matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
MHC v GSIS the MHC may be hastened by respondent
2364 SCRA 408
February 3, 1997; J. Bellosillo
Facts:
 Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC.
 The winning bidder, or the eventual
"strategic partner," is to provide
management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
 Only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
 Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter
to respondent GSIS dated 28 September
1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad.
 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check
issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
 Perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
economy
GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus.
 the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent from
perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm.
 The instant case was accepted by the
Court En Banc after it was referred to it by
the First Division. The case was then set
for oral arguments with former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
 In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the
nobility and sacredness of independence
and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony.
 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.

 Respondents except. They maintain
that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely
a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said
provision to Operate, there must be
existing laws "to lay down conditions
under which business may be done."
 Second, granting that this provision is
self-executing, Manila Hotel does not
fall under the term national patrimony
which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna and all marine wealth in its
territorial sea, and exclusive marine
zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution.  shares and the condition giving rise
 What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
 Third, granting that the Manila Hotel
forms part of the national patrimony,
the constitutional provision invoked is
still inapplicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really
contrary to the Constitution, petitioner
should have questioned it right from
Held:
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and principles.
the beginning and not after it had
lost in the bidding.
 Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on
par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding
rules which provides that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share,
is misplaced. Respondents postulate
that the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen
since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares.
Thus the submission by petitioner
of a matching bid is premature
since Renong Berhad could still
very well be awarded the block of
to the exercise of the privilege to
submit a matching bid had not yet
taken place.
 the prayer for prohibition grounded on
grave abuse of discretion should fail
since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did
abuse its discretion it was not so
patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. Similarly, the petition
for mandamus should fail as petitioner
has no clear legal right to what it
demands and respondents do not
have an imperative duty to perform the
act required of them by petitioner.
Their provisions command the legislature
to enact laws and carry out the purposes
of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens.  A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found
in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved
into one more like that of a legislative
body.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that
a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of
Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting other further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to
the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation
of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to
or prescribe a penalty for the violation
of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of
such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision
for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-
executing.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-
executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing.   The argument is flawed. If the
18
first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises
fully
 owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same
logic, the second paragraph can only
be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation.
As regards our national patrimony, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission   explains —
34
The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to
out rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to
our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural
resources but also the mental ability or faculty
of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning,
the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.   When the Constitution speaks of
35
national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
expertise in the hotel industry, or it has
significant equity
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a
living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While
it was restrictively an American hotel when it
first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to
be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural
Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the
Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government. it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel
has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest;
its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino
First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the Hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable.
Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference
here is that petitioner has been found to be
possessed of proven management
ownership in another hotel company, or it
has an overall management and marketing
proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel.
Respondents further argue that the
constitutional provision is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality.
This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function;" (2) when
the government is so significantly involved
with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is
evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories
of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction. although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of
the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it
refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions
of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed
Besides, there is no time frame for
invoking the constitutional safeguard
unless perhaps the award has been finally
made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel
to foreigners when there is a Filipino
to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among
others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm
submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the
bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life
and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction
a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the
apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring
to do business in the Philippines or with
any of its agencies or instrumentalities is
presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.
group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government
be treated as any.
 Oposa v Factoran
224 SCRA 792
J. Davide
Facts:
 The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection
of our environment and natural resources.
 The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition
by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.
 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court."
 The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."4 Consequently,
it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other
reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."
 The original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have
no cause of action against him and (2)
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government.
 In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
 Respondent Judge issued an order
granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was
the defendant's claim — that the complaint
states no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question —
sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
 Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal
 order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents
of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also
joined the latter in this case.
 We resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
a Comment in behalf of the respondents
and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
 Petitioners contend that the complaint
clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to
self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
 It is further claimed that the issue of the
respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
 Anent the invocation by the respondent
Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain
that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that
 even if TLAs may be considered protected
by the said clause, it is well settled that
they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
  the respondents aver that the petitioners
failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided
by law. They see nothing in the complaint
but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity
as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether
logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court,
but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
 As to the matter of the cancellation of the
TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of
time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither
be revised nor cancelled unless the holder
has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of
due process.
Held:
This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
We do not agree with the trial court's
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Section 16, Article II.
While the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners —
the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. 
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.
The said right implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and the right
to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources,   then
13
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,   Section 4 of
14
which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of
the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be
provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos.
It may, however, be recalled that even before
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention
to the "environmental right" of the present and
future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment
for succeeding generations."   The latter
17
statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty — under its mandate and by virtue of
its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 —
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-
777 be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What
is principally involved is the enforcement
of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation.
In the second place, even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations
or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its
very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state
for the purpose of advancing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare.
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial
court did, how the non-impairment clause
could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in
cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary,
We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place,
the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss
the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to
the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of
the Forestry Reform Code.
 Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause.
Santiago v COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325
March 19, 1997
 The heart of this controversy brought to us
by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right
of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
 The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent  and
1
the main sponsor  of the proposed Article
2
on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as
"innovative".  Indeed it is, for both under
3
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two
methods of proposing amendments to, or
revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz.,
(1) by Congress upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention.  For this and the
4
other reasons hereafter discussed, we
resolved to give due course to this
petition.
 Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin
filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
 "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin
Petition)  wherein Delfin asked the
5
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of
said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars
in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the
dates designated for the purpose.
 Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a
founding member of the Movement for
 People's Initiative,  a group of citizens
6
desirous to avail of the system
intended to institutionalize people
power; that he and the members of the
Movement and other volunteers intend to
exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution
granted under Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution; that the exercise of that
power shall be conducted in proceedings
under the control and supervision of
the COMELEC; that, as required in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
signature stations shall be established
all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that
before the Movement and other volunteers
can gather signatures, it is necessary
that the time and dates to be
designated for the purpose be first
fixed in an order to be issued by the
COMELEC; and that to adequately inform
the people of the electoral process
involved, it is likewise necessary that
the said order, as well as the Petition
on which the signatures shall be
affixed, be published in newspapers of
general and local circulation, under the
control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
 The Delfin Petition further alleged that the
provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,  Section
7
4 of Article VII,  and Section 8 of Article
8
X  of the Constitution. Attached to the
9
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution"   embodying the
10
proposed amendments which consist in
the deletion from the aforecited sections of
the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM
LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
 According to Delfin, the said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the
people, and after it is signed by at least
twelve per cent of the total number of
registered voters in the country it will
be formally filed with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued
an Order   (a) directing Delfin "to cause the
11
publication of the petition, together with the
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature
form), and the notice of hearing in three (3)
daily newspapers of general circulation at his
own expense" not later than 9 December
1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on
12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12
December 1996, the following appeared:
Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN).   Senator Roco, on that same day,
12
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
  the COMELEC directed Delfin and the
oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 
 The petitioners herein — Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special
 civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on
people's initiative to amend the Constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress. No such law has been passed;
in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
Amendments by People's Initiative, which
petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for
three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on
the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike
in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law.
Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is
not a single word in that law which can be
considered as implementing [the provision on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a
separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the
effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only
laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted
on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
vires insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of
initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to
pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,
outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated
funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government
department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
 This Court (a) required the respondents to
comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from
notice; and (b) issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC
from proceeding with the Delfin Petition,
and private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
 private respondents, through Atty Quadra,
filed their Comment   on the petition. They
15
argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD
ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL
TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING
TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
"COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED
BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE
COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE
SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION
OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES
IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL
FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND
EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE
DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE
PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
 private respondent Delfin filed in his own
behalf a Comment   which starts off with
16
an assertion that the instant petition is a
"knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . .
which is not formally filed yet." What he
filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition,"
which was legally necessary to start the
signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to
gather signatures under COMELEC power
and function.
 Contrary to the claim of the petitioners,
there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend
the Constitution. The absence therein of a
subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the
validity or sufficiency of laws.
 As to the public expenditures for
registration of voters, Delfin considers
petitioners' estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can
give the exact figure. Besides, if there will
be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with
the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any
event, fund requirements for initiative will
be a priority government expense
because it will be for the exercise of the
sovereign power of the people.
 In the Comment   for the
17
public
respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2
January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that:
 (1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia,
people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of
Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and
guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems
of initiative, includes initiative on the
Constitution and defines the same as the
power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the
Constitution.
 (2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No.
6735 because, being national in scope,
that system of initiative is deemed
included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed that
nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
 On 14 January 1997, this Court (a)
confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary
restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the
Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining
Order filed by private respondents through
Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's
Manifestation stating that he is the
counsel for private respondents Alberto
and Carmen Pedrosa only and the
Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention
filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul
Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in
Intervention not later than 20 January
1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
 The Delfin proposal does not involve a
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,   it would involve a
18
change from a political philosophy that
rejects unlimited tenure to one that
accepts unlimited tenure; and although
the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the
State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public
service and prohibiting political
dynasties.   A revision cannot be done
19
by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments
Held:
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his
book,   Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
29
1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent
on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of
the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that
right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
It was made clear during the interpellations
that the aforementioned Section 2 is
limited to proposals to AMEND — not to
REVISE — the Constitution;
"SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION
OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY
LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.
 A distinction has to be made that under this
proposal, what is involved is an amendment to
the Constitution. To amend a Constitution
would ordinarily require a proposal by the
National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths;
and to call a constitutional convention would
require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National
Assembly is required, the import being that
the process of amendment must be made
more rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an
end to a law proposed by the National
Assembly by way of a referendum.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed,
the system of initiative on the Constitution
under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the
implementation of the exercise of this right?
Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and
intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No.
6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for
Congress to implement the exercise of the
right than through the passage of a statute or
legislative act.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its
history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The
Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was
prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House
Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No.
497,   which dealt with the initiative and
47
referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the
Constitution; and (b) House Bill No.
988,   which dealt with the subject matter of
48
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative
and referendum under Section 3 of Article X
(Local Government) and initiative provided for
in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the
power and duty of Congress to "provide for
the implementation of the exercise of the
right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative
answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public
respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.  Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
The inclusion of the word "Constitution"
therein was a delayed afterthought. That word
is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative
on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect
to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of
Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions
it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must
submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of
the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
This petition must then be granted, and the
COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the
been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Lambino v COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006; J. Carpio
Facts:
 Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups 1 and
individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. The
Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
 The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed
 that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
 The Lambino Group's initiative petition
changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-
4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII
entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These
proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.  complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
 DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT
OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE
XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
 the COMELEC issued its Resolution
denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
Court's ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections8 declaring
RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.9
Held:
The Lambino Group miserably failed to
comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's
initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply
with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court's
ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision
on Elections.
The essence of amendments "directly
proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only
if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such
amendment is "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
Thus, there is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that
they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures
- that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of
the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their
present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this
Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the
oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when
they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006. The signature sheet with this Court
during the oral arguments was the signature
sheet attached21 to the opposition in
intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by
intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence
that the proposed amendment must be
incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
petition signed by the people. In the present
initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes were not incorporated with, or
attached to, the signature sheets. The
Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament proposition and not only the unrelated
will decide the expiration of their own term of subject matter.
office. This allows incumbent members of the
House of Representatives to hold office
beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term
of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the
representations of Atty. Lambino and his
group to the 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and
his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the

people to sign an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the
6.3 million signatories had to rely on
the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino
and his group because the signature sheets
did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on .
the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with the
local elections.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino

stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and
the Court and the people should simply ignore
it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally

unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system. American jurisprudence on initiatives
outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject
matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer
only either yes or no to the entire proposition,
forcing them to sign a petition that effectively
contains two propositions, one of which they
may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of

logrolling is to nullify the entire