Self-Executing and Non-self-executing

Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System (267 SCRA 408), G.R. No. 122156,
February 3, 1997
NOTE: Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.

Facts:
Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine government's privatization initiative under
Proclamation No. 50.

According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.

Only two (2) bidders participated:

a. petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
corporation or 15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, and
b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad's bid price of P44.00 per share, pending the
designation of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder partner and the execution of the relevant contracts.

In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager's check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid Security to match the bid of
Renong Berhad which respondent refused to accept.

Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and
mandamus. The SC issued a TRO enjoining respondents from consummating and perfecting the said sale.

The petitioner hinged his arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. It argued that :
a. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical monument for
the Filipino nation; and
b. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporation’s shares, the hotel
business of GSIS, which is part of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Hence, the petitioner claimed that the corporation is clearly covered by the term national
under the contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:

a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation
b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands
d. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing, the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec.
10 (2) is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing and
minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is complete and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

Summary of Principles:
1. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation—it
Is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. lt prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.

The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

3. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional

mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self- executing.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle
and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into
one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can
be cataclysmic.

4. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

5. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing—the rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a
self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

6. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self executing. The
argument is flawed.

If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

7. When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

8. When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject—such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance.
9. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a
landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.

10. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws
and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.

(Tondo) Medical v CA G.R. No. 167324 17 July 17 Art. II – Legal Value (Non-self executory) PETITIONER
RESPONDENTS Tondo Medical Center Employees Court of Appeals

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the
Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and
Executive Order No. 102, "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which was
issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999. Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 29 August
2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action

FACT:
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group
after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and
technical staff possessing the adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five
general areas of reform:
(1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
(2) secure funding for priority public health programs;
(3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
(4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and
(5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).
However, some provisions of the Health Sector Reform Agenda are challenged on the ground that they violate
15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article
XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and
promote the people’s right to health and well-being. However, these provisions are not self-executory.

Petitioners challenged:
● First reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the collection of
socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals.
● Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5
January 2001, entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring
of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January
2001;" and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled "Policies and Guidelines on the Private
Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in Government Health Facilities," dated 9 January
2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and
medical services.
● They also alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting
the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles,
functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused
its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and
technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units.

There are certain provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of DOH personnel to regional
offices and hospitals.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No.
7160), which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well
as specific health-related functions and responsibilities

Petitioners contended that:

● Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress
in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been
issued in excess of the President’s authority.
● Implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The
RSP was allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative
order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
● The validity of Executive Order No. 102 will be the reason of losing their jobs, and that some of them
were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of
work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal:
1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to sign the certification of non-forum shopping and the
verification;
2) Petitioners failed to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury
sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining;
3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days
from the time the reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and
4) Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive
Order, was not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Court of Appeals also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15,
18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV,
all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote
the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution
are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines
for legislation.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on 26
November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO102 is constitutional?

RULING: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration
and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal
autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article
II, Section 1 of ArticleIII; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services.
This contention is unfounded.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future
legislation for their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared by this Court as non-self-executing.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of
Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987 Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of
Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional
provisions as non-self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present
case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 – the
provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v.
Angara.

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal
protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were
no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to
substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing
the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining
provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition
to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption
of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to
assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as
non-self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives
addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts;
but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
DISPOSITIVE:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No.
102 as valid. No costs

Oposa v. Factoran GR 101083, 224 SCRA 792 [July 30, 1993]

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A

BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. — The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right unites with the
right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall
protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." While the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self- preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception
of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. Art II, Sec 16 is self-executing and judicially enforceable — J. Feliciano concurring.

Facts. Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country, petitioners, all minors represented by their
parents, instituted a civil complaint as a taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.” They pray for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLA)
in the country and to order the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist
from approving new TLAs. On motion of then DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack
of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an issue political (whether or not logging should
be permitted) which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to
“represent their generation as well as the generation yet unborn”, allege their fundamental right to a balanced
and healthful ecology was violated by the granting of said TLAs.

Issues.
(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape
of Mother Earth”?
(2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?

Held.
(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. xxx Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.
2) Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest to all
citizens of the Philippines and the petitioners are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for filing of a valid class suit44 are present. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue on behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. We find enough averments to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights on which
reliefs may be granted. The case cannot be thus said to raise a political question. What is principally involved
is the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. Petition granted.

NATIONAL TERRITORY and ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students -vs- Ermita Exec.Sec.,
Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information
Authority and Davide Jr.

Facts: In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over
their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046
remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA
5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change
was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III
prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and
sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime
passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in
the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their
argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its
failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of
islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of
locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS
III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not
undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over
Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what
Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

Issues:

1. Preliminarily – Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and Whether the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be
directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory of the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a
mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multilateral treaty
that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure
said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to
the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of
15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base
points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical
miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been
claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal
waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic
waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not
bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally
accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic
states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the
baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation
is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law
and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III;
otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter
and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the
country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

Philippines v China Arbitral Award (ITLOS)

The South China Sea has, especially in contemporary times, emerged as a region of great interest to global
players, in terms of strategic and economic interests of the competing States. As Foreign Policy puts it,
“There’s no tenser set of waters in the world than the South China Sea. For the last few years, China and its
neighbors have been bluffing, threatening, cajoling, and suing for control of its resources.”

To best understand the current situation in the South China Sea from a legal point of view, it is imperative to
refer back to the judgment passed by the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration last year, in
response to the claims brought by Philippines against China, primarily regarding maritime rights, entitlements
and zones in the South China Sea, as well as for the protection of the marine life and the environment of the
region, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.

China has always argued for historic rights, as demarcated by the ‘Nine Dash Line’ on its official maps of the
region in question; other stakeholders, however, dispute this claim, as shown in the arbitral proceedings. As is
noted:

… While it was the Philippines which brought the case, it wasn’t the only interested party in the Asean. Three
other members have claims to parts of the South China Sea or the Spratly Islands or the Paracels that conflict
with China’s expansive nine-dash theory: Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Indonesia, Asean’s largest economy,
has continuing run-ins with Chinese fishing vessels and occasionally with the Chinese Coast Guard in its
exclusive economic zone.

Now, as the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) heads towards working on the enforcement of this
arbitration award from last year (2016), and attempting to employ a code of conduct for the South China Sea, it
becomes even more important to look at the arbitral ruling from an objective vantage point.

Case Brief

The South China Sea Arbitration was conducted between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s
Republic of China by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), under the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The arbitration is related to disputes between the Parties regarding the legal
basis of maritime rights and entitlements, the status of certain geographic features, and the lawfulness of
certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea; in particular, the following four issues, as raised by
Philippines:

1. To resolve a dispute between the parties regarding the source of maritime rights and entitlements in
the South China Sea;
2. To resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the entitlements to maritime zones that would
be generated under the Convention by Scarborough Shoal and certain maritime features in the
Spratly Islands that are claimed by both the parties;
3. To resolve a series of disputes concerning the lawfulness of China’s actions in the South China Sea,
vis-à-vis interfering with Philippine’s rights, failing to protect and preserve the marine environment,
and inflicting harm on the marine environment (through land reclamation and construction of artificial
islands);
4. To find that China has aggravated and extended the disputes between the Parties by restricting
access to a detachment of Philippines Marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.

While China and Philippines are both parties to the UNCLOS, China specifically made a declaration in 2006 to
exclude maritime boundary delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement. In addition,
China has shown disagreement with Philippines’ decision to take the matter to arbitration and has decided
neither to agree with the decision of the Tribunal nor to participate in the proceedings.

The Tribunal, on its end, has taken cognizance of these factors and has purported to not deal with delimiting
maritime boundaries. Furthermore, the Tribunal did not bar the proceedings, on the basis of Article 9 of Annex
VII of UNCLOS. In addition, the Tribunal also noted that despite China’s absence from the proceedings, since it
is a party to the UNCLOS, the decision of the Tribunal would, in fact, be binding upon it, pursuant to Article 296
(1) and Article 11 of Annex VII.

China’s Foreign Ministry, further, stated its position with regard to the proceedings by publishing a Position
Paper in 2014. It claimed that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the matter because:

1. The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over the relevant
maritime features in the South China Sea;
2. China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through negotiations;
3. Philippines’ disputes would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two
countries.

The Tribunal considered China’s Position Paper as a plea on jurisdiction, and conducted a separate hearing on
the issue of jurisdiction and admissibility. Additionally, the Tribunal also declared that it would honour China’s
declaration of 2006 and the UNCLOS and would neither delve into issues of maritime boundary delimitation or
questions of sovereignty. The Philippines also stated that it, “does not seek in this arbitration a determination of
which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request a delimitation of
any maritime boundaries.”

Pursuant to this, the Tribunal issued its Award on Jurisdiction in October 2015, in which it concluded that it did
indeed have jurisdiction in the case, as per Philippines’ Final Submissions, and that China’s lack of
participation would not prove to be a bar to its proceedings. It, further, concluded that the treaties China was
relying on were either political in nature and not legally binding, or that they did were legally binding and yet did
not bar either Party from alternative means of dispute resolution. In accordance with Article 283 of the
UNCLOS, the Tribunal found that this requirement was met in the diplomatic communications between the
Parties and that Philippines’ initiation of proceedings under the UNCLOS did not constitute an abuse of of
process as claimed by China.

The Tribunal, proceeding with the first two submissions made by the Philippines, considered the validity of
China’s claim to historic rights in the maritime region of the South China Sea and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’.
Through a lengthy analysis of the text and context of the Convention, in line with the principles set out in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Tribunal established that the Convention supersedes any
treaties in force before its coming into force. It questioned China’s claim to historical rights in the region, and
established that China’s state practice does not show that China had been enjoying any historical rights in the
South China Sea; rather, it was enjoying the freedom of the high seas and since it did not create bar to other
states’ usage of the same, it could not be understood as being a historical right. Furthermore, since China’s
publishing of the same in its Notes Verbales in 2009, many states have objected to its claim as well. “The
Tribunal concludes that the Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction
in excess of the limits imposed therein.” However, the Tribunal also concluded that its jurisdiction was limited to
the claims of historic rights on the maritime region and not to the land masses in the South China Sea, i.e. if it
can claim historic rights on any of the islands, then it may also be able to claim maritime zones (as per the
Convention) on the basis of these islands.

Next, the Tribunal looked at Philippines’ submissions 3 to 7, concerning the nature of the features in the South
China Sea. It differentiates between low-tide elevations, high-tide features and rocks. In its Award on
Jurisdiction, the Tribunal clarified that:

This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the features, notwithstanding any possible question
concerning whether low-tide elevations may be subjected to a claim of territorial sovereignty. Nor is this a
dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation: the status of a feature as a “low-tide elevation”, “island”, or a
“rock” relates to the entitlement to maritime zones generated by that feature, not to the delimitation of such
entitlements in the event that they overlap.

The Philippines put forward three categories for classifying low-tide elevations: where a low-tide elevation is
located within 12 miles of a high-tide feature, where the low-tide elevation is beyond 12 miles but within the
state’s exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and where the low-tide elevation is located beyond the
areas of natural jurisdiction.

For the purpose of identifying the nature of the features in the South China Sea, the Tribunal relied upon
satellite imagery that had been conducted on the area and direct surveys that had been carried out, by navies
or otherwise, in the area, and relied upon maps that were sufficiently detailed. They chose a certain tidal height
to maintain uniformity across the features, and decided to rely, in cases where there had been significant
man-made changes, alterations or construction on the features, upon maps/imagery/surveys that depicted the
features as they had been in their original form.
Again the Tribunal relied upon statements previously made by China to obtain their stance on the nature of the
features, since China had neither submitted any document to the Tribunal nor had it discussed these in its
Position Paper.

The Tribunal concluded that Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan
Reef and Gaven Reef (North) were all found to be high-tide features. The Tribunal further noted that for the
purposes of Article 121(3), the high-tide features at Scarborough Shoal and the reefs were rocks that cannot
sustain human human habitation or economic life of their own and so have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf. The Tribunal found the same to be true of the Spratly Islands and so concluded that China,
therefore, has no entitlement to any maritime zone in the area of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal; they
do, however, form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines as they lie within
200 nautical miles of the Philippines’ coast and there are no overlapping entitlements in the area with respect
to China.

On the contrary, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal were
all found to be low-tide elevations, of which Hughes Reef lay within 12 miles of McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe
Island, Gaven Reef (South) lay within 12 miles of Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island, and Subi Reef lay
within 12 miles of the high-tide feature of Sandy Cay on the reefs to the west of Thitu.

In the issue of Chinese interference with the living and non-living resources (primarily concerned with fishing
practices in the South China Sea and oil and gas exploration and exploitation) of the Philippines, the Tribunal
considered diplomatic statements from China to the Philippines and regulations related to the matter that China
had passed domestically. The Philippines put forward four contentions related to living resources: China’s
prevention of fishing by Philippine vessels at Mischief Reef since 1995, and at Second Thomas Shoal since
1995, China’s revision of the Hainan Regulation and China’s moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea in
2012. The Tribunal finds that China had breached Articles 77 and 56 of the Convention through the operation
of its marine surveillance vessels (which interfered with Philippines’ oil and gas exploration) and through its
moratorium on fishing which interfered with the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, respectively.

The Tribunal also found China in breach of Article 58 (3) of the Convention, due to its failure to prevent fishing
by Chinese flagged ships in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, failing to respect the sovereign
rights of the Philippines over its fisheries in its exclusive economic zone.

Submission 10 of the Philippines related to China’s interference with Philippines’ fishing vessels and practices
in the Scarborough Shoal. While both the states had conflicting views on the situation (China believed that it
was Philippines who was causing the interference) and both claimed historic rights (Philippines distinguished
this by clarifying that it only referred to historic fishing rights) to the region, the Tribunal opined that China was,
in fact, in contravention of the Convention by interfering with the traditional fishing practice of the Philippines in
its exclusive economic zone through the deployment of its official ships in the region. The Tribunal also noted
that this decision does not depend on the question of sovereignty, and that the Tribunal once again refrained
from commenting on the matter.

Philippines’ successive contention related to China’s activities on the reefs in the South China Sea, with
regards the practices it had adopted for the purpose of large-scale construction and reclamation at seven
locations in the Spratly Islands, and its practices with regards to fishing in the South China Sea. Philippines
claimed that China had been harming and causing damage to the marine environment of the South China Sea
through these practices and despite objections from the surrounding states, China had not ceased its actions.
It was also noted that while some of the fishing ships were not state-appointed ships and were being manned
by non-state actors, the Chinese government had neither condemned their actions nor made any efforts to stop
them from proceeding. The Tribunal, assisted by three independent experts on coral reef biology, expert briefs
and satellite imagery, found that China was in breach of the Convention for failing to stop the fishing vessels
from engaging in harmful harvesting practices and also for its island-building activities. The Tribunal further
opined that China’s construction on Mischief Reef, without authorization from Philippines was in violation of
Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and a breach of the
Convention.

The next consideration before the Tribunal was the demeanour of China’s law enforcement vessels at
Scarborough Shoal and the lawfulness of these actions. The Philippines also raised the issue under the
relevant provisions of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing of Collisions at Sea, 1972
(COLREGS). The Tribunal found that China, through the actions of its law enforcement vessels, endangered
Philippine vessels and personnel and created a serious risk of collision and found China in breach of Article 94
of the Convention.

The Tribunal, in response to Submission 14 of the Philippines, opined that China had, in the course of the
proceedings of this arbitration, aggravated and extended its disputes with Philippines, through its actions of
dredging, artificial island-building and construction activities.
Lastly, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make any further declaration, owing to the fact that both the
parties are already parties to the Convention and are already obliged to comply with it.

REAGAN V CIR

Concepts: SC ruled that the income tax of the petitioner is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines to
tax. Concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation - It is to be admitted that any state may by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. “It is the property of a state-force due to which it has the
exclusive capacity of legal self determination and self-restriction.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Regan, a US citizen and an employee of Bendix Radio which provides technical assistance to the
US Air Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959. 9 months thereafter, he
imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car. On July 11, 1960, he requested the Base Commanderfor a permit to sell
the car, which was granted provided that the sale was made to: US Armed Forces member OR US citizen
employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. He then sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. (US Marine Corps)
and the latter sold it to Fred Meneses. After deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption
which the petitioner was entitled, CIR rendered him liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. Petitioners’
Complaint

Respondent’s Response

Petitioner Regan sought the recovery of the sum of P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest.

CTA Ruling CTA ruled in favor of CIR, that the respondent legally collected the income tax.

He raised Art. XII of the Military Bases Agreement: "a national of the US serving in or employed in the
Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in
the Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his income "unless derived from
Philippine sources or sources other than the United States sources"

ISSUE: W/N the income tax collected from Reagan was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines to
tax.

HELD: YES. Philippines is independent and sovereign; its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there
is a diminution of its sovereignty. Clark Air Force is not foreign territory for purposes of income tax legislation.
They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Tax exemption from foreign sources
under Art. XII of the Agreement does not apply to income derived in the bases which are clearly derived in the
Philippines.

By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be
construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government.

The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may
be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory