People v Pelegrino money was in connection with a transaction
G.R. No. 136266 between the government and Dr. Antonio N.
August 13, 2001; J. Pelegrino
 To convict the accused in a prosecution for
the violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft
Law, mere receipt of a gift or any other
benefits is enough, even without any express
demand for it. The duration of the
possession is not controlling. Important are
the appellant's words, action and reactions
showing acceptance thereof. These are
factual in nature and, absent any arbitrariness,
abuse of discretion, or palpable error, the trial
court's assessment of their presence or absence
is generally binding on appellate review.
 "That on or about October 15, 1991 and/or for
sometime prior thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused EUTIQUIO
PELIGRINO y ALAAN and BUENAVENTURA V.
BUENAFE, both public officers, being then
Examiner II and Supervisor respectively both of
Region IV-A of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Makati, Metro Manila, and as such are
tasked, among others, to examine or investigate
the Books of Accounts for Income and Business
Tax and other accounting records of
professionals (medical practitioners) and to
determine their compliance and/or tax
deficiencies after assessment, and to collect
payments thereof, taking advantage of their
public positions, while in the performance of said
official duties as such public officers, conspiring,
confederating and mutual helping each
other, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and criminally
demand directly from taxpayer Antonio N.
Feliciano, a practicing [g]enetology [d]octor
holding office at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro
Manila, found by both accused to have incurred
an alleged deficiency income tax assessment of
P500,000.00 for the calendar years
1988 and 1989, the amount of
P200,000.00 Philippine currency, for the
purpose of applying a portion thereof in the
amount of P51,858.57 as full payment for
deficiency income tax due from said taxpayer for
fiscal years 1988 & 1989 and the balance of
P148,141.43 to be appropriated by both accused
for themselves as gift or consideration for their
promise to make as they did lower assessment
for said fiscal years 1988 & 1989 in the amount
of P51,858.57, which request or demand for
Feliciano wherein both accused in their official
capacities had to intervene under the law, and
thereafter, accused Eutiguio A. Peligrino
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and criminally received the
amount of P200,000.00 in behalf of both
accused, to the damage and prejudice of Dr.
Antonio Feliciano in the amount of P148,141.43
and the government in the amount equal to the
deficiency income tax due it."6 (Underscoring in
the original.)
 On August 28, 1992, the two accused, assisted
by their respective lawyers,7 were arraigned.
Both pleaded not guilty.8 On April 24, 1998, after
full trial, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
of the offense charged, but acquitted his co-
accused.1âwphi1.nêt
 Accused Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter of
authority dated July 4, 1991 (Exhibit K) to
complainant Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano in the
latter's office at Valgozon Bldg., Pasong
Tamo, Makati. Said Exhibit K is addressed to
Dr. Antonio [N.] Feliciano signed by one
Eufracio D. Santos a [d]eputy
[c]ommissioner of the BIR stating inter alia
that 'x x x the bearer(s) hereof Revenue
Officer Eutiquio Peligrino to be supervised
by Buenaventura Buenafe is/are authorized
to examine your books of accounts and other
accounting records for income and business
for the calendar/fiscal year(s) ending 1988 &
1989 x x x.' Atty. Buenafe was referred to the
accountant of the complaining witness.
 "About two weeks later, the complainant
received a telephone call from accused Atty.
Buenafe asking him if his accountant had not
told him anything, and when he
(complainant) inquired from his accountant
Ellen Quijano about the matter, he was
informed that the accused were demanding
half a million pesos. Surprised about the
demand, since the books were not even
examined, he instructed Ellen Quijano to
further clarify the matter. Thereafter about
Sept. 1991, Atty. Buenafe called him up
requesting for a meeting in his
(complainant's) office.
 Accused Eutiquio Peligrino and Atty.
Buenaventura Buenafe appeared in the
complainant's office and told the latter that his
 tax deficiencies would amount to [f]ive
[h]undred [t]housand [p]esos (P500,000.00)[.]
 "Flabbergasted, because his books were not
even examined, complainant entertained the
idea that it was the beginning of an extortion,
and he tried to negotiate for a smaller
amount, and finally the two (2) accused
agreed to the amount of [t]wo [h]undred
[t]housand, of which [f]ifty [t]housand
[p]esos would be paid to the BIR, and the
rest to them. The pay-off would take place on
that coming Monday. He immediately wrote a
letter to the NBI (Exhibit A) requesting for
assistance, and an NBI Agent Atty. Rafael
Ragos, went to his office where they talked
and arranged for an entrapment which was
set on October 14. At around noon-time of
the said date, he provided the NBI with the
pay-off money consisting of [t]hree
[t]housand (P3,000.00) pesos as the
entrapment was scheduled at 4:00 p.m. Prior
to this, he had executed an affidavit (Exhibit
C). On the said entrapment date, October 14,
1991 neither accused appeared.
 "The defense was abject denial. Stoutly
asserting their innocence, and abjuring the
inculpation with vehemence, both accused took
the witness stand, and presented Prosecutor
Carlos Montemayor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to drive [home] their point.  x x x      x x x      x x x.
 In its well-written 40-page Decision, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the
offense described in Section 3, paragraph (b) of
Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act),11 had been proven. Being a public
officer, specifically an examiner of the BIR,
Peligrino had the right to intervene in the subject
transaction. He was a member of the Special
Project Committee tasked to verify the tax
liabilities of professionals, particularly
physicians, within the jurisdiction of Revenue
Region No. 4-A, Manila.
 Based on the testimony of private complainant,
the NBI agents' entrapment scheme, and the
positive results of the chemical examination
done on petitioner, the latter was found by the
anti-graft court to have demanded and received
money for his personal benefit in connection with
private complainant's tax liabilities. After noting
that they had no improper motive to testify
against petitioner, the court a quo  accorded full
faith and credence to the testimonies of the NBI
agents and the complaining witness.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that
petitioner demanded and received the envelope
with the boodle money
Held:
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) provides:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. --
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
The elements of this offense were summed up
in Mejia v. Pamaran,15 and we restate them here:
(1) the offender is a public officer (2) who
requested or received a gift, a present, a
share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf
of the offender or any other person (4) in
connection with a contract or transaction
with the government (5) in which the public
officer, in .an official capacity under the law,
has the right to intervene.
Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the
Special Project Committee tasked "x x x to
undertake verification of tax liabilities of various
professionals particularly doctors within the
jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila x
x x." Since the subject transaction involved the
reassessment of taxes due from private
complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in
his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore,
elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are
present.
However, petitioner disputes the prosecution
evidence establishing that he demanded and
received grease money in connection with the
transaction.
Specifically, he contends that the
Sandiganbayan's conclusion that he demanded
money from complainant was based merely on
an assumption that was not supported by any
evidence. He avers that he merely informed
complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that it
was the latter who requested the reduction of the
amount claimed.
We are not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019
penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or
requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding,
requesting and  receiving -- any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for
any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the government
and any other party, wherein a public officer in
an official capacity has to intervene under the
law. These modes of committing the offense are
distinct and different from each other. Proof of
the existence of any of them suffices to warrant
conviction.16 The lack of demand is immaterial.
After all, Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 uses the
word or  between requesting and receiving.
Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by
evidence acquired during an entrapment, as the
giver or briber is usually the only one who can
provide direct evidence of the commission of this
crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order
to apprehend a public officer while in the act of
obtaining undue benefits.17 However, we have to
distinguish between entrapment and instigation.
In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents
incite, induce, instigate or lure the accused into
committing an offense, which the latter otherwise
would not commit and has no intention of
committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent
or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused, and the
law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the Court held in the said case
that there must be a clear intention on the
part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider it as his or her own
property from then on. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show acceptance is
not sufficient to lead the court to conclude
that the crime has been committed. To hold
otherwise would encourage unscrupulous
individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody
some gift, money or other property.
The duration of the possession is not the
controlling element in determining receipt or
acceptance. In the case at bar, petitioner
opened the envelope containing the boodle
money, looked inside, closed it and placed the
envelope beside him on the table. Such reaction
did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery,
especially considering that he was not supposed
to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The
proximity of the envelope relative to petitioner,
as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies
petitioner's contention that he refused the bribe.
Mendoza-Ong v Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 146368-69
October 23, 2003; J. Quisuimbing
Facts:
 Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed
Resolution No. 93-132,5 authorizing the
municipality to borrow heavy equipment
from the Philippine Army’s 53rd Engineering
Battalion, to be utilized in the improvement
of Laoang’s Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-
132 likewise mandated the municipal
government to shoulder the expenses for fuel,
oil, and the subsistence allowances of the heavy
equipment operators for the duration of the
project.
 Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army
equipment was diverted by the petitioner,
who was then the town mayor 6 of Laoang, to
develop some of her private properties in
Rawis, Laoang, Northern Samar. A concerned
citizen and ex-member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G. Poso, Sr., filed a
complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other
municipal officers7 with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation
Officer Alfonso S. Sarmiento of the OMB
 ordered herein petitioner and her co-accused to
submit their respective counter-affidavits and
other controverting evidence. Thereafter, in a
Resolution8 dated August 16, 1995, investigator
Sarmiento recommended the filing of the
appropriate criminal action against petitioner
for violation of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A.
3019, as amended.9 Despite strenuous
opposition and objections by the defense, on
August 1, 1997, two informations were filed
against her at the Sandiganbayan docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 23847 and 23848, to
wit:
 That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime
thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang,
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in
the performance and taking advantage of her
official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, cause undue
injury to the Government and give unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to her
husband, Hector Ong, herself, and/or her
family and to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo
Lao when she, in the discharge of her official
or administrative functions, caused the
improvement or development of a private
land owned by her husband, Hector Ong,
herself and/or her family in Barangay Rawis
through the use of the equipment and
resources of the Philippine Army, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government.
(2) Criminal Case No. 23848
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime
thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang,
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in
the performance and taking advantage of her
official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, request or receive,
directly or indirectly, a gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five
(5) drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another
from the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao,
persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, in
any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Municipal
Government permit or license anent the
operation of the bus company, JB Lines, owned
by the aforenamed spouses, in consideration for
the help given or to be given by the accused.
Petitioner claims that in a criminal
prosecution for violation of Section 3(c) of
R.A. 3019 as amended, the law requires that
the gift received should be "manifestly
excessive" as defined by Section 2(c) of the
same Act. She adds that it is imperative to
specify the exact value of the five drums of
diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong
as public officer to determine whether such
is "manifestly excessive" under the
circumstances.
Held:
Based on the foregoing, the elements of the
offense charged in the assailed information are
as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he has secured or obtained, or would
secure or obtain, for a person any
government permit or license; (3) he directly
or indirectly requested or received from said
person any gift, present or other pecuniary
or material benefit for himself or for another;
and (4) he requested or received the gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit
in consideration for help given or to be
given.16
In the instant case, we find that the information
in Crim. Case No. 23848 alleged that: (1)
accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Laoang, (2) committed the crime charged in
relation to, while in the performance and
taking advantage of her official functions, (3)
did request or receive directly or indirectly, a
gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit in the form of five drums of diesel
fuel, for herself or for another, from spouses
Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom
accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, a
Municipal Government permit or license
anent the operation of the bus company, JB
Lines, owned by said spouses, in
consideration for help given or to be given
 by the accused. After considering thoroughly
this averment as formulated by the
prosecution, we are not prepared to say that
the impugned information omitted an
element needed to adequately charge a
violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019.
Petitioner pleads that the pertinent statute must
be read in its entirety. She argues that a
provision of R.A. 3019 such as Section 3(c) must
be interpreted in light of all other provisions,
particularly the definition of "receiving any gift,"
under Section 2(a) thereof, which reads as
follows:
In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the
present case applies regardless of whether the
gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and
regardless of the occasion. What is important
here, in our view, is whether the gift is received
in consideration for help given or to be given by
the public officer. The value of the gift is not
mentioned at all as an essential element of the
offense charged under Section 3 (c), and there
appears no need to require the prosecution to
specify such value in order to comply with the
requirements of showing a prima facie case.
Evidently the legislature is aware that in
implementing R.A. 3019, it will be precedents
that will guide the court on the issue of what
is or what is not manifestly excessive.
Velasco v Sandiganbayan
G.R. 160991
February 28, 2005; J. Callejo Sr.
Facts:
 The Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued a
Resolution in CSC Case No. 99-2137 ordering
the dismissal of Engr. Emmanuel Agonoy,
Municipal Engineer of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte,
for gross neglect of duty. Agonoy did not file
a motion for reconsideration thereof; instead,
he filed a petition for review in the Court of
Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
55596.
 Despite his knowledge of the said CSC
resolution, petitioner Mayor Pacifico C.
Velasco of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, allowed
Agonoy to report for work as Municipal
Engineer. He even issued on October 2, 1999
a Memorandum to the Municipal Treasurer of
Bacarra, Lorna S. Dumayag, informing her
that she had no reason not to pay the
salaries and other benefits of Agonoy in his
capacity as Municipal Engineer. She was
likewise directed to pay Agonoy’s salary and
other benefits until the Supreme Court had
finally decided the case,
 Agonoy continued reporting for duty as
municipal engineer from November 11, 1999.
On August 18, 2000, the CA denied Agonoy’s
petition for review. He filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which the CA
also denied on September 20, 2000.
 Undaunted, Agonoy filed a petition for review
of the CA decision with this Court. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 145016.
 In the meantime, on October 17, 2000, Mayor
Velasco issued a Memorandum to the
Municipal Treasurer directing her to
immediately release Agonoy’s salary,
Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA) and other benefits. Mayor Velasco again
told the treasurer that she had no right to
withhold Agonoy’s benefits
  this Court, in G.R. No. 145016, resolved to
deny3 the petition for review filed by Agonoy. On
February 28, 2001, Agonoy resigned as
Municipal Engineer. The Resolution of the
Supreme Court dismissing the petition for review
of Agonoy became final and executory on May
10, 2001.
 On March 18, 2002, Philip Corpus Velasco, the
Vice Mayor of Bacarra, filed a
Complaint4 before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner Mayor
Velasco, Agonoy and Municipal Treasurer
Dumayag for violation of Republic Act No.
3019. In his Resolution dated April 25, 2003,
the Ombudsman found probable cause
against petitioner Mayor Velasco for violation
of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, and filed
an Information with the Sandiganbayan
charging him of that crime. The case against
Agonoy was dismissed because he had
earlier resigned; on the other hand, the
Ombudsman absolved the Municipal
Treasurer, on the finding that she had merely
obeyed the orders of the Mayor. 
 That on or about September 21, 1999, in
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused PACIFICO VELASCO, a public
officer, being then the Mayor of the
 Municipality of Bacarra, committing the
crime charged in relation to and taking
advantage of his official functions, acting
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefits to EMMANUEL
AGONOY by allowing the latter to continue
his employment as the Municipal Engineer of
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte and receive his
salaries, RATA and other benefits from
November 1, 1999 up to February 28, 2001, in
the total amount of THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SIXTY-EIGHT (₱375,168.00) PESOS
Philippine Currency, despite the fact that he
knows fully well that AGONOY has been
dismissed from the government service in a
Resolution No. 992137 rendered by the Civil
Service Commission on September 21, 1999, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
 He alleged therein that while he was aware of
the CSC resolution dismissing Agonoy from
the service, he was not bound by it because
he was not a party to CSC Case No. 99-2137.
He also alleged therein that he did not
receive any directive from the CSC ordering
him to implement its resolution. Furthermore,
even if the CSC did issue the said directive, he
could not prevent Agonoy from reporting for
work. He further averred that he permitted
Agonoy to report for work, and receive salaries
and other benefits from the municipality because
the resolution of the CSC dated September 21,
1999 was not immediately executory. It cannot,
therefore, be claimed that he gave unwarranted
benefits to Agonoy through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence.
 The petitioner insists that while the
Information alleges that he was aware of the
September 21, 1999 Resolution of the CSC
dismissing Agonoy from the service, there is
no allegation therein that he was served with
a copy of the said resolution and was
directed to implement the same. He avers
that such allegations are essential elements
of the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019. He reiterates that he was
not bound to implement the resolution
because he was not a party to the case in the
CSC. Hence, he maintains, it cannot be said
that in allowing Agonoy to continue reporting
for work and ordering the municipal
treasurer to give the latter his salary, RATA
and other benefits, he (the petitioner) gave
unwarranted benefits or undue advantage or
preference to Agonoy through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence. The petitioner
further avers that he could even be charged
administratively, civilly, or criminally if he
relieved Agonoy from his official duties, and
refused to give the latter his salary, RATA
and other benefits.
 The office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
avers that although the petitioner was not a
party in CSC Case No. 99-2137, he was
bound to enforce the CSC Resolution of
September 21, 1999 as Municipal Mayor of
Bacarra, and may even be cited for contempt
for his refusal to do so. The OSP maintains
that the resolution of the CSC was immediately
executory, considering that Agonoy did not file a
reconsideration thereof. Moreover, Agonoy’s act
of filing a petition for review with the CA and the
Supreme Court did not stop the execution of
said resolution.
Held:
The petition has no merit and is, therefore,
denied.
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 states that -
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.
…
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In Librada M. Cabrera, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan,9 this Court held that the
essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.10
The Court explained in the same case that there
are two (2) ways by which a public official
violates Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 in
the performance of his functions, namely: (a)
by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference. The accused may
be charged under either mode or under both.
Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,11 the
Court held that the use of the disjunctive
term "or" connotes that either act qualifies
as a violation of Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner, at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime, was the Municipal Mayor of
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. As such, he was
mandated to ensure that all officers, including
himself, abide by Article I of Section 444(b)
(x)13 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which directs
executive officials and employees of the
municipality to faithfully discharge their duties
and functions as provided by law.  same. However, if Agonoy had filed a petition for
We agree with the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioner, at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, was the Municipal
Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. As such, he
was mandated to ensure that all officers,
including himself, abide by Article I of
Section 444(b)(x)13 of Rep. Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, which directs executive officials and
employees of the municipality to faithfully
discharge their duties and functions as
provided by law.  Resolution in the CA and in this Court, no
The LGC directs the officials and employees of
the municipality to faithfully discharge their
duties and functions as provided by law.
Considering such duty, the petitioner had to
enforce decisions or final resolutions, orders
or rulings of the CSC. Furthermore, under
Section 83 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, as
implemented by CSC Resolution No. 99-1936,
he may be cited in contempt of the
Commission in case of his refusal or failure
to do so, and may even be administratively
charged therefor
It is, thus, not necessary that the officer or
employee who willfully refuses or fails to
implement such final resolution be a party to
the case which was resolved by the CSC or
by its Regional Office.
However, in order for such resolution to be
implemented, it is required that a copy of the
CSC Resolution be furnished to the
implementing agency, or that such agency had
knowledge thereof.
In this case, the petitioner knew of the
questioned CSC Resolution even before he
was officially furnished with a copy thereof.
In fact, the petitioner unequivocably admitted
that he knew of the September 21, 1999
Resolution of the CSC dismissing Agonoy as
Municipal Engineer of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte,
in his Memoranda to the Municipal Treasurer.
The petitioner should have known that in case
of Agonoy’s failure to file any motion for the
reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, such
resolution would become executory, and he
would thus be mandated to enforce the
review in the CA and the appellate court had
issued a stay of execution as provided for in
Section 8215 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in
tandem with Section 12, Rule 43 16 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, the petitioner could not
be faulted for allowing Agonoy to continue
working and receiving compensation therefor.
In this case, Agonoy did not file any motion
for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution;
while he filed a petition for review of the CSC
stay order was issued by either courts in his
favor.
Conrado v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 94955
August 18, 1993; J. Vitug
 Facts:
 Petitioner, then a newly hired Process Server
in the office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Antipolo, Rizal, was
charged, along with Cesar Villamor and Oscar
Caing, in an information, dated 26 November
1985, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 11035
(p. 7, Rollo). The arraignment was postponed for
several times because of a pending
reinvestigation then being conducted by the
Tanodbayan. After the reinvestigation, an
"Omnibus Motion to Admit Amended
Information and to Dismiss the case Against
Accused Cesar Villamor and Oscar Caing",
dated 09 February 1987, was filed by the
Tanodbayan
 That during the period from August 31, 1984 to
February 21, 1985 in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused JUAN CONRADO, JR., a public officer
being the Process Server of all the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully neglect and
refuse to serve within reasonable time, a
copy of the Order dated July 11, 1984, issued
by Executive Judge Antonio V. Benedicto in
Civil Case
No. 290-A entitled "Pinagkamaligan Indo-
Agro- Development Corporation, et al. v.
Mariano Lim, et al.," denying plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
January 23, 1984 dismissing their complaint
for Cancellation of Title, upon plaintiffs'
counsel, Atty. Patrocinio Palanog, without
sufficient justification, despite due demand
and request made by defendant Mariano Lim,
the copy of said Order of July 11, 1984 being
served on plaintiffs' counsel only on
February 22, 1985, for the purpose of giving
undue advantage in favor of the plaintiffs and
discrimination against defendants in said
case by delaying the finality of the order of
dismissal and allowing the plaintiffs to
prolong their stay on the land in litigation.
 The Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Br. 71) issued
an Order, dated 11 July 1984, denying
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the
order of 23 January 1984, that dismissed the
complaint in Civil Case No. 290-A, entitled
"Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro-Development
Corporation, et al. v. Mariano Lim et al.";
 Second  — On 31 August 1984, the
complaining witness Mariano Lim, one of the
defendants in the above civil case, learned
the rendition of the Order and the fact that it
had not yet then been served upon the
plaintiffs. Lim left "agitated about the loss of
eleven days before the decision's period of
finality had commenced to run," and he,
therefore, made representations with the
Executive Judge, the Hon. Antonio Benedicto, to
have the Order served on Atty. Patrocinio
Palanog, the counsel for the plaintiffs;
 Third  — The accused, a process server, was
directed to effect the service. His first attempt
was unsuccessful because he could not
locate the address of Atty. Palanog. The
accused again tried on September 02, 1984,
and although this time he found the address,
Atty. Palanog and his entire family had
apparently gone out for the weekend. The
accused found only a woman, not a member
of the family of Atty. Palanog, who had only
been asked to watch over the house.
Accused Coronado did not thus leave the
Order;
 Lim went back to the courthouse where he
was informed that the case had meanwhile
been sent to the archives together with 29
other cases
 Lim returned to the courthouse and, examining
the records, he observed additional unnumbered
pages that include, among other things, a) a
return, dated 4 September 1984 (Exhibit "F"),
signed by accused Coronado stating the
plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Palanog, could not be
contacted; b) an entry at the foot of the Order of
11 July 1984 (Exhibit "A-2") to the effect that
Atty. Palanog had received the Order on 25
February 1985; and (c) a return, dated 25
February 1985 (Exhibit "B") that the Order had
indeed been served on plaintiffs 
 On the basis of the foregoing, particularly the
5-month delay in the service of the court
order, the Sandiganbayan convicted herein
petitioner of having violated Section 3 (f) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and imposed upon him
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six
(6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years
and one (1) day.
Issue:
Whether the failure of the petitioner to
successfully serve the 11 July 1984 Order, given
the above settings, warrants his conviction under
Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Held:
No.
The pertinent provision of the law (Republic Act
No. 3019) alleged to have been violated
provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers: The
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared unlawful:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or
without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before
him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of or discriminating against
another interested party.
Admittedly, the elements of the offense are that:
a) The offender is a public officer;
b) The said officer has neglected or has refused
to act without sufficient justification after due
demand or request has been made on him;
c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such
demand or request without the public officer
having acted on the matter pending before him;
and
d) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage in favor of an
interested party, or discriminating against
another.
The attendance of the first three elements in this
case can hardly be disputed. The
controversy, however, lies on the fourth
element.
We agree with Sandiganbayan that, indeed,
there was failure on the part of the petitioner, a
public officer, to observe due diligence in his
assigned task; let us call it one of neglect, a
broad term which is defined as a failure to do
what can be done and what is required to be
done (West's legal Thesaurus/Dictionary, 1986).
In its generic sense, it would not matter whether
such refusal is intended or unintended. But here
is not the real issue. To warrant conviction for a
violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the law itself additionally
requires that the accused's dereliction, besides
being without justification, must be for the
purpose of  (a) obtaining, directly or indirectly,
from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in
favor of an interested party or (b) discriminating
against another interested party. The severity of
the penalty imposed by the law leaves no doubt
that the legislative intent is to consider this
element to be indispensable.
The record is bereft of
evidence, albeit alleged, to indicate that the
petitioner's failure to act was motivated by
any gain or benefit for himself or knowingly
for the purpose of favoring an interested
party or discriminating against another. It is
not enough that an advantage in favor of one
party, as against another, would result from
one neglect or refusal. Had it been so, the
law would have perhaps instead said, " or as
a consequence of such neglect or refusal
undue advantage is derived by an interested
party or another is unduly discriminated
against."
Before an accused is convicted of a crime, his
guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
and the burden of that proof rests upon the
prosecution. The stringency with which we have
scrupulously observed this rule needs no further
explanation; suffice it to say that it behooves us
to do no less whenever at stake is the life or
liberty of a person. And so it is, not only in the
appreciation of the evidence but likewise in the
application and interpretation of the law.
It is not that We are condoning the misconduct
of the petitioner, nor that we are unmindful of the
prejudice that may have been sustained by the
private respondent, but the legal remedies lie
elsewhere, not in the instant action.
 Teves v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 154182             public officer who has a direct or indirect
December 17, 2004; J. Davide Jr.
Facts:
 Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves
seeks to annul and set aside the 16 July 2002
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing
direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in Valencia.
 That on or about February 4, 1992, and
sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in
relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, and
conspiring and confederating with his wife,
herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause
the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel
Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a
direct financial or pecuniary interest therein
considering the fact that said cockpit arena is
actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves.
 he essential elements set out in the afore-quoted
legislative definition of the crime of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction;
3. He either
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or by any law.
 There are, therefore, two modes by which a
financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law. The first mode is if in
connection with his pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction, the public
officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or any law.
 We quote herein the Sandiganbayan’s
declaration regarding petitioners’ culpability
anent the first mode:
 …[T]hat portion of the Information which
seeks to indict the spouses Teves
for his causing the issuance of a business
permit/license to operate the Valencia cockpit
on or about February 4, 1992 is not well-
founded.
 … Mayor Edgar Teves could not have issued
a permit to operate the cockpit in the year
1992 because as of January 1, 1992 the
license could be issued only by the
Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the
permit or license in 1991 or even before that
when he legally could, but that is not the
charge. The charge is for acts committed in
1992.14 [Emphasis supplied].
 The Sandiganbayan found that the charge
against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of
the business permit or license to operate the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not
well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on
the additional finding that only the Sangguniang
Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the
Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under
Section 447(3)15 of the LGC of 1991, which took
effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang
Bayan that has the authority to issue a license
for the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the
municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan,16 under the LGC of 1991,
the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence,
Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken
part in his official capacity in the issuance of a
cockpit license during the material time, as
 alleged in the information, because he was not a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan.17
 A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict
Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the
absence of a finding that Mayor Teves himself is
guilty of the offense charged. In short, the
Sandiganbayan correctly absolved the
petitioners of the charge based on the first
mode. And there is no need to belabor this point.
 The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the
petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law based on the second mode. It
reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly
evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary
interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of
1991.
Held:
The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves,
then Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, of causing, "while in the performance
and taking advantage of his official functions,
and conspiring and confederating with his wife
… the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel
Teves." The last part of the dispositive portion of
the information states that "said accused Edgar
Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary
interest therein considering the fact that said
cockpit arena is actually owned and operatedby
him and accused Teresita Teves."
A careful reading of the information reveals
that the afore-quoted last part thereof is
merely an allegation of the second element
of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or
indirect "financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction." Not
by any stretch of imagination can it be discerned
or construed that the afore-quoted last part of
the information charges the petitioners with the
second mode by which Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree
with the petitioners that the charge was for
unlawful intervention in the issuance of the
license to operate the Valencia Cockpit. There
was no charge for possession of pecuniary
interest prohibited by law.
 Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar
Teves over the cockpit were transferred to
his wife, still he would have a direct interest
thereon because, as correctly held by
respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained
married to each other from 1983 up to 1992,
and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership
of gains in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code
declares all the property of the conjugal
partnership of gains to be owned in common
by the husband and wife. 
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary
Interest.  – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official  or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
 …
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other
games licensed by a local government
unit…. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second
mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited
interest. But can the petitioners be convicted
thereof, considering that it was not charged in
the information?
The answer is in the affirmative in view of
the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
The elements of the offense charged in this
case, which is unlawful intervention in the
issuance of a cockpit license in violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction, whether or not prohibited by law;
and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of
the offense proved, which is possession of
prohibited interest in violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by
the Constitution or any law.
It is a rule of statutory construction that where
one statute deals with a subject in general
terms, and another deals with a part of the same
subject in a more detailed way, the two should
be harmonized if possible; but if there is any
conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of
whether it was passed prior to the general
statute.23 Or where two statutes are of contrary
tenor or of different dates but are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the
one designed therefor specially should prevail
over the other.24
Conformably with these rules, the LGC of
1991, which specifically prohibits local
officials from possessing pecuniary interest
in a cockpit licensed by the local government
unit and which, in itself, prescribes the
punishment for violation thereof, is
paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which
penalizes possession of prohibited interest
in a general manner. Moreover, the latter
took effect on 17 August 1960, while the
former became effective on 1 January 1991.
Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law
has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the
later expression of legislative will.25
In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of
the penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we
take judicial notice of the fact that under the old
LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a
cockpit was not among the prohibitions
enumerated in Section 4126 thereof. Such
possession became unlawful or prohibited only
upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took
effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar
Teves stands charged with an offense in
connection with his prohibited interest committed
on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the
maiden appearance of the prohibition.
Presumably, he was not yet very much aware
of the prohibition. Although ignorance
thereof would not excuse him from criminal
liability, such would justify the imposition of
the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under
Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.
Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be
acquitted. The charge against her is conspiracy
in causing "the issuance of the appropriate
business permit/license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center." For this charge,
she was acquitted. But as discussed earlier, that
charge also includes conspiracy in the
possession of prohibited interest.
Conspiracy must be established separately from
the crime itself and must meet the same degree
of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.
While conspiracy need not be established by
direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after
the commission of the crime, all taken together,
the evidence must reasonably be strong enough
to show community of criminal design.27
Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being
married to an erring spouse. 28 For a spouse or
any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be
liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that
there be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design. Except when he is the
mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that
a conspirator should have performed some overt
act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed.
The overt act must consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself or of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators.
Luz Almeda v Sandignabayan
 G.R. No. 204267
July 25, 2016: J. Del Castillo
Facts:
 In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools
Division Superintendent of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd),
Surigao del Norte, and several other public
officers and employees were charged
administratively and criminally before the
Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged
improper use and disbursement of the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
allotted to petitioner’s co-respondent
Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro),
Surigao del Norte Congressman, and
implemented through the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) and
the DepEd. The criminal charges were
consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-01-
0183. On March 19, 2003, a Resolution was
issued in said case by Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz-
Likit (dela Cruz-Likit), to the effect that probable
cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-
accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of
RA 3019.6 This Resolution was disapproved in
part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo
(Marcelo), who made minor modifications and
instructions thereto.
 Petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the
Ombudsman, instead of the OSP, entitled
"Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the
Accused to Speedy Trial with Prayer for
Dismissal of the Case."23 This time petitioner
bewailed the inaction and procedure taken
by the Ombudsman and OSP in not taking
cognizance of OMB-MIN-01-0183 and instead
indorsing and repeatedly tossing the case
back and forth to each other.
 In seeking reversal of the assailed Order and
dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as against her,
with additional prayer for injunctive relief,
petitioner contends in her Petition and
Opposition29 to the Ombudsman’s Comment,
which the Court treats as her Reply, 30 that the
Ombudsman’s failure to promptly act on her
case for nine years from the filing of her
motion for reconsideration, or from July 2003
to September 2012, is a violation of her
constitutional right to a speedy disposition
of her case; that despite her repeated
manifestations and follow-ups, no action was
taken on her case; that the Ombudsman and
OSP’s actions constitute gross neglect and
indifference; that the Ombudsman’s erroneous
action of endorsing her case to the OSP despite
the fact that the latter had no jurisdiction over
her is the sole cause of the long period of
inaction and delay which prejudiced her; and
that contrary to the Ombudsman’s argument,
she should not be deemed estopped, for filing a
motion to suspend the filing of the information
against her, from claiming her right to a speedy
disposition of her case.
Held:
First of all, the preliminary investigation
proceedings in said case took more than 11
long years to resolve, or from March 23, 2001
when the proceedings were initiated and
docketed,49 to September 6, 2012 when
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.
Secondly, the delay in the proceedings was
caused solely by the repeated indorsement of
the Ombudsman and the OSP, which may be
attributed to the Ombudsman’s failure to
realize that petitioner was not under the
jurisdiction of the OSP or
the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, when dela
Cruz-Likit, the handling GIPO, went on
official study leave, no GIPO was assigned to
OMB-MIN-01-0183; as a result, the case was
neglected. Even if, as respondents argue,
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was tardy
and that she filed a motion to defer the filing of
the information, these have no bearing as in fact
they are irrelevant to the issue; the fact remains
that the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case
took too long; the fact that the ground for
denying the Motion for Reconsideration involved
a simple procedural issue highlights the
Ombudsman’s failure to timely resolve the same.
Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay. As
a matter of fact, she sent a letter and filed
written manifestations seeking the immediate
resolution of her case. While they were filed
only in 2010 and 2011, petitioner’s letter and
manifestations cannot be considered late, and
no waiver or acquiescence may be attached to
the same, as she was not required as a rule to
follow up on her case; instead, it is the State’s
duty to expedite the same.
Santiago v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055
April 18, 2001; J. Vitug
 Facts:
 "That on or about October 17, 1988, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being
then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization for
the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani
Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat
Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy,
Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan,
Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong
Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @
Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu,
Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian,
Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An
Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian,
Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi
Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @
Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @
Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya
Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing
fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose
stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized
by said accused." 1
 Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-
94555 and No. 91-94897.
 Pursuant to the information filed with the
Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of
petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash
bail without need for physical appearance as
she was then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident. The
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty
until 05 June 1991 or until her physical
condition would warrant her physical
appearance in court. Upon manifestation by
the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was
able to come unaided to his office on 20 May
1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting
the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
 The SC issued an order deferring petitioner's
arraignment and the consideration of her motion
to cancel the cash bond until further advice from
the Court.
 On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena
from the case and to defer her arraignment
pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09
November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed
anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with
the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the
same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of
particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating
that the names of the aliens whose applications
she purportedly approved and thereby
supposedly extended undue advantage were
conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
 The Court, in its resolution of 12 November
1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset
petitioner's arraignment not later than five days
from receipt of notice thereof.
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition
assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to
decree a ninety-day preventive suspension
of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy
thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for
the implementation of the suspension order.
Held:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute
provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.
— Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
Attention might be called to the fact that
Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided
by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it
appropriate to render this decision for future
guidance on the significant issue raised by
petitioner.

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty

of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information
is found to be sufficient in form and substance,
the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 

In issuing the preventive suspension of

petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to
the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law,
as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court
has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not

state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged
to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the
use of the word "office" would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused. 

Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a

bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only
in the settlement of "actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable," but also in the determination
of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its

coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.