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Cunningham - PERCEPTION, MEANING, AND MIND PDF
Cunningham - PERCEPTION, MEANING, AND MIND PDF
at this place and time. Anonymous, timeless beliefs won't do the job.
There are, in addition, several other relevant considerations that
support my contention that the cognitive and the non-cognitive are
profoundly interwoven in perception. Taken individually, these con-
siderations may not be conclusive, but taken as a group they are, I
think, persuasive.
(i) In my hearing of the train whistle, the cognitive and non-
cognitive components occur roughly simultaneously, providing them
with a temporal unity.
(ii) The focus of attention - the object to which I respond at all
these various levels - is the same, the train whistle; and that object is
made the focus of attention by perception. If I were glad about the
train, worried about dinner, and wondering if I locked the door when I
left the house, I would not be tempted to coalesce them. The case of
the train whistle is clearly different. In such a case, to insist on treating
each element as if it were independent of the other seems to be
arbitrary.
(iii) Our perceptual memories are most frequently both cognitive
and non-cognitive in content. To remember a wedding day or the
funeral of a parent is hardly to recall a simple conceptualization of
sense information. The memory is woven through with feelings, etc.~2
This blend that appears in memory might be best accounted for as
derivative from the blend of cognitive and non-cognitive elements in
perceptual meaning. That is, it might be the case that perceptual
memories are best understood as recalled portions of perceptual
meanings.
(iv) There is a functional unity of the cognitive and non-cognitive
elements. That is, it is the combination that functions causally in
determining the behavior that follows perception. The cause of my
subsequent behavior is not simply an isolated belief or judgment. It is
generally the beliefs-and-feelings, etc., functioning jointly, that
generates my behavior. I run or shout for help, or whatever, because I
see a bear unexpectedly in a context in which I recall that he can be
dangerous, I am frightened and I want to survive, I feel confident
about my running skills, etc. If any one of the elements were different,
the outcome is likely to be affected.
(v) Finally, there is mounting psychological evidence that the cog-
nitive and non-cognitive functions - in humans, at least - are pro-
foundly interdependent. There is a growing consensus that emotions
PERCEPTION, MEANING,, AND MIND 233
(but probably not moods) are at least partially cognitive - that is, they
include, or are dependent on, cognitive states like beliefs. Further,
certain types of cognition like memory, learning, and perception have
been shown by psychological experiments to be affected by moods,
emotions, etc. The functioning of these cognitive capacities as well as
the content of such cognitive states are altered by non-cognitive
factors.~3
There are good reasons then, to think that the cognitive and
non-cognitive elements in perceptual experience are linked in im-
portant ways. An adequate theory of perception needs to take this into
account.
A second objection that one might want to make is that the
philosophic distinction between seeing and seeing-as needs to be put
to work here. One might be inclined to say that the non-cognitive
elements in the example of perceiving the bear ought to be analyzed in
terms of a purely conceptual version of seeing-as. Thus, the concep-
tualization of the sense information would include not only recogniz-
ing an object as belonging to the class of bears, but also as belonging
to the class of frightening things, challenging things, exciting things,
etc. On such an analysis, it might be argued, the full content of
consciousness could be taken into account without abandoning the
purely cognitive model.
There are, however, problems with such an analysis. There is a clear
difference between seeing an object as a bear and seeing it as
challenging or frightening. There are publicly accepted standards that
make things fall into the class of bears or fail to fall into that class. For
a perceived object to belong to such a class, fall under such a concept,
it normally must have certain sensible properties that distinguish it as a
member of that class. Specifying such sensible properties can indeed
be difficult business in some cases, but this general principle is at the
heart of research in pattern recognition. On the other hand, things
that are perceived as frightening or challenging don't have some
required shape or set of parts. They are, rather, objects that generate
certain responses in us, and their ability to generate those responses
may have little to do with their sensible properties. It is likely to have
a great deal to do with our individual past experiences or with our
current needs, expectations, etc. The perceiving of an object or event
as frightening, etc., is not a matter of conceptually noting its similarity
to other members of some class. It is, rather, an emotively charged
234 SUZANNE CUNNINGHAM
If my central contentions in the first part of this paper are right, what
are some of the consequences for certain functionalist philosophies of
mind? Rather than discuss separately each of the distinct versions of
functionalism that have been proposed, I shall direct my attention to
one very basic claim that is made by several of them and shall argue
that it is problematic. What concerns me is the claim that once a
functional characterization of a system is possible, then any con-
sideration of the composition of that system is superfluous. On this
view, psychological theories ought to abstract completely from con-
siderations of the make-up of the systems that instantiate them. It is
true that most contemporary versions of functionalism ignore Put-
ham's early claims about the possibility that non-physical systems (e.g.,
souls) as well as physical systems might exhibit psychological states.
The claims now center around physical systems alone, but some of
them (Fodor's for example) are clear in their contention that com-
puters are as plausible candidates for psychological states as are
biochemically based organisms. While I think that the shift from the
metaphysical issue to the question of function is a promising one, I
also think that it cannot be made without specifying certain constraints
on the relevant systems.
My basic contention is this: while a functional characterization of a
system need not make any explicit reference to the material corn-
PERCEPTION, MEANING, AND MIND 235
NOTES
* Earlier versions of this paper were read in the Philosophy department at the University
of Helsinki, in the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of
Edinburgh, at Vanderbilt University, at the Indiana Philosophical Association, and at
the Institute for Logic and Cognitive Science at the University of Houston, I am
240 SUZANNE CUNNINGHAM
grateful for very helpful comments on each of these occasions, and I am especially
appreciative to John Haugeland, Mark Johnson, and George McClure for their com-
ments and suggestions. Thanks, too, to Robert Solomon who urged me to amplify my
claims about perceptual meaning.
When the context allows it, I shall use the term 'psychological' rather than 'mental'
simply to avoid the metaphysical issue completely.
I use the phrase 'perceptual meaning' rather than perceptual sense primarily because
the latter is ambiguous and might suggest sensory mechanisms.
3 For Husserl's best-known extended discussion of the noema see Ideas, I, trans, by W.
R. Boyce Gibson, Macmillan, London, (1931). Dagfinn Follesdal's paper, 'Husserl's
Notion of Noema', Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), was the seminal work in suggesting
a Fregean interpretation of Husserl's view. I make no claims to be faithful to Husserl's
intentions; and, as will become apparent, my view is directly at odds with that of
Follesdal.
4 Barwise and Perry, in Situations and Attitudes, have offered a comprehensive theory
of meaning (i.e., a theory that covers more than just linguistic meaning) in terms of what
I am calling 'signitive meaning'.
s I shall confine my claims-to cases in which a person perceives an object or an event.
The perception of language involves important differences from the other cases,
differences which make it unwise to take the perception of language as paradigmatic for
all perception. The most obvious asymmetry for present purposes is that the 'trans-
parency' of perceived language - it generally directs our attention to something other
than itself - makes the application of the sense-reference distinction more complex than
it is in the perception of objects and events.
6 Cf. G. H. Bower: 1981, 'Mood and Memory', American Psychologist, February 1981;
George Mandler: 1975, in Mind and Emotion, Wiley, New York, also talks about the
interplay of cognitive (or interpretive) and emotive structures in ways that are sug-
gestive of the kinds of networks I have in mind.
7 I deliberately construe the term 'meaning' broadly here. Note, for example, that an
action like pointing will be indexical not only in terms of the object it picks out (its
'referent', so to speak) but also in terms of what significance it has in this particular
context. It might be a gesture of accusation, it might be an attempt at ostensive
definition, it might be giving directions, etc.
s Cf. David W. Smith: 1986, 'The Ins and Outs of Perception', Philosophical Studies 49
and 'Content and Context of Perception', Synthese 61 (1984).
9 Cf. John Perry: 1979, 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', Nous 13, for a
discussion of an analogous point in relation to belief.
io See also, Merleau-Ponty, in Phenomenology of Perception: "The word 'here' applied
to my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other positions or to
external co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates, the anchoring of the
active body in an object, the situation of the body in face of its tasks" p. I00.
11 For some recent discussions of indexicality as it relates to perception cf. David
Woodruff Smith: 1986, 'The Ins and Outs of Perception', Philosophical Studies 49 and
'Content and Context of Perception', Synthese 61 (1984); Jaakko Hintikka: 1985,
'Objects of Knowledge and Belief', in The Intentions of Intentionality, D. Reidel,
Dordrecht; Colin McGinn: 1983, The Subjective View, Clarendon Press, Oxford;
PERCEPTION, MEANING, AND MIND 241
Christopher Peacocke: 1983, Sense and Content, Clarendon Press, Oxford; Izchak
Miller: 1984, Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts; John Searle: 1983, lntentionality, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge; Hector-Neri Castaneda: 1977, 'Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical
Objects and Consciousness', Synthese 35. In addition there is considerable work on
indexical and demonstrative concepts, the most relevant for my purposes being, John
Perry's paper 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical'. The entire issue of Synthese 49
(1981) is devoted to the topic of indexicality.
~2 There are, of course, two sets of feelings to be distinguished here: those that are
remembered and those that are currently generated by that remembering.
~3 For a recent collection of papers addressing this issue, cf. C. E. Izard, J. Kagan, and
R. Zajonc (eds.), Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1984.
14 Cf., for example, D. M. Armstrong: 1968, A Materialist Theory of Mind, Routledge
& Kegan Paul, London, p. 181; Georges Rey: 1980, 'Functionalism and the Emotions',
in Amelie Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, University of California Press, Berkeley,
pp. 180, 190; William Lyons: 1980, Emotion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
p. 53; Jerome Shaffer: 1983, 'An Assessment of Emotion', American Philosophical
Quarterly 20, 161.
~5 Georges Rey, op. cit.
~6 Robert Solomon, 'Emotions and Choice', in A. Rorty, op. cit., p. 274,
~7 Darwin makes specific mention of sympathy as contributing to the survival of species
that are capable of it. See his (1882) Descent o[Man, 2nd ed., Murray, London, p. 107.
~8 For a recent and very clear account of all this, see Joseph E. LeDoux and Willam
Hirst (eds.): 1986, Mind and Brain: Dialogues in Cognitive Neuroscience, Cambridge
University Press; Cambridge, especially Chap. 15, 'The Neurobiology of Emotion'.
19 Cf. George Rey, op. cit.
zo John Haugeland made a similar point about Cognitivism in his (1978) paper, 'The
Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism', The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, p. 2,
reprinted in Mind Design. Haugeland was, I think, excessively generous in limiting his
claim to moods and skills (and 'understanding'). Cf. also D. A. Norman: 1981, '12 Issues
for Cognitive Science', in D. A. Norman (ed.), Perspectives on Cognitive Science, Ablex
Publications, Norwood, New Jersey.
2~ Representations, MIT, Cambridge, Maschusetts, 198 l, p. 9.
22 Jerry Fodor: 1975, Language of Thought, Harvard, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p.
203.
23 Ibid.
z4 Fodor: 1980, 'Methodological So[ipisism Considered as Research Strategy in Cog-
nitive Psychology', The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, reprinted in Representations,
p. 228.
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