STATCON CASE DIGESTS

Part 10: Strict and Liberal Construction and Interpretation of Statutes

Source: Agpalo, pp.393-452

Martin Centeno vs Hon. Villalon- Pernilos and PP

FACTS:

 1985: officers of the civic org, Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive to
renovate the chapel of Brgy. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan
 Martin Centeno, the chairman, and Vicente Yco approached Judge Angeles who is a resident of
the area and solicited P1,500.
 Solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD
 Judge Angeles filed a complaint against Centeno for violating PD 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law).
Centeno filed a motion to quash on the ground that PD 1564 only covers solicitations made for
charitable or public welfare purposes, not those made for a religious purpose

MTC: found Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt

RTC: affirmed MTC’s ruling but modified penalty

ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
religious purpose

RULING: NO

PD 1564, Sec 2:

Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon
the filing of a written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized
representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the
application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under
Act 4075

 Elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others.
o Expressed in the Latin maxim, expression unius est exclusion alterius
o “where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others
 o Rationale: legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned
 1987 consti and other statutes have treated the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and
independently of each other
o Sec 28 (3), Art 6 Consti; Sec 26 and 28 in the National Internal Revenue Code; Sec 88 of
the Corpo Code; Sec 234 of LGC
o Legislative enactments spelled out “charitable” and “religious” in an enumeration
o Whereas, PD 156 merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which only show
that framers of the law never intended to include solicitation for religious purposes within
its coverage
 All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are “charitable” in nature, since
religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions
o But religious purpose =/= charitable purpose
o There may be a “charitable” purpose which is not “religious” in the legal sense
o Charitable is a broad term and includes matters which are not religious. The term,
therefore, has different meanings and significations
 To subsume “religious” purpose of the solicitation within the concept of “charitable” purpose
under PD 1564 would be prejudicial to the petitioner
o Charitable should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for religious purposes
