Sec. of DOTC vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 129 (2000) amended PD 1416.

amended PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the

Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which
FACTS: includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735, transferring the offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
regional functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued DO 97-1025,
establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization
to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct of DOTCCAR valid?
supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.
ISSUE: In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in
W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
encroachment on the powers of the legislative department the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The
HELD: reorganization in the instant case was decreed “in the interest of service” and “for
SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders. purposes of economy and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in
In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity the Cordillera Administrative Region.” It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.
attending the issuance of the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President,
through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)
decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of the
DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer FACTS:
and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for
regional office of the LTFRB. a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she
got the rank, the CSC passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and
There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; changing the CES Board (CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the
(2) Statute; and (3) by authority of law. This case falls under the third category. Civil Service Commission (OCES).

The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create ISSUE:
and establish the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the
President’s “power of control” under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution. W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and
transferring its budget to OCES
By definition, control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to HELD:
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” It includes the
authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was
assume a power directly vested in him by law. created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the
power to reorganize under Sec. 17, Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which enumerates
stating that “unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such offices.
such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for
under the laws xxx” CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached
to CSC. This essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made
1
to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government                 No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to
agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
No. 101279, August 6, 1992
                Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and
(Admin Law, DOLE, quasi-legislative power)
controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law
Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private
and Rules and Regulations.
employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to
establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.
Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound
section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service
workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30
Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal
providing guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino
dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision,
domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30,
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter,
pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for
private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of
HK.
the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service
Commission.
Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or
in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.
CARINO V. CAPULONG
(Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution a
Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and
discretionary duty)
POEA through an administrative order and circular is valid.
ISSUES:
1)       WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to
writ of preliminary injunction
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge
2)      WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution
administrative issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative and
is a discretionary duty?
police powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the
respondents.
    HELD:
    (1)Yes
Mateo v. CA
    (2) Yes
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995
     
RATIO:
Issue:
(1) In the case at bar, private respondents' application for a permit to operate
AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution was denied by the petitioners.
                whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a
Otherwise stated, the private respondents do not have a permit to operate or a
case involving dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public
certificate of recognition from the government to undertake educational or school
corporation
operations. In fine, the private respondents do not have any existing right that
needed to be protected during the pendency of their principal action
Held:

2
for mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City
would not and did not violate any right of the private respondents.
Moreover, it is not the function of the WPI to restrain a public officer from
performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared
unlawful.  Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior
authorization of the government. And, as sanctions for operating without permit,
the DECS is authorized either to impose the total closure of school and/or to
disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the non-recognized
program or course of studies. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City,
the petitioners were only performing their duties as public officers; hence, the
respondent Judge should not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In
issuing the writ, he allowed the private respondents to continue the operation of
AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution without a permit or certificate of
government recognition, thereby sanctioning the act which is unlawful.
(2) The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition for
mandamus to compel the petitioners to approve their application to operate
AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie
only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary
function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no
room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.
In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial
duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the
petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance with — and not in
violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of
permits is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority
to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the
recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be
exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.
In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in
blatant violation of law. Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to
petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City before petitioner has even
filed an application or before his application has been first processed in
accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public
respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to allow such
operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do so is
violation of the Educational Act
CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ISSUE: WON RA 6975 violates Section 6, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which
stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over
the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
HELD:
NO.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk
and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs.  Silvosa, to mean
"the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart
of the meaning of Chief Executive." 
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the
“Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected
to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
3
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the
independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other
constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human
Rights.
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely
gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does
not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is
necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not
a part of the AFP. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive
control.
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief
powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the
national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the
internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of
the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a
member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to,
the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military." (Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee"
under Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators
as members (namely: the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Local
Government and the Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate,
and the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Public Order and Security and
the Committee on National Defense in the House of Representatives) is an
"unconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power
of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under
Section 84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory
body, established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate
"transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local
Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with
the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 85 of the Act and
once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises,
decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of
control which properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive
department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority, of the
committee. 33
As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution,
there are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on
Elections. (Article IX-A, Section 1)
As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be
protected from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were
made constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any department of the
government. 34 Certainly, they are not under the control of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on
Human Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on
the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is
independent like the latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru
Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987).
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation
of a national police commission that will administer and control the national police
force to be established thereunder.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as
the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other
constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human
Rights.
4

By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit,
Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human
Rights) are all independent  of the Executive; but the National Police
Commission is not.  In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations
that this commission would be under the President, and hence may be controlled
by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government.
BLAQUERA V. ALCALA
(Presidential power of control over executive departments)
ISSUE: WON AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over executive departments.
prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of
AO 268 and AO 29. The President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their
employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The
President did not encroached upon the authority of the CSC to grant benefits in
issuing AO 29 and AO 268

HELD:
YES. Implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System
has been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department of
agency - „

In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the

Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by
their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services
in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.

The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority
are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over
executive departments – “The president shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed” (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
judgment of the former for that of the latter.

President was only exercising his power of control.

When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without
5