People v Guanzon accused-appellant,
G.R. No. L-31429 undersigned counsel de oficio, unto this
January 31, 1972; J. Fernando
 Attorney Sixto P. Demaisip, started as
counsel de parte of appellant. On October 24,
1970, he filed a motion for extension of time
of 30 days within which to file appellant's
brief. It was granted. So were subsequent
motions for extension respectively filed on
November 11, 1970 for 25 days, December 12,
1970 for 20 days, January 4, 1971 for 18 days,
January 14, 1971 for 15 days, January 28, 1971
for 15 days, February 12, 1971 for 12 days,
February 27, 1971 for 10 days, March 6, 1971
for 15 days, April 12, 1971 for 15 days, April 20,
1971 for 13 days, May 3, 1971 for 10 days, and
May 14, 1971 for 15 days. Then, on May 25,
1971, after having obtained 13 extensions in
all, he filed a motion asking that in view of
the father of appellant being unable to raise
money for printing expenses, he be allowed
to retire as counsel de parte  and be
appointed as counsel de oficio instead to
enable him to file a typewritten brief, a draft
of which, according to him, he had by then
finished. This Court, in a resolution of June 2,
1971, granted his prayer to be appointed
counsel de oficio, but required him to file a
mimeographed rather than a typewritten
brief. In the light of his own representation,
there was reason to expect that such a brief
would be duly forthcoming. It did not turn out
to be the case at all, for respondent
Demaisip, this time as counsel de oficio,
kept on filing motions for postponement,
four in number, likewise granted by this
Tribunal in a spirit of generosity. All in all, he
had seventeen extensions. Still there was no
appellant's brief.
  this Court issued a resolution, reading as
follows: "For failure to submit accused-appellant
Roscoe Daban y Ganzon's brief within the
extended period which expired on August 24,
1971, Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby required
to explain, within ten (10) days from notice
hereof, why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him." What passed for an
explanation for appellant's persistent failure to
file appellant's brief was submitted on November
25, 1971, worded thus: "[Comes now] the
by and thru the
Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully
manifests and explains that, in the opinion of
the undersigned lawyer, grounded on settled
jurisprudence, the escape of the prisoner
automatically makes the appeal useless and
unnecessary because it is considered
abandoned." It is his prayer, therefore, that
the above be considered a satisfactory
explanation.
Held:
Respondent Demaisip ought to have known
better. His explanation disregards the facts
and betrays ignorance of the law. It is true
there was a notice on June 23, 1971 from the
then Acting Director Vicente R. Raval of the
Bureau of Prisons that on June 15 of that
year appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon did
escape. As far back as May 13, 1971,
however, respondent Demaisip, according to
his motion of that date filed on May 25, 1971,
wherein he prayed that he be appointed
counsel de oficio and permitted to submit a
mimeographed brief, had assured this Court
that he had already prepared a draft. If he
were not careless of the truth, then there was
no excuse why prior to June 15, 1971 he was
unable to submit such a brief to this Court. It
is not to be ignored either that as of that date
he had already secured thirteen extensions,
ordinarily many more than any counsel is
entitled to but nonetheless granted him,
because the sentence imposed was one of
death.
It would appear that respondent Demaisip is
unaware of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: "The
records of all cases in which the death
penalty shall have been imposed by any
Court of First Instance, whether the
defendant shall have appealed or not, shall
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
review and judgment as law and justice shall
dictate. The records of such cases shall be
forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court
within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than
fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation
of the sentence in the form prescribed by section
11 of Rule 41. The transcript shall also be
forwarded as provided in section 12 of Rule 41
within five (5) days after the filing thereof by the
stenographer." The penalty imposed on
appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of
November 21, 1969 being one of death, the
case was properly elevated to this Court.
Moreover, until after this Court has spoken,
no finality could be attached to the lower
court decision. As explained in former Chief
Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court:1 "In this connection, it must be
emphasized that the judgment of conviction
imposing the death penalty entered in the
trial court, is not final, and cannot be
executed and is wholly without force or
effect until the case has been passed upon
by the Supreme Court en consulta; that
although a judgment of conviction is entered
by the trial court, said decision has none of
the attributes of a final judgment and
sentence; and that until it has been reviewed
by the Supreme Court which finally passes
upon it, the same is not final and conclusive;
and this automatic review by the Supreme
Court is something which neither the court
nor the accused could waive or evade." 2 The
mere fact of escape of appellant, therefore,
could not be relied upon by respondent
Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to
file appellant's brief.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that
respondent Demaisip, by such gross neglect of
duty, notwithstanding the many extensions
granted him, was recreant to the trust reposed in
him as counsel de oficio. The language of
former, Justice Sanchez in a recent
decision3 fits the situation: "It is true that he is a
court-appointed counsel. But we do say that
as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a
duty to the accused as one employed and
paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the
case of the latter, he must exercise his best
efforts and professional ability in behalf of
the person assigned to his care. His is to
render effective assistance. The accused
defendant expects of him due diligence, not
mere perfunctory representation. We do not
accept the paradox that responsibility is less
where the defended party is poor. ... For,
indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience and a little
less of self-interest. Because of this, a lawyer
should remain ever conscious of his duties
to the indigent he defends.
The liability incurred by respondent Demaisip is
thus unavoidable. He had failed to fulfill his
responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as
counsel de parte or a counsel de oficio, he was
indeed truly remiss in the discharge of a
responsibility which, as a member of the Bar, he
cannot evade. It is by such notorious conduct of
neglect and indifference on the part of counsel
that a court's docket becomes unnecessarily
clogged. His transgression is indisputable; what
remains is the imposition of an appropriate
penalty.
WHEREFORE, until further orders of this Court,
respondent Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby
suspended from the practice of the law in all
courts of the Philippines, except for the sole
purpose of filing the brief for appellant
Roscoe Daban y Ganzon with this Court
within a period of twenty days from receipt of
this resolution.
People v Berriales
G.R. No. L-39962
April 7, 1976; J. Concepcion Jr.
Facts:
 Appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, in
Criminal Case No. 562-0, convicting the
accused Ricardo Beriales Benedicto
Custodio and Pablito Custodio of the crime
of murder, sentencing each one of them to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla the sum of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
 At the hearing of November 26, 1974,
appellants' counsel moved for a
reinvestigation of said ease, along with two
other related cases 3 which the court a
quo  granted,
  the trial court postponed the hearing of the case
to December 17 and 18, 1974. 5 in view of the
City Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of the
hearing or trial set for December 5 and 6,
 1974 until such time the REINVESTIGATION
shall have been terminated for which the
result of said reinvestigation will be
submitted to this Honorable Court for its
resolution in the premises."
 however, the trial court, motu
proprio  cancelled the aforesaid hearings on
December 17, and 18, 1974, and, instead,
reset the arraignment and trial of the case to
December 10 and 11, 1974. 7
 At the hearing of December 10, 1974, appellants
counsel manifested to the court that pursuant to
its approval of his motion for reinvestigation, the
City Fiscal had set the reinvestigation for
December 12, 1974 and had already issued the
corresponding subpoena to secure the
attendance of the witnesses. 8 Nevertheless,
the court a quo,  issued an order setting the
hearing of the case to the next day,
December 11, 1974, 9 at which hearing,
appellants' counsel reiterated his
manifestation that since the City Fiscal had
already ordered the reinvestigation on
December 12, 1974, the said reinvestigation
should first be finished and the
corresponding resolution rendered thereon
and submitted to the court before any trial of
the case should take place. 10
 The trial court, however, relying on the mandate
of the New Constitution that "All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies" 11 re-scheduled the
hearing to December 13, 1974. 12 Immediately
thereafter, Special Counsel Rosario R.
Polines, in representation of the City Fiscal,
manifested that the private prosecutor, Atty.
Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the case
for the prosecution.
 ounsel for the appellant asked the court to wait
for the City Fiscal to appear, since the
reinvestigation of the case had already been
terminated and the Fiscal, if given a chance,
might be able to report on said
reinvestigation. 14 The trial court, however,
insisted in arraigning the appellants. 15 When
arraigned, the three appellants declined to
plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the
question because the Fiscal is not yet
around." 16 Thereupon, the trial court entered a
plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. 17
 Thereafter, appellants' counsel again
manifested that the City Fiscal was absent
and that they could not go to trial without the
fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation
conducted by him. 18 Nonetheless, the trial
court, ordered the presentation of evidence by
the private prosecutor since he had been
previously authorized by the City Fiscal to
handle the case. 
 We sustain the appellants. After the trial court
granted the appellants' motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the
court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and
trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have
conducted and made his report on the result of
such reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty
on its part, not only to be consistent with its
own order but also to do justice aid at the
same time to avoid a possible miscarriage of
justice. It should be borne in mind, that the
appellants herein were charged with the serious
crime of murder, and considering that their
motion for reinvestigation is based upon the
ground that it was Felipe Porcadilla (husband
and father, respectively, of the two deceased,
Saturnina Porcadilla and Quirino Porcadilla)
who was the aggressor for having attacked
and seriously wounded appellant Pablito
Custodio 27 it was entirely possible for the
City Fiscal to modify or change his
conclusion after conducting the
reinvestigation. When the trial court, therefore,
ignored the appellants' manifestations objecting
to the arraignment and the trial of the case, until
after the City Fiscal shall have rendered a
resolution on his reinvestigation, but instead
considered such manifestations on their part as
a plea of riot guilty and proceeded to try the
case, received the evidence for the
prosecution, and then rendered judgment
against them on the basis thereof, it
committed a serious irregularity which
nullifies the proceedings below because
such a procedure is repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. 
 as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
"what is more deplorable and which renders
patently irregular all the proceedings taken in
this case, was the total absence of the City
 Fiscal and/or any of his assistants or special
counsel on December 13, 1974, when the
appellants were arraigned and when the private
prosecutor presented evidence and rested the
case supposedly for the People.
 Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal." 29 In the trial
of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to appeal for the government. 30 As
stated by this Court, "once a public
prosecutor has been entrusted with the
investigation of a case and has acted thereon
by filing the necessary information in court
he is b law in duty bound to take charge
thereof until its finally termination, for under
the law he assumes full responsibility for his
failure or success since he is the one more
adequately prepared to pursue it to its
termination." 31 While there is nothing in the
rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases
which denies the right of the fiscal, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, to turn over the
active conduct of the trial to a private
prosecutor,32 nevertheless, his duty to direct
and control the prosecution of criminal cases
requires that he must be present during the
proceedings. Thus, in the case of People vs.
Munar 33 this Court upheld the right of the private
prosecutor therein to conduct the examination of
the witnesses because the government
prosecutors were present at the hearing; hence,
the prosecution of the case remained under their
direct supervision and control.
 on October 25, 1971 with the fiscal's office of
In the present case, although the private
prosecutor had previously been authorized by
the special counsel Rosario R. Polines to
present the evidence for the prosecution,
nevertheless, in view of the absence of the
City Fiscal at the hearing on December 13,
1974, it cannot be said that the prosecution
of the case was under the control of the City
Fiscal. It follows that the evidence presented
by the private prosecutor at said hearing
could not be considered as evidence for the
plaintiff, the People of the Philippines. There
was, therefore, no evidence at all to speak of
which could have been the basis of the
decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside and the case remanded to
the trial court for another arraignment and
trial. Costs de oficio.
Bravo v CA
G.R. No. 48772
May 8, 1992; J. Nocon
Facts:
 Private respondent Bibiano Viña instituted a civil
suit against petitioner Pastor Bravo with the
CFI of Camarines Sur which rendered a
Decision in favor of the former. When said
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
a writ of execution pending appeal was
issued by said court. 4 Petitioner, to forestall
the execution, filed a motion to stay said
execution with the appellate court, which the
latter granted. 5 A copy of said resolution was
furnished complainant's counsel on August 23,
1971. The latter did not do anything to stop
further execution of said writ. 6
 However, since it appears that Sheriff Renato
Madera was never notified of the order to
stay the execution of the writ, 7 Sheriff
Madera together with some members of the
Philippine Constabulary proceeded to
execute the writ in the absence of
respondent Viña, by seizing the properties of
petitioner and selling the same to private
respondent Viña at a public auction on
September 10, 1971.8
 As a result of the seizure of his properties by
way of execution, petitioner filed a complaint
Camarines Sur against private respondent
Viña, and his other co-defendants for the
crime of robbery with force upon things
 While the complaint for robbery was still
pending investigation with the fiscal's office
petitioner on or about March 8, 1972,
furnished copies of said complaint together
with his affidavit the following governmental
agencies to wit: (1) Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regional Office, Naga City; (2) Clerk
of Court, Court of First Instance of Naga City;
(3) Municipal Treasurer, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; (4) the Provincial
Commander, PC Headquarters, Naga City; (5)
the Chief of Police, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur; (6) the Philippine Coconut
Administration, Manila; (7) Bureau of
Commerce, Manila; (8) Bureau of Labor
 Regional Office, Naga City; and (9) the Social
Security System Regional Office, Naga City.  be held criminally liable, has no leg to stand on
 The complaint and affidavit narrated the alleged
commission of the crime of robbery on
September 1, 1971 which gave rise to the filing
of a complaint with the Fiscal's Office of
Camarines Sur.
 The circulation of the complaint and affidavit
has for its purpose the ruining and damaging
of private respondent's reputation;
humiliating him and embarrassing him
before his friends and business associates
and to his former co-police officers of
Quezon City, private respondent being a
former Quezon City Police Chief.
 petitioner sent a letter-report to the Provincial
Commander of Naga City alleging that private
respondent Viña, together with his co-
accused in the robbery case have threatened
petitioner and member of his family several
times; that they even threatened to accuse
petitioner of several concocted crimes and,
as a matter of fact, they had already filed a
complaint of illegal possession of firearm
against petitioner.  of the Court of Appeals refuting the same
 the complaint for robbery was dismissed by
the provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur "for
want of evidence to prove the existence of
a prima-facie case of robbery against the
respondents."
 After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered
by the court below, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds defendant
Pastor T. Bravo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two separate crimes of Libel and
there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences
said defendant to an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) years of  prision
correccional, as maximum, for each of the two
separate crimes of libel committed; to suffer the
accessory penalties of the law and to pay the
costs.
 the Court of Appeals, which modified the
decision of the trial court by dismissing the libel
case arising from the robbery complaint on the
ground of prescription and reducing the awards
of moral damages.
Held:
Petitioner's contention that his robbery-complaint
necessarily partakes of the nature of an absolute
privileged communication for which he could not
as the criminal complaint for robbery never
reached the status of a judicial proceeding,
having been dismissed by the provincial
fiscal of Camarines Sur "for want of evidence
to prove the existence of a  prima facie  case
against the respondents."  Consequently,
there are none of the alleged "utterances made
in the course of judicial proceedings, including
all kinds of pleading, petitions and motions" to
speak of, which the case of Sison
v.  David  17 cited by the petitioner, considers as
belonging to the class of "communication that is
absolutely privileged." Furthermore, said
contention is already moot and academic as the
libel charge based on the criminal complaint for
robbery was already dismissed by the
respondent Court of Appeals on the ground of
prescription.
As to petitioner's contention that his letter-report
is a qualified privileged communication and that
no malice was established, We find the decision
supported by the evidence on record
showing that petitioner was motivated by
actual malice in filing the robbery complaint
and the letter-report of the alleged threats of
private respondent Viña.
Firstly, petitioner gave unnecessary publicity
to the fact that private respondent Viña was a
defendant in a robbery case which appeared
in a three-column headline in the "Bicol
Star".
Secondly, petitioner falsely accused private
respondent of threatening him, knowing fully well
that it was the group of private respondent and
not private respondent personally who
threatened him, a fact he admitted in open court,
thereby imputing on private respondent the
commission of a crime.
Likewise, petitioner's allegation that private
respondent had threatened to accuse him of
several concocted crimes and in fact had
already filed a complaint of illegal
possession of firearms against him, is simply
not true, so much so that petitioner was
forced to deny in open court that private
respondent had anything to do with the filing
of the complaint but that it was Sgts. Guerrero
and Buendia who did so
Thus, even if said letter report was in the nature
of a qualified privileged communication, such
privileges is lost by proof of actual malice as in
the case at bar. Moreover, said letter report lost
its character as a qualified privileged
communication the moment petitioner furnished
copies thereof to several provincial and national
government agencies which had no interest,
right or duty in the prosecution of said charges
and the general rule is that any written or printed
statement falsely charging another with the
commission of a crime is libelous per se
Finally, petitioner contends that there was no
fiscal who was physically present during the
proceedings of the libel cases since the entire
evidence for the prosecution was presented by a
private prosecutor who had no express authority
from the fiscal to represent the State, thereby
rendering the entire trial invalid as enunciated in
the case of People vs.  Beriales. 19
Petitioner is in error. The case of People
vs.  Beriales is not applicable to the case at bar
because in said case, the city fiscal did not
appear in all of the trial court's proceedings, from
the arraignment to the promulgation of the
decision of conviction, due to the persistent
failure and refusal of the city fiscal to submit to
the trial court its resolution on the re-
investigation of the criminal case, and it was only
the private prosecutor who handled the case
without the authority and active participation of
the prosecuting fiscal. However, in the case at
bar, it cannot be said that the trial fiscal
never appeared during the trial of said case.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General in its
comment
But in the case at bar, during the arraignment of
appellant before the lower court (CFI of Rizal
stationed in Quezon City, Branch XVIII in Crim.
Case No. Q-2837), it is presumed that the
prosecution was personally represented by a
prosecuting fiscal since there is no showing
in the records of the case of his absence
thereto (pp. 21-22, Records). Then, on the first
day of the trial on the merits of said case, which
was on October 22, 1973 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, Fiscal Modesto C. Juanson personally
appeared and represented the prosecution.
Although the transcript of the said
proceedings is silent on the matter, the
presence of Fiscal Juanson in court in effect
gave authority to the private prosecutor,
Atty. Benjamin Grecia, to handle the
prosecution under his (fiscal's) direct control
and supervision. And this implied authority
granted by the said prosecuting fiscal to the
private prosecutor continued for the
succeeding proceedings as indicated by the
stenographers concerned in their transcripts
of the proceedings held on October 23, 1973
and February 4, 1974 when it is specifically
stated therein: "For the prosecution: Atty.
Benjamin Grecia, under the supervision and
control of the City Fiscal" (See Annexes "3"
and "5" Motion for Reconsideration). The
same implied authority granted by the said
prosecuting fiscal to the private prosecutor was
acknowledged by the defense counsel when,
despite the absence of the prosecuting fiscal on
October 24, 1973, which was but a continuation
of the cross-examination of the prosecution
witness Bibiano Viña, said defense counsel
proceeded to ask questions of said witness, after
which the private prosecutor offered the
prosecution's exhibits and rested its case. The
same is true during the hearing of February 4,
1974 when, despite the absence of the
prosecuting fiscal, said defense counsel
proceeded to present the appellant as a defense
witness and thereafter allowed the private
prosecutor to cross-examine the defense
witness. By allowing the private prosecutor to
present the evidence for the prosecution, and to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses,
offering no objection nor questioning the
absence of the prosecuting fiscal, the said
defense counsel in effect acknowledged the
authority granted by the prosecuting fiscal to the
said private prosecutor to handle the prosecution
of the case based on the continuing authority
granted by the prosecuting fiscal even at the
start of the trial of this criminal case before the
trial court. And finally, on the hearing of February
5, 1974, which was the last proceedings held in
this case. Fiscal Modesto C. Juanson was
personally present and actively handled the case
for the prosecution, as shown by the fact that,
after the defense offered its exhibits and rested
its case, Fiscal Juanson interposed no
objections to some of the defense exhibits and
objected to the other exhibits and to the
"remarks and interpretations" of the defense
counsel in offering his exhibits (pp. 27-28, tsn,
Feb. 5, 1974). The presence of Fiscal
Juanson during the last hearing of this
criminal case and his active participation in
the said hearing has the effect of confirming
his previous authority granted to the private
 prosecutor for the latter to handle the
prosecution of the case during some of his
absences in court and further ratifying all the
acts of the private prosecutor pursuance to
such authority.
Laquindanum v Quintana
A.C. No. 7036   Public10 issued by Executive Judge Reno E.
June 29, 2009; J. Puno
Facts:
 In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that
pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive
judges are required to closely monitor the
activities of notaries public within the
territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to
see to it that notaries public shall not extend
notarial functions beyond the limits of their
authority. Hence, she wrote a letter2 to Atty.
Quintana directing him to stop notarizing
documents within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato (which is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that
issued his notarial commission for Cotabato
City and the Province of Maguindanao) since
certain documents3 notarized by him had
been reaching her office.
 However, despite such directive, respondent
continuously performed notarial functions in
Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the
Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card 4 executed by
Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss
of Driver’s License5 executed by Elenita D.
Ballentes.
 Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon
further investigation of the matter, it was
discovered that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife
who performed notarial acts whenever he
was out of the office as attested to by the Joint
Affidavit7 executed by Kristine C. Guro and
Elenita D. Ballentes.
 Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition
for notarial commission before Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato.
However, the same was not acted upon by
Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He
alleged that the reason for Judge
Laquindanum’s inaction was that she
questioned his affiliation with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City
Chapter, and required him to be a member of
IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
Certification of Payments from the latter chapter.
Because of this, he opted to withdraw his
petition. After he withdrew his petition, he
claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a
clerk from her office to ask him to return his
petition, but he did not oblige because at that
time he already had a Commission for Notary
Concha of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Cotabato City.
 Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled
out by Judge Laquindanum, because the
latter immediately issued notarial
commissions to other lawyers without asking
for so many requirements. However, when it
came to him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked
down all his pleadings; communicated with
his clients; and disseminated information
through letters, pronouncements, and
directives to court clerks and other lawyers
to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow
lawyers.
 Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed
documents in his office at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the
Province of Cotabato. He contended that he
did not violate any provision of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was
equipped with a notarial commission. He
maintained that he did not act outside the
province of Cotabato since Midsayap,
Cotabato, where he practices his legal
profession and subscribes documents, is
part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed
that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he
could practice his legal profession in the entire
Philippines.
 In a Resolution, the SC referred this case to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B.
Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge
Laquindanum presented a Deed of
Donation,13 which was notarized by Atty.
Quintana in 2004.14 Honorata Rosil appears as
one of the signatories of the document as the
donor’s wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on
March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate
of Death15 issued by the Civil Registrar of
Ibohon, Cotabato.
 Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana
continued to notarize documents in the years
2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his
commission as notary public for and in the
Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City
had already expired on December 31, 2005,
and he had not renewed the same.16 To
support her claim, Judge Laquindanum
presented the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of]
Title17 executed by Betty G. Granada with
subscription dated April 8, 2006 at Cotabato
City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy18 of Mr. Elias
Diosanta Arabis with subscription dated July 18,
2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Driver’s
License19 executed by Anecito C. Bernabe with
subscription dated February 20, 2007 at
Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of
Loss20 executed by Santos V. Magbanua with
subscription dated February 22, 2007 at
Midsayap, Cotabato.
 For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the
signatures appearing in the documents marked
as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his
except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of
ATM Card21 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and
(2) Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s
License22 executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and
(3) Affidavit of Loss23 executed by Santos V.
Magbanua. He explained that those documents
were signed by his wife and were the result of an
entrapment operation of Judge Laquindanum:
to let somebody bring and have them
notarized by his wife, when they knew that
his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the
he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. According to him, he slapped his
wife and told her to stop doing it as it would
ruin his profession.
 Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge
Laquindanum did not act on his petition,
because he did not comply with her
requirements for him to transfer his
membership to the Kidapawan Chapter,
wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP
President.
 On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained
that she was only performing her responsibility
and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The
reason why she did not act on his petition was
that he had not paid his IBP dues,24 which is a
requirement before a notarial commission
may be granted. She told his wife to secure a
certification of payment from the IBP, but she
did not return
 This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who
claimed that he enclosed in his Response the
certification of good standing and payments
of his IBP dues. However, when the same was
examined, there were no documents attached
thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana
prayed that he be given time to send them
later which was granted by the Hearing
Officer.
 Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness
for what he had done and promised not to
repeat the same. He also asked that he be
given another chance and not be divested of his
privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread
and butter of his family.
 In a Manifestation dated March 9, 2007, Judge
Laquindanum submitted a Certification27 and its
entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP
dues for the year 2005 only on January 9,
2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381.
Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the
years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were
also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No.
610387. Hence, when he filed his petition for
notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet
completely paid his IBP dues.
 The OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be
disqualified from being appointed as a notary
public for two (2) years; and that if his
notarial commission still exists, the same
should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC
found the defenses and arguments raised by
Atty. Quintana to be without merit,
Held:
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we
find the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six (6) months and revocation and
suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial
commission for two (2) years more appropriate
considering the gravity and number of his
offenses.
After a careful review of the records and
evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
committed the following acts: (1) he notarized
documents outside the area of his
commission as a notary public; (2) he
performed notarial acts with an expired
commission; (3) he let his wife notarize
documents in his absence; and (4) he
notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that
time.
Further, evidence on record also shows that
there are several documents which the
respondent’s wife has herself notarized.
Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed
for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the
latter to notarize documents in his absence.
According to him[,] he even scolded and told his
wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his
profession.
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm.
Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held,
thus:
"A notary public is personally accountable for all
entries in his notarial register; He cannot relieve
himself of this responsibility by passing the buck
to their (sic) secretaries"
A person who is commissioned as a notary
public takes full responsibility for all the entries in
his notarial register. Respondent cannot take
refuge claiming that it was his wife’s act and that
he did not authorize his wife to notarize
documents. He is personally accountable for the
activities in his office as well as the acts of his
personnel including his wife, who acts as his
secretary.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial
commission as the sole source of income for his
family will not serve to lessen the penalty that
should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we
feel that he should be reminded that a notarial
commission should not be treated as a money-
making venture. It is a privilege granted only to
those who are qualified to perform duties imbued
with public interest. As we have declared on
several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of the authenticity
thereof.
Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 79690-707
April 27, 1988
Facts:
  G.R. Nos. 79690-707 "Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65,"
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the
province of Antique, sought to restrain the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul
Gonzalez from proceeding with the
prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases
Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the
ground thatsaid cases were filed by said
Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional
authority, since under the 1987 Constitution
which took effect on February 2, 1987, it is
only the Ombudsman (not the present or
incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the
authority to file cases with the
Sandiganbayan. 
 In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A.
Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as
the first petition, prays that Tanodbayan
Gonzalez be restrained from conducting
preliminary investigations and similar cases with
the Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty
is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent
Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under
the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to
retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost
effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he
has been divested of such authority.
 Under the present Constitution, the Special
Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere
subordinate of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman)
and can investigate and prosecute cases only
upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special
Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of
cases but can only conduct the same if
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his
original power to issue subpoena, which he still
claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now
deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who
may, however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor
in connection with the cases he is ordered to
investigate.
Ui v Bonifacio
ADM. CASE No. 3319
June 8, 2000; J. Bonifacio
Facts:
 Complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at
the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City1 and as a result of their marital union, they
had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui.
 Sometime in December 1987, however,
complainant found out that her husband.
Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter
sometime in 1986, and that they had been
living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
 Respondent who is a graduate of the College
of Law of the University of the Philippines
was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
 Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his
relationship with the respondent. Complainant
then visited respondent at her office in the later
part of June 1988 and introduced herself as
the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a
child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however;
that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought
things would turn out well from then on and that
the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent would come to an end.
 However, complainant again discovered that the
illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in
December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant
then met again with respondent sometime in
March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui
but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted
and complainant even came to know later on
that respondent had been employed by her
husband in his company.
 A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm.
Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant's husband, Carlos Ui.
 In her Answer, respondent averred that she met
Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him
all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a
Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom
he had long been estranged. She stated that
during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
formalized his intention to marry her and
they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in
19853 . Upon their return to Manila,
respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The
latter continued to live with his children in
their Greenhills residence because
respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the
children gradually to know and accept the
fact of his second marriage before they
would live together.
 Respondent left the country and stayed in
Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her
law practice and renew legal ties. During one
of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
she was confronted by a woman who
insisted that she was the lawful wife of
Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent
then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in
July 1988 and returned only in March 1989
with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989,
a few days after she reported to work with the
law firm5 she was connected with, the woman
who represented herself to be the wife of
Carlos Ui again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been
communicating with her.
 Respondent's contention that her relationship
with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988, when
respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him.
 In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant
states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at
the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
that the reason respondent went abroad was to
give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
 Complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of
Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247,
but the same was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged.
 Complainant's evidence had prima
facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly
discovered by the complainant in December
1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with
complainant up to the latter part of 1988
and/or the early part of 1989.
 Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed 9 on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived
together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.
 In the proceedings before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent
with making false allegations in her Answer and
for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the
Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated
Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985
and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the
Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the
State Registrar as a true copy of the record
on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and
not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to
complainant, the reason for that false
allegation was because respondent wanted
to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of
her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.
 Respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because
the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui,
and that she annexed such copy because she
relied in good faith on what appeared on the
copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.
 The Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
 In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time
respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of
contemporary human experience.
 Affirmed by the Board of Governors
Held:
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and
the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;
f. possess the required educational
qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the
conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character.
More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement
to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent
Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent
fell in love with him and they got married and as
a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two
(2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should
have at least aroused respondent's suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted
that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that
she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if
Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their
first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's
allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in
courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the
fact remains that her relationship with Carlos
Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of society and the opinion
of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, the same must
be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of
Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer,
we find improbable to believe the averment of
respondent that she merely relied on the
photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal
bride would verily recall the date and year of her
marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride,
especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget the year when she got married. Simply
stated, it is contrary to human experience and
highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify
the information contained in an attachment to
her pleading, especially so when she has
personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession exacts
from its members nothing less. Lawyers are
called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar,
free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.
Figueroa v Barranco
SBC Case No. 519
July 31, 1991; J. Romero
Facts:

Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the
legal profession. Respondent had passed the
1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt,
after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and
1968. Before be could take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant petition averring
that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent did not
fulfill his repeated promises to many her.

 When they were both in their teens, they were
steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the
1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to
sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael
Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.1 It was
after the child was born, complainant alleged,
that respondent first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar
 examinations. Their relationship continued
and respondent allegedly made more than
twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He
gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's
birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned
that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.
 Respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking
to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her
comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case.
On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondent's motion to dismiss.
 The Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for
an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath
upon payment of the required fees.
Held:
We find that these facts do not constitute
gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to
marry suggests a doubtful moral character
on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held
that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one
that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It
is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
We find the ruling in Arciga
v.  Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both
of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither
so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant
the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts
whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant's
assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and
be respondent's girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All
those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to
have sexual congress with him. Complainant
was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to
marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking
out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be
entered into because of love, not for any other
reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant
complaint as an act of revenge of a woman
scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. 
It is also intended to make respondent suffer
severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing
the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six
years that respondent has been prevented
from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there
appears to be no other indiscretion attributed
to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
Guevara v Eala
A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts:
 Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March
4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct
and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath."
 He first met respondent in January 2000 when
his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje
 (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her
friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes
spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
 After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,
complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
 Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually
went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes
did not go home from work. When he asked
about her whereabouts, she replied that she
slept at her parents' house in Binangonan,
Rizal or she was busy with her work.
 Complainant saw Irene and respondent together
on two occasions. On the second occasion, he
confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house.
 Complainant went uninvited to Irene's
birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the
conjugal house and hauled off all her
personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and
her share of the household appliances.
 He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together
with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.
 5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the
bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as
his relationship with his own family:
 The Commissioner thus recommended19 that
respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
 Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code reading:
 Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
 The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled
and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit
Held:
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in
setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the
case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor
as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not
deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of
the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by
the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he
maintaining that it was "low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their
respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is
a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least
an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the
fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship
between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and,
therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 –
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
 Under consideration is the administrative
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a
woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
 Complainant narrates that she and respondent
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."
 At around this point, by complainant's own
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the
pendency of the investigation of the case before
the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation 41 on
March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his
(complainant's) marriage to Irene had been
granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal
complaint for adultery complainant filed
against respondent and Irene "based on the
same set of facts alleged in the instant case,"
which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for
review. But even if respondent and Irene were to
be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint.
Vitug v Roncal
Facts:
complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie
P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M.
Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he
said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions
of the facts as culled from the records are
hereinafter presented
met sometime in December 2000 when she was
looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing
Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological
father of her minor daughter, for support. Her
former classmate who was then a Barangay
Secretary referred her to respondent. After
several meetings with complainant, respondent
sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino
wherein he asked for the continuance of the
monthly child support Aquino used to give,
plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical
operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.
admission, she and respondent started
having a sexual relationship. She narrates that
this twist in the events began after respondent
started calling on her shortly after he had
sent the demand letter in her behalf.
Respondent allegedly started courting her,
giving her financial aid. Soon he had
progressed to making sexual advances towards
complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet
inducements such as the promise of a job,
financial security for her daughter, and his
services as counsel for the prospective claim
for support against Aquino. Complainant
 acknowledges that she succumbed to these
advances, assured by respondent's claim
that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his
own marriage had already been annulled.
 respondent allegedly convinced complainant to
sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit")
categorically stating that even as Aquino was
denoted as the father in the birth certificate 4 of
her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real
father. She was not allowed to read the contents
of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document
meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way
that Aquino would agree to give her daughter
medical and educational support. Respondent
purportedly assured complainant that
despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a
case against Aquino in the future because
the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this
point, she signed the document "without
even taking a glance at it."
  respondent allegedly advised complainant that
Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to
answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her,
respondent handed her his personal check6 in
the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give
her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001,
respondent informed her that he could not
give her the said amount because he used it
for his political campaign as he was then
running for the position of Provincial Board
Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
 Complainant maintains that inspite of their
sexual relationship and the fact that respondent
kept part of the money intended for her
daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her
a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case
against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
 Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino,
complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse
as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the
criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a
compromise agreement.7 It was only when said
cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.
 Complainant avers that respondent failed to
protect her interest when he personally prepared
the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same,
which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In
making false promises that all her problems
would be solved, aggravated by his
assurance that his marriage had already
been annulled, respondent allegedly
deceived her into yielding to his sexual
desires. Taking advantage of the trust and
confidence she had in him as her counsel
and paramour, her weak emotional state, and
dire financial need at that time, respondent
was able to appropriate for himself money
that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She
argues that respondent's aforementioned
acts constitute a violation of his oath as a
lawyer as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule
1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and
Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
 Expectedly, respondent presents a different
version. According to him, complainant needed a
lawyer who would file the aforementioned action
for support. Complainant's former high school
classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was
also his fellow barangay official, referred her to
him. He admits sending a demand letter to her
former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino
communicated through an emissary. He learned
that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in
order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she
would execute an affidavit to the effect that
Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
 Expectedly, respondent presents a different
version. According to him, complainant needed a
lawyer who would file the aforementioned action
for support. Complainant's former high school
classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was
also his fellow barangay official, referred her to
him. He admits sending a demand letter to her
former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the
child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino
communicated through an emissary. He learned
that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in
order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she
would execute an affidavit to the effect that
Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Held:
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate
the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does
not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which
act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" 20 in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the
bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. Said requirement persists as a
continuing condition for the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community.22 The Court
has held that to justify suspension or disbarment
the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as
to be reprehensible to a high degree. 24 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.25
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed
to respondent's sexual advances due to his
promises of financial security and because of
her need for legal assistance in filing a case
against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into
having sexual relations with her. Surely, an
educated woman like herself who was of
sufficient age and discretion, being at that
time in her thirties, would not be easily
fooled into sexual congress by promises of a
job and of free legal assistance, especially
when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness
and/or helplessness on her
part.29 Respondent's numerous visits and
regular calls to complainant do not necessarily
prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a
married man, precisely the fact on which the
finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the
circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid
does not induce belief that he fueled her
financial dependence as she never denied
pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial
support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that
respondent lied to her about his marital status
inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's
assertion that it was impossible for her not to
have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by
her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales
who was a fellow barangay official of
respondent. She admitted that she knew his
residence phone number and that she had
called him there. She also knew that respondent
is an active barangay official who even ran as
Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously,
she never refuted respondent's allegations
that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his
residence, that she helped him in his
campaign, or that she knew a lot of his
friends, so as not to have known of his
marital status. Considering that she previously
had an affair with Aquino, who was also a
married man, it would be unnatural for her to
have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
respondent whom she had known for only a
short time without verifying his background, if it
were true that she preferred "to change [her] life
for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We
believe that her aforementioned allegations of
deceit were not established by clear
preponderant evidence required in disbarment
cases.31 We are left with the most logical
conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered
into an illicit and immoral relationship with
respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit
on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking
advantage of his legal skills and moral control
over her to force her to sign the clearly
disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her
read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she
alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for
Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious.
She was clearly in need of financial support
from Aquino especially that her daughter
was suffering from a heart ailment. We
cannot fathom how she could abandon all
cares to respondent who she had met for
only a couple of months and thereby risk the
welfare of her child by signing without even
reading a document she knew was related to
the support case she intended to file. The
Affidavit consists of four short sentences
contained in a single page. It is unlikely she
was not able to read it before she signed it.
The question remains as to whether his act of
preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a
document disadvantageous to his client, is a
violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his
client in entering into a settlement with Aquino
after explaining all available options to her. The
law encourages the amicable settlement not only
of pending cases but also of disputes which
might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover,
there is no showing that he knew for sure that
Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter
as paternity remains to be proven. As
complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed
to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later
blame her counsel when she experiences a
change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of
evidence as to whether respondent also acted
as Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the
case. Again, we only have complainant's bare
allegations that cannot be considered
evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is
not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption
that the respondent has regularly performed his
duty in accordance with his oath.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to
how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are
in agreement that complainant received the
amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant
insists that she should have received more as
there were two postdated checks amounting
to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over
to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the
amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 – but
only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said
he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees.
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable
gravity. There is a string of cases where the
Court meted out the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the ground of gross immorality
where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with
his paramour,41 cohabited with a married
woman,42 lured an innocent woman into
marriage,43 or was found to be a
womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily
differentiated from the foregoing cases. We,
therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing
disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the
end desired.45 In Zaguirre v.
Castillo,  respondent was found to have sired a
46
child with another woman who knew he was
married. He therein sought understanding from
the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of
men and that the illicit relationship was a product
of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his
reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court
suspended him indefinitely. However,
in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent
judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but
there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a
child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his
conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his
retirement during the pendency of the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find
Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of
immorality and impose on him a FINE
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the
client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the
personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 159486-88
November 25, 2003; Per Curiam
 Facts:
 On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its
resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:
"The case for consideration has been brought to
this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney
Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et
al. The Petition prays –
"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the
members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this
petition;
"2. That the assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565
and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner,
asserts that the inhibition of the members of
the Supreme Court from hearing the petition
is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or
judges from participating in any partisan
political activity which proscription,
according to him, the justices have violated
by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in
violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that the justices have thereby
prejudged a case that would assail the
legality of the act taken by President Arroyo.
The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada
v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108)
is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice
and due process.
Held:
"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions
to the merits of his client’s case within the
judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his
assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any
pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney
Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous
threat to the administration of justice.
"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has
exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme
Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003,
addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of
forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on
matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a
resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has
strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain
of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further
making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions
to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of
the well-meant admonition to him by the Court,
Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan
political activity’ refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office which
shall include:
"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign for or against a candidate;
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences,
meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
for or against a candidate.
"(3) Making speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public
office;
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature
or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges
or support for or against a candidate."
It should be clear that the phrase "partisan
political activities," in its statutory context, relates
to acts designed to cause the success or the
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
who have filed certificates of candidacy to a
public office in an election. The taking of an oath
of office by any incoming President of the
Republic before the Chief Justice of the
Philippines is a traditional official function of the
Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of
other justices of the Court at such an event
could be no different from their appearance in
such other official functions as attending the
Annual State of the Nation Address by the
President of the Philippines before the
Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim
infallibility; it will not denounce criticism
made by anyone against the Court for, if well-
founded, can truly have constructive effects
in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial
system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer
should observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct by
others. In liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct
and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been
called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a
member of the bar from making such public
statements on a case that may tend to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is
hereby indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt
hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and
an officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts of the land through
the Office of the Court Administrator.
Areola v Mendoza
A.C. No. 10135
January 15, 2014; J. Reyes
Facts:
 This refers to the administrative complaint 1 filed
by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria
Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the
Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of
her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in
behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron
Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez
and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October
23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty.
Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and
called all detainees with pending cases before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73,
Antipolo City where she was assigned, to
attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed
that Atty. Mendoza stated the following
during her speech:
 "O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may
pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal
sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad.
Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang
ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng
kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang
bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal
banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae
na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang
ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon."3
 Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is
handling more than 100 cases, all detainees
should prepare and furnish her with their
Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know
the facts of their cases and their defenses
and also to give her the necessary payment
for their transcript of stenographic notes
 In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5,
2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing
of the administrative complaint against her is a
harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had
also filed several administrative cases
against judges in the courts of Antipolo City
 including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal
where Areola was previously detained. These
actuations show that Areola has a penchant for
filing various charges against anybody who
does not accede to his demand. 7 Atty.
Mendoza contended that Areola is not a
lawyer but represented himself to his co-
detainees as one.8 She alleged that the
motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by
Areola were not proper.
 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the
Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of law.
While he may be of service to his fellow
detainees, he must, however, be subservient
to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged
lawyer. He however found no convincing
evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza
received money from Areola’s co-detainees
as alleged. The charges against Atty.
Mendoza were also uncorroborated.
Held:
After a judicious examination of the records, the
Court finds that the instant Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks
evidence to support the allegations
contained therein. All Areola has are empty
assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she
demanded money from his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not
the proper party to file the Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty.
Mendoza. He claims that he filed the
Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees
Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez,
but it is apparent that no document was
submitted which would show that they
authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They
did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No
affidavit was even executed by the said co-
detainees to substantiate the matters Areola
raised. Consequently, the Court rejects
Areola’s statements, especially as regards
Atty. Mendoza’s alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the
Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated
this complaint when he felt insulted because
Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the
pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-
detainees who are PAO clients of Atty.
Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite
knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However,
no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not
a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal
advice and file pleadings by himself before the
courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should
be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO
instead of filing baseless complaints against
lawyers and other government authorities. It
seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself
as more intelligent and better than Atty.
Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In
his Reply19, he made fun of her grammatical
errors and tagged her as using carabao
english20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin
Office"21 which seriously undermines the
reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have
been frustrated with the way the PAO is
managing the significant number of cases it
deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to
utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO
instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she
advised her clients to approach the judge and
plead for compassion so that their motions
would be granted. This admission corresponds
to one of Areola’s charges against Atty.
Mendoza—that she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan
lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made
it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party
resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and
crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of
Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of
Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of
Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule
15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only
lessens the confidence of the public in our
legal system. Judges must be free to judge,
without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors22 according to the merits of
a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is
uncalled for.
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the
penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
 excessive and not commensurate to Atty.
Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe
forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those
cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that
when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-
iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or
malice. While her remark was inappropriate
and unbecoming, her comment is not
disparaging and reproachful so as to cause
dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of
giving improper advice to her clients in violation
of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly
meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Guarin v Limpin
Facts:
 Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles
as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a
member of the Legacy Group of Companies.
He resigned from his post effective August
11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke's Medical
Center as the Vice President for Finance.
 On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the
Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI),
another corporation under the Legacy Group,
filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for "updating
purposes". The GIS4 identified Guarin as
Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD)
and President.
 Mired with allegations of anomalous business
transactions and practices, on December 18,
2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with
the SEC.
 Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by
knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman
of the Board and President of LCI when she
knew that he had already resigned and had
never held any share nor was he elected as
chairperson of the BOD or been President of
LCI. He also never received any notice of
meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up. He has never
accepted any appointment as Chairman and
President of LCI.
 Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with
the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She
argued that the GIS was provisional to comply
with SEC requirements. It would have been
corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed
for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She
averred that the GIS was made and submitted in
good faith and that her certification served to
attest to the information from the last BOD
meeting held on March 3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a
stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October
13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and
asked him to meet with her so hemay sign a
Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings.
Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that
he would meet with her on Friday, October 17,
2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at
the arranged time and place for reasons
unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of
Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS
on November 27, 2008. Atty. Limpin admits that
she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as
a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and
President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was
provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It
would have been corrected in the future but
unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution
shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was
made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information
from the last BOD meeting held on March 3,
2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a
stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October
13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and
asked him to meet with her so hemay sign a
Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings.
Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that
he would meet with her on Friday, October 17,
2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at
the arranged time and place for reasons
unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of
Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS
on November 27, 2008.
Held:
After going through the submissions and
stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP
that there is no indication that Guarin held any
share to the corporation and that he is therefore
ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the
president of the company.23 It is undisputed that
Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits
that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she
made a due verification of the statements
contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed
that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is
inconsequential: he never signed the instrument.
We also note that there was no submission
which would support the allegation that Guarin
was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.
Limpin committed an infraction which did not
conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.1âwphi1
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing
herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members
of the BOD and officers of the corporation
despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation
Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02
of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty.
Limpin's action m submitting a false document
we see it fit to increase the recommended
penalty to six months suspension from the
practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty.
Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C.
Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Donton v Tansingco
Facts:
 Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification
of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and
respondent, as the notary public who notarized
the Occupancy Agreement.
 The disbarment complaint arose when
respondent filed a counter-charge for
perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his
affidavit-complaint, stated that:
 5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated
September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following
circumstances:
 A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time
resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don
Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City.
 B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a
U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name – agreed that the
property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
 C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton,
requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the
actual owner of the property despite the transfer
of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
 D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others,
the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing
Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the
property for his residence and business
operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT
was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had
extended to Mr. Donton.6
 Complainant averred that respondent’s act of
preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property
in his name, constitutes serious misconduct
and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be
 disbarred for advising Stier to do something in
violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out
a dishonest scheme.

 The records of this case reveal that petitioner

was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was
successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as
operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as
farm administrator was on a fixed salary,
with other allowances covering housing,
food, light, power, telephone, gasoline,
medical and dental expenses.

 As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible

for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land
preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all
matters relating to the hacienda and attending to
such other tasks as may be assigned to him by
private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on
the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house
there.

 said complaint for illegal dismissal was

dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination
of his employment was for a valid cause, but
ordering private respondent to pay petitioner
the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his
failure to serve notice of said termination of
employment to the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's
ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs.  National
Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On
appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu
City, said decision was affirmed in toto