I.

Introduction

A – Nature of Constitution

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997]

Facts
1. Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine
government's privatization initiative under Proclamation No. 50. According to its terms, the
winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
2. Only two bidders participate:
a. petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the corporation or 15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, and
b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
3. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a
subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager's check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid Security to
match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent refused to accept.
4. Because of this refusal by the respondent, apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for prohibition and mandamus. The petitioner hinged his
arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. It argued that :
a) Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical
monument for the Filipino nation; and
b) Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies
c) It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share
5. The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:
a) Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation
b) While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony since national patrimony pertains only to lands of public domains like
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum among others.
c) Granting it forms part of national patrimony, he constitutional provision invoked is
still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Issue
WON the sale of the 51% shares of the Manila Prince Hotel is violative of Art. XII, Section
10 of the 1987 Constitution?
Held
1. Yes, violates the constitution. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
2. Self-executing provision issues - A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself.
3. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.
4. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for
a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution.
5. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
6. Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. When the
Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power
— legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others
to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving
its authority from the State.
7. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must
conform with the fundamental law of the land.
 8. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we
are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution.

II. Interpreting the Constitution

A - Role of the Judiciary as interpreter of laws

Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137

Facts
Incumbent president John Adams, a member of the Federalist Party, prior to the surrendering of
presidency, in an effort to preserves the influence of his party, passed a Judiciary Act, giving him
authority to appoint different person to different government office, including appointee to
justiceship to frustrate newly elected president Thomas Jefferson, who is then a member of
Democrats. One of this so called midnight appointee was Marbury, a judge from Columbia.
Despite the fact that John Adams already issued a commission in favor of Marbury, Thomas
Jefferson directed his secretary of state, James Madison, to not deliver the commission of
Marbury thereby prompting Marbury to file a petition for writ of mandamus to compel him to
finalize his appointment. Marbury and his lawyer, former attorney general Charles Lee, argued
that signing and sealing the commission completed the transaction and that delivery, in any
event, constituted a mere formality. But formality or not, without the actual piece of parchment,
Marbury could not enter into the duties of office.
Issue
WON the Marbury have such right for commission?
Held
Judge Marshall held that the validity of a commission existed once a president signed it and
transmitted it to the secretary of state to affix the seal. Presidential discretion ended there, for the
political decision had been made, and the secretary of state had only a ministerial task to perform
—delivering the commission. Having decided that Marbury had the right to the commission,
Marshall next turned to the question of remedy, and once again found in the plaintiff’s favour,
holding that “having this legal title to the office, [Marbury] has a consequent right to the
commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his
country afford him a remedy.
However, the court still refused to give the remedy of mandamus as the provision of the
Judiciary Act giving Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus was
repugnant to the Constitution as the court founds that the Constitution specifically already laid
down the original jurisdiction of the court. If this court is not authorized to issue a writ of
mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore
incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer
and assign.
Although the court refuse to decide on the case because of guidelines set in Judiciary Act,
Judge Marshall emphasized the terminology Judicial Review that can invalidate the act of the
two co-equal branch of government if found repugnant to Constitution. By reason of judicial
review, judge Marshall ruled the invalidty of the provision of Judiciary Act conferring original
jurisdiction to the Court for issuance of writ of mandamus.

Angara v Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936)

Facts
1. In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members
of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
2. Subsequently, Angara was the one proclaimed member-elect of the National Assembly
and thereafter, took his oath of office.
 3. The National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, confirmed the election
of the herein petitioner to the said body and fixed the last date to file election protests to
Dec 3, 1935.
4. Ynsua however filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against
Angara, dated Dec 8, 1935, and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be
named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said
position be nullified.
5. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission (not the National Assembly) adopted a
resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9 1935
6. Angara then filed a motion to dismiss the protest of Ynsua before the Electoral
Commission. He contended that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted
in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented and since such
protest was filed beyond the prescriptive period, it shall be dismissed
7. The Electoral Commission released its decision denying the motion to dismiss protest of
Angara. Angara then proceeded to file a direct recourse to SC and prayed for the issuance
of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested
elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case, that the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings
8. In the motion filed by SG in representation of Electoral Commission, it answered that the
Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the
presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it
acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it
by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the powers and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law.
Issue
WON the Electoral Commission can validly exercised jurisdiction as to the motion to protest
of Ynsua on the appointment of Angara in National Assembly?
Held
1. Jurisdiction of SC to Electoral Commission - First is as to discussion on the jurisdiction
of the SC over Electoral Commission to hear the case as it was argued that the Electoral
Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decisions are final and unappeallable. The nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict
of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court, following the
American type system where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial act, has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
2. Jurisdiction of Electoral Commission to hear the case - Yes, Electoral Commission
have jurisdiction to hear the Motion to Protest of Ynsua. The Electoral Commission is a
constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The grant of power to
the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly.
 3. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission, That confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation,
does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe
the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.

GIOS Samar v DOTC G.R. 217158, March 12, 2019

Facts
1. On December 15, 2014, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted
an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation} on the airport development, operations,
and maintenance of the, Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol
(Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects). The total cost of both
Projects (distributed into two bundle 1 & 2) is P116.23 Billion.
2. On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson
Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental
importance of the issue, filed the present petition for prohibition. Petitioner alleges that it
is a non-governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from
Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government assistance
for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of the
bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding
with the bidding of the same.
3. Petitioner raised the following:
a. the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions on the anti-
dummy and the grant of opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities.
According to petitioner, bundling would allow companies with questionable or shaky
financial background to have direct access to the Projects "by simply joining a
consortium which under the bundling scheme adopted by the DOTC said [P]rojects
taken altogether would definitely be beyond the financial capability of any qualified,
single Filipino corporation;
b. bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies as it would allow one
winning bidder to operate and maintain several airports
c. Perpetrate restraint o trade
d. PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction when it bundled the projects without legal authority
e. The bundling is a mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a
level higher than what it would have been, had the projects been bidded out
separately.
4. DOTC comment was that 1) the petition is premature because there has been no actual
bidding yet, hence there is no justiciable controversy to speak of; 2) petitioner's allegation
on the violation of anti-dummy and equal opportunity clauses of the Constitution are
speculative and conjectural; 3) the bundling of the Projects does not violate the
prohibitions on monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade; and 4) They did not
commit any abuse of discretion among others.
5. On the part of CAAP however, it asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental
principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling
reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court. The case should have been filed
with the trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-
blown trial.
Issue
WON the bundling of the project is unconstitutional?
Held
 1. As to claim that it indeed violates provisions on monopolies and restraint on trade –
The court had already clarified in multiple cases that Constitution does not prohibit the
operation of monopolies per se. It further clarified that "[b]y their very nature, certain
public services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity,
transportation, telephone, telegraph, etc. must be given exclusive franchises if public
interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises are not violative of the law against
monopolies. In addition, petitioner has failed to point to any provision in the law, which
specifically prohibits the bundling of bids, not alleged any ultimate facts to support its
claim that bundling will create a monopoly.
2. As to the claim that the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional
prohibitions on the anti-dummy and the grant of opportunity to the general public to
invest in public utilities - this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how
the bundling of the Projects violated the Anti-Dummy Law (simulating foreigner
percentage ownership to circumvent the 60-40 foreign ownership). It did not identify what
corporation or association falsely simulated the composition of its stock ownership.
Moreover, it did not allege that there is a law limiting, reserving, or requiring that
infrastructure or development projects must be awarded only to corporations, a certain
percentage of the capital of which is exclusively owned by Filipinos. Executive Order
(EO) No. 65, even exempts contracts for infrastructure/development projects covered by
the BOT Law from the 40% foreign ownership limitation.|||
3. Direct recourse to the Court – Following the Angara Model, if the case behooves upon
itself, transcendental importance, although this doctrine was originally used to relax the
rules on locus standi or legal standing, its application would later be loosely extended as
an independent justification for direct recourse to this Court. However, the court
emphasized that even if the case involves transcendental or paramount importance, if the
case still involves determination of a factual issue which is indispensable to the resolution
of the legal issue, Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the
CA. Director recourse to court on the basis of transcendental importance shall only
pertains to questions of law. Not factual determination. The SC is not a trier of facts.
4. Hierarchy of courts - Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is an
effective mechanism to filter the cases which reach the Court. he doctrine of hierarchy of
courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent
further over-crowding of the Court's docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which often have to be
remanded or referred to the lower court. Recognize justification for exception to hierarchy
of courts:
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time;
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(3) cases of first impression;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(5) exigency in certain situations;
(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression; [and
(8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy

Falcis v Civil Registrar General; G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019

Facts
1. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before SC a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to
“declare Article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence,
nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”
 2. Falcis argued that
a. Resort to Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper citing the case of Magallona
v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v. Executive Secretary, and the separate opinion of
now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion) in Araullo.
Again citing Associate Justice Brion's separate opinion, he claims that this Court
should follow a "'fresh' approach to this Court's judicial power" and find that his
Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion
b. Falcis further argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of judicial review:
(1) actual case or controversy; (2) standing; (3) was raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case. As to standing,
he claims that his standing consisted in his personal stake in the outcome of the case,
as he "is an open and self-identified homosexual" who alleges that the Family Code
has a "normative impact" on the status of same-sex relationships in the country. He
was also allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to marry the
same-sex[,]" which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines. Falcis
justifies the direct recourse to this Court by citing, in addition to the alleged
transcendental importance of the issues he raised, the supposed lack of need for trial
concerning any factual issues. He also insists that the constitutionality of Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code were the very lis mota of his case.
c. He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2,
was a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion.
3. The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment. It prays that this Court deny due course to or dismiss the Petition. It notes that
the Petition was not in the nature of a class suit, but was instead personal only to Falcis.
Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show injury-in-fact and an actual case or
controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that this Court cannot issue.
4. On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. filed a motion to intervene as they
contend that they have interest on the outcome of the case and offer other procedural and
substantive arguments but similar to Falcis, they also contend that petition for certiorari
was proper and that they meet the requisites for the court to exercise its judicial review.
First, they have an actual case or controversy since petitioners-intervenors were
supposedly denied a marriage license. Second, they have legal standing both as third-
party standing even as it also claims that its own right to religious freedom was directly,
not just indirectly violated.
5. The Civil Registrar General filed its Comment in the Petition for Intervention, saying
that the issues raised in the Petition are political questions, and that marriage's legal
definition is a policy issue for Congress to determine, and that any amendment to the
definition in Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code should be addressed to Congress
6. Impromptu: Jesus Falcis was cited in contempt when it appears, during oral argument,
not in formal attire but casual jacket, cropped jeans and loafers without socks
Issue
WON Article 1 and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional?
Held
1. Marriage interpretation under our Constitution – Article XV, Section 2 defined
marriage as “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.” Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition
of marriage, the Constitution is capable of accommodating a contemporaneous
understanding of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex
characteristics (SOGIESC).The plain text and meaning of our constitutional provisions do
not prohibit SOGIESC. These constitutional provisions in particular, and the Constitution
in general, should be read through the lens of "a holistic approach in legal interpretation.
2. Whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an actual case or
controversy reviewable by this Court – No, SC does not issue advisory opinions. It is
the parties' duty to demonstrate actual cases or controversies and must show a violation of
an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. There must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. A substantive
portion of the Petition merely parrots the separate concurring opinion of retired Chief
Justice Puno in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, concerning the concept of suspect
 classifications. Petitioner's 29-page initiatory pleading neither cites nor annexes any
credible or reputable studies, statistics, affidavits, papers, or statements that would
impress upon this Court the gravity of his purported cause. The Petition stays firmly in the
realm of the speculative and conjectural, failing to represent the very real and well-
documented issues that the LGBTQI+ community face in Philippine society.
3. Petitioners seeking access to marriage - Despite seeking access to the benefits of
marriage, petitioner miserably fails to articulate what those benefits are in his pleadings
and submissions during oral arguments. There is a myriad of laws, rules and regulations
that affect, or are affected by marriage yet, none was ever mentioned in the Petition or the
Petition-in-Intervention. Marriage gives effect to bundle of rights granted to spouse which
is not just limited to Family Code, but extends to any other Statute enacted and passed by
the government including, provisions in Civil law, labor laws, criminal laws, taxation and
even to Rules of Court. By impliedly amending these two (2) provisions of Family Code,
will greatly impacted the already established policies set forth in our society concerning
marriage, spouses and foremost, families as the primary societal institution of a State. To
do so would require legislative act, and SC cannot just simply impliedly amend or
interpret a provisions which will extensively affect governmental policies which must
be properly dwell on the Legislative branch. To do so will be a violation of
separation of power
4. Petitioners legal standing – Falcis have no legal standing. Mere assertions of a law's
normative impact or impairment of his ability to find and enter into long-term
monogamous same-sex relationships, as well as injury to his plans to settle down and have
a companion for life in his beloved country or influence over his decision to stay or
migrate to a more LGBT friendly country cannot be recognized by this Court as
sufficient interest. Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned
citizens, this Court has noted that the party must claim some kind of injury-in-fact. For
concerned citizens, it is an allegation that the continuing enforcement of a law or any
government act has denied the party some right or privilege to which they are entitled, or
that the party will be subjected to some burden or penalty because of the law or act being
complained of.
5. Whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural defects of the
Petition - The Petition-in-Intervention was also authored by petitioner. He only filed it
after the Office of the Solicitor General had filed a Comment pointing out the procedural
flaws in his original Petition. Still, the Petition-in-Intervention suffers from the same
procedural infirmities as the original Petition. The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from
confusion as to its real purpose. A discerning reading of it reveals that the ultimate
remedy to what petitioners-intervenors have averred is a directive that marriage licenses
be issued to them. Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not seek this, and it
does not identify itself as a petition for mandamus (or an action for mandatory
injunction).Rather, it couches itself as a petition of the same nature and seeking the same
relief as the original Petition. Given these, this Court can only arrive at the conclusion that
the Petition-in-Intervention was a veiled vehicle by which petitioner sought to cure the
glaring procedural defects of his original Petition.
6. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is
warranted - The decisive factor in whether this Court should permit the invocation of
transcendental importance is not merely the presence of special and important reasons but
the nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be
no disputed facts, and the issues raised should only be questions of law. Otherwise, that
will be in violation of hierarchy of courts. Still, it does not follow that this Court should
proceed to exercise its power of judicial review just because a case is attended with purely
legal issues. Jurisdiction ought to be distinguished from justiciability. Jurisdiction pertains
to competence "to hear, try, and decide a case. Justiciability on the other hand pertains to
whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is justiciable and ripe for adjudication.

B – Actual case or Controversy

Mariano v Comelec, G.R. 118577

Facts
 1. Mariano, a citizen of Makati, question the constitutionality of RA 7854 entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati. He filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It alleged the
following:
a. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
b. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term'
limit for local elective officials
c. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for increasing the legislative district
of Makati only by special law in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress.
Issue
WON RA 7854 is unconstitutional?
Held
1. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. Given the facts of the cases at bench, the
court cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the
land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We
note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. The deliberations of Congress will reveal that
there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not
defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration
of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig
over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-
equal department of government, the legislations felt that the dispute should be left to the
courts to decide
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit
for local elective officials – Petitioner argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati. Such issue cannot be entertain. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-
delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy
3. Reapportionment can be made through a special law except if such reapportionment will
result to creation, alteration, merger, or abolishment of the boundaries of such province or
city, then there is a need for plebiscite.

Montesclaros vs Comelec, G.R. 152295 (2002)

Facts
1. Montesclaros et.al, initially write a letter to COMELEC demanding that the SK elections
be held as scheduled, May 6, 2022. However, then COMELEC Chairman Benipayo,
wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and Senate president expressing his
support to hold the SK Election from initial date of May 2002 to November 2002 by
 reason that it is a tedious task for them to hold both elections simultaneously, national and
SK elections.
2. On March 11, 2002, by reason that the letter was not acted upon, petitioners, who are all
20 years old and filing the petition as a taxpayer's and class suit, filed with the SC a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction, seeking the following:
a. to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK" for brevity)
elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002; and
b. to prevent a proposed bill reducing the age requirement for membership in the SK
from “15 but not more than 21 years old” to “15 but less than 18 years of age.”
3. Petitioner’s claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in
the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is
limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old
4. On the same day, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill and
on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. The President
signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002. In the law, which is RA 9164, it
provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002
Issue
WON the proposed bill is unconstitutional?
Held
1. No, In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power
of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK
elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any
date not later than July 15, 2002. (Impromptu, its like moot and academic na siya)
2. Also, on the contention that a proposed bill is unconstitutional, A proposed bill is not
subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect,
violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an
advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. Thus, there can be no justiciable
controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
3. The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that
Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws
does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. To do so would
destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for
the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.

C – Facial Challenge

Estrada v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560 (2001)

Facts
1. On April of 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Information’s against then President Joseph Estrada, one of which is violation of
the Plunder law
2. On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges
in the Information and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications "a", "b", and "c" to give the accused the opportunity to file counter-
affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause.
3. On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in finding that
"a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER. Petitioner then move for an MR but to no
avail.
4. He now then appeal his case before the SC. In his petition to SC, one of the primarily
grounds he raised was that the Plunder law is unconstitutional on the following gorunds
 a. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague as it does not clearly defined
the term "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1 and Section 2 of the Plunder Law;
b. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
c. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether
it is within the power of Congress to so classify it
Issue
WON the Plunder law can be facially challenge to questions its unconstitutionality? – No
Held
1. As to the question that the Plunder Law is vague - No, A statute is not rendered
uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. Congress intended the
words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings (i.e. number
of things, or combination of two or more things). Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of
"combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration and the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more
overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration.
2. Facial Challenge - The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that
"[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity.
However, this rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech
3. Separate Opinion of Kapunan under Void for vagueness - A view has been proffered
that "vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws." These two
concepts, while related, are distinct from each other. On one hand, the doctrine of
overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the
other hand, the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those
that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights . The fact that a
particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial
challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed. As earlier intimated, the
"vagueness doctrine" is anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined right to due process of
law. Thus, as in this case that the "life, liberty and property" of petitioner is involved, the
Court should not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has sufficiently complied
with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous argument
that the Court cannot apply the vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is
tantamount to saying that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant it is to the
constitutional right to due process.

D – Political Question
Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/196232, January 28, 2014
Facts
1. The case all started from the dismissal of then Rolando Mendoza from service which
result for him hijacking a bus in Luneta. In the aftermath of what happened, then
president Benigno Aquino ordered DOJ and DILG to conduct joint investigation which
result to finding Deputy Gonzales and a special prosecutor guilty of gross neglect of duty
in handling the case of Mendoza for failure to promptly resolve Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration.
2. In 2012 decision of the court, it upheld that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. It ratiocinated that The Power of
the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from
his Power to Appoint.
Issue
WON the MR filed in relation to the 2012 ruling shall be overturned?
Held
1. As to justiciability of the issue - the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be
subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with
that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is
one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as
where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the
powers conferred on a political branch of the government. In resolving the petitions, the
court do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress (which is technically what political
question is) choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry
is limited to whether such statutory grant violates the Constitution.
2. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and
is thus unconstitutional. It is clear that such provision is repugnant to the Constitution as
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman are all impeachable officers therefore, in enacting RA 6670, particularly
Section 8(2), the congress indeed violated the Constitution. In addition, subjecting the
Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority, will seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
itself.

E – Moot and Academic

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace

Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015
Facts
1. Petitioner International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc.
(ISAAA) is an international non-profit organization founded in 1990 "to facilitate the
acquisition and transfer of agricultural biotechnology applications from the industrial
countries, for the benefit of resource-poor farmers in the developing world" and
ultimately "to alleviate hunger and poverty in the developing countries. Respondent
Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG) is a coalition of
local farmers, scientists and NGOs working towards "the sustainable use and
management of biodiversity through farmers' control of genetic and biological resources,
agricultural production, and associated knowledge
2. On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking 14 (MOU) was executed
between UPLBFI, ISAAA and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of
a collaborative research and development project on eggplants that are resistant to the
fruit and shoot borer. the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was described as a
bioengineered eggplant (“bt-talong”)
3. In 2012, Greenpeace Southeast Asia Philippines filed before the Supreme Court a
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan and Writ of Continuing Mandamus with prayer for
 Temporary Environmental Protection Order against UPLB and ISAA. Greenpeace sought
to enjoin ISAAA and UPLB from conducting further field tests as it argued that it
violates their constitutional right on balance and health ecology reasoning that BT
Talong, without the tests being peer reviewed, is presumed to be harmful to human health
and the environment. It further alleged that the Bt talong field test project did not comply
with the required public consultation under Sections 26 & 27 of the Local Government
Code which is clearly manifested in the conduct on its own survey in which, most people,
answered that they are not aware of the testing facility.
4. ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI and UPMFI filed their respective verified returns.
They all argued that the issuance of writ of kalikasan is not proper because in the
implementation of the Bt talong project, all environmental laws were complied with,
including public consultations in the affected communities. ISAAA further argued that
the allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong as food are irrelevant in the field trial
stage as none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals, and all materials
that will not be used for analyses will be chopped, boiled and buried following the
Biosafety Permit requirements.
5. The court then referred the case to the CA for acceptance of the return of the writ and for
hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. CA judgement was rendered in
favor of respondent, ordering herein petitioner to cease and desist from further
conducting bt talong field trials. Despite the termination of termination of the Bt talong
field testing, the CA still opt to continue to hear the case as it views that the issue is
capable of repetition yet evading review and after scrutinizing the parties' arguments and
evidence, the CA concluded that the precautionary principle of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases finds relevance in the present controversy. Stressing the fact that
the "overall safety guarantee of the bt talong" remains unknown, the appellate court cited
the testimony of Dr. Cariño who admitted that the product is not yet safe for consumption
because a safety assessment is still to be done. The CA also found that existing
regulations issued by the DA and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) are
insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and health of the people. Hence
this petition
6. One of the main contention of ISAAA was that Precautionary Principle do not empower
courts to adjudicate a controversy that is moot and academic. It points out that
respondents failed to satisfy all the requirements of the exception to the rule on actual
controversies. The case has been mooted by the termination of all field trials and
expiration of the Biosafety permit.
Issue
WON the issue is now moot and academic considering that bt talong field trials had already
been terminated?
Held
1. An action is considered 'moot' when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Nonetheless, courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. We find that the presence
of the second and fourth exceptions justified the CA in not dismissing the case despite the
termination of Bt talong field trials
2. While it may be that the project proponents of Bt talong have terminated the subject field
trials, it is not certain if they have actually completed the field trial stage for the purpose
of data gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to proceed to the
next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial propagation of the Bt eggplants.
Biosafety permits will still be issued by the BPI for Bt talong or other GM crops.
Hence, not only does this case fall under the "capable of repetition yet evading
review" exception to the mootness principle, the human and environmental health
 hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular
staple vegetable among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.
3. Precautionary Principle - The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the
1960s, expressing the normative idea that governments are obligated to "foresee and
forestall" harm to the environment. In the following decades, the precautionary principle
has served as the normative guideline for policymaking by many national governments.
The precautionary principle simply means that lack of scientific certainty is no reason to
postpone action to avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the environment. For
purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last
resort. When these features — uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the
possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is
strongest.
Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO research
worldwide, the Court finds all the three conditions present in this case —
uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and the possibility of serious harm.
Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by small-scale
farmers, majority of whom are poor and marginalized. While the goal of increasing crop
yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies revealed
uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse
effects on the environment associated with use of GE technology in agriculture, and
serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. The experience of India in the Bt
brinjal field trials for which an indefinite moratorium was recommended by a Supreme
Court appointed committee till the government fixes regulatory and safety aspects as
relevant because majority of Filipino farmers are also small-scale farmers.

Pangilinan v Cayetano; G.R. No. 238875/G.R. No. 239483/G.R. No. 240954. March 16,
2021
Facts
1. On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International
Criminal Court. The following day, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal
through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The
Secretary General received this communication the next day, completing the all the
requirements for withdrawal under the Rome Statute.
2. On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon,
Paolo Benigno Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros and Antonio Trillanes IV filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, assailing the executive's unilateral act of
withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being unconstitutional. Subsequently, the IBP
also filed its own Omnibus Ex Parte Motion for Consolidation and for Inclusion in the
Oral Arguments.
3. The following issues are raised by the petitioners:
a. As a treaty, they claim that the Philippines validly entered into, the Rome Statute. It
has the same status like a law enacted by Congress and considering as such, they
claim that the President cannot repeal a law.
b. Claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a multilateral treaty require the
Senate's concurrence.
c. Following the Doctrine of Incorporation, it is effective in the Philippines despite lack
of publication.
4. Respondent, through the SG, contended that:
a. Petitioners do not have locus standi as they do not represent "the official stand of the
Senate as a body.
b. They contend that the instant petition does not present justiciable controversy as it
involved political question. The president, being the lead person in the determination
of our foreign policy, has the concurrent right to entered into and at the same time,
withdraw from any treaty or executive agreement being a policy determination
delegated to the wisdom of the executive.
c. The authority of the Senate when it comes to treaty and executive agreement was only
to provide its concurrence only when entering into such, but concurrence be not
required in case of withdrawal
 d. The withdrawal was valid for having complied with the Rome Statute, which requires
only a written notification of withdrawal.
Issue
WON the Executive can withdraw from the ICC unilaterally, without concurrence of the
Senate?
Held
1. As to issue of lack of publication of treaty - Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution
declares that international custom and general principles of law are adopted as part of the
law of the land. No further act is necessary to facilitate this unless the Constitution stated
so and under our Constitution, the only requirements needed before a treaty forms part of
the law of the land is for it to be concurred by the Senate.
2. Withdrawal from treaty - While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make
treaties valid and effective, no similar express mechanism concerning withdrawal from
treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution or any statute. The
court held that the president does not enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from treaties
or international agreements. Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty if a treaty is
unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute. However, the
president may not unilaterally withdraw from a treaty: (a) when the Senate conditionally
concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the withdrawal
itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a
treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty, must then secure Senate
concurrence.
3. However, in this case, the court cannot anymore grant the relief as the withdrawal have
already been communicated and accepted by UN. The Philippines announced its
withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 15, 2018, and formally submitted its Notice
of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de
Cabinet on March 16, 2018. The Secretary-General received the notification on March
17, 2018. For all intents and purposes, and in keeping with what the Rome Statute
plainly requires, the Philippines had, by then, completed all the requisite acts of
withdrawal. The Philippines has done all that were needed to facilitate the withdrawal.
Any subsequent discussion would pertain to matters that are fait accompli.
4. All told, the consolidated Petitions are dismissed for failing to demonstrate justiciability.
While we commend the zealousness of petitioners in seeking to ensure that the President
acts within the bounds of the Constitution, they had no standing to file their suits. We
cannot grant the reliefs they seek. The unfolding of events, including the International
Criminal Court's acknowledgment of withdrawal even before the lapse of one year from
initial notice, rendered the Petitions moot, removing any potential relief from this Court's
sphere.

F – Standing

IBP v Zamora GR 141284 (2000)

Facts
1. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, in view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President also declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
2. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the
deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution because no
emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work.
Issue
WON the calling of the marines by the President under Section 18, Article VII is
unconstitutional?
Held
1. On petitioner’s standing - "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. In the
case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts
no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing
in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a
specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. What the IBP projects as
injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten
Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run.
Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
2. Transcendental importance, an exception on legal standing - Having stated the
foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi
of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the
petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
3. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action
to CALL OUT the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.

Tanada v Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

Facts
1. Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada and others files a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent
Juan Tuvera, et.al. to publish in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of
instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation, and
administrative orders issued by the Office of the President. They invoke the constitutional
right of the people to be informed, as well as the principle that laws are valid and
enforceable after their publication in the Official Gazette.
2. The Respondent opposed the petition by contending that the publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirements for the effectivity of the laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. The presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect considering that Article 2
of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect as well when otherwise provided.
Thus, the publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue
Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette is required in order to for the
presidential issuances to become valid and effective.
Held
1. On petitioner’s standing - while the general rule is that a writ of mandamus would be
granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, nevertheless, "when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
 enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws (this shall be distinguish in the case of IBP vs
Zamora because in such case, the petition is for the declaration of law as unconstitutional,
invoking the power of the court for judicial review)
2. As to publication - the Supreme Court ruled that the Article 2 of the Civil Code does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. In fact, Commonwealth Act 638 provides that laws
shall be published in the Official Gazette. Such publication is important because there
shall be no basis for the application of the Latin maxim, “ignoratia legis non excusat”,
without such notice and publication, especially when the law-making process is not made
in public. Further, the word “shall” in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 imposes upon
the Respondent an imperative duty to enforce the right of the people to be informed of the
matters of public concern. The publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or
general applicability is mandated by law. Such publication is a requirement of due process
whereby a person may be bound by law only when he is first officially and specifically
informed of its content
3. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons or those that are merely internal
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published.

Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510,
Facts
1. The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the
port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty.
2. The ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian
departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. However, on January
17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
3. The U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement. Such regret was echoed by then US Ambassador to the
Philippines Harry Thomas and commits appropriate compensation for damage to the reef
caused by the ship.
4. Claiming that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet and those involved in such.
Issue
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the US Respondents.
Held
1. On petitioner’s standing - In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., the court
recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, This
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and
future generations.
2. Juridiction of the court to the US respondents - Traditional rule of State immunity
which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former's
 consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign
and governmental acts from private, commercial and proprietary acts Under the restrictive
rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts sovereign and governmental
acts. In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to
be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

G – Territory

Magallona v Ermita, G.R. 187167 (2011)

Facts
1. R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State, used as its bases in determining the baseline the 1898 Treaty of Paris.
It provides codification of those laws on the sovereign rights of the Philippines over its
territorial sea as well as to its contiguous zone. However, it does not provides for the
breadth which was left undetermined. Attempt to fill this void in the second round of
negotiation under Geneva proved futile hence remained unchanged for nearly five
decades.
2. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) hence, RA 9522 was
enacted. UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application
for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
3. Petitioners who are composed of professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their
respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers, assailed the constitutionality of the new law
on the ground that RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach
of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,
Issue
WON RA 9522 violates the constitution in relation to defining its territory
Held
1. No, RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the Country's maritime zones and
continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine Territory. -
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines, contiguous zone 4 nautical miles
from the baselines, exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. RA 9522 merely provides as a tool to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn. Baselines
laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. Even under the
petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters
within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the
Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the
only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS. The baselines cannot be
drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris, but from the 'outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago'.
2. Whether or not it weakens our territorial claim" over that area - UNCLOS and its
ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as the petitioners
 claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not
by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes
to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.
Further, petitioners' argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory
because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522
itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. They are just merely designated
as “regime of islands” to be consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS

H – Citizenship

In Re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)

Facts
1. Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his
birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree
at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was
advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to
take his oath.
2. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen.
His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a
legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the
foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that
he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos.
3. The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a
Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was
preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority . In conclusion,
the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship within
“reasonable time” However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case,
the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship
4. Reasonable time, as interpreted by Solicitor General then, shall mean reasonable time
after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice
to be three (3) years. Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a
(sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
Issue
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath? (shall not be confused
with Co vs HRET since what was discussed by the court in that case is the issue on WON, those
who elect Filipino citizehsip under 1935 Constitution are natural born citizen)
Held
1. Whether or not both the 1973 and 1987 constitution can provide a curative effect on
those born under the 1935 Constitution – No, If the citizenship of a person was subject
to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter
even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution
2. Can Ching be allowed to take lawyer’s oath? - No, C.A. No. 625 which was enacted
pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the
 Secretary of Justice, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time"
after attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. However, in the ruling in case of Cuenco, the court allowed for the election to
be extended for seven years when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied
with the requirements of electing Philippine citizenship or fourteen years after he had
reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one
(21) years.
Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all
his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving
this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship. All that is required of
the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay
in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692

Facts
1. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd district of
Northern Samar. His adversaries, which include petitioners Co et al., filed election
protests before HRET against him averring that he is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
2. HRET ruled in favor of ONG. MR was also denied hence, this petition.
Issue
WON Ong is a naturally-born Filipino citizen therefore, qualified to such position?
Held
1. On issue of jurisdiction - So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. However, in case of a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process, the court can take judicial notice in the exercise of its expanded authority under
judicial review. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial
of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2. On the issue of citizenship - The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private
respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan also found his wife here in the Philippines. The
private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. Subsequently, he
filed a petition for naturalization before CFI of Samar, and after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require
him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was
nine years old.
 3. On issue WON those who elect citizenship under the 1935 Constitution can be
considered as natural born Filipino? – Yes, the court gave Article 4 Section par 3 not
only prospective but also retroactive effect. It is for this reason that the amendments were
enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally
all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution. The Constitutional provision in question
is, therefore curative in nature.

Bengson v HRET, GR 142840

Facts
1. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. Under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country has an effect of losing Filipino citizenship.
2. In 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was
then running for reelection.
3. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto with respondent HRET. Petitioner
asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he
lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. Since there is a positive
act of reacquiring, it was construed by herein petitioner that respondent is not anymore a
natural born citizen. From birth" in Article IV, Section 2 was interpreted by respondent as
to refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
Issue
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered
a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held
1. Yes, Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
2. The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.

David v Agbay, GR 1991113, Mar 18, 2015

Facts
1. Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the
beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
2. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Petitioner re-
acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
3. Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
 4. Subsequently, with the turn of events and filing by Editha of her opposition for MLA,
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225
on October 2007.
5. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict
petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Thereafter, the CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA,
ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
6. MTC ruling - Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to
have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship,
the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Affirmed by
RTC
Issue
One of the main contention of petitioner is that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had
been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino
citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization. WON this
contention is correct?

Held
1. Retention vis-à-vis Re-acquisition – RA 9225 clearly provides distinction between the
two. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The
second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same
oath. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they
shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided
they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. Considering that petitioner was
naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the
first category of natural- born Filipinos.
2. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA,
it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of
such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2
declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.
3. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated
act.

I – Doctrine of State Immunity

Philippine Agila Satellite v Lichauco, G.R. No. 134887 (2006)

Facts
1. In 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of
private telecommunications carriers and the DOTC relative to the launching, ownership,
operation and management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or controlled
private consortium or corporation. Pursuant to the MOU, the consortium formed a
corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI)
 2. By its letter 2 dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio)
requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government
confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI. In
response to Silverio's letter, Secretary Lagdameo confirmed the government's assignment
of Philippine orbital slots
3. Michael de Guzman which is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of PASI later informed
the Landbank of the government's assignment to PASI of orbital slots. and requested the
bank's confirmation of its participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ 11 million, the
proceeds of which would be applied to PASI's interim satellite.
4. PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it
proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites,
including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business
partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite manufacturer.
However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications,
allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the name of [Michael de Guzman] and
sabotage the business of PASI. Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated
allegedly in her offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding to other parties
despite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that
Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown
to PASI, “Unknown Awardee”
5. Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint
against Lichauco and the Unknown Awardee. The complaint averred that the purported
award of the orbital slot to the "Unknown Awardee was illegal, and thus should be
declared null and void.
6. Lichauco filed instead a Motion to Admit with attached Motion to Dismiss. She rooted her
prayer for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a suit
against the State which may not be sued without its consent. In her Motion to Dismiss,
Lichauco asserts that she is being sued for issuing the aforementioned Notice of Offer,
which fell within her official functions as DOTC Undersecretary for Communications. She
claims that it was Secretary Lagdameo who authorized her to offer orbital slot 153º East
Longitude for bidding, and she thus acted well within the scope of her authority to advise
and assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department
objectives and policies.
7. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It characterized the defense of state immunity as "at
very least a contentious issue which cannot be resolved by mere allegations in the
pleadings but which can be best threshed out in a litigious forum. However, the CA
reversed the ruling of RTC and upheld the contention of respondent that the suit is a suit
against the State. The rationale of the CA is that the action was done pursuance to
performance of official duty.
Issue
WON a suit against Lichauco is a suit against the State?
Held
1. No, First of, Lichauco is being sued not on his personal capacity but through his official
capacity. The present action was denominated against Lichauco, who then was the acting
Secretary of DOTC because of the sudden death of the previous DOTC Secretary, and the
unknown awardee, The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would
result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a
suit against the State itself. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the
public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the
outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a
tortious act in the performance of his/her duties)
2. As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the defense of state immunity
from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits
against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to
impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of
state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of
the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been
 so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the
DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in
this case
3. As to the third cause of action - A different set of principles applies to the third cause of
action, anchored as it is on alleged acts that are tortious in character or otherwise beyond
the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered
several disparaging and defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false assertions
against them in her letter to the Land Bank President. Of course, Lichauco could very well
raise the defense of state immunity from suit in regard to the third cause of action with the
assertion that the acts complained of constituting said cause of action fell within her
official functions and were not tortuous in character. Still, to establish such assertions of
fact, a full-blown trial on the merits would be necessary.

Sayson v Singson 54 SCRA 282)

Facts
1. the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair
of a D-8 bulldozer and was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez. It was
subsequently approved by Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
2. A canvass or public bidding was conducted. The committee on award accepted the bid of
the Singkier Motor Service owned by respondent Felipe Singson. Subsequently, a letter
was sent to Singkier Motor Service requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed
therein subject to release of the voucher amounting to 45k as proof of payment.
3. In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for
pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. Thereafter, Sayson
issue voucher but only amounting to 34k with the retention of 20% or 8k, subject to
condition that the retention amount be released only upon submission of additional
supporting documents.
4. On June 10, 1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram excessive prices charge
for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by voucher. It would appear that when a
canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI
(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the
Philippines. said firm thus submitted its quotations at 2k only, way low than the 45k
quoted by Singkier
5. Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, filed a complaint in the lower court
against the Auditor claiming for the payment of the balance, amounting to P8,706, which
was withheld due to alleged overpricing. The lower court adjudged Singson as entitled to
collect the balance. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue
WON the lower court is correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for
contractual money claims against the government?
Held
1. No, the suit disguised as one for mandamus, o compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained
by the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should
have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim
against the government may be filed.

J - Suits vs Foreign States

The Holy See v Rosario, (December 17, 1994)

Facts
1. Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy,
and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business
 2. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land located in Paranaque and
registered under the name of Holy See. Said lot is contiguous to other two lots registered in
the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon
Licup. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
3. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Private respondent insists that petitioner should clear the property of the
squatters. Petitioner refused and proposed that either private respondent be the one to
undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned which was done by petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sold the land to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
4. Private respondent thus filed a petitioner before RTC and prayed for: (1) the annulment of
the Deeds of Sale of herein petitioner with Tropicana. However, petitioner moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit.
5. a Motion for Intervention was filed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it
has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of
petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the
Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity
from suit.
Issue
WON the Holy See properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability?

Held
1. In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In
the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization
to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In the
case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs
moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of
sovereign immunity.
2. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, the court came up with
the guideline. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in
the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a
business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
3. In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or
the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim. Besides, the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and
officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to
all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this
country.
IV. Philippine Constitutional Principles and Policies

A - Pable Ocampo v HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004)

Facts
1. On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent
Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila. However, 8 days after his proclamation, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral
protest 4 against private respondent, impugning the election in 807 precincts in the 6th
District of Manila on the following grounds: (1) misreading of votes garnered by petitioner;
(2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of election returns; (4) use of marked,
spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written by one person or two
persons
2. The HRET limit the issue as to whether or not vote-buying subsist during the said contested
election in relation to such position. Meanwhile, in a separate petition before HRET against
Mark Jimenez but the petition is on the alleged residence, the HRET held that private
respondent is "ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack
of residence in the district.
3. Now, petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared disqualified the votes
cast for him should not be counted. And having garnered the second highest number of
votes, he (petitioner) should be declared the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
4. On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that private respondent was
guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
However, the HRET did not grant the prayer of the petitioner. As quoted by the resolution
of HRET it states “Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer
cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office”.
Issue
Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as winner
considering that the duly-elected representative is not eligible for the office.
Held
1. Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence that the subsequent
disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner.
This principle has been reiterated in a number our decisions of the court. If the winning
candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected, a
permanent vacancy is thus created. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the
democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind
voters' preferences.
2. On the issue on the application of Section 6 of RA 6646 which provides “any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted”. – The issue has already
been resolved in the case of Codilla, Sr. vs De Venecia in which the court ruled that
application of Section 6 hereof require a final judgment before the election for the votes of
a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray.

Maquiling v COMELEC, G.R. 195649 (2013)

Facts
1. Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. He then subsequently applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 in 2008. In the following year, Arnado filed his COC to run as mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao Del Norte for May 2010 election.
2. On April of 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed
a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy contending
 that he is a foreigner attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American. To further
bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a
computer-generated travel record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport
in going to the Philippines.
3. Arnado then won the mayoralty race. It was only after he won that he filed his answer on
the petition and present proof like Certification and Affidavit supporting his claim about
him being a Filipino once again.
4. COMELEC First Division, in ruling on the petition, first treated it as an action for
disqualification instead of treating it as cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation. In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division
disagreed with Arnado's claim that he is a Filipino citizen. The First division ruled that the
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation. Upon MR to COMELEC en banc, Maquiling, who is the
second placer, filed a petition for intervention contending that the effect of
disqualification of Arnado, shall not result to observance of order of succession shall not
be observed and instead the second placer be the one to be elected.
5. COMELEC Enbanc ruling on the MR:
a. First, it shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even
after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned.
b. Ruling that the order of succession under LGC is the one to be observed therefore,
Maquiling has no legal standing as he will not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case
c. Setting aside the ruling of COMELEC First Division ruling that the continuous use of
foreign passport does not negate Affidavit of Renunciation.
6. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying
that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.
Issue
WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made?
Held
1. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. - After
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to
run for public office. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and
is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. The renunciation
of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only
to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the citizenship.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue
to attack.
2. As to WON Maquiling shall be the one to replace Arnado – As held in some cases
decided by the SC, the court already ruled that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate
do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates is the one that form part of that voice and must
be respected. The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves
his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in
 the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013)

Facts
1. Deutsche Bank remitted to the CIR an amount representing 15% (68M) of its branch
profit remittance tax for 2002 and prior taxable years. Believing it made an overpayment,
it filed an administrative claim for refund and requested a confirmation of its entitlement
to a preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
2. Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review 7 with the CTA. The CTA Division however denied this claim based on the
following:
a. Petitioner violated RMO No. 1-2000 which mandats that the application for a tax
treaty relief was must be filed with ITAD within 15 days prior to the payment by the
former of its BPRT.
b. It also cited Mirant case which stated that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be
extended to a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first
invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the
corporation.
3. The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division's Decision
Issue
WON failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of
the benefit of a tax treaty.

Held
1. By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, the court extend to a branch in the
Philippines, remitting to its head office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate
equivalent to 10% BPRT - Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The time-honored
international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of
treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. A state that has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those
modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax
treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional
requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under
international agreements.
Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment
of tax treaty relief as required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest
entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good
faith in complying with a tax treaty. The denial of the availment of tax relief for the
failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the administrative
issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the application for a tax
treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the
taxpayer to the relief.

Estrada v Escritor AM No. P-02-1651 (2006)

Facts
1. Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested
an investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man (Quilapio) not her husband and
having a child with the latter while she was still married. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed as it might appear that the court condones her
act.
 2. Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged
gross immoral conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s
Witness and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious
beliefs. She further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in
accordance with her religion which allows members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who have
been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.
3. The Office of Deputy Court AdministratorLock found Escritor's defense of freedom of
religion unavailing to warrant dismissal of the charge of immorality. Accordingly, he
recommended that respondent be found guilty of immorality and that she be penalized
with suspension.
Issue
WON Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship and does her
religious belief justify such act?
Held
1. Strict neutrality vs Benevolent neutrality – Jurisprudence has demonstrated two main
standards used by the Court in deciding religion clause cases: 1) Complete separation or
strict scrutiny and accommodation or benevolent neutrality:
a. Separation is a strict neutrality of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the
principle. While the strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, it is strict in
holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action
b. Benevolent neutrality protects religious realities, tradition and established practice
with a flexible reading of the principle. It recognizes that religion plays an important
role in the public life of the people hence accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances can be done the government.
2. While the U.S. and Philippine religion clauses are similar in form and origin, Philippine
constitutional law has departed from the U.S. jurisprudence of employing a separationist
or strict neutrality approach. The Philippine religion clauses have taken a life of their own,
breathing the air of benevolent neutrality and accommodation. Thus, the wall of
separation in Philippine jurisdiction' is not as high and impregnable as the wall created by
the U.S. thus, the Filipinos, as the one who drafted themselves the Constitution,
manifested their adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the
religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government
action and examines the effect of these actions on religious exercise.
3. Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the Compelling State Interest Test – the
Court mentioned several tests in determining when religious freedom may be validly
limited. First, the Court mentioned the test of "immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community" and "infringement of religious freedom only to the
smallest extent necessary" to justify limitation of religious freedom. Second, religious
exercise may be indirectly burdened by a general law which has for its purpose and effect
the advancement the state's secular goals, provided that there is no other means by which
the state can accomplish this purpose without imposing such burden. Third, the Court
referred to the "compelling state interest" test which grants exemptions when general laws
conflict with religious exercise, unless a compelling state interest intervenes.
In deciding respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause it is the
compelling state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied. However, the Court
could not rule definitively on the ultimate issue of whether the respondent was to be held
administratively liable for there was a need to give the State the opportunity to adduce
evidence that it has a more “compelling interest” to defeat the claim of the respondent to
religious freedom.
4. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to
discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's compelling interest which can override
respondent's religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression
where we are applying the "compelling state interest" test in a case involving purely
religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as how we will
decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent who stands
not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.
Pamatong v Comelec GR No. 161872 (2004)
Facts
1. Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on
December 2003. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.
2. Petitioner herein now files petition for certiorari before SC. Petitioner seeks to reverse the
resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to “equal access to
opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
Issue
WON COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the
grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.
Held
1. No, Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies”,
are generally considered not self-executing. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
2. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not
convey any judicially enforceable rights. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much
to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to
interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Words and phrases such as “equal access,”
“opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to
their inherent impreciseness.

Garcia v Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)

Facts
1. Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the
part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support. They have three children. (binubugbog daw siya). Finding reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO.
2. Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their
children, private respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
She alleged inter alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit with the end in view of
recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children.
A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven
policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys.
3. Frustrated by the continued issuance of TPO in favor of private respondent, petitioner filed
a case before CA for petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TPO,
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7262 (VAWC) or being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses. Subsequently, the CA denied the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in
the civil case in the issuance of TPO, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the
same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for
prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a
collateral attack on said law hence this petition before SC.
Issue
 WON RA 9262 is violative of due process clause and equal protection clause?
Held
1. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make
for real differences justifying the substantial classification under the law. According to the
Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked
with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception
leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to
retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power. Even the United Nations has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue stating
that violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women. An official statistics during the deliberation of the law,
concludes that Women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence.
2. R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioner
bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of Protection order. He
contends that the PO’s are issued on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened. Such contention shall be given scant consideration. A
protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.
3. Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the
VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence
- Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated.

V – Exercise of Governmental Power

A - Separation of Powers and Delegation of Power

In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382

Facts
1. Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC (Narvassa, Herrera, and Cruz) dated
October 20 1986 and 6 days thereafter, a letter was also forwarded to the justices of the
First division, complaining about the dismissal of her case (aland dispute involving large
estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately
and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry
beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. The letter even attacks the participation of
 Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously
a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. Illustre
also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from
finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference.
2. The Court en banc took up the background and history of the case, found no reason to
take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division.
3. The First division clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding
justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and
that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also
made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.
4. On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to the three Justices with
more threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of
justice.” True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the
Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute
Resolution.
5. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which
was widely publicized without any copy furnishing the SC nor the members who were
charged thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of the Court and the other
respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually
filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice.
6. Tanodbayan then dismissed the petition and issue order for both Maravilla (aggrieved
party) and Laureta (counsel) as to why both of them shall not be cited with contempt.
On Eva Maravilla, she answers the following:
a. there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court;
b. the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in character
On Atty. Laureta, she answers the following:
a. he is not respondent Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has
consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of the
prosecution of her case;
b. it was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended press conference and
from circulating copies of her complaint
c. he did not prepare respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justice
Issue
WON both Maravilla and Atty. Laureta be cited in contempt?
Held
1. We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their
claims that they had done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity
of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances.
2. As to contention that letters to justices where private in character - Respondents'
reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual
Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. There is no vindictive
reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of
an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.
3. As to contention of Atty. Laureta that he had nothing to do with respondent
Ilustre's letters - Respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had control of
the proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever
steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Also, the reports
received by the members of the Court that copies of the complaint filed with the
Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes
bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio speaking on the
same complaint, and that he was following up the complaint and the motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
4. As to the case filed before Tanodbayan on the SC rendering unjust judgment -
Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. It is elementary that the Supreme Court is
supreme — the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the
 judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No
other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust. The
Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's judicial power is by
no means a "display of arrogance" but a restatement of the fundamental principle of
separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government
such as ours, viz. that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive,
legislative and judicial, are each supreme and independent within the limits of its
own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the
other.
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does
so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who
would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or
the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no
application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions
who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation.

INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983)

Facts
1. The case arose when Jagdish Rai Chadha, a Kenyan citizen and having a non-immigrant
student visa in the US, overstayed his student visa and was ordered deported by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
2. Chadha then sought relief from the deportation under the provision of Nationality Act that
allowed the Attorney General to suspend deportation if certain criteria were met. The
Attorney General granted Chadha’s request but Congress passed a resolution vetoing the
decision. Such resolution was based on the authority of the Congress in one section of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized either Lower or Upper House of
Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney
General by issuing resolution
3. Chadha sought the constitutionality of the veto provision arguing that it violated the
constitutional principle of separation of powers by giving Congress the power to overturn
executive branch decisions.
Issue
WON the veto provision made by Congress violates the separation of power?
Held
1. Yes, the SC, in holding that the veto provision was unconstitutional because it violated the
Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which requires that every bill passed by Congress
be presented to the President for approval or veto. It invalidated the provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act that allowed Congress to veto certain executive branch
decisions. The court held that the legislative veto under the guise of resolution, was
effectively an exercise of Congress' legislative authority and, therefore, unconstitutional
because the action was not approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by
the president.

Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955)

Facts
1. The case all started when the government plans to bought the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates. In such sale, the Senate adopted a Resolution for the conduct of investiagation as
to whether or not the sale was made in honest and proper proceedings were observed. In
the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-
appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase price was delivered but refused to
answer such.
2. Arnault was incarcerated in New Bilibid Prison pursuant to a resolution by the Senate
finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he
transacted business in relation to a government purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates
 3. while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit, Exhibit A
wherein he summarized the facts surrounding the acquisition of both estates under which
he mentioned the named of Jess D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit to
the said Senate Special Committee, the latter subjected petitioner to questioning regarding
the identity of Jess D. Santos, and after said investigation and questioning the Committee
adopted Resolution ruling on the continued detention of said petitioner since it appears
that he is still reluctant to give the real identity of the person to whom he gave the
remaining purchase price and the name Jess D. Santos was found to be merely a made-up
name only.
4. Arnault then filed a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas in CFI.
CFI held that the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically existed in the human
that the Senate abused its discretion in making its conclusion and that under these
circumstances the only thing that could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his
release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial department for
investigation and prosecution as the circumstances warrant
Issue
WON the decision of the court granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus is proper?
Held
1. There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The judicial
department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the
same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of
the legislative discretion.
2. All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior
to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has
been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of the
mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or
property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been
extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard personally
and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering
his continued confinement.

Belgica v Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013)

Facts
1. The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district. The earliest form of the pork barrel
system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public Works Act of
1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an
item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The pork barrel system was temporarily
discontinued when martial law was declare
2. It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called
“Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-
sum allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public
works project or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which
would fall under education, health and livelihood.
3. In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The
CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing
agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators
and congressmen could identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads,
buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. In
 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs:
(i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior
consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
4. In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA.
PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release
of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except
personal services and other personnel benefits. In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA
contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators
and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds
(Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard
projects" and P30 Million for "soft projects while P200 Million was given to each Senator
as well as the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft
projects) The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing
agencies. Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his
legislative district.
5. As to Presidential Pork Barrel - While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically
associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases
and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term's usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund. Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section
12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public
funds from the National Treasury.
6. In the recent case that happen which involved Janet Lim Napoles, the PDAF (pork barrel)
funds was once again put into limelight. Allegedly, the PDAF fund given to certain
Senators was used to corruption by the so-called scheme ghost projects. Hence, different
petition was filed to declare pork barrel as unconstitutional.
Issue
WON the pork barrel shall be declared unconstitutional?
Held
1. Actual case or controversy - The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the laws allowing for their utilization are currently existing and operational and
thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.
2. The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments
has been violated - The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund
release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department. The Legislative
branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain
of the Executive.
3. Violation of Non-delegability of Legislative Power - In the cases at bar, the Court
observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which is lodged in Congress
4. As to validity of Presidential Pork Barrel - Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of
PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively
provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that
Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific" purpose
of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only
created a Special Fund incidental thereto. In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section
12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential
 Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which
is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.
The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and
specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if
a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates
the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes
apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation
made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
a. Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees,
revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all
sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified
public purpose),and
b. Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, after
deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60% if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and ...the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified
public purpose)

NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association v Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)
Facts
1. On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001. Under Section 48 of the EPIRA
Law, a new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy
restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the
privatization and the restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Corporation (PSALC).
2. On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-
124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the
Selection and Placement of Personnel.” Under this Resolution, the services of all NPC
personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to
separation benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution
2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to manage and implement the NPC’s Separation
Program.
3. Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their
individual and representative capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain
respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002- 125.
a. Petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were not passed and issued by a majority of
the members of the duly constituted Board of Directors since only three of its
members, as provided under Section 48 6 of the EPIRA Law, were present.
b. According to petitioners, the other four members who were present at the meeting and
signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective departments but
were merely representatives or designated alternates of the officials.
c. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of the well-settled
principle that "delegated power cannot be further delegated." Thus, petitioners
conclude that the questioned Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not
issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum existed because only three of the
nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were present and
qualified to sit and vote.
Issue
WON NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were properly enacted.
Held
1. No. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board
of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their
judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion, when applied to
public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting
officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
2. There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involves the exercise of
discretion and not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate,
thus as the court ruled, an officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it
to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute
another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
3. Does the rule on exercising discretion then precludes the said officer from utilizing, as
a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates? – No, it does
not preclude him from having a subordinates in relation to the exercise of subordinates so
long as it is the legally authorized official who makes the final decision through the use of
his own personal judgment. In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in
approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of
the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves
who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as shown by the fact that it is
the signatures of the respective representatives that are affixed to the questioned
Resolutions.

VI. Structure and Powers of Government

A - The Legislative Branch

Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)

Facts
1. This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment
2. Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October
2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
3. The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
4. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely
on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “Each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.”
5. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue
WON RA 9716 is violative of the provision of the constitution which requires that for every
250k inhabitant, there shall be at one representative
Held
1. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of a
comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province|.
2. Whether or not the condition of 250k population is a sine qua non requirements for
the formation of an additional legislative district in a province? – The court ruled in
the negative the apportionment shall always follow a UNIFORM and PROGRESSIVE
RATIO meaning, the apportionment depends on the number of inhabitants as time goes
by, it can be 300,000 to 1 or 200,000 to 1 depending on the number of inhabitants per
district.

Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013
Facts
1. Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations which includes”
a. that she is single when she is married
b. that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of
Bauan, Batangas
c. She is an American citizen
2. In her Answer, petitioner countered that:
a. there is no valid and binding marriage between her and Congressman Mandanas as
their marriage did not comply with the formal requisites of marriage
b. That the claim that she is an American citizen is vereft of evidence
3. COMELEC First division ruled in favor of respondent cancelling the COC of petitioner he
COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her
COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with
the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.
4. Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration 14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an
American passport.
5. Subsequently, an MR was filed before COMELEC en banc. Four days thereafter however,
the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. One month after his
proclamation, the MR was denied by COMELEC en banc
6. Petitioner now comes before the SC, questioning first, that her case shall now rest before
HRET as the court already loss its jurisdiction upon her proclamation and that she is a
Filipino citizen.
Issue
WON Petitioner herein is qualified for such position?
Held
1. On jurisdiction of COMELEC - the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. Before a candidate
can be come a member of the house of representative, the following shall concur: (1) a
valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Here, the petitioner
cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a
Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
 2. In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported
Oath of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is
not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives. before
there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with.
3. As to issue of citizenship - respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her
the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or
that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention (i.e proof of allegiance, affidavit of
renunciation etc.)
4. Ruling on the Motion for Reconsidertation – Petitioner once again argue in an MR that
since he was already proclaimed, the jurisdiction to hear election protest against his
candidacy shall be with HRET, not COMELEC. The COMELEC still denied the petition.
It ruled that 4 days prior to his proclamation, the COMELEC En banc already ruled
denying the MR that was filed to it on the decision of COMELEC division cancelling her
certificate of candidacy. COMELEC Rules provides that any aggrieved party to the
decision of COMELEC en banc shall file within 5 days from promulgation of the decision
thereof, an restraining order otherwise, the decision will become final and executory,
which herein petitioner fails to observe. After the five days when the decision adverse to
her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more
imperative. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a
proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision.

Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766

Facts
1. The Comelec disqualified 52 party-list groups and organizations from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, particularly those that did not satisfy these two criteria:
(1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors; AND (2) all nominees must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
2. Aggrieved by the disqualification, said part-list groups via Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec.
Issue
WON he Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections;
Held
1. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is
to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from
the party-list system.|
2. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must
now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
3. New rule (abandoning Banat doctrine)
a. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
 b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector.
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
o However, In order to acquire juridical personality as a political party and
entitle it to rights and privileges granted to political parties, it must be
registered before COMELEC. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint and after due notice and hearing, cancel the registration
of a party, organization or coalition if it will advocate violence r unlawful
means to seek its goal or if it’s a party belonging to a religious sect
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.

Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015

Facts
1. Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization. It filed its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.
Thereafter, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as
first nominee and Roberto Mascariña as second nominee.
2. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-
list groups. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, and thereafter assumed
office.
3. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the
Interim Central Committee of Ating Koop expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty.
Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty
and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
Lico filed an MR before the Interim Central Committee but was denied
4. On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico which prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered
to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession
of the second nominee, Roberto. The COMELEC Second division upheld the petition
filed by Rimas Group and ordered Lico to vacate such office and order the appointment of
Robert as the duly representative of Ating-Koop.
 5. Lico appeal the decision before COMELEC enbanc but was denied hence this petition
before SC. In COMELEC enbanc decision, first it held that it had no jurisdiction to expel
Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion
from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the
Petition. At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted
him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity
even after their terms had expired; and that the COMELEC was not in a position to
substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion.
Issue
WON the COMELEC en banc correnctly ruled, affirming the decision of its Second Division
expelling Lico as representative of Ating-Koop?
Held
1. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
2. The court find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its
own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings
already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide
member of the party-list group sought to be represented.
3. The court find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that
the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not registered with
the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu meeting and the
Parañaque conference pursuant to the said amendments, were valid. A party-list
organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval must be obtained
through its agent, the COMELEC therefore, any amendment to the by-laws of a party-list
organization should become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.

B – Organization and Discipline

Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)

Facts
1. The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding officer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. On the
agenda for the day was the election of officers. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate as against Senator Tatad who was also a
nominee for Senate President. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as
president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
2. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority.
3. During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party with total number
of member as seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader.
4. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto,
alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue
WON Senator Guingona assumption of position being the minority leader is proper?
Held
1. As to whether or not the court shall assume jurisdiction considering that the issue is
an internal matter within the purview of Congress and interference will result to
violation of separation of power – Under the expanded jurisdiction of the court and in
light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction
over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
2. As to contention of the petitioner on the definition of minority –While the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader. Therefore, the interpretation proposed by
petitioners (that election of majority leader carries with it the determination also of
minority leader) finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
3. As to whether or not the court can make determination as to who will be the
minority – While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President
and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. As the SC view it, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
4. Notably however, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within
the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.

Avelino vs Cuenco
Facts
1. In the session of the Senate, Senator Tanada requested that his right to speak on the floor
on the next session day be allowed to formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved. Thereafter, before the opening of
the session Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the
Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering
the investigation thereof.
2. Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate
session hall at the appointed time said petitioner, being the Senate president, delayed his
appearance at the session hall. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution he read slowly and carefully said resolution.
3. Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but
the petitioner, then presiding, continuously ignored him; and when after the reading of
the minutes, Senator Tañada insisted on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak without being
previously recognized by him.
4. At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery as if it was pre-
arrange. Senator David then, one of petitioners followers move for the adjournment of the
session which Senator Tanda vehemently oppose. A vote was agreed upon whether or not
the session shall be adjourned or not but while the vote is on-going, Senator Avelino walk
out of his chair followed by his other co-Senators that support him. Senator Tanada and
 the other remaining Senators then continued the session in such case, Senator Tanada was
able to give his privilege speech.
5. With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, which
declares the seat of Senate President be vacant and putting Cuenco as Acting Senate
president Such Resolution was put to a vote and was unanimously approved. Senator
Cuenco took the oath. The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the
respondent as acting president of the Philippine Senate.
6. By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioner asks the Court to declare him
the rightful President of the Philippine Senate and oust respondent.
Issue
WON Avelino shall be the one to be rightfully declared as the Senate President?
Held
1. As to issue of jurisdiction of the court – In view of the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, the court refused to take cognizance of the case because the selection of the
presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to
be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in
the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. As to whether or not a quorum was properly constituted in the continued session? -
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House" does not mean all the members. There is a difference between a
majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring
less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23) for being out of the country, constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore that even if
the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least,
of the absent members.
 Impromptu only - In computing quorum, members who are outside the country and,
thus, outside of each House’s jurisdiction are not included. The basis for determining
the existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are
within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate. Coercive Jurisdiction – The power of
each house of the congress to compel the attendance of its absent member to
constitute a quorum

De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)

Facts
1. On 12 March 1993, a Criminal Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against then
Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (a) of RA
3019 also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
2. After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend the Accused
pende lite which was granted by the Sandiganbayan and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
accused. But the Speaker did not comply.
3. The Sandiganbayan then issued a Resolution ordering the Speaker of the House to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed,
through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and
claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body.
4. Thereafter, because of such refusal, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring herein
De Venecia as Speaker of the House for contempt of Court. Roberto P. Nazareno, in his
capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives filed a petition for certiorari
before the court.
Issue
WON the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held
1. As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation
of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The
 order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution.
2. The suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature
and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary
measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid Information. Its purpose is to prevent the
accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance
while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the
other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-
imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

Facts
1. In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated
her frustration over the Supreme Court even calling it “surrounded by idiots” and then
telling Chief Justice Artemio that she will spit in his face and his cohorts. Her speech
came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that
only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy
of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court,
including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified.
2. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending
that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ
Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.
3. In her comment on the complaint, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue
WON Senator Santiago can validly claim parliamentary immunity on the utterances she made
during her privileged speech that appears to put the integrity of judiciary in question.
Held
1. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof” can be validly invoke by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment
or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
2. However, the court took cognizance of the improper speech taken by the good Senator.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To
the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used
as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members
of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
3. We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator's offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of
justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-
accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people's representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the
courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
C - Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
Facts
1. Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate for being elected as
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his
incumbency as Senator. The petition was anchored on the following below provision of
the Constitution which states:
“SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.”
2. Respondent insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in
the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an
employment.
Issue
WON the petition present justiciable issue?
Held
1. As to standing first of petition – Petitioner have not standing. A careful reading of the
petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto as it appears to alleged usurpation of
public office. Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper
party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly
usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person
instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any
stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
2. On the substantive issue - The PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency,
commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine
Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such,
does not hold a government office or employment.
Considering therefore that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the appointment of
Richard Gordon therefore does not violate such provision of the Constitution. The Court
therefor held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors.
3. As to PNRC Charter – The court also ruled to declare some sections of the PNRC
Charter as violative of the Constitution. Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC
was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the
elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus,
although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-
owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was
in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against
the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even
for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as
 it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for
being unconstitutional.
4. Motion for Clarification filed by Senator Gordon – In the said motion, Senator
Richard Gordon clarifies before the court as to its ruling declaring some provisions of
PNRC Charter as violative of the Constitution. It argues the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95, PNRC Charter was not raised by the parties, the Court went
beyond the case in deciding such issue.
 The court agrees with petitioner. The court should not have declared void certain
sections of R.A. No. 95, PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter. As correctly pointed out in respondent's Motion,
the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was
not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very
lis mota of the case. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties
 Furthermore, the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to
certain individuals, families, or groups. it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does
not come within the spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant
special privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity
that strives to serve the common good. (more like an exception to the rule)

D - Powers and Limitations on Powers

Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003

Facts
1. Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of
this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. He claim his standing as
a taxpayer suit since the challenged law requires necessary amount to carry out its
provisions.
2. Petitioner question Section 5(d) of the law which allows the execution of Affidavit in lieu
of residency requirement provided for under the Constitution to be a qualified voter.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election.
3. It also question Section 18.5 of the law as petitioner claims that the provision of Section
18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.
4. Finally, it question Sections 19 and 25 of the law on the creation of joint Congressional
Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC as it appears to
intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not
under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government
Issue
WON RA 9189 on the Absentee Voting Abroad is unconstitutional?
Held
1. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile in
 relation to out election laws. Bases on the transcript on the drafting of Constitution also,
it is clear that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents' domicile of
origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
2. As to Harmonization of both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Constitution – It appears
there is conflict between both Section1 and Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. While
Section 1 recognize the residency requirement, Section 2 appears to allow the Congress
to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. For purposes of
harmonizing these two provisions of the Constitution, the court held that by the doctrine
of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines
may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
3. As to execution of Affidavit in lieu of residency requirement to be a qualified voter -
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not
in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. the affidavit is required of immigrants and
permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are
presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain
4. In relation to Section 18.5 of the law - Indeed, the phrase, “proclamation of winning
candidates” in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily
includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-
presidency. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given
to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on
the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.
5. In relation to Section 19 and 25 of the law on the creation of JCOC – JCOC are
composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, therefore, it can be
summarized that it is a purely legislative body. By vesting itself with the powers to
approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. The second sentence of the first
paragraph of Section 19 stating that the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall
be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of
Section 25 stating that it shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in
both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the
Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional
infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the
COMELEC.

Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

Facts
1. On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with
 the Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al in relation to
the alleged connivance of corruption at the expense of the Filipino people. The said
petitioner alleges in that petition that Bengzon Law Office conspire with the accused and
manipulated schemed for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and
jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) the accused.
2. While the case is on-going, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the
"Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. One
newspaper even cited that the Romualdez corporation was sold to certain Ricardo Lopa, the
President's brother-in-law, and had effectively taken over the firms, even pending
negotiations for the purchase of the corporations.
3. On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of
Companies (FMMC) owned by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case. The matter was then referred to Blue Ribbon
Committee.
4. At the hearing Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case filed against him before Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify invoking his constitutional right
to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondent Committee's inquiry
could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-
defendants.
5. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional
rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief
Issue
WON the hearing of Senate Blue Ribbon Committee shall be pursued?
Held
1. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision
of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
2. The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he
merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It cannot, therefore, be said
that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212,
because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo
Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
3. In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.

Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820

Facts
1. The case all started when the government plans to bought the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates. 4.5M and 500k were the sums paid respectively. Of the total amount, 1M was
given to certain Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the
 Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault. The second sum
amounting to 500k was also given to Arnault in representation also of Ernest Burt.
However, it appears that these Ernest Burt previously bought both Buenavista and
Tambobong estates to their original owners with only a down payments and still a
remaining balnce have not yet been paid-off.
2. Arising from these facts, an investigation was conducted. Among the most important
person called was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. During senate investigation on
the matter, Arnault refuse to give answer to some question posited to him (which includes
naming a certain man to whom he gave a money worth 440k) invoking his right to self-
incrimination which as a result thereof, the Senate issues a Resolution putting him under
detention for contempt.
Issue
WON the incarceration of herein petitioner by the Senate was valid?
Held
1. Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our
Constitution having been drawn largely from American institution and practices — we
can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous
provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although there
is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process
to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
2. Power of inquiry - the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field
than either the congress of the United States or a State Legislature, the court think it is
correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be
difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded.
Suffice it to say it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power. If the
subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony called relate to that subject, obedience to its process
may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. These power of inquiry is subject
only to limitation on constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.|
3. In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the special Committee created by it,
to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the
petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the
validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. the transaction involved a questionable
and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public
funds, of which the Congress is the constitutional guardian.

Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (549 SCRA 77 AND 564
SCRA 152
Facts
1. On 2007, DOTC entered into contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of almost 350M $. Such project is to be finance by Republic
of China. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in
the Senate for the investigation on the propriety of the project. Petitioner herein is one of
those invited who at that time, was Secretary of NEDA. It appeared that the Project was
initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but the NEDA acquiesced
to convert it into a government-to-government project.
2. Petitioner herein thereafter testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours.
One which he disclose was that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that
he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege".
3. respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him
to appear and testify but the Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent
 Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R.
Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the
order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate
and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials.
4. Respondent Committee, dissatisfied with the refusal to comment and attend the hearing,
cite in contempt herein petitioner and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. In
view of such Order, herein petitioner now files before SC a petition for certiorari with
urgent application for TRO on the issuance of said order.
Issue
WON NEDA Secretary Neri validly invoke executive privilege?
Held

1. The Communications Elicited are covered by Executive privilege - The power of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad but still subject to limitation
and one of which, is if the person to invokes executive privilege. Below are the three
questions propounded by the Committee but which does not answered by Neri invoking
Executive Privelege:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?
Citing the case of US vs Nixon, the court enumerated the three basic requirements before
executive privilege be properly invoke: First, the communications relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, (i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries). Second, the communications are
"received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
2. Whether the question propounded are in the exercise of oversight functions of
legislative inquiry – the court held that the question appears to be in a form of oversight
function. While the Section 21 and 22 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution are closely
related and complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while Section
22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. Here, the record is bereft of any
categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical
need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function. The
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
3. Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a
possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing citing the case of US vs Nixon. However,
unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a
legislative inquiry. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims
executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to
her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
4. Motion for Reconsideration Ruling - The failure of the counsel for respondent
Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how the
withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative
purpose is very evident. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully
discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential
communication stands. The implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to
 dispense with the burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly impair the
President's performance of her function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the
presumption.

Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Facts
1. On 2017, Horacio Castillo, a first year law student, died due to hazing. By reason of this,
a Senate inquiry was made to investigate about Castillo’s death. Petitioner however did
not attend the hearing which lead to the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum against
herein petitioner. Petitioner appeared on the date stated in such subpoena but was being
uncooperative in the probe into the death of the UST Law Student. During the Senate
inquiry, Balag repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he
headed the fraternity. He was then cited by contempt of the Senate and order detained
until he released such information being elicited from him. Balag, leader of Aegis Juris
Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after senators ordered him detained in Senate
premises.
Issue
WON the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt
during its inquiries
Held
1. Petition was already moot and academic - In this case, the Court finds that there is no
more justiciable controversy. Tn its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court
ordered in the interim the immediate release of petitioner pending resolution of the
instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the Senate's authority.
2. Exception to mootness - In this case, the petition presents a critical and decisive issue
that must be addressed by Court: what is the duration of the detention for a contempt
ordered by the Senate?
 The court mentioned first the case of Aurnult which gave a distinction between
the Senate and the House of Representatives' power of contempt. In the former,
since it is a continuing body, there is no time limit in the exercise of its power to
punish for contempt; on the other hand, the House of Representatives, as it is not
a continuing body, has a limit in the exercise of its power to punish for contempt,
which is on the final adjournment of its last session. In the same case, the Court
addressed the possibility that the Senate might detain a witness for life. However,
in the case of Neri vs Senate, the court clarified the doctrine of contuing body of
the Senate to wit:
“On the nature of the Senate as a continuing body. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved
as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of
each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, (i.e.,unpassed bills and even legislative investigations) are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters”
Based on the above-pronouncement, the Senate is a continuing institution.
However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to
the termination of the business of the Senate during the expiration of one (1)
Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters. In this case, the court
ruled therefore that the period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of
contempt is not indefinite which should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked.
Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)
Facts
1. This case is about the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of
the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
2. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate. Before said date arrived, Executive
Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the
hearing in order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare
for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.” Senate refused the request.
3. Subsequently, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.”
Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the
executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President
has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
martial for such attendance.
Issue
WON EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Held
1. E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress,
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials.
2. Implied claim of privilege - Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that informations and
those public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad.
In light of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege"
may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of
information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as
defined in Section 2(a). Such person then must first secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of
the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing
the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse
a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464. In view thereof, whenever an
official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized
by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the
President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without
mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the
information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on
the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
3. Section 2 and 3 thereof is not entirely invalid but must still be subject to
interpretation – Section2 and Section 3 therefore shall not be dismissed outright This
Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
determine whether it is valid. While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed
on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular
circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that
renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of
respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3
of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof While
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under
the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being
referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive,
but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive
order.
VI – EXECUTIVE BRANCH

A – President

Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)

Facts
1. On December of 1991, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan, to have the deposited money in escrow with PNB amounting to
658M dollar including interest be forfeited in favor of national government. The funds
were previously held by the five account groups, using various foreign foundations in
certain Swiss banks. The said amount was said to be one of those ill-gotten wealth which
then former Ferdinand Marcos accumulate during dictatorship. In addition, the petition
sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded
the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately
acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines,
now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
2. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. The General
Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions
contained therein. In one of its whereas clauses however, it was indicated that petitioner
Republic was able to obtained a favorable judgment before Swiss Federal Trubunal ruling
that the 356M dollar belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines.
3. Due to the said ruling of the Swiss Court in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, a
petition for summary judgement for the forfeiture of the said amount deposited in escrow in
PNB was filed by the PCGG before Sandiganbayan. The initial ruling of Sandiganbayan
grants the petition for forfeiture. However, upon MR, the Sandiganbayan reverse its initial
ruling, holding that although it still ruled that the Marcoses have no valid claim over those
funds the government wasn’t able to estalsih a prima facie case for forfeiture of the Swiss
Funds as the PCGG wasn’t able to present the original copies of the authenticated Swiss
decisions and their authenticated translations therefore, shall still be subject for further
proceedings.
4. This opt PCGG to file before SC a petition for certiorari on the decision rendered by
Sandiganbayan, denying the petition for forfeiture.
Issue
WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion?
Held
1. Proprietary of Summary Judgement - respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine
issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary
judgment should take place as a matter of right. An action for summary judgment of the
complaint is filed when there is no genuine issues but merely consequential issues such as
dates or the amount of damages. • A party seeking to recover a claim, counter-claim
or cross-claim or declaratory relief may move for summary judgement in his favor upon
all or part thereof.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture (i.e
made computation as to the salaries of the spouses Marcos and compare it with the
amount indicated as ill gotten wealth concluding with he discrepancy between the two,
uneven balance sheet of their earnings etc.)
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos
and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the
petition for forfeiture. In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and
every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the
rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or
"they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos,
"the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.
 2. Proprietary of the Forfeiture - Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever
any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are: (1) the
offender is a public officer or employee: (2) he must have acquired a considerable
amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Considering that the total
amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful
income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully
acquired was duly established.

B – Powers and Limitations

Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)

Fact
1. The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the
Roppongi property. The other lots where the Nampeidai Property, Kobe Commercial
Property, and Kobe Residential Property. The Roppongi Property consists of the land
and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site
of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study
the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
2. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at
$225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second
one, after postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on
February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. In one of the petition, petitioner submits
that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" He states
that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by
the State.
Issue
WON the president her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?
Held
1. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that
the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents (government) have failed to
do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man not until declared as patrimonial property. The fact that the Roppongi site has
not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is
a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.Abandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to
repair and improve the property.
 It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the
inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic
value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the
President and congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value,
the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully
followed.

Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760

Facts
1. Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos
and his family.
Issue
WON the president can validly prohibit Mr Marcos to return to the Philippines?
Held
1. The right invoke is not one one’s right to travel but the right to return to one’s
country - It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as
a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is
part of the law of the land.
2. Whether or not the president acted in grave abuse of discretion in not allowing the
return of Mr. Marcos - Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these
basic principles in arriving at a decision. To the President, the problem is one of
balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people. That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines. The Resolution
does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to
come home to die in his country.

Saguisag v Ochoa, G.R. 212426 (2016)

Facts
1. Petitioners questions the constitutionality Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.).
One of their main argument is that under Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution,
which requires that after the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of
 the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate. This EDCA in a form of Executive Agreement
violate such provision of the Constitution which clearly states that any succeeding military
bases shall be in a form of treaty. EDCA allows prepositioning and temporary access of US
military troops and equipment’s to some designated Philippine territory, build facilities,
store fuel among others.
Issue
WON the EDCA violates provision of the Constitution?
Held
1. Executive Agreements - Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of
Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded.
Executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing
policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty; 209 (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; 210 or (3) in
the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution. This rule does
not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion.
Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by
the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws.
2. Validity of EDCA - Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military
forces if it merely involves detail adjustments of an already existing military treaty.
EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the VFA.
The court agreed with the position of the OSG that EDCA simply implements existing
policies under the MDT and the VFA by providing more concrete terms and mechanisms
as to how military engagement between the Philippines and US be properly implemented
(i.e prepositioning of military troops, temporary stationing on a rotational basis of U.S.
military personnel, facilities to be built etc.) all of this simply compliments the provisions
of MDT and VFA and does not in anyway alter or amend existing treaties and
agreements the Philippines have with the United States.
3. Motion for Reconsideration ruling – Petitioner insist in MR that the provisions of
EDCA appears to fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it
provides a wider arrangement than the VFA particularly, EDCA allows prepositions and
building of facilities for US military unit in the Philippines. As the court ruled, VFA is
not just limited to joint exercises but are actually broader in scope. By that reason alone,
EDCA was established so that other related activities can be properly observed and
arrange between the military engagement of these two countries. In such instance, EDCA
therefore, being an executive agreement is proper.

De Castro v JBC, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)

Facts
1. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
2. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice,
the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court. Although it has already begun the process for the
filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not
yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to
the controversy now before us being yet unresolved. The OSG contends that the
 incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme
Court.
Issue
WON the outgoing president can still validly appoint a member of the Supreme Court despite
the fact that under Section 15 of Article VII of the Constitution, the president, two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, he/he shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments?

Held
1. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary - Article
VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4 (1) and Section 9 of this Article
are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices.
In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be
made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the
JBC; Section 4 (1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or
Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
2. The usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word shall — an imperative, operating to
impose a duty that may be enforced 71 — should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4
(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
3. Arguably, the provision on article VII Section 15 provdes for prohibition on the so-called
midnight appointee. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the
prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need
to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of
the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

Velicaria-Garafil v O.P. GR 203372, Jun 16, 2015

Facts
1. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in
several government offices. Herein petitioner, Atty. Velicaria-Garafil's appointment as State
Solicitor II at the OSG, is one of those appointments.
2. On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of
office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino
issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President
Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
3. Many petitions had been filed before SC questioning the constitutionality of EO No.2. In
2012, the SC however refer the petitioners before CA for further proceedings. In the CA
decision, although it ruled separately on each petition, majority of its ruling hold the
constitutionality of EO No. 2
Issue
 WON the appointments made by previous president PGMA are considered as midnight
appointees?
Held
1. All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional. The following
elements should always concur in the making of a valid appointment:
(1) Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority - provided for
in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of
appointment
(2) Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal - It is not
enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an
appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the
appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of
the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the
President's intent of its issuance.
(3) A vacant position at the time of appointment; and
(4) Acceptance of the appointment by the qualified appointee – Acceptance is
indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount
to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a
public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the
appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These
steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process.
There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. Petitioners have failed
to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the
appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took
their oaths of office during the appointment ban.

Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)

Facts
1. On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic
Act 6975, creating the DILG. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief
Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in
the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said
police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions without
their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the
Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez
III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
2. On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original petition
for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and
disbursements. They contends that the lack of confirmation from the Commission on
Appointments on the following officers renders their appointment as invalid.
Issue
WON the appointments are valid?
Held
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President. First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only
presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
 Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not
within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
2. Section 26 and 31 of RA 6975 declared unconstitutional - Consequently,
unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the
Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose
appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed. But the
unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act
6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable
from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect
the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without
its voided sections.

Kulayan v Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)

Facts
1. Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. The three staffs were
purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized
by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG).
2. The Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009,
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF
to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety
3. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing
Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Issue
WON Proclamation No. 1 is valid?
Held
1. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the
Republic - It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. By
constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to
declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone
2. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President -
Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers
enumerated under Proclamation 01 as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and
disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the
province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these
occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a
calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to
justify their actions. Moreover, the Local Government Code does not involve the diminution
of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and
defense.

Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 (2012)

Facts
 1. On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1959, declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Congress, in joint session,
convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the
validity of the President's action. But, two days later before Congress could act, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Prior also to said lifting of
martial, there are several peititons filed before SC questioning the constitutionality of the
declararation.
Issue
WON the Proclamation on the declaration of martial law is constitutional?
Held
1. Petition already moot and academic - It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the
President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation
or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation
of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Here, President
Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have
become moot and the Court has nothing to review.
2. The validity of declaration of martial must first be determined by Congress before
resort to court can be made - Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional
validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable
one in the hands of the Court.

Lagman v Medialdea, GR 231658, Jul 4, 2017

Facts
1. On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to
Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the
Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist
group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS
which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its
control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless
violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
2. In the Lagman petition, it claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no actual rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part
of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion
since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from
allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. It labels the flying of ISIS flag by
the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda and not an
open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government
Issue
WON the declaration of martial law is valid?
Held
1. Locus standi - Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the
appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
 martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."[T]he only
requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be
a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
2. The petition is not one of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but rather a specific
petition laid down under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution - A plain reading
of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to
the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It could not have been the
intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII.
The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized
that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers.
3. Overturned the decision in Fortun - The power of the Court to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information
and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not
allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." 106 On the
other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into
the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could
probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only
totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have
the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless
to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power
of revocation of Congress.
4. Whether or not actual invasion or rebellion exist - Invasion or rebellion alone may
justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a
concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his
Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the
Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but
likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed
hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up;
schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims
or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical
services and delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of government
troops and civilian movement were hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao
Island was compromised. These particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him
to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on
the foregoing, the SC hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and
fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being
probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the
martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus

FINALS

I – Police Power
 MMDA v Viron Transportation G.R. 170656 (2007)
Facts
1. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003,
"PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER MANILA MASS
TRANSPORT SYSTEM," in such EO, the MMDA had "recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities
2. Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and
policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution to integrate the different
transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the
MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares
of Metro Manila
3. Alleging that the MMDA's authority does not include the power to direct provincial
bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use
of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of
the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic.
Issue
WON MMDA have such power to prohibit bus terminals to ply through EDSA and other
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Held
1. As to validity of delegation of police power – Not valid, EO 125, which former President
Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, reorganized the then
Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications. In such EO,
mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate
networks of transportation and communications. While police power rests primarily with
the legislature, such power may be delegated. It bears stressing that under the provisions
of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and
regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the Project in question. In light of the administrative nature
of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project
as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of respondents' terminals.
2. As compliance with the requisites of police power - Even assuming arguendo that police
power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two
tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Court fails to see how the prohibition against the
existence of respondents' terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease
traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents'
bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of
traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to
another. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses,
vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger
pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic
situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions
from major thoroughfares.

Tano v. Socrates, G.R. 110249, August 27, 1997

Facts
1. Petitioner herein, Alfredo Tano et al.,all fisherman, filed a petition for certiorari with
TRO, questioning the constitutionality of two (2) Ordinance issued by Puerto Princesa
City. Ordinance 15-92 provides for banning of shipment of all fish and lobster outside
Puerto Galera (closed season) and Ordinance 02-93 provides for prohibiting the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms both lasting for a period of 5 years, both Ordinances is for purposes of
protecting and conserving the marine resources of Palawan
2. Petitioner’s contentions is that the said ordinances deprived them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. In addition,
some of them were also criminally charged by reason of violation of the said ordinance.
Issue
WON both Ordinance is unconstitutional?
Held
1. Valid exercise of police power – The Local Government Code vests municipalities with
the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor. The Sangguniangs are directed to enact ordinances that protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing. Such authority are police
power measures, enacted by the Province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa,
pursuant to the Local Government Code under Section 16 (General Welfare Clause) of
the LGC, which is a Legislative Grant, in accordance of the principles of decentralization
and devolution and the powers granted therein to local government units under the
Constitution.
2. Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed
season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five
years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The
accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce
fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment
of "closed seasons." The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the
Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Interior and Local Government. The realization of the second
objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express
mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G. R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Facts
1. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. 5 It built
and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel.
2. The City of Manila in 1993, enacted an ordinance which prohibits establishment or
operation of business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities in the Ermita-Malate area. Establishment and operation of sauna, beerhouses,
clubs, cabarets, and even motels, as part of the business of herein private respondents was
included as part of those being prohibited to operate. The purpose of such ordinance is to
mitigate, if not totally eliminate, which tends to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community by using
as a tools, “women” in general
3. Petitioner herein question the constitutionality of such law before RTC. Its main
argument before RTC is that under Section 458 of LGC, its authority is only to regulate
establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments but not total prohibition thereof. On the part of
City of Manila, it state that their power emanates from the Section 16 (general welfare
clause) of the constitution. RTC ruled in favor of respondent hence this very petition
before the SC.
Issue
 WON the City ordinance issued by City of Manila is valid
Held
1. Invalid exercise of police power - The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the
promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community by reason that
the operation of these nightclubs, bars, motels among others, brought social ills into the
community particularly, within the Ermita-Manila, However, Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's
police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable
and unduly oppressive. The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of
the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private
rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into
businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
2. The Ordinance violates substantive due process- Considering that the ordinance
unduly deprived the operators of these establishment of their right to operate business,
these rights will be tantamount already to unduly depriving them of their right of
property. Considering such, the LGU must have a valid justification to do so case law
provides that if the very purpose of the exercise of police power is one that infringe
on fundamental rights, strict scrutiny will be used and the law will be determined if
the governmental action is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.

Fernando vs. St. Scholastica

Facts
1. Respondents St. Scholastica's College (SSC) and St. Scholastica's Academy-Marikina,
Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions and is the owner of four (4) parcels of
land Located within the property are SSA-Marikina. The property is enclosed by a tall
concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. The petitioners are the officials
of the City Government of Marikina.
2. The City of Marikina enacted an ordinance, regulating the construction of fences and
walls which provides for the standard of fences heights (not more than one meter) and
that no walls and fences shall be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance. A
letter was sent to herein respondent ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of
their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back
about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. They seek extension
for the compliance but instead, the City of Marikina insisted on the enforcement of the
said ordinance
3. Respondent argues, that the ordinance is already an appropriation of its property without
due process of the law since first, allowing a 6 meters set-back and destruction of its
fence will diminish their total lot space and will result to them adjusting destrying some
property they already have in their lot like garbage house etc. They also pointed out that
the goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not exist as the
solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection for many years. The
petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public
safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
Issue
WON the City of Marikina validly exercise its police power?
Held
1. No, even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192,
series of 1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the
City's purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights. The Court first turns
its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for
a parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to
be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its
 students and faculty, and that its use by the public on non-school days would only be
incidental. The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback
requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it
would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available
for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
2. 80% See-Thru Fence Requirement - The principal purpose of the said regulation on
fences is to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful
acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure
public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to
private rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious
to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher
level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid
concrete wall. It may even be argued that such exposed premises could entice and tempt
would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass
and breach. It also appears that the respondents' concrete wall has served as more than
sufficient protection over the last 40 years.

PPI vs COMELEC
Facts
1. COMELEC passed a resolution requiring all print media to allocate at least ½ space in at
least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city, a so called
“COMELEC Space” which will be used to enable the candidates to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of
government and at the same time, for dissemination of information related to COMELEC
activities which is free of charge. Petitioner herein, Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI”)
question the constitutionality of the said resolution as it appears it takes in a form of
expropriation by the government without just compensation.
Issue
WON the COMELEC Resolution is valid?
Held
1. No, To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions
specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of print space
here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of
private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for
election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space
lies at the heart of the problem. 3 Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of imminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that
power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be
shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

Napocor v Heirs of Sangkay (Inverse Condemnation) GR 165828, Aug 24, 2011

Facts
1. Pursuant to its legal mandate, NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant
Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the
construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from
the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
2. In November of 1997, herein respondents filed an action for damages against NPC. They
alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC
that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric
 Project traversed their land. In their answer, NPC claim that the respondents have no right
of compensation since there was actually no taking of their property made against their
property and that a mere legal easement in their land was established. Furthermore,
assuming that they be entitled to just compensation, their action already prescribed due to
the tunnel having been constructed since 1979.
3. RTC ruled in favor of respondents after ocular inspection have been made and that ruled
that indeed, NPC had concealed the construction of the tunnel in 1979 from respondents.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue
WON the respondents shall be entitled for just compensation?
Held
1. Section 3 (i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and
does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently,
NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just
compensation for their land. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its
expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as
inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. On the other hand, the latter action
seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not
conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human
relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal
wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.
2. Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to
acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or
through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been liable to
pay to the owners the fair market value of the land.
3. We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is
settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be
an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short
of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.
Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the
rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in
a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.

City of Pasig & Crispina Salumbre v Meralco, GR 181710, Mar 7, 2018

Facts
1. In December of 1992, the Municipality of Pasig enacted Ordinance No. 25 which, under
its Article 3, Section 32, imposed a franchise tax on all business venture operations
carried out through a franchise within the municipality. However, in 1995, the
Municipality of Pasig was converted into a highly urbanized city.
2. In 2001, the City of Pasig informed MERALCO of its tax liability pursuant to its
Ordinance No. 25 (enacted while Pasig was still a Municipal). MERALCO protested
saying that the DOJ already released a resolution saying that collection of franchise tax
out of such ordinance is in contravention of law since franchise tax can only be collected
by a city and not by municipality. The ordinance was enacted when Pasig was still a
municipality
Issue
WON Pasig can validly collect franchise tax through Ordinance No. 25?
Held
1. No, unlike a city, a municipality is bereft of authority to levy franchise tax, thus, the
ordinance enacted for that purpose is void. The conversion of the municipality into a city
does not lend validity to the void ordinance. The LGC further provides that the power to
impose a tax, fee, or charge or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the Sanggunian
 of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance. This simply
means that the local government unit cannot solely rely on the statutory provision (LGC)
granting specific taxing powers, such as the authority to levy franchise tax. However, an
ordinance must pass muster the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with
the prevailing laws. Otherwise, it shall be void.
2. It is not disputed that at the time the ordinance in question was enacted in 1992, the local
government of Pasig, then a municipality, had no authority to levy franchise tax. Article 5
of the Civil Code explicitly provides, "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory
or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizers their validity."
Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is, thus, void for being in direct contravention
with Section 142 of the LGC.

CIR v DLSU, GR 196596, Nov 9, 2016

Facts
1. In 2004, BIR conduct an audit report on the books of accounts of DLSU. Subsequently,
BIR issued a formal letter to DLSU upon the following deficiency in taxes. (1) income
tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within the
campus; (2) value-added tax (VAT) on business income; and (3) documentary stamp tax
(DST) on loans and lease contracts. The BIR demanded the payment of P17,303,001.12,
inclusive of surcharge, interest and penalty for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003.
2. DLSU protested the assessment before the CTA. DLSU stresses that Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) of the Constitution is clear that all assets and revenues of non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes are exempt from taxes and duties. On the part of BIR, they contends that a tax-
exempt organization like DLSU is exempt only from property tax but not from income
tax on the rentals earned from property. Thus, DLSU's income from the leases of its real
properties is not exempt from taxation even if the income would be used for educational
purposes (i.e operation of its canteens and bookstore even though exclusively serving the
university community). CTA partly granted the petition of DLSU but did not exempt
them from VAT and DST from its Lease contract. However, upon appeal, the CTA
modified the payment by reducing it.
Issue
WON DLSU shall be paid the tax deficiency as assessed by BIR?
Held
1. The revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions proved to
have been used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes are
exempt from duties and taxes. - The constitutional provision refers to two kinds of
educational institutions: (1) non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and (2)
proprietary educational institutions. Article XIV, Section 4 (3) categorically states that
"[a]ll revenues and assets ...used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. We find it helpful to discuss at this point
the taxation of revenues versus the taxation of assets.
a. Revenues consist of the amounts earned by a person or entity from the
conduct of business operations. It may refer to the sale of goods, rendition of
services, or the return of an investment. Revenue is a component of the tax base in
income tax, VAT, and local business tax (LBT).
b. Assets, on the other hand, are the tangible and intangible properties owned
by a person or entity. It may refer to real estate, cash deposit in a bank,
investment in the stocks of a corporation, inventory of goods, or any property
from which the person or entity may derive income or use to generate the same. In
Philippine taxation, the fair market value of real property is a component of the
tax base in real property tax (RPT). Also, the landed cost of imported goods is a
component of the tax base in VAT on importation and tariff duties.
Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit educational institution proves that it uses its revenues
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from
income tax, VAT, and LBT. On the other hand, when it also shows that it uses its assets
in the form of real property for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from RPT.
 2. To be exempt from tax, DLSU has the burden of proving that the proceeds of its rental
income (which amounted to a total of P10.61 million) were used for educational
purposes. This amount was divided into two parts: (a) the P4.01 million, which was used
to pay the loan obtained for the construction of the Sports Complex; and (b) the P6.60
million, which was transferred to the CF-CPA account. For year 2003, the total
disbursement from the CF-CPA account amounted to P23.46 million. The records show
that DLSU never claimed that the total CF-CPA disbursements of P23.46 million had
been for educational purposes and should thus be tax-exempt; DLSU only claimed
P10.61 million for tax-exemption and should thus be required to prove that this amount
had been used as claimed. Based on these considerations, DLSU should therefore be
liable only for the difference between what it claimed and what it has proven. In more
concrete terms, DLSU only had to prove that its rental income for taxable year 2003
(P10,610,379.00) was used for educational purposes. Hence, while the total
disbursements from the CF-CPA Account amounted to P23,463,543.02, DLSU only had
to substantiate its P10.6 million rental income, part of which was the P6,602,655.00
transferred to the CF-CPA account. Of this latter amount, P6.259 million was
substantiated to have been used for educational purposes.

II - DUE PROCESS

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31, Dec. 12, 1997
Facts
1. Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots promulgated PPA-AO No. 04-92 limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. PPA
ratiocinated the basis of the order by reason that it wanted to instill effective discipline
and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage
services.
2. Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association,
questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92. It alleged that the said order violates there property right
without due process since the exercise of one's profession is a property rights and any
interference or deprivation of such shall be in accordance with the constitutional
guarantee right of due process.
Issue
WON Respondents right to due process was violated by the issuance of the said
Administrative Order?
Held
1. Two kinds of Due Process - Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as
the due process clause of the Constitution. In order to fall within the aegis of this
provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due
process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and
matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner
by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process requires that the law itself,
not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and
just.
2. The Administrative Order violate Substantive Due process clause – Although in this
case, the court recognize that the fact that the pilots where not consulted did not in any
way violate procedural due process since such can be invoke only if the administrative
body is in the exercise of quasi-judicial function, the court did recognized that the
Administrative order fails to observe substantive due process. There is no dispute that
pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that "(t)he
exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. It is readily
apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job
 training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless
sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance,
they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary
or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots
and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire
at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation
of performance which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled.
Hence, the use of the term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily
makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
Facts
1. This is an application for habeas corpus in filed by Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
2. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
followed by executive order No. 2 which provides for a creation of a reservation area on
Non-Christian (non-christian tribes) people of Mindoro in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. The resolution as stated by
the provincial governor, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of
Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the
purposes of the Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes,
and to improve the health and morals — to conclude, the aim is to begin the process of
civilization.
3. The idea that the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification but is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority. (only if ask what is non-
christian)
Issue
WON respondent were deprived of due process of law as their liberty was being curtail and
limited by such resolution forcing them to stay in a designated area.
Held
1. No. There is no deprivation of Liberty. The Supreme Court make a comparative analysis
to those Indian Community in the United States being put to reservation for civilization
purposes and to the Manguian. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful
reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian
tribes in the United States.
2. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest
conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately
equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro
must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people
as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
3. We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of
the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Liberty does not import "an
absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good.

Mayor Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, GR 16107, May 12, 2013

Facts – See discussion previously

Ople v. Torres, 292 SCRA 141. (1998)

Facts
1. Petitioner Ople files a petition before SC, questioning the constitutionality of
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on
our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. - require a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce.
Issue
WON Administrative Order No. 308 shall be struck down?
Held
1. As to usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate - A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order. It establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy. Its broad scope can only give an impression
that what it seeks to regulate is something that must falls within the contemplation of a
statute as maybe enacted by the Congress. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O.
No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first
time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc
2. Impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy - The right to privacy
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need
to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
3. Fishing expeditions - The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No.
308 cannot be underplayed. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services
and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. Yet, there are no
controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of
sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
the data stored within the system. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O.
No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
 correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks to prevent.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. et al v Anti-Terrorism Council. 632

SCRA 146 (2010)
Facts
1. Petition for certiorari challenging the constitutionality of Human Security Act of 2007.
Issue
WON the law shall be struck down?
Held
1. Actual case or controversy - Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance"
and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the
petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
2. Facial challenge on the Statute - Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms
like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. The court reiterate, a facial
challenge on the invalidation of a statute is allowed only in case the law itself affects free
speech and expression to the point that it creates such chilling effect to the exercise of
such. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
3. Facial challenge vs as-applied - Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination
of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.
4. Applicability of facial challenge to penal laws - the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. The
allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
"chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. What the law
seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under
RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation
of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of
the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Nestle Philipiines, Inc., v Puedan, GR 220617, Jan. 30, 2017

Facts
1. Respondents alleged that on various dates, ODSI and NPI hired them to sell various NPI
products in the assigned covered area. After some time, respondents demanded that they
be considered regular employees of NPI, but they were directed to sign contracts of
 employment with ODSI instead. When respondents refused to comply with such
directives, NPI and ODSI terminated them from their position. Thus, they were
constrained to file the complaint, claiming that: (a) ODSI is a labor-only contractor and,
thus, they should be deemed regular employees of NPI; and (b) there was no just or
authorized cause for their dismissal
2. ODSI averred that it is a company engaged in the business of buying, selling,
distributing, and marketing of goods and commodities of every kind. ODSI admitted that
on various dates, it hired respondents as its employees and assigned them to execute the
Distributorship Agreement 10 it entered with NPI. However, the business relationship
between NPI and ODSI turned sour (disagreement on sales target). Eventually, NPI
downsized its marketing and promotional support from ODSI which resulted to business
reverses. ODSI argued that respondents were not dismissed but merely put in floating
status.
3. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit (ruled that they are not
employees of NPI and that ODSI, theyre actual employer did not actually illegally
dismiss them given the financial constraint on the part of ODSI), but nevertheless,
ordered, inter alia, ODSI and NPI to pay respondents nominal damages. On appeal to
NLRC, it reverses the decision of LA and ruled that indeed, NPI and ODSI is engaged on
labor contracting only. CA affirm the decision of NLRC but in addition, ruled on the
claim of NPI that there right to due process was violated it was not notified and wasn’t
able to participate in the proceedings before the LA. Ca ruled that NPI was not deprived
of its opportunity to be heard as it was able to receive a copy of the complaint and other
pleadings, albeit it failed to respond thereto.
Issue
WON the right to due process of NPI was violated
Held
1. The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to
administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
2. In this case, NPI essentially claims that it was deprived of its right to due process when it
was not notified of the proceedings before the LA and did not receive copies and
issuances from the other parties and the LA, respectively. However, as correctly pointed
out by the CA, NPI was furnished via courier of a copy of the amended complaint filed
by the respondents against it. It is also apparent that NPI was also furnished with the
respondents' Position Paper, Reply, and Rejoinder. Verily, NPI was indeed accorded due
process, but as the LA mentioned, the former chose not to file any position paper or
appear in the scheduled conferences. Assuming arguendo that NPI was somehow
deprived of due process by either of the labor tribunals, such defect was cured by: (a)
NPI's filing of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC; (b) the NLRC's
subsequent issuance of its Resolution dated August 30, 2013 wherein the tribunal
considered all of NPI's arguments as contained in its motion; and (c) NPI's subsequent
elevation of the case to the CA.

Turks Shawarma Company v Pajaton, GR 207156, Jan 16, 2017

Facts
1. Turks hired Pajaron and Carbonilla respectively as its service crews. 3 years after they
were hired, they filed a complaint before Labor Arbiter for constructive and actual illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day
premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners. On defense
of petitioner, they denied that the dismissal of the two employees is without just cause
and that both actually abandon their work.
2. Ruling of LA found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them
constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. Due to alleged non-availability of
 counsel, Zeñarosa (as representative for Turks) himself filed a Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. It was denied by NLRC
considering that the partial bond was just 15k in comparison to award as ruled by LA
amounting to 197k. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC.
Issue
WON the dismissal of the appeal of petitioner is proper?
Held
1. The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. It is clear from both
the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and
administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should
give utmost regard to this intention. The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore
mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,]
the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal
[and] is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade
payment of their obligations to the employees.
2. However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has relaxed the requirement
of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on technical considerations
to give way to equity and justice. 24 Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC
Revised Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the appeal bond is allowed, subject to the
following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the
appellant. Compliance with these two conditions will stop the running of the period to
perfect an appeal. In the case at bar, petitioners filed a Motion to Reduce Bond together
with their Notice of Appeal and posted a cash bond of P15,000.00 within the 10-day
reglementary period to appeal. The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to reduce bond as such motion
was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable grounds and the amount tendered is not
reasonable in relation to the award.

Estate of F.E. Marcos v Republic, GR 213227, Jan 18, 2017

Facts
1. Petition for review on certiorari assailing the judgement and resolution the pieces of
jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection, were labeled as ill-gotten and were
consequently forfeited in favor of the Republic. The case emanated from the Civil Case
filed by the Republic through PCGG to recover those ill-gotten wealth. Some of the
dispute wealth were already adjudged (such as Swiss Deposits). With respect to other
remaining property such as the one in this case known as “Malacanang collection”, the
Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment for its forfeiture in favor also of
the government.The court, in its previous ruling declared that the Malacanang Collection
is not included in the ill-gotten wealth
2. Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta filed their Manifestation and Preliminary
Comments dated 21 July 2009. They manifested therein that Imelda Marcos had indeed
demanded the return of the jewelry to her through a letter dated 25 May 2009 and that the
PCGG had been unlawfully possessing the properties in view of its failure to initiate the
proper proceeding or to issue a sequestration or freeze order.
3. After the submission of the parties of their respective memoranda, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Partial Summary Judgment dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the
Malacañang Collection was part and subject of the forfeiture petition; (2) the Motion for
Summary Judgment was proper; and (3) the forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection was
justified pursuant to R.A. 1379.
Issue
WON the Sandiganbayan correctly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation of
petitioners' right to due process of law.
Held
1. The Sandiganbayan correctly held that the forfeiture was justified and that the
Malacañang Collection was subject to forfeiture. The legitimate income of the Marcoses
had been greatly out of proportioned in relation to their salaries. We reiterate what we
have already stated initially in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, and subsequently in Marcos v.
Republic that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired." Petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the properties were
lawfully acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that they were unlawfully acquired
prevails.
2. Claim of violation of due process - Petitioners claim that there has been a lack of
observance of due process that "there has been no trial or hearing" and that "petitioners
were shamefully never given an opportunity to show that the questioned properties may
have been lawfully acquired through other means. "We find the invocation of lack of
observance of due process at this stage of the proceedings rather belated, especially when
it was never invoked before the Sandiganbayan. Needless to say, the various pleadings
petitioners have filed in this case and in other cases involving the Marcos properties were
countless occasions when they could have proven that the Malacañang Collection had
indeed been lawfully acquired as claimed. They allege that they were denied due process
by not being given any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang
Collection. This allegation cannot be given credence for being utterly baseless.
PAGC v Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146
Facts
1. Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional
Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando,
Pampanga. On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from "a
concerned citizen relating Montemayor's ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently
disproportionate to his income as a public official. PAGC immediately conducted a fact-
finding inquiry into the matter.
2. During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, a media organization which had previously published an article on the
unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also submitted to the PAGC copies of
Montemayor's SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. On the basis of the said
documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against Montemayor. However,
Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the deferment of the administrative
proceedings explaining that he has filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
questioning the PAGC's jurisdiction. The CA then issued a TRO good for sixty days
enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation.
3. Right after the termination of the TRO, PAGC issued Resolution finding Montemayor
administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the President
Montemayor's dismissal from the service. The OP then subsequently adopted the
resolution of PAGC.
4. Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This time, he argued that he
was denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case on
the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the
complainant's assertions, without giving him the opportunity to present controverting
evidence.
Issue
WON right to due process of Montemator was violated?
Held
1. Elementary is the rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or an administrative body
such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of the latter where there is no writ of
injunction restraining it. 27 For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is
issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing
 prevents the PAGC from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before its office.
2. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with. Significantly, the records show that the PAGC
issued an order informing Montemayor of the formal charge filed against him and gave
him ten (10) days within which to present a counter-affidavit or verified answer. When
the said period lapsed without respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave
Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer, but the latter chose to await
the decision of the CA in his petition for certiorari.
3. Motion for Reconsideration – The court found find no merit in his reiteration of the
alleged gross violation of his right to due process. Records bear out that he was given
several opportunities to answer the charge against him and present evidence on his
defense, which he stubbornly ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure to submit
the required answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with supporting evidence shall
be construed as waiver on his part of the right to do so. A period of ten (10) months had
elapsed from the time respondent was directed to file his counter-affidavit or verified
answer to the administrative complaint filed against him, up to the rendition of the OP's
decision. It cannot therefore be said that the PAGC and OP proceeded with undue haste
in determining respondent's administrative guilt.

Ombudsman v Reyes, G.R. 170512

Facts
1. On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent
Antonio Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer
II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated that when he took the
driver’s license examination, Penaloza informed him that he failed the exam but if he still
wish to be issued with driver’s license, he can pay additional assessment then they will
reconsider his application. Peñaloza denied the allegation in his Counter-Affidavit and
point to Reyes who manipulate the result of the exam. Reyes categorically denied the
allegation of Penaloza and
2. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed the parties to appear before its office
or a preliminary conference but none of the parties appeared. Subsequently, the
Ombudsman rendered a decision adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding
Peñaloza guilty of simple misconduct. However, upon appeal to CA via petition for
review, it reverses the decision of Ombudsman
Issue
WON the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven?
Held
1. Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following
cardinal principles: (1) the respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply
accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such
manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.
2. Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Peñaloza,
as well as the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not
furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered its Decision. In the
present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not
properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the
bases of petitioner's decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
Ateneo vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 (1986
Facts
1. On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon
and Teresita Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the
Cervini Hall) slap Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other
boarders held him from striking again, but the boarders hid the incident from Fr.
Campbell. The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the
basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university. The
dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his
parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Occidental at Bacolod City.
2. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair
trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known
residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the
university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of
Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals,
proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the
university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the
sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be
undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable
for its existence as an institution of learning
3. After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay
them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the
university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint
was dismissed. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the
appellate court reversed its decision
Issue
WON the absence of notice to the dismissed student’s parents negates the compliance of the
requirements of administrative due process.
Held
1. The Court of Appeals ruled that Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process. We
fail to see what, in the records, made the respondent court reverse its earlier and correct
finding that there was due process. The procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate. Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline.
He admitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat
for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he
actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively;
and all requisites of administrative due process were met.
2. As to notice to parents - We do not share the appellate court's view that there was no
due process because the private respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given
any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was
already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In
fact, in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be expelled because of
the incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed.
3. While it may be true that Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened
to her because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box
top, this did not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly
shows that the altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language
"bilat ni bay", an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but normal
on the part of Mateo to react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of
Juan Ramon who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the
investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threatening gestures at Mateo prompting
her to pick up a cardboard box top which she threw at Juan Ramon

Non vs. Hon. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990
Facts
 1. Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in
Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of BusinessAdministration, et al., G.R. No. 76353,
May 2, 1988, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is
considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after
the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed
terminated.
2. Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding
semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to
the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988
relying on the earlier decision re Alcuaz vs PSBA.
Issue
WON petitioners be denied admission relying on the doctrine raised in the case of Alcuaz vs
PSBA that there is a “termination of contract” on a semester basis.
Held
1. The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But
it must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority
given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions.
2. However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been
taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with
the Court's ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary
proceedings in connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that
could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be
imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with.
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions
have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-
enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4)
semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of
discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions
that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them
to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further
aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent school
which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.

III – EQUAL PROTECTION

Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, GR 192935 (2010)

Facts
1. Executive Order No. 1 provides for the creation of Philippine Truth Commission. PTC is
an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it
has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a
fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
2. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
performing its functions. One of the main argument is that it violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
 the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Issue
WON the creation of PTC violates the equal protection clause?
Held
1. Yes. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
2. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
3. As to authority of the president to create PTC – petitioner asserts that the Truth
Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. He
adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the
continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a
truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as
"reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish. The creation of the PTC
however, finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing
upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. (also known as
residual power of the president)
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
Facts
1. Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against females. The
Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing
for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of
DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power
of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.
Issue
WON the Department Order imposing a temporary ban of female domestic servant on
selective country is in violation of the equal protection clause due to preferential application on
sexes.
Held
1. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of
the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic
 servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
2. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. There is likewise no
doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the
midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
Garcia v Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)
See previous assigned case

IV – ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

Facts
1. The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders in Ermita Manila, to send packages to a friend in
Switzerland. The husband of attendant Anita Reyes, Mr. Job Reyes, opened the boxes for
inspection as part of the SOP before delivery to the Bureau of Customs. Reyes discovered
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves allegedly marijuana.
2. The trial court convicted Marti for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
3. In his appeal, Marti argues the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) and therefore argues
that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence.
Issue
WON the Bill of rights may be invoked against the acts of a private individual?
Held
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity
of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in
which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. That the Bill of Rights
embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.
2. The factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and
a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure
before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Facts
1. Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the RTC
 Quezon City under which the premises of “We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in
the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Held
1. Petitioner marking of the evidence - Respondents also submit the theory that since
petitioner had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic
of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner and he can do whatever he
pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does
not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed
in this petition.
2. As to the probable cause of search warrant – petitioner question that the issuance of
search warrant was on the basis only of the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and
Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col.
Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises. We find petitioners' thesis
impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the
broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in
his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause

Laud v People 741 SCRA 239 (2014)

Facts
1. On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, ) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in
Davao City where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called
"Davao Death Squad" may be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto
Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the
group that buried the victims.
2. Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant which was later
enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in
coordination with the members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.
The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of
human remains.
3. On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence[9] premised on the
following grounds:
a) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant which was to be
enforced in Davao City; and
b) the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause.
4. RTC granted the motion of Laud and ruled still in its favor upon MR of the People.
However, upon appeal to CA, it reverses the decision of RTC. It held that the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an
application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an exception to the
 compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Also,
the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness Avasola
deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in
December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims — two bodies
in each of the three (3) caves.
Issue
WON the Search Warrant is valid?
Held
1. a) As to the issue that Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant
which was to be enforced in Davao City – RTC Manila can validly issue the search
warrant. Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court. These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving
heinous crimes,” Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by "the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
courts.
The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this
case. As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the
Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable
cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
2. As to the issue that the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause - In this
case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is
evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he
personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of
the group that buried the victims. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the
quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That a
"considerable length of time" attended the search warrant's application from the crime's
commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant's claims or the
testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be
accounted for by a witness's fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a
criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and
circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a
judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal
case. To the Court's mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant's application does not
dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement
has been sufficiently met.
People ans Pastrana v Abad, GR 196025, Feb 21, 2018
Facts
1. On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Albert
Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant before the
RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office
premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential
information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors.
Some of their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would
convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks
 2. The RTC Makati grant the issuance of search warrant, thus, the NBI agents and
representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to
respondents' office to search the same. The NBI and the SEC were able to seize telephone
bills, sales agreements OR, credit advise etc.
3. Respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant because it was issued in connection
with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the
RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure
that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in connection
with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with
specificity the objects to be seized.
4. RTC in its ruling, upheld the contention of the respondent stating that the search warrant
was null and void because it violated the requirement that a search warrant must be
issued in connection with one specific offense only. Unsatisfied, the OSG appeal it to CA
which also denied their petition affirming the previous ruling by the RTC.
Issue
WON the search warrant is not valid since it presupposes two distinct offenses which violated
one specific offense only in issuing search warrant?
Held
1. Yes, Aside from its failure to specify what particular provision of the SRC respondents
allegedly violated, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also covered estafa under the RPC.
Contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so
intertwined with each other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate
the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each other and
neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An offense may
be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
2. Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense alleged committed by
respondents. Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well
as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that the items sought to be seized are
connected to any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and
items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of particularity. The terms used in
this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the
transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the
phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual
registration with the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant
No. 01-118 was indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could
well-nigh pertain to the corporations' certificate of registration with the SEC and not just
to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or dealers.
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp., G.R. 140946, September 13, 2004
Facts
1. On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed several applications for
search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation under copyright
infringement and Article 189 of the RPC for unfair competition. After conducting a
preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon
issued multiple Search Warrants, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.
2. Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of
Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search
warrants. On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants
alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in
the form of general warrants. The RTC denied Maxicorps motion on 22 January 1997.
The RTC also denied Maxicorps motion for reconsideration.
3. On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTCs order. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order
 denying Maxicorps motion to quash the search warrants. The Court of Appeals held that
NBI Agents failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence
that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals noted that
the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought
counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Issue
WON there was probable cause to issue the search warrant?
Held
1. It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. The description of the property to be seized need not be technically
accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the
identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern. Measured against this
standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized
were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically identified by
stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those
articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners
software. This language meets the test of specificity.
2. However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph
(c) states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,
advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal
or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition.
3. Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items,
should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the
items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items not
sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. The
exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and
seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling
under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

Sta. Rosa Mining Co., vs. Fiscal Zabala, 153 SCRA 367 (1987)
Facts
1. On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap
iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte against private respondents.
2. On October 29, 1974, finding probable cause, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte an Information. However, private respondent elevated the
case to Secretary of Justice, to review the findings of probable cause of the Fiscal. On
March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings
of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case.
3. A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but
the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against
private respondents and set the case for trial.
Issue
WON the court correctly ruled on the case be setting on trial?
Held
1. There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information according
to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt and when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise
of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so. However, after the case had already
been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court,
 to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further
proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court

Dimal andCastillo, v People, GR 216922, Apr 18, 2018

Facts
1. At around 6:00 p.m. of September 6, 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma
Eugenio were scheduled to visit the compound of petitioner Dimal in Echague, Isabela, to
negotiate for the sale of palay. At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to
Dimal's compound, asking for information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie
and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that they had left an hour ago. Unable to locate his
relatives, Edison went to the police station in Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were
missing, then proceeded to seek assistance from the police station in Echague.
2. Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they
allegedly stayed and observed the premises in the absence of Dimal. On same day at
around Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a warrant Dimal's
compound, but found no evidence linking him to the disappearances.
3. Subsequentyl, a certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement made
by one witness that he was involved in the killing of the three. Sapipi purportedly made
an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three victims, and ordered him, Castillo
and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by throwing the bodies in a river.
4. On October 8, 2010, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, filed an
Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant in connection with the kidnapping and
multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma which was subsequently granted by the
court. In the conduct of the search, blood stain on different clothings, purportedly
belonging to the victims were seized.
5. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to quash Search Warrant and to declare the seized
items as inadmissible in evidence. They argued that the search warrant is invalid because
it was issued in connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e.,
kidnapping and multiple murder. They also contended that the search warrant was
invalidly implemented because the raiding team failed to comply with Section 8, Rule
127 of the Rules of Court on the requisite presence of two witnesses during a search of
premises, and with Section 10, Rule 126 on the issuance of a receipt of seized properties.
Finally, petitioners sought that the items seized which are not covered by the search
warrant, should be declared inadmissible in evidence and be ordered returned to the
accused.
Issue
WON not the items seized in the search warrant shall be inadmissible evidence?
Held
1. A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can
ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from
other places in the community. A designation that points out the place to be searched to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. To the Court's view, the search
warrant sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the
search be confined strictly to the place described. At any rate, petitioners cannot be heard
to decry irregularity in the conduct of the search of the premises of the Felix Gumpal
Compound because, as aptly ruled by the RTC, a Certification of Orderly Search was
issued by the barangay officials, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of
public duty was not sufficiently contradicted by petitioners.
2. Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid, petitioners are
correct that most items listed in the Return on the Search Warrant are inadmissible in
evidence. Since only 2 items were particularly described on the face of the search
warrant, namely: (1) the blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of faded
pink long sleeves jacket and black t-shirt; and (2) the 0.9mm caliber pistol, the Court
declares that only two articles under the Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in
evidence as they could be the blood-stained clothes of Gemma subject of the warrant
 3. Plain view doctrine however cannot be applied it other items illegally seized since it does
not meet all the 3 necessary requirements namely (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The first requisite
of the "plain view doctrine" is present in this case because the seizing officer, P/Insp.
Macadangdang, has a prior justification for an intrusion into the premises of the Felix
Gumpal Compound, for he had to conduct the search pursuant to a valid warrant.
However, the second and third requisites are absent, as there is nothing in the records to
prove that the other items not particularly described in the search warrant were open to
eye and hand, and that their discovery was unintentional.

Unilab vs. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005

Facts
1. UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing
fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some
photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB
then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of
searchwarrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a
search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB,
particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead,
sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and
200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB.
2. The respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress
Evidence.They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their
search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of their building in A-Lacson, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. They pointed out that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products
which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant. The
Court grant their quash
3. UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI
agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court
in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of
the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The Court denied the petition.
Issue
WON there is a valid search warrant conducted?
Held
1. No, A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly
described in the search warrant. Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant
but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure
by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be
presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely:
(a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion
or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the
officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
2. In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the
court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant
specifically authorized the officers only to seize "counterfeit Revicon multivitamins,
finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of
the said vitamins." The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where
they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.
 It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that
the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the
sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been
adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the
doctrine during the hearing of the respondents' motion to quash, or at the very least,
during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. There is no
showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact,
the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the
warrant, or any of the petitioner's representative who was present at the time of the
enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed
boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent.

People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992)

Facts
1. In the morning of September 12, 1988, PC Joseph Layong, constable with the Mt.
Province PC Command at Bontoc, proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio Dantay
and, per instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a checkpoint at the
junction of the roads, one going to Sagada. At about 9:15 A.M., PC Layong and his
teammate, saw and flagged down a Ford Fiera. PC Layong and his companions asked
permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to the request. When they peered
into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag. Layong and his companions asked
permission to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request but told
them that it only contained some clothes. When Layong opened the bag, he found that it
contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized
substances. Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod,
who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. Accused was prosecuted for
the dispatching in transit or transporting of prohibited drugs pursuant to Section 4, Article
II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
2. In one of the accused contention, it contends that the item seized cannot be used against
him since it was done without arising from unlawful search
Issue
WON the marijuana confiscated n the accused can be used against him?
Held
1. The third assignment of error hardly deserves any consideration. Accused was not
subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would
be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly
gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his
vehicle and travelling bag.
People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994)
Facts
1. That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, rode the
Dangwa Bus bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Bontoc, Mountain
Province, the bus stopped and both the police officers, who were seated at the back, saw
accused carrying a carton, board the bus and then put the carton under his seat.
Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt.
Ayan before they alighted, called C2C Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18.
After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he
asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered.
Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao
invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the
suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. That upon entering the detachment
the carton was opened in the presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was
asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied it. That when accused
denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus
 conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana.
That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the carton
containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana.
Issue
WON the search conducted against the accused was valid?
Held
1. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a
search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in
our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may
lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles -- automobiles, trucks, etc. -- ¬without
need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a
vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought In carrying out warrantless searches of moving
vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are
neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
2. In the case at bar, the SC have been unable to find in the record any circumstance which
constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to
search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of such a box by
appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced the police officers that
the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the subject
matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The carrying of carton boxes is a common
practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since such boxes
constitute the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here
involved had not received any information or "tip-off" from an informer; no such a "tip-
off" was alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. They just merely rely on
the alleged odor being emitted by the carton and the suspicious acts of the accused which,
in its entirety, cannot in a way justified probable cause to effectuate warrantless search.
3. The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any
irregularities which may have attended his arrest because the posting of the bail
bond constitute as waiver to question validity of the search. - The invalidity of an
unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may
be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop as
accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to
accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the
latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former. Waiver of the non-
admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search
and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at
bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of
the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in
evidence by the prosecution.[24] We consider that appellant's objection to the admission
of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no
intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct
before or during the trial.
Veroy vs. Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)
Facts
1. Petitioner herein are Sps Veroy. When the husband was promoted to the position of
Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his
family transferred to Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City
was left to two (2) houseboys. A certain Edna who received money from the Sps Veroy,
is the one giving salary to the houseboys.
2. On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, upon a directive
issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein
petitioners in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the
 caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not
have a search warrant. Petitioner wifewas contacted by telephone in her Quezon City
residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma.
Luisa Veroy (wife) responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but
relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet,
an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys. The
authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who
answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that
the permission was given on the condition that the search be conducted in his presence.
he following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners
in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner
Ma. Luisa Veroy.
3. Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the children’s
room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the basis of the
charge of illegal possession of firearms against them.
4. Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them,
petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, The
Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for being obtained in violation
of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue
WON the search made was valid?
Held
1. Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was
merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to room search inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
2. The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless
search. The reason for searching the house is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the
owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search
warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to
seek permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter the
house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Lopez vs. Comm. of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
Facts
1. Sometime in 1964, a conditional contract of purchase and sale was entered into between
the Reparations Commission and petitioner Lopez, whereby the former awarded the M/V
JOLO LEMA to Lopez in consideration of the total sum of $174,900, payable on
installments, as provided in Republic Act No. 1789, and subject to the condition that the
title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain with the Commission until full payment
of the stipulated price.
2. After registering the vessel and securing therefrom the requisite license in his name, as a
fishing vessel Lopez entered into a contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the
latter to supervise and manage the vessel. On September 19, 1966, the vessel was,
however, apprehended, searched and then seized by the Collector of Customs of Davao,
for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks of
Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of section 2530(a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines.
3. While the seizure proceeding was pending hearing before the customs authorities, Lopez
filed before RTC Manila a complaint questioning the seizure, saying that it was made in
violation of law. RTC dismiss the case of Lopez for lack of jurisdiction
Issue
WON the RTC Manila correctly dismiss the case?
Held
 1. Lopez maintains that whatever powers the Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto,
over seizure identification proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission. This pretense is manifestly devoid of merit. Said section 5 of Republic Act
No. 3512 merely transfers to the Philippine Fisheries Commission the powers, functions
and duties of the Bureau of Customs, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine
Constabulary over fishing vessel and fishery matters. Transferred to the Philippine
Fisheries Commission by Republic Act No. 3512 are limited to those relating to the
"development, improvement, management and conservation of our fishery resources." All
other matters, such as those concerning smuggling, particularly of agricultural products,
into the Philippines, are absolutely foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and
could not have been were not transferred to the aforementioned Commission.

Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 5, 2002

Facts
1. In 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous. With appellant's consent, the
police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NPC). The accused thereafter was adjudged by the RTCX of guilty of theft of property.
Affirmed by CA.
2. Petitioner now comes before the court to question the ruling of CA. in one of its
argument, it did question the propriety of the search conducted upon him
Issue
WON the search is valid?
Held
1. he constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; 9 (3) search of moving vehicles;
10 (4) consented warrantless search; 11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); 12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
2. Search of moving vehicle - warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The mere
mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion
to conduct indiscriminate searches. Still and all, the important thing is that there was
probable cause to conduct the warrantless search. One such form of search of moving
vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which
has been declared to be not illegal per se for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies
of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may
either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited
to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle;
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a
fixed area."
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle.
They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks
before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the
 back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was
unusual and uncommon. We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
3. Consented Search - In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which
the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct
the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and
he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the
police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the
vehicle of petitioner (its like they were ordering). For all intents and purposes, they were
informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle.

Pollo vs Constantino-David, 659 SCRA 198

Facts
1. Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No.
IV. On January 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC from a
certain Alan Pascual was received accusing herein petitioner of lawyering of an accused
gov't employee having a pending case in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately
formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and
issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all
the files in the computers specifically, on Legal Divisions.
2. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC's Office for Legal Affairs
(OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from
the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the
CSC and other tribunals.
3. Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous
letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is
he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting
a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his
computer. On February 2007, finding a prima facie case against petitioner, charging him
of dishonesty and grave misconduct
Issue
WON the search conducted was valid
Held
1. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding
circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee's relationship to the item seized; (2)
whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and
(3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. Petitioner
failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did
not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or
that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did
he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from
accessing his computer files.
2. A search by a government employer of an employee's office is justified at inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee
is guilty of work-related misconduct. Petitioner's claim of violation of his constitutional
right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3 (1),Article III of the 1987
Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace. The search of
petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David
 regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the
CSC. A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)

Facts
1. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national,|was charged before RTC of Benguet of
violation of Dangerous Drug Act after having been confiscated upon him, in a checkpoint
hashish, a derivative of marijuana. The search happens while the accused was a passenger
in a bus, wherein the police officers, after noticing a bulge on accused's waist, as him
about his identification card and passport and when he fails to provide so, ordered the
accused to open it, and then thereafter, the said hashish was retrieve.
2. During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised
the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags
were not owned by him. RTC found him guilty of the offense
Issue
WON the search conducted was valid
Held
1. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when
the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe
that accused was then and there committing a crime. Aside from the persistent reports
received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited
drugs in his possession.
2. It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine
check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive
search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the
waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present
his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to
do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide
his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide
from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so.

People vs. Libnao, et. al., G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003
Facts
1. This is a case finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty
of violating Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Tarlac
PNP began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They
learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from
Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On the night of
October 1996, two police officers flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female
passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the herein appellant and her co-
accused. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos
uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to
Kabayan Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain
Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the brgy. Captain arrived, the
black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of
the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered
with newspaper.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic
Chemist Babu conducted a lab exam on them and concluded that the articles were
marijuana. For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them.
 2. In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant
for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers,
she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner,
she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid
warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently,
any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
Issue
WON the search conducted was valid
Held
1. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac
Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months
in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her
co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996,
the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle.
Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a
suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these
circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant's bag was not illegal.
2. Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police
officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the
confession or admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence
against her. These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any
confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant
and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana

People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)

Facts
1. On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles went to
the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was
to be used in the operation. Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned
themselves at strategic places. Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the
appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana.
Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and
brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani.
From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. After the
exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged
signal of raising his right hand. The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went
inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find
the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his
wife.
2. After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, finding guilty the accused for
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
Issue
WON the search conducted was valid
Held
1. The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding
the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent
conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by
contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
2. As to the validty of the confiscated marijuana - The appellant next assails the seizure and
admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents
found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal
to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being
questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife. Thereafter the
 police officers went to the kitchen and noticed a cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked the appellant about its contents but
failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the
appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but
the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence.
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after
arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in
the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search
and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
3. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room.
Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents
searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its
seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. The NARCOM agents in this case went from room to
room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence. Even assuming then, that
the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within
their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the
plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic
bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. We, therefore,
hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply
and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)

Facts
1. At 8:00pm, Maranarag and his companion witnessed a hit-and-run accident involving the
Mitsubishi Pajero of Robin Padilla (D), who was the unknown driver at the time. As a
member of a civic group, Maranarag decided to report the incident to the police via VHF
radio. Mobile patrols responded and chased the fleeing Pajero to the north. They finally
caught up with the Padilla (D) and found several firearms in the vehicle and in his person.
Issue
WON the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?
Held
1. Validity of arrest - First, the court ruled on the validity of the warrantless search
conducted against Padilla. In arrest under Flagrante delicto, it require (a) requires that the
person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's
vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a
private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that
presence does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he
"hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. As testified to
by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped
victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the
erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver After having
sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge
where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned
near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the
policemen who actually arrested him were not at, the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg
to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly
were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in
any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as
 policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of
resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his
own life.
2. Validity of search - Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of
an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the
police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment and containers
in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature
of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to
be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61
and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.

People v Bolasa, G.R. 125754, Dec 22. 1999

Facts
1. At around 4:30 p.m. on 17 May 1985, a civilian informer went to the Police Station of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, and reported that a person was selling marijuana at the basketball
court along Daez Street at Karuhatan, Valenzuela. After evaluation of the report, the
Station Commander ordered to conduct a "buy-bust" operation along with the civilian
informer for the apprehension of the reported drug pusher. This buy-bust operation yields
to the arrest of Samuel Salamanes, together with Isagani Bolasa and Gerardo Cabamban,
were charged with selling, delivering and transporting "marijuana flowering tops," a
prohibited drug.
2. In one of the main argument of petitioner, argues that the non-presentation of the civilian
informer as a witness was fatal to the cause of the prosecution
Issue
WON the non-presentation of the civilian informer was fatal to the cased against the accused?
Held
1. No, It has been repeatedly held that the determination of who should be presented as
witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting
officer. While the civilian informer, as the "poseur buyer," would have been the
most logical witness to testify on what transpired at the "buy-bust" operation, his
testimony would nonetheless have been merely corroborative. This being so, the
identity of the civilian informer may remain confidential; there are strong reasons for
permitting the continued anonymity of the informer such as the maintenance of his health
and safety and the encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to police authorities

Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. 81567, July 9, 1990

Facts
1. The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the
informations filed against them are null and void. They seek to file a petition for habeas
corpus:
a. In the case of Dural, he was charged with double murder without bail. His
contention was that the arrest is by reason of subversion and not on the double
murder being charged against him. The double murder case filed against Dural
and proceeded for trial. He was found guilty hence, the writ of habeas corpus is
no longer available to Dural.
b. In Amelia Roques’s petition, a certain Rogelio Ramos gave an information about
the location of certain Constantino, a member of NPA. Thereafter, the military
raid the place where Constatntino is alleged to be situated with a search warrant
and found some firearms, ammunition and other communication equipment.
Wilfredo Buenobra who was at that time going to deliver a letter was arrested
keeping in him some numbers of other members that leads to the raid on the
house of Amelia Roque and found some subversive documents, ammunition and a
fragmentation. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on their behalf, but
Buenaobra later withdrew his petition and preferred to stay in Camp Crame.
 c. Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were both members of the NUFC-CPP.
They were apprehended at Constantino’s house after having been caught carrying
a bag of subversive materials. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed
on their behalf of the two alleging that they were unlawfully arrested and that
there was no preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information. The
two, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
RPC. They also failed to request for a preliminary investigation after the filing of
informations against them.
Issue
WON warrantless arrests of the petitioners were valid?
Held
1. Yes. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of
a continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
3. Sarmiento Dissenting - The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional
one. By its language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt
of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely and simply, the
military taking the law in its hands. By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless
arrest, I am afraid that the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due
respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan,
Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to
be a continuing offense. As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving
claims of the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and
Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines — and that they have
supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed organization. The question
that has not been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible,
for purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing
that they were apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the
majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the Constitution
divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus.
People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
Facts
1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer, the
penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
2. Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel
Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from
the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the
three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo and Totoy Echigoren
and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace. The prosecution witness testified
that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace,
followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of
wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the
 victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of
Gerente.
3. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police
Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He
went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed
by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The policemen proceeded to the
house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house
and they introduced themselves as police¬men. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.
The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Issue
WON warrantless arrest is valid
Held
1. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. The policemen
arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the
crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block
which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as
one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his
two companions did.
2. The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001

Facts
1. At about 3:30 in the morning of August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City
police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery
along San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team responded to the call and
found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle
driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant and the victim
were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, about a kilometer and a half away
from the crime scene. Forthwith, the police officers. went to the cafe and talked to Danet
Garcellano, a food server/waitress in Sting Café. Garcellano told the police investigators
that she had seen accused-appellant and the victim together. Garcellano described
accused-appellant as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a
white t-shirt and brown short pants.
2. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told police officers that Garcellano's description
fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." One of the police officrs who knew where
accused-appellant lived proceed to the accused-appellant's house. The police operatives
identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the
shooting near the cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident the
police officers then asked permission to enter and look around the house.
3. Upon entering the house, police officer noticed a white t-shirt. Upon close examination,
they notice that it was bloodied. When they picked up the t-shirt, a 38 caliber shells fell
from it. Police Officers then asked accused-appellant to go with them to Sting Cafe for
purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was positively identified by Danet
Garcellano as the victim's companion. Thereafter, the arrest of the accused was enforce.
Issue
WON warrantless arrest is valid
Held
 1. Before warrantless arrest based on personal knowledge be effected, two conditions must
concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an
offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that
"personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. In this case, the
arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question,
therefore, is whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold
that there was none. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that
accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from
which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based
entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP
station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and
reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an
alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe;
by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the
victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a
pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that
the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias "Jun Dulce"
and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-
appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information
given to them by others.
2. Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without
a warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned.
Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest.

Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586 (1992)

Facts
1. According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July
1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila,
heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way
street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson
and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner
then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able
to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting. The police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
2. On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2)
lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same
day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
3. Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness
to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required
for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to
the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue
WON warrantless arrest is valid
Held
1. Yes. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the
time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6)
 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in
fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was
the gunman who had shot Maguan.
2. Petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was
otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in
court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
3. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary
investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions.
Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also
entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
Social Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410 (2008)
Facts
1. In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is
put in issue.
Issue
WON the said provision under Dangerous Drugs Act on mandatory drug testing is
constitutional?
Held
1. For public officer - Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution. Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by
the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
2. For students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses -
the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Just as in the case
of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace.
Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced.

Lucas v Lucas, 650 SCRA 667 (2011)

Facts
1. On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate
Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the RTC of
 Valenzuela. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother migrated to Manila
from Davao and worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. On one occasion, Elsie got
acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas and an intimate relationship developed
between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and eventually gave birth to petitioner,
Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner's father was not stated in petitioner's certificate of
live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. While
petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
2. Petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA
testing order to abbreviate the proceedings.
Issue
WON the order of DNA Testing can be validly made?
Held
1. At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without
corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court's attention. In light of this
observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid
the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other
filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
2. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of
the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The same
condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.

Navarro vs CA, GR 121087 (1999)

Facts
1. Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the
police station to report alleged indecent show (nude dancers) in one of the night
establishment in the City. Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to
report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were
having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions
to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer to report the incident. At the
station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro which lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's
gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died
under treatment. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the
exchange between petitioner and the deceased. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media
man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he
had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer
Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
Navarro then charged and got convicted of homicide
Issue
WON the recorded tape can be properly be admissible as evidence?
Held
1. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any
question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape
played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of
the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
 personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.

Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)

Facts
1. Complainant and his client were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
the City Fiscal against Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. Laconico telephoned appellant, to advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault. When complainant called up, Laconico
requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant
heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint
for direct assault.
2. Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money. Complainant called up again and instructed
Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public
Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
3. Appellant executed an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demands for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to
the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on
the merits, the lower court, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1
of Republic Act No. 4200. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
appellate court who affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue
WON any other device or arrangement” includes extension phones and listening thru it is a
violation of RA 4200.
Held
1. The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of
the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a
device or arrangement under the contemplation of such. The petitioner contends that
telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly
known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. An extension telephone is an
instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have
to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place
within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he
is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the
risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares
its line with another. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as
the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use.
2. Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of
the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
 very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation

Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995

Facts
1. A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood.
2. To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
3. In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE
TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the confrontation.
Issue
One of the main argument of petitioner is that Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
Held
1. The provisions of Anti-Wire Tapping Law provides under Section 1 - It shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
2. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any." Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator.

Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005

Facts
1. An Information for coup d’etat was filed against the soldiers involved in taking control of
the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood Mutiny). The soldiers disarmed the
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration
and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took
part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain
under the custody of ISAFP.
2. One of the contention of petitioners is that that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center violated the detainees' right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP
officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
("Maestrecampo").
Issue
WON the act of opening the letters is valid?
Held
1. The CA ruled that the opening and reading of the detainees' letters in the present case
violated the detainees' right to privacy of communication. The SC disagrees. First, the
letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection
of contraband. Second, the letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
 received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the
detainees' personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
2. In addition, a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen's
privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons
who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to
Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

Vivares v St. Theresa's College 737 SCRA 92 (2014)

Facts
1. Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
2. At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned
from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne,
among others. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar;
and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
3. Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from
joining the commencement exercises. Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the
minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data on the claim that there
was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data as
petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
considering that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to
who may view them, lost their privacy in some way
Issue
WON the writ of habeas data can be properly invoke?
Held
1. Writ of Habeas Data - It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
2. To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile
as well as information uploaded by the user (ability of the users to “customize their
privacy settings). The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’
right to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
“Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone
on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure
of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the
right to informational privacy.
People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
Facts
1. Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio
a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate
in the killing. The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain
Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested.
2. Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He
stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said
group had ordered the arrest of the victim Esma testified against the accused during the
trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter
introduced as evidence by prosecution. Rodrigo Esma’s Affidavit referred to in the letter
taken on July 21, 1981, mentioned accused “Albofera and “alias Jun” “as having killed
the victim. After trial, the lower Court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both accused for the crime charged
Issue
WON the Letter which appears to indicate confession of the crime can be used as evidence to
prosecute herein petitioner?
Held
1. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search
and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera's privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself,
who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court.
Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded
that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor.
Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at
a determination of his culpability.

Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Facts
1. Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of her
husband, together with her mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly
opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs without Dr. Martin’s knowledge
and consent. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Issue
WON these documents are inadmissible in evidence?
Held
1. Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
2. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.

Cadajas v People, GR 247348, Nov 16, 2021

Facts
1. Petitioner, who was then 24 years old, met the victim, AAA, 5 who was only 14 years
old, in the canteen where he works. Their relationship started when the younger sibling of
 AAA told petitioner that AAA had a crush on him. Petitioner tried to evade AAA, but the
latter started to stalk him. Later, AAA sent petitioner a request in his Facebook
Messenger, which he accepted. The petitioner and AAA would then exchange messages
on Facebook Messenger and after some time, petitioner courted AAA for two weeks,
until they became sweetheart.
2. Sometime in June 2016, BBB, the mother of AAA, learned of their relationship. She
discovered the relationship because AAA would borrow her cellphone to access the
latter's Facebook account. Her mother was thus able to read their messages whenever
AAA would forget to log out her account. BBB disapproved of their relationship because
AAA was still too young. However, petitioner and AAA ignored her admonishment. On
November 18, 2016, BBB was shocked when she read the conversation between
petitioner and AAA. She found that petitioner was coaxing her daughter to send him
photos of the latter's breast and vagina. AAA relented and sent petitioner the photos he
was asking. When AAA learned that her mother read their conversation, she rushed to a
computer shop to delete her messages. BBB, however, was able to force her to open
petitioner's Facebook messenger account to get a copy of their conversation.
3. Petitioner later learned from his co-workers that two (2) criminal cases were filed against
him. 13 He was charged for violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 and for child
pornography. One of the arguments raised by petitioner before this Court concerns the
admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution, which was taken from his
Facebook messenger account. He claims that the photos presented in evidence during the
trial of the case were taken from his Facebook messenger account. According to him, this
amounted to a violation of his right to privacy, and therefore, any evidence obtained in
violation thereof amounts to a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue
WON facebook post obtain can be validly held as evidence?
Held
1. In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that
were obtained and used as evidence against petitioner, which he considers as fruit of the
poisonous tree, were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of
the State. Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing
the admissibility of an evidence under Article III of the Constitution must affect only
those pieces of evidence obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals
who can flex government muscles and use government resources for a possible abuse.
However, where private individuals are involved, for which their relationship is governed
by the New Civil Code, the admissibility of an evidence cannot be determined by the
provisions of the Bill of Rights.
2. Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to have violated petitioner's right to
privacy. Here, petitioner's expectation of privacy emanates from the fact that his
Facebook Messenger account is password protected, such that no one can access the same
except himself. Petitioner never asserted that his Facebook Messenger account was
hacked or the photos were taken from his account through unauthorized means. Rather,
the photos were obtained from his account because AAA, to whom he gave his password,
had access to it. Considering that he voluntarily gave his password to AAA, he, in effect,
has authorized AAA to access the same. He did not even take steps to exclude AAA from
gaining access to his account. Having been given authority to access his Facebook
Messenger account, petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy, in so far as AAA is
concerned, had been limited. Thus, there is no violation of privacy to speak of.