ANNOTATION: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 323 SCRA 699

Facts: Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng), a Chinese national, was employed as an

Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and worked in the
Philippines. He was charged with grave oral defamation based on allegations
that he had made defamatory statements to a member of the clerical staff of
ADB on two separate occasions in January 1994, specifically on January 28
and January 31.

The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) advised the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City to dismiss the criminal charges against Liang, asserting
that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity from legal processes. The DFA's position
was rooted in the claim that, as an employee of ADB, Liang was immune from
prosecution while acting in his official capacity.

However, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set
aside the dismissal of the criminal charges. This decision was made on the
grounds that the immunity did not extend to the specific actions that formed
the basis of the charges. Consequently, Liang sought recourse by filing a
petition for review with the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Issues:

1. DFA's Determination of Immunity: The first issue revolved around

whether the DFA's determination of diplomatic immunity is a political
question to be made by the executive branch of the government and is
conclusive upon the courts. Liang argued that the DFA's decision to
grant immunity should not be subject to judicial review.
2. Immunity of International Organizations: Liang contended that the
immunity of international organizations, such as the ADB, should be
considered absolute. He argued that their employees should be
shielded from legal and judicial processes under all circumstances.
3. Extent of Immunity: Another central issue was whether the immunity
extended to all staff of the ADB, as opposed to being limited to specific
officials or a narrower category of employees.
4. Due Process: The case also raised questions about whether due
process was fully afforded to the complainant to rebut the DFA's
protocol. Specifically, it addressed whether the complainant had an
opportunity to challenge the DFA's determination of immunity.
5. Erroneous Finding of Fact: Liang argued that the previous Supreme
Court decision, dated January 28, 2000, made an erroneous finding of
fact on the merits of the case, specifically regarding the alleged slander.
He contended that this had the effect of prejudging his case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) in Mandaluyong.
6. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: The final issue revolved
around the applicability of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
 Relations to this case. Liang questioned whether the Convention was
relevant and applicable to his situation.

Court's Ruling and Reasoning: In its previous decision dated January 28,
2000, the Supreme Court denied Liang's petition for review and offered the
following key points in its reasoning:

 The Court clarified that diplomatic immunity is not absolute. It is

contingent upon the specific circumstances and acts performed in an
official capacity. Immunity does not cover personal actions unrelated to
official duties, particularly criminal activities like slander or oral
defamation.
 The DFA's determination of immunity was subject to judicial review, and
it was not a purely political question. The court asserted its role in
ensuring that immunity determinations were in line with the law.
 The issue of diplomatic immunity in this case hinged on whether Liang's
alleged defamatory statements were made while he was performing his
official functions, as required by the agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine government.
 The Supreme Court's previous decision did not prejudge the criminal
case for oral defamation against Liang. It merely stated that, in general,
slander could not be considered an act performed in an official capacity.
The determination of whether Liang's utterances constituted oral
defamation was left to the trial court to decide.
 The Court emphasized that its decision did not reject diplomatic
immunity but set the boundaries for its application, particularly in cases
involving personal conduct unrelated to official duties.

Relevance of Diplomatic Immunity: Diplomatic immunity played a central

role in this case as it determined whether Jeffrey Liang was exempt from legal
and judicial processes in the Philippines. The Court's ruling clarified the
limitations of diplomatic immunity for employees of international organizations
like the ADB, emphasizing that it only applied to acts performed in an official
capacity and did not cover personal actions that might involve criminal
activities. This case underscores the importance of differentiating between
official and personal conduct when considering diplomatic immunity in legal
proceedings involving foreign officials or international organization staff. It also
highlighted the judicial role in reviewing and ensuring the proper application of
diplomatic immunity, rather than leaving it as an entirely political matter.
§ 14. Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats
Members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend
international conference are accorded diplomatic immunity while in the
performance of their official functions. The principle of restrictive immunity
applies to them, however, for acts not directly connected with their official
duties.
§ 15. The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case
In the case under annotation, the proper procedure was for the municipal
court to inquire whether the petitioner had committed the crime in connection
with the performance of his official duties as an officer of the Asian
Development Bank. Sec. 45 (a) of the Headquarters agreement between the
Government of the Philippines and the Asian Development Bank states that
the immunity applies to the performance of their duties in their official
capacities.
The immunity of Jeffrey Liang was not absolute. The principle of restrictive
immunity applies to him. The municipal judge in outrightly dismissing the case
on the ground of immunity of the petitioner from local jurisdiction was not
proper. It will be different if the person enjoyed full diplomatic immunity as
what happened in the case of WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 243 (1972) the
official was a U.N. officer with full diplomatic immunity. Thus, the certifications
of Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the WHO officials enjoyed diplomatic
immunity are conclusive on the courts. It was a political act of the executive
which should be respected by the court.
For that matter, had there been a preliminary investigation as averred by the
petitioner, the case should not have reached the Supreme Court. The
preliminary investigation could have clarified whether the petitioner committed
oral defamation in connection with his official duties as an ADB official.