Professional Documents
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QI:ourt: L/epublic of Tbe
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JCT 0 2 2016
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THIRD DIVISION
x----------------------------------------------~-~-x
DECISION
LEONEN,J.:
Las Pifias City, which denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho's (Racho) Petition for
Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry. 4 The denial
was on the ground that a Certificate of Divorce issued by the Japanese
Embassy was insufficient to prove the existence of a divorce decree.
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in
Las Pifias City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in
Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children. 5
Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce
and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate6 issued by
Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate
in the Philippines and had it authenticated7 by an authentication officer of
the Department of Foreign Affairs. 8
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil
Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no
court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department of Foreign
Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed the
proper court order. She was also informed by the National Statistics Office
that her divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if
there was a court order capacitating her to remarry. Io
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and
Declaration of Capacity to Marry 12 with the Regional Trial Court, Las Pifias
City.
Butay Aglugub.
Id. at 38-39. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.
I
Id. at 40-48.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 6.
10
Id. at 33.
11
Id. at 33-34.
12
Id. at 40-48.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 199515
On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Pifias City
rendered a Decision, 13 finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally
obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove Tanaka's
national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent evidence since it
was not the divorce decree itself. 14
13
14
Id. at32-37.
Id. at 36.
I
15
Id. at 53-63.
16
Id. at 56-57.
7
1 Id. at 38-39.
18
Id. at 39.
19
Id.at3-31.
20
Id. at 64-65.
21
Id. at 66-72.
22 Id, at 67.
23
Id. at 69-70.
24
Id. at 82-86.
25 Id. at 87-89.
26 Id, at 126-151.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 199515
Reply. 2 7
She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving a
divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She
maintains that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul Takayama, whom
the Department of Foreign Affairs certified as duly appointed and qualified
to sign the document. She also states that the Divorce Certificate has
already been filed and recorded with the Civil Registry Office of Manila. 29
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article
728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce. 30
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that the
Certificate of Divorce has no probative value since it was not properly
authenticated under Rule 132, Section 24 31 of the Rules of Court. However,
it states that it has no objection to the admission of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance
with this Comi's January 18, 2012 Resolution. 32
It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned that she and her
husband obtained a divorce by agreement and only mentioned it in her
27
28
Id.
Id.
at 176-197. All notices to respondent Tanaka were returned unserved (rollo, pp. 216-217).
at 14-15.
I
29
Id.at 16-17.
30
Id.at 22, as cited in the Petition:
TERMINATION OF MATRIMONIAL RELATIONSHIP
Article 728. I. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.
31
RULES OF COUIU, Rule 132, sec. 24 provides:
Section 24. Proof of official record. -The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
32
Rollo, p. 13 8.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 199515
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. Thus, petitioner
failed to prove that she is now capacitated to marry since her divorce was
not obtained by the alien spouse. She also failed to point to a specific
provision in the Civil Code of Japan that allows persons who obtained a
divorce by agreement the capacity to remarry. In any case, a divorce by
agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family
Code. 33
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the Regional Trial
Court erred in dismissing the Petition for Declaration of Capacity to Marry
for insufficiency of evidence. After the submission of Comment, however,
the issue has evolved to whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between
petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly
obtained by the latter according to his national law.
II
Respondent's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner presented "a copy [of] the English Version of the Civil Code of
Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the Ministry of
Justice and the Code of Translation Committee." 44 Article 728(1) of the
Civil Code of Japan reads: I
37
See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division] and
Republic v. Orbecido ll/, 509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
38
See Corpuz v. Sta, Tomas, 642 Phil. 420(2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
39
See Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
40
418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
41
See Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/july2016/215723.pdf> 3 [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
42
642 Phil. 420 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
43
Id. at 432--433, citing II REMEDIAL LAW, Rules 23-56, 529 (2007); Republic v. Orbecido Ill, 509 Phil.
108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division]; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]; and Bayot v. Court ofAppeals, 591 Phil. 452 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division].
44
Rollo, p. 36.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 199515
This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the
basis of the Acceptance Certjfication of Notification of Divorce issued by
the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009. 46
!
[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce, namely: (1)
judicial divorce and (2) divorce by agreement.
III
45
Id. at 22.
46
Id. at 50.
47
Id. at 39.
48
Id. at 88-89. The original Japanese document and an English translation by Byunko Visa Counseling
Office, Tokyo, Japan are attached.
49
Id. at 87.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 199515
In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the cases to the Regional
Trial Courts for the reception of evidence and for further proceedings. 51
More recently in Medina v. Koike, 52 this Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine the national law of the foreign spouse:
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding
subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken
from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance
with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The court records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the
factual issues. 54 Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General neither
posed any objection to the admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce 55 nor argued that the Petition presented questions of fact.
50
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:
Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
/
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth. (Emphasis supplied)
51
See also Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third
Division] and San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Phil. 275 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division]
where this Court remanded the cases to the trial courts to determine the validity of the divorce decrees.
52
GR. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20I6/july2016/215723.pdf> [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
53
Id. at 5, citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420, 433-
435 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v.
People, 721 Phil. 760, 766-767(2013) [Per .J. Brion, Second Division]; and RULES OF COURT, Rule 56,
sec. 6.
54
See Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna Metal Multi-purpose Cooperative, 738 Phil. 37(2014) [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division] where this Court resolved the issues of the case despite being factual in nature
due to the sufficiency of the court records. In this case, the records of the Regional Trial Court were
received by this Court on November 19, 2014 (rollo, p. 214).
55
Rollo, p. 138.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 199515
In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve
this case on its merits.
IV
56 Id. at 87.
57
Id. at 39.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 199515
provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be
given to women. It does not require the State to actively pursue "affirmative
ways and means to battle the patriarchy-that complex of political, cultural,
and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment." 61
Article 2
Article 5
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles
for men and women[.]
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta
for Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations." 63 This necessarily includes the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be
interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the
foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is
issued, the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign
spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from
initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently
61
Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
I
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20 l 8/april20 I 8/22 I 029 _leonen.pd
t> 2 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
62
The Philippines became a signatory on July I 5, I 980. The treaty was ratified on August 5, I 981.
<https://treaties. un .org/Pages/View Detai ls.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no= IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en>.
63
Rep. Act No. 9710 (2008), sec. 19.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 199515
unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on
Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our
own nationals.
Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was
enacted during the Japanese occupation, provided for 11 grounds for
divorce, including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
least one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to
make further living together impracticable." 66
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared
void and Act No. 2710 again took effect. 67 It was only until the enactment
of the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in our
jurisdiction.
64
I
An Act to Establish Divorce ( 1917).
65
Section I. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-
seven of the Penal Code, cited in Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
66
Baptista v. Castaneda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 ( 1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
67
Id. at 462-463.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 199515
68
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
See Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen, Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
I
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2018/april2018/221029_leonen.pd
t> 4 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
69
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
<http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2018/april2018/221029 .pdt> [Per
J. Peralta, En Banc].
Decision 14 G.R. No. 199515
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is
in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as
a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation
of the latter's national law. 70 (Emphasis in the original)
The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses
initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner and
respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of
divorce in Japan: judicial divorce and divorce by agreement. Petitioner and
respondent's divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement, which is a
valid divorce according to Japan's national law. 71
[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former
wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
70
Id. at 11-12, citing Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86 ( 1993) [Per 1.
r
Quiason, First Division]; Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 ( 1992)
[Per J. Romero, En Banc]; Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268 (!994) [Per J.
Quiason, En Banc]; Enjay, Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. 648, 656 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division];
Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc]; National
Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005) [Per 1. Ynares-Santiago,
First Division]; Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007) [Per J.
Corona, First Division]; Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,
Third Division]; Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc.
(PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 547, 553 (2009) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]; league of Cities of the Phils., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., 623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]; and Fujiki v. Marinay,
712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
71
Rollo, p. 39.
72
Id. at 142.
73
509 Phil. I 08 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
Decision 15 G.R. No. 199515
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
I
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
74
Id. at 116-117.
75 Rollo, p. 142.
76 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
Decision 16 G.R. No. 199515
There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured
by respondent.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty
party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other
interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is
absolute and completely terminates their marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the
marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry. Thus,
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
irrelevant for the resolution of the issues in this case. The existence of
respondent's Marriage Certificate, however, only serves to highlight the
absurd situation sought to be prevented in the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.: 79
In Republic v. Orbecido 111, 83 this Court noted the obiter in Quita and
stated outright that Filipino citizens who later become naturalized as foreign
citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino spouses:
/
79
223 Phil. 357 (l 985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
80
Id. at 362-363, citing Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]; I PARAS,
CIVIL CODE 52 (1971 ); SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (1979).
81
360 Phil. 601 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
82
Republic v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 114 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
83
509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
Decision 18 G.R. No. 199515
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our
laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's newfound
companionship with another cannot be just. 85 Justice is better served if she
is not discriminated against in her own country. 86 As much as petitioner is
free to seek fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be
free to pledge her commitment within the institution of marriage.
SO ORDERED.
.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: /
J. VELASCO, JR.
Asri;ociate Justice
Chairperson
84
Id. at 114-115, citing Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850, 855 (1957) [Per J.
Montemayor, En Banc].
85
See Van Dorn v. Romillo, J1:, 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
86
See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
Decision 19 G.R. No. 199515
SAMUEL R.
~
Associate Justi e
RES
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been ryached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the oBmion of the
Court's Division.
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
OCT 0 ? 701B