
he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely
expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value
and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now
that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness
in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he
should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was
rewarded for it.

Sides:
• The additional compensation received by the petitioner is not an issue in the
case at bar because of its express approval by the COA and the admission
of the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.
• The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional
compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium and not
a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of
Section 9 and so should not be added to his salary in computing his
retirement benefits.
• The Court rejected the contention. An honorarium is defined as something
given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered;
a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no
compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the petitioner
was in the nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of
right in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SANTIAGO V CSC
One Liner: Next-in-rank rule is not absolute as it cannot encroach upon the
wisdom and discretion of the appointing authority.
1. Customs Commissioner Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector of
Customs I to Collector of Customs III.
2. JOSE, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems
Promotion Board (the Board, for short) against SANTIAGO's promotional
appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position
of Collector of Customs III.
3. Board referred the protest to Commissioner Tanada for appropriate action.
4. In reply, said official upheld SANTIAGO's promotional appointment on the
following grounds:
(1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory;
(2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the position and such
fact was not questioned by the protestant; and
(3) existing law and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the
appointing authority provided there is no clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion or fraud.
5. JOSE appealed to the Board which decided to revoke petitioner
SANTIAGO's appointment and directed that respondent JOSE be appointed
in his stead.
6. The Commission affirmed the board resolution when it ruled that although
both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs
Collector III, respondent JOSE has far better qualifications in terms of
educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and
training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a
position which is higher in rank and salary range. It added that the
Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as
mandated by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service, subject to specified exceptions, pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (h),
Section 9 of the Civil Service Law.
ISSUE: WON Santiago’s promotional appointment should be upheld.
RULING: YES.
• There is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law)
that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it
does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for
the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the
same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment."
• One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion
to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one
else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder
nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such
person to the next higher position.
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• As provided for in Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 83- 343:
Section 4. An employee who holds a next-in- rank position who is deemed
the most competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service
eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion shall be promoted to the
higher position when it becomes vacant.
However, the appointing authority may promote an employee who is not
next-in-rank but who possesses superior qualifications and competence
compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the minimum
requirements for the position.
• The former Customs Commissioner had explained the reasons behind
petitioner's appointment in his reply to the Merit Systems Board, thus:
Suffice it to state that both Jose and the protestee are customs collectors. Jose
was assigned to Camarines Norte, but he never assumed that position. For the
past five years, there is no official record of any activity that recommends him for
promotion. On the other hand, after the February revolution, the Protestee was
immediately designated by the undersigned as Chief of a task force which has
been credited with the seizure of millions of pesos worth of smuggled shipments.
Each one was duly recorded, not only in the official files, but also in the media.
For the services, the undersigned saw fit, not only to promote the Protestee but
also to designate him as my special assistant.
• It may likewise be mentioned that Protestee has been the recipient of
citations awarded by the Customs Commissioner for the two consecutive
years 1984 and 1985, for exemplary performance of official duties,
particularly investigation and prosecution. More specifically, the latest
citation commends the Protestee for his pivotal role in the seizure and
forfeiture of an ocean-going vessel upheld by the Supreme Court, which
constituted a first in the history of this Bureau.
THE POWER TO APPOINT IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION.
• The appointing power has wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified
for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a
rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that
among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted
discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.
• Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification.
However, consistent with our ruling in Luego vs. CSC "all the commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does,
his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as
the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the
proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was
better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely (in the appointing authority)."
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

LAPINID VS. CSC
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lapinid was appointed by the PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) to
the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila Int‘l Container Terminal.
2. This appointment was protested by private respondent Junsay,
a. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or
to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right
thereto.
3. In 1989, private respondent went to CSC complaining that the PPA had not
acted on his protest and challengeed Lapinid‘s appointment on the same
grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA.
4. After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the
appeal meritorious. It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and
Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo
(78).
5. In the comparative evaluation sheets, the parties were evaluated according
to the following criteria, namely: eligibility; education; work experience;
productivity/performance/attendance; integrity; initiative/leadership; and
physical characteristics/personality traits. (ang numerical values in number 4
kay mao na results sa ila comparative evaluation sheets nya it came out na
mas dako kang junsay kaysa sa kang lapinid)
6. Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay
and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice
protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be
considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to
their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days
of the implementation hereof.
- Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the
appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy
renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no
authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another
employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on
the discretion vested in the appointing authority.
- The appointment as declared by the court once again is a highly
discretionary act that even this court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection
itself of the appointee — taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality — is the
prerogative of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil
Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the
applicable laws. CSC is ordered to desist from disregarding the doctrine
announced in Luego v CSC and the subsequent decisions reiterating such
ruling.
- While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional body,
we must stress, as a necessary reminder, that every department and office
in the Republic must know its place in the scheme of the Constitution. The
Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts are subject to
reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its decisions even
if the Commission may not agree with them.
THE PETITION IS GRANTED.

ISSUE: WON CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the

ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, ordering his replacement by the latter? NO

RULING: NO
The court had no reason to deviate from its previous ruling in Luego vs CSC.
- Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.
- In Gaspar v CA, the only function of CSC in cases of this nature, according
to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the
Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all
other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but
to attest to the appointment.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LUEGO VS. CSC
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II, Officer of the City
Mayor, Cebu City by Mayor Solon on Feb. 18, 1983.
2. The appointment was described as permanent but CSC approved it as
temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private
respondent and another employee, and another employee, and provided
―there was no pending administrative case against the appointee, no
pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent
authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment."
3. On March 22, 1984, CSC found that private respondent better
qualified(WHOOPS! Imong mama better qualified you cannot do that) than
the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly, directed Tuozo be
appointed to the position of Admin Officer II in the Admin Division Cebu City,
in place of Luego whose appointment as Admin Officer is hereby revoked.
4. OSG CONTENTION: petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case
because his appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn
at will, with or without cause. Having accepted such an appointment, it is
argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran the
risk of an abrupt separation from his office without violation of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: WON CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, ordering his replacement by the latter NO
RULING: NO.
- While the principle (OSG’s contention) is correct, and we have applied it
many times, it is not correctly applied in this case. The argument begs the
question. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but
permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing
authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it
was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call
it temporary
POWER OF CSC
- The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change
the character of the appointment, which was clearly described as
"Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated
February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval of the
appointment, not the appointment itself. And what made the approval
temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified
therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the
position.
- CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements
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of the Civil Service Law. If the appointee is qualified and all the legal
requirements are satisfied, CSC has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
- Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of
the fact that the appointee is quali ied for the position to which he has been
named.
APPOINTMENT; COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
- Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have
been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
- It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to
the approval of another officer or body, like the Commission on
Appointments under 1935 Constitution. Appointments made by the President
of the Philippines had to be confirmed by that body and could not be issued
or were invalidated without such confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments was then considered part of the appointing
process, which was held complete only after such confirmation.
- Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of the
appointment and had the power to refuse to concur with it even if the
President's choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No
similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil Service Decree. On the
contrary, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-
discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed
meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.
IN THISCASE
By admitting that both parties were qualified for the position in controversy. It
rendered CSC functors officio in the case and prevented it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner‘s appointment. CSC had no
authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
Mga pakapin
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of
Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the
power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein
that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to:
"9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in
the civil service, the except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications." (emphasis supplied)
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will
make it clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether
or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the
required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the
Commission when it acts on - or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves"
- an appointment made by the proper authorities.

Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the

petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in
controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and
prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better
qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely in the city mayor.

In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner, the Commission was

probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are two or more
employees who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the employee who
is most competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service
eligibility." This rule is inapplicable, however, because neither of the claimants is
next in rank. Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service
Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees,
reinstatement, reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the
appropriate eligibility.

There are apparently no political overtones in this case, which looks to be an

honest contention between two public functionaries who each sincerely claims to
be entitled to the position in dispute. This is gratifying for politics should never be
permitted to interfere in the apolitical organization of the Civil Service, which is
supposed to serve all the people regardless of partisan considerations. This
political detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the
Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service are revoked
and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party
may be in power.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission on Civil Service

dated March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is hereby declared to be
entitled to the of ice in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment thereto
dated February 18, 1983. No costs.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
BORROMEO V. MARIANO
(libog kay ni ambot asa ang evidence of assumption ani)
FACTS: (Nag-ilog ang duha ka tao kung kinsa jud ang judge sa CFI sa 24th
Judicial District)
1. Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the
Twenty-fourth (24th) Judicial District. He duly qualified and took possession
of the office on that date.
2. After ana, Borromeo was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial
District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth
Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has consistently refused to accept
appointment to the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District.
ISSUE: KINSA MAN JUD ANG JUDGE NILANG DUHA?
RULING: Andres Borromeo is entitled to the 24th Judicial District. Fermin
Mariano is ousted from the same office.
- Gi explain sa case how appointment was done for judges sa karaang
panahon. Si Governor-General ang mu appoint sa judge with consent of
senate until they reach 65 yrs old. Ang kani nga judges kay ma detail rani
siya temporarily to another district “BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE” for
the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. However,
I take note nga naa sad sa Administrative Code ang concluding words nga
“but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of the first
instance of one district from being appointed to be a judge of another
district.”
APPLICATION OF PROVISO
- ang ka kunong Sec 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning
with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of
a proviso. The purpose of a proviso is to limit the application of the law.
HOWEVER, It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main
provisions of the statute. A proviso which is directly repugnant to the purview
or body of an Act is inoperative and void.
DILI KAPUGOS SI GOVERNOR-GENERAL NGA IBALHIN ANG JUDGE
UNDER THE GUISE OF SEC 155
- The language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code,
interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the
Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to
another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district. (so to
simplify, kung musugot si judge nga ibalhin siya, Sec 155 allows that,
however, di siya mapugos nga ibalhin kay di man siya ma compel to accept
a position; ang pag transfer sa iyaha without his consent is tantamount to
removal)
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APPOINTMENT V. QUALIFICATIONS
- Appointment - the act of being designated to a public office by the appointing
authority.
- Qualification - the act of signifying one's acceptance of the appointive
position. This generally consists of the taking / subscribing / filing of an
official oath, and in certain cases, of the giving of an official bond, as
required by law
GIVING EFFECT TO THE WORD “APPOINT”
- Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it.
Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for
office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a
man to accept the office. If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a
judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this
district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment
to another district.
STRICT SPECIFICATION OF LAW
- No judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district
than that for which he is commissioned, except when judges of first instance
are detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty.
PROVISIONS OF JUDICIARY LAW ARE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS
- Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance
of the respective judicial districts of the Philippines Islands. They are not
appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these
positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire,
or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law
is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.
CARDINAL RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
- The court should give effect to the general legislative intent if that can be
discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be
accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may
be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to
embrace it, to effectuate the intent.
Gi-show ni Attorney-General ang Act No. 396 allowing the transfer of judges, but
it was repealed 3 times by Philippine Legislature, through Act. No 2347, The
Judiciary Reorganization Act and the Administrative Code of 1916 and 1917. The
purpose of the Philippine Legislature was clearly to safeguard the interests of the
judiciary.
CONCLUSION: A Judge of First Instance may be appointed as a judge of
another district only with his consent.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
CARABEO vs. CA, OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
1. Carabeo was the OIC in the Office of the Treasurer (City Treasurer) of
Parañaque
2. The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-
RIPS) filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Carabeo
for violations of the RPC, and RA Nos. 3019, 6713, 1379; alleging –
UNEXPLAINABLE BALLOONING OF WEALTH
a. His annual gross salary throughout the years ranged from P8,400.00 to
P291,036.00 at present; but Carabeo’s networth has ballooned from
P114,900 (1981) to P7.5M (2004)
b. He and wife recently purchased a share in the very exclusive The Palms
Country Club in Alabang, Muntinlupa (one share = P745,000, purchasable
only in cash)
c. Drastic increase in expensive properties (his and wife’s); noteworthy,
purchases in last 9 years include:
i. - Various larges lots in Tagaytay(x2), Cavite, Laguna
ii. - Seven vehicles currently owned – Ford F150, Mazda Familia,
Chevrolet Cassia, Mitsubishi Lancer, Honda CRV, Honda City,
Nissan Sentra (as per LTO records)
d. He went abroad atleast 15 times from 1996 to 2004 (more than once a year)
e. Carabeo claims in his SALNs some investments in various businesses but
deemed not enough to justify the substantial wealth
f. BIR information shows that his wife Cynthia recently only paid 3K CGT for a
one-time transaction (i.e. walay kwarta sad iya wife to justify the purchases)
UNDECLARED PURCHASES
g. Carabeo did not declare in his SALNs the Tagaytay land purchase
(information from Tagaytay City Assessors office), and most of the foregoing
vehicles
h. This failure to disclose is a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section
8(A) of RA 6713 requiring him to file under oath the true and detailed
statement of his assets as well as those of his spouse
3. Ombudsman's Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau— directed Carabeo to file his counter-affidavit, and placed Carabeo
under preventive suspension for a period not to exceed 6 months without
pay – see Annex B for Ombudsman’s justification for the preventive
suspension order (PSO)
4. Carabeo filed Petitions in CA – DISMISSED (See Annex A if you want)
CARABEO ARGUMENTS BEFORE SC:
5. (TOPIC) The preventive suspension was violative of due process as
there were no prior notice and hearing before its issuance
6. EO 259 (from which DOF-RIPS derives its powers and authority) is
unenforceable for lacking an IRR, thus the “lifestyle check” by DOF-RIPS is
illegal and the filed charges are invalid
7. The complaint against him involves a violation of SEC 10 of RA 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which
entitles him to be informed beforehand of his omission and to take the
necessary corrective action
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ISSUE 1 (TOPIC): WON PSO requires prior notice
ISSUE 2: WON lack of IRR for EO 259 renders the filing of complaint ultra-vires
ISSUE 3: WON charges regarding his SALN entitles him to be informed
beforehand to take corrective measure
RULING ON ISSUE 1: NO
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS NOT A PENALTY
- Settled rule: prior notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a
preventive suspension order (PSO)
- An order of preventive suspension is not a demonstration of a public official's
guilt, which can be pronounced only after a trial on the merits.
- Nera v. Garcia – It is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING
- Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 (AGACPA) and RA
6670 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that prior notice of the non-completion of
the SALN and its correction precede the filing of charges for violation of its
provisions
ELEMENTS OF VALID PSO
- RA 6770, SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; OR
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
- While a preventive suspension order may originate from a complaint, the
Ombudsman is not required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint prior to ordering a preventive suspension.
REQUISITES ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE
- Requisite 1: The evidence of guilt is strong – see enumeration of grounds in
DOF-RIPS’ complaint
- Requisite 2: non-declaration amongst other things = dishonesty
- Requisite 3: Carabeo being OIC-City Treasurer, his continued stay thereat
may prejudice the outcome of the instant case, he being the head of that
particular office, albeit OIC capacity.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
“EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG” LEFT TO DETERMINATION BY THE
OMBUDSMAN
- Buenaseda v. Flavier – the disciplining authority is given the discretion to
decide when the evidence of guilt is strong
- RA 6770, SEC 24 – expressly provides “in his (Ombudsman) judgment”
- Thus, as aptly stated by CA, courts cannot substitute its own judgment on
whether “evidence of guilt is strong” absent showing of grave abuse, since
its determination is vested by law onto the Ombudsman
NO DAMAGE OR INJURY SINCE PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT A PROPERTY
- Public office is not property but a "public trust or agency."
- Carabeo cannot claim any right against, or damage or injury from PSO,
since there is no vested right to a public office, or even an absolute right to
hold it.
- This is nice ☺: While their right to due process may be relied upon by
public officials to protect their security of tenure which, in a limited sense, is
analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure cannot
be invoked against a preventive suspension order which is a preventive
measure, not imposed as a penalty.
RULING ON ISSUE 2: NO
- EO 259 does not have an IRR, but this fact is immaterial to the charges.
o Ang thought is, anyone, even ordinary citizens can file criminal and
administrative charges against him, so ang EO 259 has no bearing
in DOF-RIPS ability to file charges against him.
- And anyway, EO 259 is basically internal needing no IRRs to be enforceable
o EO 259 intended to curb graft and corruption in the DOF and its
attached agencies, covering only those in revenue collection. DOF-
RIPS was created by EO 259 exactlly to carry this policy in effect;
“lifestyle check” is the fact-finding investigation necessary in
enforcing this EO.
- Saybit: There is no more dispute on the matter of publication of EO 259 as it
was clearly established that it was published in the Official Gazette 13 on 23
February 2004.
RULING ON ISSUE 3: NO
- RA 6713, SEC 10. Review of Compliance Procedure. — (a) The
designated Committees of both Houses of the Congress shall establish
procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said
statements which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in
proper form. In the event a determination is made that a statement is not
so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting
individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action. Xxxx
- While SEC 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for corrective measures, Carabeo
is charged not ONLY with violation of RA 6713, but also with violation of
the RPC, RA 1379, and RA 3019 –
o RA 3019, SEC 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. —
basically every public officer is required to file chuchuc…
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o RA 3019, SEC 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to
Unexplained Wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-
Nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons,
an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact
shall be ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of
the spouse and dependents…. when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank
deposits…. including frequent travel abroad of a non-official
character…. shall likewise be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary. xxxx
- Ombudsman v. Valeroso – "Unexplained" matter normally results from
"non-disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials
and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of
accountability of all public officers and employees in the government. By the
SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public
official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed
properties and wealth.
ANNEX A. Carabeo filed 2 petitions in CA
- PETITION 1: Certiorari – for grave abuse daw of Ombudsman and DOF-RIPS
members
- CA issued TRO against preventive suspension pending petition resolution
- Meanwhile, Secretary Teves detailed Carabeo somewhere else, and placed someone
else as OIC City Treasurer
- So ofcourse suko si Madam and filed….
- PETITION 2: to cite Teves in contempt for violating the TRO CA issued
- Both PETITIONS later DENIED. MR DENIED
o PETITION 1: no grave abuse because preventive suspension laid down
after review of factual findings; hearing not necessary because preventive
suspension not penalty
o PETITION 2: complained acts were indirect contempt, contempt charge
must be in writing and due process required to impose penalties therefor;
and anyway, Sec Teves’ detail order was in accordance with CSC
regulations, thus not in contempt of court.
ANNEX B. The order was justified by the Ombudsman in this wise: As can be gleaned
from the evidence on record, the deliberate failure of respondent Carabeo to disclose all of
his supposed properties in his SALN, particularly the vehicles which are registered in his
name involves dishonesty which, if proven, warrant his corresponding removal from the
government service. The same is true with respect to the 1,000 square meter residential lot
located at Tagaytay City which he failed to disclose in his SALN for 2001 and 2002,
respectively.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
LO CHAM VS. OCAMPO
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
FACTS:
1. Gregorio Lantin (Dr. Lantin), a doctor of medicine and lawyer, Acting Chief of
the Medico-Legal Section of the DOJ was given an assignment by Acting
SOJ Quisumbing:
a. Temporarily detailed as Assistant City Fiscal of the City Fiscal of
Manila
b. LETTER FROM SOJ QUISUMBING:
"SIR:
"Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of Manila and in
accordance with the provision of section 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed to
this office effective today, to assist him in the discharge of
his duties, with the same powers and functions of an
assistant city fiscal."
2. Following his detail, Dr. Lantin signed and filed informations in the ff. cases
after, presumably, conducting preliminary investigations.
a. Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, Canape vs. Jugo, and People vs. Dinglasan
3. The attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on the ground
already stated. (Wa btaw ground gi state sa kaso pero feel nako it’s based
on the ground that Dr. Lantin has no authority to prosecute considering that
we was only temporarily detailed as Asst. City Fiscal)
a. two of these motions were denied and one was sustained, the
losing parties instituted the instant proceedings for certiorari.
4. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: WON Dr. Lantin has the authority to perform the duties and functions of
an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila such as the filing of informations, conduct of
investigation, et. al.
RULING: YES! By necessary implication!
SECTION 1686 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE—NO
RESTRICTIONS STATED
❖ "SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal.—The Secretary of Justice
may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same
authority therein as might be exercised by the Attornev General or
Solicitor General."
❖ The law uses general terms.
➢ When the law does not restrict, it should not be given restricted meaning
➢ It is the rule on statutory construction that provisions should not be
given restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated
❖ It is fair to presume that if the legilslature wanted to restrict or forbid the
lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal, sign informations, make investigations
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and conduct prosecutions, it would have indicated its intention by clear
implication in the law.
❖ Certainly a lawyer who is invested with the same authority as might be
exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed to be
competent to be entrusted with any of the duties, without exception,
devolving on a prosecuting attorney
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION
❖ Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which
they were enacted.
❖ The duties of a public office include all those which:
➢ truly lie within its scope,
➢ essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the
office was created, and
➢ those which although incidental and collateral, are germane to,
and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal
purposes.
IN THE CASE AT BAR—BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION, DR. LANTIN IS
AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF AN
ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL
❖ The authority to sign informations, make investigations and conduct
prosecutions is within the inferences to be gathered from the circumstances
which prompted the passage of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and
its predecessors.
❖ The power to sign informations, make investigations and conduct
prosecutions is inherent in the power "to assist" a prosecuting attorney,
as these words are used in the Administrative Code.
➢ It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor
General conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of
Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself.
HISTORY OF THE PROVISION IN THE RAC
❖ SEC. 45 OF ACT NO. 135 PARAGRAPH (C)
➢ "The (Attorney General) shall, when required by the public service, or
when directed by the Chief Executive, repair to any province in the
Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his
duties, and shall assist the provincial fiscal in any prosecution against
an officer of the Government."
❖ AMENDED BY ACT NO. 300 BY ADDING
➢ “.. whenever it is impracticable for either the Attorney General or
Solicitor General personally to repair to nny province..”
➢ .. it shall be lawful for the Attorney General, with the prior approval of
the Civil Governor, to appoint some person who may be eligible to the
office of Attorney General temporarily to represent him in such
prosecution.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
➢ The person so appointed shall have all the power of the Attorney
General or Solicitor General in conducting the prosecution..”
❖ ACT NO. 325, SECTION 1, AMENDING SECTION 47 OF ACT NO. 136
➢ created the position of supervisor of provincial fiscals, whose duty it was
"to assist the Attorney General and under his direction to prepare rules
for the guidance of all provincial fiscals..”
❖ LASTLY, SECTION 17 OF ACT NO. 867—ADOPTED UNDER THE RAC
➢ "SEC. 17. Fiscals may be aided by lawyers appointed by Attorney
General; duties of suck appointees; compensation.—It shall be lawful
for the Attorney General to appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate
from his office, or, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance and
Justice, a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to
assist the fiscal of a province or district in the discharge of his duties
and to represent the Attorney General in such matters.
➢ The person so appointed shall have all the powers of the Attorney
General or Solicitor General in the conduct of causes in which the
Government is interested and to which he may be assigned.
❖ There has been no material alteration in the law since the administrative
laws were codified, except that, whereas under the former Administrative
Code the Attorney General was the officer authorized to designate a
lawyer to assist a fiscal, under the Revised Administrative Code it was the
Solicitor General who made the detail, and by Commonwealth Act No. 144
the authority to designate was put in the hands of the Secretary of
Justice.
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JOSON v. TORRES
FACTS:
1. Vice Gov Tinio and Board Members (VG and BMs) filed with the Office of the
President a complaint against their Gov. Joson for grave misconduct and
abuse of authority alleging that:
a. During their session, Gov belligerently barged into the Hall, angrily
kicked the door and chairs in the hall and uttered threatening words
at them; close behind petitioner were several men with firearms
who encircled the area.
b. Tungod daw ni sa ilang resistance sa pending legislative measure
supported by the Gov to obtain 150m loan from PNB. Vice Gov and
BMs opposed the loan because their province still has an
unliquidated obligation of more than 70m (yawaa) incurred w/out
prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
c. act of barging in and intimidating private respondents was a serious
insult to the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed
grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety.
2. President Ramos instructed the Secretary of DILG (Barbers) to take
appropriate preemptive and investigative actions “but not to break the
peace”
3. Sec. Barbers notified Gov on the case against him, directed the latter to
submit answer w/in 15 days
4. Parties entered into peace agreement, whereby Gov promised to maintain
peace and order in the province while VG and BMs promised to refrain from
filing cases – but it was not respected by parties so case proceeded.
5. Gov requested for 30 days extension to submit his answe (3 TIMES!)
granted. Pero wa jd gyapon ni file og answer ang animal.3 months later,
Acting Secretary of DILG (Sanchez) issued an order declaring the Gov in
default. Ordered ex parte presentation of evidence by VG and BMs
6. Gov filed Motion to Dismiss before DILG
a. alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was
filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him, to
answer the complaint.
7. On recommendation of Sec. Barbers, Executive Secretary Torres issued an
order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive
suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him. –
designated VG as Acting Gov for the mean time.
8. Singit – Gov filed certiorari against order of default and order of suspension
before the CA – denied. CA applied alter-ego principle, thus Secretary of
DILG has powers to order such.
9. Case before DILG continued. he required the parties to submit their position
papers within an inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which the
case shall be deemed submitted for resolution (weird)
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
10. Daghan kaayog procedural nga mga samok samok pero DILG allowed Gov
to submit Answer Ad Cautelam, pero gi treat ni Sec. as position paper ang
answer.
11. DILG Secretary ruled against Gov BASED ON THE POSITION PAPERS.
12. Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the
penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.
13. Gov filed "Motion To Conduct Formal Investigation" three months before the
issuance of the order of suspension and this motion was denied by the
DILG.
14. GOVS’ ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SC:
a. questions the jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over
the case. He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the
President that has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the
Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego principle because
the power to discipline elective local officials is vested only to the
President of the Executive Secretary, not with the DILG Secretary.
TOPIC!!!!
b. suspension was made without formal investigation pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23.
ISSUES:
- WON the DILG Sec acted with authority under the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency (same ranang 2 ka doctrines og
meaning) TOPIC!
- WON the resolution of the Exec. Secretary finding the Gov guilty was valid.
HELD: ISSUE 1 – YES! SC APPLIED alter-ego principle re: investigative
power of DILG Sec, not disciplinary power
1. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities: Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:
a. Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly
verified, against elective local officials shall be acted upon by the
President. The President, who may act through the Exec.
Secretary, shall be referred to as the Disciplining Authority."
b. Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of DILG is designated
as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute an Investigating
Committee in the DILG for the purpose.
3. The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service,
constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government."
4. Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the
President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the
Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is
the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the
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exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
5. The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments as enshrined in the Constitution.
6. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of
local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
7. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power
to discipline.
8. Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative
complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency. Thus:
a. "Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
9. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
10. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate
some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by
the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of
the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected
to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time.Each
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.
11. When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority
shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer
within fifteen (15) days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority for
investigation. (take note ani)
IN THIS CASE..
1. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President
but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.
2. Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply
with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required
petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer
should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further
proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal.The
filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a
preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint
sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The
judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion.
3. In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err
in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension
during the investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under the LGC
4. In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority
at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is
strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
RULING ON 2ND ISSUE: NO! (note: ako gibutang diri uban facts para masabtan
ni nga issue kay libog jd kaayo sya if isagol sa Facts sa ibabaw and para d mo
maglibog unsay I recite nga related sa topic) WA NAJUD NI APIL SA TOPIC
GUYS, PERO IN CASE PANGUTAN ON MO, LAHOS NA DAAN
1. The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is
erroneous.
2. The records show that Gov submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he
disputed the truth of the allegations that he barged into the session hall of
the capitol and committed physical violence to harass VG and BMs who
were opposed to any move for the province to contract a P150 million loan
from PNB.
3. In his Order Undersecretary Sanchez admitted petitioner's Answer Ad
Cautelam but treated it as a position paper.
4. Gov filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. Which was denied by
DILG
5. Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged on the basis of the
parties' position papers.
6. Executive Secretary Torres adopted Secretary Barbers' findings and
recommendations and imposed the penalty of six (6) months suspension
without pay.
SC:
7. The rejection of right to a formal investigation denied Gov procedural due
process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary
conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider
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whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the
Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal
investigation would be conducted.
8. Gov's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint
against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in
the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective
local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23
does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing
especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast
but contradictory to each other.
9. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion
for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and
employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
government officials are not exactly similar to those
against appointive officials.
10. The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials are markedly different from appointive officials. The rules on the
removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The
procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive
officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular
vote, is directly responsible to the community that elected him. The official
has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short
duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens
this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or removed, the
people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in
the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the
elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed
only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against
him strongly dictates their imposition.
THUS, RESOLUTION BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY IS VOID!
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
APRUEBA VS. GANZON
Kinds of Authority—Discretionary
FACTS:
1. 1947 - the PH and the USA forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized,
among others, the use of installations in the PH territory by US military personnel.
2. 1951 - To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the PH and US
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty
a. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack
on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft
3. 1991 – The PH Senate rejected the proposed PH – US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US
military bases in the PH.
4. 1997 - the US panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing strategic
interests of the US and the PH in the Asia-Pacific region."
a. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
i. a consolidated draft was made and conferences and negotiations
were culminated thereafter
5. 1998 - President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA (ratified), which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
a. P. Ramos then officially submitted the VFA (Instrument of Ratification) to the
Senate of the PH for concurrence
i. The Proposed Senate Resolution recommending the concurrence
of the Senate to the VFA was approved by the Senate by 2/3
votes (TN: 23 members ra sila ani BUT SC said na that’s
immaterial)
6. June 1, 1999 – The VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes
between respondent Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
a. Please refer to the VFA Preamble full text for guidance
7. Petitioners, as legislators, NGOs, citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of
the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the
agreement.
ISSUE: WON the President committed grave abuse of discretion in in ratifying the VFA
RULING: NO!
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS ARE BINDING EVEN WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF
THE SENATE
❖ In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements
even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
❖ For as long as the USA accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
RATIFICATION
❖ Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of
our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold
the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
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❖ Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the
state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance
of the treaty is proclaimed
❖ In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature.
➢ The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification
TOPIC—NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
❖ GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION: discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
❖ By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of
State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
➢ the President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance
in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded."
➢ Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the
nation, as Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether."
POWER TO ENTER INTO TREATIES OR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
❖ As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 vote of all the members of the Senate.
❖ THUS— the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful
exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by
the fundamental law itself.
➢ “Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.”
❖ Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA—
specfically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or
incidental to the exercise of such principal acts— squarely fall within the sphere of
his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or
discretion.
❖ It is the Court's considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in
submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines
and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution.
IN THE CASE AT BAR—
❖ It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion
and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
aforementioned provision.
❖ Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of
judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring
the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence
requirement embodied in the fundamental law.
❖ In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a
prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office.
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

❖ Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be
adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and
capricious manner.
POWER TO CONCUR BY THE SENATE
❖ As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the
Senate alone.
❖ Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be
viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof.
❖ Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of
such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred
and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
OTHER TOPICS:
SEC. 21 ARTICLE VII VS. SECTION 25 ARTICLE XVIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
❖ Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general,
in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of
the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement,
valid and binding on the part of the PH.
❖ In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties
which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
PH.
➢ Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to
consider the agreement binding on the PH.
➢ Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities" may be allowed in the PH only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred
in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as
such by the other contracting state
❖ There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of
the VFA.
➢ The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the general
requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in
Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by
a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
AS TO THE THIRD REQUIREMENT—RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY
❖ PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The phrase "recognized as a treaty," embodied in
section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and consent
of the US Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should
not be considered merely an executive agreement by the US
❖ RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: The letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard
stating that the VFA is binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the
point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.
According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted as a treaty
by the United States.
❖ SC: The phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party
accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
➢ To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case,
to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
➢ Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty
❖ With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to inal acceptance, and with the
exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now
becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international
law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement.

SECTION 25 IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE OF THE VFA

❖ On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops and
personnel visiting the PH.
➢ provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel
➢ further defines the rights of the US and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation
of equipment, materials and supplies.
❖ Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case
❖ HOWEVER, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate

THE VFA HAS COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS UDER THE CONSTITUTION
❖ Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a
treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
FIRST PHIL. HOLDINGS V. SANDIGANBAYAN
One liner: As a GR, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act,
however, as an exception, mandamus can lie if there is GADALEJ.
FACTS:
1. Civil case No. 0035- is pending before the Sandiganbayan – in that case,
PCGG seeks the reconveyance and restitution with damages of certain
funds and properties which were allegedly acquired by private respondents
Romualdezs through abuse of right and power and unjust enrichment.
2. Herein petition states that part of these funds and properties are some
6,299,177 sequestered shares of stock in the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIBank) which were allegedly acquired by the
respondent spouses, as beneficial owners, in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Said shares were allegedly purchased from petitioner
by respondent Romualdez using respondents Equities and Narciso as his
dummy buyers, with no or negligible cash out.
3. Sandiganbayan (respondent Court) granted the motion for intervention of
respondent Equities, which claims ownership of said shares kay they have
the right to vote on the shares and dividends daw.
4. Later, petitioner filed its own Motion for Leave to Intervene in said Civil Case:
alleging that the PCIBank shares were obtained by means of fraud and acts
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, as well as in breach
of fiduciary duty and thus their acquisition is either voidable or void or
unenforceable.
5. Petitioner also alleged that the purchase price of P47,243,827.50 was
extravagantly low as the book value at the time of sale was P104,755,313.51
at P16.63 per share. To pay this P47 million, Equities borrowed the exact
same amount from SOLOIL, alleged to be another Romualdez front, which in
turn borrowed the same, using the facilities of PCIBank itself. Petitioner
therefore asked in its proposed Complaint in Intervention that said shares be
returned to it.
6. In the aforementioned assailed Resolutions, the respondent Court denied
petitioners motion for intervention because -
1) The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction cannot extend to intra-corporate
controversies - The right sought to be enforced x x x aside from
being contingent, is not only personal between FPHC (petitioner
herein) and Trans Middle East Philippine Equities and Edilberto S.
Narciso, Jr., but also intra-corporate in nature x x x
2) The intervention will unduly delay the proceedings and prejudice
the adjudication of the rights.
ISSUES:
1) WON petitioner has a legal interest in the Civil Case, particularly in the
return, reconveyance, accounting and restitution. YES.
2) WON Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction to declare as void the sale of such
shares to respondents Narciso and Equities as alleged dummies of
respondent Romualdez and to return them to petitioner. YES
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3) If the answer to both questions is YES, WON respondent Court abused its
discretion in denying the Motion for Intervention, and WON the writ of
mandamus be issued to compel it to grant such motion. YES *kani pinaka
relevant sa topic*
RULING on 1st issue: YES.
- Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in a
proceeding, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a
right or interest which may be affected by such proceeding. (di kaayo
relevant sa admin but sa civpro relevant, gi apil lang nako kay related siya
sa second and third issue)
- In this case, petitioner has a legal interest in the shares which are the
subject of the controversy. At the very least, it is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of the (sequestered
shares) in the custody of the court.
RULING on 2nd issue: YES.
- Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to declare void the sale of the shares. So
dapat gi grant unta ni Sandiganbayan ang motion to intervene.
- PCGG vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pea, etc., et al., *the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan was clarified
- Under Section 2 of the Presidents Executive Order No. 14 - all cases of the
Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees whether civil or criminal, are
lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original
jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
(Gi reiterate pajud daw ni in 6 other cases)
- CONCLUSION: It is therefore indubitable that in view of the extra-ordinary
nature of sequestration, parties who claim ownership or interest in the
subject matter before the Sandigabayan have no other recourse than
intervention in the litigation for no other court or forum has jurisdiction over
proceedings for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
- Indeed, in the face of such previous rulings, the inescapable conclusion is
that the instant intervention must be allowed otherwise the Sandiganbayan
will not be able to determine the ultimate owner of the shares under
sequestration.
RULING on 3rd issue: YES. Sandiganbayan abused its discretion.
- In this case, respondent Court abused its discretion because, clearly, the
question of ownership of the shares under sequestration is within its
jurisdiction, being an incident arising from or in connection with the case
under its exclusive and original jurisdiction.
PETITIONER IS DEPRIVED OF A REMEDY IN LAW
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

- It is the respondent Court which has jurisdiction to entertain both complaints

and answers in intervention over properties under sequestration by the
PCGG. With the denial of its intervention, petitioner is deprived of a remedy
in law to recover its property alleged to have been taken illegally from it.

GENERAL RULE: MANDAMUS WILL NOT PROSPER TO COMPEL A

DISCRETIONARY ACT. *related sa topic*
- As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2(b), intervention shall be allowed in the
exercise of discretion by a court. Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to
compel a discretionary act.

EXCEPTION: WHEN THERE IS GADALEJ, MANIFEST INJUSTICE OR

PALPABLE EXCESS OF AUTHORITY
- But where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
excess of authority equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ
shall issue.

IN KANT KWONG VS. PCGG, ET AL.,:

- Although, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the
performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding
official can only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or
the other, yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control
his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise
proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or
palpable excess of authority.

IN ANTIQUERA VS. BALUYOT, ET AL.,

- Such exceptions were allowed, because the discretion must be exercised
under the law, and not contrary to law.

CONCLUSION: the petition is GRANTED; the questioned Resolutions are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Court is DIRECTED to
grant the petitioners motion for leave to intervene in Civil Case No. 0035 and to
admit the proposed complaint in intervention.

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
SECRETARY of DOTC v. MABALOT
FACTS:
1. Then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No.
96-735 directing LTFRB Chairman Lantin to transfer the regional functions of
LTFRB to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular
Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat.
2. Month later, Roberto Mabalot filed in RTC –
a. a petition for certiorari and prohibition
b. with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
c. prayed that the MO be declared "illegal and without effect."
3. While pending in RTC, a Department Order creating DOTC-CAR Regional
Office was issued –
a. The DO was included in the petition as likewise assailed for
illegality
4. RTC – MO and DO are void for encroachment on powers of legislative
department
5. MABALOT arguments before the SC:
a. MO and DO are unconstitutional for being "an undue exercise of
legislative power"
b. transfer of powers and functions could only be effected through
legislative fiat
c. not even the President can do so, much less by the DOTC
Secretary who is the former’s mere extension
ISSUE: WON the MO and DO are valid
RULING: YES
MODES OF CREATION OF PUBLIC OFFICE:
- A public office may be created through any of the following modes:
o (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law),
o (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress) – can be delegated,
o OR (3) by authority of law.
PRESIDENT HAS POWER TO REORGANIZE
- Settled rule: validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President to
create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department
- Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.
o General rule: a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
INSTANT CASE
- Creation of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was pursuant to the THIRD MODE
— by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through an
Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an
administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission pursuant to The
Administrative Code of 1987.
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EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI
- Here, the President — through his alter ego the DOTC Secretary in the
present case — may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB
Regional Office, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public
functions (NOTE: SC said the EO was really act of President and the act of
DOTC Sec is merely in compliance of President’s mandate)
- PURPOSE of herein reorganization: so as not to compromise in any
significant way the performance of public functions and delivery of basic
government services in the Cordillera Administrative Region.
- Here, the reorganization was decreed "in the interest of the service" and "for
purposes of economy and more effective coordination”
- Here, the DOTC Secretary retains the supervision and control it exercised in
the prior LTFRB
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REORGANIZE AND
CREATE
- SEC 17, ART VII, 1987 Constitution: The President shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
- DEFINITION OF CONTROL: the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It
includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to
undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.
JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS OF PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REORGANIZE
AND CREATE
- JURISPRUDENCE: Larin vs. Executive Secretary – on the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the National Government, which
power includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public offices…
evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational
changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency
concerned.
STATUTORY BASIS OF PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REORGANIZE AND
CREATE
- STATUTE: SEC 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987):
Section 20. Residual Powers. — Unless Congress provides otherwise,
the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in
the President which are provided for under the laws and which are
not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.
- Q: what laws give these powers of reorganize?:
- A: PD 1772 which amended PD 1416 (see ANNEX A) – these decrees
expressly grant the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde EZier DIGESTS | CALVO GARGANERA OBAOB OMAMALIN ACBAY BALIONG EBO YUGI

classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities,
materials. agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as
o The PDs remain valid: 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers,
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of functions, and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or relevant aspects of their charters. (As added by P.D. 1772)
revoked.” ABSENT REPEAL, THE TWO PDs REMAIN VALID g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the
BASES. purposes and objectives of this decree. (As added by P.D. 1772)
(Emphasis supplied.)
OTHERS
ALTER EGO DOCTRINE: ACTS OF CABINET SECS = ACTS OF PRESIDENT
- Members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the
President since they are merely his alter ego. Their personality is in reality
but the projection of that of the President. Their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.

ISSUE ON VIOLATION OF SEC 7 and 8 of ART IX-B, 1987 Constitution

- As to Section 7: No additional appointment, just designation: The
organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designated to
perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office.
o And assuming arguendo theres additional appointment: its
only “an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary
functions of one's principal office,” an exception to the prohibition.
- As to Section 8: No evidence establishing that the “appointive” officials and
employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or indirect
compensation, in violation of Section 8.
- Kindly check Consti nalang, short provisions raman.

ANNEX A
Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be
guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and
responsive national development, including but not limited to the following
guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-
oriented governmental framework:
xxxxxx
b. Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be
necessary, or create those which are necessary, for the efficient
conduct of government functions, services and activities;
c. Transfer functions, (appropriations, equipment, properties, records and
personnel) from one department, bureau, office, agency or
instrumentality to another;
d. Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;
e. Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;

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ADMIN LAW | Atty. Gujilde
EUGENIO vs. CSC, GUINGONA, JR., ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
1. EUGENIO = Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute –
a. She applied for Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO
rank; later was recommended by the Career Executive Service Board
to the President for CESO rank.
2. Later, CSC passed a resolution reorganizing its organizational structure –
a. The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was to become the
“Office for Career Executive Service” of the CSC (OCES-CSC).
b. existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the CESB will
become part of OCES-CSC
3. IOW: na-abolish ang CESB which supposedly recommended Eugenio’s
promotion to CESO Rank IV. So iyacc si madam.
4. Later, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Hon. Carpio, wrote to Eugenio,
advising that he can file a case in court to settle the legal issues, and for
guidance of all.
EUGENIO FILED PETITION TO ANNUL THE RESOLUTION: CSC usurped the
legislative functions of congress when it abolished CESB and authorized the transfer
of public money through the resolution
CSC DEFENSE:
- CESB’s recommendation to OP to appoint Eugenio to CESO rank has no defect
- OP is estopped ky OP already appointed to CESO rank 4 officials similarly
situated as Eugenio. OUCH
- the integration of CEB into CSC is authorized by law as per Section 17 of the
Admin Code: SEC 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director,
and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out their respective
functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises."
ISSUE: is the resolution valid?
RULING: NO, it’s unconstitutional
CESB BACKGROUND
- CESB was created by PD No. 1 (September 1, 1974) which adopted the
Integrated Reorganization Plan
- ART IV, CHAP I, PART III of the said Plan provides:
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-
selected and development-oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.
2. A CESB….is created to serve as the governing body of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members
from the private sector and/or the academic community who are familiar with
the principles and methods of personnel administration.
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IF CREATED BY LAW, TO BE ABOLISHED BY LAW
- As the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This
follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function.
- A.M. JUR 2d on Public Officers and Employees: Except for such offices as are
created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative
function…… When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to
and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the
mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent and, if it
sees fit, abolish the office.
- CONGRESS PASSED NO LAW TO ABOLISH CESB: Infact and instead, in the
General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside
funds for the operation of CESB.
THE BASIS INVOKED BY CSC (SEC 17, see codal above) SHOULD BE READ
WITH SEC 16 OF SAME CODE
- SEC 16 (see ANNEX A) enumerates the “Offices in the Commission” NYA WALA
DIHA ANG CESB. Alams na
- THUS: CSC’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as
enumerated in Section 16. CESB is not one of such offices!
CESB ATTACHED, BUT INDEPENDENT
- CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached
to CSC. The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to CSC.
- Attachment to CSC does NOT equate to control by CSC.
- SEC 38(3), CHAP 7, BOOK IV, ADMIN CODE: (3) Attachment. — (a) This
refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and
the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either
as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by
the charter; xxxx and having the department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework: for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
ANNEX A. ADMIN CODE. SEC. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The
Commission shall have the following offices: (1) The Office of the Executive
Director… (2) The Merit System Protection Board… (3) The Office of Legal Affairs…
(4) The Office of Planning and Management… (5) The Central Administrative Office…
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records… (7) The Office of Position Classification
and Compensation… (8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement…
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards… (10) The Office of Human
Resource Development… (11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Relations and
Audit… (12) The Office of Personnel Relations… (13) The Office of Corporate
Affairs… (14) The Office of Retirement Administration… (15) The Regional and Field
Offices.