Laurel v Desierto
6713, and Article 217 of the Revised
FACTS:
A Committee – "National Centennial Commission."–
was constituted "for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebration in 1998." (created by Corazon
C. Aquino; reconstituted by Fidel V. Ramos) The
Committee was mandated "to take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration
of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Malolos Congress."
Appointed to chair to the reconstituted Commission
was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel (petitioner)
Characterized as an "ad-hoc body," the existence of
the Commission "shall terminate upon the completion
of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations."
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine
Centennial Expo '98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created. Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp
incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief
Executive Officer. (Note: Expocorp is the one which
was awared to undertook the Freedom Ring Project, a
part of the preparations for the National Celebration)
A Senator delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and
operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the
Clark Special Economic Zone which was then
referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee) and several other Senate Committees for
investigation.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations
was "the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr.
Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP
for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the
award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia
Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting
manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring)
even in the absence of a valid contract that has
caused material injury to government and for
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA
of the funds infused by the government for the
implementation of the said contracts all in violation . . .
of the anti-graft law."
Saguisag Committee recommendations was "the
further investigation by the Ombudsman, and
indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC
Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section
11 of R.A. No.
Penal Code.”
Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman’s recommendation was “that a
formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be
conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman
against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H.
Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Peña and
AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD
1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;”
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner is a public officer to grant
ombudsman jurisdiction over him.
2. WON petitioner is not a "public officer" as
defined under the anti-graft & corrupt
practices act.
RULING:
1. Yes.
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of
1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is
that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on
the subject:
A public office is the right, authority
and duty, (RAD) created and
conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public
officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to
Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an
oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of
duties, and the designation of the position as an
office. 15
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics
are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely:
(1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary,
since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the
NCC being temporary.
[RE: delegation of sovereign functions]
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of
some of the sovereign functions of government as
"[t]he most important characteristic" in determining
whether a position is a public office or not.
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the
sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law
did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be
described as legislative or judicial. May the functions
of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions.
The executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance." 17 The executive
function, therefore, concerns the implementation of
the policies as set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the
foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into
effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the
following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study,
conceptualization, formulation
and implementation of
programs and projects on the
utilization of culture, arts,
literature and media as vehicles
for history, economic
endeavors, and reinvigorating
the spirit of national unity and
sense of accomplishment in
every Filipino in the context of
the Centennial Celebrations. In
this regard, it shall include a
Philippine National Exposition
'98 within Metro Manila, the
original eight provinces, and
Clark Air Base as its major
venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all
the activities related to
awareness and celebration of
the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the
preparation and dissemination
of all information about the
plans and events for the
Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which
shall undertake the
implementation of the programs
and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of
historical sites and structures
nationwide. In this regard, the
Commission shall formulate
schemes (e.g. lease-
maintained-and-transfer, build-
operate-transfer, and similar
arrangements) to ensure the
preservation and maintenance
of the historical sites and
structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or
instrumentality and corporation,
and to invite private individuals
and organizations to assist it in
the performance of its tasks;
and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President
on the plans, programs,
projects, activities as well as
the status of the preparations
for the Celebration.
[RE: Salary]
A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms
no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is
annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted
merely for the public good. 23 Hence, the office of
petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an
honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an
office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation
or fees are attached. 24 But it is a public office,
nonetheless.
[RE: continuance/tenure vis-à-vis being ad hoc
body]
The term office, it is said, embraces
the idea of tenure and duration, and
certainly a position which is merely
temporary and local cannot ordinarily
be considered an office. "But," says
Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a
continuing one, which is defined by
rules prescribed by the government
and not by contract, which an
individual is appointed by government
to perform, who enters on the duties
pertaining to his station without any
contract defining them, if those duties
continue though the person be
changed, — it seems very difficult to
distinguish such a charge or
employment from an office of the
person who performs the duties from
an officer."
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can
not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other
elements are present "it can make no difference," says
Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a series of
acts to be done, — whether the office expires as soon as the
one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good
behavior."
2. The question of whether petitioner is a public
officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act involves the appreciation of
evidence and interpretation of law, matters
that are best resolved at trial. It is clear from
Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a
 "public officer" is expressly limited to the
application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition
does not apply for purposes of determining
the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, as defined by
the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of
1989.
Segovia v Noel
FACTS:
Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of
Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He
continuously occupied this position until having
passed sixty-five milestones, he was ordered by the
Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the
office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary
justice of the peace has acted as justice of the peace
for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia instituted friendly quo warranto
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
inquire into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the
office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter
therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of
the peace of Dumanjug. To this complaint, Pedro
Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did
not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and
because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had
automatically ceased to be justice of the peace.
In force before the enactment of Act No. 3107
(placing a mandatory retirement at age 65), is Act.
No. 1627 which provides that "all justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold
office during good behavior and those now in office
shall so continue." Later amended by Acts Nos.
2041 and 2617 (still before Act no. 3107), the law
was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of
the Administrative Code.
Codal section 203 in its first paragraph provides
that "one justice of the peace and one auxiliary
justice of the peace shall be appointed by the
Governor-General for the City of Manila, the City of
Baguio, and for each municipality, township, and
municipal district in the Philippine Islands, and if the
public interests shall so require, for any other minor
political division or unorganized territory in said
Islands." It was this section which section 1 of Act
No. 3107 amended by adding at the end thereof the
following proviso: "Provided, That justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five
years." But section 206 of the Administrative Code
entitled "Tenure of office," and reading "a justice of
the peace having the requisite legal qualifications
shall hold office during good behavior unless his
office be lawfully abolished or merged in the
jurisdiction of some other justice," was left
unchanged by Act No. 3107.
ISSUE:
WON Act 3107 (placing mandatory retirement at age 65)
can be applied retroactively
RULING:
No.
Sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute
operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless
the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either
by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication.
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section
203 of the Administrative Code, gives no indication of
retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of
operating upon existing rights. A proviso was merely
tacked on to section 203 of the Administrative Code, while
leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits
justices of the peace to hold office during good behavior.
In the absence of provisions expressly making the law
applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in
the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such
legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving
the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful
public servants out of office.
Answering the question with which we began our decision,
we hold that the proviso added to section 203 of the
Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107, providing
that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-
five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is
not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices
of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force.
Consequently, it results that the decision of the trial court is
correct in its finding of fact and law and in its disposition of
the case.
Cornejo vs. Gabriel
One Liner: A public office is not a property
within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public
trust or agency.
Facts: Petitioner Cornejo was suspended as
Municipal President, amid investigations by the
Respondents (Provincial Governor and the
Provincial Board), without the benefit of notice
and hearing. He now seeks to restrain the latter
from continuing with the investigation, and to
issue for his reinstatement.
The Provincial Governor has filed an answer, in
which he alleges that numerous complaints
have been received by him against the conduct
of Cornejo; that he came to the conclusion that
the Municipal President should be temporarily
suspended, and that an investigation is now
being conducted by the Provincial Board.
Dom: The Provincial Governor has the power
to reprimand or temporarily suspend a
Municipal President.
Petitioner has argued that he has been deprived
of an office, to which he was elected by popular
vote, without having an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense. The respondents
reply that all that the provincial governor and
the provincial board have done in this case is to
comply with the requirement of the law which
they are sworn to enforce.
Ruling: Suspension without notice and hearing
is valid.
Ordinarily, a public official should not be
removed from office without notice, charges, a
trial, and an opportunity for explanation. While
a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, in administrative proceedings - it is
otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. In certain proceedings of an
administrative character the right to a notice
and hearing are not essential to due process of
law.
Due process is violated only if an office is
considered property. However, a public office
is not property within the constitutional
guaranties of due process. It is a public trust or
agency. As public officers are mere agents and
not rulers of the people, no man has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office.
Every officer accepts office pursuant to law and
holds office as a trust for the people whom he
represents.
Notes:
Power to suspend temporarily may be exercised
without notice to the person suspended.
Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the
suspension of a public officer under a statute
which does not provide for such notice and
hearing.
The basic idea of government in the Philippine
Islands, as in the United States, is that of a
popular representative government, the officers
being mere agents and not rulers of the people,
one where no man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but
where every officer accepts office pursuant to
the provisions of the law and holds the office as
a trust for the people whom he represents.
Abeja vs. Tanada
One Liner: Public office being personal, the
death of a public officer terminates his right to
occupy the contested office and extinguishes
his counterclaim for damages.
Facts: Petitioner Abeja and private respondent
Rosauro Radovan were contenders for the
office of municipal mayor in the national
election.
Private respondent was credited with 6,215
votes as against petitioner's 5,951 votes.
Petitioner filed an election contest covering
twenty-two (22) precincts. Private respondent
filed an Answer with a Counter-Protest of the
results in thirty-six (36) precincts.
During the pre-trial, private respondent's
counsel filed a motion praying that the 36
counter-protested precincts be revised only if it
is shown after completion of the revision of the
22 protested precincts that petitioner leads by a
margin of at least one (1) vote.
The revision of the ballots of the 22 precincts
were completed so Abeja filed a motion that a
judgment be rendered based on the results
from the 22 precincts. The first judge did not
rule on the motion. After, Radovan died.
Radovan was then substituted by the vice
mayor (Conrado de Rama) and Radovan’s wife,
Ediltrudes. Ediltrudes substituted his deceased
husband insofar as the latter’s counterclaim for
damages is concerned.
Federico Tañada, the judge who succeeded the
first judge, ruled that the motion is premature
because the 36 precincts are not yet revised. He
posits that the 36 precincts may only be revised
if there is at least one point lead by Abeja (as
agreed).
Dom: wa ko kasabot unsa ning revise2
Issues:
WON private respondents should be allowed to
proceed with the revision of the 36 precincts
subject of the counter-protest.
WON the substitution was proper [Main Topic]
Ruling:
1) No.
By insisting that the counter-protested
precincts should be revised only if it is shown
after the revision of the protested precincts
that petitioner, his opponent, leads by at least
one (1) vote, private respondent is adopting a
self-serving rule without legal sanction
calculated to unduly prolong the litigation.
There is no rule in election protests cases which
states that a protestant (Abeja) must first show
that she won in the precincts she is contesting
before evidence on the protestee’s (Radovan)
counter-protest can be had. This will render the
protestant’s case to be at the mercy of the
protestee who can just prolong the case until
his term is over.
2) No.
The substitution of the deceased Rosauro
Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes Radovan, on the
ground that private respondent had a counter-
claim for damages was erroneous.
Public office is personal to the incumbent and is
not a property which passes to his heirs. The
heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased
protestee's counter-claim for damages against
the protestant for that was extinguished when
death terminated his right to occupy the
contested office.
Javier v. Sandiganbayan (medyo taas kay ako giapil
enumeration, e skip lang na ninyo. incase rana mag ask si
sir ana)
FACTS: On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, or
otherwise known as the "Book Publishing Industry
Development Act", was enacted into law. The purpose
was to promote the book industry and support
adequate and affordable books to the people.
To achieve its purpose, the law provided for the
creation of the National Book Development Board
(NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall
be under the administration and supervision of the
Office of the President. The Governing Board shall be
composed of eleven (11) members who shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, five (5) of
whom shall come from the government, while the
remaining six (6) shall be chosen from the nominees of
organizations of private book publishers, printers,
writers, book industry related activities, students and
the private education sector.
On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the
Governing Board as a private sector representative for a
term of 1 year. During that time, she was also the
President of the Book Suppliers Association of the
Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in
the following year. On September 14, 1998, she was
again appointed to the same position and for the same
period of one (1) year. Part of her functions as a
member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs
to establish linkages with international book publishing
bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the
Office of the President a travel authority to attend the
Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-
12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of travel, she was paid
P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately,
petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled
international book fair.
On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T.
Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund
her cash advance considering that her trip was
canceled. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. On July 6,
1998, she was issued a Summary of Disallowances from
which the balance for settlement amounted to
P220,349.00. Despite said notice, no action was
forthcoming from the petitioner.
On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the
Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the
Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for
malversation of public funds and properties. She
averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip,
petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the NBDB her
cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival,
or in this case from the date of cancellation of the trip,
in accordance with government accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged
petitioner with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 for failure to file her Statement of Assets and
Liabilities.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. It, however, dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, the charge for violation of R.A.
No. 6713. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
25867 and raffled to the First Division.
Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged
petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
petitioner delivered to the First Division the money
subject of the criminal cases, which amount was
deposited in a special trust account during the pendency
of the criminal cases. In a Resolution dated October 5,
2000, the Third Division ordered the consolidation of
Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867.
On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867. She
claimed that she does not perform public functions and
is without any administrative or political power to speak
of — that she is serving the private book publishing
industry by advancing their interest as participant in the
government's book development policy. The First
Division denied the motion to quash.
ISSUE: (mga pre naa ni lain topic regarding motion to
quash and double jeopardy and salary grade 27, di lang
nako apilon)
WON petitioner is a public officer
RULING: To substantiate her claim, petitioner
maintained that she is not a public officer and only a
private sector representative, stressing that her only
function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and
objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to
obtain priority status for the book publishing
industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD
Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a book
publisher’s association. As such, she could not be held
liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn,
she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to
develop and support the Philippine book publishing
industry. It is a statutory government agency created
by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure
the full development of the book publishing industry as
well as for the creation of organization structures to
implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise
the implementation. The Governing Board was vested
with powers and functions, to wit:
a) assume responsibility for carrying
out and implementing the policies,
purposes and objectives provided
for in this Act;
b) formulate plans and programs as
well as operational policies and
guidelines for undertaking activities
relative to promoting book
development, production and
distribution as well as an incentive
scheme for individual authors and
writers;
c) formulate policies, guidelines and
mechanisms to ensure that editors,
compilers and especially authors are
paid justly and promptly royalties
due them for reproduction of their
works in any form and number and
for whatever purpose; ASHECD
d) conduct or contract research on
the book publishing industry
including monitoring, compiling and
providing data and information of
book production;
e) provide a forum for interaction
among private publishers, and, for
the purpose, establish and maintain
liaison will all the segments of the
book publishing industry;
f) ask the appropriate government
authority to ensure effective
implementation of the National
Book Development Plan;
g) promulgate rules and regulations
for the implementation of this Act in
consultation with other agencies
concerned, except for Section 9
hereof on incentives for book
development, which shall be the
concern of appropriate agencies
involved;
h) approve, with the concurrence of
the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), the annual and
supplemental budgets submitted to
it by the Executive director;
i) own, lease, mortgage, encumber
or otherwise real and personal
property for the attainment of its
purposes and objectives;
j) enter into any obligation or
contract essential to the proper
administration of its affairs, the
conduct of its operations or the
accomplishment of its purposes and
objectives;
k) receive donations, grants,
legacies, devices and similar
acquisitions which shall form a trust
fund of the Board to accomplish its
development plans on book
publishing; ESTCDA
l) import books or raw materials
used in book publishing which are
exempt from all taxes, customs
duties and other charges in behalf of
persons and enterprises engaged in
book publishing and its related
activities duly registered with the
board;
m) promulgate rules and regulations
governing the matter in which the
general affairs of the Board are to be
exercised and amend, repeal, and
modify such rules and regulations
whenever necessary;
n) recommend to the President of
the Philippines nominees for the
positions of the Executive Officer
and Deputy Executive Officer of the
Board;
o) adopt rules and procedures and
fix the time and place for holding
meetings: Provided, That at least
one (1) regular meeting shall be held
monthly;
p) conduct studies, seminars,
workshops, lectures, conferences,
exhibits, and other related activities
on book development such as
indigenous authorship, intellectual
property rights, use of alternative
materials for printing, distribution
and others; and
q) exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties as may be required by the law.
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to
conclude that they partake of the nature of public
functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private
sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested
her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, so that the purpose of the government is
achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance
the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in
the national development. Hence, the fact that she was
appointed from the public sector and not from the other
branches or agencies of the government does not take her
position outside the meaning of a public office. She was
appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that
the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved.
The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its
mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for
appointing members from the private sector is to ensure
that they are also properly represented in the
implementation of government objectives to cultivate the
book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a
public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which
provides that a public officer includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer
if one has been elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to the
Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for
a year that does not make her private person exercising a
public function. The fact that she is not receiving a
monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No.
8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall
receive per diem and such allowances as may be
authorized for every meeting actually attended and
subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also,
under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's
appointment, and whether the compensation one receives
from the government is only nominal, is immaterial
because the person so elected or appointed is still
considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a
public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the
law, popular election, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be
deemed to be a public officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public
functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047,
verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the
performance of public functions in the government
whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of
any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner
took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules
and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was
supposed to represent the country in the canceled book
fair in Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Petitioner Azarcon owned and operated an earth-
moving business, and his services were contracted by
Paper Industries Corporation in Mangagoy, Surigao del
Sur. Often, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like
Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at Azarcon’s premises.
From this set of circumstances arose the controversy. The
BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property
against the property of Jaime Ancla. The warrant of
garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to keep
in his possession as custodian of the BIR the trucks of
Ancla. Azarcon signed a receipt of the goods from BIR and
promised to not permit others to remove or dispose said
property and to give it up to the BIR upon demand.
Subsequently, Azarcon wrote BIR stating that Ancla has
ceased his operations with him. In connection to that, he
relinquishes whatever responsibilities he may have
acquired over the property by virtue of the receipt he
signed. The petitioner also reported that the truck has
been taken. After a complaint was filed, the
Sandiganbayan subsequently found out that the truck was
again being rented out to PICOP.
Due to this, Jaime Ancla and Azarcon were charged before
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to
Article 222 of the RPC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation alleging that
he never appeared for the preliminary investigation and
that petitioner was not a public officer. It was granted, but
the Ombudsman insisted on proceeding with the case. A
motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction but it was denied.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can be considered a public
officer by reason of his being designated by the BIR as
depositary of distrained property
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of
being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over
the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who
are public officers.
Thus,
"(to) be a public officer, one must be —
(1) Taking part in the performance of public
functions in the government, or Performing in
said Government or any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the
performance of public functions or to perform
public duties must be —
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent
authority."
Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the
receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by
popular election. The next logical query is whether
petitioner's designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct
provision of law, or by competent authority. We answer in
the negative.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting
constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by
Jaime Ancla, and in requiring Petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a
pro forma receipt for it, effectively "designated" petitioner
a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, a public
officer.
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable
to the case before us simply because the facts therein are
not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here.
While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the
proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of
the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIR's
administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over
alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back
taxes, property which was received by Petitioner Azarcon.
In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that
court's jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the
judicial deposit and give "the depositary a character
equivalent to that of a public official." However, in the
instant case, while the BIR had authority to require
Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which
mandates a limited government, that its branches and
administrative agencies exercise only that power
delegated to them as "defined either in the Constitution or
in legislation or in both." Thus, although the "appointing
power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, . .
." the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative
agency forming part of the executive branch will still be
limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary or fair
implication in its enabling act. Hence, "(a)n administrative
officer, it has been held, has only such powers as are
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in
the exercise thereof." Corollarily, implied powers "are
those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore
of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend
to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not
incidental thereto." For to so extend the statutory grant of
power "would be an encroachment on powers expressly
lodged in Congress by our Constitution." It is true that Sec.
206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution,
authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by
requiring "any person to preserve a distrained property.
However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting
such person a public officer by reason of such
requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private
individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to
include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
"Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." This is
particularly observed in the interpretation of penal
statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as
to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . ." The
language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private
individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or
property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts
defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title
Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the
same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in
this provision is it expressed or implied that a private
individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a
public officer.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court
thus finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused
Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously
charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over
them. The Sandiganbayan's taking cognizance of this case
is of no moment since "(j)urisdiction cannot be conferred
by . . . erroneous belief of the court that it had
jurisdiction."
SERANA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a
senior student of the UP-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on
as a student regent of UP.
Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman. Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation
of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the
President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-
wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa.
ISSUE: (a) Whether the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from
the government.
RULING: It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In fine, the two
statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt
practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of
estafa. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or
sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section
4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is
not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, We held that while the first part of Section
4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner
is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is
not an essential element of public office. At most, it
is merely incidental to the public office.
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function
in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP
performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing advanced instruction in literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.
The offense charged was committed in relation to
public office, according to the Information. In the
case at bench, the information alleged, in no
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student
regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position,
with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government x x x."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan
observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a
matter of defense that should be ventilated during
the trial on the merits of the instant case.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G.
dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019." We admonish petitioner’s counsel to
be more careful and accurate in his citation. A
lawyer’s conduct before the court should be
characterized by candor and fairness. The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if
lawyers do not act with complete candor and
honesty before the courts.
GO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: The SC rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), declaring as null and void the 1997
Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the
Supplemental Contracts entered into between the
Government, through the DOTC and the MIAA, and
PIATCO.
By the aforementioned contracts (PIATCO contracts),
the Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the
project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA
IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT)
scheme pursuant to the RA 7718 (BOT Law).
The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO's
predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder
as it failed to meet the financial capability
requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the
PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for
being contrary to public policy as it contained
material and substantial amendments to the original
1997 Concession Agreement, converting into an
entirely different contract bidded upon.
Subsequently, an amended affidavit-complaint, was
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Ma.
Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asia's
Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), charging
several persons in connection with the NAIA IPT III
project. The AEDC was the original proponent
thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO.
After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon,
the Office of the Ombudsman filed with
the Sandiganbayan the Information charging Vicente
C. Rivera, as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go,
as Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation
of Section 3 (g) 4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It stated that ARCA
substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement providing that the government shall
assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the
latter's default and is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic
of the Philippines.
The "Motion for Determination (Re-Determination)
of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss" and the
"Motion to Quash," filed by accused Vicente C.
Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, respectively, were
DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not ruling that Section 3(g) does not
embrace a private person within its proviso.
RULING: NO grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Go contends that Section 3 (g) of RA 3019,
by its text, cannot be extended or even enlarged by
implication or intendment to bring within its limited
scope private persons. As a private person, he could
not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the
government," there being no showing of any agency
relations or special authority for him to act for and
on behalf of the government.
The petition is bereft of merit. The elements of this
offense are as follows:(1) that the accused is a public
officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go,
however, the fact that he is not a public officer does
not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Section
3 (g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Go's simplistic syllogism
goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed
policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. — It is
the policy of the Philippine Government, in
line with the principle that a public office is
a public trust, to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.
Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that
the anti-graft law's application extends to both
public officers and private persons.
“SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or
private person committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 xxx “
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3 (g)
of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer"
does not necessarily preclude its application to
private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being
charged with conspiring with public officers in the
commission of the offense thereunder.
The precept that could be drawn from the Luciano,
Singian and Domingo cases, and which is applicable
to the present case, is that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019,
including (g) and (h) thereof.
Reliance by
petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan is not
quite appropriate. It can be gleaned from the entire
context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the
former First Lady's conviction was based on the fact
that it was later held that she signed the subject
lease agreement as a private person, not a public
officer. However, this acquittal should also be taken
in conjunction with the fact that the public officer
with whom she had supposedly conspired, her co-
accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted.
(On the alleged absence of specificity of allegation of
conspiracy) The absence or presence of any
conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which
can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on
the merits.
The determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is a function of the
government prosecutor, which in this case is the
Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not interfere in the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause, unless there are compelling
reasons. Mindful of this salutary rule,
the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made its own
determination on the basis of the records that were
before it. It concluded that there was sufficient
evidence in the records for the finding of the
existence of probable cause against petitioner Go.
SAMPAYAN VS DAZA
FACTS: Residents of the 2nd Congressional District of
Northern Samar filed this petition for prohibition
seeking to disqualify Raul Daza, an incumbent
congressman, from exercising his functions on the
ground that he is a green-card holder and a
permanent resident of the US. They allege that he
did not renounce (by any act or declaration) his
status as permanent resident thereby violating the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election law. They
also filed a case in COMELEC to disqualify Daza in the
May 11 elections on the basis of Sec 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code (no mention of the contents
of the provision).
The OSG was asked to comment, but instead asked
for an extension of time. Petitioners opposed this
since such time was excessive. Not important.
Daza commented by denying such matters, for the
truth is that although he was indeed accorded
permanent resident status, as evidenced by a letter
order of the District Director of US Immigration, he
has already waived such status when he returned to
the Philippines.
The Secretary General of the House of Reps, the
Officer-in-Charge of General Services, and the Chief
Accountant of COA was also asked to comment.
They contend that if indeed it were true, Daza
should be removed from his position. Not important
also.
Now, Daza is asking the court to direct the COMELEC
to dismiss the case filed by the petitioners.
Petitioners insist that he should be disqualified since
he is a green-card holder as evidenced by a letter
from the United States Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) stating
that “As far as we know, subject (sic) still has his
green-card. No he has not applied for citizenship”.
(Exact words)
ISSUE: The central issue to be resolved in this case is
whether or not respondent Daza should be
disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
RULING: NO. Petition should be dismissed.
We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case.
First, this case is already moot and academic for it is
evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners
dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to unseat
respondent from his position as Congressman for the
duration of his term of office commencing June 30,
1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly,
jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualification of
its members. Since petitioners challenge the
qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate
remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel
respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before
the election or a quo warranto case with the House
Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Daza’s
proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no
longer be issued against respondent since his term
has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not
intended to provide for acts already consummated.
Fourth, as a de facto public officer, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed
during his term of office because his acts are as
valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de
facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.
NOTE: Resolution ni siya. Di nako ma-search ang
Decision jud. Basin didto nag-ask ang petitioners nga
ipa-reimburse ang funds disbursed by Daza. Wala
ma’y facts diri relating sa disbursing2x and
emoluments.
Guji in transcript: A de jure officer, who is declared as
the rightful winner, cannot ask for reimbursement
for his salary because he did not work in the first
place. It is the de facto officer who is entitled to
compensation at the time prior to his being
unseated. Except: Where there is a sitting de jure
officer.
MANAGER OF PPA VS MONSERATE
FACTS: Monserate started her government service
as a Bookkeeper II Iloilo Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA). Barely a year later, she was promoted to
Cashier II, then Finance Officer.
(worked at PPA. Book Keeper, Cashier II, then
Finance Officer. Applied for manager II but demoted
to Administrative Officer)
In 1988, PPA underwent reorganization and
respondent applied for Manager II of the Resource
Management Division. There were six aspirants and
were ranked accordingly in a Comparative Data
Sheet. The General Manager appointed her to the
position and hence she assumed the position and
discharged functions. The Civil Service Commission
approved her appointment. (Applied for manager II.
She was appointed and she assumed position dayun)
Meanwhile, petitioner Anino, who ranked second in
the Comparative Data Sheet, filed an appeal/petition
with the PPA Appeals Board protesting against
respondent’s appointment. The Board sustained the
protest based on appointment based on certain
Memorandum Circulars of CSC and Eligibility Law.
These grounds were not explained or discussed in
the Resolution and the respondent’s appointment
was rendered ineffective. Of course, after receiving
the order implementing such resolution, she
complained since she did not receive any notice of
hearing, copy of the complaint and was not included
in such proceedings.
Later, she received an order from the General
Manager (GM) that she was reassigned to Anino’s
former position (Administrative Officer) with a salary
grade of 15 (a position which was lower than her
previous position before applying [salary grade 16]).
She later learned of the issuance of the GM’s order
appointing petitioner to the contested position.
Hence, she filed an appeal of protest with the CSC,
but such appeal remained pending for 6 damn years.
Eventually, CSC dismissed it. CSC reasoned that
“Although Monserate had already assumed the
position of RMD Manager II, the appointing
authority may still withdraw the same if a protest is
seasonably filed.” Motion for recon was also denied.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled in Monserate’s
favour. CA said that such demotion was in violation
of her constitutional right to security of tenure, and
hence directed her reinstatement to the position as
Division Manager II.
Later, petitioner Anino filed this present petition and
then months after filing, he retired from government
service.
ISSUE: The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not
there was due process when respondent was
replaced by petitioner Anino from her position as
Manager II, Resource Management Division, and
demoted as Administrative Officer.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Respondent was never
demoted because “demotion” presupposed a
conviction of a charge. Moreover, she was merely
displaced due to a timely protest filed. Lastly, the
head of the agency is in the best position to know
who can best perform the functions of the office.
RULING: The Court ruled that respondent was
irregularly replaced by petitioner Anino in her
position as Division Manager and illegally demoted
to the position of Administrative Officer. She was not
notified and was not able to participate in the
proceedings, hence such was tainted with
irregularities.
Moreover, in Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission,
this Court emphasized that "once an appointment is
issued and the moment the appointee assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable, right (to the position) which is protected
not only by statute, but also by the constitution, and
cannot be taken away from him either by revocation
of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing."
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide
latitude of discretion in the selection and
appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions
in the civil service. However, the moment the
discretionary power of appointment is exercised and
the appointee assumed the duties and functions of
the position, such appointment cannot anymore be
revoked by the appointing authority and appoint
another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota
of evidence was ever established to justify the
revocation of respondent's appointment by
demoting her. Respondent's security of tenure
should not be placed at the mercy of abusive
exercise of the appointing power.
Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals
reinstated respondent to her legitimate post as
Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it
merely restored her appointment to the said
position to which her right to security of tenure had
already attached. To be sure, her position as
Manager II NEVER became vacant since her
demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, "an
appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil
service is null and void ab initio."
In this respect, while petitioner Anino's appointment
to the contested position is void, as earlier
discussed, he is nonetheless considered a DE FACTO
officer during the period of his incumbency. A de
facto officer is one who is in possession of an office
and who openly exercises its functions under color
of an appointment or election, even though such
appointment or election may be irregular.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals,26 this Court ruled
that a rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from a de facto officer the salary received by
the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure,
even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the
office in good faith and under color of title. A de
facto officer, not having a good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to
the de jure officer for whatever salary he received
during the period of his wrongful tenure. In the
later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary, this Court allowed a de facto officer to
receive emoluments for actual services rendered
but only when there is no de jure officer.
In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure
officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful
incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments
attached to the office, even if he occupied the
office in good faith. This rule, however, CANNOT be
applied squarely on the present case in view of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed
under protest the position of Administrative Officer
sometime in the latter part of 1988, which position
she currently holds. Since then, she has been
receiving the emoluments, salary and other
compensation attached to such office. While her
assumption to said lower position and her
acceptance of the corresponding emoluments
cannot be considered as an abandonment of her
claim to her rightful office (Division Manager), she
cannot recover full backwages for the period when
she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled
only to backpay differentials for the period starting
from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to
the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful
position as Division Manager. Such backpay
differentials pertain to the difference between the
salary rates for the positions of Manager II and
Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by
petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he
wrongfully assumed the contested position up to the
time of his retirement on November 30, 1997.
BENITO CODILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE L.
MARTINEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents. (topic: distinction
between de jure and de facto)
FACTS:
Baloyo, mayor of Tagum Davao, left for
Negros Occidental to attend to his sick brother. He
designated the vice mayor to act in his place. Then
the vice mayor in turn fell sick of lung trouble, hence
he designated councilor Bermudez as acting mayor.
He was also not in good health, so he designated 3 rd
raking councilor Martinez to act as mayor. Martinez
accepted the designation and assumed office. His first
official act as mayor was to separate from service the
petitioners, who were policemen of the municipality.
Petitioners filed their protest. But Martinez did not
heed and instead appointed Duaso as municipal
policeman in lieu of Codlla. The appointment was
approved by the pres and the CSC.
Petitioners then filed a petition for
mandamus before the CFI against Acting Mayor
Martinez and incumbent Mayor Baloyo, alleging that
as civil service employees, they can only be
separated for case, hence their separation was illegal.
Respondents answered that the
appointments of petitioners having been made in a
temporary capacity coz they were not civil service
eligible, the same were valid only for 3 months, and
that Baloyo likewise endorsed and ratified, hence
validated the act of Martinez. CFI favored defendants.
ISSUE:
WON PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY SEPARATED
– YES COZ TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS ONLY
RULING:
MAIN CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS:
Martinez was the THIRD ranking councilor,
hence his designation as acting mayor was not
proper. The provincial governor should have made
the designation with the consent of the provincial
board.
But the CFI countered this by deciding that
his designation is not entirely void, but at most, a de
facto officer acting under a color of authority, as
distinguished from a usurper who is without title
nor color of right to an office.
SC AGREES WITH THE CFI:
1) DE JURE VS DE FACTO
"An officer de facto is to be distinguished
from an de jure officer, is one who has the reputation
or appearance of being the officer he assumed to be
but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to
the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished
from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the
former holds by some color of right or title while the
latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to
exercise its functions without either the legal title or
color of right to such office."
To constitute a de facto officer, there must
be an office having a de facto existence, or least one
recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual
possession of the office under color of title or
authority.
2) Martinez’s designation was likewise
subsequently endorsed and ratified by
incumbent Mayor Bayolo when he returned to
office, HENCE CURING THE IRREGULARITY
OF HIS DESIGNATION.
3) TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS ONLY
Petitioners were validly separated because
they were merely given TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENTS because they do not have civil
service eligibility, thus making their status as
employees wholly dependent upon the grace of the
ruling power.
A temporary appointment is similar to one
made in acting capacity, the essence of which lies in
its temporary character and its terminability at the
pleasure of the appointing power."
The replacement of non-eligibles by eligibles is lawful.
Tenure of office is only guaranteed upon the latter.
ANTONIO LACSON, petitioner, vs. HONORIO ROMERO ET
AL., respondents (topic: stages of appointment)
FACTS:
Lacson (petitioner) was appointed by the
president as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental on
July 25, 1946. It was confirmed by COA on Aug. 6,
1946, and he took office on Aug 10, 1946. Then on
May 17, 1949, he was nominated as provincial fiscal
of Tarlac by the president. As replacement, Romero
(respondent) was nominated in Negros Oriental for
provincial fiscal. Both were confirmed.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment
nor assumed the office of fiscal in Tarlac. Romero
assumed office in the fiscal of Negros Oriental. Upon
arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros, he
notified Lacson of his intention to take over, but
Lacson objected. In one case, Romero appeared but
Lacson objected and asked the judge that Romero be
stricken from the record. The judge however denied
Lacson’s objection and recognized Romero as
provincial fiscal of Negros.
When Lacson asked for his salary as
provincial fiscal, the Provincial Treasurer turned down
his request and instead, gave it to Romero, pursuant
to the reply of the Sec. of Justice upon the treasurer’s
query concerning who is the fiscal in Negros.
ISSUE:
1) Was Lacon validly appointed even without his
acceptance? – NO
2) Is the nomination and confirmation of Lacson to
Tarlac equivalent to a valid removal? INVALID
REMOVAL
3) Can the president (appointing authority) validly
remove him at will or does Lacson enjoy security
of tenure? ENJOYS SECURITY OF TENURE
RULING:
Reasoning sa SC why Lacson did not accept the
nomination in Tarlac:
Negros Oriental was classified as a second
class province with a salary of P5,100 per annum for
the post of provincial fiscal when Lacson was
appointed. Tarlac was first class with a salary of
P5,700. But when he was appointed for Tarlac and
then Romero for Negros, Negros was raised to first
class a and then Tarlac to first class b, both having
the same salary of P6,000 for provincial fiscal. So,
this daw explains why Lacson declined the
nomination.
1) LACSON WAS NOT VALIDLY APPOINTED
BECAUSE OF HIS NON-ACCEPTANCE
STAGES OF APPOINTMENT:
First is the NOMINATION by the President
Second is the CONFIRMATION of COA of the
Legislature in order to make the nomination valid
and permanent
 Both stages constitute a mere offer of a
post. They are acts of the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
Third is ACCEPTANCE thereof by the appointee by
his ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE
 This is the necessary step to make the
appointment complete and effective.
 He may or may not accept the appointment
or nomination – hence rests solely with the
appointee himself.
 As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano,
41 Phil., 327, "there is no power in this
country which can compel a man to
accept an office."
2&3) A PROVINCIAL FISCAL CAN ONLY BE
REMOVED FOR CAUSE PROVIDED BY LAW,
HENCE ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE.
NATURE OF THE OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL
FISCAL:
It is part of the Philippine Civil Service. There
are two types of persons in the Civil Service.
Classified or Unclassified. Included in the
UNCLASSIFIED persons are those “x x x appointed
by the president of the phil with the consent of the
COA of the National Assembly x x x”.
CAN PRES REMOVE WITHOUT VALID CAUSE?
The Committee on Civil Service of the Consti
Convention advocated the MERIT SYSTEM. It
claimed that the adoption of said system has secured
efficiency and social justice. It eliminates the political
factor in the selection of civil employees which is the
first essential to an efficient personnel system. It
ensures equality of opportunity to all deserving
applicants desirous of a career in the public service.
So to make the merit system effective, The
Committee’s report requires that removals shall be
made only for causes and in the manner provided
by law. This means that there should be bona fide
reasons and action may be taken only after the
employee shall have been given a fair hearing.
This affords to public employees REASONABLE
SECURITY OF TENURE.
(Background lng in case mangutana) The merit
system was introduced upon the establishment of the
American Regime in the Philippines. The Schurman
Commission advocated in its report that the greatest
care should be taken in the selection of officials for
administration.

IN THIS CASE:
Romero argues that the power of removal is
inherent in the power to appoint, hence the pres daw
can remove Lacson and transfer him. Also, the
appointment daw of a provincial fiscal is not for a fixed
term and no tenure of office daw. Nya, granting can
be removed on valid cause only, the law daw does
not provide for any grounds constituting valid cause.

SC SAID that the Pres power is QUALIFIED

AND LIMITED – SHOULD BE FOR A VALID
CAUSE!

A provincial fiscal also enjoys tenure of

office coz aside from removal only for a valid cause,
sec. 1673 of the Administrative Code likewise
provides that “after Dec. 31, 1932, x x x provincial
fiscal x x x over 65 years of age shall vacate his office
x x x”, hence, he shall continue to serve until 65
unless sooner removed for a cause.

The law provides grounds, among others,

falsification of daily time record, gambling,
drunkenness, dishonesty, oppression, grave
misconduct, neglect in performance of duty.