G.R. No.

166496 November 9, 2006 CA:

JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, Petitioner,
vs. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by
SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL M. way of a Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion
FERRER and FLORA FERRER,Respondents. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the
dismissal.
FACTS:
On 16 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
 Petitioner Josefa alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo granting the Petition. It held that petitioners Complaint is not the
Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of respondents Manuel M. proper action for the respondent to enforce her right of
Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael). reimbursement of the cost of the improvements on the subject
 Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece property.
of lot.
 He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
thereon, including a residential house and a two-door
apartment building. However, on 17 December 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Resolution denying the motion.
 However, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that
he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of
Hence, the present recourse.
a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of
respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
ISSUE:
 When her husband was already bedridden, respondents
WON respondents have an obligation to respect her right to be
Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document,
reimbursed
purported to be his last will and testament. The document,
however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the
HELD:
improvements thereon.
 Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of
NO.
Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against
While it made a reference to the right of the spouse as
respondents.
contemplated in Art. 120 of the family code to be reimbursed for
the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when
the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation
There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property,
of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for
in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
the cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the
She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted
ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and
property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or
paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
Alfredo’s lot.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
She averred that respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge about
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
the fact that the improvements were constructed using conjugal
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong
funds as they had occupied one of the apartment buildings on
to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value
Alfredo’s lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner.
of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
Petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to render an
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement
accounting from September, 1991, on the income of the boarding
of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely
house constructed thereon which they had appropriated for
declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article
themselves, and to remit one-half thereof as her share. Finally,
120 of the Family Code.
petitioner sought from respondents moral and exemplary damages,
litigation and incidental expenses.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner
the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever
had no cause of action against them, and that the cause of action
be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to
was barred by prior judgment.
reimburse petitioner for her costs rested.
RTC:
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the
conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to Dismiss.
efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not
According to the RTC, no pronouncement as to the improvements
have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.
constructed on Alfredos lot has been made in Civil Case No. 61327,
and the payment of petitioners share in the conjugal partnership
The right of the respondents to acquire as buyers the subject
constitutes a separate cause of action.A subsequent
premises from alfredo under the assailed Deed of Sale in Civil Case
Order[11] dated 17 January 2003 was issued by the RTC, denying
No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is because the validity of the
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with finality.
The petition is denied.

Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or

adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or
both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the
original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property
of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise,
said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested
upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006 Ratio Decidendi:
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner, There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the
vs. Philippines.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of
Facts: hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the the property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the
house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek
petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller. reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity
as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court
granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, pursuant to Article 92 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse
during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property.
The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is
excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein
spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property
as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong
exclusively to the petitioner.

However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for

acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by
the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will
leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice
to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which

reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It
ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of
P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo,
Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to
reimbursement.

Held:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely:
LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all
surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
FACTS:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with
a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to
Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on
March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father,
Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of
Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999,
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go)
sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters
to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00. On March 2, 2001,
the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to
resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial
Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the
sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation,
the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community
property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned
the property because he had purchased it with his own money.
On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the property was the
conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the
sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the
participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their
being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil
Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless
there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s
renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property, holding that: "As long as the portion sold, alienated or
encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final
partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the portion
sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is
valid."
The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration prompted the
petitioners to appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
[1] Is Article 130 of the Family Code the applicable law?
[2] Is that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio void for being
made without prior liquidation?
HELD:
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of
gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were
married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death
in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article
175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with
respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation. The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an
ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest
of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as
co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of
Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly
provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of
the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the
sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned
in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of
the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion
that might not be validly sold to her.
G.R. No. 200274
MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner, Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s
vs. effectivity which was on August 3, 1988 and so their property
SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by relation is a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora died in
ESTER MOLINA, Respondents. 1968, pursuant to now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.

FACTS: The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership

On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought
a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided
portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land which was
annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354.
Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent spouses
Genaro and Elena Molina all throughout his life. Ten years after the
death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to
the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2729677 and the entire one-
half undivided portion of the land was transferred to the them.
One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the spouses
Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17, 1999. Melecio
claims that it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his
father has borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio could not have
validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s
consent, as she was already dead at the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to
the subject property to answer for his debts and told them that
they already own half of the land. They have been in possession of
the subject property before the title was registered under their
names and have religiously paid the property’s real estate taxes.
The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina,
substituted them when they died during the pendency of the case.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio
failed to establish his claim that his father did not sell the property
to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio could dispose of
conjugal property to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it
denied Melecio’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling and
so he proceeded with his appeal to the CA.
among the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.
This will also include Anastacio with respect to Flora’s share of the
conjugal partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title
to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without having
done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by judicial
decree. On the other hand, Anastacio owns one-half of the original
conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest. As a consequence, he had the right to freely sell
and dispose his undivided interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to
the extent of Anastacio’s interest. Anastactio’s sale to the spouses
Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally
void, for his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively
transferred. The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit
of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might
belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. Melecio’s
recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no
fraud in the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina.
The notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT executed
between Anastacio and the spouses Molina negated Melecio’s
argument that no document was executed for the sale of the
disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioner’s belief that his
father, Anastacio, could not have sold the property without his
knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the
spouses Molina's registered title over the subject property.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari.
The decision dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94160 is AFFIRMED.

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to
prove by preponderant evidence that there was fraud in the
conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave credence
to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that
Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights
over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding Flora’s interest. Finally,
the CA held that Melecio’s action has prescribed because he failed
to file the action within one year after entry of the decree of
registration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses

Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal; and
2. Whether or not fraud attended the transfer of the subject
property to the spouses Molina.

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale
of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without
Flora’s consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.
[ G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017 ]
RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE), PETITIONER, V. ESTATE OF
VIPA FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered owner of a parcel of
land situated in Jaro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her husband Levi
Lahaylahay have two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances.
In 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael
Uy over the subject property and the improvements thereon to
which Rafael bound himself to pay the amount of P 3,000 per month
with provision for a 10% every year thereafter.
On 1995, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever, Grace
Joy became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. In 1998,
Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, the estate
of Vipa filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC against
Rafael. Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the complaint, unpaid
rents amounted to P271,150.00.
MTCC rendered a decision ordering Rafael to vacate the premises
and to pay the amount of unpaid rents with 12% interest per
annum.
On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC and dismiss the
complaint for unlawful detainer. According the RTC, Grace was the
plaintiff not the estate and it had failed to the bring the dispute to
the barangay conciliation; that the property is part of conjugal
property and after Vipa’s death the conjugal partnership was
terminated. Levi sold his property to Rafael, thus making him co-
owner of the property.
ISSUE:
(1) What happens to the partition of the property upon dissolution
of conjugal partnership due to death of a spouse (Vipa) and
(2) Whether Rafael has a right over the property
HELD:
Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961 and in the absence of
a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains
governs their property relations. It is presumed that the subject
property is part of the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi
considering that the same was acquired during the subsistence of
their marriage and there being no proof to the contrary.
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was
automatically terminated.
Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership
property, upon its dissolution due to the death of either spouse,
should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof,
by the surviving spouse within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void. Thus:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations
of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership
of gains already established between the spouses prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code pursuant to Article 105 thereof, Article
105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements
that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter
shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws as
provided in Article 256.
Rafael bought Levi’s one-half share in the subject property in
consideration of P500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Sale52
dated December 29, 2005. At that time, the conjugal partnership
properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such
disposition, notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the
conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains, the husband and wife are co-owners of all the property of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving
spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the
properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated
properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.
With respect, however, to the deceased spouse’s share in the
conjugal partnership properties, an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the
deceased.
Thus, upon Vipa’s death, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his
share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa’s
share, was transmitted to Vipa’s heirs — Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and
her husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child. The ensuing implied co-ownership is governed by
Article 493 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership
properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or
claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial
decree. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof.
All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.

Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi

had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.
Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject
property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof
was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of
the subject property. It must be stressed that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.

However, Rafael became a co-owner of the subject property only on

December 29, 2005 — the time when Levi sold his one-half
undivided share over the subject property to the former. Thus, from
December 29, 2005 Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to possess
the subject property as an incident of ownership. Otherwise stated,
prior to his acquisition of Levi’s one-half undivided share, Rafael was
a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus obliged to pay the
rent for his possession thereof.

Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject

property since he is already a co-owner thereof. Nevertheless,
Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid rentals from June 1998 until
April 2003 in the amount of P271,150.00. Prior to July 1, 2013, the
rate of interest on loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of
stipulation, is still 12%. Accordingly, the amount of P271,150.00,
representing the unpaid rentals shall earn interest at the rates of
12% per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003
until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully
paid.

Further, Rafael is likewise bound to pay reasonable rent for the use
and occupancy of the subject property from May 2003 until
December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand, i.e.,
the filing of the complaint with the MTCC on June 12, 2003, until
June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
The award of attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 is likewise proper.

Certainly, because of Rafael’s unjustified refusal to pay the rents due

on the lease of the subject property, the Estate of Vipa was put to
unnecessary expense and trouble to protect its interest under
paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
SPOUSES JULIETA B. CARLOS and FERNANDO P.
CARLOS, Petitioners
vs.
JUAN CRUZ TOLENTINO, Respondent
FACTS:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land located in Quezon
City and registered in the name of respondent Juan Tolentino.
Without Juan's knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff, who
were then residing in the subject property, allegedly forged a Deed
of Donation thereby making it appear that Juan and Mercedes
donated the subject property to Kristoff. Thus, by virtue of the
alleged forged Deed of Donation, a new TCT was issued in the name
of Kristoff.
Subsequently, Kristoff offered the sale of the property to Spouses
Carlos. After a series of negotiations, Kristoff and Julieta executed a
Memorandum of Agreement stating that Kristoff is selling the
subject property to Julieta in the amount of Two Million Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,300,000.00). After Julieta made the
full payment, on the same day a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
between Kristoff and Julieta.
Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim which was annotated on the title. Juan also filed a
criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Document before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against Kristoff.
Meanwhile, by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Register of
Deeds issued a new transfer certificate of title in favor of the
spouses Carlos.
Which prompted Juan to file a complaint for annulment of title with
damages against his wife Mercedes Tolentino, his grandson Kristoff
Tolentino, herein petitioner spouses Carlos and Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.
RTC, found that Juan’s signature was a forgery. Despite such finding,
however, it dismissed Juan's complaint. The R TC found that at the
time Spouses Carlos fully paid the agreed price in the MOA Kristoff
was the registered owner of the subject property. Further, when the
MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 30, 2011 were
executed, nothing was annotated on the said title to indicate the
adverse claim of Juan or any other person. It was only on July 15,
2011 when Juan's adverse claim was annotated on Kristoff's title.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the CA found that Spouses
Carlos were negligent in not taking the necessary steps to determine
the status of the subject property prior to their purchase thereof.
Accordingly, the CA ruled that Juan has a better right over the
subject property. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation and subsequent sale of the subject
property is valid?
RULING:
The Court partially granted the petition. The Court ruled that he
donation and subsequent sale of the subject property is declared
NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion owned by
Juan Cruz Tolentino, but VALID with respect to the other undivided
1/2 portion belonging to Mercedes Tolentino. Accordingly,
petitioners Spouses Carlos and respondent Juan Cruz Tolentino are
hereby declared as co-owners of the subject property.
Here, the Court noted that Juan and Mercedes appear to have been
married before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
There being no indication that they have adopted a different
property regime, the presumption is that their property relations is
governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119
of the Civil Code thus provides:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Since the subject property was acquired on March 17, 196728
during the marriage of Juan and Mercedes, it formed part of their
conjugal partnership. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the
absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest, respectively,
over the subject property.
Meanwhile, as in any other property relations between husband and
wife, the conjugal partnership is terminated upon the death of
either of the spouses. In respondent Juan's Comment filed before
the Court, the Verification which he executed on February 9, 2018
states that he is already a widower. Hence, the Court takes due
notice of the fact of Mercedes' death which inevitably results in the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
In retrospect, as absolute owners of the subject property then
covered by TCT No. RT-90746 (116229), Juan and Mercedes may
validly exercise rights of ownership by executing deeds which
transfer title thereto such as, in this case, the Deed of Donation
dated February 15, 2011 in favor of their grandson, Kristoff.
With regard to Juan's consent to the afore-stated donation, the RTC,
however, found that such was lacking since his signature therein was
forged. Notably, the CA did not overturn such finding, and in fact, no
longer touched upon the issue of forgery. On the other hand, it must
be pointed out that the signature of Mercedes in the Deed of
Donation was never contested and is, therefore, deemed admitted.
In the present case, while it has been settled that the congruence of
the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of
conjugal property, it cannot be ignored that Mercedes' consent to
the disposition of her one-half interest in the subject property
remained undisputed. It is apparent that Mercedes, during her
lifetime, relinquished all her rights thereon in favor of her grandson,
Kristoff.
Furthermore, Mercedes' knowledge of and acquiescence to the
subsequent sale of the subject property to Spouses Carlos is
evidenced by her signature appearing in the MOA dated April 12,
2011 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 12, 2011. We
are also mindful of the fact that Spouses Carlos had already paid a
valuable consideration in the amount of Two Million Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,300,000.00) for the subject property before
Juan's adverse claim was annotated on Kristoff s title. The said
purchase and acquisition for valuable consideration deserves a
certain degree of legal protection.
Given the foregoing, the Court is disinclined to rule that the Deed of
Donation is wholly void ab initio and that the Spouses Carlos should
be totally stripped of their right over the subject property. In
consonance with justice and equity, Court deem it proper to uphold
the validity of the Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011 but
only to the extent of Mercedes' one-half share in the subject
property. And rightly so, because why invalidate Mercedes'
disposition of her one-half portion of the conjugal property that will
eventually be her share after the termination of the conjugal
partnership? It will practically be absurd, especially in the instant
case, since the conjugal partnership had already been terminated
upon Mercedes' death.

Accordingly, the right of Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the one-

half undivided portion that Mercedes owned. The Deed of Donation
insofar as it covered the remaining one-half undivided portion of the
subject property is null and void, Juan not having consented to the
donation of his undivided half.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Spouses Carlos' right, as vendees in

the subsequent sale of the subject property, is confined only to the
one-half undivided portion thereof. The other undivided half still
belongs to Juan. As owners pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in
question, either Spouses Carlos or Juan may ask for the partition of
the lot and their property rights shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. This disposition is in line with the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as
far as it is legally possible to do so—quando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valerepotest.