CRISANTO M. AALA v. REY T.

UY
G.R. No. 202781 : Jan 10, 2017

“The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from
directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this
policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the
congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter," it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be
achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance."

FACTS:

July 12, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City's Committee on Finance conducted a
public hearing for the approval of a proposed ordinance. The proposed ordinance sought to
adopt a new schedule of market values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City.
It then passed City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, entitled An Ordinance Approving the New
Schedule of Market Values, its Classification, and Assessment Level of Real Properties in the
City of Tagum. The ordinance was approved by Mayor Rey T. Uy (Mayor Uy) on November 11,
2011 and was immediately forwarded to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte for
review.

On February 7, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways
and Means/Games and Amusement issued a report dated February 1, 2012 declaring City
Ordinance No. 516, s-2011 valid. It also directed the respondents to revise the ordinance based
on the recommendations of the Provincial Assessor's Office. Consequently, petitioners returned
it to the respondents for modification. As a result of the amendments introduced to City
Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, on March 19, 2012, the respondents passed City Ordinance No. 558,
s-2012 and was approved by Mayor Uy on April 10, 2012. It was then transmitted for review to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte. The petitioners received the proposed
ordinance on April 12, 2012.

On April 30, 2012, Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel Jorge P. Ferido (Ferido), both
residents of Tagum City, filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an
Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. It was referred to the Committee on
Ways and Means/Games and Amusement. The Committee conducted a hearing to tackle the
matters raised in the Opposition.

In their Opposition/Objection, Aala and Ferido asserted that City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012
violated Sections 130(a), 198(a) and (b), 199(b), and 201 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
They alleged that Sections III C 1, 2, and 3 as well as Sections III G 1(b) and 4(g) of the proposed
ordinance divided Tagum City into different zones, classified real properties per zone, and
fixed its market values depending on where they were situated without taking into account the
"distinct and fundamental differences ... and elements of value" of each property.
Aala and Ferido asserted that the proposed ordinance classified and valued those properties
located in a predominantly commercial area as commercial, regardless of the purpose to which
they were devoted. According to them, this was erroneous because real property should be
classified, valued, and assessed not according to its location but on the basis of actual use.
Moreover, they pointed out that the proposed ordinance imposed exorbitant real estate taxes,
which the residents of Tagum City could not afford to pay.
After the hearing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways and
Means/Games and Amusement issued Committee Report No.5 dated May 4, 2012, which
returned City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 to the respondents. The petitioners also directed the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City to give attention and due course to the oppositors'
concerns.
On May 22, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City issued Resolution No. 808, s-2012
dated May 14, 2012, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte to reconsider
its position on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del
Norte issued Resolution No. 428 declaring as invalid Sections III C 1, 2, and 3, Sections III D (1)
and (2), and Sections G 1(b) and 4(g) of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. However, on July 9,
2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City passed Resolution No. 874, s-2012 declaring
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 as valid. It argued that te Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
del Norte failed to take action on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 within 30 days from its receipt
on April 12, 2012. Hence, under Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 enjoys the presumption of validity.

On July 13, 2012, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 was published in the July 13-19, 2012 issue of
Trends and Time, a newspaper of general circulation in Tagum City.

Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012, petitioners filed
before this Court an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on August 13,
2012. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction.

In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the ground that respondents
enacted it with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners invoke this Court's original jurisdiction
under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in view of the need to immediately resolve
the issues they have raised.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners comply with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion
of administrative remedy?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court denies the Petition for serious procedural errors. The doctrine on
hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly
resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind
this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as
to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to
"satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter," it must remain
as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing
with causes in the first instance."

As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus."However, this Court has
emphasized that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not
exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not give parties unfettered
discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the
appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot
randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed. There is another
reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. The
doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner."
Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the
lower courts. This holds especially true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court,
trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are
in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance.

Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to
dwell on and resolve the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by
petitioners could have been properly addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the
doctrines of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were
established for a reason. While petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy may be admirable,
their overzealousness has further delayed their cause.

HEIRS OF LOYOLA, presented herein by Zosimo L. Mendoza VS CA

G.R. No. 188658 : January 11, 2017
 “A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law.
There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the
exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”

FACTS:
This case involves a 4,419-square-meter parcel of land located in Lingatin, Morong, Bataan,
known as Lot No. 780, Cad. 262 of the Morong Cadastre.7 The land is formerly a public
agricultural land planted with nipa and coconut.

Sometime on May 2003, the Heirs of Teodora Loyola (Heirs ), represented by Zosimo Mendoza,
Sr. (Zosimo ), filed a Complaint for annulment of free patent and original certificate of title,
reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages against respondent Alicia Loyola
(Alicia). They claimed that the property belonged to the parents of their mother, Teodora
Loyola (Teodora), who had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. Teodora
inherited the property from her parents upon their demise. In tum, when Teodora died in 1939,
the Heirs inherited it from her.

The Heirs insisted that they since maintained open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession until the present. However, Alicia was allegedly able to obtain Free Patent No. (III-
14) 001627 and Original Certificate of Title No. 1784 over the property through fraud and
misrepresentation. Alicia was the wife of their deceased cousin Gabriel Loyola (Gabriel), who
was given permission to use part of Teodora's property.

In her Answer, Alicia denied the allegations of fraud and illegality on the registration of the free
patent and issuance of the original certificate of title. She countered that the Complaint was
barred by laches and prescription as the free patent was registered as early as December 1985.

The case proceeded to trial.

RTC: dismissed the case based on failure to implead an indispensable party, Guillermo
Mendoza as party-plaintiff. MR was filed but was denied. The case was appealed to the CA.

CA: Dismissed the case. The RTC erred in finding that there was a failure to implead an
indispensable party as the heirs of Guillermo Mendoza were not indispensable parties and
judgment could be rendered without impleading them as party-plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the CA
found that the evidence presented by the Heirs was insufficient to overcome the presumption of
regularity of the free patent and original certificate of title issued to Alicia. 41 It found that the
Heirs failed to submit evidence showing that Teodora alone inherited the property when
testimonies revealed that she had a brother. Likewise, they failed to prove that they were legally
related to or were the only heirs of Teodora.

Thus, petition for Certiorari under R65 RC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it went beyond
the issue of dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency of petitioners’ evidence before the
Regional Trial Court?

RULING:

NO. Petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy. They should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In Microsoft Corp. V. Best Deal Computer Center Corp.:

A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
manifested. For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when
respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying its
application for the issuance of an ex parte order. However, other than this bare allegation,
petitioner failed to point out specific instances where grave abuse of discretion was allegedly
committed ....

Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be
deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct of jurisdiction while a
petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of
judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise
of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. (Citations
omitted)

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it went
beyond the issue of dismissal of the Complaint and / touched on the factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court. They allege that respondent did not contest the trial court's factual
findings as she did not file an appellee's brief. They posit that the Court of Appeals should have
just ruled on the issue of dismissal alone.

The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in - dismissing petitioners'
Complaint. It had jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the case, and there is
no showing that it whimsically or capriciously exercised this jurisdiction. At most, it may
have committed an error of procedure, as petitioners question its ruling on the merits of the
case and not just on the issue of dismissal for failure to implead indispensable parties.

As petitioners fail to avail themselves of the proper remedy, the Petition ought to be
dismissed. Nonetheless, so as not to further delay the disposition of this case, this Court
resolves the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the merits of the case and
not just on the issue of dismissal for failure to implead indispensable parties.

As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Rule 51,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided - No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors
and clerical errors.

This provision likewise states that the Court of Appeals may review errors that are not assigned
but are closely related to or dependent on an assigned error. The CAis allowed discretion if it
"finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the
case.

As sucuch, we have ruled in a number of cases that the appellate court is accorded a broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as
errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds other than those
touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other
grounds, the CA may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis
of grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. We have applied this rule, as a matter
of exception, in the following instances:
(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;

(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving
at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice;

(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise
or which the lower court ignored;

(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and

(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent. 69 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to consider the issue and address the matter
where its n1ling is necessary (a) to arrive at a just and complete resolution of the case; (b) to
serve the interest of justice; or (c) to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. This is consistent with
its authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.

Petitioners' appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint
for failure to implead an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled
on whether petitioners were able to prove their claim. It had the discretion to properly consider
this separate issue in order to arrive at a complete resolution of the case.

Ordinarily, this case should have been remanded to the Regional Trial Court to make the
proper factual determination. However, due to judicial economy, or "the goal to have cases
prosecuted with the least cost to the parties," the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed the
case in its entire context.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to DISMISS the Petition. The
December 22, 2008 Decision and May 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88655 are hereby AFFIRMED.

CRISTINA BARSOLO VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 187950 : Jan 11, 2017
 “It is worthy to note that this Court has already ruled on the compensability of Myocardial
Infarction as an occupational disease. Rañises v. Employees Compensation Commission, is instructive:

Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, now considers cardio-
vascular disease as compensable occupational disease. Included in Annex "A" is cardio-vascular disease,
which cover myocardial infarction. However, it may be considered as compensable occupational disease
only when substantial evidence is adduced to prove any of the following conditions:

a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an
acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;

b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.

c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs
and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs
persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.”

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Cristina Barsolo, assailing the Decision
dated November 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 102469.

Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was employed as
a seaman by various companies from 1988 to 2002." From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002,
Manuel served as a Riding Gang/ Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela
International Marine Ltd., (Vela). Vela was his last employer before he died in 2006. After his
separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. He was examined and
treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an outpatient from April 2, 2003 to October 22,
2004. When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction as
his cause of death.
Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Social Security System.
SSS: denied her claim on the ground that there was no longer an employer-employee
relationship at the time of Manuel's death and that "[h]is being a smoker increased his risk of
contracting the illness." Appealed to Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC).

ECC: denied the appeal for lack of merit. It reasoned that, since Myocardial Infarction
(Cardiovascular Disease) is listed as an occupational disease under P.D. 626 as amended,
[Cristina] is bound to comply with all the conditions required [under Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employee's Compensation] to warrant the grant of benefits. It held that Cristina was
unable to establish that her husband's case fell under any of the above
circumstances. Moreover, since Manuel was a smoker, the Commission believed that
Manuel's "smoking habits precipitated the manifestation of his Myocardial Infarction." The
ECC added that "the System correctly ruled that the development of the Myocardial Infarction
could not be categorically attributed to the occupation of [Manuel] as Seaman because of the
presence of major causative factor which is not work-related." Thereafter, petition for review to
CA.

CA: It ruled that while there was no doubt that myocardial infarction was a compensable
disease, Cristina failed to prove a causal relationship between Manuel's work and the illness
that brought about his death. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission that Manuel's
habit of smoking, which dates as far back as 1973, may have contributed to the development of
his heart ailment.
MR denied. Hence, this Petition to SC was filed.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not there is substantial evidence that the death was due to myocardial infarcation is
work-related?

RULING:

No. It held citing the case of Rañises, we held that for myocardial infarction to be considered a
compensable occupational disease, any of the three conditions must be proven by substantial
evidence. Petitioner failed in this regard. On petitioner's insistence that Manuel's case falls
under the third condition, this Court disagrees. For a claim under this condition to prosper,
there must be proof that: first, the person was asymptomatic before beginning employment and
second, he had displayed symptoms during the performance of his duties. Such symptoms
should have persisted long enough to establish that his work caused his heart problem.
However, petitioner offered no proof that her husband suffered any of the symptoms during his
employment. All she managed to prove was that her husband went to the Philippine Heart
Center and was treated for Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease from April 2, 2003 to January
9, 2004, four months after his contract with Vela ended on December 6, 2002.

The Medical Certificate did not help petitioner's cause, as this only shows that Manuel was
already suffering from hypertension even before his pre-employment examination, and that he
did not contract it during his employment with Vela. Having had a pre-existing cardio vascular
disease classifies him under the first condition.
 However, for a claim under the first category to prosper, petitioner must show that there was
an acute exacerbation of the heart disease caused by the unusual strain of work. Petitioner failed
to adduce any proof that her husband experienced any symptom of a heart ailment while
employed with Vela, much less any sign that his heart condition was aggravated by his job.

Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury
during the performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's
employment caused the disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing heart
ailment.

Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Manuel died on September 24,
2006, four years after he disembarked from MV Polaris Star. Other factors have already played a
role in aggravating his illness. Due to the considerable lapse of time, more convincing evidence
must be presented in order to attribute the cause of death to Manuel's work. In the absence of
such evidence and under the circumstances of this case, this Court cannot assume that the
illness that caused Manuel's death was acquired during his employment with Vela.

To emphasize, it is not refuted that myocardial infarction is a compensable occupational illness.

However, it becomes compensable only when it falls under any of the three conditions, which
should be proven by substantial evidence.

Furthermore, Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different major causative factor, which
could explain his illness and eventual death, defeats petitioner's claim. Thusm Petitioner's claim
for death benefits was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 19,
2008 and Resolution dated May 19, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102469 are hereby AFFIRMED.

PALAO VS FLORENTINO INTERNATIONAL, INC.

G.R. No. 186967 : January 18, 2017

“The rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-
forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance
therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.”

FACTS:
On July 30, 2008, Florentino appealed to the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual
Property Office. This appeal's Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
signed by Atty. John Labsky P. Maximo (Atty. Maximo) of the firm Balgos and Perez. However,
Florentino failed to attach to its appeal a secretary's certificate or board resolution authorizing
Balgos and Perez to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Thus, on
August 14, 2008, the Office of the Director General issued the Order requiring Florentino to
submit proof that Atty. Maximo or Balgos and Perez was authorized to sign the Verification and
Certification ofNon-Forum Shopping.

In his Order dated September 22, 2008, Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian S.
Cristobal, Jr. (Director General Cristobal) dismissed Florentino's appeal He noted that the
Secretary's Certificate pertained to an August 14, 2008 Resolution issued by Florentino' s Board
of Directors, and reasoned that the same Certificate failed to establish the authority of
Florentino's counsel to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping as of the
date of the filing of Florentino's appeal (i.e., on July 30, 2008).

Florentino then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In its assailed January 8, 2009 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals
faulted Director General Cristobal for an overly strict application of procedural rules. Thus, it
reversed Director General Cristobal's September 22, 2008 Order and reinstated Florentino' s
appeal.

ISSUE/S:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the September 22, 2008 Order of Intellectual
Property Office Director General Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., and in reinstating respondent
Florentino III International, Inc.'s appeal.

RULING:

The need for a certification of non-forum shopping to be attached to respondent's appeal before
the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office is established. Section 3 of
the Intellectual Property Office's Uniform Rules on Appeal specifies the form through which
appeals may be taken to the Director General.

These requirements notwithstanding, the Intellectual Property Office's own Regulations on

Inter Partes Proceedings (which governs petitions for cancellations of a mark, patent, utility
model, industrial design, opposition to registration of a mark and compulsory licensing, and
which were in effect when respondent filed its appeal) specify that the Intellectual Property
Office "shall not be bound by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence.
In Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.:34

[T]he rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
its own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the
certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not,
however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances,
considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.35

Thus, in Pacquing, this Court held that while, as a rule, "the certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient,"36 still, "when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the rules."

Given these premises, it was an error for the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office
to have been so rigid in applying a procedural rule and dismissing respondent's appeal. It is
reasonable, therefore-consistent with the precept of liberally applying procedural rules in
administrative proceedings, and with the room allowed by jurisprudence for substantial
compliance with respect to the rule on certifications of non-forum shopping-to construe the
error committed by respondent as a venial lapse that should not be fatal to its cause.

In any case, even in judicial proceedings, this Court has rebuked an overly strict application of
the rules pertaining to certifications of non-forum shopping.

Van Clifford Torres Salera vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206627 : January 18, 2017

“It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive on this Court. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not
duty-bound to analyze, review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the absence of any showing of
any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.47 A departure from the general rule may only be
warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the
trial court or when these are unsupported by the evidence on record.”

FACTS:
On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the
conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from
fishing. CCC's wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend
the conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging
CCC's multicab. In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres
damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to
pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop.
However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's
multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-
shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. CCC came to
his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated
by Barangay Captain Hermilando Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times.
Based on the physical examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustain a
contusion.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version of the incident:
Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer
for the damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the
heated discussion between the two men. Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to
stop making unfounded accusations or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres'
bluff, which further provoked Torres. Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the
timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked. Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to
preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against CCC. He also claimed that he
tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife. However, the parties failed to reach an
agreement due to the unreasonable demands of the spouses.

ISSUE/S:

1st issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on a judgment premised
on a misapprehension of facts; and

2nd issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck
with a wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse.

It is a fundamental rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.44 The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive on this Court.45 This Court is not a trier
of facts.46 It is not duty-bound to analyze, review, and weigh the evidence all over again in the
absence of any showing of any arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.47 A departure
from the general rule may only be warranted in cases where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court or when these are unsupported by the
evidence on record.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial
courts.49It is a question of fact not reviewable by this Court.50 The trial court's findings on the
matter are entitled to great weight and given great respect and "may only be disregarded . . . if
there are facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which would
substantially alter the results of the case.

This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court
neither disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially
alter the case. The presence or absence of one person during the incident is not substantial
enough to overturn the finding that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt.
Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should
not be considered as child abuse because the law requires intent to abuse. Petitioner maintains
that he whipped AAA merely to discipline and restrain the child "from further intensifying the
situation." He also maintains that his act was justified because AAA harassed and vexed him.
Thus, petitioner claims that there could not have been any intent to abuse on his part. Petitioner
contends that the injuries sustained by AAA will not affect the latter's physical growth or
development and mental capacity. He argues that he could not be convicted of child abuse
without proof that the victim's development had been prejudiced.

He begs the indulgence of this Court and claims that his conviction would only serve as a
"precedent to all children to act recklessly, errantly and disobediently" and would then create a
society ruled by juvenile delinquency and errant behavior. If at all, petitioner claims that he
could only be convicted of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code for the
contusion sustained by AAA. Respondent maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of
child abuse. Respondent argues that the act complained of need not be prejudicial to the
development of the child for it to constitute a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Respondent,
citing Sanchez v. People, argues that Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines and
punishes four distinct acts. We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not
child abuse but merely slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA,
was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under
Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has been defined in Araneta v. People
thus:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

PEOPLE VS MONIR JAAFAR TAMBUYONG

G.R. No. 219829 : January 18, 2017

“While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered
by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule.”

FACTS:

On September 10, 2009, at around 8 PM, a male civilian informant reported to Chief of Police,
Police Superintendent Alberto Capacio Larubis (Chief Larubis) that a certain "Mana" was selling
shabu at the port area barangay located just beside the police station.[ Mana was later identified
as Jaafar, who sold shabu between 12:00 m.n. and 4:00a.m. to facilitate the sale of the drug and
evade arrest. Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his house.

A buy-bust operation headed by Chief Larubis was conducted. PO1 Look was designated as the
poseur-buyer while PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent Mark Dela Cruz were designated as the
arresting officers. On September 11, 2009, the buy-bust team left the police station at 1:45 a.m.
and went to Jaafar's house. Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door of his house and
asked them if they were buying shabu. PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a
marked P500.00 bill. Jaafar called for Gani inside the house. Gani came out and handed Jaafar a
sachet containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigarette—
the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team. The police officers rushed to arrest
Jaafar, but he managed to escape. Jaafar threw away the marked P500.00 bill as he ran.
Eventually, the arresting officers caught up with him 30 meters away from his house.

Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked the confiscated sachet of shabu with his
initials. He then turned over the sachet and the marked P500.00 bill to their team leader, SPO4
Morales. The buy-bust team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for investigation.

Chief Larubis prepared a letter-request addressed to forensic chemist Melvin Manuel for the
examination of the contents of the sachet. Upon examination, the contents tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
RTC: convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it
acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence. Case was appealed to CA.

CA: The Court of Appeals ruled that although the sachet of shabu was not formally offered in
evidence during trial, it was nevertheless identified by PO1 Look and the forensic chemist.
Being part of their direct testimonies, the shabu formed part of the records of the case. Hence,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court did not err in considering the shabu as
evidence. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Regional Trial Court with regard to the
alleged violation of the chain of custody rule. Although there was a departure in the procedure
mandated under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Court of Appeals ruled that it did not
automatically render the confiscated drugs inadmissible since the integrity of the seized shabu
had been kept intact.

ISSUE:

WON the guilt of accused appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

RULING:

No. This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong.

In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. Its existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the
dangerous drug must be clearly established. While it may be true that non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies
departure from the general rule. This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any
justifiable reason that would warrant non-compliance with the mandatory requirements in
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust team marked[63] and conducted a
physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet
had been photographed. Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from
accused-appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for
violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

REPUBLIC v. SPS LLAMAS

G.R. No. 194190 : January 25, 2017
 “In White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the widening of the
Katipunan Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991
White Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces
for public use, such as roads, and for which they need not be compensated by Subdivision
owners are mandated to set aside such open spaces before their proposed subdivision plans
may be approved by the government authorities, and that such open spaces shall be devćted
exclusively for the use of the general public and the subdivision owner need not be
compensated for the same. A subdivision owner must comply with such requirement before the
subdivision plan is approved and the authority to sell is issued. “

FACTS:

On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action for
expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat Road. This
action was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case. On
November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in the
expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just compensation for the
expropriated areas be set to P12, 000.00 per square meter. Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent
and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-
Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They also filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21,
1994. After which, on August 2, 1994, they filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an
Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and
Improvements."

After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance
of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution dated May 14, 2002. In this Motion, the Llamas
Spouses faulted the Department of Public Works and Highways for what was supposedly its
deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders and even with its
own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just compensation to the Llamas Spouses.

Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an understanding that
the resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of: (1) certified true copies of the
TCTs covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the tax declarations, tax clearances, and
tax receipts over the lots. But, due to their continued failure to comply with their undertaking,
the Department of Public Works and Highways did not pay them.

On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the
Llamas Spouses of just compensation at P12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the
lot covered by TCT No. 217267. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165 and
noted that these were subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses "no longer owned" and
which "belonged to the community for whom they were made." In the Order dated May 19,
2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the
subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165.

RULING:

YES. The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not
compensable since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies
chiefly on this Court's 1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which
pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon
City.”More specifically, in the 1991 White Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for
subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for public use, such as roads, and for which they
need not be compensated by Subdivision owners are mandated to set aside such open spaces
before their proposed subdivision plans may be approved by the government authorities, and
that such open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public and the
subdivision owner need not be compensated for the same. A subdivision owner must comply
with such requirement before the subdivision plan is approved and the authority to sell is
issued. On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the Regional
Trial Court's Orders and required the Department of Public Works and Highways to similarly
compensate the Llamas Spouses for the two (2) road lots at P12, 000.00 per square meter.

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first be made by the "owner-
developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As
there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual
transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the
owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just
compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local government should first acquire them by donation,
purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road."

Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use, remain
private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or through
expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property even if it
has been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may
even choose to retain said properties. Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the
City Government of Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they
retain their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents as
the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
 METROBANK v. LIBERTY CORRUGATED
G.R. No. 184317 : January 25, 2017

“A petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in the Interim Rules
of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a special proceeding. It is one
that seeks to establish the status of a party or a particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4
of the Interim Rules on Corporate Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the
inability of the corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan,
containing the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the
end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party.”

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's December 21, 2007 Order approving
Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp.'s rehabilitation plan.

Respondent Liberty Corrugated Boxes Manufacturing Corp. is a domestic corporation that

produces corrugated packaging boxes. It obtained various credit accommodations and loan
facilities from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) amounting to Pl
9,940,000.00. To secure its loans, Liberty mortgaged to Metrobank 12 lots in Valenzuela City.

On June 21, 2007, Liberty filed a Petition8 for corporate rehabilitation before Branch 7 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon City. Liberty claimed that it could not meet its obligations to
Metrobank because of the Asian Financial Crisis, which resulted in a drastic decline in demand
for its goods, and the serious sickness of its Founder and President, Ki Kiao Koc. Liberty's
rehabilitation plan consisted of: (a) a debt moratorium; (b) renewal of marketing efforts; (c)
resumption of operations; and ( d) entry into condominium development, a new business.

On August 6, 2007, Metro bank filed its comment/opposition. It argued that Liberty was not
qualified for corporate rehabilitation; that Liberty's Petition for rehabilitation and rehabilitation
plan were defective; and that rehabilitation was not feasible. It also claimed that Liberty filed
the Petition solely to avoid its obligations to the bank. Rehabilitation Receiver Rafael Chris F.
Teston recommended the approval of the plan, provided that Liberty would initiate
construction on the property in Valenzuela within 12 months from approval.

In its December 21, 2007 Order, the Regional Trial Court approved the rehabilitation plan.
Metrobank appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 13, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued the
Decision16 denying the Petition and affirming the Regional Trial Court's December 21, 2007
Order.
The Court of Appeals also found that the trial court correctly approved the rehabilitation plan
over Metrobank's Opposition upon the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Receiver, who
had carefully considered and addressed Metrobank's criticism on the plan's viability.

The Court of Appeals stressed that the purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the
distressed company to gain a new lease on life and to allow the creditors to be paid their claims.
It held that the approval of the Regional Trial Court was precisely "'to effect a feasible and
viable rehabilitation' of ailing corporations” as required by Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

ISSUE/S:

WON the respondent, as a debtor in default, is qualified to file a petition for rehabilitation
under Presidential Decree No. 902-A and Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules; and

WON the respondent's Petition for rehabilitation is sufficient in form and substance and
respondent's rehabilitation plan, feasible.

RULING:

1) Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules provides:

RULE 4

Debtor-Initiated Rehabilitation
SECTION 1. Who May Petition. - Any debtor who foresees the impossibility of meeting its debts
when they respectively fall due, or any creditor or creditors holding at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of the debtor's total liabilities, may petition the proper Regional Trial Court to • have the
debtor placed under rehabilitation.

Philippine Bank of Communications v. Basic Polyprinters and Packaging Corporation50

reiterates the purpose of rehabilitation, which is to provide meritorious corporations an
opportunity for recovery: Under the Interim Rules, rehabilitation is the process of restoring "the
debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of
operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern that if it is
immediately liquidated." It contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an
effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and
solvency.

2) The Interim Rules provide for a liberal construction of its provisions:

RULE 2
Definition of Terms and Construction
SECTION 2. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives
of Sections 5(d), 6(c) and 6(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, and to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases. Where
applicable, the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily to proceedings under these Rules.
To adopt petitioner's interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Interim Rules. There is
no reason why corporations with debts that may have already matured should not be given the
opportunity to recover and pay their debtors in an orderly fashion. The opportunity to
rehabilitate the affairs of an economic entity, regardless of the status of its debts, redounds to
the benefit of its creditors, owners, and to the economy in general. Rehabilitation, rather than
collection of debts from a company already near bankruptcy, is a better use of judicial rewards.
A.M. No. 08-8-1 O-SC further describes the remedy initiated by a petition for rehabilitation: A
petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a special proceeding. It is one that
seeks to establish the status of a party or a particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the
Interim Rules on Corporate Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability
of the corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan,
containing the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the
end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party.

SHELL v. ROYAL FERRY

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, vs. ROYAL FERRY SERVICES, INC.,
G.R. No. 188146 : February 1, 2017

“To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a corporation should be the
actual place where its principal office has been located for six (6) months before the filing of the petition. If
there is a conflict between the place stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the
corporation's main office, the actual place of business should control.

Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has abandoned just to file a case is the very definition of
inconvenience. There is no reason why an insolvent corporation should be forced to exert whatever
meager resources it has to litigate in a city it has already left.

JUDGEMENT ON THE MERTS; It is judicial policy to determine a case based on the merits so that the
parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and defenses.75 The Court of Appeals did not err in
taking cognizance of the appeal.“

FACTS:

On August 28, 2005, Royal Ferry Services Inc. filed a petition for Voluntary Insolvency before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In its Petition stated therein , in the year 2000, the company
suffered business losses. Efforts were made to revive its financial condition but failed. The
business ceased its operations. A special board meeting was held and was approved and
authorized by the members of the board to allow the company to file a Petition for insolvency.
In retrospect of the company, it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the
Philippine Laws and was holding its principal business office address in Bangkal Street, Makati
City but holds its Office at Room 203 at Bf condominium Building , Intramuros , Manila at the
time the Petition was filed.
On December 19, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an order, granting the petition
declaring the Royal Ferry Services insolvent.

The Court orders:

The Branch Sheriff to take possession of, and safely keep until the appointment, of an Assignee
all the deeds, vouchers, books of accounts, papers, notes, bills and securities of the petitioner
and all its real and personal properties, estates and effects not exempt from execution;
All persons and entities owing money to petitioner are hereby forbidden to make payment for
its accounts or to deliver or transfer any property to petitioner except to the duly elected
Assignee;

All civil proceedings against petitioner are deemed stayed;

For purposes of electing an Assignee, a meeting of all creditors of the petitioner is hereby set on
February 24, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. before this Court, at Room 435, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall
Building.
The said order was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive
weeks furnishing copies to all creditors of the company in the schedule of creditors.
On December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
a Formal Notice of Claim and a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the respondent Royal Ferry
Services Inc owes them the amount of P 2,769,387.67 and the Petition for Insolvency was filed
erroneously filed in a wrong venue. The petitioners argued that in Insolvency Law, a petition
for Insolvency should be filed before he Court with territorial jurisdiction over the company's
residence. In its Article of Incorporation, respondent's principal business address is situated in
Makati City would it be the Petition for Insolvency should be filed before the Court of Makati.
The petitioners Motion was denied by the Court on January 30, 2006 for lack of merit.
Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell moved for a reconsideration on February 24, 2006.
On June 15, 2006, Regional Trial Court reconsidered the denial of Pilipinas Shell Motion to
Dismiss and reconsider its order dated January 30, 2006. The Petition for Voluntary Insolvency
was ordered DISMISSED.
The respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2006 and the records was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court ruled reinstating the Insolvency proceedings setting
aside the Trial Court order dated June 15, 2006.

ISSUE/S:
WON the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency was filed in a proper venue where the company's
residence is situated.

WON the CA erred in deciding to rule on the Merits.

RULING:
1st issue: NO. To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a
corporation should be the actual place where its principal office has been located for six (6)
months before the filing of the petition. If there is a conflict between the place stated in the
articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation's main office, the actual
place of business should control.

Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has abandoned just to file a case is the very
definition of inconvenience. There is no reason why an insolvent corporation should be forced
to exert whatever meager resources it has to litigate in a city it has already left. The Supreme
Court ruled, AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency filed by the respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
Petition for certiorari filed by Pilipinas Shell was ordered Denied. The respondent Royal Ferry
Services is a resident of Manila in its actual operations of its business when the Petition for
Insolvency was filed. It was not opposed as stated in the Articles of Incorporation of the
respondent that its principal business address is situated in Makati is no longer accurate and
existing. Facts has been proven that the actual use and venue of the respondent's business
operations is in Manila when the Court Sheriff implemented the order of the Court dated
December 19, 2005. Court should have been more prudent in granting the immediate execution,
considering that the execution of the judgment award involves the payment of almost ₱8.5
billion in public funds. As previously discussed, there was no legal basis to grant the back
payment of additional COLA and AA to NAPOCOR personnel from July 1, 1989 to March 16,
1999.

2nd issue: NO. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the
merits. The term "may" in Rule 50, Section 173 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of
Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on the enumerated grounds. The Court of
Appeals exercised its discretion when it decided that the interest of justice would be better
served by overlooking the pleading's technical defects. Time and again, this Court has declared
that dismissal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon.74 It is judicial policy to determine a
case based on the merits so that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and
defenses.75 The Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal.

LIZA L. MAZA v. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA

G.R. No. 187094 : February 15, 2017
 “In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al., this
Court reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari."

In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list
representatives. The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be
affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents in Congress.

Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate
this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.”

FACTS:

Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal
Investigation and Detection Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija, three (3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons. Inspector
Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for the
death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. That the named individuals
conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List.
Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy
Peralta was mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. On July 18, 2008,
Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla issued an Order37 on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla
held that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed
in the Palayan cases and remanded the case back to the prosecutor’s office for another
preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Doctrine of Heirarchy Courts is violated?

2. Whether or not the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor in order to
conduct a complete preliminary investigation?

RULING:

1st issue: NO. This case is an exception to the doctrine of heirarch courts. This Court
thoroughly explained the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission
on Elections:
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure
that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence
presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may
include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions
and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence
as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their
territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination
of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope.
There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical
considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination
of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has
original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional
issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating
- in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions
for certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes
availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of
both legislative and executive branches of the government.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases,
the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental
importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with
the need for substantial protection.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression,
no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the
United States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression
that may guide the lower courts.

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute
a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower
courts.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this
court held that:

... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.

Fifth, ... Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this
court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ...

....
Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]
... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow
direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In
the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving
modernization of voters' registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.
....
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court.70 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al.,71 this Court
reiterated that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari."72
In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list
representatives. The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be
affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents in Congress.
Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate
this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

2nd issue: YES.. Thus, he trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor.

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.

A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge
has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable
cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the
existence of probable cause. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation
of the prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an
arrest warrant, or require the submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand
the case for another conduct of preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier
preliminary investigation was improperly conducted. Hence, the trial court judge erred in
remanding the case back to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.