Od

July 2016
UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES v.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT G.R. No.
BUS LINES, INC. 205951 July 04, 2016 Sales - Contract to Sell
ALICIA P. LOGARTA v.
CATALINO M. G.R. No.
MANGAHIS 213568 July 05, 2016 LTD - Land Registration
DAMASO T. AMBRAY
v. SYLVIA A. G.R. No.
TSOUROUS 209264 July 05, 2016 LTD - Sales
TECHNO
DEVELOPMENT &
CHEMICAL
CORPORATION v.
VIKING METAL G.R. No.
INDUSTRIES 203179 July 04, 2016 Obligations
PHIL-NIPPON KYOEI,
CORP. v. ROSALIA T. G.R. No.
GUDELOSAO 181375 July 13, 2016 Extinguishment of Obligations
SPOUSES AUGUSTO
AND NORA NAVARRO
v. RURAL BANK OF G.R. No.
TARLAC, INC. 180060 July 13, 2016 Extinguishment of Obligations
TORRES-MADRID
BROKERAGE, INC. v.
FEB MITSUI MARINE G.R. No.
INSURANCE CO., INC. 194121 July 11, 2016 Quasi Contract v. Quasi Delict
SPOUSES MAMERTO
AND ADELIA* TIMADO
v. RURAL BANK OF G.R. No.
SAN JOSE, INC. 201436 July 11, 2016 Damages
SPOUSES ARCHIBAL
LATOJA AND
CHARITO LATOJA v.
HONORABLE ELVIE G.R. No.
LIM 198925 July 13, 2016 Sales
TARCISIO S.
CALILUNG v.
PARAMOUNT
INSURANCE G.R. No.
CORPORATION 195641 July 11, 2016 Obligations
Cathay Pacific Airways,
Ltd. vs. Sps. Arnulfo G.R. No.
and Evelyn Fuentebella 188283 July 20, 2016 Breach of Contract, Damages
Heirs of Gamaliel Albano G.R. No.
vs Sps Ravanes 183645 July 20, 2016 Lease
Benjie B. Georg vs.
Holy Trinity College, G.R. No.
Inc. 190408 July 20, 2016 Contract
Philippine National Oil
Company and PNOC
Dockyard & Engineering
Corporation vs. Keppel G.R. No.
Philippines Holdings, Inc. 202050 July 25, 2016 Contract; Sales
Anna Marie L.
Gumabon vs. Philippine G.R. No.
National Bank 202514 July 25, 2016 Damages
Thelma Rodriguez vs.
Spouses Jaime Sioson G.R. No.
and Armi Sioson, et al. 199180 July 27, 2016 Sales
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs.
Napoleon Sesante, et G.R. No.
al. 172682 July 27, 2016 Contract; Damages

August 2016
1. Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Company Vs. G.R. No.
Chuy Lu Tan, et al., 202176. August 1, 2016

2. Bonifacio Dana Vs.

Spouses Gregorio
Serrano and Adelaida G.R. No.
Reyes, 195072 August 1, 2016

3. Sps. Joven Sy and

Corazon Que Sy Vs.
China Banking G.R. No.
Corporation, 215954. August 1, 2016

4. Luz S. Nicolas Vs.

Leonora C. Mariano, G.R. No.
G.R. No. 201070 195072 August 1, 2016

5. Ever Electrical
Manufacturing, Inc.
Vicente C. Go and
George C. Go Vs.
Philippine Bank of
Communications G.R. Nos.
(PBCOM) 187822-23 August 3, 2016

6. Teresita I.
Buenaventura Vs.
Metropolitan Bank and G.R. No.
Trust Company 167082. August 3, 2016
7. Jose Norberto Ang
Vs. The Estate of Sy G.R. No.
So, 182252 August 3, 2016

8. Sps. Lolita Orencia

and Pedro D. Orencia
Vs. Felisa Cruz Vda. G.R. No.
De Ranin 190143. August 10, 2016

9. Marcelino T. Tamin
Vs. Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation
and/or Masterbulk Pte. G.R. No.
Ltd. 220608. August 31, 2016

10. Sps. Charito M.

Reyes and Roberto
Reyes, et al. Vs. Heir of
Benjamin Malance, et G.R. No.
al. 219071 August 24, 2016

September 2016
Cameron Granville 3
Asset Management, Inc.
vs. UE Monthly G.R. No.
Associated, et al. 181387 September 5, 2016 Failure to prove their rights to the properties / Third-Party Claims
Taina Manigque-Stone
Vs. Cattleya Land, Inc., et G.R. No.
al 195975 September 5, 2016 Sale of Philippine Land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the nam
Social Security System vs. G.R. No.
Commission on Audit 210940 September 6, 2016 Funds of the SSS were merely held in trust for the benefit of workers a
The Roman Catholic
Bishop of Tuguegarao vs.
Florentina Prudencio, et G.R. No.
al. 187942 September 7, 2016 The nullity of the Extra-Judicial Partition does not automatically result i
Heirs of Zosimo Q.
Maravilla vs. Privaldo G.R. No. Question on whether Private individuals may acquire vested right of ow
Tupas 192132 September 14, 2016 years.
Michael A. Onstott Vs.
Upper Neighborhood G.R. No.
Association, Inc. 204423 September 14, 2016 Presumption of Conjugality
Philippine Science High
School-Cagayan Valley
Campus Vs. Pirra G.R. No.
Construction Enterprises 204423 September 14, 2016 Article 1234 of the Civil Code
Naga Centrum, Inc. Vs.
Sps. Ramon J. Orzales G.R. No.
and Nenita F. Orzales 203576 September 24, 2016 Easement of Right of Way

Philippine Economic Zone G.R. No. September 28, 2016 Philippine Economic Zone Authority Vs. Philhino Sales Corporation
Authority Vs. Philhino 185765.
Sales Corporation
St. Lukes Colleges of
Medicine-William H.
Quasha Memorial
Foundation, et al. Vs. Sps.
Manuel and Esmeralda G.R. No.
Perez, et al 222740 September 28, 2016 Complaint for damages for the death of respondent’s daughter; Enrollm

PDF
October 2016
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. vs.
Antonio M. Garcia, et
al./Jaime Y. Gonzales vs. G.R. No.
Hon. Court of Appeals and 168134/G.R.
Ferro Chemicals, No.
Inc./Antonio M. Garcia vs. 168183/G.R.
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. No. 168196 October 5, 2016 Fraud
Julia Lim Rosario, et al. G.R. No.
vs. Alfonso Lim 206534 October 5, 2016
Philippine National Bank G.R. No.
vs. Venancio C. Reyes, Jr. 212483 October 5, 2016 Loan and Mortgage
Elizabeth Sy-Vargas vs.
The Estate of Rolando
Ogsos, Sr. and Rolando G.R. No.
Ogsos, Jr. 221062 October 5, 2016 Damages
Dr. Restituto C. Buenviaje
vs. Spouses Jovito R. and G.R. No.
Lydia B. Salonga, et al. 216023 October 5, 2016
Buenavista Properties,
Inc. and/or Josephine
Conde vs.Ramon G. G.R. No.
Mariño 212980 October 10, 2016
Republic of the Philippines
and Housing and Urban
Development
Coordinating Council G.R. No.
(HUDCC) 203610 October 10, 2016 Specific Performance and Rescission
Philippines National Bank
vs. Heirs of Benedicto and G.R. No.
Azucena Alonday 171865 October 12, 2016 Mortgage
Lylith B. Fausto, et al. vs.
Multi Agri-Forest and
Community Development G.R. No.
Cooperative 213939 October 12, 2016 The requirement of demand or notice may be waived.
Greenstar Express, Inc.
and Sayson, Jr. vs.
URC and Nissin
Universal Robina G.R. No.
Corporation 205090 October 17, 2016 Extra-Contractual
RG Cabrera
Corporation, Inc. vs. G.R. No.
DPWH and COA 221773 October 18, 2016 Lease
Leo's Restaurant and
Bar Cafe, et. al. vs. G.R. No.
Bensing 208535 October 19, 2016 Damages
RCBS Savings Bank G.R. No.
vs. Odrada 219037 October 19, 2016 Sales
Sps. Sarigumba vs.
Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries
Association, et. al.
G.R. No.
179566 October 19, 2016 Damages PDF
Sps. Ramon Sy and
Anita Ang, et. al. vs. G.R. No.
Westmont Bank, et. al. 201074 October 19, 2016 Loan

November 2016
Manuel Enrique L.
Zalamea, et al. Vs. Atty.
Rodolfo P. De Guzman, A.C. No.
et al. 7387 November 3, 2016 Void Contracts
Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. Vs. Sps.
Jose R. Bernardo and G.R. No.
Lilibeth R. Bernardo 19066 November 7, 2016 Torts
Catherine Ching, et al.
Vs. Quezon City Sports G.R. No.
Club, Inc., et al. 200150 November 7, 2016 Interpretation of Contracts
Evelyn V. Ruiz Vs. G.R. No.
Bernardo F. Dimailig 204280 November 9, 2016 Credit Transactions; REM
Universal International
Investment (BVI) Limited
Vs. Ray Burton
Development
Corporation/Universal
International Investment
(BVI) Limited Vs. Ray G.R. No.
Burton Development 182201/G.R. November 14,
Corporation No. 185815 2016 Sales; Contact of Sales Distinguished from Contract to Sell / To
Efren S. Quesada, et al.
Vs. Bonanza G.R. No. November 14,
Restaurants, Inc. 207500 2016 Contracts; Mutuality of Contracts / Interpretation of Contracts / L
Jocelyn "Joy" Lim-
Bungcaras Vs.
Commission on
Elections and Rico
Rentuza/Hermenegildo
S. Castil Vs.
Commission on
Elections and Rachel B.
Avendula/Jesus G.R. Nos.
Avendula, Jr., et al. Vs. 209415-
Commission on 17/G.R. No. November 15,
Elections, et al./Aldrin B. 210002. 2016 Torts; Damages; Actual or Compensatory; AFs
Pamaos Vs.
Commission on
Elections, et al.

UCPB General
Insurance Company,
Inc. Vs. Hughes G.R. No. November 16,
Electronics Corporation 190385. 2016 Contracts
William Enriquez and
Nelia-Vela Enriquez Vs.
Isarog Line Transport, G.R. No.
Inc. and Victor Sedenio 212008. November 16, 2016 Damages
Nanito Z. Evangelista
Vs. Sps. Nereo V. G.R. No.
Andolong III, et al. 221770. November 16, 2016 Damages
Sps. Desiderio and
Teresa Domingo Vs.
Sps. Emmanuel and Tita G.R. No.
Manzano, et al. 201883. November 16, 2016 Sales
White Marketing
Development
Corporation Vs.
Grandwook Furniture & G.R. No.
Woodwork, Inc. 222407. November 23, 2016 Credit Transactions
Rosita B. Lim Vs. Luis G.R. No.
Tan, et al./Luis Tan, et 177250/G.R.
al. Vs. Rosita B. Lim/Ang No.
Tiat Chuan Vs. Rosita B. 177422/G.R.
Lim No. 177676. November 28, 2016 Damages

December 2016
PHILIPPINE STOCK
EXCHANGE, INC., v.
ANTONIO K.
LITONJUA1 AND
AURELIO K. G.R. No. December 05,
LITONJUA, JR. 204014 2016 Contracts
PRYCE PROPERTIES
CORPORATION v.
SPOUSES SOTERO G.R. No. December 07,
OCTOBRE 186976 2016 Contracts
SPOUSES LUISITO
PONTIGON v. HEIRS
OF MELITON G.R. No. December 05,
SANCHEZ 221513 2016 Contracts
MAJESTIC PLUS
HOLDING v. BULLION G.R. No. December 05,
INVESTMENT AND 201017 2016 Rescission
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v.
SPOUSES CONCHITA
AND LAZARO G.R. No. December 07,
MALIJAN 211731 2016 Damages
B.F. CORPORATION
AND HONORIO
PINEDA v. FORM-EZE G.R. No. December 07,
SYSTEMS, INC., 192948 2016 Contracts
POWER SECTOR
ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION v.
SEM-CALACA POWER G.R. No. December 05,
CORPORATION 204719 2016 Contracts
EDDIE CORTEL Y
CARNA AND YELLOW
BUS LINE, INC. v. G.R. No. December 07,
CECILE GEPAYA-LIM, 218014 2016 Torts and Damages
ARSENIO
TABASONDRA v.
SPOUSES CONRADO
CONSTANTINO AND
TARCILA
TABASONDRA- G.R. No. December 07,
CONSTANTINO 196403 2016 Co-Ownership
MARCELINO
REPUELA AND
CIPRIANO REPUEL v.
ESTATE OF THE
SPOUSES OTILLO G.R. No. December 07,
LARAWAN 219638 2016 Contracts
GILAT SATELLITE
NETWORKS, LTD. v.
UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK
GENERAL G.R. No. December 07,
INSURANCE CO., INC 189563 2016 Credit Transactions
 JULY 2016
ALICIA P. LOGARTA, Petitioner, v. CATALINO M. MANGAHIS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 213568, July 05, 2016

FIRST DIVISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

TOPIC: LTD - Land Registration

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
Respondent Catalino M. Mangahis (respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel of
land. He authorized a certain Venancio Zamora (Zamora) to sell the subject property,
who, in turn, delegated his authority to Victor Peña (Peña). Peña entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Carmona Realty and Development Corporation
(Carmona Realty), represented by petitioner Alicia P. Logarta (petitioner), for the sale
to Carmona Realty of contiguous parcels of land in Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Malitlit
Estate) which included the subject property. Respondent filed a petition to cancel the
subject entries on the ground that the MOA was a private document that had no legal
effect because the Notary Public before whom it was acknowledged was not
commissioned as such in the City of Manila for the year 2001. In the same petition,
respondent also sought the revocation of Zamora's authority to sell the subject
property. In opposition, petitioner contended that the MOA was duly notarized in
hanrobleslaw

Makati City where the Notary Public, Atty. Loreto Navarro, was commissioned.18 She
also maintained that Peña had the authority to enter into the MOA at the time it was
executed, considering that respondent expressed his intention to revoke the same only
in the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA and the RTC erred in ordering the cancellation of the subject entries.
RULING:
Yes, the RTC and the CA erred in ordering the cancellation of the subject entries on the
strength of Section 70 of PD 1529. New Dagupan's claim over the subject property is
based on a conditional sale, which is likewise a voluntary instrument. However,
New Dagupan's use of the adverse claim to protect its rights is far from being
incongruent in view of the undisputed fact that Peralta failed to surrender the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 52135 despite demands. Thus, the prevailing rule is that voluntary
instruments such as contracts of sale, contracts to sell, and conditional sales are
registered by presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title for annotation, pursuant
to Sections 51 to 53 of PD 1529. The reason for requiring the production of the owner's
duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is that, being a willful
act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is interested in registering the
instrument and would willingly surrender, present or produce his duplicate certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds in order to accomplish such registration. The exception to
this rule is when the registered owner refuses or fails to surrender his duplicate copy of
the title, in which case the claimant may file with the Register of Deeds a statement
setting forth his adverse claim.
chanrobles law

In the case at hand, there was no showing that respondent refused or failed to present
the owner's duplicate of TCT No. CLO-763, which would have prompted Carmona Realty
to cause the annotation of the MOA as an adverse claim instead of a voluntary dealing.
On this score, therefore, the RTC and the CA erred in ordering the cancellation of the
subject entries on the strength of Section 70 of PD 1529 which authorizes regional trial
courts to cancel adverse claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from registration.
Being a voluntary dealing affecting less than the ownership of the subject property,
Section 54 of PD 1529 - which states that the cancellation of annotations involving
interests less than ownership is within the power of the Register of Deeds - should have
been applied. Accordingly, the RTC and the CA should have dismissed the petition for
cancellation of the subject entries for being the wrong remedy.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 209264, July 05, 2016

DAMASO T. AMBRAY AND CEFERINO T. AMBRAY, JR.,* Petitioners, v. SYLVIA A.

TSOUROUS, CARMENCITA AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY AMBRAY-AZORES, VIVIEN
AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY AMBRAY-ESCUDERO, MARISTELA AMBRAY-ILAGAN,
ELIZABETH AMBRAY-SORIANO, MA. LUISA FE AMBRAY-ARCILLA, AND
CRISTINA AMBRAY-LABIT, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

TOPIC: LTD - Sales

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of land described as Lot 2-
C in the name of petitioners Damaso T. Ambray (Damaso) and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr.
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela
owned several properties. Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila Bank. The
mortgage was discharged on September 16, 1984. Prior to the discharge of the
han

mortgage Lot 2 was registered in Ceferino, Sr.'s name in accordance with his letter
requesting the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register Lot 2-C in his name.
Thus, TCT No. T-22749 was issued covering the said parcel under the name of Ceferino,
Sr., married to Estela. Maristela discovered that Lot 2-C had been cancelled and was
issued in the name of petitioners. Thereafter, respondents filed the instant
complaint18 for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and
Estela (defendants alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and
void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC's nullification of the Deed of Sale

RULING:
Yes, the CA and RTC erred in nullifying the Deed of Sale. Between the Questioned Documents
Report presented by respondents and the testimony given by Estela in the falsification
case in support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary weight in
favor of the latter. Hence, respondent's complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance,
and damages in Civil Case No. SP-5831(01) should be dismissed. Further lending
credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-settled principle that a duly
notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution
as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this
legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 203179, July 04, 2016

TECHNO DEVELOPMENT & CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VIKING

METAL INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

TOPIC: Obligations
NATURE: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
Respondent Viking Metal Industries, Incorporated (VMI), through its President and
General Manager, Brilly Bernardez, presented to the PNOC Energy Development
Corporation (PNOC-EDC) its bid proposal to supply and deliver, within one hundred and
sixty (160) days, various fabricated items, consisting of pipe shoes and structural
supports, for the PNOC-EDC First 40 MW Mindanao-Gcothermal Project (MG Project).
The project was awarded to VMI for having the lowest bid. Pending the execution of a
formal contract, VMI and PNOC-EDC agreed that the bid document and the Notice of
Award shall constitute as the binding contract between them. While the corrosion
c

problem on the fabricated items was being remedied, VMI incurred delays in the
submission of required fabrication drawings, encountered difficulties in sourcing
construction materials, and committed gross miscalculations of the tons requirements,
ultimately resulting in the delay in the deliveries of the structural supports.
slaw

ISSUE:
Whether or not VMI was in delay in the fulfillment of its obligation with PNOC-EDC; and
(3) whether Techno could be held liable to VMI and, on the other hand, whether VMI
has an outstanding unpaid obligation in favor of Techno.

RULING:
In the instant case, while the appellate court aptly ruled upon and rejected VMI's claim
of P550,000.00 subject of VMI's Complaint for Sum of Money against Techno, it clearly
overlooked the factual issues presented by Techno in its counterclaim against VMI. In
its thirty-five (35)-page Decision, the CA seemed to have preoccupied itself with the
other issues presented by VMI as against PNOC-EDC and Techno, without addressing
the issue of whether VMI has an outstanding unpaid obligation in favor of Techno, nor
providing any reason for such failure. Had it exerted additional effort in taking Techno's
claims into consideration, as well as their supporting pieces of proof, it would have
warranted their meritorious and evidentiary value.

At this point, it is worthy to note that a careful look at the rulings of the trial court and
appellate court would reveal that neither court exerted any effort in determining the
veracity of petitioner's assertions. While both courts acknowledged the counterclaim in
their decisions, and even listed the same as part of the issues that needed to be
resolved, nowhere in their decisions did they even remotely pass upon said claim. It
can hardly be said, therefore, that the courts below definitively denied Techno's claim
to the payment of the unpaid products in the sheer absence of any showing that they
took into consideration Techno's allegations much less the probative value of the
evidence presented to support it. Even granting VMI's argument that the trial court
implicitly denied Techno's counterclaim against it, and that the appellate court affirmed
said denial, the Court finds the need to reverse said implicit denials and grant Techno's
counterclaim for as previously threshed out, not only did petitioner Techno present
sufficient proof to substantiate its claim, VMI consistently and utterly failed to adduce
any evidence to refute the same.

Ultimately, it must be noted that if Techno's claim was to be denied simply by the
failure of the lower courts to pass upon the same in their decisions, without any factual
or legal explanation therefor, VMI would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Techno
for VMI's failure to pay for the paints it received. Such unjust enrichment due to the
failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received cannot be
countenanced and must be correspondingly corrected by the Court.34 In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds Techno to be entitled to the payment of the unpaid paint
products purchased by VMI therefrom.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181375, July 13, 2016

PHIL-NIPPON KYOEI, CORP., Petitioner, v. ROSALIA T. GUDELOSAO, ON HER

BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN CHRISTY MAE T. GUDELOSAO
AND ROSE ELDEN T. GUDELOSAO, CARMEN TANCONTIAN, ON HER BEHALF AND
 IN BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN CAMELA B. TANCONTIAN, BEVERLY B.
TANCONTIAN, AND ACE B. TANCONTIAN, Respondents.

JARDELEZA, J.:

TOPIC: Extinguishment of Obligations

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
FACTS:
Petitioner, as local principal, and Top Ever Marine Management Maritime Co., Ltd.
(TMCL), as foreign principal, hired Edwin C. Gudelosao, Virgilio A. Tancontian, and six
other crewmembers. They were hired through the local manning agency of TMCL, Top
Ever Marine Management Philippine Corporation (TEMMPC). Petitioner secured a Marine
Insurance Policy from SSSICI over the vessel against loss, damage, and third party
liability or expense, arising from the occurrence of the perils of the sea for the voyage
of the vessel from Onomichi, Japan to Batangas, Philippines. This Marine Insurance
Policy included Personal Accident Policies for the eight crewmembers for in case of
accidental death or injury. While still within Japanese waters, the vessel sank due to
rob

extreme bad weather condition. Only Chief Engineer Nilo Macasling survived the
incident while the rest of the crewmembers, including Gudelosao and Tancontian,
perished. Respondents, as heirs and beneficiaries of Gudelosao and Tancontian, filed
c

separate complaints for death benefits and other damages against petitioner, TEMMPC,
Capt. Orbeta, TMCL, and SSSICI, with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The LA ruled that the liability of petitioner shall be
la

deemed extinguished only upon SSSICI's payment of the insurance proceeds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the liability of petitioner is extinguished only upon SSSICI's
payment of insurance proceeds.

RULING:
No, the extinguishment of the liability of the petitioner does not depend on SSSICI’s
payment of insurance proceeds. All the same, the Release and Quitclaim executed
between TEMMPC, TMCL and Capt. Oscar Orbeta, and respondents redounded to the
benefit of petitioner as a solidary debtor. We have consistently applied the Civil Code
provisions on solidary obligations, specifically Articles 121756 and 1222,57 to labor
cases. Thus, the rule is that the release of one solidary debtor redounds to the benefit
of the others.61Considering that petitioner is solidarily liable with TEMMPC and TMCL, we
hold that the Release and Quitclaim executed by respondents in favor of TEMMPC and
TMCL redounded to petitioner's benefit. Accordingly, the liabilities of petitioner under
Section 20(A)(l) and (4)(c) of the POEA-SEC to respondents are now deemed
extinguished. We emphasize, however, that this pronouncement does not foreclose the
right of reimbursement of the solidary debtors who paid (i.e., TEMMPC and TMCL) from
petitioner as their co-debtor.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 180060, July 13, 2016

SPOUSES AUGUSTO AND NORA NAVARRO, Petitioners, v. RURAL BANK OF

TARLAC, INC., Respondent.

SERENO, C.J.:

TOPIC: Extinguishment of Obligations

NATURE: ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
This petition stems from the complaint for a sum of money filed by the Rural Bank of
Tarlac, Inc., against Spouses Navarro. It is undisputed that petitioners obtained a bank
loan in the amount of P558,000 for the purchase of a motor vehicle, and that they were
unable to complete the agreed monthly installments. It is also uncontested that they
surrendered their vehicle to the bank, so that the latter could sell it and apply the
proceeds of the sale to their obligations. The parties, however, disagreed as to the
effect of the surrender of the vehicle under that circumstance. According to the bank,
petitioners still had an unpaid balance of P315,677.80 excluding interests, penalties,
and liquidated damages even after the sale of the van. Thus, it alleged that it could
only credit the total amount of P242,322.20 in their favor. Spouses Navarro did not
anroble

deny that they had executed a Promissory Note in favor of the bank, and that the terms
were correctly reflected in the note. They claim, however, that when they surrendered
the vehicle, they understood that it would serve as complete satisfaction of their
remaining loan obligation by way of a dacion en pago.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was complete satisfaction of petitioner’s remaining loan obligation
by way of a dacion en pago.

RULING:

No, there is no extinguishment of petitioner’s obligation to pay by way of dacion en

pago. We also note that petitioners did not seek to present any additional piece of
evidence that would substantiate their claim of a dacion en pago agreement with
respect to the surrender of the Kia Advantage van. Neither did they present before the
RTC any basis for their assertion that a different valuation must be used for the sale of
the van. Instead, they eventually asked the trial court to consider the conveyance of
the vehicle as full payment of their loan obligation or, in the alternative, that it order
the bank to render an accounting to establish the correct loan balances.48 They argued
before the CA in this wise:49
An examination of the pleadings, documents and affidavits on file immediately reveal
that there is controversy as to the claim of the plaintiff that the defendants are still
indebted to it for the sum of P315,677.80, plus interests, penalty charge, liquidated
damages and attorney's fees when the obligation has already been fully extinguished
with a Dacion En Pago over a motor vehicle conveyed to the plaintiff. And even
assuming, but without admitting that defendant still owed the plaintiff, the same would
just be one for deficiency claim with the total payments made and actual value of the
motor vehicle conveyed set off against total bank claims, so that, in such case, an
accounting is first needed to establish the correct balances thereon and the lack or
absence thereof necessarily renders plaintiffs action premature. These contentious
issues necessarily entail the presentation of evidence.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194121, July 11, 2016

TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE, INC., Petitioner, v. FEB MITSUI MARINE

INSURANCE CO., INC. AND BENJAMIN P. MANALASTAS, DOING BUSINESS
UNDER THE NAME OF BMT TRUCKING SERVICES, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

TOPIC: Quasi Contract v. Quasi Delict

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
A shipment of various electronic goods from Thailand and Malaysia arrived at the Port
of Manila for Sony Philippines, Inc. (Sony). Previous to the arrival, Sony had engaged
the services of TMBI to facilitate, process, withdraw, and deliver the shipment from the
port to its warehouse in Binan, Laguna. TMBI - who did not own any delivery trucks -
subcontracted the services of Benjamin Manalastas' company, BMT Trucking
Services (BMT), to transport the shipment from the port to the Binan
warehouse.3 Incidentally, TMBI notified Sony who had no objections to the
arrangement. However, BMT could not immediately undertake the delivery because of
the truck ban and because the following day was a Sunday. only three trucks arrived at
Sony's Binan warehouse. Both the driver and the shipment were missing. After being
subrogated to Sony's rights, Mitsui sent TMBI a demand letter for payment of the lost
goods. TMBI refused to pay Mitsui's claim.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not BMT is liable to Mitsui for quasi-delict.;
2. Whether or not BMT is liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage

RULING:
1. No, there is no basis to directly hold BMT liable to Mitsui for quasi-delict.. We
have repeatedly distinguished between an action for breach of contract {culpa
contractual) and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana).

In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to establish the existence of the
contract and the obligor's failure to perform his obligation. It is not necessary for
the plaintiff to prove or even allege that the obligor's non- compliance was due
to fault or negligence because Article 1735 already presumes that the common
 carrier is negligent. The common carrier can only free itself from liability by
proving that it observed extraordinary diligence. It cannot discharge this liability
by shifting the blame on its agents or servants.52 chanrob leslaw

On the other hand, the plaintiff in culpa aquiliana must clearly establish the
defendant's fault or negligence because this is the very basis of the
action.53 Moreover, if the injury to the plaintiff resulted from the act or omission
of the defendant's employee or servant, the defendant may absolve himself by
proving that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage,54 chanroble slaw

In the present case, Mitsui's action is solely premised on TMBl's breach of

contract. Mitsui did not even sue BMT, much less prove any negligence on its
part. If BMT has entered the picture at all, it 'is because TMBI sued it for
reimbursement for the liability that TMBI might incur from its contract of carriage
with Sony/Mitsui.
2. Yes, BMT is liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage. Since BMT
failed to prove that it observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of its
obligation to TMBI, it is liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage.

In these lights, TMBI is liable to Sony (subrogated by Mitsui) for breaching the
contract of carriage. In turn, TMBI is entitled to reimbursement from BMT due to
the latter's own breach of its contract of carriage with TMBI. The proverbial buck
stops with BMT who may either: (a) absorb the loss, or (b) proceed after its
missing driver, the suspected culprit, pursuant to Article 2181

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 201436, July 11, 2016

SPOUSES MAMERTO AND ADELIA* TIMADO, Petitioners, v. RURAL BANK OF SAN

JOSE, INC., TEDDY MONASTERIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ITS
PRESIDENT/MANAGER, AND ATTY. AVELINO SALES, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

TOPIC: Damages
NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
the petitioners obtained a loan from Rural Bank amounting to P178,000.003 As security
for the loan, they executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land and a chattel
mortgage in favor of the bank. The petitioners eventually failed to pay their loan
a

amortizations. Rural Bank proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage and sold the property at a public auction where it emerged as the highest
bidder. The petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption
period. The petitioners filed a petition for indirect contempt with damages
(indirect contempt case) against the respondents, alleging that the latter had pre-
empted judicial authority by foreclosing the mortgages and selling the properties at a
public auction during the pendency of the reformation of instruments case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of exemplary damages is proper, considering the CA's
deletion of the award of moral damages.

RULING:
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory
damages.21 The award of exemplary damages is allowed by law as a warning to the
public and as a deterrent against the repetition of socially deleterious actions. The
requirements for an award of exemplary damages to be proper are as follows: First,
chan

they may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among

others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant. Second, the claimant must first establish his right to
moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. And third, the wrongful
act must be accompanied by bad faith; and the award would be allowed only if the
guilty party acted in a wanted, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
In the light of the appellate court's finding that the respondents are not entitled to
moral damages, the award of exemplary damages, too, must be deleted for lack
of legal basis.

As regards the attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation,
attorney's fees may be awarded as actual or compensatory damages under any of the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that
attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under
Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith
could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction
of the righteousness of his cause.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 198925, July 13, 2016

SPOUSES ARCHIBAL LATOJA AND CHARITO LATOJA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE

ELVIE LIM, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 1, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, ATTY. JESUS APELADO, REGISTER OF DEEDS,
BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, ALVARO CAPITO, AS SHERIFF, BRANCH 2,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, AND TERESITA CABE,
REPRESENTED BY ADELINA ZAMORA, Respondents.

SERENO, C.J.:
TOPIC: Sales
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court
FACTS:
Respondent Cabe, together with Donato A. Cardona II (Cardona II), executed a Deed of
Sale with Pacto de Retro3 over a parcel of land registered under the "Heirs of Donato
Cardona represented by Jovita T. Cardona." The sale was with the conformity of Jovita
Cardona and spouses Rhodo and Myrna Cardona (Spouses Cardona), who are Cardona
II's grandmother and parents, respectively. For failure of Cardona II to repurchase the
property from her within one year as agreed upon in the deed, Cabe filed a Petition for
Consolidation of Ownership.

ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent Judge Lim committed grave abuse of discretion when
he issued the Order granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession in favor of
private respondent Cabe in the consolidation case.

RULING:
Yes, Judge Lim overlooked the nature of the Pacto de Retro sale entered into by Cabe
and Cardona II. It is basic that in a pacto de retro sale, the title and ownership of the
property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro. As a result, the vendee a
retro has a right to the immediate possession of the property sold, unless otherwise
agreed upon. Therefore, the right of respondent Cabe to possess the subject property
anro

must be founded on the terms of the Pacto de Retro Sale itself, and not on the Decision
in the consolidation case. It would be erroneous to conclude that she is entitled as a
matter of right to possession of the subject property by virtue of the Decision on
consolidation which has become final and executory. Judge Lim committed grave abuse
leslaw

of discretion in issuing the Order granting Cabe's motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, as he went against basic law and established jurisprudence.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 195641, July 11, 2016

TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, Petitioner, v. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

RP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., RENATO L. PUNZALAN AND JOSE MANALO,
JR., Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

TOPIC: Obligations
NATURE:
FACTS:

Tarcisio S. Calilung, herein respondent, commissioned Renato Punzalan, President of

the RP Technical Services, Inc. (RPTS1), a domestic corporation, also impleaded as
respondent, of his desire to buy shares of stocks. Respondent Punzalan, on behalf of
RPTSI, executed a promissory note in favor of Calilung . The payment of this
promissory note was guaranteed by petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation
(Paramount). On the same date, Punzalan and Jose Manalo, Jr., another officer of
RPTSI, executed an indemnity agreement to the effect that Paramount would be
reimbursed of all expenses it will incur under the surety bond. However, RPTSI failed to
pay Calilung the amount stated in the promissory note when it fell due, prompting him
to file a complaint for sum of money against RPTSI and Paramount. For its part,
Paramount filed a third party complaint against RPTSI and its corporate officers,
Punzalan and Manalo, Jr., seeking reimbursement for all expenses it may incur under
the surety bond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents' obligation to pay the 14% interest per annum was joint
and several

RULING:
The only interest to be collected from the respondents is the 14% per annum on the
principal obligation of P718,750.00 reckoned from October 7, 1987 until full payment.
There was no basis for the petitioner to claim compounded interest pursuant to Article
221218 of the Civil Code considering that the judgment did not include such obligation.
As such, neither the RTC nor any other court, including this Court, could apply Article
2212 of the Civil Code because doing so would infringe the immutability of the
judgment. Verily, the execution must conform to, and not vary from, the decree in the
final and immutable judgment. chanrobles law

It is cogent to observe that under the express terms of the judgment, the respondents'
obligation to pay the 14% interest per annum was joint and several. This meant that
the respondents were in passive solidarity in relation to the petitioner as their creditor,
enabling him to compel either or both of them to pay the entire obligation to him.
Stated differently, each of the respondents was a debtor of the whole as to the
petitioner, but each respondent, as to the other, was only a debtor of a part.
 FIRST DIVISION

G. R. No. 188283, July 20, 2016

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ARNULFO AND EVELYN

FUENTEBELLA, Respondents.

SERENO, C.J.:

TOPIC: Breach of Contract, Damages

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
The case originated from a Complaint for damages filed by respondents Arnulfo and
Evelyn Fuentebella against petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondents prayed for a total of PI3 million
in damages for the alleged besmirched reputation and honor, as well as the public
embarrassment they had suffered as a result of a series of involuntary downgrades of
their trip from Manila to Sydney via Hong Kong on 25 October 1993 and from Hong
Kong to Manila on 2 November 1993. In its Answer, petitioner maintained that
respondents had flown on the sections and sectors they had booked and confirmed.
Petitioner prays that the Complaint be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the
damages be substantially and equitably reduced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a breach of contract; whether respondents were entitled to moral
damages.

RULING:
Yes, there was a breach of contract. The Court concluded that petitioner may have been
telling the truth that the passengers made many changes in their booking. However,
their claim that respondents held both Business Class tickets and the open-dated First
Class tickets is untrue. We can also conclude that on the same day of the flight,
petitioner still issued First Class tickets to respondents. The incontrovertible fact,
therefore, is that respondents were holding First Class tickets on 25 October 1993.

There is basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages; however, the amounts
were excessive. Moral and exemplary damages are not ordinarily awarded in breach of
contract cases. This Court has held that damages may be awarded only when the
breach is wanton and deliberately injurious, or the one responsible had acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner argues that the testimonial evidence
of the treatment accorded by its employees to respondents is self-serving and, hence,
should not have been the basis for the finding of bad faith. We do not agree. The Rules
of Court do not require that the testimony of the injured party be corroborated by
independent evidence. In fact, in criminal cases in which the standard of proof is
higher, this Court has ruled that the testimony of even one witness may suffice to
support a conviction. What more in the present case, in which petitioner has had
adequate opportunity to controvert the testimonies of respondents.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183645, July 20, 2016

HEIRS OF GAMALIEL ALBANO, REPRESENTED BY ALEXANDER ALBANO AND ALL

OTHER PERSON LIVING WITH THEM IN THE SUBJECT
PREMISES, Petitioners, v. SPS. MENA C. RAVANES AND ROBERTO RA
VANES, Respondents.

JARDELEZA, J.:

TOPIC: Lease
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
Respondent Mena Ravanes (Mena), married to Roberto Ravanes (Roberto) (collectively,
the respondent-spouses), is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Petitioners' father,
Gamaliel Albano, purchased the house in 1986 from a certain Mary Ong Dee. Petitioners
leased the property from Mena with the agreement that they will vacate it, regardless
of their rental payments, when the latter and her family would need to use it. ch

Respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter, Rowena, is getting

w

married and would need the property to build her house. However, petitioners refused
to vacate the property. Thus, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for
Ejectment against petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution of the lease contract is a supervening event that will
justify the stay of execution of the CA Decision.

RULING:
No, The Execution of the Lease Contract is not a Supervening Event. Petitioners'
contentions are untenable. A supervening event refers to facts which transpire after
judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed
after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not
aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. Here,
the lease contract was executed after the CA Decision was promulgated but before it
attained finality. In fact, petitioners executed the lease contract just six days after they
received the adverse ruling of the CA. To our mind, instead of a supervening event, the
execution of the lease contract partakes of the nature of a compromise. A compromise
is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. It is an agreement between two or more
persons, who, for the purpose of preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their
difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which each party
prefers over the hope of gaining but balanced by the danger of losing. In the case
before us, petitioners claim that they executed the lease contract before notice of the
CA Decision as an "amicable settlement of the issues with reference to occupancy of the
subject property." Thus, petitioners' intention to end the litigation by virtue of a
compromise is evident.

A compromise may be entered into at any stage of the case—pending trial, on appeal
and even after finality of judgment. Hence, petitioners may enter into a compromise
with the respondent-spouses, even after the CA Decision was rendered. However, the
validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and the
principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. Unfortunately for petitioners,
the compromise that they effected is wanting of one of the essential requisites of a
valid and binding compromise—consent of all the parties in the case. We have
consistently ruled that a compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not
voluntarily take part in the settlement itself and gave specific individual consent.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 190408, July 20, 2016

BENJIE B. GEORG REPRESENTED BY BENJAMIN C. BELARMINO,

JR., Petitioner, v. HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE, INC., Respondent.

PEREZ, J.:

TOPIC: Contract
NATURE: petition for review
FACTS:
The Grand Chorale and Dance Company were two separate groups but for the purpose
of performing locally or abroad, they were usually introduced as one entity. the Group
was slated to perform in Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany. Edward Enriquez
(Enriquez), who allegedly represented Sr. Medalle, contacted petitioner Benjie B. Georg
to seek assistance for payment of the Group's international airplane tickets. Petitioner is
the Filipino wife of a German national Heinz Georg. She owns a German travel agency
named DTravellers Reiseburo Georg. Petitioner, in turn, requested her brother, Atty.
Benjamin Belarmino, Jr. (Atty. Belarmino), to represent her in the negotiation with
Enriquez. A Memorandum of Agreement with Deed of Assignment3 (MOA) was executed
between petitioner, represented by Atty. Belarmino, as first party-assignee; the Group,
represented by Sr. Medalle, O.P. and/or its Attorney-in-Fact Enriquez, as second-party
assignor and S.C. Roque Group of Companies Holding Limited Corporation and S.C.
Roque Foundation Incorporated, represented by Violeta P. Buenaventura, as
foundation-grantor. Under the said Agreement, petitioner, through her travel agency,
will advance the payment of international airplane tickets. Petitioner claimed that the
second-party assignor/respondent and the foundation-grantor have not paid and
refused to pay their obligation under the MOA. Petitioner prayed that they be ordered to
solidarily pay the amount

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable under the MOA.

RULING:
Yes, that Sr. Medalle possessed full mental faculty in affixing her thumbmark in the
MOA and that respondent is hereby bound by her actions. The doctrine of apparent
authority provides that a corporation will be estopped from denying the agent's
authority if it knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the
scope of an apparent authority, and it holds him out to the public as possessing the
power to do those acts. ralawred chan roble slaw

The existence of apparent authority may be ascertained through (1) the general
manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the power to
act or, in other words, the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes
him; or (2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or
constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of his ordinary
powers. anrobleslaw

In this case, Sr. Medalle formed and organized the Group. She had been giving financial
support to the Group, in her capacity as President of Holy Trinity College. Sr. Navarro
admitted that the Board of Trustees never questioned the existence and activities of the
Group. Thus, any agreement or contract entered into by Sr. Medalle as President of
Holy Trinity College relating to the Group bears the consent and approval of
respondent. It is through these dynamics that we cannot fault petitioner for relying on
Sr. Medalle's authority to transact with petitioner.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 202050, July 25, 2016

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY AND PNOC DOCKYARD & ENGINEERING

CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. KEPPEL PHILIPPINES HOLDINGS,
INC., Respondent.

BRION, J.:

TOPIC: Contract; Sales

NATURE: petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
Almost 40 years ago or on 6 August 1976, the respondent Keppel Philippines Holdings,
Inc. (Keppel) entered into a lease agreement (the agreement) with Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (Lusteveco) covering 11 hectares of land located in Bauan,
Batangas. The lease was for a period of 25 years for a consideration of P2.1 million.6 At
the option of Lusteveco, the rental fee could be totally or partially converted into equity
shares in Keppel. chanroble slaw

At the end of the 25-year Jease period, Keppel was given the "firm and absolute
option to purchase the land for P4.09 million, provided that it had acquired the
necessary qualification to own land under Philippine laws at the time the
option is exercised. Apparently, when the lease agreement was executed, less than
60% of Keppel's shareholding was Filipino-owned, hence, it was not constitutionally
qualified to acquire private lands in the country. chanrobles law

If, at the end of the 25-year lease period (or in 2001), Keppel remained unqualified to
own private lands, the agreement provided that the lease would be automatically
renewed for another 25 years. Keppel was further allowed to exercise the option to
purchase the land up to the 30th year of the lease (or in 2006), also on the condition
that, by then, it would have acquired the requisite qualification to own land in the
Philippines.

Together with Keppel's lease rights and option to purchase, Lusteveco warranted not to
sell the land or assign its rights to the land for the duration of the lease unless with the
prior written consent of Keppel. Accordingly, when the petitioner Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC) acquired the land from Lusteveco and took over the rights and
obligations under the agreement, Keppel did not object to the assignment so long as
the agreement was annotated on PNOC's title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not absence of a consideration supporting the option contract does not
invalidate an offer to buy (or to sell)

RULING:
Yes, the absence of a consideration supporting the option contract, however, does not
invalidate an offer to buy (or to sell). An option unsupported by a separate
consideration stands as an unaccepted offer to buy (or to sell) which, when
properly accepted, ripens into a contract to sell. Thus, when an offer is supported
by a separate consideration, a valid option contract exists, i.e., there is a contracted
offer which the offerer cannot withdraw from without incurring liability in damages.
Thus, when Keppel communicated its acceptance, the offer to purchase the Bauan land
stood, not having been withdrawn by PNOC. The offer having been duly accepted, a
contract to sell the land ensued which Keppel can rightfully demand PNOC to
comply with.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 202514, July 25, 2016

ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

BANK, Respondent.
 BRION, J.:

TOPIC: Damages
NATURE: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages before the
RTC against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the PNB Delta branch manager
Silverio Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed from the PNB's refusal to release
Anna Marie's money in a consolidated savings account and in two foreign exchange
time deposits, evidenced by Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time Deposit
(FXCTD). Anna Marie prayed that the PNB and Fernandez be held solidarily liable for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, costs of suit, and
legal interests because of the PNB's refusal to honor its obligations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB is entitled to the payment of damages

RULING:

Yes, PNB is liable to Anna Marie for actual, Moral, and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees for its negligent acts as a banking institution. As earlier settled, the PNB
was negligent for its failure to update and properly handle Anna Marie's accounts. This
is patent from the PNB's letter to Anna Marie, admitting the error and unauthorized
withdrawals from her account. Moreover, Anna Marie was led to believe that the
amounts she has in her accounts would remain because of the Deed of Waiver and
Quitclaim executed by her, her mother, and PNB. Assuming arguendo that Anna Marie
made the contested withdrawals, due diligence requires the PNB to record the
transactions in her passbooks. As to contributory negligence, the Court agrees with the
RTC that the PNB failed to substantiate its allegation that Anna Marie was guilty of
contributory negligence. Anna Marie cannot be held responsible for entrusting her
account with Salvoro. As shown in the records, Salvoro was the bank's time deposit
specialist. Anna Marie cannot thus be faulted if she engaged the bank's services
through Salvoro for transactions related to her time deposits. In these lights, the Court
held that Anna Marie is entitled to moral damages of P-l 00,000.00. In cases of breach
of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in clear disregard
of his contractual obligations.60 Anna Marie was able to establish the mental anguish
and serious anxiety that she suffered because of the PNB's refusal to honor its
obligations.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199180, July 27, 2016

THELMA RODRIGUEZ, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES JAIME
SIOSON AND ARMI SIOSON, ET AL., Respondents.

REYES, J.:

TOPIC: Sales
NATURE: petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
the Municipality of Orani, Bataan (Municipality) purchased from Neri an area of about
1.7 hectare of Lot 398, to be used for the extension of the Municipality's public market.
Among other things, it was agreed that upon full payment of the purchase price, Neri
will surrender the mother title to the Municipality for subdivision of the property on the
condition that Neri will equitably share in the expense thereof.The respondents
countered that they are innocent purchasers for value having bought Lot 398-A at the
time when Thelma's adverse claim was already cancelled. While they admit Thelma's
possession of the subject property, they, however, qualify that possession is being
contested in a separate action for forcible entry.chanroble slaw

ISSUE:
Whether or not the transaction between Neri and Thelma is a contract of sale or a
contract to sell

RULING:
The transaction is a contract to sell. Despite the denomination of their agreement as one of
sale, the circumstances tend to show that Neri agreed to sell the subject property to
Thelma on the condition that title and ownership would pass or be transferred upon the
full payment of the purchase price. This is the very nature of a contract to sell, which is
a "bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds
himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price."38 As stated by the
Court, the agreement to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price
"shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the
purchase price." It was likewise established that Thelma was not able to pay the full
purchase price. Moreover, the alleged delivery of the property, even if true, is irrelevant
considering that in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the registered owner in
spite of the partial payment of the purchase price and delivery of possession of the
property. aw

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016

SULPICIO LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. NAPOLEON SESANTE, NOW SUBSTITUTED

BY MARIBEL ATILANO, KRISTEN MARIE, CHRISTIAN IONE, KENNETH KERRN
AND KARISNA KATE, ALL SURNAMED SESANTE, Respondent.
 BERSAMIN, J.:

TOPIC: Contract; Damages

NATURE:
FACTS:
the M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the
petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150
were lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner
for breach of contract and damages. Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V
hanr

Princess of the Orient left the Port of Manila while Metro Manila was experiencing
stormy weather and that because it had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to
sail despite the storm signal, the petitioner should pay him actual and moral damages.
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the
Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the proper
authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had not been
negligent; and that its officers and crew had also not been negligent because they had
made preparations to abandon the vessel because they had launched life rafts and had
provided the passengers assistance in that regard.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of
the plaintiff; whether the petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage;
whether the award of moral damages and temperate damages is proper

RULING:
Yes, an action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the
plaintiff. Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of
due process. It protects the right of due process belonging to any party, that in the
event of death the deceased litigant continues to be protected and properly represented
in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. A contract of
carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages. Sesante's claim
against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach of the contract
of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and
could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution. The petitioner is
liable for breach of contract of carriage. Sesante sustained injuries due to the
buffeting by the waves and consequent sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient where he
was a passenger. To exculpate itself from liability, the common carrier vouched for the
seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient, and referred to the BMI report to the effect
that the severe weather condition - a force majeure - had brought about the sinking of
the vessel. The award of moral damages and temperate damages is proper. We
agree with the petitioner that moral damages may be recovered in an action upon
breach of contract of carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b) it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not
result. However, moral damages may be awarded if the contractual breach is found to
be wanton and deliberately injurious, or if the one responsible acted fraudulently or
with malice or bad faith. As cargo officer of the ship, he failed to prepare a detailed
report of the ship's cargo stowage plan. He likewise failed to conduct the soundings
(measurement) of the ballast tanks before the ship departed from port. While the
anguish, anxiety, pain and stress experienced by Sesante during and after the sinking
cannot be quantified, the moral damages to be awarded should at least approximate
the reparation of all the consequences of the petitioner's negligence. While the anguish,
anxiety, pain and stress experienced by Sesante during and after the sinking cannot be
quantified, the moral damages to be awarded should at least approximate the
reparation of all the consequences of the petitioner's negligence. The award of
temperate damages was proper. Temperate damages may be recovered when some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be proven with certainty. Clearly, the petitioner and its agents on the scene acted
wantonly and recklessly. Wanton and reckless are virtually synonymous in meaning as
respects liability for conduct towards others. Wanton means characterized by extreme
recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others; or marked by or manifesting
arrogant recklessness of justice or of rights or feelings of others. Conduct
is reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a
high degree of danger is apparent. It must be more than any mere mistake resulting
from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or
inadvertence, or simple inattention.

SEPTEMBER 2016
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181387, September 05, 2016

CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. UE MONTHLY

ASSOCIATES, UEAMI WORKERS UNION NFL AND ALFREDO BASI, Respondent.

SERENO, C.J.:

TOPIC: Failure to prove their rights to the properties / Third-Party Claims

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
The dispute in this case stemmed from the levy and execution sale made by NLRC
Sheriff Manolito G. Manuel. The subjects of the execution were certain machinery,
equipment, tools and implements owned by UE Automotive Manufacturing, Inc.
(UEAMI). The levy was made pursuant to a final and executory NLRC judgment against
UEAMI in an illegal dismissal case. Metrobank filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim7 with the LA. Through its Senior Manager Ramon S. Miranda, the bank claimed
that the machines and equipment levied upon by Sheriff Manuel were covered by three
mortgage documents executed in favor of the bank by UEAMI, i.e., a Mortgage Trust
Indenture, an Amended Mortgage Trust Indenture, and a Second Amended Mortgage
Trust Indenture. As expected, respondents opposed Metrobank's third-party claim. They
han

asserted that they were not bound by the mortgage agreements cited by the bank,
because the instruments were not registered and consequently had no effect on third
parties. hanrobles law

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in denying Metrobank's third-party claim

RULING:
No, the denial of Metrobank’s third-party claim was proper. Petitioner also had an
opportunity to prove the third-party claim before this Court. It was aware that the CA
had denied Metrobank's Petition for Certiorari due to the absence of proof that the
properties allegedly mortgaged to the bank were among those sold by the sheriff on
execution. It would have been a simple matter to identify the properties sold by the
sheriff, as well as to prove that these items were included in the list of properties
mortgaged to Metrobank. Petitioner, however, still opted to attach only a machine copy
of the Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property, without annexes,56 to
its Petition for Review. For obvious reasons, this machine copy will not suffice as
evidence.

It must be pointed out that third-party claimants in execution proceedings have the
burden of proving their right or title to the subject properties, if they want to defeat the
judgment lien.57 To do so, they must submit evidence not only of the basis of their
entitlement, but also of the fact that the properties they are claiming were indeed the
subject of the execution. Failure to submit that evidence will justify the denial of the
third- party claim, as in this case.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 195975, September 05, 2016

TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE, Petitioner, v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., AND SPOUSES

TROADIO B. TECSON AND ASUNCION ORTALIZ-TECSON, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

TOPIC: Sale of Philippine Land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the name of his Filipino spouse is void
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:

Cattleya Land, Inc. (Cattleya) sent its legal counsel, Atty. Federico C. Cabilao, Jr. (Atty.
Cabilao, Jr.), to Tagbilaran City to investigate at the Office of the Register of Deeds in
that city the status of the properties of spouses Col. Troadio B. Tecson (Col. Tecson)
and Asuncion Tecson (collectively, Tecson spouses), which Cattleya wanted to
purchase. One of these properties is registered in the name of the Tecson spouses, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17655 (henceforth, the subject
property). Atty. Cabilao, Jr. found that no encumbrances or liens on the subject
property had been annotated on the TCT thereof. Cattleya entered into a Contract of
Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land, including the
subject property. In this transaction the Tecson spouses were represented by Atty.
Salvador S. Pizarras (Atty. Pizarras). The Contract of Conditional Sale was entered in
the Primary Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds. The parties executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the subject property. This Deed of Absolute Sale was also
entered in the Primary Book. However, neither the Contract of Conditional Sale nor the
Deed of Absolute Sale could be annotated on the certificate of title covering the subject
property because the then Register of Deeds of Bohol, Atty. Narciso S. De la Serna
(Atty. De la Serna) refused to annotate both deeds. According to Atty. De la Serna it
was improper to do so because of the writ of attachment that was annotated on the
certificate of title of the subject property.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the assailed Decision is legally correct in considering that the verbal
contract of sale between spouses Tecson and Mike transferred ownership to a foreigner,
which falls within the constitutional ban on sales of land to foreigners.

2. Whether the assailed Decision is legally correct in not considering that, assuming
that the sale of land to Mike violated the Constitution, the same has been cured by the
subsequent marriage of petitioner to Mike and by the registration of the land in the
name of petitioner, a Filipino citizen.

3. Whether the assailed Decision is legally correct in not applying the rules on double
sale, which clearly favor petitioner Taina.

RULING:
Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the subject
lot; hence, Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that
if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the
subject property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply
because she and Mike wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition
barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in the
Philippines. Indeed, both the CA and the RTC exposed and laid bare Taina's posturing
and pretense for what these really are: that in the transaction in question, she was a
mere dummy, a spurious stand-in, for her erstwhile common-law husband, who was
not a Filipino then, and never attempted to become a naturalized Filipino citizen
thereafter. Given the fact that the sale by the Tecson spouses to Taina as Mike's
dummy was totally abhorrent and repugnant to the Philippine Constitution, and is thus,
void ab initio, it stands to reason that there can be no double sale to speak of here.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 210940, September 06, 2016

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

 MENDOZA, J.:

TOPIC: Funds of the SSS were merely held in trust for the benefit of workers and employees in the private sector
NATURE: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
The SSC of the Social Security System (SSS) approved Resolution No. 360 granting a
new compensation package for its members, including medical benefits, rice allowance,
and a provident fund. These benefits were incorporated in the SSS Manual on Personnel
Policies, Rules and Regulations or commonly known in the SSS as the "Blue Book.” The
SSC issued Resolution No. 790 granting EME to its members at similar rates then given
to members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). EME included, but
was not limited to, expenses incurred for meetings, seminars, conferences, official
entertainment, and public relations. In the same resolution, the SSC further approved
additional budgetary appropriations in the amount of approximately P 4.49 million to
cover the payment of EME. It also covered the increase in EME of its Chairman to
P750,000.00 per year, which was the rate being given to his counterpart in the GSIS.
the Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate Government Sector (LAO-CGS) of the COA
issued ND No. SSS-2007-02 (2004) disallowing the total amount of P4,314,683.99.

ISSUE:
Whether the members of the SSC are entitled to the EME, medical benefit, rice
allowance and the provident fund.

RULING:
No, compensation and/or benefits which may be received by SSC members was not
proper. The House version of the bill only sought to authorize the SSS to increase the
amount of RATA received by SSC members. It did not empower the SSS to provide for
additional benefits other than those already explicitly indicated in the SS Law. It was
still consistent with the intention to specifically provide the benefits to be received by
SSS commissioners. Hence, the grant of EME and other additional benefits was
improper considering that the only benefits which may be received by the members of
the SSC are those enumerated under Section 3(a) of the SS Law. The SSS cannot rely
on Sections 3(c) and 25 of the SS Law either. A harmonious reading of the said
provisions discloses that the SSC may merely fix the compensation, benefits and
allowances of SSS appointive employees within the limits prescribed by the SS Law.
Nothing in the aforementioned provisions authorizes the SSS to grant additional
benefits to its members. Notwithstanding the disallowance of the questioned
disbursements, the Court rules that the responsible officers under the ND need not
refund the same on the basis of good faith. In relation to the requirement of refund of
disallowed benefits or allowances, good faith is a state of mind denoting "honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder
upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage
of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information,
notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187942, September 07, 2016

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF TUGUEGARAO, Petitioner, v. FLORENTINA

PRUDENCIO, NOW DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY:
EXEQUIEL, LORENZO, PRIMITIVO, MARCELINO, JULIANA, ALFREDO AND
ROSARIO, ALL SURNAMED DOMINGO; AVELINA PRUDENCIO, ASSISTED BY HER
HUSBAND VICTORIANO DIMAYA; ERNESTO PENALBER* AND RODRIGO
TALANG; SPOUSES ISIDRO CEPEDA AND SALVACION DIVINI, NOW DECEASED,
SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: MARCIAL, PEDRO AND LINA, ALL
SURNAMED CEPEDA, Respondents.

JARDELEZA, J.:

TOPIC: Question on whether Private individuals may acquire vested right of ownership over the island, considering
that they have been in open and continued possession for several years.
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari1
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

TOPIC: Presumption of Conjugality

NATURE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

TOPIC: Article 1234 of the Civil Code

NATURE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
TOPIC: Easement of Right of Way
NATURE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

TOPIC: Philippine Economic Zone Authority Vs. Philhino Sales Corporation

NATURE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

TOPIC: Complaint for damages for the death of respondent’s daughter; Enrollment Contracts
NATURE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

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