SUPREME COURT

[G.R. No. 142002. July 31, 2000]

JEROLAN TRUCKING, et al., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated

JUL 31 2000.

G.R. No. 142002 (Jerolan Trucking/Orlando Uy vs. Court of Appeals, National

Labor Relations Commission, et al.)

Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Court of

Appeals, Sixteenth Division, dated September 13, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No.
525891 Jerolam Trucking/Orlando Uy, Petitioner, vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., Respondents. which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Supreme Court, Third Division,
dated September 14, 1998 in G.R. No. 132176.2 Ibid.

The case arose from several complaints for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of overtime pay, cost of living allowance, night shift differentials,
service incentive leave and other benefits filed by private respondents
against petitioner. On the basis of the position papers, affidavits and other
documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
the complaints against petitioner for lack of merit.3 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter in NLRC Case Nos. 8-0332-95, 8-0231-95-A, 8-0231-95-B, 8-0231-
95-C and 8-0231-95-D, dated May 30, 1996, Rollo, pp. 15-20.

On appeal, the aforementioned decision was reversed by the National Labor

Relations Commission which held that private respondents were illegally
dismissed and were therefore entitled to reinstatement and backwages, as
well as payment of their 13th month pay.4 Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. V-0237-97, dated December 10,
1997, Id. At 21-31.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this Court.

However, in a Resolution, dated September 14, 1998, we dismissed the
same for lack of merit, ruling thus:

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 x x x The challenged decision of the Commission, to the
effect essentially that the private respondents are
petitioner's employees and not independent contractors
hired "as needed", is based on the parties' position
papers and the evidence on record which was subjected
to careful evaluation. This Court perceives no grave
abuse of discretion on the Commission's part in arriving
at this conclusion; indeed, the same is supported by
substantial evidence. There is otherwise no special and
important reason for the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction in this case.

PETITION DISMISSED. NO COSTS.5 Resolution of the

Supreme Court, Third Division in G.R. No. 132176, dated
September 14, 1998, Id., at 32-33.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 Id., at 34-44. of the

said Resolution which we referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action7 Resolution of the Supreme Court, Third Division, dated February 24,
1999, Id., at 45. pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs.
National Labor Relations Commission.8 295 SCRA 494 (1998).

Finding no cogent reason to reconsider this Court's Resolution, the Court of

Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution, dated
September 13, 1999.9 Rollo, pp. 46-47.

Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order setting the pre-execution

conference for February 16, 2000.10 Id., at 48.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed Resolution, since the same did not express clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based, in violation of Article VIII, Section
14 of the constitution. Petitioner further claims that the appellate court failed
to consider the excerpts of the testimonies of private respondents as cited in
the motion for reconsideration which show that they were not employees of
the company.11 Petition, Id., at 7-10.

The Courts finds no merit in the petition.

In the first place, the petition was filed out of time. Assuming that a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper
remedy, the petition was filed way beyond the period granted under the
Rules. Contrary to petitioner's claim that it learned of the appellate court's

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Resolution only on February 10, 2000 when it received the notice of entry of
judgment, the records show that petitioner's counsel, Atty. Felicisimo
Chavez Ilagan, received the same on September 21, 1999, the date
indicated in the registry receipt returned to the appellate court.12 see Notice
of Resolution with attached Registry Receipt, Id., at 73.

Atty. Ilagan's receipt thereof is binding on petitioner since it is established

doctrine that when a party is represented by counsel, service of pleadings
and notices shall be made upon his counsel or one of them.13 see Rule 13,
Sec. 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals,14 261 SCRA 309 (1996), per Puno, J. we
reiterated the foregoing rule thus:

x x x This is in accord with our case law that notice sent

to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform them of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of their right to appeal will
not justify setting aside a judgment that is valid and
regular on its face. xxx

x x x15 Id., at 317-318, citing Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,

256 SCRA 158 (1996), Palanca vs. American Food Mfg. Co., 24
SCRA 819 (1968), Duran V. Pagarigan, 106 Phil. 907 (1960).

Hence, the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should have been
accomplished within sixty (60) days from September 21, 1999.16 see Rule
65, Sec. 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Clearly, the sixty-day period had already lapsed when the petition was filed
on March 9, 2000.17 Rollo, p. 1.

Second, the instant petition is not the appropriate remedy to seek the
reversal of the assailed Resolution. Rule 65 clearly states that a petition for
certiorari may be filed when the remedy of appeal is not available. Petitioner
could have appealed the appellate court's Resolution to this Court by way of
a petition for review under Rule 45 within 15 days from its receipt of the
same on September 21, 1999, since this remedy was available to petitioner
under the Rules. Since its failure to appeal was due to its own negligence,
petitioner cannot now substitute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for its
lost remedy of appeal.18 People vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 418, 427
(1998), per Davide, J.; Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 (1998).

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There is, likewise, no merit in the allegation that the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution. We have
already explained in several cases that the constitutional mandate that
decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law forming the
basis therefor does not apply to minute resolutions.19 Borromeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 1, 5-6 (1990; Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 206 SCRA 127, 132-133 (1992), per Cruz J.; Nunal vs. Commission
on Audit, 169 SCRA 356, 362-363 (1987), per Melencio-Herrera, J.; Que vs.
People, 154 SCRA 160, 165 (1987), per Paras, J.; see Dabulo vs. Civil
Service Commission, 223 SCRA 747, 754-755 (1993), per Cruz, J.

As this Court held in Nunal vs. Commission on Audit.20 supra Note 19.

x x x This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted

for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of
Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case
may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution
refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the
second place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal
basis for the dismissal of the petition and thus complies
with the Constitutional provision.

Our ruling in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals,21 Supra Note 19. sufficiently
explains the rule with regard to minute resolutions:

The Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by

minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and
the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records
that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the
rules. xxx

xxx

In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the
Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a
decision must express clearly and distincly the facts and
law on which it is based as referring only to decisions.
Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the

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 constitutional provision which states that, "No petition
for review x x x shall be refused due course x x x without
stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII,
Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a
petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,
comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised are factual
or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision
is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the
resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.

It must be noted that the assailed Resolution was issued in connection with
a motion for reconsideration of a Minute Resolution of this Court which
dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated December 10, 1997. The Minute
Resolution issued by this Court in G.R. No. 132176 already sufficiently
discussed the reason for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari earlier
filed by petitioner. The appellate court's Resolution merely denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the same, and likewise stated that
it was standing by this Court's resolution dismissing the petition and the
reasons cited therein. Clearly, the assailed Resolution stated the legal basis
for the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration which is, as stated by
this Court in its Minute Resolution dated September 14, 1998, for lack of
merit.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Very truly yours,

VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL

Asst. Clerk of Court