(1) Requirements for the Issuance of Provisional
Approval (BOE)
G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, ANA MARIA
NEMENZO, as President of FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION, MA. TERESA I. DIOKNO-PASCUAL, REP.
LORETTA ANN ROSALES (Party-List Akbayan), REP. JOSE
VIRGILIO BAUTISTA (Party-List Sanlakas), REP. RENATO
MAGTUBO (Party-List Partido Manggagawa),
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY (MERALCO),
The challenged provisional rate increase transgresses
Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR in two major respects.
The violations involve a couple of new requirements
prescribed by the IRR. These are, first, the need to
publish the application in a newspaper of general
circulation in the locality where the applicant operates;
and second, the need for ERC to consider the comments
or pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in its
action on the application or motion for provisional rate
adjustment.
The record shows that MERALCO failed to comply with
the publication requirement prescribed by the IRR. What
the IRR requires to be published is the application itself.
In fact, it even requires the applicant to submit the
"certification of the notice of publication" of the
"application or petition for rate adjustment"101 together
with the application/petition to the ERC.
Here, what was actually published is a mere notice of
the intent to file an application. Nothing more, nothing
less.
Legislative history supports ERC’s power to grant
provisional rate adjustments
A brief review of the legislative history of the regulatory
bodies which preceded the ERC is instructive.
The first regulatory body was the Board of Rate
Regulation (BRR) which came into existence in 1907.61
It had the power, after a full hearing, to fix, revise,
regulate, reduce or increase the rates charged by public
service corporations from time to time. In 1913, the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners (BPUC) was
created to take over the functions of the BRR. The BPUC
was empowered, after conducting a hearing, to fix rates
imposed by any public utility. In addition, it had the
power to hear and determine, upon a written complaint
or motu proprio,whether any increase or changes in
classification of rates proposed by a public utility is just
and reasonable. Pending such hearing and
determination, the BPUC had the power to order the
suspension of the increase or change in classification for
a period not exceeding three (3) months.
The BPUC was shortly replaced by the PSC. Under its
Charter,66 the PSC was authorized to fix rates and
approve provisional rate adjustments.
With the advent of Martial Law, on September 24, 1972,
then President Marcos through Presidential Decree No. 1
reorganized the executive branch of the National
Government and implemented the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. Under the Plan, the Board of Power
and Waterworks (BOPW) was created in place of the
PSC, taking over the "pertinent regulatory and
adjudicatory functions" of the latter.
Later, President Marcos created the Board of Energy
through Presidential Decree No. 1206,
transferring to it the powers and functions of the BOPW
relative to power utilities.
The Board of Energy had the authority to grant
provisional rate adjustments on the basis of the last
paragraph of Section 11 of P.D. No. 1206, which reads:
….
Likewise, the foregoing transfers of powers and
functions of the abolished agencies shall be to the
extent that they are not modified by any specific
provision of this Decree.
This Court, in Bautista v. Board of Energy, held that the
Board of Energy derived its prerogative to grant
provisional relief not only from Section 11 of P.D. No.
1128, amending Section 12 of R.A. No. 6173, but also
from Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act.
The BOE in turn was replaced by the ERB pursuant to
E.O. No. 172. Sections 872 and 1473 of the E.O.
empowered the ERB to grant provisional rate
adjustments.
Historically, therefore, in this jurisdiction, at least
beginning with the Public Service Act in 1936, the
regulatory bodies concerned have exercised the power
to grant provisional rate adjustments only because
there was a statutory grant of such power.
The foregoing recital establishes the following salient
points: (1) Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act
authorizing the approval of provisional rate increases
has never been repealed and as such continues to be in
full force and effect up to the present; (2) The BOPW
had the power to grant provisional rate increases on the
basis of the provision of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan that the pertinent powers of the PSC were
transferred to it; (3) The applicability clause found in
Section 44 of the EPIRA is the same as or similar to the
applicability clauses contained in Sections 11 and 21 of
P.D. No. 1206 and Section 14 of E.O. No. 172; and, (4)
The applicability clause or transfer of power provision is
sufficient to effect the transfer of powers from a
regulatory agency to its successor.
All told, the provisions of the Public Service Act74 and
E.O. No. 17275 which relate to the power of the
regulatory body to approve provisional rates continue to
have full force and effect, and the power was
transferred to the ERC by virtue of Section 80 in relation
to Section 44 of the EPIRA. Said provisions are not
inconsistent with the EPIRA except the directives therein
dispensing with the need for prior hearing. They are
deemed modified to the extent that the EPIRA imposes
a publication requirement76 and, through the IRR,
assures the customers affected the opportunity to
oppose or comment on the application for provisional
rate adjustment before it is acted upon by the ERC.
Indeed, both the letter and spirit of the law require that
the authority of the ERC to grant provisional power rate
adjustments should be upheld. The law is so clear that it
cannot be misread.
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita for the development of the Smokey Mountain
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, dumpsitea n d reclamation area to be
2005 converted into a low cost medium
rise housing complex
a n d indus trial/commercial site. The Project will
Facts: involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for initially 40hectares but the JVA was amended). The
prohibition o questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 JVA also provides that a s part of the cons ideration
and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and for theProject, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code lands to RBI.The reclamation of the area was made; and
(NIRC). subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveyingthe
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and reclaimed land to NHA.O n A u g u s t 5 , 2 0 0 4 , f o r m e r
properties; Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and t h i s P e t i t i o n f o r Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
lease of properties; andthe Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project, and all o ther agreements in
These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the relationthereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after Issues:
specified conditions have been satisfied. 1.
W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
Issues: authority to reclaim lands of the publicdomain
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of (Chavez claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested
the Constitution. exclusively with PEA).
2.
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and
in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution. authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore
andsubmerged lands, as required
Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and (Chavez claims that they were not)
equal protection of the Constitution. .
3.
Ruling: W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alie nable
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of and disposable lands of the public domain
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its (Chavez claims that there was no proclamation
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House officially classifying the reclaimed lands asalienable and
bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 disposable).
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise 4.W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void
and franchise taxes. since it did not und ergo public bidding but
bynegotiated contract.5 . W / N R B I , b e i n g a p r i v a t e
No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only corporation, is barred by the Constitution to
of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is a c q u i r e l a n d s o f p u b l i c domain.
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what Held/Ratio:
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of 1.
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the YES. Although PEA was designated under EO
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In 525 as the agency
this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a Primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does
and administration of the increased rate under the law is not mention thatit has the
contingent. Exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of
public domain. In fact, EO525 provides that reclamation
No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural projects may also be undertaken by a national government
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been agencyor entity authorized by its charter to reclaim
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the land.There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid
kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be reclamation projet:
raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection,
the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a a.approval by the P r e s i d e n t ; b.favorable
rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a recommendation of PEA; and c . u n d e r t a k e n b y a n y
clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or of the ff:
arbitrariness.
i . P E A
Chavez v. NHA (2007) ii.any person or entity pursuant to a contract it
Doctrines: executed with PEA
• iii. the National government agency or entity
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XI I of the Constitution declare authorized under its charter toreclaim lands
that al l natural resources are owned by theState and subject to consultation with PEA. Applying the above
they cannot be alienated except for alienable agricultural requirements, the SC concluded that the Project has met all 3
lands of the public domain. requirements:

Facts: a.
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines.
Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. Presidents Aquino and Ramosissued Proclamations approving
( R B I ) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JV A) and implementing the reclamation of lands.

b.
There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement of the
reclamation phase from PEA.
This is shown in the fact that PEA was a member of
the EXECOM which w as in c harge of overseeing the
implementation of the Project.
c.
The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national
government agency authorized toreclaim lands under its
charter and other laws.
While the charter of NHA does not explicitlymention
“reclamation” i n any of its lis ted powers, such power
is impl ied since i t is vi tal or incidental to achieving the
objective of an urban land reform and housing program.
2.
YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all landsof the public
domain. As such, i t decides whether areas, like
foreshore or submerged lands,should be reclaimed or
not and whether they should be classified as alienable and
disposable.In this case, when the President approved and
ordered the development of a housing project withthe
corresponding reclamati on work, making DENR a
member of the EXECOM (committee tasked to implement
the project), the required authorization from the DENR to
reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. Also, the issuance of
the Environmental Compliance Certificates by theDENR shows
its ratification of the reclamation project.
3.
YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the
administration and disposition of the NHA) and 465 (increased
the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were
issued,the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations
were
converted to alienable and disposablelands of public
domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed
lands were transferred tothe NHA, said alienable and
disposable lands of public domain were automatically
classified aslands of the private domain or patrimonial
properties
of the State. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is
not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA,
then it would beu s e l e s s t o t r a n s f e r i t t o t h e N H A
since it will not be able to transfer such
l a n d s t o q u a l i f i e d entities and thus, it will not achieve its
purpose.
4.VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became
patrimonial properties of the State upon
t r a n s f e r o f their titles to the NHA, the latter can
therefore legally transfe r them to RBI or to any
other i n t e r e s t e d q u a l i f i e d b u y e r w i t h o u t a n y
bidding. Unlike the PEA, the NHA
g o v e r n m e n t agency not tasked to sell lands of the public
domain.5 . N O . R A 6 9 5 7 , a s a m e n d e d ( B O T
Law), states that a contractor can be
p a i d “ a p o r t i o n a s percentage of the reclaimed land”
subject to the constitutional requirement that only
Filipinocitizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same. In this case, RBIis a private
corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least 60% of its
shares.
SUNTAY VS GOCOLAY – NO DIGEST
Suntay v. Gocolay that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over
cases filed bysubdivision or condominium owners or
developers against subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers
or owners. The rationale behind this can be found in the
wordings of Sec. 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies
that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted
by subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the
project developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the
policy of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in
the real estate trade and business.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official
may be availed of when the subject act or omission was
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election
relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render
such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even
if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding,
but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or
criminal action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the
faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law.
While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to
2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of
the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the
PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO)
certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any
permission to engage in limited practice of profession.
Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9)
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were
on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached
a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from
is a the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman
likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC
has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20
years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice.
On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant,
and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents,
among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31,
2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December
31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC
announcement further provided that “applicants with
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not
be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno
expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP
Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was
treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an
Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering
that most of her government records in the academe are
more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance
issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor.
There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon.
Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have
“complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was
appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by
Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed
to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination
of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the
chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such
as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not
declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’
and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign
one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG,
requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic,
initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil
action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the
SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
[yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened.
Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing
actual bias for having testified against her on the
impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy
because what is being sought is to question the validity of her
appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her
of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman
Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera.
OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office”
in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that
Members of the SC may be removed through modes other
than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year
reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s
transgressions only came to light during the impeachment
proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an
imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under
the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against
the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring
that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified.
Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the
OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will
have no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing
A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate
complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical
violations against members of the SC and contending that this
is not a political question because such issue may be resolved
through the interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the
ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of
proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for
membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII
of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed
to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her
integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN,
which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno
from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold
the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein
malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be
ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of
the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,
Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon.
Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against
SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an
exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only
by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was
chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking
government officers to shield them from harassment suits
that will prevent them from performing their functions which
are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno
further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI
only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment
trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since
the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in
all fours with the present case because the President and the
Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than
impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the
“sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision
for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the
cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo
warranto may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may
be filed before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum
because a judge of lower court would have effectively
exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision
over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is
contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution
which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative
power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be
ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the
Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be
rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred.
Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto
must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster”
and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume
that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer,
she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office
was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created
by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared
of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity
is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC
and the President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact
that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference that
they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should
give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to
prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required by
the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or
not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover,
submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what
is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors
likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age,
and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as
competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere
subjective considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for
intervention
2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the
inhibition of Sereno against five Justices
Main Issues:
3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give
due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with
the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can
be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e.,
whether the only way to remove an impeachable
officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto
proceeding is violative of the principle of separation
of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the
ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility
for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of
the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of
the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and
statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether
Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether
Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and
promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission
of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative,
whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief
Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold
the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the
President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a
certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or
preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those
proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of
right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and
the second requirement that no delay and prejudice
should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism
and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine
Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’
intervention that their would-be participation in the
impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of
impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the
impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought
in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and
not in any private individual or group, because disputes over
title to public office are viewed as a public question of
governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel
among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.
However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the
case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide
cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with
clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were
present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the
requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the
Members are to testify only on matters within their personal
knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not
enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has
been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language,
context and meaning of the answers the Justices may have
given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the
House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing
the line of President Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto
petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing
seeds of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the
public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one,
except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and
promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met
consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise
automatically and positively be received in the present quo
warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court
adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to
determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the
magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed
against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to
issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs
is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified
considering that the action is directed against the Chief
Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is
empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To
exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an
outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide
cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty
cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference
to, any other branch of the government including the
Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through
the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the
election or appointment of a public official based on
predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process
to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a
public office may not be contested collaterally but only
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public
office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public
interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The
SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority
in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the
national interest and the government policy on the matter at
hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto
proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum
shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently
of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to
initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum
shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another. The test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo
warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be
considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the
other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for
certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title
to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that
Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an
impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she
committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from
office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a
quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from
holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold.
Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the charges of
impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the
respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a
person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not
and cannot legally hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the
impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of
probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated
by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the
Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the
House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of
discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a
crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive
remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does
not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable
officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”
The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory
effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an
option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to
be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods
when there are other adequate reasons to account for this
express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency,
impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an
offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they
are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for
their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The
proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public
officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the
PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is
made absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are
treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to
saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If other
causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster
can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that
appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside
judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of
any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-
prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an
absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable
officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or
she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in
offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or
she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an
impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is
not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by
the Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and
impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an
impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto
conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise
of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power
of impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even
principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
unqualified public official should be removed from the position
immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements
were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of
another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to
sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be
long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the
Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative
duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible
removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be
unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election
relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render
such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of
a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity,
being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly
elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto
proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable
and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense,
or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against
the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in
this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a
public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of
such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office
or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive
period has been applied in cases where private individuals
asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no
private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice.
Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the
present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the
Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good
reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof must commence such
action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation,
civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding
brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither
could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the
Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense
to an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced
from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because
quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no
statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say,
no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person
to hold public office, much more the highest position in the
Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for
questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon
discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the
present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the
required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment
was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary,
deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory
authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision
means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it
that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s
absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action
or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not
what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s
duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the
exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is
not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision
as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope
of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a
certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion
to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the
nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy
or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category
as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
[yourlawyersays]
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the
Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and
one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for
honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity
to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed
integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the
litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order
to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional
and statutory requirement.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public
officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA
6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a
“prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may
result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is
a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials
and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for
purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to
comply with such requirement may result not only in
dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities.
According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one
case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or
with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens
and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative
provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the
duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the
performance of those duties. More importantly, while every
office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere
non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade
considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum
and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission
of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her
SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only
11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled
doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs
by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no
clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be
applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of
the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received
by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the
missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor
was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these
SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established
by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere
inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN
filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except
SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden
of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and
Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to
discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of
proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed
by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave
does not exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not
tantamount to separation from government service. The fact
that Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was
on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in
an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on
RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be
taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno was
a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office
of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet established
compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by
officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like
U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As
such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to
perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to
Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The
import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of
her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and
property accountabilities and from administrative charges as
of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates
with complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by
the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN
requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for
the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her
with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been
disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot
be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does
not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was
squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist
of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do
not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped
is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and
promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would
likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by
malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN
being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in
2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs
were not filed which were the years when she received the
bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on
intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases
were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in
personal properties were seen in her first five months as
Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno
failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but
also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose
the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials
whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies,
inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the
required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the
JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from
those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices,
absent which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From
the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that
Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for
having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of
service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with
the SALN requirement, but still required substantial
compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only
Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the
SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a
letter containing justifications why she should no longer be
required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in
2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009,
thus her government service is not continuous; that her
government records are more than 15 years old and thus
infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all
academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple
fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-
year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on
Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to
mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course
of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material
fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any
claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court. [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply
with the submission of the SALNs but there was no
compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense
the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first
infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing
less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts
serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the
integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have
considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in
private practice while in UP, her false representations that she
was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact
she was counsel for the government, her false claims that the
clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with
SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to
truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-
2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at
least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without
requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government
funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the
venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO
in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines
v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules,
manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the
venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored
rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release
of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and
Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude
then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly
confidential document involving national security against the
latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has
integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to
the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity
was not established at the time of her application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic
when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On
the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero
proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for
the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone
through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs
means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to
commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for
example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits
would be practically useless for the years that she failed to
submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the
same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of
proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office
must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure
as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC
nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding
that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate
for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said
position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample
jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the
JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations
from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo
warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to
the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to
qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally
created, the participation of the President in the selection and
nomination process is evident from the composition of the
JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power
of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing
power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is
subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the
appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are
satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is
susceptible to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer
removable through quo warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is
ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment
will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a
de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification,
Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such,
Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable
official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo
warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno
from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
OMBUDSMAN Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay G.R.
Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 Doctrine of Condonation
Abandoned
APRIL 1, 2019
FACTS:
A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et
al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019,
otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act,” in connection with the five phases of the procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the
Ombudsman issued the order placing Binay, Jr., et al. under
preventive suspension for not more than six months without
pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present, and that their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation
relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking
the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.
Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending
any of the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project
since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as
City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the
Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court,
assailing the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.’s
prayer for TRO.
The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to
grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in
Binay’s case.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine
adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and
thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this
Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated
from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same,
such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor
Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment
of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v.
Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, There is no truth in
Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation
were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to
the process by which a particular constituency chooses an
individual to hold a public office.
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude
that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is
there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official’s administrative liability
would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same
should have been provided by law under our governing legal
mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present,
by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a
constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be
said that the electorate’s will has been abdicated.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v. COMELEC, GR No. 198742,
2012-08-10
Facts:
petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen... she became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship...
pursuant to
The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines... the petitioner
filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued
the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has...
ceased to be an Australian citizen.
petitioner ran for Mayor in
Caba, La Union... in the 2007 elections. She lost
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor.
and was proclaimed as... the winning candidate.
private respondents... filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the... petitioner's eligibility
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner's disqualification
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign... citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by
R.A. No. 9225.
trial court held that the petitioner's failure to comply with
R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public
office.
the personal... declaration of renunciation she filed in
Australia was not under oath.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was
dismissed
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
Issues:
For purposes of determining the petitioner's eligibility to run
for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship"... in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-
forma requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance
with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship... by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of... any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath... she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in
Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that
the renunciation of... foreign citizenship must be sworn before
an officer authorized to administer oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels
natural- born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens
of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225,... and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of...
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
[T]he intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce
their foreign... citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts
in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine
elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely,
Philippine citizenship.
it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only
to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that
restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's
failure to... comply therewith in accordance with the exact
tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she... executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
elective office in the Philippines.
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947,
2009-02-19
Facts:
Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in
the following items:
Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001
elections]... and
Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections
No. 6 - I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
No. 9 - No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek
to be elected;
No. 12 - I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for
local public office because Tambunting lacked the required
citizenship and residency requirements.
Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of... a Filipino mother and an
American father. Tambunting further denied that he was
naturalized as an American citizen.
Tambunting's possession of an American passport did not
mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting
also took an oath of allegiance... pursuant to
R.A. No.
9225
To refute Cordora's claim that the number of years of
residency... is false because Tambunting lost his residency
because of his naturalization as an American citizen,
Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not
the... same as citizenship.
COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of
Cordora's complaint
COMELEC En Banc affirmed... was convinced that Cordora
failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
Issues:
Cordora's petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting
because of Tambunting's failure to meet citizenship and
residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an
action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-
resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute
Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in
his certificates of candidacy.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances
of their birth.
Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those
desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is
involuntary and... arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough
for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public... office to
file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other
hand, is brought about by the individual's active participation
in the naturalization process.
under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country
is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act
of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturalized citizen's... foreign citizenship.
Section
5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who
reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective
public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the... time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath"
The twin requirements of... swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship... involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently... become a naturalized citizen
of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to him.
Tambunting's residency
Cordora's reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
election laws, includes the twin... elements of the fact of
residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there
permanently,... and is not dependent upon citizenship.
we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting
indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of
candidacy.
Tambunting is eligible for the... office which he sought to be
elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency
requirements prescribed by law.
Quinto and Tolentino vs COMELEC
FACTS:
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in
the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
BACKGROUND:
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the
third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of
sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the
second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and
employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political
campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is
not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification if the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privelege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to
priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials
and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation by an
appointing authority
TALAGA V COMELEC
FACTS In focus are the disqualification of a substitute who
was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election and the
ascertainment of who should assume the office following the
substitute’s disqualification.
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their certificates of
candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for
the 2010 elections. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition
to cancel the COC of Talaga on the ground that he has
already served as mayor of Lucena for three consecutive
terms (2001, 2004, 2007) without interruption. Talaga
countered by saying that the Sandiganbayan had preventively
suspended him from office during his second and third terms,
which he claims to have amounted to an interruption.
Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his candidacy. On May 4, 2010,
Barbara Ruby filed her own COC to substitute Talaga. Talaga’s
name remained printed on the ballots and votes in his favor
were counted for Barbara Ruby, who won against Castillo.
But it was only on May 13, 2010 when the Comelec gave due
course to Ruby’s COC to include her in the official list of
candidates. Ruby was proclaimed newly elected mayor.
ISSUES The core issue involves the validity of the substitution
by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ancillary to the
core issue is the determination of who among the contending
parties should assume the contested elective position.
RULING 1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise
to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid
CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without
a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be
substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the
first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a
valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and
was not a candidate at all.
2. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City
thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to
the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to
wit: 67
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.
– If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x
Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed
his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as
Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte
under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on
December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition,
alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College
Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills,
Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that
Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition,
Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course
and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a
Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition without any
qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by
BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a
candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of
Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution
dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even
date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality “in
order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the
necessary documents for substitution.”
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private
respondent) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party
endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice
her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In
response to various letter-requests submitted to the
COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC
En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued
Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among
others, the recommendation of the said department to allow
the substitution of private respondent.
The substitution complied with the requirements provided
under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS
the following:
xxxx
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A
SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Issue: Whether or not there is valid substitution.
Held: No. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification
and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain
remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among
these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1)
a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a
petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two
are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC
is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or
her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the
latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal
laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3)
spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 634 of the
OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that
any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she
is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of
the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the
same, if he or she had already been elected.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section
68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate,
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of
supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or
her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s
compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by
law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in
question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the
commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC
is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the
material qualifications required for the elective office aspired
for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a false
representation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a
Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v.
COMELEC, where the Court illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the
cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running
for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for
public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened
a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of
the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of
bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that
the person’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC
be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express
finding that the person committed any deliberate
misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed
cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition
essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC
on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be
granted without any qualification.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is
still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and
purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been
denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being
is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid
votes. In Talaga v. COMELEC (Talaga), the Court ruled that:
xxxx
While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who certificate
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC
Albana v. COMELEC
Facts:
During the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioners and private respondents
ran for the positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor andMembers of the
Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Panitan, Capiz-On May 18,
2001, the petitioners were duly elected and
proclaimed winners . On June 23, 2001, the private
respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners with the
COMELEC Law Department,alleging that the latter committed acts of
terrorism and engaged in vote-buying-The Law Department found a
prima facie case and recommended the filing of an
Information against the Petitioners-Acting on the said
Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc iss ued, on
February 28, 2003, a Resolution directing its
LawDepartment to file the appropriate Information against the petitioners
and directing the Clerk of the Commission to docketthe electoral aspect of
the complaint as a disqualification case. The Clerk of the Commission is
likewise directed to docket the electoral aspect of the complaint as a
disqualificationcase and immediately assign the same to a division which
shall resolve the case on the basis of therecommendation of the Law
Department
C O M E L E C :
Denied Petitioners’ MR for Lack of merit and for having been filed out of
time
-
COMELEC, 1 St Division:
Annulled petitioners’ proclamation on the ground that they violated Section
261(a) and (e) of the Omnibus ElectionCode, and directing the election
officer of Panitan to constitute a new municipal board of canvassers-
C O M E L E C , E n B a n c :
Denied the MR
As an aftermath of petitioners’ violation of Section 261(e) in relation to
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,they are considered disqualified
candidates and, therefore, the votes they received are deemed stray
votes- H e n c e t h e p r e s e n t P e t i t i o n
Issues:-W/N the COMELEC acted with GADLEJ in
issuing the Resolutio ns
Held: Y E S mental reservation or purpose of evasion.[8]
Ratio:-Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is as clear:
COMELEC is mandated to dismiss a complaint for the
disqualificationof a candidate who has been charged with an election
offense but who has already been proclaimed as winner by theMunicipal
Board of Canvassers
- Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
In
Bagatsing v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that a complaint for disqualification
filed after the election against a candidatebefore or after his proclamation as
winner shall be dismissed by the COMELEC
o
Second , as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed
after the electionagainst a candidate (a)who has not yet been proclaimed as
winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases,
the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be
referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation-In the case at bar, the complaint for
disqualification was filed 7 days after the elections. Thus, the
disqualification case should have been dismissed.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.[3]
However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization
as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.[4] On the same day an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.[5]
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.[6]
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I
absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity
to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen,
and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.[7]
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino
citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign
country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the
10 May 2010 local and national elections.[9] Respondent
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."[10]
To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record[11] dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado
left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June
2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in
the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700[12]
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order[13] requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the
2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with
an Opposition to Arnado's Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his
Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly
lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or
benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
 RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc
held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling's intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also
cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive
portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled
that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by
law,[24] having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not
later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado's Motion for
Reconsideration.
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error
on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is
a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC
En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En
Banc or to affirm the First Division's disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of
Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."
ISSUE:
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in
a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or
not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one's qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in
the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage
when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in
the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before
the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano[28] clarified the right of intervention in a
disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.[29]
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case.
The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption
to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC[30]
are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right
to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado's claim that the main case has attained finality as the
original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed
the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained.
The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the
issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain
finality.
The use of foreign
passport after
renouncing one's
foreign citizenship is
a positive and
voluntary act of
representation as to
one's nationality and
citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino
citizenship regained
by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of
Renunciation required
to qualify one to run
for an elective
position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. xx
x[31]
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run
for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that
after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once
but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous
with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise
possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore
become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced
his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility
to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.[32]
However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing
his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.[33]
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack
when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The
pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public
office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter
to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of
all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano[34] already hinted at this situation when
the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill
his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,[35] it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation[36] that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"[37] and that he "divest(s)
[him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."[38]
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado's bid for public office, as
it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position.
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.[39] Dual citizens by naturalization, on the
other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was
qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,[40] he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen
only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14
April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. x x x.[41]
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of
the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously.
Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
Division that "Arnado's act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
Renunciation."[42] This does not mean, that he failed to
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for
he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements
that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified
him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying
dual citizens from running for any elective public office would
be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier
renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he
was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.[43]
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu,
the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a
Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation
he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US
citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad."[44] We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three
months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he
would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado's subsequent use of his Philippine passport
does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he
used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his
foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one's
flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek
election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the
public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified
not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes[45] which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle
that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an
election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of
Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent,
Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested
the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible
in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.[46]
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of Topacio on the basis of
a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent
the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is
the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."[47]
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter
dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud
or irregularities in the elections x x x [with] that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled
to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections
is quite different from that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other
person than the candidate declared to have received a
plura[l]ity by the board of canvassers actually received the
greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns
accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the
election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality
that it cannot be determined who received a [plurality] of the
legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the
correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and
counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and
generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely.
In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the
word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate
(according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in
an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the
other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the
question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast
ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal
character and circumstances of a single individual.[48]
(Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with
"In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest"
in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a
contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held
that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is
that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to
try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person
who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally
elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only
question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold
that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elect[ed]
municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last
general election; and that said order and all subsequent
proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect;
and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised
some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered
accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.[49]
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of
decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was
a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process
with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the
ineligible candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops
the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who
received the next highest number of votes as the winner
and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of
votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but
by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had
the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a
legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However,
notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility
as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not
only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number
of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to
qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to
run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed
by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law
that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the
voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should
be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our
republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in
Frivaldo v. COMELEC[50] when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case,
that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco
v. COMELEC[52] where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."[53]
[W]e have ruled in the past that a candidate's victory in the
election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor
of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue
involves defects in the candidate's certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to
give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v.
COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with
the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our
elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidate's
eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified
reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the
basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally
susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the
OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78
may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution
of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false
COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk
falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election
victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a
seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case
filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate
and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign
voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects
the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through
the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set
rules are disregarded and only the electorate's voice spoken
through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely
serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
Maquiling is not a
second-placer as he
obtained the highest
number of votes from
among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado's disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC[54]
and Jalosjos v. COMELEC[55] that a void COC cannot produce
any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner
of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and
even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of
the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who
are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC[56] that when the voters are well aware within the
realm of notoriety of a candidate's disqualification and still
cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who
placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification
is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate
of a candidate's disqualification is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one
can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the
vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed
and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado's proclamation to be
suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado
only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections
and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons

are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall
under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,

his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the

prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be
not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor

should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is

GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective position.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the
duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the

parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.