I.

THE CONCEPT OF SUFFRAGE

1. Badelles v. Cabili, G.R. No. L-29333. February 27, 1969

FACTS:

In the 1967 election for mayor of Iligan City wherein Camilo Cabili and
Mariano Badelles were candidates. Cabili was proclaimed as the winner. This
prompted Badelles to file a protest before the CFI of Lanao. He alleged that flagrant
violations of Election Code attended the election. He pointed out that more than 200
voters were registeredper precinct contrary to what the law mandated at 200 voters
per precinct. He also alleged that no publication of lists of voters per precinct was
made up to the election day itself enabling around 8,300 persons to vote illegally
while around 8,000 qualified voters were not able to vote since their names were not
found on the lists.

Camilo Cabili filed a motion to dismiss the protest based on three grounds namely:

(1) Failure to file the protest within the reglementary period; (2) lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case; and (3)
failure to state a cause of action. Motion to dismiss the protest was granted but only
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In granting the MTD, the court
argued that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers
were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an
allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor of the
protestants and against the protesters, that such irregularities would destroy
the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the protesters knew of or
participated in the commission thereof. It also declared that voters should not be
deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the election officials to
comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage and that
the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the
voting should be considered directory thereafter.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss

RULING:

Yes. In resolving the motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in the

complaint should be hypothetically admitted. In this case, the court obviously erred in
dismissing the protest. The seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have
election conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to
doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials.
IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE

If the right of suffrage would be disregarded or frittered away, popular

sovereignty becomes a myth. In the case of Moya v. Del Fierro, it was declared by
Justice Laurel, to wit:
As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must
continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into
the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it
implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source
of the established authority.

A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on
the consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly
recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the
ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials
of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for
assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that
corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
2. Pangutan v. Abubakar, G.R. No. L-33541, January 20, 1972

FACTS:

Abubakar and the other candidates alleged that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul,
Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive violence,
terrorism and fraud. Pungutan denied this and said the election was valid. Comelec:
that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or
manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said
municipalities are sham. The Commission is of the opinion that the elections in said
municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao
del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting was
done by persons other than the registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were
to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled the Commission to reject the
returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as no returns at all or spurious
or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint. By
majority vote of the members of the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from
said canvass the returns from the towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to
proclaim the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971, unless restrained
by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC exceeded its constitutional power by encroaching on

terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being involved.

RULING:

1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of

power to disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56
precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being
spurious or manufactured. We find and so hold that the election returns from the 42
precincts in question were prepared under circumstances conclusively showing that
they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be completely unworthy of inclusion
in the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelec's finding that they
are spurious and manufactured.15 Nor is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject
returns of such a character has been exercised most judiciously. Even a cursory
perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission
resulting in the challenged resolution should suffice to remove any doubt as to the
absence of any impropriety or improvidence in the exercise of such a prerogative.
Clearly, there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective
of insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly there
is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any
reluctance in yielding the imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent
Commission in the discharge of its constitutional function of the enforcement of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections. As was so well put by Justice, later Chief
Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created -- free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully
with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere." The same approach is reflected
in the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v. Dimaporo when as he pointed out if
"pursuant to our Administrative Law, the findings of fact of administrative organs
created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by courts of justice, except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings
there is no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place
the Commission on Elections — created and explicitly made 'independent' by the
Constitution itself — on a lower level than said statutory administrative organs."

2. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost

significance. It is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the
people becomes nugatory. In the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling
every citizen to participate in the process of government to assure that it derives its
power from the consent of the governed. What was so eloquently expressed by
Justice Laurel comes to mind. As long as popular government is an end to be
achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form
devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must
be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their
Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. How such a right
is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. Its enforcement under the
Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent Commission. Such a power, however,
is purely executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief Justice in
Abcede v. Imperial: Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although
independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive
charge of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative
questions.
3. A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976 SALVADOR LACSON, JR., complainant, vs.
RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge, of Talisay, Negros Occidental,
respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent disregarded this requirement and none of the petitions for inclusion
based on lack of forms contains the attached certificate of the Chairman or any
member of the Board of Inspectors of the precinct concerned to the effect that
petitioner or petitioners applied for registration on October 9, 1971 but were refused
registration for lack of registration forms. While it may be true that the various;
petitions for inclusion contained the sworn statement of Eduardo Belbes that a copy
of the petition had been served on the members of the Board of Inspectors of the
corresponding precinct, yet this notice applied to the original dates of hearing stated
in the Petition and it is reasonable to assume that on the dates at which the petitions
were ordered reset for hearing by respondent Judge, to wit: On October 18 for the
petitions filed on October 14; and on October 20 for the petitions filed on October 19,
the Board of Inspectors were not notified. This is impliedly admitted by respondent
when he expressed the belief that notice to the Election Registration Board alone
was sufficient, and that the certificate of the Board of Inspectors to the effect that the
petitioners applied for registration in the corresponding precinct on October 9, 1971,
but were refused registration for lack of forms was not necessary inasmuch as he
relied on the testimonies of the petitioners themselves on that point. Also, even if
respondent was motivated by a desire to adhere strictly to the requirement of
Comelec Resolution No. RR-938 that inclusion cases be decided within two (2) days
from the filing of the petition, it would seem that respondent acted rather hastily in
resetting the inclusion cases filed in the afternoon of October 19, 1971 for hearing
immediately the following morning or on October 20, 1971. This is especially true of
Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172, except Cases Nos. 162 to 172 (Exhs. 8A to 8K
inasmuch as Mrs. Efren admittedly informed respondent of the filing of the cases
right the same morning of October 20. Hence it is not likely that the various members
of the Board of Inspectors could have been notified to appear and testify that
petitioners in fact appeared before their respective precincts and were denied
registration for lack of forms. caution dictated that this requirement or this procedure
be followed as this was one sure way of Identifying the petitioners and ascertaining
whether in fact they applied for and were refused registration for lack of forms. True,
inclusion and exclusion cases are summary in nature but the procedure adopted by
respondent Judge provided no safeguard whatsoever against indiscriminate
inclusion. For he admitted that as long as the petitioners were present when he
called the inclusion cases for hearing and the respondent Election Registration
Board or the members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts concerned were
not present he considered the latter in default and summarily granted the petition.
This could be the only reason why practically all the inclusion cases resulted in the
issuance of orders directing the inclusion of the petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B',
'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out, on appeal most of the petitions were dismissed
either for failure of the petitioners to appear or, as in Cases Nos. 136-153, because
the Court found on the basis of the testimony of the Chairman of Precinct No, 41 of
Talisay that he even had a surplus of seventeen (17) application forms

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent failed to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of
the electoral law.

RULING:

Yes. In our republican system of government, the exercise by the people of their
right of suffrage is the expression of their sovereign will. It is, therefore, absolutely
essential that the free and voluntary use of this right be effectively protected by the
law and by governmental authority. As stated in an earlier case: The people in
clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent
and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute
him a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercise, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of
citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general
benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank 92 U.S. 588.) In the last
analysis, therefore, the inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of
any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in
general. In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's failure
to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the electoral law becomes evident.
His good faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are
mala prohibita the act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. It
appears, however, that on April 8, 1974, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which grants general amnesty under
certain conditions to public school teachers, other government officials and
employees, members of the armed forces of the Philippines and other persons for
violation of election laws and other related statutes in connection with the elections
of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention.
4. Taule v. Santos, G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991

FACTS:

An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay

Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members
of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent
Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view
of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the
allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the
said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his
appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being
the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. Respondent Santos issued
a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V
of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.
Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1) Whether the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election

protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC.

2) Whether the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an

election protest.

RULING:

Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989

resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However,
the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be
conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any

protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the
power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over
the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the
Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear
election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.

2. Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section
205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang
panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of
the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said
member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may
be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent
governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of
the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular
No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall
preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that
neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the
meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said
mandatory provision. Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition
alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum
dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said
election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who
does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of
barangay councils.
5. Romualdez v. RTC, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez

and a niece of Imelda Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the days of People Power, relatives of the
deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled the country. One
of them are the Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United
States. However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the
U.S. or else they’ll be deported. Upon receipt of the information, Romualdez went
back to the Philippines and did not delay his return to his residence in Leyte and
immediately registered himself as a voter. In 1992, herein private respondent
Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of the voters alleging that
the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter.
However, the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition
to the RTC, the appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romualdez as
a registered voter. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa,

Leyte despite his sudden departure to the U.S?

RULING:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because
he is still considered a resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Stating that, the political
situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused great fear
to the Romualdez, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-
exile is understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as
‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment of residence’. It must be emphasized that the right to
vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of every citizen enabling them
to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the people.
II. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ITS POWERS

1. Antonio Gallardo vs. Hon. Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., G.R. No. 104848,
January 29, 1993

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Petitioners would have us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public
respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with the proceedings in a
petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit, docketed
therein as Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus
Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of
the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April
1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and without
jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order because
the case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely
baseless, that the private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public
respondent acted with undue haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of
the private respondent in issuing the Temporary Restraining Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil
Action No. 465.

RULING:

Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No.
465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with
the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of
suffrage -- the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government
and in achieving and promoting political stability. Additionally, by statutory mandate,
the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers:

1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets
eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing
its orders. The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the
preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral
processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions,
orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the
Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office
any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty
of such violation or failure.

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any
unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and
hearing.” The present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid
statutory authority to grant the Commission on Elections broader and more flexible
powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative
intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes,
Congress may withdraw the same at any time.
2. Antonio V.A. Tan Vs. Commission On Elections G.R. No. 112093, 4 October
1994

FACTS:

Tan, a city prosecutor, was designated by the Commission on Election as

Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992
synchronized national and local elections. After the election, a lost candidate filed a
number of cases accusing the board with unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and
irregular canvass. One of these is an administrative charge instituted in the
COMELEC for “Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical
to the Service. Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC since he is under the Executive
Department of the government. However, the COMELEC denied the motion to
dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a city prosecutor who is designated to be a part of Board of

Canvassers by the COMELEC is under the administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC
with respect to the administrative charge concerning the election canvass filed
against him.

RULING:

Yes. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation
to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city
prosecutor. The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and
immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees,
including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and
employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also
provided than upon the COMELEC’s recommendation, the corresponding proper
authority, which is the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar, shall
take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or
employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or
failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.
3. Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995

FACTS:

Biliran was originally a municipality of the 3rd District of the province of Leyte.
It was later converted into a sub-province then a regular province. COMELEC sought
to remedy the consequent inequality of the distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte by promulgating Resolution No. 2736 where it
transferred (in Sec 1 thereof) the municipality of Capoocan of its 2nd District and
Palompon of its 4th District to its 3rd District. Cong. Montejo of the 1st District of
Leyte sought to annul said Sec of Res. No. 2736 on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, he prays to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd District of the province.

ISSUE:

May the Court transfer the Municipality of Tolosa of the 1st District to the 2nd
District of Leyte as prayed for?

RULING:

No. The court held Sec 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void and conceded that the
conversion of Biliran to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters in the legislative districts and, as such, could devalue a citizen’s
vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. However, what is
prayed for involves an issue of reapportionment of legislative districts and remedy for
such lies with Congress in accordance to Art VI, Sec 5(4). While this Court can strike
down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment
as Montejo would want the Court to do by directing COMELEC to transfer Tolosa
from the 1st District to the 2nd District. Transferring a municipality from one district to
another is a substantive (not minor) change.
4. Herrera v. COMELEC, 3 G.R. No. 131499 November 17, 1999

Facts: In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras

requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial
districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two
consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains,
barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested
parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division. The PES then issued a
memo recommending the division of the province. Guimaras was then reclassified
from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance. The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district
(Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats. The petitioners questioned
Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1. The districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.

2. The consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters
of the province.

3. The apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.

4. There is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member
represents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in

issuing Resolution No. 2950?

RULING:

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and

adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a
common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable
distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped
together are contiguous or adjacent.

2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested
parties were duly notified and represented.
 3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative
district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province
and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members and 2 districts.

4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis
for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the
number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was
based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
5. Matsura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 443 (1998)

FACTS:

Petitioner Michael Matsura and private respondent Didagen Dilanggalen were

congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. Dilanggalen objected
to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of Municipality of Matanog on the
ground that the same was allegedly tampered. The COMELEC ordered the
production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog.
During the examination, four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon the
examination and comparison the COMELEC found that indeed the Certificate had
been tampered. Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers convenes and re
canvassed the votes. Matsura objected to the inclusion of fifty(50) out of fifty
seven(57) election returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of the election
returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the
original of Municipal Board of Canvassers. Matsura thereafter walked out while the
new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. After the
proceedings, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected member and
Maguindao. Matsura filed a petition for Certiorari; prohibition and Mandamus praying
the annulment of said decision due to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC exercise a grave abuse of discretion by not

including the seven (7) remaining election returns for the re canvassing of votes.

RULING:

No, COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether
mere existence of a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from
the disputed voting centers. Once the election returns were found to be falsified or
tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine
returns.
6. Banaga, Jr. Vs. Comelec. G.R. No. 134696. July 31, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for
vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the
city board of canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for
having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a
Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging
that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying
voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of
Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated. In
fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore,
the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be
considered as the true will of the people. Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he
should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, during
the May 1998 local elections. Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and
held that the election offenses relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election
tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an
election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot
be viewed as an election protest. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis
whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of

election is considered as an election protest.

Whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.

RULING:

The instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public

respondent is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.’s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the

COMELEC was a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An
election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a
petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions.
Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such
as failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.

2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of
elections for being groundless. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to
annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare
a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of
election. There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (b)
the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes. The instances being not present in the petition of
Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss
the petition.
7. Aggabao v. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400 (2005)

FACTS:

Aggabao and Miranda were Congressional candidates of the 2004 elections.

During the canvassing of COCVs (Certificate of canvass of votes) Miranda moved for
the exclusion of the copy from Municipality of Cordon on the ground that it was
tampered with thus manifest errors. The PBC (Provisional Board of Canvassers)
excluded the contested COCVs; based on the results Miranda garnered the highest
votes. On appeal with COMELEC Second Division Aggabao asserted that PBC
acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for exclusion. COMELEC
En Banc directed the proclamation of Miranda as duly elected Congressman.
Aggabao filed this petition for certiorari, assailing the proclamation of Miranda. He
claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered
Miranda’s proclamation considering that the appeal had not yet been resolved. In his
Comment, Miranda moved for the dismissal of the petition considering that the issue
raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

ISSUE:

Whether the petition of Aggabao in under jurisdiction of COMELEC or HRET

RULING:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It is undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such,
petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET.
His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.
8. Ronald Allan Poe A.K.A. Fernando Poe, Jr., Protestant, Vs. Gloria
Macapagalarroyo, Protestee. P.E.T. Case No. 002. March 29, 2005

FACTS:

Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of
Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808
votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie actor Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court on June 30, 2004. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the
elections, Mr. FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal
on July 23, 2004. Mrs. GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest
on August 5, 2004. As counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the
presentation of their respective positions on the controversy, an act of God
intervened. On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by
Congress nor the death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to
abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of
periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal
to decide the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has
submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with
URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe claiming
that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of
her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino
people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late
husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will
of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA,
relying on Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and subsequent cases including analogous
cases decided by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts
that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes
on to the heirs. Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased
husband because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidates who obtained the 2 nd and 3 rd highest votes for the
presidency may contest the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not
receive the 2 nd and 3 rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the
presidency in the election that is being contested. Citing pertinent PET Rules,
protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of surviving
spouses to ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only
over election protests and quo warranto cases.

ISSUE:

May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case?

RULING:

NO. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule

14 of the PET Rules. Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd
placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers
have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election
contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly
voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3 rd highest
number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but it
does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decision of the electoral tribunals. Rule 3,
Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule
that movant/ intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16.
However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time
ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by
the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest. Motion of movant/intervenor is DENIED for lack of merit.
9. Legarda v. De Castro, P.E.T. CASE No. 003, March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright
dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a
motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the
correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots;
that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or
election returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing
bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be
made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power
to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based
on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing
election returns; that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of
law which are inadequate to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are
not supported by facts. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the
manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).

ISSUES:

1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?

2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?

3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance?

RULING:

1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President
and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and
COCs.

2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an
election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is
involved. However, we do not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of
the protest, considering that the protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot
results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee,
and reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of
manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and
addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.

3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces,

municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts
therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its
face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his office. The instant protest consists
of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due
time. Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must
again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations.
The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the
opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said
rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from
allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-
making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
10. Sarmiento v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992

FACTS:

Nine (9) special civil actions for certiorari, hereby jointly resolved, seek to set
aside the resolutions of respondent COMELEC. Petitioners impugn that the
challenged resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion, in that the
Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance and decided the appeals without first
referring them to any of its Divisions.

ISSUE:

Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having

been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting
en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to
any of it Divisions.

RULING:

The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of

discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned
Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3,
subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 3. The
Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc. Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be
set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission
for proper referral to a Division. A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said
Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on
assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No.
7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices
involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June
30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would
only be an exercise in futility. Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but
without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the
winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these
petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests
shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC
and of these petitions before this Court.
11. Zarate v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129096. November 19, 1999

FACTS:

Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes. Unsatisfied
with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an election
protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read
“JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the
votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name
or nickname of “JL”. The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of
petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid. Lallave appealed to the
Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in
his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and
that the votes bearing “Julian, Jr de Real”, “Notno Lallave”, and “Nono de Real”
should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename,
respectively. The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission
but was, instead, submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc
annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the
elected SK chairman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

RULING:

Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring
the case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision
was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to
a division. The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of
the Constitution which provides that “...election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.”
12. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GLAN v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Benzonan, who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani

during the May 14, 2001 elections, sought to declare null and void the canvass
conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Glan, Sarangani and to
recall the proclamation of petitioners Enrique B. Yap, Jr., Venancio S. Wata, Jr.,
Gildo Villorente, Sr., Ting Musa, Benedicto L. Ruiz, Ananias S. Emnace, Vannevar
B. Alegado, Alito Arnold Carino, Saturnino Bag, Jr. and Federico J. Tangan, as duly
elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan,
Sarangani, respectively. Benzonan argued her pre-proclamation case on the
grounds that:

a) after the original and second MBC had resigned, the third MBC was illegally
constituted as its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary are not qualified under
the Omnibus Election Code;

b) the canvassing proceedings, which were initially held in the Session Hall of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, were later transferred to the Provincial Capitol of
Danao Province, contrary to COMELEC Resolution No. 3848;

c) the Secretary of the MBC failed to record the minutes of the canvassing
proceedings since the start of the canvass;

d) neither Benzonan nor her representatives were notified of the last three days of
the canvassing proceedings and, consequently, they were not able to participate
therein;

e) a substantial number of the election returns had been tampered with or falsified;
and f) the MBC had falsified the certificate of canvass votes. On December 4, 2001,
the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding that, based on the evidence
presented, the canvass of votes had been conducted in a place other than the
previous venue at the inception of the proceedings to which all were notified. Thus,
the proclamations of the winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-
canvass of the election returns was ordered.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over this case

RULING:

Section 3 (c) of Article IX-C of the Constitution reads: The Commission on

Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc. Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC and reiterated in
subsequent cases, the most recent being Balindong v. COMELEC, the Court has
upheld this constitutional mandate and consistently ruled that the COMELEC sitting
en banc does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in
the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission and any
decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the
first instance is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is important to clarify, however,
that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to
be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-
judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in
division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc. It is clear that SPC No.
01-032 is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that requires the exercise
of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers, as the illegality of the composition and
proceedings of the MBC, including the falsification of election returns and certificate
of canvass, were alleged to be in issue. Furthermore, in her comment to the petition
dated January 9, 2000, Benzonan categorically stated that it is not disputed that
what is involved here is a pre-proclamation controversy.
13. Arsenio Alvarez vs. COMELEC and La-Raine Abad Sarmiento G.R. NO.
142527, March 1, 2001.

FACTS:

Arsenio Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Dona

Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent
Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest
claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of
Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the MTC
ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It
subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She
garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount. On appeal, the
Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that Sarmiento won over petitioner.
Sarmiento filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed.
Both petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and private respondents Motion for
Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The COMELEC En Banc
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second
Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. Petitioner brought
before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC when:

(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;

(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and

(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that decisions, final orders, or

rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay
officials shall be final, executory and not appealable. Petitioner’s argument: the
COMELEC violated its mandate on preferential disposition of election contests as
mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257,
Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought
before it within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out that the case
was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 1999 but the COMELEC En
Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four months and four days
after November 14, 1999.

ISSUE:

WON the COMELEC violated its mandate on “preferential disposition of

election contests”?
RULING:

Petition is dismissed. The court is not unaware of the Constitutional provision

cited by petitioner. The court agrees with him that election cases must be resolved
justly, expeditiously and inexpensively. The court is also not unaware of the
requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election cases
brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
submission for decision. The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten
(10) election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity,
legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The
COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical.
Considering further the tribunals manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to
treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence
to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by
reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code
had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert
the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in
numerous cases. Court finds NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION by the
COMELEC. Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to
treat the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the preferential disposition applies to
cases before the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of
the section will readily show. Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay
of the COMELEC for the first time. As private respondent pointed out, petitioner did
not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was pending before it. In
fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early
Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active participation of
a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-
judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said
party from later impugning the court or the body’s jurisdiction. Election cases brought
before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
submission for decision. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where
attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunals manpower and
logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines
realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to
resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this
is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction
might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to
disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.
14. Engr. Oscar A. Marmeto V. Comelec, Gr No. 213953, 2017-09-26

FACTS:

Marmeto assails the COMELEC's Resolution No. 14-0509, contending that

the denial of an initiative petition due to lack of appropriated funds constitutes a
gross neglect and abandonment of the COMELEC's duties under the Constitution He
asserts that the COMELEC evaded its mandated duty by citing unavailability of funds
as ground to frustrate the conduct of local initiative The COMELEC, on the other
hand, claims that the denial of Marmeto's initiative petition was proper, since the
propositions therein were beyond the legal powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
to enact "initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sanggunian to enact." The COMELEC refers to Section 458 of the
LGC which enumerates the powers and duties of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
noting that nothing in the provision grants the Sanggunian the power to create a
separate local legislative body. In its Comment and Memorandum, the COMELEC
defends the dismissal of Marmeto's second initiative petition on the ground that the
propositions raised therein were matters that were not within the powers of the
Sangguiang Panlungsod to enact. This petition purportedly proposed the creation of
another legislative body separate from the Sanggunian, composed of 12 appointive
sectoral representatives. Not only does the LGC denies to the Sanggunian the power
to create a separate legislative body, but it also limits the number of sectoral
representatives in the Sanggunian itself to only three elected members

ISSUES:

The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer the laws on local

initiative and referendum.

The COMELEC cannot defeat the exercise of the people's original legislative
power for lack of budgetary allocation for its conduct.

The COMELEC has the power to review whether the propositions in an

initiative petition are within the power of the concerned Sanggunian to enact.

RULING:

The Court has definitely ruled the question of whether the COMELEC may
prevent the conduct of a recall election for lack of specific budgetary allocation
therefor. The Court added that "when the COMELEC receives a budgetary
appropriation for its 'Current Operating Expenditures,' such appropriation includes
expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions" There is no reason not to
extend the Goh ruling to the present case. In fact, Marmeto's second initiative
petition was also filed in 2014; in dismissing Marmeto's petition for lack of funds, the
COMELEC was referring to its budget under the FY 2014 GAA. Although Goh
involved the conduct of recall elections, the 1.4 billion appropriation under the FY
2014 GAA was for the "conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
and plebiscites. The term "election" is comprehensive enough to include other kinds
of electoral exercises, including initiative elections.
III. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

1. AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318 (2001)

FACTS:

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements

sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The
voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks
that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth then sued COMELEC
for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are
now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which
provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election.
AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the
COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods
of preelection acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it

denied the extension of the voters registration.

RULING:

No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear
provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not
absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement. Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not
require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.
Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be presumed that
the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is
far removed from the realm of the possible. The State, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over
RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say
that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset. Further, even if what is asked is a
mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified,
sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to
reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the
May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes
after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good.
Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient.
Nowhere in AKBAYANYouth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from an
individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters
registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted
in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on
time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights.
2. Datu Inocencio C. Siawan Vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. A.M. No.
Mtj95-1056 .May 21, 2001

FACTS:

This is a complaint filed by Datu Inocencio Siawan against Judge Aquilino. A.

Inopiquez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for
gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of power, and misconduct in connection with
the latter's handling of a criminal case (Crim. Case No. 584) and two election cases
for inclusion of voters (Election Case Nos. 333 and 292.). In Crim. Case No. 584
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Julia Enriqua Seco, the accused then was
charged of Usurpation of Authority and Official Functions , involving, as the
complaint states, a "paquiao" contract in which the accused Julia Seco allegedly
signed as the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Cansuso, Matag-ob, Leyte; In the course of
the proceedings after the prosecution had already presented its witnesses, the
complaint was dismissed on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance executed by
complainant Restituto C. Pedrano. This Affidavit of Desistance is opposite to the
earlier affidavit of the same complainant, which was made the basis of the
Complaint. Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit of Desistance ,accused Seco had
filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court a Motion for Inhibition of the Presiding
Judge now respondent in this case .The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the
father-inlaw of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present in
the proceedings during which time he gave consultation to the complainant. Without
addressing the issues raised by accused Seco, respondent denied her motion for
inhibition in his order, dated May 22, 1987. Apparently realizing that the motion for
disqualification was meritorious, respondent, after partially hearing the case,
dismissed it on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Restituto
Pedrano. But, as Seco sued Pedrano for damages for filing the criminal case,
respondent judge ordered the withdrawal of Pedrano's affidavit of desistance from
the record and recalled his order dismissing the criminal case. Respondent then
revived Criminal Case No. 584 only to dismiss it again, saying the complainant in the
criminal case could always refile it. He then inhibited himself on the ground of
delicadeza citing his relationship to counsel for the private prosecutor. When
Criminal Case No. 1181 was filed against accused Seco, based on the same facts
as Criminal Case No. 584, respondent, to whom the case was again assigned,
issued an order, dated April 28, 1994, inhibiting himself, reiterating that he is related
to the private prosecutor which was later denied by the RTC of Ormoc city and soon
thereafter, respondent judge in an Order dated September 5, 1994 dismissed
Criminal Case No. 1181. A Motion For Reconsideration re the Order of dismissal
was filed by the private complainant. The respondent judge issued the Order of
November 14, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration complainant to which the
respondent judge directed accused's counsel, to file comment to the motion; a
second motion for reconsideration was again filed by the private complainant and the
respondent in an Order dated December 23, 1994 directed anew the accused's
counsel for another comment; Atty. Custodio Cañete complied and filed his comment
dated December 26, 1994 and later a supplemental comment. Criminal Case No.
1181 was finally laid to rest on February 17, 1995 as per admission of complainant
(b)Election Case Nos. 333 was a petition for inclusion of a voter in the voter's list.
Respondent judge admits that the petitioner, retired Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez,
Sr., is his uncle. Nonetheless, he justifies his failure to recuse himself on the ground
that the petition of Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr. was meritorious. (c) In Election Case
No. 292, on the other hand, the seven petitioners, all surnamed Herbas, alleged that
they were refused registration on February 1, 1992 at Brgy. San Sebastian, Matag-
ob, Leyte by the Board of Election Inspectors; and that they have not voted for two
consecutive elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr is guilty of grave

abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for his mishandling of the 3 cases
mentioned above.

RULING:

Respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a

fine of P20,000.00 for violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and is
SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months for abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law (a) Complainant's counsel in Criminal Case No. 584 was Atty.
Eusebio Otadoy, Jr. Respondent admits that he is related to Atty. Otadoy. Although
respondent is not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to Atty
Otadoy, the evidence shows that because of his relationship not only to Atty Otadoy
but also to those helping the complainant, Restituto Pedrano, one of whom,
Guillermo Laurente, is respondent's father-in-law, while the other one, Atty. Felix
Sun, is his brother-in-law, respondent judge acted with obvious partiality for
complainant in the criminal case. It is obvious that respondent got entangled in his
own maneuverings in his desire to favor and protect the complainant Restituto
Pedrano and those helping the latter .Respondent could have recused himself from
the moment his disqualification was sought by the accused Seco in Criminal Case
No. 594. Respondent hung on to the case as long as he could until this case was
filed against him. But then he realized that it was untenable for him to continue
hearing the criminal case not only because of his relationship to Atty. Otadoy but
also to Atty. Felix Sun and Edgardo Laurente, both of whom were his brothers-in-
law, who were actively participating in the prosecution of the criminal case. Indeed,
although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is
related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules
nonetheless provide that a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. (Rule 137, §1 of the
Rules of Court.) It may also be added that a well-meaning judge may not just order
the reopening of an already dismissed criminal case or direct the removal of a vital
evidence on record without first going over the record of the case. We are referring
to the irregular actuations of respondent in the same Crim. Case No. 584 wherein he
granted the motion of the private prosecutor to withdraw or detach the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by the private complainant 1) without the approval of the
private prosecutor; 2) despite the fact that the dismissal of the case was already
final; and 3) stating in the order that the accused was not yet arraigned, when the
truth is the prosecution has already rested when the case was dismissed on
December 22, 1992 (b) Respondent judge's contention is without merit. Rule 137, §1
of the Rules of Court provides: No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above. Similarly, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides: A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,
proceedings where: (d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree; . In every
instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition. Under these
provisions, respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle
and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose of the
prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of a judge. (c) The records show that neither of the petition in
Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No. 292 named the board of election
inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any showing that the board of
election inspectors was ever notified of hearings to be conducted on such inclusion
proceedings either by registered mail or by personal delivery, or by notice posted in
a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other
conspicuous places within the city or municipality at least 10 days prior to the day set
for the hearing as required in paragraph (b) of the above provision. The Omnibus
Election Code provides: Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings
in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters. (a) Outside of
regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of
voters shall be received. (b) Notices to the members of the board of election
inspectors and to challenge voters shall state the place, day and hour in which such
petition shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by
registered mail or by personal delivery. The failure of respondent to observe the
requirements of the Election Code is inexcusable. As a judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion or
exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these requirements because it
can be assumed that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.
3. Cirilo I. Mercado V. Judge Hector F. Dysangco, Am No. Mtj-00-1301, 2002-07-
30

FACTS:

Complainants Flordeliza C. Alejo, Arsenio L. Carpio, Cirilo I. Mercado, and

Pedro V. Soriano charged Judge Hector F. Dysangco, Acting Presiding Judge of the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Natividad-Llanera, Nueva Ecija, and Teresita S.
Esteban, Clerk of Court of the same court, with grave misconduct. Complainants
alleged that prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, forty-eight (48) persons
filed with the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters' list. Of these
forty-eight (48) petitioners, nine (9) were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado,
while thirty-nine (39) were supporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales. Mercado
and Gonzales were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Kabulihan,
Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija. on the day of the election, complainants were surprised
to find thirty-four (34) of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners with an Order signed by
respondent judge and attested by respondent clerk of court,directing their inclusion
in the voters' list of Barangay Kabulihan. Complainants averred that the issuance of
the Order by respondent judge was "highly anomalous, illegal, and patently of
dubious origin" because not one of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners presented
evidence or appeared in the scheduled hearings. Respondents, therefore, aided and
abetted thirty-four (34) flying voters in violating the Election Laws and in influencing
the result of the Barangay Elections in Kabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija.
Respondent judge denied committing any anomaly. In her comment, respondent
clerk of court denied any hand in the issuance of the questioned Order, asserting
that it was respondent judge's official and personal act. She claimed that, as a mere
clerk of court, she could not coerce respondent judge into issuing the Order. This
Court resolved to refer the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City for investigation, report and recommendation. Executive Judge
Johnson L. Ballutay act of respondent Judge Hector F. Dysangco, he should be
meted a fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS with warning that a repetition
of the same will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave
misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended.

RULING:

This Court dismissed the complaint against respondent Clerk of Court

Teresita S. Esteban. We find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and grave misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended. The clear mandate
of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on the basis of the
evidence presented, b) to conduct a hearing thereon, and c) to render a decision
within 10 days from the filing of the petition. Respondent judge, unfortunately, does
not know the above legal provisions. He did not decide the petition on the basis of
petitioners' evidence. He could not have done so. Extant in the record is the fact that
the thirty-nine (39) petitioners failed to attend any of the scheduled hearings. And,
second, respondent judge issued the Order beyond the ten-day period required by
Section 143. The petitions of the thirty-nine (39) Gonzales supporters were filed prior
to April 17, 1997, yet the Order granting them was issued only on May 9, 1997.
Respondent judge's issuance of the controversial Order sans hearing and beyond
the ten-day period constitutes gross ignorance of the law. His failure to observe the
requirements of the Omnibus Election Code is inexcusable. As a judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions
for inclusion or exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these legal
requirements because it can be assumed that these election cases were not the first
cases he has decided. Respondent judge likewise committed gross misconduct
constituting violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides that, "a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." It needs to be reiterated over and
over again, until it sinks into the consciousness of every judge, that litigants are
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the
ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only
render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. Considering the
circumstances in this case, the penalty of suspension from office for four (4) months
without salary and other benefits is deemed appropriate.
4. Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006.

FACTS:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship

under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among
others. Petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter”
but were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to
vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement
prescribed by the Constitution. Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in
the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC’s refusal to include them in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1,
2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not individuals who retained and/or reacquired Philippine

citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

RULING:

The Court accords merit to the petition. As may be noted, there is no provision
in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their
right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are
most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as
that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that
R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter
under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the
Constitution, respectively reading as follows: SECTION 1. Suffrage may be
exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. xxx. SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. In a nutshell, the
aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor
for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a
system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.
In effect, qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote
even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.