Lawyers Oath mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself
these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.
Cayetano v Monsod
Practice of Law:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177) stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
The test that defines law practice by looking
to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining
the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics
[West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as "the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn.
222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325,
22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such
a definition would obviously be too global to
be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
Facts:
 Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC
 Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten
years.
 The Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of
Monsod
 He took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
  petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and
the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
 Atty. Christian Monsod is a member
of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86.55%. He has been a
dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He
 has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years.
 After graduating from the College of
Law (U.P.), Atty. Monsod worked in
his father’s law office. During his
stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two
years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank.
 He worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since, has
rendered services to various
companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved
being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in
its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen’s Conference
for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial
body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was
cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability
and the party-list system for the
House of Representative
Ruling: Atty. Monsod s past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for
a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment
is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law."
(Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular
appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines,
upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc.
Suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice,
as distinguished from the modern
concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition
would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practiced two
or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or
twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent. The
Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. 
 A.C. 1928 In the Matter of the IBP
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLION
 Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was
disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the
vote being unanimous
 On November 29. 1975, the IBP
Board of Governors, unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court
the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP
since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
 IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval,.
Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which. reads: ... Should the
delinquency further continue until
the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to
the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys.
 The Court required the respondent
to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment, reiterating
his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him.
 The Court required the IBP
President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment
 They submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for
hearing. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
 Reference was then made to the
authority of the IBP Board of
Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys as found in
Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-
payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys. 
 Submission of respondent Edillion
as summarized in the aforesaid
resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of
this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed
to him by the
Constitution. Provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and
effect.
Ruling: Resolution that such issues was
raised on a previous case before the
Court. The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case
in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The
unanimous conclusion reached by
the Court was that the integration of
the Philippine Bar raises no
constitutional question and is
therefore legally unobjectionable,
"and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively."
As mentioned at the outset, the vote
was unanimous. This Court, in the light
of the above, felt that reinstatement
could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made
certain that there was full acceptance
on his part of the competence of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary
power to regulate the legal
profession and can integrate the bar
and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two
years had elapsed during which he
war. barred from exercising his
profession was likewise taken into
account. The power to discipline,
especially if amounting to
disbarment, should be exercised on
 the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the
bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss
of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a
sufficient time having elapsed and
after actuations evidencing that there
was due contrition on the part of the
transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of
such a privilege.
RESOLUTION, 1978:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized
Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,
as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is
an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of
a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar,
and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach
of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2 The integration of the Philippine
Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies
the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed
with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer
of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of
this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created.  The
State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and
welfare of the State. for, as the Latin
maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme
law. The most compelling argument
sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme
Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the
1973 Constitution of the Philippines The
Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and pro. procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397,
which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two
years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to
effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards
of the legal profession,
improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public
responsibility more
effectively.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon
entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society
at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him
to conform to such regulations as might
be established by the proper authorities
for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If
he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
A.C. No. 5377
LINGAN v CALUBAQUIB and BALIGA
RESOLUTION:
Principle: This court has the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
When this court orders a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of
suspension. This includes desisting
from holding a position in government
requiring the authority to practice law.
 This court found Attys. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga
guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's
Oath.4 Respondents allowed their
secretaries to notarize documents
in their stead, in violation of
Sections 2455 and 2466 of the
Notarial Law. This court suspended
respondents from the practice of law
for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified
them from reappointment as
notaries public for two years.
 Complainant. Lingan filed his motion
for reconsideration,7 praying that
respondents be disbarred, not
merely suspended from the
practice of law. In the
8
resolution  dated September 6,
2006, this court denied
complainant Lingan's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
 Atty. Baliga, also the Regional
Director of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II, filed the undated ex parte
clarificatory pleading with leave of
court.9
 In his ex parte clarificatory pleading,
Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14,
2006, complainant Lingan wrote the
Commission on Human Rights.
Lingan requested the Commission
to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter's suspension
from the practice of law.
 After this court had suspended
Atty. Baliga from the practice of
law, the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc issued the
resolution, suspending him from
his position as Director/Attorney
VI of the. Commission on Human
Rights Regional Office for Region
II. According to the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc, Atty.
Baliga's suspension from the
practice of law "prevent[ed] [him]
from assuming his post [as
Regional Director] for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is
suspended."11
 Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot
be suspended for acts not
connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director. According to
Atty. Baliga, his suspension from
the practice of law did not include
his suspension from public office.
 Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga
continued practicing law and
discharging his functions as
Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director, in violation of
this court's order of suspension.
 Complainant Lingan claimed that the
discharge of the functions of a
Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director necessarily
required the practice of law. A
Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director must be a member
of the bar and is designated as
Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the
practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in
effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was]
disqualified to hold the position of
[Regional Director] [during the
effectivity of the order of
suspension]."17 
 This court endorsed complainant
Lingan's letter to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation.19
 the Office of the Bar Confidant
found that the period of
suspension of Attys. Calubaquib
and Baliga had already lapsed. It
recommended that respondents be
required to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension
with certifications from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the
Executive Judge of the court where
they might appear as counsel and
state that they desisted from
practicing law during the period of
suspension.
 Atty. Baliga argued that his
suspension from the practice of law
did not include his suspension from
public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o
stretch the coverage of [his
suspension from the practice of law]
to [his] public office would be
tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due
process and to the statutory
principle in law that what is not
included is deemed excluded.
 In compliance with this court's order,
Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed
their respective motions to lift
order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga
also filed his comment on
complainant Lingan's allegation that
he continued performing his
functions as Regional Director
during his suspension from the
practice of law.
 Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional
Director, he "perform[ed], generally,
managerial functions,"30 which did
not require the practice of law.
These managerial functions
allegedly included ."[supervising] ...
the day to day operations of the
regional office and its
personnel";31 "monitoring progress
of investigations conducted by the
[Commission on Human Rights]
Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring
the implementation of all other
services and assistance programs
of the [Commission on Human
Rights] by the different units at the
regional level";33 and "[supervising]
. . . the budgetary requirement
preparation and disbursement of
funds and expenditure of the
[Regional Office]."34 The
Commission allegedly has its own
"legal services unit which takes
care of the legal services matters of
the [Commission]."
 The Commission on Human
Rights argued that "the penalty
imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a
member of the bar is separate and
distinct from any penalty that may
be imposed upon him as a public
official for the same
acts."38 According to the
Commission, Atty. Baliga's
suspension from the practice of
law is a "bar matter"39 while the
imposition of penalty upon a
Commission on Human Rights
official "is an entirely different
thing, falling as it does within the
exclusive authority of the
[Commission as] disciplining body."
 Nevertheless, the Commission
manifested that it would defer to
this court's resolution of the issue
and would "abide by whatever
ruling or decision [this court]
arrives at on [the] matter.
 complainant Lingan countered that
Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the
order of suspension. Atty. Baliga
admitted to performing the functions
of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which
under the landmark case of
Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted
practice of law.
 this court lifted the order of
suspension of Atty. Calubaquib. But
his court referred to the Office of
the Bar Confidant for evaluation,
report, and recommendation Atty.
Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension and the respective
comments of Atty. Baliga and the
Commission on Human Rights.49
 The Office of the Bar Confidant
stated that Atty. Baliga "should not
[have been] allowed to perform his
functions, duties, and responsibilities
[as Regional Director] which
[required acts constituting]
practice .of law."51 Considering that
Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not
perform his functions as Regional
Director which required the practice
of law, the Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that the
Commission on Human Rights be
required to comment on this claim.
The Office of the Bar Confidant also
recommended holding in abeyance
the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift suspension "pending
[the Commission on Human Right's
filing of comment]."52
  this court held in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to
lift one-year suspension.
Ruling:
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's
order of suspension. We, therefore,
suspend him further from the practice of law
for six months. Practice of law is "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience."57 It
includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" 58 or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."59 Work in government
that requires the use of legal knowledge
is considered practice. of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and agreed that work rendered
by lawyers in the Commission on Audit
requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or
legal talent"61 is practice of law. The powers
and functions of the CHR are
characteristics of the legal profession.
Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary
and notaries public71 - officers who are
necessarily members of the
bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints
are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection
remedies and reviewing and approving draft
resolutions of human rights cases prepared
by the legal officer require the use of
extensive legal knowledge. The exercise of
the powers and functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constitutes practice of law.
Thus, the Regional Director must be an
attorney - a member of the bar in good
standing and authorized to practice
law.74 When the Regional Director loses this
authority, such as when he or she is
disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or
she is holding. The disbarred or suspended
lawyer must desist from holding the position
of Regional Director. The Commission, in
the exercise of its authority to discipline, is
concerned with the transgression by Atty.
Baliga of his oath of office as government
employee. As records have it, the
Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority
to secure a commission as a notary public.
With this, he is mandated to act as a notary
public in accordance with the rules and
regulations, to include the conditions
expressly set forth by the Commission.
A.C. No. 11754
BONIFACIO v ATTY.. ERA and ATTY.
BRAGAS,
 Sometime in 2003, an illegal
dismissal case was lodged
against Bonifacio and his
company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation
 Complainants therein (Abucejon
Group) were represented by Era
and Associates Law Office
through Atty. Era.
 the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio
and the corporation liable for
illegal dismissal and, consequently,
ordered them to pay Abucejo Group
their separation pay, full backwages
and pro-rated 13th month pay.  on November 28, 2013 and
 Meanwhile, an administrative
complaint was filed against Atty.
Era for representing conflicting
interests entitled Ferdinand A.
Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era,
 this Court found Atty. Era guilty of
the charge and imposed the
penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years
 the scheduled public auction over
Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's
properties in the business
establishment was conducted to
implement the alias writ. Atty. Era
actively participated therein. He
attended the public auction and
tendered a bid for his clients who
were declared the highest
bidders. On the same day, a
certificate of sale was issued, which
Atty. Era presented to the
corporation's officers and employees
who were there at that time. Armed
with such documents, Atty. Era led
the pulling out of the subject
properties but eventually stopped
to negotiate with Bonifacio's
children for the payment of the
judgment award instead of pulling
out the auctioned properties. Atty.
Era summoned Bonifacio's children
to continue with the negotiation in
his law office. On behalf of his
clients, their counter-offer for the
satisfaction of the judgment award
went from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.11
 parties were not able to settle.
Attys. Era and Bragas went back to
Bonifacio's business
establishment together with their
clients and several men, and
forced open the establishment to
pull out the auctioned properties.
This was evidenced by the videos
presented by Bonifacio in the instant
administrative complaint.
 This prompted Bonifacio to file a
criminal complaint for malicious
mischief, robbery, and
trespassing. the City Prosecutor
found probable cause to indict Attys.
Era and Bragas for grave coercion.
 Atty. Era's name remains to appear
in pleadings filed before the NLRC
and this Court with regard to the
subject labor case.
 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that
Bonifacio has no personal
knowledge as to what transpired
December 3, 2013 as the latter
was not present therein at that
time. Hence, his allegations of force,
threat, and intimidation in the
execution of the judgment is without
basis.19 In his defense, Atty. Era
further argued that he did not
 violate the Court's order of
suspension from the practice of
law as he merely acted as his
clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant
to a Special Power of
Attomey20 (SPA) It is Atty. Era's
theory that with such SP A, he
was not engaged in the practice
of law in representing his clients
in the implementation of the alias
writ. He added that he never
signed any document or pleading
on behalf of his clients during his
suspension. For Atty. Bragas,
being an associate of Era and
Associates Law Firm, she was
merely representing the Abucejo
Group as said law firm's clients.
Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million
counter-offer that they made, Attys.
Era and Bragas explained that the
parties were still on negotiation,
hence, both parties are free to have
their own computations, which they
could respectively accept or
otherwise.
 Investigating Commissioner Jose
Villanueva Cabrera recommended
the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.
 The Investigating Commissioner
found nothing wrong with the
indication of a suspended
lawyer's name in a pleading
considering that the same was
not signed by the latter. There was
also no proof that a pleading was
prepared by Atty. Era. On the other
hand, there was no impediment
against Atty. Bragas to sign the
pleadings. There was also no
proof that in doing so, Atty.
Bragas was assisting suspended
Atty. Era in filing a pleading. Neither
the presence of Atty. Era during the
public auction and the negotiations
was an implication or proof that Atty.
Era was engaging in the practice of
law during his suspension.
According to the Investigating
Commissioner, anybody, not
exclusively lawyers, can be present
at an auction sale or negotiation.
 Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that
the administrative charges against
Attys. Era and Bragas be
dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
 The IBP Board of Governors,
reversed and set aside the
Investigating Commissioner's
findings and conclusions
 Atty. Era's continuedengagement in
the practice of law during the period
of his suspension by admittedly
participating in the negotiation for
the payment of money judgment
including pegging of interest he
acted as his clients advocate instead
as an agent in view of the presence
also of his client in the negotiation,
for holding office and admittedly
summoned the complainant's
children to determine the money
judgment. Hence, Atty.
Edgardo O. Era is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years.
 found Atty. Era's argument that he
merely acted pursuant to an SP A
given to him untenable. The Board
explained that the invoked SP A
gave Atty. Era the authority to
appear and represent the Abucejo
Group only on the May 4, 2006
auction and did not include the
November 28, 2013 auction. while
he was authorized to receive
payment on behalf of his clients, the
SP A specifically stated that said
payments should be made in the
form of checks and not machinery or
property. Thus, Atty. Era had no
authority under the SP A to
represent his clients during the
November 28, 2013 auction and to
pull out and receive the
corporation's machines as
payment of the judgment award.
At any rate, according to the Board,
Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal
knowledge in having the judgment
award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era
violated Section 28,32 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.33
 the Board also found Atty. Bragas
liable for allowing and assisting
Atty. Era to engage in an
unauthorized practice of law. 
Rule:
We sustain the findings and
recommendations of the Board of
Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of
law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the
landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v.
Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty.
Yolando F. Bustamante,38We succinctly
ruled that the term practice of law implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for
compensation as a source of livelihood
or in consideration of services. Holding
one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by
acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing
in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of
law.39The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent it is
undisputed that Atty. Era committed the
following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of
his winning clients in the public auction
of the condemned properties; (2)
tendered bid in the auction for his
clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale
and presented the said document to the
corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4)
insisted that his clients are now the new
owners of the subject properties, hence,
should be allowed entry in the premises;
(5) initiated the pull out of the properties;
and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's
children in his law office as regards the
payment of the judgment award with
interest instead of pulling out the
properties.40 It is true that being present
in an auction sale and negotiating
matters relating to the same may not be
exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the
Investigating Commissioner. However, in
this case, as aptly put by the Board in its
Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly
involved the determination by a trained
legal mind of the legal effects and
consequences of each course of action
in the satisfaction of the judgment
award.41 Precisely, this is why his clients
chose Atty. Era to represent them in the
public auction and in any
negotiation/settlement with the
corporation arising from the labor case
as stated in the SPA being invoked by
Atty. Era.4
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty.
Era in his unauthorized practice of law and,
thus, must likewise be reproved.There is no
question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of
Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of
law and yet, she allowed herself to
participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized
practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the
CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.
 Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty.
Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of
the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era
was not at that time. Hence, she should
have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm
cannot be used to circumvent the
suspension order. The factual
circumstances of the case clearly shows
that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty.
Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's
clients during the latter's suspension. Atty.
Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively
performing all acts pertaining to the
labor case he was handling.
STA. ANA v CORTES
A.C. No. 6980
 Complainants alleged that
respondent was left with the care
and maintenance of several
properties either owned or under
the administration of Atty. Casal
since the latter's death; that
respondent abused his authority,
as such administrator, and
engineered the sale or transfer of
the said properties, specifically
the two parcels of land which
were owned originally by their
(complainants') ancestors; t
 respondent, in connivance with Inis
and Atty. Casal’s alleged adopted
daughter, Gloria Casal Cleddera and
her husband, Hugh Cledera (the
spouses Cledera), sold the
abovementioned parcels of land
to the Property Company of
Friends, Inc.
 Complainants further averred that as
the said properties were originally in
the names of Inis, Ruben Loyola
(Loyola), Angela Lacdan (Lacdan)
and Cesar Veloso Casal (Veloso),
these persons, in conspiracy with
respondent, caused to be executed
a Special Power of Attorney2 (SP
A) dated May 4, 2004, under which
Loyola, Lacdan and Veloso
purportedly authorized their co-
owner Inis to sell the said
properties; that this SPA was,
however, forged or falsified,
because Loyola was already dead
on August 15, 1994, whereas
Lacdan died on August 31, 2001,
and at the time of the execution of
the SP A in Caimona, Cavite,
Veloso was in fact in Tacloban
City; and that indeed, as a
consequence of respondent’s
 wrongdoing, criminal cases for
Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document were filed
against respondent and the
spouses Cledera.3
 Complainants moreover claimed that
respondent notarized 12 falsified
Deeds of Donation, and
supposedly executed in Carmona,
Cavite, under which it was made
to appear that Atty. Casal
purportedly donated 66 pieces of
property to Gloria; that they
(complainants) caused to be
verified/examined Atty. Casal’s
"superimposed" signatures on
these deeds of donation by the
Questioned Documents Division
of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); and that in its
Disposition Fonns, the NBI
concluded that "the signatures
appearing on the said questioned
documents are mere xerox copies
which do not truly and clearly
reflect the minute details of the
writing strokes and other aspects
relative to the preparation of the
questioned signatures.
 respondent asserted that all the
criminal complaints against him
had been dismissed, and the
criminal information/s instituted
therefor had been withdrawn by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), hence,
he had been exonerated of all the
charges against him.
 the Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
 After due proceedings, the
Investigating Commissioner
submitted a finding respondent not
only guilty of dishonesty and
deceitful conduct, but also guilty
of having violated his oath as a
notary public.
 he Investigating Commissioner
noted that although there was no
direct evidence that it was
respondent himself who prepared
or drafted the SP A, there was
evidence nonetheless that
respondent did actively
participate, or take part, in the
offer and sale of the properties to
the PCFI; and that since the
execution of the forged or
falsified SP A is a crucial or
critical component of the eventual
consummation of the sale to PCFI,
respondent could not be heard to
say that he had no knowledge of
the use of a falsified document.9
 As regards the 12 Deeds of
Donation allegedly executed by Atty.
Casal, the Investigating
Commissioner lent more credence
to the unbiased or impartial report
of the NBI's finding that the
signatures of Atty. Casal were per
se mere xerox copies; and that
moreover, respondent had
violated Section 24010 of the
Revised Administrative Code,
when he caused to be
acknowledged the Deeds of
Donation in his law office in
Quezon City, despite the fact that
these were supposedly signed
and executed by Atty. Casal in
Cavite. The Investigating
Commissioner opined that
respondent "ought to have known
that since he was outside his
territorial jurisdiction as a notary
public, he could not have
performed the acts of a notary
public at the time of the signing of
the 12 Deeds of Donation,
including the taking of oath of the
parties."11
 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the
findings of the Investigating
Commissioner but modified the
recommended penalty to a one-year
suspension from the practice of
law, with revocation of
respondent’s notarial license,
plus a two-year disqualification
from reappointment as notary
public.
Ruling:
In the instant case, respondent acted
with deceit when he used the falsified
documents to effect the transfer of
properties owned or administered by the
late Atty. Casal. In a letter15 sent by Atty.
Florante O. Villegas, counsel for the
PCFI, to the spouses Cledera, the
former explicitly stated that respondent
did have a hand in the negotiation
leading to the sale of the properties
covered by TCT Nos. T1069335 and T-
1069336. By using the falsified SP A
and by knowingly notarizing documents
outside of his notarial commission’s
jurisdiction, respondent was evidently
 bereft of basic integrity which is an
indispensable sine qua non of his
ongoing membership, in good standing,
in the legal profession, and as a duly-
commissioned notary public.
In actively participating in the offer and
sale of property to PCFI, respondent
was guilty of deceit and dishonesty by
leveraging on the use of a spurious
Special Power of Attorney
As the lawyer who assisted in the sale of
the properties through the use of the
falsified SP A in question, he ought to
know that the use of such falsified or
forged SP A gives rise to grievous
legal consequences which must
inevitably enmesh him
professionally. As a member of the Bar
in apparent good legal standing, he
effectively held himself out as a
trustworthy agent for the principals he
was purportedly representing in the
transaction/sin question.
Respondent's act of notarizing a forged
Deed of Donation outside of his
jurisdiction is a violation of his duties as
a notary public, as well as a blatant
falsification of public document
This Court agrees with the findings of the
IBP Board of Governors which upheld the
impartial report of the NBI and its findings
that the signatures on the Deeds of
Donation were mere photocopies attached
to the said Deeds.21 Given the fact that
respondent admitted to having been with
the late Atty. Casal at the time of the
execution of the Deed, it would not be far-
fetched to say that the use of the said mere
photocopies was with his knowledge and
consent. What is more, his act of bringing
the Deeds of Donation that were executed
in Carmona, Cavite, to his law office in
Quezon City, and notarizing them there, not
only violated Section 240 of the Revised
Administrative Code but "also [partook] of
malpractice of law and falsification."22
Section 240 of the Revised Administrative
Code explicitly states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The
jurisdiction of a notary public in a province
shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of
Manila shall be co-extensive with said
city. No notary shall possess authority to
do any notarial act beyond the limits of
his jurisdiction.23 Needless to say,
respondent cannot escape from the
clutches of this provision.
The dismissal of the criminal complaints
against respondent did not change the
sui generis character of disbarment
proceedings
As a member of the Bar, respondent should
know that administrative cases against
lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their
own. "Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance.
DOMINGO v REVILLA, JR.,
A.C. No. 5473
Principle: A disbarred lawyer who is found
to have committed an offense that
constitutes another ground prior to his
eventual disbarment may be heavily fined
therefor. The Court does not lose its
exclusive jurisdiction over his other
disbarrable act or actuation committed
while he was still a member of the Law
Profession.
 The complainant is an American
citizen of Filipino descent.
 During a visit to the Philippines, he
sought the services of a lawyer to
handle the cases to be filed against
his cousin Melchor Arruiza and to
work on the settlement of the estate
of his late mother Judith Arruiza.2 In
April 2000, petitioner met
respondent, a lawyer recommended
by a friend.
 The complainant alleged that the
respondent represented to him
that he would take on the cases in
behalf of the law firm of Agabin
Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De
Castro, where he worked as an
associate. He assured petitioner
that the law firm was able and
willing to act as his legal counsel
in the cases he intended to
institute against his adopted
brother, and to undertake the
transfer of his mother's properties
to his and his children's
names.4 Trusting the
representations of respondent,
the complainant agreed to engage
respondent and his law firm, and
paid the initial amount of
₱80,000.00.
 Being based in the United States of
America, the complainant
maintained constant communication
with respondent often through
electronic mail (e-mail) and
sometimes by telephone to get
updates on the cases. 
 Based on the respondent's Canons 1, 2, 13, 15 & 16 of the
representation as to how justice was Code of Professional
achieved in the Philippines, the Responsibility.11
complainant was constrained to give
to the respondent the requested   the respondent denied the
amounts in the belief that he had no accusations
choice.6 The complainant would
repeatedly request the original or at  the Court referred the complaint for
the very least copies of the decisions disbarment and the comment to the
and the titles by e-mail, facsimile Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(fax) or courier service, but (IBP) for investigation
respondent repeatedly failed to
comply with the requests, giving
 he IBPCBD found the respondent
various reasons or excuses. The
guilty of violating the Code of
respondent even volunteered to
Professional Responsibility with
meet with the complainant in the
respect to negligence in the
United States of America to
performance of his duties towards
personally deliver the promised
his client, and recommended the
documents. The respondent never
penalty of reprimand with a stem
went to the United States of America
warning that a repetition of the
to meet with the complainant. He
offense would warrant a more
also did not turn over the requested
severe penalty. It ruled that the
documents to the latter. Even worse,
proceeding before it was basically a
the respondent ultimately tried to
disciplinary proceeding; that it could
avoid the complainant by cutting off
only decide on the fitness of
communications between them.
respondent to continue in the
practice of law;17 that it could not
 Given the respondent's evasion, the go beyond the sanctions that
complainant decided to write the law could be imposed under
firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso the Rules of Court; that it had the
Layaoen & De Castro to inform them power to require the restitution of
of the fraudulent actions of the the client's money as part of the
respondent.7 The complainant was penalty; that it could only order
surprised to be informed by the law the restitution of whatever
firm that he had never been its amount that was given by
client.8 The law firm also told him petitioner to respondent but not
that the respondent had been other monetary claims of
forced to resign from the law petitioner like travel and plane
office because of numerous fare and litigation expenses,
complaints about his performance which were properly within the
as a lawyer.9 jurisdiction of other
authorities;18 and that,
 Hence, the complainant terminated accordingly, it ordered
the services of the respondent for respondent to immediately deliver
refusal to respond and to surrender to petitioner the amount of
the alleged documents in his ₱513,000.00, plus interest
possession. He engaged the computed at the legal rate.
services of another law firm to verify
the status of the cases allegedly  the IBP Board of Governors adopted
brought by respondent in petitioner's and approved the Report and
behalf. The new law firm secured a Recommendation of the
certification from the RTC of Abra Investigating Commissioner.
to the effect that no case against
Melchor Arruiza had been filed. Ruling:
The complainant also discovered
that none of the representations of
the Court accepts the findings
the respondent, as enumerated
against the respondent but modifies
above, had come to pass because
the recommended penalty
all of such representations were
considering that his violation of
sham and intended to induce him to
the Code of Professional
remit almost half a million pesos to
Responsibility constituted deliberate
the respondent.
defraudation of the client instead of
mere negligence.
 the complainant filed his complaint
for disbarment in this the Court Firstly, the respondent misled the
accusing the respondent of complainant into thinking that it would be his
committing acts in violation of law firm that was to take on the case.
Secondly, despite the fact that he had
intimated to the complainant that it would be
highly unlikely to still have the adoption
decree nullified due to the decree having
long become final and executory, he
nonetheless accepted the case. Thirdly, he
told the complainant that he had already
instituted the action for the annulment of the
adoption despite not having yet done so.
Fourthly, he kept on demanding more
money from the complainant although the
case was not actually even moving forward.
Fifthly, he continued to make up excuses in
order to avoid having to furnish to the
complainant the requested copies of court
documents that, in the first place, he could
not produce. And, lastly, he claimed that he
intended to return the money to the
complainant but instead sent the latter a
stale check.
All these acts, whether taken singly or
together, manifested the respondent's
dishonesty and deceit towards the
complainant, his client, in patent violation of
Rule 1.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Firstly, the respondent misled the
complainant into thinking that it would be
his law firm that was to take on the case.
Secondly, despite the fact that he had
intimated to the complainant that it would be
highly unlikely to still have the adoption
decree nullified due to the decree having
long become final and executory, he
nonetheless accepted the case. Thirdly,
he told the complainant that he had already
instituted the action for the annulment of the
adoption despite not having yet done so.
Fourthly, he kept on demanding more
money from the complainant although
the case was not actually even moving
forward. Fifthly, he continued to make up
excuses in order to avoid having to
furnish to the complainant the requested
copies of court documents that, in the first
place, he could not produce. And, lastly, he
claimed that he intended to return the
money to the complainant but instead
sent the latter a stale check. All these
acts, whether taken singly or together,
manifested the respondent's dishonesty and
deceit towards the complainant, his client, in
patent violation of Rule 1.0128 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Despite the
fact that the complainant engaged his
services and advanced sums of money to
cover the court fees and related expenses
to be incurred along the way, the
respondent did not file the petition for
annulment. His conduct was reprehensible
because it amounted to dishonesty and
plain deceit. His filing of the petition for
annulment later on did not mitigate his sin
because he did so only because he had
meanwhile received the complainant's
demand letter that contained the threat of
filing administrative charges against him.
Moreover, he repeatedly did not inform the
complainant on the actual status of the
petition although the latter regularly sought
to be updated. Instead, the respondent kept
on making up excuses and conjured up
pretenses to make it appear that the case
was moving along. His conduct of accepting
money for his legal services in handling the
annulment of the adoption decree, and of
failing to render the contracted legal
services violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.32 Also, the
highly fiduciary and confidential relation of
attorney and client required that he as the
lawyer should promptly account for all the
funds received from, or held by him for, the
complainant as the client.33
Furthermore, the respondent did not abide
by the mandate of Canon 15 that required
members of the Legal Profession to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all their
dealings and transactions with their clients.
The respondent's commission of various
offenses constituting professional
misconduct only demonstrated his
unworthiness to remain as a member of
the Legal Profession. He ought to be
disbarred for such offenses upon this
complaint alone.
In fine, the gravity of the respondent's
professional misconduct and deceit should
fully warrant his being permanently barred
from reinstatement to the ranks of the
Philippine Bar and from having his name
restored in the Roll of Attorneys.
Tan Jr. v Gumba A.C. No. 9000
 According to complainant, in August
1999, respondent obtained from
him a ₱350,000.00 loan with 12%
interest per annum. Incidental
thereto, respondent executed in
favor of complainant an undated
Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105-
square meter lot located in Naga
City under the name of respondent's
father
 Attached to said Deed was a Special
Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed
by respondent's parents authorizing
her to apply for a loan with a bank to
be secured by the subject property.
Complainant and respondent
purportedly agreed that if the latter
failed to pay the loan in or before
August 2000, complainant may
register the Deed of Absolute Sale
with the Register of Deeds (RD).
 Respondent failed to pay her loan
when it fell due. Complainant
 attempted to register the Deed of disqualify her to appear in courts
Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga for the period of her suspension.
City but to no avail because the
aforesaid SPA only covered the  her inquiry arose because
authority of respondent to respondent represented a party in
mortgage the property to a bank, a case pending in her court; and,
and not to sell it the counsel of the opposing party
called Judge Arrr1ea's attention
 Complainant argued that if not for regarding the legal standing of
respondent's misrepresentation, respondent to appear as counsel.
he would not have approved her Judge Armea added that
loan. He added that respondent respondent denied that she was
committed dishonesty, and used suspended to practice law since
her skill as a lawyer and her moral she (respondent) had not yet
ascendancy over him in securing received a copy of the Court's
the loan. Thus, he prayed that resolution on the matter.
respondent be sanctioned for her
infraction  respondent countered that by reason
of such downloaded decision, Judge
 Commissioner dela Rama declared Armea and Executive Judge Pablo
that the SPA specifically Cabillan Formaran III (Judge
authorized respondent to Formaran III) of the Regional Trial
mortgage the property with a Court (RTC) of Naga City
bank. He stressed that for selling disallowed her appearance in
t.lie property, and not just their courts. She insisted that
mortgaging it to complainant, who service of any pleading or
was not even a bank, respondent judgment cannot be made
acted beyond her authority. Having through the inte1net. She further
done so, she committed gross claimed that she had not received
violation of the Lawyer's Oath as an authentic copy of the Court's.
well as Canon 1,9 Rule 1.01,10 and October 5, 2011 Resolution.
Canon 711 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As  the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and
such, he recommended that approve the Report and
respondent be suspended from Recommendation22 of Commissioner
the practice of law for one year. Oliver A. Cachapero (Comrnissioner
Cachapero) to dismiss the
 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines complaint against respondent.
- Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) According to Commissioner
resolved to adopt and approve the Cachapero. there is no rule
Report and Recommendation of allowing the service of
Commissioner de la Rama. judgements through the internet;
and. Judge Armea and Judge
 Thereafter, the SC issued a Formaran III acted ahead of time
Resolution13  which sustained the when they implemented the
findings and conclusion of the IBP. suspension of respondent even
The Court nonetheless found the before the actual service upon her
reduction of the penalty proper, of the resolution concerning her
pursuant to its sound judicial suspension.
discretion and on the facts of the
case. Accordingly, it suspended  the OBC stressed that respondent
respondent from the practice of law received the August 13, 2012
for six months, effective immediately Resolution (denying her motion, for
reconsideration on the October 5,
 Judge Armea of the Municipal Trial 2011 Resolution) on November 12,
Court in Cities of Naga 2012 per Registry Return Receipt
City, inquiring from the Office of the No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity of
Court Administrator (OCA) whether respondent's suspension was from
respondent could continue November 12, 2012 until May 12,
representing her clients and 2013. The OBC also pointed out
appear in courts. She also asked that suspension is not
the OCA if the decision automatically lifted by mere lapse
relating to respondent's of the period of suspension. It is
suspension, which was necessary that an order be issued
downloaded from the inten1et, by the Court lifting the
constitutes sufficient notice to suspension to enable the
 concerned lawyer to resume
practice of law.
 OBC further maintained that
respondent has no authority to
practice law and appear in court
as counsel during her
suspension, and until such time
that the Court has lifted the order of
her suspension
 Respondent filed with the RTC a
verified Complaint29 for nullity of
clearance, damages, and
preliminary injunction with urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining
order against the OCA, the OBC,
and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso  respondent was duly informed of her
 OCA argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action, which
seeks reversal, modification or
enjoinment of a directive of the
Court. The OCA also stressed that
respondent should raise such matter
by filing a motion for reconsideration
in the administrative case, instead of
filing a complaint with the RIC.
Ruling:
Pursuant to these guidelines in the case of
Maniago v Atty. De Dios: l) After a finding
that respondent lawyer must be suspended
from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the
decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days
within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of
suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he
or she has desisted from the practice of law
and has not appeared in any court during
the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be
furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP
and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases
handled by him or her, and/or where he or
she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be
considered as proof of respondent's
compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the
statements made by the lawyer tmder oath
shall be a ground for the imposition of a
more severe punishment, or disbarment, as
may be warranted.38
the Court issued a Resolution dated
October 5, 2011 suspending respondent
from the practice of law for six months
effective immediately. Respondent filed her
motion for reconsideration. And, on
November 12, 2012, she received the notice
of the denial of such motion per Registry
Return Receipt No. 53365. While, indeed,
service of a judgment or resolution must
be done only personally or by registered
mail,39 and that mere showing of a
downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011
Resolution to respondent is not a valid
service, the fact, however, that
suspension remains unrebutted. Again,
as stated above, she filed a motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution, and the Court duly notified
her of the denial of said motion. It thus
follows that respondent's six months
suspension commenced from the notice
of the denial of her motion for
reconsideration on November 12, 2012
until May 12, 2013.
It is common sense that when the Court
orders the suspension of a lawyer from the
practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions which require the
application of legal knowledge witl1in the
period of his or her suspension. 42 To stress,
by practice of law, we refer to "any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It
includes performing acts which are
characteristic of the legal profession, or
rendering any kind of service which requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.''43 In fine, it will amount to unauthorized
practice, and a violation of a lawful order of
the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in
the practice of law during the pendency of
his or her suspension.44 during and even
after the period of her suspension and
without filing a sworn statement for the
lifting of her suspension, respondent
signed pleadings and appeared in courts
as counsel. Clearly, such acts of
respondent are in violation of the order
of her suspension to practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension
order is not automatic. It is necessary
that there is an order from the Court
lifting the suspension of a lawyer to
practice law.1âwphi1 To note,
in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a
suspended lawyer shall, upon the
expiration of one’s suspension, file a
sworn statement with the Court, and that
such statement shall be considered
proof of the lawyer's compliance 1Nith
the order of suspension.
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015 - RE: IN
THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S.
TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE BAR.
 Records show that respondent was
administratively charged by his
sister-in-law, complainant Isidra
Ting-Dumali (complainant), for
"presentation of false testimony;
participation in, consent to, and
failure to advise against, the forgery
of complainant's signature in a
purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the
purpose of profiting from such
forgery."
 According to the complainant, the
respondent took advantage of his
relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession
to deprive them of what was
lawfully due them even if it
involved the commission of an
illegal, unlawful, or immoral act.
 respondent participated in, consented
to, and failed to advise against, the
perjury committed by his wife
Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam
when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
wherein the two made it appear that
they were the sole heirs of the late
spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting, knowing fully well
that the same was false. He
presented that document to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite for the
transfer of the title over Lot No.
1586 in the names of his wife and
Miriam.
 The respondent participated in,
consented to, and failed to advise
against, the forgery of complainant's
signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17
March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when
he knew that she was in Italy at that
time working as an overseas contract
worker. He even presented the
falsified document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title
over the property in favor of his wife
Felicisima and sister-in law Marcelina.
The forgery or falsification was
made to enable them to sell Lot
1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc.
Payment was received and
misappropriated by Felicisima and
Marcelina.
 he Court found merit in the complaint
and, thus, held respondent guilty of
gross misconduct and of violating the
lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1
and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, resulting in his
disbarment from the practice of law
 respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid
Resolution, which the Court denied
with finality in the Resolution
 respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Lift Disbarment10 begging that
compassion, mercy, and
understanding be bestowed upon
him by the Court in that his
disbarment be lifted. The same was,
however, expunged from the records
in a Resolution
 More than ten (10) years from his
disbarment, respondent filed the
instant Petition once more seeking
judicial clemency from the Court to
reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
Ruling:
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who
demands it, but rather, a special privilege
granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. The same
reasoning applies to reinstatement of a
disbarred lawyer. "The basic inquiry in a
petition for reinstatement to the practice of law
is whether the Iawver has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct
and character. Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a
great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and
prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she is again worthy of membership in
the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her
conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed in between
the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement."  Letter of Judge Augustus C.
Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial
21
Clemency  the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. There 'must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials
of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.
1. Sufficient time must have lapsed from
the imposition of the penalty to ensure
a period of reform.
2. The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still
has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
3. There must be a showing of
promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen
or contribution to legal scholarship
and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential
for public service.
4. There must be other relevant factors
and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
Applying the foregoing standards to
this case, the Court finds that the
instant petition is not meritorious.
While more than ten (10) years had
already passed since his disbarment
on April 14, 2004, respondent's
present petition has failed to show
substantial proof of his reformation
as required in the first guideline
above. the Court will grant it only if
there is a showing that it is
merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise
are indispensable."23
In this case, the only ostensible
proof of reformation that
respondent has presented is a
Certification24  signed by Reverend
Nelson D. Feranil, Administrative
Pastor of the Buenavista
Evangelical Church in General
Trias, Cavite, which generally
states that respondent, "before and
after his disbarment," has been
"assisting the poor and indigent
litigants in our community," and
that "he has been very active in
spreading the [w]ords and gospel
of the Almighty God[,] being an
active member of the Couples of
Christ FFL." Aside from these bare
statements, no other proof was
presented to specify the actual
engagements or activities by which
respondent had rendered free legal
services to indigents or had
ministered to the members of his
community or church, hence,
insufficient to demonstrate any
form of consistency in his
supposed desire to reform. All the
testimonials were executed in May
2004.29 Thus, they can only attest to
respondent's conduct or
attributions a mere month removed
from his disbarment on April 14,
2004.
More significantly, it should be
discerned that the root cause of
respondent's disbarment was his
fraudulent acts against his sister-
in-law, the complainant herein.
However, no proof was presented to
show that he had reconciled or
even attempted to reconcile with
her so as to show remorse for his
previous faults. The dismissal of the
criminal complaint against him
for Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents, filed by
complainant is no proof of remorse
since the same was based on lack of
probable cause.30 Likewise, its
dismissal,' could not prove that he
was actually innocent of the
administrative charges against him,
since the parameters and
considerations of an administrative
case are evidently different from
that in a criminal case.  As in this
case, the lack of probable cause
against respondent as found by the
prosecutor does not negate his
administrative liability already
adjudged by this Court. That the
prosecutor found that respondent
"merely rendered legal services to the
Ting siblings"31 does not mean that
he rendered the same in
accordance with the lawyer's oath
and ethical canons.
To add, no other evidence was
presented in his Petition to
redarclaw
demonstrate his potential for public
service, or that he - now being 68
years of age32 - still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to
good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself. Thus, the third and
fourth guidelines were neither
complied with.
Pimentel v Legal Education Board
G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954
 Prompted by clamors for the
improvement of the system of
legal education on account of
the poor performance of law
students and law schools in
the bar examinations,2 the
Congress, on December 23,
1993, passed into law R.A. No.
7662
 Towards this end, the State shall
undertake appropriate reforms in
 the legal education system, continuing legal education and for
require proper selection of this purpose, the LEB may
law students, maintain quality provide for the mandatory
among law schools, and attendance of practicing lawyers
require legal apprenticeship in such courses and for such
and continuing legal duration as the LEB may deem
education. necessary] encroach upon the
 R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, Supreme Court's powers under
an executive agency which was Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article
made separate from the VIII of the Constitution. 
Department of Education,  it cautioned that the law's
Culture and Sports (DECS), objectionable provisions, for
but attached thereto solely for reasons above-cited, must be
budgetary purposes and removed.
administrative support.  Relative to the foregoing
 Chairman and regular members observations, the CLEBM
of the LEB are to be appointed by proposed the following
the President for a term of five amendments to R.A. No. 7662:
years, without reappointment,
from a list of at least three Towards this end, the State shall
nominees prepared, with prior undertake appropriate reforms in
authorization from the Court, by the legal education system,
the Judicial and Bar Council  require proper selection of law
 In July 2001, the Court's students, provide for legal
Committee on Legal Education apprenticeship, and maintain
and Bar Matters (CLEBM), quality among law schools.
through its Chairperson, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, noted several 2.) to increase awareness among
objectionable provisions of R.A. law students of the needs of the
No. 7662 which "go beyond the poor, deprived and oppressed
ambit of education of aspiring sectors of society;
lawyers and into the sphere of
education of persons duly
licensed to practice the law (a) to regulate the legal
profession."5 education system in accordance
 In particular, the CLEBM with its powers and functions
observed: herein enumerated;

 x x x [U]nder the (b) to establish standards of

declaration of policies in accreditation for law schools,
Section 2 of [R.A. No. consistent with academic freedom
7662], the State "shall x x and pursuant to the declaration
x require apprenticeship of policy set forth in Section
and continuing legal 2 hereof;
education." The concept
of continuing legal (c) to accredit law schools that
education encompasses meet the standards of
education not only of accreditation;
law students but also of to provide for minimum
members of the legal qualifications for faculty members
profession. [This] of law schools;
implies that the [LEB]
shall have jurisdiction (f) to prescribe guidelines for law
over the education of practice internship which the law
persons who have schools may establish as part of
finished the law course the curriculum; and
and are already licensed
to practice law[, in (g) to perform such other
violation of the Supreme administrative functions as may
Court's power over the be necessary for the attainment
Integrated Bar of the of the policies and objectives of
Philippines]. this Act.8 
 Section 7(e) giving the LEB the
power to prescribe minimum  the Court approved the CLEBM's
standards for law admission and explanatory note and draft
Section 7(h) giving the LEB the amendments to R.A. No. 7662.
power to adopt a system of The Senate and the House of
 Representatives were formally
furnished with a copy of said
Resolution. This, notwithstanding,
R.A. No. 7662 remained
unaltered.
 In 2003, the Court issued a
resolution authorizing the JBC
to commence the nomination
process for the members of
the LEB.  who failed to take the first
 Acting pursuant to its authority to
prescribe the minimum standards
for law schools, the LEB
issued Memorandum Order No. 1,
Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-
2011) providing for the Policies
and Standards of Legal Education
and Manual of Regulation for Law
Schools. Since then, the LEB had
issued several orders, circulars,
resolutions, and other issuances
which are made available through
their website
 mong the orders issued by the
LEB was Memorandum Order No.
7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-
2016) pursuant to its power to
"prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission"
under Section 7(e) of R.A. No.
7662. The policy and rationale of
LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve
the quality of legal education by
requiring all those seeking
admission to the basic law course
to take and pass a nationwide
uniform law school admission
test, known as the PhiLSAT.
 The PhiLSAT is essentially an
aptitude test measuring the
examinee's communications and
language proficiency, critical
thinking, verbal and quantitative
reasoning.11 It was designed to
measure the academic potential
of the examinee to pursue the
study of law.12 Exempted from
the PhiLSAT requirement were
honor graduates who were
granted professional civil service
eligibility and who are enrolling
within two years from their
college graduation.
 Effective for the academic year
2017 to 2018, no applicant to law
school was allowed admission
without having taken and passed
the PhiLSAT.  that the conditional admission
 A total of 6,575 out of 8,074
examinees passed the first-ever
PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT,
the passing grade was adjusted
by the LEB from 55% to 45% by
way of consideration.
 Since the PhiLSAT was
implemented for the first time
and considering further that there
were applicants who failed to
take the PhiLSAT because of the
inclement weather last April 16,
2017, the LEB
issued Memorandum Order No.
11, Series of 2017 (LEBMO No.
11-2017).
Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those
PhiLSAT were allowed to be
admitted to law schools for the
first semester of academic year
2017 to 2018 for justifiable or
meritorious reasons and
conditioned under the following
terms:
 b. If the student fails to take the
next scheduled PhiLSAT for any
reason, his/her conditional
admission in the law school shall
be automatically revoked and
barred from enrolling in the
following semester;
 The conditional admission and
enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-
2017 and the transitory provision
provided in LEBMO No. 7-2016
were subsequently clarified by
the LEB through its Memorandum
Circular No. 7, Series of
2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).

On October 26, 2017, the LEB
issued a Memorandum reminding
law schools, law students, and
other interested persons that the
passing of the PhiLSAT is
required to be eligible for
admission/enrollment in the basic
law course for academic year
2017 to 2018. It was also therein
clarified that the discretion given
to law schools to admit those who
failed the PhiLSAT during the
initial year of implementation is
only up to the second semester
of academic year 2017-2018.
 Because of the confusion as to
whether conditional
admission for academic year
2018 to 2019 may still be
allowed, the LEB
issued Memorandum Circular
No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMC
No. 18-2018). Under LEBMC
No. 18-2018, it was clarified
was permitted only in
academic year 2017 to 2018
as part of the transition
adjustments in the initial year
of the PhiLSAT
implementation. As such, by
virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018,
the conditional admission of
students previously allowed
 under LEBMO No. 11-2017
was discontinued.
 Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018,
the LEB issued Memorandum
Circular No. 19, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018)
allowing limited conditional
admission/enrollment in the
first semester of academic
year 2018 to 2019 for those
applicants who have never
previously taken the PhiLSAT.
 Those who have taken the
PhiLSAT and scored below the
cut-off score were disqualified. In
addition, only those law schools
with a passing rate of not less
than 25%, are updated in the
reportorial requirement and
signified its intention to
conditionally admit applicants
were allowed to do so. The
limited enrollment was subject to
the condition that the admitted
student shall take and pass the
next PhiLSAT on September 23,
2018, otherwise the conditional
enrollment shall be nullified. Non-
compliance with said circular was
considered a violation of the
minimum standards for the law
program for which law schools
may be administratively
penalized.
 Petitioners filed a prohibition
principally seeking that R.A. No.
7662 be declared unconstitutional
and that the creation of the LEB
be invalidated together with all
its issuances, most especially the
PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon
the rule-making power of the
Court concerning admissions to
the practice of law;33 They
prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order
(TRO) to prevent the LEB from
conducting the PhiLSAT.
 moved to intervene and prayed
for the dismissal of the Petition
for Prohibition.
 The Court issued a
TRO37 enjoining the LEB from
implementing LEBMC No. 18-
2018 and, thus, allowing those
who have not taken the PhiLSAT
prior to the academic year 2018
to 2019, or who have taken the
PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or who
are honor graduates in college
with no PhiLSAT Exemption
Certificate, or honor graduates
with expired PhiLSAT Exemption
Certificates to conditionally enroll
as incoming freshmen law
students for the academic year
2019 to 2020 under the same
terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642
argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the
PhiLSAT are offensive to the
Court's power to regulate and
supervise the legal profession
pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII38 of the Constitution and that
the Congress cannot create an
administrative office that
exercises the Court's power over
the practice of law. 
 R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC
additional functions to vet
nominees for the LEB in violation
of Section 8(5), Article VIII 39 of
the Constitution.
  petitioners also question the
constitutionality of the LEB's
powers under Section 7(c)40 and
7(e)41 to prescribe the
qualifications and
compensation of faculty
members and Section 7(h)42 on
the LEB's power to adopt a
system of continuing legal
education as being repugnant to
the Court's rule-making power
concerning the practice of law.
They also argue that the
PhiLSAT violates the academic
freedom of law schools and
the right to education.
 Petitioners-in-intervention
contends that PhiLSAT violates
the right to liberty and pursuit
of happiness of the student--
applicants. They posit that the
PhiLSAT violates the equal
protection clause as it is an
arbitrary form of classification
not based on substantial
distinctions. They also argue
that the PhiLSAT violates the
right of all citizens to quality
and accessible education,
violates academic freedom,
and is an unfair academic
requirement. It is also their
position that the PhiLSAT violates
due process as it interferes with
the right of every person to select
a profession or course of study.
They also argue that R.A. No.
7662 constitutes undue
delegation of legislative powers.
  the OSG contends that the
Court's power to regulate
admission to the practice of law
does not include regulation of
legal education. It also defends
Section 7(e) on the LEB's power
to prescribe minimum standards
for law admission as referring to
admission to law schools; Section
7(g) on the LEB's power to
establish a law practice internship
as pertaining to the law school
curriculum which is within the
power of the LEB to regulate; and
7(h) on the LEB's power to adopt
a system of continuing legal
education as being limited to
the training of lawyer-
professors.
 In defending the validity of the
PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the
argument that the PhiLSAT is
the minimum standard for
entrance to law schools
prescribed by the LEB
pursuant to the State's power
to regulate education. The
OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is
no different from the National
Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) which the Court already
upheld as a valid exercise of
police power in the seminal case
of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.48
Ruling:
Regulation and supervision of legal
education had been historically and
consistently exercised by the
political departments
Consistent with these statutory
precursors, the 1935 Constitution
expressed in no uncertain terms that
"[a]ll educational institutions shall be
under the supervision and subject to
regulation by the State."121
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
remained consistent in mandating that
all educational institutions shall be
under the supervision of and subject to
regulation by the State.132
  DECS Order No. 27-1989 was the
precursor of R.A. No. 7662
Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg.
232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order
No. 27, Series of 1989 (DECS Order No.
27-1989),144 in close coordination with
the Philippine Association of Law
Schools, the Philippine Association of
Law Professors and the Bureau of Higher
Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989
specifically outlined the policies and
standards for legal education, and
superseded all existing policies and
standards related to legal education.
These policies were made applicable
beginning school year 1989 to 1990.
Legal education 1s a mere
composite of the educational
system
Legal education is but a composite of
the entire Philippine education system.
It is perhaps unique because it is a
specialized area of study. This
peculiarity, however, is not reason in
itself to demarcate legal education and
withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political
branches. First, it assumes that the
Court, in fact, possesses the power to
supervise and regulate legal education
as a necessary consequence of its power
to regulate the admission to the practice
of law. This assumption, apart from
being manifestly contrary to the above-
recounted history of legal education in
the Philippines, is likewise devoid of
legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial
functions and it cannot, and must not,
arrogate upon itself a power that is not
constitutionally vested to it, lest the
Court itself violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. For the Court to
void R.A. No. 7662 and thereafter, to
form a body that regulates legal
education and place it under its
supervision and control, as what
petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a
highly improper form of judicial
activism.
Court's exclusive rule-making
power covers the practice of law
and not the study of law
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power
of admission to the Bar has been
interpreted as vesting upon the Court
the authority to define the practice of
law,156 to determine who will be
admitted to the practice of law, 157 to
hold in contempt any person found to be
engaged in unauthorized practice of
law,158 and to exercise corollory
disciplinary authority over members of
the Bar.159
The act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the
practice of law is a judicial function
because it requires "(1) previously
established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals; and
(3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and
principles."160

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