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Decision:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President
in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy
center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all
areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet
again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must
uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully
exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution,
lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same
Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace
process effectively.
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and
the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to
materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed
their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding
of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the
GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF
Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The
following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on
August 27, 1998.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel
Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments,
and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Issues:
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is
concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the
finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid
commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Held:
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts
and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and
the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions,
the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and
academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c)
the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion
of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought
by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations
on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and
process and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the peace
process.
Article II Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations
are complied with and approval mus be obtained.”
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter
provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over: 1. Administrative organization; 2. Creation of
sources of revenues; 3. Ancestral domain and natural resources; 4. Personal,
family, and property relations; 5. Regional urban and rural planning
development; 6. Economic, social, and tourism development; 7. Educational
policies; 8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and 9. Such
other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A
constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws “shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework.” The president’s authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001
is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace
Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland
Issues:
Issue 1:
The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to
the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the
Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
Issue 2:
Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a
proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents
to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a
departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.
Issue 3:
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of
guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they
considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Issue 4:
Issue 5:
No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement, this would not have
sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.
Issue 6:
Issue 7:
The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted the main and
intervening petitions.