VICENTE SY-JUCO and CIPRIANA VIARDO, plaintiffs-appellants, The defendant invokes the decision of this Court in the case
The defendant invokes the decision of this Court in the case of Martinez vs. Martinez (1 Phil. Rep., 647), which
vs.
SANTIAGO V. SY-JUCO, defendant-appellant.
AVANCEA, J.:
In 1902 the defendant was appointed by the plaintiffs administrator of their property and acted as such until
June 30, 1916, when his authority was cancelled. The plaintiffs are defendant's father and mother who allege
that during his administration the defendant acquired the property claimed in the complaint in his capacity as
plaintiffs' administrator with their money and for their benefit. After hearing the case the trial court rendered his
decision, the dispositive part of which is the following:
Wherefore, the court give judgment for the plaintiffs and orders:
1. That the defendant return to the plaintiffs the launch Malabon, in question, and execute all the
necessary documents and instruments for such delivery and the registration in the records of the
Custom House of said launch as plaintiffs' property;
2. That the defendant return to the plaintiffs the casco No. 2584, or pay to them the value thereof
which has been fixed at the sum of P3,000, and should the return of said casco be made, execute all
the necessary instruments and documents for its registration in plaintiffs' name at the Custom House;
and
3. That the defendant return to the plaintiffs the automobile No. 2060 and execute the necessary
instruments and documents for its registration at the Bureau of Public Works. And judgment is hereby
given for the defendant absolving him from the complaint so far concerns:
1. The rendition of accounts of his administration of plaintiffs property;
2. The return of the casco No. 2545;
3. The return of the typewriting machine;
4. The return of the house occupied by the defendant; and
5. The return of the price of the piano in question.
Both parties appealed from this judgment.
In this instance defendant assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the lower court in connection
with the three items of the dispositive part of the judgment unfavorable to him. We are of the opinion that the
evidence sufficiently justifies the judgment against the defendant.
Regarding the launch Malabon, it appears that in July, 1914, the defendant bought it in his own name from the
Pacific Commercial Co., and afterwards registered it at the Custom House. But his does not necessarily show that
the defendant bought it for himself and with his own money, as he claims. This transaction was within the
agency which he had received from the plaintiffs. The fact that he has acted in his own name may be only, as we
believe it was, a violation of the agency on his part. As the plaintiffs' counsel truly say, the question is not in
whose favor the document of sale of the launch is executed nor in whose name same was registered, but with
whose money was said launch bought. The plaintiffs' testimony that it was bought with their money and for
them is supported by the fact that, immediately after its purchase, the launch had to be repaired at their
expense, although said expense was collected from the defendant. I the launch was not bought for the plaintiffs
and with their money, it is not explained why they had to pay for its repairs.
we do not believe is applicable to the present case. In said case, Martinez, Jr., bought a vessel in his own name
and in his name registered it at the Custom House. This court then said that although the funds with which the
vessel was bought belonged to Martinez Sr., Martinez Jr. is its sole and exclusive owner. But in said case the
relation of principal and agent, which exists between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the present case, did not
exist between Martinez, Sr., and Martinez, Jr. By this agency the plaintiffs herein clothed the defendant with
their representation in order to purchase the launch in question. However, the defendant acted without this
representation and bought the launch in his own name thereby violating the agency. If the result of this
transaction should be that the defendant has acquired for himself the ownership of the launch, it would be
equivalent to sanctioning this violation and accepting its consequences. But not only must the consequences of
the violation of this agency not be accepted, but the effects of the agency itself must be sought. If the defendant
contracted the obligation to but the launch for the plaintiffs and in their representation, but virtue of the agency,
notwithstanding the fact that he bought it in his own name, he is obliged to transfer to the plaintiffs the rights he
received from the vendor, and the plaintiffs are entitled to be subrogated in these rights.
There is another point of view leading us to the same conclusion. From the rule established in article 1717 of the
Civil Code that, when an agency acts in his own name, the principal shall have no right of action against the
person with whom the agent has contracted, cases involving things belonging to the principal are excepted.
According to this exception (when things belonging to the principal are dealt with) the agent is bound to the
principal although he does not assume the character of such agent and appears acting in his own name (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, May 1, 1900). This means that in the case of this exception the agent's apparent
representation yields to the principal's true representation and that, in reality and in effect, the contract must be
considered as entered into between the principal and the third person; and, consequently, if the obligations
belong to the former, to him alone must also belong the rights arising from the contract. The money with which
the launch was bough having come from the plaintiff, the exception established in article 1717 is applicable to
the instant case.
Concerning the casco No. 2584, the defendant admits it was constructed by the plaintiff himself in the latter's
ship-yard. Defendant's allegation that it was constructed at his instance and with his money is not supported by
the evidence. In fact the only proof presented to support this allegation is his own testimony contradicted, on
the on hand, by the plaintiffs' testimony and, on the other hand, rebutted by the fact that, on the date
this casco was constructed, he did not have sufficient money with which to pay the expense of this construction.
As to the automobile No. 2060, there is sufficient evidence to show that its prices was paid with plaintiffs'
money. Defendant's adverse allegation that it was paid with his own money is not supported by the evidence.
The circumstances under which, he says, this payment has been made, in order to show that it was made with
his own money, rather indicate the contrary. He presented in evidence his check-book wherein it appears that on
March 24, 1916, he issued a check for P300 and on the 27th of same month another for P400 and he says that
the first installment was paid with said checks. But it results that, in order to issue the check for P300 on March
24 of that year, he had to deposit P310 on that same day; and in order to issue the other check for P400 on the
27th of the same month, he deposited P390 on that same day. It was necessary for the defendant to make these
deposits for on those dates he had not sufficient money in the bank for which he could issue those checks. But,
in order to pay for the price of the automobile, he could have made these payments directly with the money he
deposited without the necessity of depositing and withdrawing it on the same day. If this action shows
something, it shows defendant's preconceived purpose of making it appear that he made the payment with his
own funds deposited in the bank.
The plaintiffs, in turn, assign in this instance the following three errors alleged to have been committed by the
lower court:
 1. The court erred in not declaring that the plaintiffs did not sell to the defendant the casco No. 2545
and that they were its owners until it was sunk in June, 1916.
2. The court erred in absolving the defendant from his obligation to render an account of his
administration to the plaintiffs, and to pay to the latter the amount of the balance due in their favor.
3. The court erred in not condemning the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the value of the woods,
windows and doors taken from their lumber-year by the defendant and used in the construction of the
house on calle Real of the barrio of La Concepcion, municipality of Malabon, Rizal.
Concerning the casco No. 2545, the lower court refrained from making any declaration about its ownership in
view of the fact that this casco had been leased and was sunk while in the lessee's hands before the complaint in
this case was filed. The lower court, therefore, considered it unnecessary to pass upon this point. We agree with
the plaintiffs that the trial court should have made a pronouncement upon this casco. The lessee may be
responsible in damages for its loss, and it is of interest to the litigants in this case that it be determined who is
the owner of said casco that may enforce this responsibility of the lessee.
Upon an examination of the evidence relative to this casco, we find that it belonged to the plaintiffs and that the
latter sold it afterwards to the defendant by means of a public instrument. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' allegation
that when they signed this instrument they were deceived, believing it not to be an instrument of sale in favor of
the defendant, nevertheless, they have not adduced sufficient proof of such deceit which would destroy the
presumption of truth which a public document carries with it. Attorney Sevilla, who acted as the notary in the
execution of this instrument, testifying as a witness in the case, said that he never verified any document without
first inquiring whether the parties knew its content. Our conclusion is that this casco was lawfully sold to the
defendant by the plaintiffs.
Concerning the wood, windows and doors given by the plaintiffs to the defendant and used in the construction
of the latter's house on calle Real of the barrio of La Concepcion of the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, we find
correct the trial Court's decision that they were given to the defendant as his and his wife's property.
Concerning the rendition of accounts which the plaintiffs require of the defendant, we likewise find correct the
trial court's decision absolving the latter from this petition, for it appears, from the plaintiffs' own evidence, that
the defendant used to render accounts of his agency after each transactions, to the plaintiffs' satisfaction.
From the foregoing considerations, we affirm the judgment appealed from in all its parts except in so far as
the casco No. 2545 is concerned, and as to this we declare that, it having been sold by the plaintiffs to the
defendant, the latter is absolved. No special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, master and servants, or employer and employee, refer to cases of physical injuries, light or serious, resulting in
vs. loss of a member of the body or of any one of the senses, or permanent physical disability or even death,
NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees. suffered in line of duty and in the course of the performance of the duties assigned to the servant or employee,
and these cases are mainly governed by the Employer's Liability Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a
Conrado Rubio for appellant.
case involving damages caused to an employee by a stranger or outsider while said employee was in the
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, and Benjamin Guerrero for appellees.
performance of his duties, presents a novel question which under present legislation we are neither able nor
MONTEMAYOR, J.: prepared to decide in favor of the employee.

The facts in this case based on an agreed statement of facts are simple. In the year 1941 the Northern Theatrical
Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation operated a movie house in Laoag, IlocosNorte, and among the persons
employed by it was the plaintiff DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the
main entrance of the cine, to maintain peace and order and to report the commission of disorders within the
premises. As such guard he carried a revolver. In the afternoon of July 4, 1941, one Benjamin Martin wanted to
crash the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in
without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo. De la Cruz defendant himself as
best he could until he was cornered, at which moment to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the
latter's death.
In a case like the present or a similar case of say a driver employed by a transportation company, who while in
the course of employment runs over and inflicts physical injuries on or causes the death of a pedestrian; and
such driver is later charged criminally in court, one can imagine that it would be to the interest of the employer
to give legal help to and defend its employee in order to show that the latter was not guilty of any crime either
deliberately or through negligence, because should the employee be finally held criminally liable and he is found
to be insolvent, the employer would be subsidiarily liable. That is why, we repeat, it is to the interest of the
employer to render legal assistance to its employee. But we are not prepared to say and to hold that the giving
of said legal assistance to its employees is a legal obligation. While it might yet and possibly be regarded as a
normal obligation, it does not at present count with the sanction of man-made laws.

For the killing, De la Cruz was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 8449 of the Court of First Instance of If the employer is not legally obliged to give, legal assistance to its employee and provide him with a lawyer,
IlocosNorte. After a re-investigation conducted by the Provincial Fiscal the latter filed a motion to dismiss the naturally said employee may not recover the amount he may have paid a lawyer hired by him.
complaint, which was granted by the court in January 1943. On July 8, 1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the
Viewed from another angle it may be said that the damage suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the expenses
same crime of homicide, in Criminal Case No. 431 of the same Court. After trial, he was finally acquitted of the
incurred by him in remunerating his lawyer, is not caused by his act of shooting to death the gate crasher but
charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases De la Cruz employed a lawyer to defend him. He demanded
rather by the filing of the charge of homicide which made it necessary for him to defend himself with the aid of
from his former employer reimbursement of his expenses but was refused, after which he filed the present
counsel. Had no criminal charge been filed against him, there would have been no expenses incurred or damage
action against the movie corporation and the three members of its board of directors, to recover not only the
suffered. So the damage suffered by plaintiff was caused rather by the improper filing of the criminal charge,
amounts he had paid his lawyers but also moral damages said to have been suffered, due to his worry, his
possibly at the instance of the heirs of the deceased gate crasher and by the State through the Fiscal. We say
neglect of his interests and his family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P15,000.
improper filing, judging by the results of the court proceedings, namely, acquittal. In other words, the plaintiff
On the basis of the complaint and the answer filed by defendants wherein they asked for the dismissal of the
was innocent and blameless. If despite his innocence and despite the absence of any criminal responsibility on
complaint, as well as the agreed statement of facts, the Court of First Instance of IlocosNorte after rejecting the
his part he was accused of homicide, then the responsibility for the improper accusation may be laid at the door
theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of the defendants and that as such agent he was entitled to
of the heirs of the deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they are the parties that may be held responsible
reimbursement of the expenses incurred by him in connection with the agency (Arts. 1709-1729 of the old Civil
civilly for damages and if this is so, we fail to see now this responsibility can be transferred to the employer who
Code), found that plaintiff had no cause of action and dismissed the complaint without costs. De la Cruz
in no way intervened, much less initiated the criminal proceedings and whose only connection or relation to the
appealed directly to this Tribunal for the reason that only questions of law are involved in the appeal.
whole affairs was that he employed plaintiff to perform a special duty or task, which task or duty was performed
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and the plaintiff was not that lawfully and without negligence.
of principal and agent because the principle of representation was in no way involved. Plaintiff was not
Still another point of view is that the damages incurred here consisting of the payment of the lawyer's fee did
employed to represent the defendant corporation in its dealings with third parties. He was a mere employee
not flow directly from the performance of his duties but only indirectly because there was an efficient,
hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special guard and staying at the main entrance
intervening cause, namely, the filing of the criminal charges. In other words, the shooting to death of the
of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order within the premises. The question
deceased by the plaintiff was not the proximate cause of the damages suffered but may be regarded as only a
posed by this appeal is whether an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the
remote cause, because from the shooting to the damages suffered there was not that natural and continuous
task assigned to him, performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in expenses, caused not directly by
sequence required to fix civil responsibility.
his master or employer or his fellow servants or by reason of his performance of his duty, but rather by a third
party or stranger not in the employ of his employer, may recover said damages against his employer. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
The learned trial court in the last paragraph of its decision dismissing the complaint said that "after studying
many laws or provisions of law to find out what law is applicable to the facts submitted and admitted by the
parties, has found none and it has no other alternative than to dismiss the complaint." The trial court is right. We
confess that we are not aware of any law or judicial authority that is directly applicable to the present case, and
realizing the importance and far-reaching effect of a ruling on the subject-matter we have searched, though
vainly, for judicial authorities and enlightenment. All the laws and principles of law we have found, as regards
 JULIAN T. AGUNA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ANTONIO LARENA, judicial administrator of the intestate estate of even assuming it to be admissible, in view of the circumstances appearing undisputed in the record, namely, the
the deceased Mariano Larena, Defendant-Appellee. fact that the plaintiff-appellant did not have any source of income that could produce him such a large sum of
money as that invested in the construction of the house; and the fact that the deceased had more than the
Ramirez &Ortigas for appellant.
necessary amount to build the house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Cardenas &Casal for appellee.
But above all, the facts appearing from Exhibit 40 are conclusive against the claim of the plaintiff-appellant.
OSTRAND, J.:
Exhibit 40 is a book of accounts containing several items purporting to have been advanced by the deceased to
This action is brought to recover the sum of P29,600 on two cause against the administrator of the estate of the the plaintiff-appellant for the construction of the house. The plaintiff admitted that the first two lines
deceased Mariano Larena.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library constituting the heading of the account on the first page were written by himself. Said two lines say:
"DineroTomado a Don Mariano Larenapara la nueva casa." Appellant further admits that the first entry in Exhibit
Upon his first cause of action, the plaintiff claims the sum of P9,600, the alleged value of the services rendered 40 was made by him and that the sum of P3,200 mentioned in the third entry was received by him. It is to be
by him to said deceased as his agent in charge of the deceased's houses situated in Manila. Under the second noted that the first entry is dated February 1, 1926, and the last is under the date of December 31, 1927. The
cause of action the plaintiff alleges that one of the buildings belonging to the deceased and described in his other entries are admitted by the plaintiff-appellant to have been made by the deceased. Finally the appellant
complaint was built by him with the consent of the deceased, and for that reason he is entitled to recover the admitted in cross-examination that this book, Exhibit 40, was his and that whenever he received money from the
sum disbursed by him in its construction, amounting to P20,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual deceased, he handed it to the deceased in order that the latter might enter what he had received. The total of
law library the items contained in this book is P17, 834.72, which is almost the amount invested in the construction of the
From the evidence it appears undisputed that from February, 1922, to February, 1930, the plaintiff rendered building. Furthermore, the items entered in Exhibit 40, appear in Exhibit 41 as withdrawn by the deceased from
services to the deceased, consisting in the collection of the rents due from the tenants occupying the deceased's his account with the Monte de Piedad, and a corresponding entry appears in Exhibit 43 showing a deposit made
houses in Manila and attending to the repair of said houses when necessary. He also took any such steps as were by the plaintiff in his current account with the Philippine National Bank. From all of this it is clear that the money
necessary to enforce the payment of rents and all that was required to protect the interests of the deceased in invested in the construction of the building in question did not belong to the
connection with said houses. The evidence also shows that during the time the plaintiff rendered his services, he plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
did not receive any compensation. It is, however, a fact admitted that during said period the plaintiff occupied a
house belonging to the deceased without paying any rent at all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
library
As to the building whose value is claimed by the plaintiff, the record shows that said building was really erected
on a parcel of land belonging to the deceased on Calle Victoria, Manila, and that the expenses for materials and
labor in the construction thereof were paid by the appellant, the construction having begun in 1926 and
terminated in 1928, but the ownership of the money interested in the building is in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the first cause the plaintiff-appellant insists that, the services having been rendered, an obligation to
compensate them must necessarily arise. The trial court held that the compensation for the services of the
plaintiff was the gratuitous use and occupation of some of the houses of the deceased by the plaintiff and his
family. This conclusion is correct. if it were true that the plaintiff and the deceased had an understanding to the
effect that the plaintiff was to receive compensation aside from the use and occupation of the houses of the
deceased, it cannot be explained how the plaintiff could have rendered services as he did for eight years without
receiving and claiming any compensation from the deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As to the second cause, the evidence presented by the plaintiff is his own testimony, that of his witnesses, and
several documents, consisting of municipal permit, checks, vouchers, and invoices. The testimony of the
plaintiff's witnesses, the persons who sold the materials and furnished the labor, proves a few unimportant facts,
and as to the ownership of the money thus invested, there is only the testimony of the plaintiff-appellant, who
said that it all belonged to him and that his understanding with the deceased was that the latter would get the
rents of the house, and, upon his death, he would bequeath it to the plaintiff, but unfortunately, he died
intestate. This testimony, however, was objected to on the ground that it is prohibited by section 383, paragraph
7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the party to an action against an executor or administrator
cannot testify on any fact that took place before the death of the person against whose estate the claim is
presented. The lower court admitted this testimony but did not believe it. And certainly it cannot be believed,
UNILAND RESOURCES, petitioner,
vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,* respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In the law on agency, it is elementary that when the main transaction between the principal parties does not
materialize, the claim for commission of the duly authorized broker is disallowed.1 How about the instance when
the sale was eventually consummated between parties introduced by a middleman who, in the first place, had
no authority, express or implied, from the seller to broker the transaction? Should the interloper be allowed a
commission? On these simplified terms rests the nature of the controversy on which this case turns.
As stated by the respondent Court of Appeals,2 the ambient circumstances of this case are as follows:
(1) [Petitioner] Uniland Resources is a private corporation engaged in real estate brokerage and
licensed as such (p. 2, Rec.), while [respondent] DBP, as we all know [sic], is a government corporation
engaged in finance and banking in a proprietary capacity.
(2) Long before this case arose, Marinduque Mining Corporation obtained a loan from the DBP and as
security therefor, mortgaged certain real properties to the latter, among them two lots located in
Makati, M.M., described as follows:
(a) Corner lot, covered by TCT No. 114138, located at Pasong Tamo, Makati with an area of
3,330 sq. mts. on which is constructed a [four]-story concrete building, etc., which, for
brevity, shall be called the office building lot; and
(b) Lot covered by TCT No. 16279 with 12,355 sq. mts located at Pasong Tamo, Makati, on
which is constructed a concrete/steel warehouse, etc., which, for brevity, shall be called the
warehouse lot.
The aforesaid lots had, however, been previously mortgaged by Marinduque Mining Corp., to Caltex,
and the mortgage in favor of DBP was entered on their titles as a second mortgage (Pre-Trial Order, p.
37, Rec.).
The account of the Marinduque Mining Corp., with the DBP was later transferred to the Assets
Privatization Trust (APT) pursuant to Proclamation No. 50.
(3) For failure of the Marinduque Mining Corp. to pay its obligations to Caltex, the latter foreclosed its
mortgage on the aforesaid two lots (pp. 37-38, Rec.). APT on the other hand, to recover its investment
on the Marinduque Account, offered for sale to the public through DBP its right of redemption on said
two lots by public bidding (Exhs. "1" and "2").
(4) Considering, however, that Caltex had required that both lots be redeemed, the bidding guidelines
set by DBP provided that any bid to purchase either of the two lots would be considered only should
there be two bids or a bid for the two items which, when combined, would fully cover the sale of the
two lots in question (Exh. "1").
(5) The aforesaid bidding was held on May 5, 1987 with only one bidder, the Counsel Realty Corp. [an
affiliate of Glaxo, Philippines, the client of petitioner], which offered a bid only for the warehouse lot in
the amount of P23,900,000.00. Said bid was thus rejected by DBP.
(6) Seeing, however, that it would make a profit if it redeemed the two lots and then offer them for
sale, and as its right to redeem said lots from Caltex would expire on May 8, 1987, DBP retrieved the
account from APT and, on the last day for the exercise of its right of redemption, May 8, 1987,
redeemed said lots from Caltex for P33,096,321.62 (Exh. "5"), thus acquiring them as its physical
assets.
(7) In preparation for the sale of the two lots in question, DBP called a pre-bidding conference wherein
a new set of bidding guidelines were formulated (Exh. "3"). Then, on July 30,1987, the public bidding
for the sale of the two lots was held and again, there was only one bidder, the Charges Realty Corp.
[another affiliate of Glaxo, Philippines], for only the warehouse lot and for the amount of
P24,070,000.00, which is slightly higher than the amount previously offered by Counsel Realty Corp.,
therefor at the May 5, 1987 bidding (see Exh. "5," p. 1 00, Rec.). No bid was submitted for the office
building lot (id.).
(8) Notwithstanding that there was no bidder for the office building lot, the DBP approved the sale of
the warehouse lot to Charges Realty Corp., and on November 23, 1987, the proper documentation of
the sale was made (Exh. "D"). As for the office building lot, it was later sold by DBP in a negotiated sale
to the Bank of P.I. as trustee for the "Perpetual Care Fund of the Manila Memorial Park" for
P17,460,000.00, and proper documentation of the sale was made on November 17, 1987 (Exh. "E" and
submarkings). The DBP admittedly paid the (five percent) broker's fee on this sale to the DBP
Management Corporation, which acted as broker for said negotiated sale (p. 15, Appellant DBP's brief).
(9) After the aforesaid sale, [petitioner], through its President, wrote two letters to [respondent DBP],
the first through its Senior Vice President (Exh. "C"), and, the second through its Vice Chairman (Exh.
"4" [sic], asking for the payment of its broker's fee in instrumenting the sale of its (DBP's) warehouse
lot to Charges Realty Corp. The claim was referred to the Bidding Committee chaired by Amanda S.
Guiam which met on November 9, 1987, and which, on November 18, 1987, issued a decision denying
[petitioner's] claim (Exh. "5"). Hence, the instant case filed by [petitioner] to recover from [respondent]
DBP the aforesaid broker's fee.
After trial, the lower court, on October 25, 1988, rendered judgment
ORDERING [respondent DBP] to pay [petitioner] the sum of P1,203,500,00 which is the
equivalent of [five percent] broker's fee plus legal interest thereto (sic) from the filing of the
complaint on February 18, 1988 until fully paid and the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees. Costs against [respondent DBP].(p. 122, Rec.).3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court4 and dismissed the complaint. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was also subsequently denied. 5
Petitioner is now before this Court alleging that the petition "RAISES A QUESTION OF LAW IN THE SENSE THAT
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS BASED ITS DECISION ONLY ON THE CONTROVERSIAL FACTS FAVORABLE
TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT DBP,6 primarily making capital of the disparity between the factual conclusions of
the trial court and of the appellate court. Petitioner asserts that the respondent Court of Appeals disregarded
evidence in its favor consisting of its letters to respondent DBP's higher officers sent prior to the bidding and
sale, wherein petitioner requested accreditation as a broker and, in the process of informing that it had offered
the DBP properties for sale, also volunteered the name of its client, Glaxo, Philippines, as an interested
prospective buyer.7
The rule is that in petitions for certiorari as a mode of appeal, only questions of law distinctly set forth may be
raised.8 Such questions have been defined as those that do not call for any examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties.9 Petitioner's singular assignment of error would, however, have this Court
go over the facts of this case because it necessarily involves the examination of the evidence and its subsequent
reevaluation. Under the present proceeding, the same, therefore, cannot be done.
It bears emphasizing that mere disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the facts of redeem the properties from the APT due to the presence of a ready and willing buyer, as communicated and
a case does not of itself warrant this Court's review of the same. It has been held that the doctrine that the assured by petitioner.
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, being conclusive in nature, are binding on this Court, applies even
In Prats v. Court of Appeals,19 there was a finding that the petitioner therein as the agent was no longer the
if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent
efficient procuring cause in bringing about the sale proceeding from the fact of expiration of his exclusive
reversal of its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the Court of Appeals are borne out by the record or
authority. There was therefore no basis in law to grant the relief sought. Nevertheless, this Court in equity
based on substantial evidence.10 while the foregoing doctrine is not absolute, petitioner has not sufficiently
granted the sum of P100,000.00, out of the P1,380,000.00 claimed as commission, by way of compensation for
proved that his case falls under the known exceptions.11
the efforts and assistance rendered by the agent in the transaction prior to the expiration of his authority. These
Be that as it may, the Court has perused the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and still finds the primary consist in offering the lot for sale to the eventual buyer, sending follow-up letters, inviting the buyer to dinner
assertion of petitioner to be unfounded. The Court of Appeals has addressed all the factual contentions of and luncheon meetings, etc.
petitioner and chose not to give credence to petitioner's version. Moreover, the findings of the Court of Appeals
Parallel circumstances obtain in the case at bar. It was petitioner who advised Glaxo, Philippines of the
are consistent with, and sufficiently supported by, the records of this case.
availability of the warehouse property and aroused its interest over the same. Through petitioner, respondent
It is obvious that petitioner was never able to secure the required accreditation from respondent DBP to transact DBP was directly informed of the existence of an interested buyer. Petitioner's persistence in communicating
business on behalf of the latter. The letters sent by petitioner to the higher officers of the DBP and the APT are with respondent DBP reinforced the seriousness of the offer. This piece of information no doubt had a bearing
merely indicative of petitioner's desire to secure such accreditation. At best these missives are self-serving; the on the subsequent decisions made by respondent DBP as regards the disposition of its properties.
most that they prove is that they were sent by petitioner and received by respondent DBP, which clearly never
Petitioner claims the amount of P1,203,500.00 awarded by the trial court as commission computed at five
agreed to be bound thereto. As declared by the trial court even when it found in favor of petitioner, there was
percent of the sale price of the warehouse property. Under the foregoing disquisition and following the
no express reply from the DBP or the APT as to the accreditation sought by petitioner.12 From the very beginning,
precedent, as well as roughly the proportion, set in Prats, the Court in equity grants petitioner the sum of One
therefore, petitioner was aware that it had no express authority from DBP to find buyers of its properties.
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) for the role it played in the transaction between respondent DBP and
In its reply submitted pursuant to the resolution requiring the same13 petitioner also invokes Article 1869 of the buyer Glaxo, Philippines. It is emphasized, however, that the circumstances that came into play in this case do
new Civil Code14 in contending that an implied agency existed. Petitioner argues that it "should have been not meet the minimum legal standards required for the existence of an agency relationship and that the award is
stopped, disauthorized and outrightly prevented from dealing the 12,355 sq. m (with warehouse) [sic] by the based purely on equity considerations. Accordingly, petitioner's other arguments need not now be discussed.
DBP from the inception."15 On the contrary, these steps were never necessary. In the course of petitioner's
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that in equity
dealings with the DBP, it was always made clear to petitioner that only accredited brokers may look for buyers
respondent DBP is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No
on behalf of respondent DBP. This is not a situation wherein a third party was prejudiced by the refusal of
pronouncement as to costs.
respondent DBP to recognize petitioner as its broker. The controversy is only between the DBP and petitioner, to
whom it was emphasized in no uncertain terms that the arrangement sought did not exist. Article 1869, SO ORDERED.
therefore, has no room for operation in this case.
Petitioner would also disparage the formality of accreditation as merely a mechanical act, which requires not
much discretion, as long as a person or entity looks for a buyer [and] initiate or promote [sic] the interests of the
seller.16Being engaged in business, petitioner should do better to adopt the opposite attitude and appreciate
that formalities, such as the need for accreditation, result from the evolution of sound business practices for the
protection and benefit of all parties concerned. They are designed and adopted specifically to prevent the
occurrence of situations similar to that obtaining in this case.
More importantly, petitioner's stance goes against the basic axiom in Civil Law that no one may contract in the
name of another without being authorized by the latter, unless the former has by law a right to represent
him.17 From this principle, among others, springs the relationship of agency which, as with other contracts, is one
founded on mutual consent: the principal agrees to be bound by the acts of the agent and the latter in turn
consents to render service on behalf or in representation of the principal. 18
Petitioner, however, also invokes equity considerations, and in equity, the Court recognizes the efforts of
petitioner in bringing together respondent DBP and an interested and financially-able buyer. While not actively
involved in the actual bidding and transfer of ownership of the warehouse property, petitioner may be said to
have initiated, albeit without proper authority, the transaction that eventually took place. The Court is also
aware that respondent DBP was able to realize a substantial profit from the sale of its two properties. While
purely circumstantial, there is sufficient reason to believe that the DBP became more confident to venture and