FIRST DIVISION this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the "Agreement
Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the
G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28,
2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFA'S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE
MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE
COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
(ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA
PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT
ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED
PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations1 for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and January
31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of
the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner
enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him.
On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
dismissing the criminal cases.
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we
rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that
the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts
performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover
the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also
granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the
parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic
immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the
Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made
clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely.
The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made
by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for
Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank," to wit:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner's and intervenor's Motions
for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000.
As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered
as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.
Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral
defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein
is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official
capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is
still for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner
and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Pardo, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I also join concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno.
Puno, J., Please see concurring opinion.
Concurring Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Jeffrey Liang of this
Court's decision dated January 28, 2000 which denied the petition for review. We there
held that: the protocol communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect
that petitioner Liang is covered by immunity is only preliminary and has no binding effect
in courts; the immunity provided for under Section 45(a) of the Headquarters Agreement
is subject to the condition that the act be done in an "official capacity"; that slandering a
person cannot be said to have been done in an "official capacity" and, hence, it is not
covered by the immunity agreement; under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions; the commission of a crime is not part of official duty; and
that a preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is anchored on the following arguments:
1. The DFA's determination of immunity is a political question to be made by the
executive branch of the government and is conclusive upon the courts;
2. The immunity of international organizations is absolute;
3. The immunity extends to all staff of the Asian Development Bank (ADB);
4. Due process was fully accorded the complainant to rebut the DFA protocol;
5. The decision of January 28, 2000 erroneously made a finding of fact on the merits,
namely, the slandering of a person which prejudged petitioner's case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) Mandaluyong; and
6. The Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations is not applicable to this case.
Petitioner contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the
Department of Foreign Affairs is a political question. It is solely within the prerogative of
the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. In support of his submission,
petitioner cites the following cases: WHO vs. Aquino;1 International Catholic Migration
Commission vs. Calleja;2 The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.;3 Lasco vs. United Nations;4 and
DFA vs. NLRC.5
It is further contended that the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and
independence of international organizations against interference from any authority
external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge their
entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an
implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The
exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar.
Petitioner likewise urges that the international organization's immunity from local
jurisdiction empowers the ADB alone to determine what constitutes "official acts" and the
same cannot be subject to different interpretations by the member states. It asserts that
the Headquarters Agreement provides for remedies to check abuses against the exercise
of the immunity. Thus, Section 49 states that the "Bank shall waive the immunity
accorded to any person if, in its opinion, such immunity would impede the course of justice
and the waiver would not prejudice the purposes for which the immunities are accorded."
Section 51 allows for consultation between the government and the Bank should the
government consider that an abuse has occurred. The same section provides the
mechanism for a dispute settlement regarding, among others, issues of interpretation or
application of the agreement.
Petitioner's argument that a determination by the Department of Foreign Affairs that he is
entitled to diplomatic immunity is a political question binding on the courts, is anchored on
the ruling enunciated in the case of WHO, et al. vs. Aquino, et al.,6 viz:
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse
to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the
plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by
seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government
in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial
department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not
embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International Catholic Migration
Commission vs. Calleja;7 The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.;8 Lasco vs. UN;9 and DFA vs.
NLRC.10
The case of WHO vs. Aquino involved the search and seizure of personal effects of
petitioner Leonce Verstuyft, an official of the WHO. Verstuyft was certified to be entitled to
diplomatic immunity pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the Philippines
and the WHO.
ICMC vs. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election filed against ICMC and IRRI.
As international organizations, ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess diplomatic
immunity. It was held that they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was ruled that the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor over the case would defeat the very
purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations from
political pressure or control by the host country and to ensure the unhampered
performance of their functions.
Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale of land against the Holy
See, as represented by the Papal Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner's defense of
sovereign immunity. It ruled that where a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the
civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state, which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission, with all the
more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in that
case is the Holy See.
In Lasco vs. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration was sued before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. The Court again upheld the
doctrine of diplomatic immunity invoked by the Fund.
Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development
Bank. Pursuant to its Charter and the Headquarters Agreement, the diplomatic immunity
of the Asian Development Bank was recognized by the Court.
It bears to stress that all of these cases pertain to the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by
international organizations. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the same diplomatic
immunity and he cannot be prosecuted for acts allegedly done in the exercise of his official
functions.
The term "international organizations" —
"is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more
states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some
degree of international legal personality such that they are capable of exercising specific
rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general
international business in which the member states have an interest."11
International public officials have been defined as:
". . . persons who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular
international community, are appointed by this international community, or by an organ of
it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest of
this particular international community, and who are subject to a particular personal
status."12
"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields,
such as posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation,
meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees.13
Issues
1. Whether petitioner Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled
to diplomatic immunity;
2. Whether an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts,
whether private or official;
3. Whether the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in the
courts;
4. Whether the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner is
covered by immunity is a political question that is binding and conclusive on the courts.
Discussion
A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and
agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who
the recipient is. Thus:
1. Charter of the United Nations
"Article 105 (1): The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
Article 105 (2): Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization."
2. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
"Section 2: The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as
in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that
no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 11 (a): Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of the
United Nations . . shall . . . enjoy . . . immunity from personal arrest or detention and
from seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or written and all
acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity from legal process of
every kind.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 14: Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Members not
for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the United Nations.
Consequently, a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity
of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the immunity would
impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for
which the immunity is accorded.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 18 (a): Officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in
respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Section 18, the
Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in respect of
themselves, their spouses and minor children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions
and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law.
Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interest of the United
Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary-
General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case
where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived
without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 22: Experts . . . performing missions for the United Nations . . . shall be accorded:
(a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal
baggage; (b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of
the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind."
3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
"Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to
any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and
shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 31 (1): A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction,
except in certain cases.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 38 (1): Except in so far as additional privileges and immunities may be granted by
the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently a resident in
that State shall enjoy only immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of
official acts performed in the exercise of his functions."
4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
"Article 41 (1): Consular officials shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial,
except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial
authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 43 (1): Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of
acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.
Article 43 (2): The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not, however, apply in
respect of a civil action either: (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer
or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of
the sending State; or (b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the
receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft."
5. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
"Section 4: The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far
as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however,
understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Section 13 (a): Representatives of members at meetings convened by a specialized
agency shall, while exercising their functions and during their journeys to and from the
place of meeting, enjoy immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of
their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by
them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19 (a): Officials of the specialized agencies shall be immune from legal process in
respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in sections 19 and 20,
the executive head of each specialized agency, including a any official acting on his behalf
during his absence from duty, shall be accorded in respect of himself, his spouse and
minor children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to
diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law."
6. Charter of the ADB
"Article 50 (1): The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in
cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities, in which
cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in the
territory of a country in which the Bank has its principal or a branch office, or has
appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued
or guaranteed securities.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 55 (i): All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank,
including experts performing missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process
with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
waives the immunity."
7. ADB Headquarters Agreement
"Section 5: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in
cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities, in which
cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in the
Republic of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 44: Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President, Vice-
President and executive officers as may be agreed upon between the Government and the
Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of the Philippines in connection with
their official duties with the Bank: (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and
from seizure of their personal baggage; (b) immunity from legal process of every kind in
respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official capacity; and
(c) in respect of other matters not covered in (a) and (b) above, such other immunities,
exemptions, privileges and facilities as are enjoyed by members of diplomatic missions of
comparable rank, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations.
Section 45 (a): Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purposes of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy . . . immunity from
legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when
the Bank waives the immunity."
II
There are three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities.
Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the
diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving
State only with the express consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity
from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their functions,
nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving
State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State of
which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the
jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending
State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent
for the jurisdiction of the Sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of
immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective
sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of reciprocity and
the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar
protection.14
The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the foundation of
international immunities are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in
three basic propositions, namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status
which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the
performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to
democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are
represented; (2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal
charges on common international funds; and (3) that the international organization
should, as a collectivity of States Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its
official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The
thinking underlying these propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not
concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of
functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control
and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their
members.15
III
Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities
to the personnel of international organizations. The first is by simple conventional
stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by
internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon whose territory the
international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the international
character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and
immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its
personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions
is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and
the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination of the first
two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status
of an international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and
general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are
determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is
located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and
the United Nations.16
The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category.
There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to
international officials. The connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of
the relatively well-established body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international
functionaries. This connection is purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis of
their special status in the necessity of retaining functional independence and freedom from
interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship between an
ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the
relationship between the international official and those states upon whose territory he
might carry out his functions.17
The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon
different legal foundations. Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a
right of the sending state based on customary international law, those granted to
international officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary international law
places no obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an international official or to
grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from specific treaty
provisions.18
The special status of the diplomatic envoy is regulated by the principle of reciprocity by
which a state is free to treat the envoy of another state as its envoys are treated by that
state. The juridical basis of the diplomat's position is firmly established in customary
international law. The diplomatic envoy is appointed by the sending State but it has to
make certain that the agreement of the receiving State has been given for the person it
proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State.19
The staff personnel of an international organization — the international officials — assume
a different position as regards their special status. They are appointed or elected to their
position by the organization itself, or by a competent organ of it; they are responsible to
the organization and their official acts are imputed to it. The juridical basis of their special
position is found in conventional law,20 since there is no established basis of usage or
custom in the case of the international official. Moreover, the relationship between an
international organization and a member-state does not admit of the principle of
reciprocity,21 for it is contradictory to the basic principle of equality of states. An
international organization carries out functions in the interest of every member state
equally. The international official does not carry out his functions in the interest of any
state, but in serving the organization he serves, indirectly, each state equally. He cannot
be, legally, the object of the operation of the principle of reciprocity between states under
such circumstances. It is contrary to the principle of equality of states for one state
member of an international organization to assert a capacity to extract special privileges
for its nationals from other member states on the basis of a status awarded by it to an
international organization. It is upon this principle of sovereign equality that international
organizations are built.
It follows from this same legal circumstance that a state called upon to admit an official of
an international organization does not have a capacity to declare him persona non grata.
The functions of the diplomat and those of the international official are quite different.
Those of the diplomat are functions in the national interest. The task of the ambassador is
to represent his state, and its specific interest, at the capital of another state. The
functions of the international official are carried out in the international interest. He does
not represent a state or the interest of any specific state. He does not usually "represent"
the organization in the true sense of that term. His functions normally are administrative,
although they may be judicial or executive, but they are rarely political or functions of
representation, such as those of the diplomat.
There is a difference of degree as well as of kind. The interruption of the activities of a
diplomatic agent is likely to produce serious harm to the purposes for which his immunities
were granted. But the interruption of the activities of the international official does not,
usually, cause serious dislocation of the functions of an international secretariat.22
On the other hand, they are similar in the sense that acts performed in an official capacity
by either a diplomatic envoy or an international official are not attributable to him as an
individual but are imputed to the entity he represents, the state in the case of the
diplomat, and the organization in the case of the international official.23
IV
Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of
international organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection
in the exercise of their functions — The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire
and France which provided "all the rights of neutrality" to persons employed in regulating
navigation in the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the
European Commission of the Danube "complete independence of territorial authorities" in
the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which granted "diplomatic
immunities and privileges." Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of
protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of
personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The tendency cannot be considered
as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on the
privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the problem
presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international functionaries lies in
the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents in that the special
status of each agent is granted in the interest of function. The wide grant of diplomatic
prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper
functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials.
While the current direction of the law seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the
personnel of international organizations, the reverse is true with respect to the
prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities. Historically,
states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to organizations
than they have to the personnel of these organizations.24
Thus, Section 2 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations states that the UN shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except
insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. Section 4 of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies likewise provides
that the specialized agencies shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process
subject to the same exception. Finally, Article 50(1) of the ADB Charter and Section 5 of
the Headquarters Agreement similarly provide that the bank shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the
exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or
underwrite the sale of securities.
The phrase "immunity from every form of legal process" as used in the UN General
Convention has been interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a state's jurisdiction to
adjudicate or enforce its law by legal process, and it is said that states have not sought to
restrict that immunity of the United Nations by interpretation or amendment. Similar
provisions are contained in the Special Agencies Convention as well as in the ADB Charter
and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges and
immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It
is clear therefore that these organizations were intended to have similar privileges and
immunities.25 From this, it can be easily deduced that international organizations enjoy
absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives granted to diplomatic envoys.
Even in the United States this theory seems to be the prevailing rule. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act was passed adopting the "restrictive theory" limiting the
immunity of states under international law essentially to activities of a kind not carried on
by private persons. Then the International Organizations Immunities Act came into effect
which gives to designated international organizations the same immunity from suit and
every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments. This gives the
impression that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has the effect of applying the
restrictive theory also to international organizations generally. However, aside from the
fact that there was no indication in its legislative history that Congress contemplated that
result, and considering that the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations exempts the United Nations "from every form of legal process," conflict with the
United States obligations under the Convention was sought to be avoided by interpreting
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the restrictive theory, as not applying to suits
against the United Nations.26
On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of
the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that
officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention
on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB
provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from
legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when
the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords
the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that
international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their
official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity.
Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his
international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in
doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of the
jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are
imputed to the organization, and without waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for
them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have no right to
waive an official's immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to assume
jurisdiction over an individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his
act at all. It is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own
immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he appears in the
name of the organization. Provisions for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear,
aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of most modern international
organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as
declaratory of international law.27
V
What then is the status of the international official with respect to his private acts?
Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of the
specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private life
and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without the necessity of
waiver.28 It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international officials were
granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune for both
private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was
curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the
organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current
status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to
international officials for acts of their private lives.29 This much is explicit from the
Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar
provisions to that of the General Convention.
VI

Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official?
This is an entirely different question. In connection with this question, the current
tendency to narrow the scope of privileges and immunities of international officials and
representatives is most apparent. Prior to the regime of the United Nations, the
determination of this question rested with the organization and its decision was final. By
the new formula, the state itself tends to assume this competence. If the organization is
dissatisfied with the decision, under the provisions of the General Convention of the United
States, or the Special Convention for Specialized Agencies, the Swiss Arrangement, and
other current dominant instruments, it may appeal to an international tribunal by
procedures outlined in those instruments. Thus, the state assumes this competence in the
first instance. It means that, if a local court assumes jurisdiction over an act without the
necessity of waiver from the organization, the determination of the nature of the act is
made at the national level.30
It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an
act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion
seems to be to leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is
official or private does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the United
Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement of
disputes between the organization and the member states as provided in Section 30 of the
General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official or private is
made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the
international level if questioned by the United Nations.31
A similar view is taken by Kunz, who writes that the "jurisdiction of local courts without
waiver for acts of private life empowers the local courts to determine whether a certain act
is an official act or an act of private life," on the rationale that since the determination of
such question, if left in the hands of the organization, would consist in the execution, or
non-execution, of waiver, and since waiver is not mentioned in connection with the
provision granting immunities to international officials, then the decision must rest with
local courts.32
Under the Third Restatement of the Law, it is suggested that since an international official
does not enjoy personal inviolability from arrest or detention and has immunity only with
respect to official acts, he is subject to judicial or administrative process and must claim
his immunity in the proceedings by showing that the act in question was an official act.
Whether an act was performed in the individual's official capacity is a question for the
court in which a proceeding is brought, but if the international organization disputes the
court's finding, the dispute between the organization and the state of the forum is to be
resolved by negotiation, by an agreed mode of settlement or by advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice.33
Recognizing the difficulty that by reason of the right of a national court to assume
jurisdiction over private acts without a waiver of immunity, the determination of the
official or private character of a particular act may pass from international to national
control, Jenks proposes three ways of avoiding difficulty in the matter. The first would be
for a municipal court before which a question of the official or private character of a
particular act arose to accept as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international
organization that the act was official in character, such a claim being regarded as
equivalent to a governmental claim that a particular act is an act of State. Such a claim
would be in effect a claim by the organization that the proceedings against the official
were a violation of the jurisdictional immunity of the organization itself which is unqualified
and therefore not subject to delimitation in the discretion of the municipal court. The
second would be for a court to accept as conclusive in the matter a statement by the
executive government of the country where the matter arises certifying the official
character of the act. The third would be to have recourse to the procedure of international
arbitration. Jenks opines that it is possible that none of these three solutions would be
applicable in all cases; the first might be readily acceptable only in the clearest cases and
the second is available only if the executive government of the country where the matter
arises concurs in the view of the international organization concerning the official
character of the act. However, he surmises that taken in combination, these various
possibilities may afford the elements of a solution to the problem.34
One final point. The international official's immunity for official acts may be likened to a
consular official's immunity from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process which is
not absolute but applies only to acts or omissions in the performance of his official
functions, in the absence of special agreement. Since a consular officer is not immune
from all legal process, he must respond to any process and plead and prove immunity on
the ground that the act or omission underlying the process was in the performance of his
official functions. The issue has not been authoritatively determined, but apparently the
burden is on the consular officer to prove his status as well as his exemption in the
circumstances. In the United States, the US Department of State generally has left it to
the courts to determine whether a particular act was within a consular officer's official
duties.35
Submissions
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, I submit the following conclusions:
First, petitioner Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and
hence his immunity is not absolute.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and
hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit,
unless his diplomatic immunity is waived.36 On the other hand, officials of international
organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise
of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes.37 This is the reason
why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal
process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and
employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private
acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal
process" accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is
absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official
acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to
narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to
personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to increase the
prerogatives of international organizations.
Second, considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for
their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the Department of
Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is
limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the
power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department's foreign relations,
nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to
invoke immunity for private acts of bank officials and employees, since no such
prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to
certify.
As an aside, ADB cannot even claim to have the right to waive immunity for private acts of
its officials and employees. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement are clear that
the immunity can be waived only with respect to official acts because this is only the
extent to which the privilege has been granted. One cannot waive the right to a privilege
which has never been granted or acquired.
recognition of the court's jurisdiction to ascertain the suability or non-suability of the
sovereign by assessing the facts of the case. The Court hastened to add that when a state
or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign
court, in some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the
local courts by the respondents through their private counsels, or where the foreign states
bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own
determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
Finally, it appears from the records of this case that petitioner is a senior economist at
ADB and as such he makes country project profiles which will help the bank in deciding
whether to lend money or support a particular project to a particular country.41 Petitioner
stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his
secretary, the private complainant herein. Considering that the immunity accorded to
petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to
make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made
pursuant and in relation to his official functions as a senior economist.
I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.
Davide, Jr., C.J., concurs.

Third, I choose to adopt the view that it is the local courts which have jurisdiction to
determine whether or not a given act is official or private. While there is a dearth of cases
on the matter under Philippine jurisprudence, the issue is not entirely novel.

The case of M.H. Wylie, et al. vs. Rarang, et al.38 concerns the extent of immunity from
suit of the officials of a United States Naval Base inside the Philippine territory. Although a
motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants therein invoking their immunity from suit
pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the trial court denied the same and,
after trial, rendered a decision declaring that the defendants are not entitled to immunity
because the latter acted beyond the scope of their official duties. The Court likewise
applied the ruling enunciated in the case of Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan39 to the effect that
a mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being
automatically dropped. While it is true that the Chavez case involved a public official, the
Court did not find any substantial reason why the same rule cannot be made to apply to a
US official assigned at the US Naval Station located in the Philippines. In this case, it was
the local courts which ascertained whether the acts complained of were done in an official
or personal capacity.

In the case of The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.,40 a complaint for annulment of contract of
sale, reconveyance, specific performance and damages was filed against petitioner.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of, among others, lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit, which was denied by the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration, and subsequently, a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of
Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense" were
filed by petitioner. The trial court deferred resolution of said motions until after trial on the
merits. On certiorari, the Court there ruled on the issue of petitioner's non-suability on the
basis of the allegations made in the pleadings filed by the parties. This is an implicit
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano
went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100
meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored
his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was
responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one.
Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the
handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand,
which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg
with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to
hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his
house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the
house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested
that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal
certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20
years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser
palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This
wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was
already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence,
on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police
to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police
blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis
and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives
to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to
Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical
treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p.
87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay
captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General
Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and
was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of
a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
 adm. at DX TETANUS That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi- in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon
that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San
Fabian, a town of said province;
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation
tion of respiration and HR
dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or
after muscular spasm.
controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches
were regulated and reduced;
02 inhalation administered.
Ambo bag resuscita-
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to
the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in
tion and cardiac massage said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
done but to no avail. mudfishes;

Pronounced dead by Dra. That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected,
Cabugao at 4:18 P.M. with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

PMC done and cadaver That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late
brought home by rela- Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions;
tives. (p. 100, Original
Records) That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that
said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District. The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4)
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the
that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito)
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation
costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality
of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v.
of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November
against the appellant.
14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a
very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial tetanus.
was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for
Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened
from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which
covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of
his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus.
And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus
except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981).
Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound
which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
(Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel
78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a
desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive
that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand.
(pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo
Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the
injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his
farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when
the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition
of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause
from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any
liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days.
A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms
occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100
percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and
patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus
in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the
familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved,
rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most
muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are
 caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive
contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful
and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli
produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation.
Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and
death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days
and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately
severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time;
trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe
tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged,
generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends
on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October
23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus,
like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected
with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him
was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus
after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before
he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As
we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At
the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However,
the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act.
After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the
medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v.
Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is
limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow
that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from
 civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Commission as follows: Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most SO ORDERED.
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given
use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads

to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between
criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the
social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party.
The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads
thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes
of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is
the right of the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the

adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part
of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court
to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not
thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the
victim are so minded.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise,
he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya
pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another
City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness
testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were
not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC),
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted
murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he
and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod
for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment
to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal
Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his
accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did
not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime
is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy
the void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced,
that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law
and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code,
inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this
clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown
to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with
the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the
police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an
attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party
imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it
no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished
simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated
upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to
kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the
court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only
became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane
did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is
inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by
outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has
no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous
acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery
even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice
Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason
of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the
public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the
unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime.
Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done
is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil;
intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt
takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room
thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another
part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to
make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However,
we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference
between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of
impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for
impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of
Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were
attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this
regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two
categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If
the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime
was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court
performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the
knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination
of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model SO ORDERED.
Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming
modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal
impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take
place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt
are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime,
but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for
an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law,
there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a
defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized.
The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because
the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006
render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act
"which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented vs.
the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19
November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of
homicide, allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay
Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE,
hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to
impact which caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4
for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released 5 after posting
sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded
not guilty to the crime of homicide charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano,
companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are
collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano,
together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing
Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed
paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was
harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for
throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao,
victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan
dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then
picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at
the left side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and
held his back. Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put
down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s
house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit
by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness
Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving
petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was
unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He
was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to
bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day,
05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre
asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he
ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly
thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and
Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death
of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body
of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the
Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an
exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15
April 1996,12 after which, he reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and
blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage
and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated
spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a
stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to
death by petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of
the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was
walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay,
Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The
victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan
attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from
his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either
"to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from
the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged
man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he
described as approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He
was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao
then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was
able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to
a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and sought their help in
settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile,
refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and, instead,
chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after
the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw
the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he
knew, the victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food
poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the
victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the
prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in
defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run.
While it appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the
aggression already ceased after Michael was able to run and there was no more need for
throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can
be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1
of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side
was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the
victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in
the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally
liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate
result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-
G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts
merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14
Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of
the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8)
YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of
Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty
Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001, 17 sustained the conviction of homicide
rendered by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by
the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the
accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained
by the victim was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a
traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior
Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health
Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was food
poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even
able to identify and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made available for
cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh.
"C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the
defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning,
as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to
belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect
because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised
therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the
Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2)
consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with
dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable
doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the
first physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the
victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food
poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of
the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government
physicians whose findings are at variance with each other materially, it is humbly
contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of the
petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the
case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt and
therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23,
1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt
is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires
only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all
possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold
petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the
RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces
of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre
died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his
testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be
lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a blunt object, such as the
stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert
witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by
the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is
presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology,
and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded
it great weight and probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his
area of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim
Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the
mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the causal
relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated
spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no
apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed
the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and
testimony must be seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support
the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the
death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and
disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of
internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood
vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the
ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base
is vulnerable to trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several
blood vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic,
splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the
duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and
the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity.
Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress,
contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow
from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is
protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs,
yet on account of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend
for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be
plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is
more than just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles,
and the spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen
and all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all
directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even
impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-
mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already
been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the
victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external
injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused
by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is
the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the
lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls,
sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are frequently
implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim
Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable, superficial,
and fragile – even without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the
findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his
lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his
testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the
proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre,
had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February
1996. Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts,
actions, and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the
encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be
physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of backache.
Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than
being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre
may have been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of
his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated
spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer
who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the
cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the
defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-
mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative value for the
following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as
well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected
food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement
that it was so. In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause
of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by
laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the
immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was
"Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed
conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food
poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains
just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in which she had
explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP
B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning".
What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food
poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I
even recommended that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or
abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the
history of the victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in
the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an
incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in
search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it
located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body,
his SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC 31 how he conducted the
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the
victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other
matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury
of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term
traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make
causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like
this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this
traumatic injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body
of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent
findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr.
Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed
to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured
spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves
to be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being
included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that
would give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution
if produced.32 As this Court already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not
constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The
prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for
the prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the
prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the
quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely
corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not
presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule
that the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1)
the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4)
the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the
failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable
to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to
testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the
RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the
conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing,
however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate
court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her
testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was
caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC
and the Court of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for
which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which
they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These
two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of
malicious intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of
Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in
performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As
stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or
lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner
Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the
absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for
the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless
imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that
demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely,
that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of
petitioner Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have
failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on
the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a
chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The
victim Cantre and witness Sañano were on their way home from a drinking spree in
Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from
the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running
grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there
was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the
defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched
Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road.
The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner
Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner
Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account that the
victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of
five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15
years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could
have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the
assault of the victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at
the victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan
since the incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim
Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is
highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and impulsively,
with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre stopped his
aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also
desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a
very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon
the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur
in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone
at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction
to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That
Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the
notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was
forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim
Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre.
What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the
attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who
was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He Chief Justice
failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on
someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely
disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse,
kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre
was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless
imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for
such death. This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for his death and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306,
dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated
19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period
of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision
correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice