CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Unless it is expressly
I. Introduction
Nature of the Constitution
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS (1997)
Doctrine: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform to.
Facts: GSIS held a public bidding 30%-51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) where only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm.
Renong Berhad bid a better price (P44 per share, while MPH bid P41.58 per
share). Manila Prince tried to match Renong Berhad’s bid, but was refused by
GSIS. Thus, Manila Prince filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus to the
Supreme Court. SC issued TRO.
Manila Prince invokes the Filipino First Policy enshrined in Art. XII, par. 2, Sec.
10 of the 1987 Constitution, which prescribes the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
GSIS, on the other hand, argues that the provision is not self-executing and thus
requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Issue: Whether or not Manila Prince should be awarded the bid in accordance
with the Filipino First Policy in the Constitution
Ruling: Yes.
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. It is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
to. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution, that law or contract is null and void and without any
force and effect. The constitution is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Some parts of the Constitution are mere declarations of policies and principles,
such as those laid down in Art. II, which are not self-executing. On the other
hand, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself from
the mere examination and construction of its terms.
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. Why? If
they are treated as not self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. Even if the legislature
may supplement a self-executing provision, it does not render such provision
ineffective.
As to the subject provision, it is self-executing. It is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. Patrimony means heritage which
embraces Manila Hotel as it has become a landmark of Philippine heritage. 51%
ownership thereof is covered by the Filipino First Policy. When a choice has to be
made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino”, the latter should
be chosen over the former.
In this case, Manila Prince was already considered a qualified bidder. The
constitutional mandate is reason enough not to award the bid to Renong Berhad.
Pursuant to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Filipino First Policy
should be deemed impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by the GSIS.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00
per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Changing the Constitution
Lambino v. COMELEC (2006)
Doctrine: A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
Facts: The Lambino group gathered signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution and thereafter filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for ratification in accordance with RA 6735 (Initiative and Referum
Act). They allege that at least 12% of all registered voters with each legislative
represented by at least 3% supported their petition to modify Secs. 1-7 of Article
VI, Secs. 1-4 of Art. VII, and to add Article XVIII as a chapter on “transitory
provisions”. These changes will shift the Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
COMELEC denied the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions as held in Santiago v. COMELEC where the SC declared RA 6735 as
inadequate to implement the initiative clause.
Issue: Whether or not the Lambino group’s petition was properly denied by
COMELEC
Ruling: Yes, the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative. The issue on whether or not
Santiago v. COMELEC is binding need not even be discussed.
First, Sec. 2, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that amendments to the
Constitution may be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein. The phrase “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” means that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be
ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The people should
sign on the proposal itself. Thus, two essential elements must be present:
1) People must author and sign the entire proposal personally; and
2) As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These elements are only fulfilled if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people either on the face of the petition or as an attachment.
Otherwise, it is impossible to prove that every one of the millions of signatories
had actually seen the proposal before signing. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements. In this case, the
Lambino group did not attach to their petition to this court a copy of the paper that
the people signed as their initiative petition. It only showed the signature sheet
where not a single word, phrase or sentence of the proposed changes are seen.
Moreover, their allegation that they circulated copies of the petition was belated
and likewise failed to mention that what they circulated was the amended petition.
Even assuming that they did, they admitted that their circulation was only very
limited copies (100,000) personally printed by Atty. Lambino.
Second, the initiative violates Sec. 2, Art. XVII which disallows revision through
initiatives. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. On the other hand,
Congress or constitutional convention can propose both amendments AND
revisions to the Constitution. Art. VIII provides three modes of amending the
Constitution: (1) Congress upon ¾ vote of all its members; (2) Constitutional
Convention; and (3) people’s initiative. 1&2 covers any amendment or revision,
while 3 applies only to amendments as intended and written by the framers of the
Constitution. Ratio: Since a revision affects basic principles or several provisions,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake the
same.
Revision implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution (e.g.
altering the principle of separation of powers or checks and balances), or an
alteration of a substantial entirety of the constitution affective substantial
provisions therein. On the other hand, an amendment refers to a change that adds,
reduces or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. There is a two-
part test to determine the same: (a) quantitative test which determines whether
the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change a substantial
entirety of the constitution; and (b) qualitative test which inquires whether the
change will amount to an alteration of the structure of government amounting to a
revision. In this case, the Lambino group’s initiative is a revision. Quantitatively,
it overhauls two articles affecting a total of 105 provisions. Qualitatively, it alters
substantially the basic plan of the government from presidential to parliamentary,
and from bicameral to unicameral. In effect, it alters the separation of powers by
merging the legislative and executive branches.
II. Interpreting the Constitution
Role of the Judiciary as interpreter of laws
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Doctrine:
Angara v. Electoral Commission (1936)
Doctrine: In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constitutent units
thereof.
Facts: Angara, together with respondents Ynsua, Castillo and Mayor were
candidates as member of the National Assembly of Tayabas. Angara was
proclaimed as member-elect and eventually took his oath of office. The National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming Angara’s election. Meanwhile, Ynsua
protested against his election to which Angara filed a motion to dismiss. The
electoral commission denied Angara’s motion. Angara now comes to the SC for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking further cognizance of Ynsua’s protest.
In essence, Angara argues that the Electoral Commission has no jurisdiction to
further entertain the protest filed after the National Assembly has already issued a
resolution dated Dec. 3, 1935 confirming his election. He also asserts that the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon this case because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution. For the Solicitor General and Ynsua, the Doctrine:
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional creation which is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person whose quasi-judicial functions cannot be subject to a
writ of prohibition from the Supreme court. Moreover, they note that the Electoral
Commission fixed Dec. 3, 1935 as last day for filing of protests against the
elections.

Issue: May the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy?

Ruling: Yes. In cases of conflict, overlapping and interlacing of functions and

duties between the several departments, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not

assert any superiority over the other departments but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution. The power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies, limited to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. The judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Moreover, it accords the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments.

In this case, the exercise of the power of review of the SC is proper as there is an
actual controversy involving a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly and the Electoral Commission. Although the Electoral
Commission is a constitutional organ, it is not beyond the reach of the power of
judicial review.

As to whether or not the Electoral Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction

when it entertained the petition
No. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. If we concede that the National Assembly may regulate and cut off the
power of the Commission to lay down the period within which protests should be
filed, the grant of power to the latter would be ineffective. The incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its power must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission. In conclusion, the confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of Angara through its resolution does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member should be filed.
Araullo v. Aquino (2014)
III. Philippines as a State
Territory
Magallona v. Ermita (2011)
Doctrine: Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted as statutory mechanisms
for UNCLOS States parties to delimit the precision and extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. It is not meant to delineate Philippine territory.
Facts: Congress enacted RA 9522 in 2009, amending RA 3046, in order to make
it compliant with the terms of the UNCLOS III which prescribes the water-land
ratio, length and contour of baselines of archipelagic States and sets the deadline
for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. RA 9522 shortened
one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints and classified adjacent
territories of Kalayaan Island Groups (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes
of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
RA 9522 is being questioned by petitioners allege, among others, that:
(a) the law reduces the Philippine maritime territory and the Philippine’s state’s
sovereign power in violation of the Constitution because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and
related treaties which is already embodied in the constitution;
(b) RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of KIG
weakens our territorial claim over that area
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling: No, it is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and
continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS III. It does not delineate Philippine
territory.
UNCLOS III does not affect the acquisition or loss of territory. It is only a
multilateral treaty regulating sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous
zones, EEZ, and continental shelves to codify norms of conduct of States in the
world’s oceans and submarine areas. On the other hand, baseline laws such as RA
9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III State parties to mark-out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are drawn to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Because UNCLOS III requires baselines to be drawn from the outermost islands
and drying reefs of the archipelago, the baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris as petitioners argue.
Moreover, the use of the framework of “regime of islands” to determine maritime
zones of the KIG and Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with the Philippines’
claim of sovereignty over these areas. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime
space way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the
Treaty of Paris. Further, had RA 9522 enclosed KIG and Scarborough Shoal as
part of the Philippine archipelago, the Philippines would have committed a breach
of UNCLOS III: “The drawing of baselines shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.” Congress’ decision to
classify these islands as “regime of islands” manifests the Philippine’s observance
of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
In sum, contrary to petitioners’ view, RA 9522 is the most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP) (2008)
Doctrine:
Facts: The GRP and the MILF were going to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace. Petitioners sought a TRO to enjoin the signing of the MOA-AD and sought
the declaration of its unconstitutionality.
Among the matters contained in the MOA-AD:
 “Bangsamoro homeland” is owned exclusively by the Bangsamoro
people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
 Both parties to the agreement acknowledge that ancestral domain does
not form part of the public domain.
 Bangsamoro people have the right to self-governance rooted on ancestral
territoriality under the suzerain authority of their sultanates
 Bangsamoro people are the “First Nation” with defined territory and with
a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations
 The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted the authority and
jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the
bangsamoro
 The Bangsamoro homeland is the land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, aerial and atmospheric space above the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan region
 Sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central
Government and BJE; Joint jurisdiction over natural resources over
territorial waters only, not internal
 BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations
with other foreign countries
  Multinational third party shall observe and monitor the implementation
of MOA-AD
 CG and BJE shall have “associative” relationship characterized by shared
authority and responsibility
 Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to existing legal
framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive
Compact
Issue: Whether or not the MOA-AD is unconstitutional
Ruling: Yes.
First, the concept of association is not recognized under the Constitution. The
concept implies powers that go beyond what the Constitution grants to any local
or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state.
Second, the MOA-AD not merely expanded the version of the ARMM, but made
the BJE a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. Even assuming that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of the Philippine territory, the spirit animating it runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept
between the national government and the BJE itself is contrary to the
Constitution.
Third, it provides that those municipalities which voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite are automatically part of the BJE without need
of another plebiscite. This runs counter to the Constitution, as the plebiscite
covered their vote to be included in ARMM, not BJE.
Fourth, many provisions of the MOA-AD are irreconcilable with the Constitution
such as the power of the BJE to enter into economic and trade relations which
power is solely vested with the President. Moreover, an associative relationship
does not uphold national unity for indigeneous cultural communities. The act of
placing a portion of the Philippine territory in a status of preparation for
independence, is not conducive to national unity.
Fifth, the obligations of the Philippines under international law do not strictly
require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the BJE, the
particular rights and powers provided under the MOA-AD. For example, no right
to aerial domain and atmospheric space is necessary nor the right to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to guarantee
the amendment of the Constitution and laws to facilitate the MOA-AD. Thus, the
MOA-AD is declared unconstitutional.
Reagan v. CIR (1969)
Doctrine: If a State allows another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory, it by no means follows
that such areas become impressed with an alien character.
Facts: Reagan, as US Citizen, disputes the payment of the income tax assessed by
the CIR on an amount he earned on the sale of his car to a member of the US
Marine Corps as the transaction took place at the Clark Field Air Base. He alleges
that the sale was made outside Philippine territory, thus beyond its jurisdictional
power to tax.
Issue: Whether or not the Clark Air Base is foreign soil or territory for purposes
of income tax legislation
Ruling: No, the Philippine jurisdictional rights therein, including the power to
tax, have been preserved.
The Philippines, being independent and sovereign, may exercise its authority over
its entire domain. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal.
Any state may, by its express or implied consent, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights (auto-limitation). If it allows another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory, it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. Thus, the bases
leased to the American armed forces are not and cannot be foreign territory.
People v. Gozo (1973)
Doctrine: By agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that the US
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases out of comity, courtesy or expediency. The
Philippines has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein.
Facts: Gozo was convicted for a violation of an ordinance in Olongapo, Zambales
which required a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction of a
building. She now questions the applicability of the ordinance to her, alleging that
her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed
forces.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales applies
 Ruling: Yes, the Philippine Government merely consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction of the US in the bases in certain cases. The consent was given purely
as a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. While
the US Govrnment has prior or preferential jurisdiction under the terms of the
treaty, it is not exclusive. The Philippine Government retains not only the
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also those ceded to the US. Moreover,
whether a given case comes under the US jurisdiction or be transferred to
Philippine authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or
say. The rights granted to the US by the treaty insure solely to that country and
cannot be raised by the offender.
Philippine Citizenship
Lee v. Director of Lands (2001)
Doctrine: If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Facts: The Dinglasans sold to Lee, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land in Roxas
City. However, the heirs of the Dinglasans sought to have the sale annulled
because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of
private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. The
SC dismissed the case holding that the parties were in pari delicto. Another case
was filed but was dismissed due to res judicata.
Meanwhile, petitioners, who are the widows of the deceased heirs of Lee, filed a
petition for reconstitution of title. RTC granted. A petition for annulment of
judgment was filed by the Solicitor General contending that Lee did not acquire
title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was not constitutionally
qualified to own the subject land. It essentially seeks to have the land reverted.
CA declared the reconstitution void.
Issue: Whether or not the land should be escheated/reverted
Ruling: No, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos.
The fact that the SC did not annul the sale of the land in the very first case did not
validate the transaction, as it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription
against aliens acquiring lands of public or private domain. However, the proper
party to assail the illegality of the sale was the Solicitor General, not the parties
who were in pari delicto. The Solicitor General may initiate an action for
reversion or escheat of the land to the State.
This is what the Solicitor General is doing in this case. While it took sixty years,
prescription never lies against the State. In this case however, there would be no
more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to
acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. The
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has
been achieved.
Republic v. Lim (2004)
Doctrine: By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, such child
automatically becomes a Filipino upon birth and need not comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship.
Facts: Lim was born to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother who never got
married. The Republic argues that the lower court erroneously ordered the
correction of the citizenship of Lim from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact
that she never demonstrated any compliance with the legal requirements for
election of citizenship. It cites Art. IV, Sec. 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Moreover, Sec. 1 of CA No. 625
provides that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to
before any officer authorized to administer oaths and filed with the civil registry.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional and statutory requirements apply in this
case
Ruling: No, Lim is an illegitimate child and such requirements only apply to
legitimate children. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, she
automatically became a Filipino upon birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
Nevertheless, records show that she indeed elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority by registering as a voter. The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.
Calilung v. Datumanong (2007)
Doctrine: RA 9225 allows dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. It does not recognize dual allegiance.

Facts: Calilung filed a petition for prohibition against Datumanong, then
Secretary of Justice, to stop the latter from implementing RA 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act) alleging that the law is unconstitutional for
allowing dual allegiance of citizens in violation of Art. IV, Sec. 5 of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional for allowing dual allegiance
Ruling: No.
The intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to amend the provision of CA
63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. It allows dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. The person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship
by swearing allegiance to the Republic.
What RA 9225 did is to stay clear out of the problem of dual allegiance. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern by the law.
Sec. 5, Art. IV is not a self-executing provision but is only a declaration of policy.
The Congress still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the Court to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Republic v. Sagun (2012)
Doctrine: There is no proceeding established by law or the Rules for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
Facts: Sagun, a legitimate child of a Chinese national and a Filipino citizen, did
not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of
33, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, but said document was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar. Meanwhile, her
application for a Philippine passport was denied. She then sought a judicial
declaration of her Philippine citizenship. RTC granted.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly granted Sagun’s petition for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship
Ruling: No, there is no proceeding established by law or the Rules for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a person is part
of our citizenry.
Being a legitimate child, Sagun’s citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship – to which she did not comply with. In any case, CA 625 prescribes
the procedure to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship:
(1) Statement of election under oath;
(2) Oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the civil registry.
Moreover, there must first be a petition with the Bureau of Immigration for a
cancellation of one’s alien certificate. Such office will then decide as to the
validity of said election. Thereafter, the case shall be elevated to the Department
of Justice for final determination and review. To reiterate, there is no direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
Setting aside the procedural infirmities in this case, Sagun failed to comply with
the legal requirements for a valid election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts
showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship.
Re: Ching (1999)
Doctrine: One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with
fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Facts: Ching, a legitimate son of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. His application was granted
subject to the condition that he submit proof of his Philippine citizenship. Despite
passing the bar, he was not allowed to take his oath due to the questionability of
his citizenship. The SolGen contended that Ching did not formally elect
Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority
and, if ever he does, it would be beyond the time allowed by jurisprudence which
is 3 years therefrom. Meanwhile, while the case was ongoing, Ching manifested
that he has already elected Philippine citizenship.
Issue: Whether or not Ching elected Philippine citizenship within a “reasonable
time”, and if it retroacted to the time he took the bar examinations
Ruling: No, he slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship, thus his
privilege slipped away from his grasp.
If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old constitution
(1935, as in this case), it remains subject to challenge under the new Constitution
even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of
the new charter.

Notably, the 1935 Constitution and CA 625 did not provide any time period
within which the election should be made and only stated that it should be made
“upon reaching the age of majority” (then 21 y/o). The Secretary of Justice opined
that the election should be made within 3 years from reaching the age of majority.
However, in Cuenco v. SOJ, the Court had already ruled that the 3-year period is
not an inflexible rule. Nevertheless, the extension is not indefinite.
In this case, Ching was already 35 years old when he complied with the legal
requirements of the law, or over 14 years after he had reached the age of majority.
Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. His continuous stay in the
Philippines, registration as a voter, and election to public office cannot vest him
Philippine citizenship.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and
painstaking process. His unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over. One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship only has an inchoate right.
Co v. HRET (1991)
Doctrine: The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time
to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Facts: Balinquit, Co and Ong vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar, where Ong was proclaimed the winner.
Petitioners filed election protests, arguing that Ong is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines nor a resident of Northern Samar. HRET proclaimed Ong as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
Issue: Whether or not Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to the
position of representative of Northern Samar
Ruling: Yes. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The
reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father, a Chinese, had been naturalized as Filipino when the
respondent Ong was only nine years old.
Jurisprudence defines “election” as both a formal and informal process. In Re:
Florencio Mallare, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In this case, Ong did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He established his life here in the Philippines. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are fully aware of Ong’s parentage. They voted by overwhelming numbers
to have him represent them in Congress. Because his acts since childhood, they
have considered him as Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
Thus, any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would not only
have been superfluous but would have resulted in absurdity.
Bengson III v. HRET (2001)
Doctrine:
Facts: Cruz, a natural-born Filipino of Filipino parents, lost his Filipino
citizenship when he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and swore allegiance to the
US and thereafter underwent naturalization as a US citizen. In 1994, he reacquired
his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2360. He was elected as
Representative of 2nd Dis. Of Pangasinan against Bengson. Bengson thus filed a
Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET, challenging Cruz’s citizenship. HRET
dismissed the petition. Bengson now maintains that even assuming arguendo that
Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship, such reacquisition could not legally
restore his natural-born status. According to him, the Constitution expressly states
that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Issue: Whether or not respondent, who was a natural-born Filipino who then
became an American citizen, be considered a natural-born Filipino again upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
Ruling: Yes.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same through:
(1) naturalization; (2) repatriation; and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship in accordance with the qualifications of law. Repatriation consists of
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic and registering the same in the Local
Civil Registry. Repatriation also results in the recovery of the original nationality.
Accordingly, a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In this case, Cruz reacquired Philippine citizenship through an oath of allegiance
and having registered the same in the Civil Registry. Thus, he is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
The fact that he had “to perform an act” to obtain his natural-born status is
untenable. The 1987 Constitution considers only naturalized Filipinos as NOT
natural-born citizens. A citizen who is not naturalized Filipino necessarily is a
natural-born. Since Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
So v. Republic (2007)
Doctrine: CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and distinct laws as the former
covers all aliens while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived in the
Philippines all their lives and all along thought that they were Filipinos.
Facts: So, a Chinese citizen who lived in Binondo since birth, filed a petition for
naturalization under CA 473 as amended (Revised Naturalization Law). The OSG
argues that So failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under CA
473. So maintains that qualifications set forth in RA 9139 apply even to
applications for naturalization by judicial act.
Issue: Whether or not So is qualified for judicial naturalization.
Ruling: No.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political
body of a nation by clothing him with the privileges of a citizen. There are three
ways to be naturalized: (1) administrative naturalization (RA 9139); (2) judicial
naturalization (CA 473 as amended); and (3) legislative naturalization.
CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and distinct laws as the former covers all aliens
while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived in the Philippines all their
lives and all along thought that they were Filipinos. RA 9139 was enacted to make
the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious and less technical. The
qualifications under the two laws are distinct. In this case, So applied for
naturalization by judicial act, thus his application should be governed by CA 473.
In any case, So failed to discharge the burden of proving not only his good moral
character, but also that the witnesses he presented for competent to vouch for his
good moral character and are themselves of good moral character. His witnesses
did not personally know him enough. Thus, So failed to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of naturalization law.
David v. Agbay (2015)
Doctrine: . Reacquisition will apply for those who lost their citizenship by virtue
of CA 63, the law applicable before RA 9225. Meanwhile, retention of Philippine
citizenship will apply to those who took oath after the effectivity of RA 9225.
Facts: David, who became a Canadian citizen by naturalization, purchased a lot in
the Philippines where he and his wife constructed a residential house. Later on,
they discovered that the place was part of public land so he filed an MLA (lease)
with the DENR-CENRO representing himself as a Filipino citizen. Agbay
opposed on the ground that David is a Canadian disqualified to own land.
Meanwhile, David reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of RA
9225. In his defense, David alleges that the provisions of RA 9225 should be
given retroactive effect.
Issue: Whether or not David shall be considered a Filipino citizen during his
MLA application
Ruling: No.
RA 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of RA 9225. For those naturalized
in a foreign country BEFORE RA 9225 took effect, they shall “reacquire” their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Philippines. For
those who became naturalized citizens of foreign country AFTER RA 9225 took
effect, they shall “retain” their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath.
The law purposely distinguishes between reacquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship. Reacquisition will apply for those who lost their citizenship by virtue
of CA 63, the law applicable before RA 9225. Meanwhile, retention of Philippine
citizenship will apply to those who took oath after the effectivity of RA 9225. In
this case, David lost his Philippine citizenship under CA 63. Thus, he only
reacquired the same upon taking his oath; he did not retain the same. In sum, he
cannot be deemed a Filipino citizen during his MLA application.
Nicholas-Lewis v. COMELEC (2006)
Doctrine: “Duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage through the absentee
voting scheme and as absentee voters upon successful application under RA 9225.
Facts: Petitioners, successful applicants for Philippine citizenship under RA 9225
and were considered “overseas absentee voters”, were advised by the Philippine
embassy in the US that they have no right to vote yet as per COMELEC.
COMELEC argues that although RA 9225 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of
suffrage since the Overseas Absentee Voting Law (OAVL) was not enacted for
them. As Filipinos who merely reacquired their citizenship, they are considered
regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the
Constitution. While the question of being able to vote in the 2004 elections was
rendered moot and academic, as they were in fact unable to do so, the question
raised was the propriety of allowing “duals” to participate and vote as absentee
voter in future elections.
Issue: Whether or not those who have retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voters under the OAVL
Ruling: Yes.
There is no provision under RA 9225 requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their
right to vote. On the contrary, it implicitly acknowledges that “duals” are most
likely non-residents and grants the right of suffrage as that granted to an absentee
voter under the OAVL. The OAVL aims to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for residency requirements, exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and the OAVL and the
expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of RA 9225, the conclusion is
that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage through the absentee voting
scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
If the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to
enjoy full civil and political rights, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why
the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to the OAVL, be denied
the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter.
Aznar v. COMELEC (1990)
Doctrine: Considering the fact that admittedly one was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Facts: Aznar, representing Cebu-PDP Laban, filed a petition for the
disqualification of Osmena (grandson of Pres. Osmena) for the position of
Provincial Governor of Cebu on the ground that the latter is a citizen of the US.
Meanwhile, COMELEC proclaimed Osmena as the Provincial Governor of Cebu
having obtained the highest number of votes.
Issue: Whether or not Osmena is not Filipino thereby disqualified to be elected as
Provincial Governor
Ruling: No, Aznar failed to present substantial and convincing evidence that
Osmena is disqualified from running and being elected to the office.
He failed to present direct proof that Osmena had lost his Filipino citizenship by
any of the modes provided under CA 63. He merely relied on the fact that Osmena
was issued an alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit
to re-enter the Philippines by the Immigration. He thus concluded that Osmena
must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the US
Naturalization Law.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the US does
not concern the Court. Since his father is Filipino, the presumption that he is also
Filipino remains.
Even if Osmena was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fatc that he has a
Certificate stating that he is an American does not mean that he is not still
Filipino. There is no express renunciation of Philippine citizenship, nor even an
implied one.
The statement in the 1987 Constitution against dual allegiance has no retroactive
effect. While it is true that even before the same, the Philippines already frowned
upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the effect of such shall be dealt
with by a future law which is yet to be enacted.
Valles v. COMELEC (2000)
Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC (2016)
Doctrine: As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
Facts: Grace, a foundling adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces, became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001. In 2005, she and her husband decided to reside
permanently in the Philippines. In 2005-2006, she has been travelling back and
forth to the US. In 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic pursuant
to RA 9225 to which the Bureau of Immigration ruled favorably. In 2010, she was
appointed as MTCB chair. Before assuming her post, she executed an “Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Thereafter,
the US Vice Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US. In 2012,
she filed with her COC as Senator and won in 2014. In 2015, she filed her COC
for Presidency where she declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines would be 10 years and 11 months. This led to several
COMELEC cases for her disqualification. They allege, among others:
(1) misrepresentation;
(2) foundlings cannot be considered natural-born citizens due to the principle of
jus sanguinis;
(3) she cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship because it
only applies to former natural-born citizens;
(4) there was lack of intent to abandon her US domicile; and
(5) in her Senatorial COC, she declared that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least 6 years and 6 months prior to the 2013 elections;

Issue: Whether or not Grace’s COC should be cancelled on the ground that she
made a false material representation

Ruling: No, as a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.All three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws to render
social justice. Domestic laws on adoption also support such principle.

The phrase "having to perform an act" under Art. IV, Sec. 2, means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of
foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. The object of the
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship
of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship
by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution,
which is an act to perfect it.